原文信息：
- 标题：1969 May Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1969-05-29
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
May 29th, 1969
To My Partners:
致我的合伙人：
About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives.
大概18个月前，我曾经写信给你们说因为投资环境的改变以及个人的原因使得我调整了我们将来的投资收益目标。
The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters) has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”)
我在那时讨论的投资环境（我在其他信中也曾经有过各类描述），随着时间的流逝，已经变得越来越差并成为一种阻碍。也许我只是缺乏思维灵活性。(一位观察家在评论年过四十的证券分析师时说： “他们知道太多不再正确的事情”）。
However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our 3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stock at market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market.
然而，对于我来说：（1）对于注重“量的因素”的分析者来说，在过去二十年的不停蒸发下，投资的机会基本已经消失了；（2）我们现在高达1亿美元的资产，让我们无法投资于看起来已经是不毛之地的投资市场中的大部分公司，因为少于300万的投资对于我们的整体收益没有实质的影响，而这就排除了那些市值小于1亿美元的股票；（3）对投资业绩兴趣的不断增大，创造了一个越来越以短期为导向、投机性（在我看来）更强的市场。
The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn’t worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly. I can’t help being competitive. I know I don’t want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop.
我在1967年10月9日的信中说，个人因素是调整我们投资收益目标的最主要因素。我说希望不用再将100%的精力专注于巴菲特合伙有限公司上。过去18个月，我无法通过这场测试。信中说：“我希望较低的目标可以只需要较低的努力”。实际上并不能如此。只要我还在“舞台”之上，还要继续公布定期投资收益，并为很多实际上100%的净资产都在合伙公司的合伙人管理资产，我就无法将精力转向任何非巴菲特合伙有限公司的事务。只要参加任何公开的事情，我都无法不争强好胜。但是，我知道我不想我的一生都被追逐投资收益这样的兔子所占据。想要慢下来的唯一办法就是停下来。
Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire. There are, of course, a number of tax and legal problems in connection with liquidating the Partnership, but overall, I am concerned with working out a plan that attains the following objectives:
所以，年底之前，我打算正式通知所有有限合伙人，我将退休。当然，会存在一些关于清算合伙公司的税收和法律上的问题。不过，我将会就以下几个方面制定一个计划：
- The most important item is that I have an alternative regarding money management to suggest to the many partners who do not want to handle this themselves. Some partners of course, have alternatives of their own in which they have confidence and find quite acceptable. To the others, however, I will not hand over their money with a “good luck”. I intend to suggest an alternative money manager to whom I will entrust funds of my relatives and others for whom I have lifetime financial responsibility. This manager has integrity and ability and will probably perform as well or better than I would in the future (although nowhere close to what he or I have achieved in the past). He will be available to any partner, so that no minimum size for accounts will cause any of you a problem. I intend, in the future, to keep in general touch with what he is doing, but only on an infrequent basis with any advice on my part largely limited to a negative type.
最重要的是，我将会给那些不想自己管理资金的合伙人，一个资金管理的可替代选择。有一些合伙人有他们信任并觉得合适的选择。不过，对于其他人，我不会以“祝你好运”来对待他们的资金。我会推荐一个资金管理者，使我能够放心地让我的亲戚和其他我一生都负有财务责任的人将他们的资金交予这个人管理。这个管理者诚信且有能力，很可能会和我将来的表现一样甚至更好（尽管不能达到我和他以前已经取得的成绩）。他会接纳所有的合伙人，没有最小投资金额限制你们。未来，我会继续与他保持联系，但是从我的角度看在某种程度上只是作为一个被动的建议者。
- I want all partners to have the option of receiving cash and possibly readily marketable securities (there will probably be only one where this will apply) where I like both the prospects and price but which partners will be able to freely convert to cash if they wish.
我希望所有的合伙人都会选择收取现金和市场化程度较高的证券（可能在清算后只会剩下一个）。我非常喜欢这个证券的前景和价格，而且合伙人们也可以非常方便的把它转换成现金。
- However, I also want all partners to have the option of maintaining their proportional interests in our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) and one other small “restricted” holding. Because these securities will be valued unilaterally by me at fair value, I feel it is essential that, if you wish, you can maintain your proportionate interest at such valuation.
不过，我也希望所有的合伙人都会选择继续持有我们合伙基金控股的两家公司（Diversified Retailing Company Inc.和Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）的相应股权以及另一个较小的流动性“受限”的持股。因为这些证券主要靠我一个人给出公允估值，所以你们能够在这个价格下保有你们的股份，是我认为非常重要的。
However, these securities are not freely marketable (various SEC restrictions apply to “control” stock and non-registered stock) and they will probably be both non-transferable and non-income -producing for a considerable period of time. Therefore, I want you to be able to go either way in our liquidation - either stick with the restricted securities or take cash equivalent. I strongly like all of the people running our controlled businesses (joined now by the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, a $100 million plus, extremely well-run bank, purchased by Berkshire Hathaway earlier this year), and want the relationship to be life long. I certainly have no desire to sell a good controlled business run by people I like and admire, merely to obtain a fancy price. However, specific conditions may cause the sale of one operating unit at some point.
然而，这些证券无法在公开市场自由交易（SEC对控股股票和不记名股票有很多限制），而且它们很可能无法交易并且在很长时间内不会带来收入。所以，我想让你们在清算过程中有机会选择任何一种方式——继续持有这些“受限”证券或等价换成现金。我非常喜欢我们控股公司现在的管理层（今年通过H-B，我们又购买了伊利诺伊州罗克福德的Illinois National Bank and Trust Company，体量为1亿多美元，是运营及其良好的银行），并且想一生都和他们保持这个关系。我肯定不会因为一个较好的价格，就想着要出售一家由我非常喜欢和尊敬的人管理的控股公司。不过，某些特殊情况下可能会出售某个运营单元。
I believe we will have a liquidation program which will accomplish the above objectives. Our activities in this regard should cause no change in your tax planning for 1969.
我相信我们会制定一个可以实现上述目标的计划。我们的这项工作不会影响你们1969年的税收计划。
One final objective, I would like very much to achieve (but which just isn’t going to happen) is to go out with a bang. I hate to end with a poor year, but we are going to have one in 1969. My best guess is that at yearend, allowing for a substantial increase in value of controlled companies (against which all partners except me will have the option of taking cash), we will show a breakeven result for 1969 before any monthly payments to partners. This will be true even if the market should advance substantially between now and yearend, since we will not be in any important position which will expose us to much upside potential.
最后一个目标，我非常想要达到（但是几乎不可能达到）的是能够以很好的收益结束合伙基金。我讨厌以表现较差的一年作为结束，但是或许1969年是这样的年份。我猜测，加上我们所控股公司大量的价值增长（如果这样，或许除了我之外所有的合伙人都会选择要现金），在扣除“月度支付”之前，在年底最好的结果是我们1969年能够收支平衡。即使股票市场从现在到年底有大幅上涨，但我们已经没有任何重要的仓位跟着大盘上涨了，所以上述的猜测很有可能是正确的。
Our experience in workouts this year has been atrocious - during this period I have felt like the bird that inadvertently flew into the middle of a badminton game. We are not alone in such experience, but it came at a time when we were toward the upper limit of what has been our historical range of percentage commitment in this category.
我们今年在”Workouts”类投资上的经验非常不好，这段时期我感觉像一只飞进了羽毛球赛场的小鸟。我们的这种遭遇不止一次了，但是它发生的时间是在这类投资的比例到达了历史最高点，已接近我们最高的比例限制的时候。
Documenting one’s boners is unpleasant business. I find “selective reporting” even more distasteful. Our poor experience this year is 100% my fault. It did not reflect bad luck, but rather an improper assessment of a very fast-developing governmental trend. Paradoxically, I have long believed the government should have been doing (in terms of the problem attacked – not necessarily the means utilized) what it finally did - in other words, on an overall basis, I believe the general goal of the activity which has cost us substantial money is socially desirable and have so preached for some time. Nevertheless, I didn’t think it would happen. I never believe in mixing what I think should happen (socially) with what I think will happen in making decisions - in this case, we would be some millions better off if I had.
记录愚蠢的错误是件不愉快的事情，但是我认为“选择性的报告”更加令人不舒服。我们今年较差的表现，百分之百要归咎于我自己。这并不是因为坏运气，而是因为对快速变幻的政府趋势的不当评估。自相矛盾的是，我曾一直认为政府应当（就所针对的问题而言，不是所使用的手段）会做这些现在已经做了的事情。换句话说，总体来看，我认为这个浪费了我们大量资金的项目所想要达成的目标是公众想要的，而且有时确实也是如此宣传的。但是，我认为实际上它不会发生。在做决定的时候，我从来不认为应当将我认为（社会）需要发生的和实际上可能会发生的事情混在一起。在这个案例中，或许如果我这样做了，结果会好一万倍。
Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don’t see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to “get lucky” with other people’s money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don’t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand just so I can go out a hero.
当然坦白说，尽管有上述的种种因素。如果我仍然能够有一些一流的好主意，我仍将在1970年或1971年继续运营我们的合伙公司。不是因为我想要这样做，而只是因为我非常希望以好年份而不是坏年份作为结束。但是，我只是无法看到任何合理的、能够获得好年份的希望，并且我不想在黑暗中摸索并期望用别人的资金来“获取好运”。我无法适应现在的市场环境，我也不想通过尝试玩我无法理解的游戏，来破坏既有的良好记录，以便我在退出时还能像个英雄一样。
Therefore, we will be liquidating holdings throughout the year, working toward a residual of the controlled companies, the one “investment letter” security, the one marketable security with favorable long-term prospects, and the miscellaneous “stubs”, etc. of small total value which will take several years to clean up in the Workout category.
所以，我们将在今年清算我们所持有的投资，只留下我们控股的公司、一个“存信股票”1、一个有非常好长期前景的公开市场证券，还有一些资金较小且需要数年时间才能处理完的“Workouts”类投资。
I have written this letter a little early in lieu of the mid-year letter. Once I made a decision, I wanted you to know. I also wanted to be available in Omaha for a period after you received this letter to clear up anything that may be confusing in it. In July, I expect to be in California.
相比平常的年中信，我较早的写好了这封信。因为我一旦做出决定，就想让你们马上知道。另外，我也想在你们收到信后的一段时间内，我还在奥马哈，以便澄清你们的疑虑。到了7月份，我很可能会去加利福尼亚。
Some of you are going to ask, “What do you plan to do?” I don’t have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years.
有些人会问：“你接下来计划做什么？”对此我没有答案。不过，我知道我60岁时想要达到的个人目标，会跟我20岁时最想做的事不一样。所以，除非我从成年后第一个18年里所做的、耗尽了我所有时间和精力的事情中脱身出来，否则我无法在以后的数年里开展适应新环境的事情。
We will have a letter out in the Fall, probably October, elaborating on the liquidation procedure, the investment advisor suggestion, etc…
在秋天，很可能是10月份，我会再写一封信，讨论清算程序、投资咨询建议等等。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB/glk
Footnotes
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非公开上市或交易受限制的股票. ↩