B
Coopinio投资智慧库

Difficult to Teach a New Dog Old Tricks新狗难教旧把戏：1988年巴菲特访谈录

35 min read

新狗难教旧把戏：1988年巴菲特访谈录

Original Info:

It’s Difficult to Teach a New Dog Old Tricks

A complete transcript of Warren Buffett’s 1988 interview with Adam Smith

No one documented the feats and foibles of the investment world quite like George Goodman. His pseudonymous work — under the name of “Adam Smith” — perfectly captured the psychological depth (and madness) of markets.

Starting with The Money Game in 1968, Goodman’s many must-read books exhorted curious investors to examine their own personalities and temperaments before jumping into the market. As the author ably showed, the difference between investment gains and losses could often be traced back to ego and self-image.

Not surprisingly, Warren Buffett became a recurring character of sorts in Goodman’s work. He first profiled Buffett — then virtually unknown outside of Omaha — in his 1972 book, Supermoney.

Then, in 1985, Goodman spoke with Buffett again for his Adam Smith’s Money World television program that aired on PBS. This iconic interview is often heralded as Buffett’s first national television appearance. In it, the Berkshire Hathaway CEO advised the audience to focus on businesses that they can understand, ignore the noise from Wall Street, and invest with a long-term perspective.

Buffett’s second appearance on Money World, though, gets far less attention. In 1988, Goodman returned to Omaha for another sit-down with the Oracle — one timed to coincide with that year’s annual meeting. This episode, titled Warren Buffett: Reluctant Billionaire, aired in June 1988. And, after that, it disappeared into the television ether.

Happily, a recording of this rare Buffett interview popped up on YouTube a couple of weeks ago. Many thanks to jazz on the coast for uploading this video!

For the sake of posterity and further study, I’ve transcribed Buffett’s remarks below…

[Note: Warren Buffett’s discussion with “Adam Smith” forms the backbone of the episode. Clips of the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, comments from shareholders, and Smith’s own thoughts are interspersed around the larger interview. I limited this transcript to just the Buffett interview itself.]

Adam Smith: If I had given you $10,000 when I first met you — and I devoutly wish I had — I would have millions today.

Warren Buffett: If you joined the partnership when we started in 1956, and when we disbanded it in ‘69, reinvested the proceeds in Berkshire — which was somewhat of a continuation — I think you’d have a little over $15 million now.

AS: From 15 million.

WB: Something like that, yeah.

AS: That’s a pretty good record.

WB: It’s okay — but that doesn’t tell you anything about tomorrow. (Laughs)

AS: Well, let’s talk about tomorrow. Could anyone do the same thing you did, starting today?

WB: If they didn’t try and do too much the first week, yeah. (Laughs)

AS: You know what the academics say. They say the market is efficient and no one can beat it — but you have.

WB: And a number of other people who followed Ben Graham’s principles have [beaten the market]. In fact, every one that I personally know that has really stuck with the Ben Graham principles over twenty years or more has done appreciably better than the market.

AS: What about all the learned business schools that say you can’t beat the market?

WB: Well, then they aren’t so learned. (Laughs)

AS: But you’ve seen some of the [academic] papers.

WB: I’ve seen the papers, but I’ve [also] seen some other people’s tax returns.

AS: Warren, you say you like to buy businesses. How do you know what a company is worth?

WB: I look for a business where I think I know what, in a general way, is going to happen.

If you buy a bond, you know exactly what’s going to happen — assuming it’s a good bond, a U.S. government bond. If it says 9% coupons, you know what the 9% coupons are going to be for maybe thirty years, if it’s a thirty-year bond.

Now, when you buy a business, you’re buying something with coupons on it too — except the only problem is they don’t print in the amount. It’s my job to print in the amount on the coupon. Some companies I feel capable of doing that with and others I don’t have the faintest idea.

AS: You seem to stay away from high-tech companies.

WB: You name ten high-tech companies to me and ask me where they’re going to be in ten years — or ten months — and I don’t have the faintest idea. That would be exactly like buying cocoa beans or something. I just don’t know what’s going to happen.

AS: Do you ever really get a big, big hit just buying these predictable stocks?

WB: Yeah, you do.

AS: You do?

WB: But not very often. But, occasionally, sensational businesses are given away.

In the mid-’70s, the whole Washington Post Co. was selling for 400 million. And no one would have argued with you about the properties being worth $400 million. The price was there for all to see, but people just didn’t feel very enthusiastic about the world then.

AS: You have been talking [about] this philosophy for years. It’s no secret.

WB: It’s no secret.

AS: Why doesn’t everybody do it?

WB: Well, it requires patience — which a lot of people don’t have. People would much rather be promised that they’re going to win [on] a lottery ticket next week than that they’re going to get rich slowly.

Gus Levy used to say that he was long-term greedy, not short-term greedy. If you’re short-term greedy, you probably won’t get a very good long-term result.

AS: You’ve said they could close the New York Stock Exchange for two years and you wouldn’t care. Can you explain that?

WB: We own parts of businesses when we own stocks. The New York Stock Exchange being open has nothing to do [with] whether the Washington Post is getting more valuable over a five or ten year period.

What we want to do is be right on the business. If we’re right on the business, the market will take care of itself. If the stock exchange closes on Saturday and Sunday and I don’t break out in hives, if it closes for a couple of years and the business does well, we’ll do very well.

AS: I noticed in your annual report you say that if you’re in a poker game for thirty minutes and you don’t know who the patsy is, you’re the patsy.

WB: You’ve got it.

AS: How do you apply that to the market and to investing?

WB: If you think the market knows more about your business… In other words, if your stock goes down 10% and that upsets you, it obviously means you think the market knows more about the company than you do. And, in that case, you’re the patsy.

If it goes down 10% and you want to buy more because you know the business is worth just as much as when you bought it before — or perhaps a little bit more with the passage of time — so you buy more, [then] they’re the patsy.

AS: Where do you get these aphorisms that [you are] so well known for?

WB: Well, I don’t know. (Laughs) They’re about the limit of my intellectual capacity, so I have to work with one sentence.

AS: Was October 19 an aberration or could it happen again?

WB: Oh, it can always [happen again]. Anything can happen in the stock market.

If you read financial history for a couple of hundred years and take the South Sea Bubble and the Tulip Boom and some of the panics we’ve had in this country. We closed the stock exchange for a few months back around 1914. Anything can happen.

You ought to conduct your affairs so that, if the most extraordinary events happened, you’re still around to play the next day.

WB: Any time you offer a big prize for a small amount of money, you encourage stupid behavior on behalf of those you’re appealing to. And low margins, which you can get through the futures market, encourage that sort of activity.

AS: How much did the small investor look at stock index futures and index arbitrage and all the volatility that has come into the stock market?

WB: He should hope that they cause other people to behave very silly and then he should step in occasionally. He should ignore them himself, but to the extent that silly instruments occasionally cause silly prices, he can take advantage of them and the rest of the time he ignores them.

AS: Old basketball players lose their legs. Do old investors lose their legs?

WB: I don’t think so. They probably lose their legs, but they don’t need their legs that much. Being a sound investor really just requires a certain control of your temperament and the ability to know what you know and know what you don’t know and, occasionally, act. I don’t see any reason why that goes [away] with age.

I may give you an illustration in another few years, but so far it has no effect. In a sense, you keep accumulating a little more business knowledge as you go along — and that’s a plus.

AS: There’s been a lot of talk about the Silicon Valley culture. Is there a Berkshire Hathaway culture?

WB: I guess there’s a Berkshire Hathaway culture, but it would be a long way from the Silicon Valley culture.

AS: What is the Berkshire Hathaway culture?

WB: We like managers who are in love with their businesses. We like ‘em when they feel like I do — I want to tap dance when I get to the office. That’s the sort of managers we have.

We have terrific luck when we buy businesses with managers that had been enormously successful over a period of time. They’re usually rich after we buy the business — and they keep on working afterwards.

We don’t have so much luck with business school grads. We find it’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks. We like the people who have been around a while.

AS: If you had to look over the next five or ten years, what do you think will be good businesses?

WB: The businesses that have some sort of a franchise to them. What makes a good business a good business is when if I go into a drug store and I want a Hershey bar, they can’t sell me an unmarked bar. If I’m going to pay 35 cents for a Hershey bar and they say, “Wouldn’t you love this wonderful unmarked chocolate bar for 30 cents?” I’d buy the Hershey bar. And if they don’t have it someplace, I’ll go across the street to buy it. That’s what makes a good business.

I don’t feel that way about the carton of milk I buy. I’ll take whatever carton of milk is in the grocery store’s cooler.

AS: So it’s the power of the franchise?

WB: It’s the power of the franchise.

AS: When Ben Graham talked about these things, he talked about tangible assets. Iron and steel above the ground, bricks and mortar. But you’ve expanded Ben Graham’s idea to this idea of the franchise, haven’t you?

WB: I learned [the value of franchise power] subsequent to Ben. The principles of buying value and the margin of safety and the detachment from the market, I learned from Ben. You might say that I learned the proper temperamental set from Ben. The stocks I buy are entirely different from what Ben would buy if he were alive today.

AS: Do you still do your own tax returns?

WB: Yeah, it’s a pretty simple return.

AS: Really?

WB: Yeah, it’s a very simple return.

AS: Warren, you have spoken for years against corporate perks, but you finally bought a corporate jet.

WB: I can’t explain it. It’s a total blank in my mind. I’ve given speeches against them for years and — I gotta tell you — I love it. (Laughs)

AS: But you have the cheapest corporate jet of anybody in America.

WB: Well, no, I don’t know whether it’s the cheapest corporate jet. It works perfectly for me. I’ve got to tell you that I have an untapped potential for that type of life, apparently, because it’s made life a lot easier the last couple years.

AS: Warren, you created a stir with your remarks about money and children. You have three children and grandchildren. You love your children [and] they love you, but you’ve said you’re not going to give them any money because that would be a bad thing to do.

WB: I hear children of the rich — or the rich themselves — talk about the debilitating effect of food stamps on welfare mothers. They say it’s terrible [that] you hand them all these food stamps and it causes the cycle to perpetuate itself, but of course when a very rich child or one who’s going to inherit a lot of money is born, when they leave the womb they’re handed this lifetime supply of food stamps. They have a welfare officer — he’s called a trust department officer — and the food stamps are little stocks and bonds. Nobody seems to notice the debilitating effects of that particular form of a lifetime supply of food stamps.

I think, by and large, that if I’m going to be a sprinter, I will become a better sprinter in life if I sprint against everybody else leaving the starting box at the same time than if they say [that], because I’m Jesse Owens’s child, I get to start on the 50-yard line.

AS: How have your children felt about that?

WB: I think they feel pretty good. I’m not quite as draconian as I sound, but I’m quite close to it. (Laughs)

AS: Do you do this for the money? What does money mean to you?

WB: Money is a byproduct of doing something I like to do extremely well. I think if you found an athlete who was doing well, my guess is — and I’m not comparing myself — but a Ted Williams or an Arnold Palmer or something, after they have enough [money] to eat, they’re not doing it for the money.

My guess is that if Ted Williams was getting the highest salary in baseball but was batting .220, he would be unhappy. And if he was getting the lowest salary in baseball and batting .400, he’d be very happy. That’s the way I feel about this job.

AS: What do you feel like when you look at this piece of paper that gives you your net worth and says that you’re worth over $1 billion?

WB: It’s a byproduct of doing things that I like to do well. If I bat .400 long enough in this business, you get a very big sum [of money].

AS: That is a big sum. What are you going to do with it?

WB: Eventually, it’s all going to go back to society. 99+% of it is going to go to society. It should.

Another can’t-miss highlight from this episode of Adam Smith’s Money World…

In 1988, Warren Buffett and Tom Murphy (CEO of Capital Cities/ABC) made a cameo appearance on the soap opera Loving. In their scene, Buffett the bartender and Murphy the waiter were called upon to escort an unruly customer out of the bar. Neither man had any lines, though.

Money World actually included this brief scene — which I had never seen before — in the Buffett episode.

“They were wise,” Buffett told the Omaha World-Herald about his soap opera cameo. “They didn’t trust us with any dialogue.”

“For a town that produced Henry Fonda, Marlon Brando, and Fred Astaire, I’m a sad commentary, let me tell you.”

“If they ever have a worst performance of the season award, I’m a cinch [to win].”

原文信息：

新狗难教旧把戏

沃伦-巴菲特 1988 年与亚当-斯密访谈的完整文字记录

没有人像乔治-古德曼那样记录了投资界的壮举和弱点。他以 “亚当-斯密”的笔名创作的作品完美地捕捉到了市场的心理深度（和疯狂）。

从 1968 年的《金钱游戏》开始，古德曼的许多必读书籍都劝诫好奇的投资者在进入市场之前先审视自己的个性和脾气。正如作者所精辟指出的，投资收益和损失之间的差异往往可以追溯到自我和自我形象。

毫不奇怪，沃伦-巴菲特成了古德曼作品中反复出现的人物。他在 1972 年出版的《超级金钱》一书中首次介绍了巴菲特，当时巴菲特在奥马哈以外几乎无人知晓。

之后，在 1985 年，古德曼在他的亚当-斯密的《金钱世界》电视节目中再次采访了巴菲特，该节目在美国公共广播公司（PBS）播出。这次标志性的访谈被认为是巴菲特首次在全国性电视节目中露面。在访谈中，这位伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的首席执行官建议观众关注他们能够理解的企业，忽略来自华尔街的噪音，以长远的眼光进行投资。

不过，巴菲特第二次出现在《金钱世界》节目中的关注度要低得多。1988 年，古德曼再次回到奥马哈，与这位 “先知”进行了一次对谈，时间恰好是当年的年会。这期节目名为《沃伦-巴菲特：不情愿的亿万富翁》，于 1988 年 6 月播出。之后，它就消失在电视荧屏上了。

令人欣慰的是，几周前，YouTube 上出现了这段罕见的巴菲特访谈录音。非常感谢 jazz on the coast 上传了这段视频！

为了便于后人进一步研究，我将巴菲特的讲话转录如下…

[注：本文的主要内容是巴菲特与 “亚当-斯密 “的谈话。伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司年会的片段、股东们的评论以及斯密自己的想法穿插在整个访谈中。我将这段文字记录仅限于巴菲特访谈本身]。

亚当-斯密（AS)：如果我第一次见到你时给你 1 万美元—我真心希望我给了你—我今天就会拥有数百万美元。

沃伦-巴菲特 (WB)：如果你在 1956 年加入我们的合伙公司，在 69 年我们解散合伙公司时，将收益再投资于伯克希尔—这在某种程度上是一种延续—我想你现在会有 1,500 多万美元。

AS: 从 10,000 美元到 1,500 万美元。

WB: 差不多吧，是的。

AS: 这是个不错的记录。

WB: 还行—但这并不能说明未来会怎样。笑

AS: 好吧，让我们谈谈未来。从今天开始，会有人和你做同样的事情吗？

WB: 如果他们在第一周不做太多尝试的话，可以。

AS: 你知道学者们是怎么说的。他们说市场是有效的，没人能打败它—但你做到了。

WB: 还有很多遵循本-格雷厄姆原则的人也[战胜了市场]。事实上，我所认识的每一个人，只要真正坚持本-格雷厄姆的原则二十年或更长时间，他们的业绩都明显好于市场。

AS：那些学识渊博的商学院说你无法战胜市场，那又如何呢?

WB：那他们就懂得还不够多。笑

AS: 但你看过一些[学术]论文。

WB：我看过论文，但我[也]看过一些其他人的纳税申报单。

AS: 沃伦，你说你喜欢购买企业。你怎么知道一家公司值多少钱？

WB：我寻找的是我认为我知道大致会发生什么的企业。

如果你买的是债券，你很清楚会发生什么—假设它是好债券，是美国政府债券。如果它标有 9% 的票面利率，你就会知道在三十年内，这 9% 的利息会是多少。

现在，当你购买一家企业时，你也是在购买带有息票的债券—只不过唯一的问题是这些利息的具体数额并不事先确定。我的工作就是确定这些利息的数额。有些公司我觉得我有能力做到，有些公司我却毫无头绪。

AS: 你似乎远离高科技公司。

WB：你给我列举十家高科技公司，问我它们十年后会怎样，或者十个月后会怎样，我一点头绪都没有。这就像买可可豆之类的东西一样。我就是不知道会发生什么。

AS：你买这些可预测的股票真的会有很大的收益吗？

WB: 是的，会。

AS: 真的吗？

WB: 但这种情况并不常见。不过，偶尔也会有非常抢手的企业被低价出售。

70 年代中期，整个华盛顿邮报公司以 8000 万美元的价格出售，而当时这些资产的价值不低于 4 亿美元。没有人对这些资产值 4 亿美元有异议。价格是有目共睹的，但那时人们对这个世界并不热衷。

AS: 你多年来一直在谈论这一理念。这不是什么秘密。

WB: 这不是秘密。

AS: 为什么不是每个人都这么做？

WB: 这需要耐心，而很多人没有耐心。比起慢慢致富，人们更愿意下周就能中彩票。

格斯-李维常说，他是追求长期利益的贪婪者，而不是追求短期利益的贪婪者。如果你追求短期利益，你很可能得不到很好的长期结果。

AS：你说过，即使纽约证券交易所关闭两年，您也不会在意。你能解释一下吗？

WB：当我们持有股票时，我们拥有企业的一部分。纽约证券交易所是否开放与《华盛顿邮报》是否在五年或十年内变得更有价值无关。

我们要做的是对企业有正确的判断。如果我们对企业判断对了，市场就会自己照顾自己。如果证券交易所在周六和周日关闭，我也不会感到不安，如果它关闭几年，而企业表现良好，我们就会做得很好。

AS：我注意到你在年度报告中说，如果你在扑克游戏中玩了 30 分钟，却不知道谁是傻瓜，那么你就是傻瓜。

WB：你说对了。

AS: 你是如何把这句话应用到市场 and 到投资中的？

WB: 如果你认为市场更了解你的企业…换句话说，如果你的股票下跌了 10%，这让你很不高兴，这显然意味着你认为市场比你更了解这家公司。在这种情况下，你就成了傻瓜。

如果下跌了 10%，而你想买更多，因为你知道这家公司的价值和你之前买入时一样高—或者随着时间的推移可能更高一点—所以你买了更多，[那么]他们就是傻瓜。

AS：[你]如此出名的这些格言警句是从哪里来的？

WB：我也不知道。(笑）这大概是我的智力极限了，所以我只能用一句话回答这个问题。

AS：10 月 19 日是一次反常事件，还是可能再次发生？

WB：哦，总是会[再次发生]的。股市中任何事情都可能发生。

如果你阅读几百年的金融史，看看南海泡沫 and 郁金香狂潮，以及我们国家发生的一些恐慌。1914 年前后，我们曾关闭证券交易所数月。任何事情都有可能发生。

你应该处理好自己的事务，这样，即使发生了最不寻常的事件，你第二天仍然可以参与。

WB：任何时候，如果你以小博大，你就会鼓励那些你所吸引的人做出愚蠢的行为。而通过期货市场可以获得的低保证金就会鼓励这种行为。

AS：小投资者对股指期货 and 指数套利以及股市的所有波动有多少看法？

WB：他应该希望这些波动导致其他人表现得非常愚蠢，然后他应该偶尔介入。他自己应该忽略它们，但只要愚蠢的工具偶尔会导致愚蠢的价格，他就可以利用它们，其余时间则忽略它们。

AS: 老篮球运动员跑不动了。老投资者也会失去能力吗？

WB: 我不这么认为。他们可能会丧失一些能力，但他们并不需要那么多能力。作为一个稳健的投资者，其实只需要对自己的性情有一定的控制，有能力知道自己知道什么，知道自己不知道什么，并偶尔采取行动。我不认为随着年龄的增长，这种能力会[消失]。

再过几年，我可能会现身说法，但到目前为止还没有影响。从某种意义上说，你会不断积累更多的商业知识—这是个优点。

AS：关于硅谷文化有很多说法。伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司有自己的文化吗？

WB：我想伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司有自己的文化，但与硅谷文化相去甚远。

AS：伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的文化是什么？

WB: 我们喜欢热爱自己企业的经理人。我们喜欢他们像我一样的感觉—我一到办公室就想跳踢踏舞。这就是我们拥有的经理人。

当我们收购那些一直来取得巨大成功的经理人的企业时，我们的运气非常好。我们买下企业后，他们已经很富有，而且还会继续工作。

我们在商学院毕业生身上就没那么幸运了。我们发现，要教会一只新狗老把戏是很难的。我们喜欢有经验的人。

AS: 如果要展望未来五年或十年，你认为哪些会是好企业？

WB：具有某种特许经营权的企业。好生意之所以好，是因为当我走进一家杂货店，想买好时巧克力棒时，他们不能卖给我没有商标的巧克力棒。如果我要花35美分买一条好时巧克力棒，他们却说 “难道你不喜欢30美分的无商标巧克力棒吗？” 我就买好时巧克力棒。如果没有，我就去街对面买。这就是好的生意。

我买一盒牛奶就不会有这种感觉。杂货店的冷藏柜里有哪盒牛奶，我就买哪盒。

AS: 所以这是特许经营的力量？

WB: 是特许经营的力量。

AS: 本-格雷厄姆谈到这些东西时，谈到的是有形资产。地面上的钢铁、砖块和砂浆。但你把本-格雷厄姆的想法扩展到了特许经营这个概念上，是吗？

WB：我是在本之后才了解到[特许经营权的价值]的。我从本那里学到了购买价值、安全边际和远离市场的原则。可以说，我从本那里学到了正确的气质。我买的股票与本如果在世会买的股票完全不同。

AS：你还自己报税吗？

WB: 是的，报税很简单。

AS: 真的吗？

沃伦：是的，非常简单。

AS：沃伦，你多年来一直反对公司特权，但你最终还是买了一架公司专机。

沃伦：我无法解释。我脑子里一片空白。多年来，我一直在讲反对公司特权，而且—我得告诉你—我超爱公司专机。笑声

AS：但你的公司专机是全美国最便宜的。

WB：不，我不知道它是不是最便宜的公司专机。它非常适合我。我得告诉你，我对这种生活的潜力显然还没有开发出来，因为在过去的几年里，它让我的生活轻松了很多。

AS: 沃伦，你关于金钱 and 孩子的言论引起了轩然大波。你有三个孩子 and 孙子。你爱你的孩子，他们也爱你，但你说过你不会给他们钱，因为那样做不好。

WB: 我听到富人的孩子—或者富人们—谈论粮票对福利母亲的削弱效应。他们说，[你]把这些粮票交给她们，会造成恶性循环，这太可怕了。当然，当一个非常富有的孩子或一个将继承很多钱的孩子出生时，当他们离开子宫时，一辈子不愁吃穿。他们有一个福利官—称得上是信托部官员—粮票就是少量股票 and 少量债券。似乎没有人注意到这种终生供应粮票的特殊形式所带来的削弱作用。

我认为，总的来说，如果我要成为一名短跑运动员，如果我与同时离开起跑线的其他人一起冲刺，我会成为一名更好的短跑运动员，而不是因为他们说[因为]我是杰西-欧文斯的孩子，我就可以从50码线开始冲刺。

AS：你的孩子们对此有何感想？

WB：我觉得他们感觉很好。我不像听起来那么严厉，但也差不多了。笑声

AS: 你做这个是为了钱吗？钱对你意味着什么？

WB: 钱是我做自己喜欢做的事情的副产品。我想，如果你发现一个运动员表现很好，我想—我不是在拿自己做比较—但是泰德-威廉姆斯（Ted Williams）或阿诺德-帕尔默（Arnold Palmer）什么的，在他们有足够的[钱]吃饭之后，他们就不再是为了钱。

我猜想，如果泰德-威廉姆斯拿着棒球界最高的薪水，但打击率却只有 .220，他一定会不开心。而如果他拿着棒球界最低的薪水，却能打出 .400的打击率，他会非常开心。这就是我对这份工作的感觉。

AS：当你看到这张纸上写着你的净资产超过 10 亿美元时，你有什么感觉？

WB：这是做我喜欢做好的事情的副产品。如果我在这个行业里打出 .400 的好成绩，就会赚很多钱。

AS: 这的确是一大笔钱。你打算怎么花这笔钱？

WB: 最终，这些钱都会回归社会。99%以上的钱都会捐给社会。应该这样。

《亚当-斯密的金钱世界》本期节目的另一个不容错过的亮点…

1988 年，沃伦-巴菲特 and 汤姆-墨菲（Capital Cities/ABC 首席执行官）在肥皂剧《Loving》中客串演出。在他们的戏份中，酒保巴菲特 and 服务生墨菲被要求护送一位不守规矩的顾客离开酒吧。不过两人都没有台词。

事实上，《金钱世界》关于巴菲特一集中收录了这个我从未见过的简短场景。

“他们很聪明，”巴菲特在接受《奥马哈世界先驱报》采访时谈到了自己在肥皂剧中的客串。“他们信不过我们的对白。”

“我告诉你，对于一个出过亨利·方达、马龙·白兰度 and 弗雷德·阿斯泰尔的小镇来说，我是一个可悲的写照。”

“如果他们要评选本季最差表演奖，我肯定能赢。”

Graph View

Backlinks