原文信息：
- 标题：1969 Semi-annual Letter to Partners
- 发表时间：1969-05-29
- 校译：Terrellchen
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
May 29th, 1969
1969 年 5 月 29 日
To My Partners:
致各位合伙人：
About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives.
大约 18 个月前，我曾致信各位，说明因 “市场环境与个人因素变化”，我将调整我们未来的业绩目标。
The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”)
当时我所描述的投资环境（且在其他多封信中提及过），随着时间推移，总体变得愈发不利，也更令人沮丧。或许只是我思维不够灵活罢了。（有观察家评价 40 岁以上的证券分析师时说：“他们知道太多早已不再正确的事。”）
However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our 3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stock at market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market.
但在我看来，现状如下：（1）过去二十年来，强调量化因素的分析师能接触到的投资机会持续减少，如今已几乎消失；（2）我们 1 亿美元的资产规模，进一步缩小了本就看似贫瘠的投资领域 —— 因为单笔低于 300 万美元的投资，对整体业绩无法产生实质影响，这实际上排除了 “普通股市值低于 1 亿美元” 的公司；（3）市场对投资业绩的追捧愈发热烈，催生了一个愈发短期导向、且（在我看来）投机性更强的市场。
The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn’t worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly. I can’t help being competitive. I know I don’t want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop.
1967 年 10 月 9 日的信中提到，个人因素是我调整目标的最核心原因。我当时表示，希望能摆脱 “100% 专注于巴菲特合伙企业（BPL）” 的（自我施加的）压力。但过去 18 个月，我完全没通过这场考验。信中曾写道：“我希望降低目标能让我少花些精力。” 但事与愿违。只要我还 “站在舞台上”—— 定期公布业绩、为众多合伙人近乎全部的净资产承担管理责任 —— 我就永远无法把持续精力投入到非合伙企业的事务中。既然选择公开参与，我就忍不住要追求领先。我很清楚，我不想一辈子都忙着 “超越投资领域的兔子”。想要慢下来，唯一的办法就是彻底停下。
Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire. There are, of course, a number of tax and legal problems in connection with liquidating the Partnership, but overall, I am concerned with working out a plan that attains the following objectives:
因此，我计划在年底前，向所有有限合伙人发出法定正式通知，告知我退休的决定。当然，合伙企业清算涉及诸多税务与法律问题，但总体而言，我会制定一份能实现以下目标的计划：
1.The most important item is that I have an alternative regarding money management to suggest to the many partners who do not want to handle this themselves. Some partners of course, have alternatives of their own in which they have confidence and find quite acceptable. To the others, however, I will not hand over their money with a “good luck”. I intend to suggest an alternative money manager to whom I will entrust funds of my relatives and others for whom I have lifetime financial responsibility. This manager has integrity and ability and will probably perform as well or better than I would in the future (although nowhere close to what he or I have achieved in the past). He will be available to any partner, so that no minimum size for accounts will cause any of you a problem. I intend, in the future, to keep in general touch with what he is doing, but only on an infrequent basis with any advice on my part largely limited to a negative type.
1.最核心的目标：为众多不想亲自管理资金的合伙人，推荐一位资金管理的替代选择（即替代我管理资金的人）。当然，部分合伙人已有自己信任且满意的选择，但对其他人，我绝不会只说一句‘祝好运’，就把你们的资金转交出去。我会推荐一位资金管理者 —— 我会将亲友及其他我需承担终身财务责任之人的资金托付给他。这位管理者正直且有能力，未来业绩大概率会和我相当甚至更优（尽管远不及他或我过去的成绩）。他会为所有合伙人提供服务，不会因账户规模下限给任何人带来困扰。未来我会与他保持大致联系，但频率很低，且我给出的建议，基本都是”不建议做某事”的负面建议。
2.I want all partners to have the option of receiving cash and possibly readily marketable securities (there will probably be only one where this will apply) where I like both the prospects and price but which partners will be able to freely convert to cash if they wish.
2.让所有合伙人有权选择领取现金，或可能存在的“易于流通的证券”（这类证券可能只有一只）—— 这只证券我既看好前景，也认可价格，合伙人若想变现，也能自由转换成现金。
3.However, I also want all partners to have the option of maintaining their proportional interests in our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) and one other small “restricted” holding. Because these securities will be valued unilaterally by me at fair value, I feel it is essential that, if you wish, you can maintain your proportionate interest at such valuation. However, these securities are not freely marketable (various SEC restrictions apply to “control” stock and non-registered stock) and they will probably be both non-transferable and non-income -producing for a considerable period of time. Therefore, I want you to be able to go either way in our liquidation - either stick with the restricted securities or take cash equivalent. I strongly like all of the people running our controlled businesses (joined now by the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, a $100 million plus, extremely well-run bank, purchased by Berkshire Hathaway earlier this year), and want the relationship to be life long. I certainly have no desire to sell a good controlled business run by people I like and admire, merely to obtain a fancy price. However, specific conditions may cause the sale of one operating unit at some point.
3.同时，让所有合伙人有权选择保留 “我们两家控制类公司（多元零售公司与伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司）及另一只小型‘限制性’持仓” 的相应比例权益。由于这些证券将由我单方面评估公允价值，我认为，若你们愿意，有权按该估值保留相应权益，这一点至关重要。但这些证券无法自由流通（美国证券交易委员会对 “控股权股票” 和 “未注册股票” 有多项限制），且在相当长一段时间内可能既无法转让，也无收益产生。因此，清算时你们可二选一 —— 要么持有这些限制性证券，要么领取等值现金。我非常欣赏所有管理我们控制类业务的人（如今又新增了伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行信托公司 —— 这家机构资产超 1 亿美元，运营极为出色，今年早些时候被伯克希尔・哈撒韦收购，也加入了我们的控制类业务团队），并希望能保持长期合作关系。我绝不会只为追求高价，就出售由我欣赏和敬佩之人管理的优质控制类业务。但在特定情况下，未来可能会出售某一运营单元。
I believe we will have a liquidation program which will accomplish the above objectives. Our activities in this regard should cause no change in your tax planning for 1969.
我相信我们会制定出能实现上述目标的清算方案。相关操作不会影响你们 1969 年的税务规划。
One final objective, I would like very much to achieve (but which just isn’t going to happen) is to go out with a bang. I hate to end with a poor year, but we are going to have one in 1969. My best guess is that at yearend, allowing for a substantial increase in value of controlled companies (against which all partners except me will have the option of taking cash), we will show a breakeven result for 1969 before any monthly payments to partners. This will be true even if the market should advance substantially between now and yearend, since we will not be in any important position which will expose us to much upside potential.
还有一个我非常想实现（但显然无法实现）的最终目标：圆满收官。我不想以糟糕的业绩结束，但 1969 年我们注定会经历这样一年。我最乐观的预估是，到年底，即便控制类公司价值大幅增长（除我之外，所有合伙人都可选择按该增值领取现金），合伙企业 1969 年 “扣除月度合伙人收益分配前” 的业绩也仅能持平。即便从现在到年底市场大幅上涨，结果也不会改变 —— 因为我们没有任何重要持仓能让我们充分享受上涨收益。
Our experience in workouts this year has been atrocious - during this period I have felt like the bird that inadvertently flew into the middle of a badminton game. We are not alone in such experience, but it came at a time when we were toward the upper limit of what has been our historical range of percentage commitment in this category.
今年套利类投资的表现糟透了 —— 这段时间，我感觉自己就像一只不小心闯进羽毛球赛场的鸟，乱作一团。并非只有我们遭遇这种情况，但问题在于，当时我们在该品类的投资占比正接近历史区间的上限。
Documenting one’s boners is unpleasant business. I find “selective reporting” even more distasteful. Our poor experience this year is 100% my fault. It did not reflect bad luck, but rather an improper assessment of a very fast-developing governmental trend. Paradoxically, I have long believed the government should have been doing (in terms of the problem attacked – not necessarily the means utilized) what it finally did - in other words, on an overall basis, I believe the general goal of the activity which has cost us substantial money is socially desirable and have so preached for some time. Nevertheless, I didn’t think it would happen. I never believe in mixing what I think should happen (socially) with what I think will happen in making decisions - in this case, we would be some millions better off if I had.
承认自己的失误并非易事，而 “选择性披露” 更让我反感。今年的糟糕表现完全是我的责任，并非运气不佳，而是我对 “快速发展的政府政策趋势” 判断失误。矛盾的是，长期以来，我一直认为政府本该采取（就其要解决的问题而言 —— 而非具体实施方式）最终采取的这些措施 —— 换句话说，总体而言，我认为让我们蒙受重大损失的这些政策，其核心目标是符合社会利益的，我也为此倡导过一段时间。但我从未想过这些政策真的会落地。我做决策时，向来不会把 “我认为应该发生的（社会层面）” 和 “我认为会发生的” 混为一谈 —— 而这次，若我当时能打破这个原则，我们本可以多赚数百万美元。
Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don’t see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to “get lucky” with other people’s money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don’t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand just so I can go out a hero.
坦白说，尽管前面提到了种种因素，但要是我有真正顶尖的投资机会，我仍会在 1970 年甚至 1971 年继续运营合伙企业。不是因为我想做，而是因为我实在太想以良好的业绩收尾，而非惨淡收场。但问题在于，我看不到任何能让人有合理理由期待 “业绩向好” 的投资机会，也不想拿着别人的钱瞎摸索、碰运气。我不适应当前的市场环境，更不想为了 “以英雄的姿态退场”，就去玩一场自己不懂的游戏，进而糟蹋了一份还算不错的业绩记录。
Therefore, we will be liquidating holdings throughout the year, working toward a residual of the controlled companies, the one “investment letter” security, the one marketable security with favorable long-term prospects, and the miscellaneous “stubs”, etc. of small total value which will take several years to clean up in the Workout category.
因此，我们将在全年逐步清算持仓，最终仅保留以下资产：控制类公司、一只‘投资函’证券（指通过投资咨询函推荐的特定证券）、一只长期前景良好的流通证券，以及套利类投资中总额较小、可能需要数年才能清理完毕的各类‘残余持仓’等”。
I have written this letter a little early in lieu of the mid-year letter. Once I made a decision, I wanted you to know. I also wanted to be available in Omaha for a period after you received this letter to clear up anything that may be confusing in it. In July, I expect to be in California.
这封信我写得稍早一些，用以替代年中信件。一旦做出决定，我就想让各位尽快知晓。同时，在你们收到信后的一段时间内，我会待在奥马哈，为大家解答信中可能存在的疑问。7 月份，我计划前往加利福尼亚州。
Some of you are going to ask, “What do you plan to do?” I don’t have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years.
你们中有些人可能会问：“你接下来打算做什么？” 我目前还没有答案。但我很清楚，当我 60 岁时，我应该去追求与 20 岁时优先考虑的不同人生目标。因此，若我现在不彻底脱离这项 “占据了我成年后前 18 年几乎全部时间和精力” 的事业，就很难培养出适应未来新环境的新事务能力。
We will have a letter out in the Fall, probably October, elaborating on the liquidation procedure, the investment advisor suggestion, etc…
今年秋天（大概率是 10 月），我们会再发一封信，详细说明清算流程、推荐的投资顾问等事宜……
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB/glk
诚挚的，
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
谨上