原文信息：
- 标题：Letter to Partners (1970-02-18)
- 发表时间：1970-02-18
- 链接：
- 翻译：Terrellchen
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
Warren E. Buffett, General Partner
William Scott
John M. Harding
February 18th, 1970
1970 年 2 月 18 日
To My Partners:
致各位合伙人：
Our Partnership life ended on a symmetrical note. I consider 1957 and 1969, our beginning and terminal years, to have been the two most difficult twelve-month calendar periods that we faced during our operating history. It was fortunate our Partnership symmetry went no further than this — an ending capital equal to our beginning capital, despite a classical aesthetic balance, might not have produced total fulfillment.
我们合伙企业的生命周期，以一种对称的方式落幕。1957 年（起步之年）与 1969 年（终结之年），是我们运营史上最艰难的两个自然年度。幸运的是，这种对称性仅止于此 —— 若最终资本与初始资本持平，即便符合古典美学意义上的平衡，也未必能带来圆满的结果。
The usual table appears below in final form (accompanied by a giant sigh of relief from the General Partner):
以下是常规业绩表格的最终版本（普通合伙人在此长舒一口气）：
| **Year（
年份）** | 道指整体业绩（1）（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙企业业绩（2）（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（3）（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 7.7% | 58.8% | 45.6% |
| 1969 | -11.6% | 6.8% | 6.6% |
附注（Footnotes）
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of Partnership activity.
(1) 基于道指年度价值变化，加上持有道指成分股当年可获得的股息。该表格涵盖合伙企业所有完整运营年度的业绩。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the General Partner.
(2) 1957-1961 年数据为 “所有前身有限合伙企业全年运作、扣除所有费用后、向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人计提收益前” 的合并业绩。
(3)For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of Partnership results allowing for allocation to the General Partner based upon the present Partnership Agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957-1961 年数据按 “当前合伙协议中普通合伙人收益分配规则”，基于合伙企业业绩计算得出，且未扣除有限合伙人月度资金提取。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
以下为累计（即复利计算）业绩：
| **Year（
年份区间）** | 道指整体业绩（Overall Results From Dow） | 合伙企业业绩（Partnership Results） | 有限合伙人业绩（Limited Partners’ Results） |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 1958 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 1959 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 1960 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 1961 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 1962 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 1963 | 94.9% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 1964 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 1965 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 1966 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 1967 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 1957 – 1968 | 185.7% | 2610.6% | 1403.5% |
| 1957 – 1969 | 152.6% | 2794.9% | 1502.7% |
| **
年化复利收益率（Annual Compounded Rate）** | 7.4% | 29.5% | 23.8% |
And the final tabulation on the usual four investment companies:
以下是常规四家投资公司的最终业绩对比表格：
| **Year（
年份）** | 马萨诸塞投资者信托（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票基金（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆（2）（Tri-Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯工业指数（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 10.3% | 8.1% | 6.7% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 45.6% |
| 1969 | -4.8% | -7.9% | -1.9% | 0.1% | -11.6% | 6.6% |
| **
累计业绩（Cumulative Results）** | 75.2% | 146.3% | 219.1% | 208.4% | 152.6% | 1502.7% |
| **
年化复利收益率（Annual Compounded Rate）** | 8.1% | 7.2% | 9.3% | 9.0% | 7.4% | 23.8% |
附注（Footnotes）
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 按 “资产价值变动 + 年度向持有人分配金额” 计算。
(2) From 1968 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1968. Estimated for 1969.
(2) 1957-1968 年数据来源于《穆迪银行与金融手册》1968 年版，1969 年数据为估算值。
The Stock Market in 1969
1969 年的股市
Most investors and investment managers who, until quite recently, were deriding the Dow and investment companies such as the four mentioned above fell on lean times in 1969. The year probably witnessed the worst relative performance for so-called “aggressive” money management that has occurred since such activity became fashionable. Predictably, the poor performance has been applied to huge aggregates of capital whereas the earlier brilliant results only benefited much smaller sums. Those of you with an analytical bent should give some thought as to how accurately the standard mutual fund literature portrays the investment record of a fund which has a 100% gain in one year on 1 billion (attracted by the earlier performance) of assets. The “chain letter” phenomenon, whether created intentionally by a financial Machiavelli or accidentally by a public responding to its baser emotions, tends to produce an identical effect — a few people, the ones who intentionally or accidentally mail the first letters, make a great deal of money; and a vastly greater number on the outer ring of concentric circles lose money while behaving in a manner they think is certain to succeed because of the obviously bountiful results to early participants.
直到不久前还在嘲讽道指及上述四家投资公司的大多数投资者和投资经理，在 1969 年都陷入了困境。这一年，所谓 “进取型” 资金管理的相对业绩，可能是自这类操作流行以来最差的一次。可以预见的是，糟糕的业绩影响的是巨额规模的资金，而早年辉煌业绩惠及的仅仅是少量资金。那些善于分析的合伙人不妨想一想：一只基金当年以 100 万美元资产实现 100% 收益，随后凭借这份业绩吸引到 10 亿美元资金，却在次年亏损 25%—— 主流共同基金的宣传材料，能如实反映这样的投资记录吗？“连锁信” 现象无论是由精明的金融操盘手刻意制造，还是公众受低级情绪驱使意外形成，结果往往一致：少数人（那些有意或无意发出第一封信的人）赚得盆满钵满；而处于同心圆外圈、蜂拥而至的绝大多数人【 —— 指跟风参与的后来者】，只因看到早期参与者的丰厚回报，就坚信自己的做法必然成功，最终却以亏损收场。
Eighteen months ago I sent you a reprint of an article by Marvin M.May describing the chain letter effect of “funny money” acquisitions. In the stock market of 1969, the roof fell in on this sort of activity and the implications of Mr. May’s article were validated. Many of the better investment management records in the 1964-1968 period were at least partial beneficiaries of corporate chain letter activity and, to the extent they over-stayed their hand in 1969, a substantial bath was taken.
18 个月前，我曾寄给各位一篇马文・M・梅的文章重印本，文中描述了虚钱收购【 —— 指以高估值非现金对价完成的收购】的连锁信效应。1969 年的股市中，这类操作彻底栽了跟头，梅先生的观点也得到了验证。1964-1968 年间许多优秀的投资管理业绩，至少在一定程度上受益于企业层面的连锁信式操作；而那些在 1969 年仍执迷不悟的管理者，最终遭遇了惨重损失。
BPL in 1970 and 1971</br
巴菲特合伙企业 1970-1971 年后续安排
In winding up the Partnership, I have wanted to give you cash or cash equivalent, since that is the way you entered BPL. As you know, we have distributed about $99 million of the December 31, 1969 assets of Buffett Partnership, Ltd. in the form of cash and your proportional share of controlled companies. Those partners who wanted to sell their share of the controlled companies for cash at yearend valuation prices have been able to do so. Those who wish to stay with them, as I am doing, have been able to maintain their proportional interest without incurring a capital gains tax on the unrealized appreciation over BPL’s cost.
清算合伙企业时，我希望给各位返还现金或现金等价物 —— 毕竟你们当初就是以这种方式加入巴菲特合伙企业的。如各位所知，我们已将巴菲特合伙企业 1969 年 12 月 31 日的资产中，约 9900 万美元以‘现金 + 控制类公司相应比例权益’的形式完成分配。那些希望按年末估值价格出售控制类公司权益换取现金的合伙人，已经实现了这一诉求；而那些愿意继续持有这些权益的合伙人（就像我一样），可以保留相应比例权益，且无需为 “超出巴菲特合伙企业成本的未实现增值” 缴纳资本利得税。
We are down to about 4,000 per year) and 80% of a small store building in South Chicago. It is much easier to get into business than to get out of it. My expectation is that we will get everything finally wound up during 1971, but this is very tentative — in any event, I think it unlikely we make a further distribution in 1970. The office will be maintained at Kiewit Plaza (although perhaps on a different floor) through 1971 when our lease expires.
目前我们仅剩约 600 万美元净资产，主要为蓝筹印花公司的持仓。此外，还有一些杂项资产，包括一些‘小宝贝’—— 得克萨斯州比县一口天然气井的部分特许权使用费的 90%（年化收益不足 4000 美元），以及芝加哥南部一栋小型商铺建筑的 80% 权益。涉足一项业务容易，退出却难。我预计所有事务将在 1971 年彻底清算完毕，但这只是初步判断 —— 无论如何，1970 年大概率不会再进行进一步分配。办公室将继续留在基威特广场（可能会更换楼层），直至 1971 年租约到期。
Taxes</br
税务相关说明
BPL held large amounts of commercial paper due in the early days of January, 1970, on which substantial interest was received at maturity. The entire amount will be reported by cash basis taxpayers (which you and I are) in the year received rather than when accrued. Thus, you will have taxable interest income in 1970 equal to about 1-1/4% of your January 1, 1969 capital, although you received the economic benefit almost entirely in 1969. In early 1971, you will receive full tax information applicable to your 1970 BPL investment, just as in past years.
巴菲特合伙企业持有大量 1970 年 1 月初到期的商业票据，到期时获得了丰厚的利息。作为收付实现制纳税人（你我均在此列），这笔利息需在 “实际收到年度” 申报纳税，而非 “应计年度”。因此，尽管相关经济利益几乎全部产生于 1969 年，你在 1970 年需申报的应税利息收入，约为你 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本金额的 1.25%。与往年一样，1971 年初你将收到与 1970 年巴菲特合伙企业投资相关的完整税务信息。
We will only be able to give you completely accurate figures pertaining to the tax basis of your Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. and Diversified Retailing Company, Inc. stock in early 1971. This is due to some complexities of the tax law whereby 1970 BPL figures could have a minor effect on the basis of these items. Since no one sold his holdings until 1970, and since supporting detail for the Internal Revenue Service is not required until April 15, 1971, our final figures will be available to you in ample time. Anyone needing close approximations as to the tax basis of these securities should get in touch with John Harding prior to March 31, 1970.
关于你持有的伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司与多元零售公司股票的税务基础，我们要到 1971 年初才能提供完全准确的数据。这是因为税法存在一些复杂性，1970 年巴菲特合伙企业的相关数据可能会对这些股票的税务基础产生轻微影响。由于所有人都直到 1970 年才出售相关持仓，且美国国税局要求的佐证材料需在 1971 年 4 月 15 日前提交，我们的最终数据会及时提供给你。若有人需要这些证券税务基础的近似值，请在 1970 年 3 月 31 日前联系约翰・哈丁。
And My Thanks</br
致谢
This is not the last time you will hear from me, since there are bound to be a few winding-up communications. I also will be sending out a letter on about February 25th to those who have requested it, dispensing an elementary general education on bonds with the emphasis on the tax-free area.
Normally, the liquidation of an enterprise implies institutional or personnel weaknesses. Our own case represents the opposite extreme. I consider the BPL staff to be superior to that of any organization I have seen. Gladys, Donna, John and Bill have done everything asked of them — and sometimes it was plenty — in the most accurate, prompt and pleasant manner possible. They are exceptionally high-grade, talented people. Don’t get any ideas about hiring them — John is going with Bill Ruane — I expect Gladys and Bill to become employed by Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., primarily in connection with the bond activities of the bank and insurance company — and Donna will be keeping tab on the run-out of BPL over the next couple of years.
通常情况下，一家企业清算意味着存在机构或人员层面的缺陷，但我们的情况恰恰相反。我认为巴菲特合伙企业的团队，比我见过的任何组织的团队都要优秀。格拉迪斯、唐娜、约翰和比尔完成了所有交办的工作 —— 有时任务还相当繁重 —— 且始终保持准确、及时、友善的态度。他们都是极其优秀、有才华的人。你们可别打挖他们的主意 —— 约翰将追随比尔・鲁安；我预计格拉迪斯和比尔将加入伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司，主要负责银行和保险公司的债券相关业务；而唐娜将在未来几年负责跟进巴菲特合伙企业的清算收尾事宜。
Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt have done extraordinary jobs for BPL since acquisition of their companies by DRC and BH. Their efforts over the past three years have contributed to a significant degree to the increased valuations applied to the controlled companies at each yearend. Our figures would have been considerably poorer had they turned in only the normal managerial job.
自本・罗斯纳和杰克・林沃尔特的公司被多元零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦收购以来，他们为巴菲特合伙企业做出了非凡贡献。过去三年里，他们的努力在很大程度上推动了控制类公司年末估值的持续提升。若他们仅完成常规的管理工作，我们的业绩将会逊色得多。
Without the right group of partners, there would have been no BPL. Efforts can only be productive in the proper environment, and that is what you have provided. I have probably been able to utilize my time and energy more effectively than virtually any money manager working with comparable sums. My activity has not been burdened by second-guessing, discussing non sequiturs, or hand holding. You have let me play the game without telling me what club to use, how to grip it, or how much better the other players are doing. I’ve appreciated this, and the results you have achieved have significantly reflected your attitudes and behavior. If you don’t feel this is the case, you underestimate the importance of personal encouragement and empathy in maximizing human effort and achievement.
没有合适的合伙人团队，就不会有巴菲特合伙企业。努力只有在合适的环境中才能见效，而这个环境正是你们为我营造的。与其他管理规模相当的资金管理者相比，我或许能更有效地利用自己的时间和精力。我的工作从未因 “事后质疑、讨论无关话题或循循善诱” 而受到拖累。你们让我放手 “打球”，从不指手画脚 —— 不干涉我用什么球杆、怎么握杆，也不拿我和其他 “球员” 的表现做比较。我对此深表感激，而你们最终取得的业绩，也在很大程度上反映了你们的态度和行为。若你们不这么认为，那就是低估了 “个人鼓励与共情” 在激发人类最大努力和成就方面的重要性。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB/glk
诚挚的，
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
谨上