原文信息：
- 标题：1960 Annual Letter to Partners
- 发表时间：1961-01-30
- 整合：Ponge
- 英文校对：孙萧萧
- 校译：孙萧萧
1960 Letter
1960 年信
WARREN E. BUFFETT
沃伦 E. 巴菲特
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
内布拉斯加州，奥马哈市，安德伍德大道 5202 号
The General Stock Market in 1960:
1960 年股市的整体情况：
A year ago, I commented on the somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which had advanced from 583 to 679, or 16.4%. Although practically all investment companies showed gains for that year, less than 10% of them were able to match or better the record of the Industrial Average. The Dow-Jones Utility Average had a small decline and the Railroad Average recorded a substantial one.
一年前，我评述说 1959 年道琼斯工业平均指数从 583 点上涨到 679 点，涨幅 16.4% 有些失真。虽然当年几乎所有的投资公司都取得了正收益，但其中仅有不到 10% 的投资公司的业绩能够跟上或者超过道琼斯工业指数的涨幅。1959 年，道琼斯公用事业平均指数小幅收跌，而道琼斯铁路平均指数却录得大幅下跌。
In 1960, the picture was reversed. The Industrial Average declined from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average still left it with an overall loss of 6.3%. On the other hand, the Utility Average showed a good gain and, while all the results are not now available, my guess is that about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the Industrial Average. The majority of investment companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in the range of plus or minus 5%. On the New York Stock Exchange, 653 common stocks registered losses for the year while 404 showed gains.
1960年，情况则反转过来。道琼斯工业平均指数从 679 点 下跌到 616 点，跌幅 9.3%。加回持有道琼斯指数收到的股息，总体上仍然亏损 6.3%。另一方面，公用事业平均指数获得了不错的收益。虽然目前还不知道所有投资公司的业绩，但我估计约有 90% 的投资公司业绩跑赢道琼斯工业平均指数。大多数投资公司去年的总体收益率分布在正负5%这个区间内。去年，纽约证券交易所上市的股票中，有 653 只股票下跌，404 只股票上涨。
Results in 1960:
1960 年的业绩：
My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve a long-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more or less parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.
我管理合伙基金的一贯目标是取得跑赢道琼斯工业平均指数的长期业绩记录。我相信，长期来看，该指数的涨幅将或多或少与一流投资公司业绩相当。除非我们取得跑赢指数的业绩，否则我们的合伙企业就没有理由存在了。
However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.
然而，我曾指出，我们可能达成的跑赢指数的记录，不应是一种我们每年都能相对恒定地超越指数的奢望。如果说我们跑赢了指数，极有可能是通过在横盘或下跌的市场超越指数，而在快速上涨的市场仅仅跟上甚至落后于指数实现的。
I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the Average 30% to be much superior to a year when both we and the Average advanced 20%. Over a period of time there are going to be good and bad years; there is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed about the sequence in which they occur. The important thing is to be beating par[^1]; a four on a par three hole is not as good as a five on a par five hole and it is unrealistic to assume we are not going to have our share of both par three’s and par five’s.
我认为平均指数下跌了 30%，而我们的业绩只下跌 15% 的年份要好于我们的业绩和平均指数都上涨 20% 的年份。长期而言，总有好年份，也总会有差年份。不必因一时的业绩良好而兴奋不已，也不必因一时的收益落后而失望不快。投资就像打高尔夫球一样，重要的是战胜标准杆，三杆洞四杆的成绩不如五杆洞五杆（此乃标准杆）成绩，要是奢望我们在三杆洞和五杆洞都不出现“加分”杆，那可是不现实的。
[^1]
译注： 以下解释来自上角里，略有改动：高尔夫球场是由18个洞组成，这18个洞按球道长短来分为3种类型：三杆洞、四杆洞、五杆洞，杆数越多，代表洞距离越远。标准杆 par 就是球员根据设计应当完成的杆数（比如三杆洞用三杆进洞，四杆洞用四杆进洞），如果每洞都按照标准杆来打完，总得分为72杆，实际杆数超出标准杆几杆，就用+“加号”计分，多几杆就加几，反之亦然，使用杆数越少水平越高，高尔夫的魅力在于，不可能所有洞都以标准杆打完。
The above dose of philosophy is being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known limitations.
由于本年增加了不少新合伙人，所以我又讲了讲上述的投资理念。我想确保他们理解我的目标、达成这些目标的衡量方法，以及我所了解到的某些局限性。
With this background it is not unexpected that 1960 was a better-than-average year for us. As contrasted with an overall loss of 6.3% for the Industrial Average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating throughout the year. Our results for the four complete years of partnership operation after expenses but before interest to limited partners or allocation to the general partner are:
有了上述背景介绍，对于我们在 1960 年跑赢指数就毫不意外了。与道琼斯工业平均指数总体亏损 6.3% 相比，我们运营了整年的 7 家合伙企业去年取得了 22.8% 的收益。下述业绩已扣除运营费用，但尚未扣除需支付给有限合伙人利息及普通合伙人的分成。我们已经运营了 4 个完整年度的合伙企业业绩如下：
Year
年份|Partnerships Operating Entire Year
运营完整年的合伙企业数量|Partnership Gain
合伙企业收益率|Dow-Jones Gain
道琼斯指数收益率
---|:---:|:---:|:---:
1957|3|10.4%|-8.4%
1958|5|40.9%|38.5%
1959|6|25.9%|19.9%
1960|7|22.8%|-6.3%
It should be emphasized again that these are the net results to the partnership; the net results to the limited partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they had selected.
需要再次强调的是，表中数据是合伙企业的净收益；有限合伙人的净收益则还要依据他们所选择的合伙协议从中扣除抽成比例。
The overall gain or loss is computed on a market to market basis. After allowing for any money added or withdrawn, such a method gives results based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the partnership at the beginning, of the year and what would have been realized upon liquidation at year end and is different, of course, from our tax results, which value securities at cost and realize gains or losses only when securities are actually sold.
总体盈亏按照年初及年末市值计算得出的。这种方法计算收益率已考虑了期间的资金增加和撤出，并基于在年初与年末清算合伙企业获得的价值得出。当然，这不同于我们的报税结果，报税时是基于股票的成本计算的，仅仅当股票真正卖出时才会实现盈利或者亏损。
On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:
按复利计算，累计业绩如下：
Year
年份|Partnership Gain
合伙企业收益率|Dow-Jones Gain
道琼斯指数收益率
---|:---:|:---:
1957|10.4%|-8.4%
1958|55.6%|26.9%
1959|95.9%|52.2%
1960|140.6%|42.6%
Although four years is entirely too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence there is points toward confirming the proposition that our results should be relatively better in moderately declining or static markets. To the extent that this is true, it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively, although decidedly less conventionally, invested than if we owned “blue-chip” securities. During a strongly rising market for the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching their performance.
虽然四年时间实在太短，还不足以由此推断出长期如何。但是经过验证的一个确定的结论是，在温和下跌或横盘市场下，我们的业绩表现相对更好。某种程度上说，的确如此。相比持有蓝筹股的人而言，我们的投资组合可能更为保守，也明显更为不合常规。在蓝筹股强劲上涨的市场中，我们可能真的很难跟上他们的业绩。
Multiplicity of Partnerships
合伙企业多样化：
A preceding table shows that the family is growing. There has been no partnership which has had a consistently superior or inferior record compared to our group average, but there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in about the same proportions. This variation, of course, could be eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate much detail and a moderate amount of expense.
前面的表格表明我们的合伙企业数量正在增加。与平均业绩相比，我们的合伙企业业绩没有始终很优秀或者始终很差劲的。尽管我努力让我们的所有合伙企业以大致相同的比例投资于一样的股票，但是每年持仓仍然有一定的差异。当然，这种差异可以通过将现有的合伙企业合并成一家大的合伙企业来消除，如此做的话，也将会砍掉很多运营方面的细枝末节，同时减少适量的相应费用。
Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the next few years. The problem is that various partners have expressed preferences for varying partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without unanimous consent of partners.
坦率地讲，我很希望接下来的几年沿着合并这个思路去推进。问题在于不同的合伙协议，反映出的是各合伙人不同的偏好。如果所有的合伙人之间不能达成一致的话，合并这事儿就搞不成。
Advance Payments
预存资金：
Several partners have inquired about adding money during the year to their partnership. Although an exception has been made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements during mid-year where we have more than one family represented among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed partnerships an additional interest can only be acquired at the end of the year.
有几位合伙人询问在年内向合伙企业追加资金的问题。虽然有过一次例外，但是要在年中修改合伙协议实在是太麻烦了，特别是有限合伙人中不只牵涉一个家庭的时候。因此，对于有多个有限合伙人的合伙企业，只能在年末额外追加投资资金。
We do accept advance payments during the year toward a partnership interest and pay interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the end of the year. At that time, subject to amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus interest is added to the partnership capital and thereafter participates in profits and losses.
不过，我们确实会在年中接收预存到合伙企业的增资资金，我们将会对此支付6%的利息，计息期为收到资金那天开始到当年年末为止。年末时，依托于合伙人对协议的修改，前述预存资金及相应利息将一并追加到合伙企业的资本金中，其后分担利润和亏损。
Sanborn Map
桑伯恩地图公司[^2]： [^2]: 译注： 桑伯恩地图公司更详尽的信息及公司后续发展可参阅《巴菲特的估值逻辑：20个投资案例深入复盘》（陆晔飞 著/李必龙，林安霁，李羿 译）
Last year mention was made of an investment which accounted for a very high and unusual proportion (35%) of our net assets along with the comment that I had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960. This hope materialized. The history of an investment of this magnitude may be of interest to you.
去年，我提到过一笔投资占到我们净资产比例非常高乃至到了不寻常的比例（达35%），我还说我希望在1960年了结该笔投资。如今，这个愿望实现了。你们应该会有兴趣听我讲讲如此规模的投资始末。
Sanborn Map Co. is engaged in the publication and continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of the United States. For example, the volumes mapping Omaha would weigh perhaps fifty pounds and provide minute details on each structure. The map would be revised by the paste-over method showing new construction, changed occupancy, new fire protection facilities, changed structural materials, etc. These revisions would be done approximately annually and a new map would be published every twenty or thirty years when further pasteovers became impractical. The cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha customer would run around $100 per year.
桑伯恩地图公司从事的是美国所有城市高精度地图的绘制、出版及持续修订业务。比如，奥马哈市地图分册大概重 50 磅1，包含每个建筑的微小细节标识。其地图通过“粘贴覆盖”方式进行修订，以显现新增的建筑物，居住房屋的变化，新的防火设施、结构材料的变动等等。这些修订大概每年更新一次，每隔二十到三十年，当实在无法继续进行更多的“粘贴覆盖”修订时，就出版一份新地图。每年从每个奥马哈地图使用客户那里收取的修订更新费用大约为 100 美元。
This detailed information showing diameter of water mains underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of roof, etc., was primarily of use to fire insurance companies. Their underwriting departments, located in a central office, could evaluate business by agents nationally. The theory was that a picture was worth a thousand words and such evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the degree of conflagration exposure in an area, advisable reinsurance procedure, etc. The bulk of Sanborn’s business was done with about thirty insurance companies although maps were also sold to customers outside the insurance industry such as public utilities, mortgage companies, and taxing authorities.
地图所展示的埋于街道下的水管直径、消防栓的位置、屋顶构成等详细信息，主要是供火灾保险公司使用的。这些公司位于总部办公区的承保部门，可以据此评估全国各地代理人提交的保险业务。其理论就是“一图胜千言”，这种评估将了解风险是否被合理的率定，一个区域的火灾快速燃烧和扩散程度，明智的再保险程序等等。虽然桑伯恩的业务主要是与约三十家保险公司有关，但是其地图也会卖给给诸如公用事业设备商、抵押贷款公司及税务机关等保险业以外的客户。
For seventy-five years the business operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort. In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry became fearful that Sanborn’s profits would become too great and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn’s board of directors to act in a watch-dog capacity.
该公司几乎垄断经营了 75 年，每年的盈利几乎完全不受经济衰退的影响，也不用费力推销。在公司业务发展的早期，保险业客户担心桑伯恩的利润太过丰厚，于是安排了一些知名保险人士进入桑伯恩的董事会，让他们盯着点公司，以防止涨价太多。
In the early 1950’s a competitive method of under-writing known as “carding” made inroads on Sanborn’s business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over 100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power.
20世纪50年代早期，一种被称为“计分”（carding）[^4]的有竞争力的承保方式侵蚀了桑伯恩的业务，其地图业务的税后利润从的20世纪30年代后期的年均超过50万美元下滑到1958和1959年的不到10万美元。考虑到这一时期经济的蓬勃向上趋势，这表明其地图业务原本可观的、稳定的盈利能力几乎消失殆尽。
[^4]
However, during the early 1930’s Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.
然而，在30年代初期，桑伯恩就开始构建并积累起一个投资组合。因为地图业务没有资本开支需求，所以任何留存收益都被投进这个组合中。一段时间后，大约有250万美元被投入该投资组合中，其中债券和股票大约各占一半。因此，尤其是最近十年来，投资组合不断增长，而主营的地图业务日渐萎缩。
Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at 45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about 65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of 110 less the 20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing.
让我给大家讲讲这两部分业务的极端差异。1938年，道琼斯工业平均指数大约在100-120点之间，桑伯恩的股价为每股110美元；1958年，道琼斯工业平均指数在550点附近，桑伯恩的股价为每股45美元。与此同时，桑伯恩的投资组合价值从每股20美元左右上涨到每股65美元。这意味着，事实上，1938年，在当时经济和股市都萧条的情况下购买桑伯恩股票的人给予地图业务每股90美元的估值（110美元股价减去无关地图业务的投资组合估值20美元）。在1958年更加强劲的氛围下，同样的地图业务却被估值为每股负20美元，而即便是白送地图业务，股票购买者也不愿意支付超过投资组合价值七成的价格。
How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would have cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite “carding” over $500 million of fire premiums were underwritten by “mapping” companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn’s product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings.
这是怎么发生的呢？其实无论是1938年还是1958年，桑伯恩拥有的大量地图信息对保险业来说都极其重要。若要重制这些已积累多年的精细地图信息，得花费上千万美元。尽管出现了“计分”这种新方式，但由“地图测绘”公司承保的火灾保险费仍超过了5亿美元。然而多年来，桑伯恩这种包装、销售产品及信息的方式一直没有改变，这种一成不变的应对最终也反映在了其盈利上。
The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about 7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director’s and committee fees.
在大多数董事看来，投资组合的收益如此之高，重振地图业务毫无必要。桑伯恩每年销售额大约为200万美元，而持有的证券市值约为700万美元。公司投资组合带来的收益巨大，又没有财务困难，保险公司对地图服务价格也感到满意，股东们仍然会收到股息。然而，这些股息在八年内已被调低了五次，不过我却从没有发现任何关于建议削减工资或者董事及委员会薪酬的记录。
Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had been only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.
在我进入董事会前，14 个董事中有 9 个是保险业中的知名人士，他们合计持有105,000股流通股中的46股。尽管他们都在一些大公司中身居要职，能够提议公司以必需的资金（至少是适量的投入）购入该股票，但他们中最多的持股量也仅为10股。有些情况下，这些董事经营的保险公司持有少量股票，但是跟他们持有的投资组合相比，这些股票只是象征性的。过去十年来，这些保险公司在涉及桑伯恩股票的任何交易上一直都是卖出方。
The tenth director was the company attorney, who held ten shares. The eleventh was a banker with ten shares who recognized the problems of the company, actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings. The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn who owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware of the problems of the business, but kept in a subservient role by the Board of Directors. The final member of our cast was a son of a deceased president of Sanborn. The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock.
第 10 位董事是公司的律师，持有10股股票。第 11 位董事是一名银行家，也持有 10 股股票，他认识到了并积极指出公司的问题，后来还增持了股票。第12、13位董事是桑伯恩的高管，总共持有约 300 股股票。这两位高管很能干，也认识到了公司的问题，但却只能屈从于董事会。最后一位董事成员是桑伯恩已故总裁的儿子，已故总裁的遗孀持有 15,000 股股票。
In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business, demanded the top position in the company, was turned down, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares (dispersed among customers of a brokerage firm) and one of about 8,000. These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a separation of the investment portfolio from the map business, as did we.
1958 年后期，已故总裁的儿子对公司的发展趋势不满，要求担任公司的高级管理职位，但被拒绝了。接着他递交了辞职信，辞职被批准了。此后不久我们提议买下他母亲的那部分股票，对方接受了。当时，还有两位大股东，一位持有 10,000 股（一个经纪公司代其客户持有），另一位持股大约 8,000 股。这些人对公司现况相当不满，和我们一样，他们也希望将投资组合业务与地图业务拆分。
Subsequently our holdings (including associates) were increased through open market purchases to about 24,000 shares and the total represented by the three groups increased to 46,000 shares. We hoped to separate the two businesses, realize the fair value of the investment portfolio and work to re-establish the earning power of the map business. There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply map profits through utilization of Sanborn’s wealth of raw material in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to the most usable form for the customer.
后来，通过公开市场买入，我们的持股数量（已包括其他合作伙伴的）增加到了约 24,000 股，同时，算上另两位股东，三方的持股总量达到了 46,000 股。我们希望拆分投资业务与地图业务，兑现投资组合的公允价值并重构地图业务的盈利能力。通过桑伯恩丰富的原始资料，将这些数据转换为对客户更实用的电子形式，这似乎正是显著强化地图业务盈利能力的真正机遇。
There was considerable opposition on the Board to change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider, although management was in complete accord with our plan and a similar plan had been recommended by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Management Experts). To avoid a proxy fight (which very probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would have been certain of winning) and to avoid time delay with a large portion of Sanborn’s money tied up in blue-chip stocks which I didn’t care for at current prices, a plan was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock, involving 50% of the 1,600 stockholders, was exchanged for portfolio securities at fair value. The map business was left with over 1 million was eliminated. The remaining stockholders were left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially higher earnings per share, and an increased dividend rate.
虽然管理层完全赞同我们的计划，而且博兹、艾伦&汉密尔顿管理咨询公司 (Booz Allen & Hamilton)也提出过类似的方案，但是董事会反对任何形式的改变，特别是由外部人发起的变革。为避免代理权之争（很可能不会发生，即使发生我们也肯定能赢），也为了避免桑伯恩大量的资金都套在我毫不看好的高股价蓝筹股上，我们达成了一个方案——所有想要退出的股东都可以公允价值兑现并退出。美国证券交易委员会（SEC）裁定该方案公平合理。约72%的桑伯恩股票（涉及1600名股东中的一半股东），都按公允价值兑换为投资组合中的证券。地图业务得以保留，有超过125万美元的政府和市政债券作为储备资金，超过100万美元的潜在公司资本所得税也得以避免。留下来的股东的资产价值略有提升，每股收益显著增加，股息率也有所提高。
Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated description of this investment operation. However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring our results over a short span of time such as a year. Such control situations may occur very infrequently. Our bread-and-butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action. To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is possible that more opportunities will be available in “control situations.”
当然，上述的小故事只是对这次投资过程非常简短的描述。然而，这确实也表明：对我们的投资组合进行保密的必要性，同时，以很短的时间跨度（比如一年）来衡量我们的业绩是无用的。这种控股类投资（control situations）并不会经常发生，我们的主要业务还是购买低估值股票并在估值修复之后卖出，以及利润依赖于公司本身而非市场波动的特殊情形（special situations）[^6]投资。一定程度上，随着我们的合伙企业资金继续增长，未来可能还会有更多的控股类投资机会出现。
[^6]
The auditors should be mailing your financial statement and tax information within about a week. If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or this letter, be sure to let me know.
审计师将会在大约一周内寄出你们的财务报表和税务信息，如果你们对其报告或本信有任何疑问，请一定要告诉我。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦 E. 巴菲特
1-30-61
1961 年 1 月 30 日
Footnotes
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译注： 1磅=0.4536千克=0.9072斤。 ↩