原文信息：
- 标题：1957 Annual Letter to Partners
- 发表时间：1958-02
- 整合：Ponge、孙萧萧
- 英文校对：孙萧萧
- 校译：孙萧萧
1957 Letter
1957 年信
WARREN E. BUFFETT
沃伦 E. 巴菲特
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
内布拉斯加州，奥马哈市，安德伍德大道5202号
SECOND ANNUAL LETTER TO LIMITED PARTNERS
致有限合伙人的第 2 封年度信
The General Stock Market Picture in 1957
1957 年股市的整体情况
In last year’s letter to partners, I said the following:
在去年的致合伙人信中，我写道：
My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially.
“
我认为股市的整体价格水平已经高于内在价值，这主要反映在蓝筹股上。如果上述判断准确，那么所有股票（即便是低估值股票）价格，都有大幅下跌的风险。无论如何，未来五年内人们认为当前股市价格便宜的可能性微乎其微。不过，就算是市场全面转熊，也不会实质性地影响到咱们套利类投资（work-outs）的市场价值。
If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio.
如果整个市场回到低估状态，我们不仅可能会把所有资金都投入到低估类投资（general issues）中，甚至不排除借些钱加点杠杆购买。反之，假如市场继续大幅走高，我们计划获利了结低估类投资，减少其持仓，并增加套利类投资组合比重。”
All of the above is not intended to imply that marke analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.
The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word “moderate” since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market, is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.
去年，股市温和下跌。我之所以强调“温和”二字，是因为媒体和刚入市的股民总倾向于渲染出一幅股价暴跌的情景。事实上，在我看来，股价的跌幅远不及当前经济形势下公司盈利能力的下滑幅度。这表明广大股民仍然非常看好蓝筹股和整体经济前景。我无意预测经济或股市走向。说这么多，只是想消除大家关于股票已经大幅下跌或者整体市场处于低位的错觉。基于长期投资价值而言，我仍然认为当前股市已被高估。
Our Activities in 1957
1957 年的投资活动
The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term “work-out” is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15.
市场的下跌创造了更多的投资低估类股票机会。所以，与去年相比，我们投资组合中的低估类持仓重于套利类。也许有必要解释一下“套利类”投资。套利类投资的获利是基于某些特定的公司行为，而不是像低估类投资受益于一般意义的股价上涨。套利投资机会往往蕴含于公司出售、合并、清算、收购等商业行为中。其投资风险在于原本计划好的商业行为被打乱或者被终止，而非经济形势的恶化和股市的普遍下跌。1956年末，我们持有的低估类和套利类仓位比例为 70: 30，现在则是 85: 15。
During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.
去年，我们有两只股票的持股数量已经达到可以参与公司某些决策的规模。其中一只股票的仓位占某些合伙人投资组合的比例在10%到20%之间，另一只占比约为5%。虽然这两只股票大概要三到五年后才会有收益，不过当下来看，它们都具有低风险高年化收益率的潜力。虽然它们不属于套利类投资，但同样也不受大盘走势影响。当然，如果未来市场大幅上涨，我预计这部分投资可能会跑输市场。
Results for 1957
1957 年的业绩
In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.
我们于 1956 年成立的三家合伙企业在 1957 年大幅跑赢市场。道琼斯工业指数去年年初站上了 499 点，年末收于 435 点，下跌 64 点。考虑买入指数可获得 22 点的股息，全年实际亏损降低到 42 点或 8.470%。投资大多数基金获得的差不多就是这个收益，据我所知，今年没有哪一个投资于股票的基金取得了正收益。
All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes the importance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.
按照 1956 年末的净值计算，1956 年成立的三家合伙企业在1957年分别取得了 6.2%、7.8% 和 25% 的收益率。你们自然会问，尤其是前两家合伙企业的合伙人，为何最后一家合伙企业的业绩如此出众？这个业绩差异凸显了短期内运气的重要作用，特别是资金到账的时间的影响。第三家合伙企业成立时间最晚，当时市场正好处于低位，有几只股票价格还特别便宜。由于第三家合伙企业的可用资金充裕，于是我买入了大量仓位。而先前成立的两家合伙企业的大部分资金前期已被投资出去，因此配置在这几只便宜股票的仓位很小。
Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages[^2], so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.
所有合伙企业基本上都投资同样的股票，持股比例也相差不多。然而，由于资金可用时间不同，市场估值水平不同，所以刚开始时（特别是成立初期）业绩差异将明显大于后续年份。长期来看，我的业绩目标是每年超越指数[^2] 10%，对于三家合伙企业而言，因为 1957 年业绩均超过目标，所以该年是非常成功的一年。
[^2]
译注： 巴菲特在此指的是道琼斯工业平均指数（DJIA）。
Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.
1957 年年中新成立的两家合伙企业，业绩表现与市场指数大致相当，自成立以来下跌了大约 12%。现在他们的投资组合正逐渐向 1956 年成立的合伙企业靠拢，未来把所有合伙企业看作整体的业绩将更具可比性。
Interpretation of results
业绩解读
To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.
我们 1957 年的业绩能超越指数，某种程度上是因为今年大多数股票表现普遍低迷。相对而言，我们在熊市的业绩可能会好于牛市。因此，我们应当正视上述业绩，毕竟行情不好的年份我们本就应该比指数表现得更好。而在股市整体大幅上涨的年份里，只要能跟上指数涨幅，我就非常满意了。
I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.
我可以肯定地说，与 1956 年末相比，1957 年末我们的投资组合价值更高了。这得益于两个因素，一是普遍更低的股价，二是有充足的买入时间。要买入更多严重低估的股票，得有些许耐心。前面我提到我们最大的一笔持仓占某些合伙企业资产的 10% 到 20%。我计划将这只股票在所有的合伙企业资产中都配置到 20% 的仓位，但这不可能一步到位。毫无疑问，在购买股票期间，我们最希望看到的是股价横盘或下跌，而不是上涨。因此，有时候我们相当一部分的投资组合可能处于静待播种尚未收获状态。这个投资策略需要耐心，但会带来最高的长期收益。
I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.
我尽可能在信中谈论我认为大家都关心的话题，在不透露具体个股的情况下，尽量多地阐述我们的投资理念。如果对我们的投资活动有任何问题，欢迎来信垂询。
1958 年 2 月