原文信息：
- 标题：1968 Semi-annual Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1968-07-11
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
July 11th, 1968
First Half Performance
上半年的表现
During the first half of 1968, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average declined fractionally from 905 to 898. Ownership of the Dow would also have produced dividends of about $15 during the half, resulting in an overall gain of 0.9% for that Average. The Dow, once again, was an anemic competitor for most investment managers, although it was not surpassed by anything like the margins of 1967.
在1968年上半年，道琼斯工业指数从905点下降到898点，加上15美元的分红，道指的平均收益率为0.9%。对于大多数投资经理来说，道指再次成为较弱的竞争对手，尽管他们今年超出道指的幅度没有1967年那么大。
Our own performance was unusually good during the first half, with an overall gain of 16% excluding any change in valuation for controlled companies (which represented slightly over one-third of net assets at the beginning of the year). However, any release of adrenalin is unwarranted. Our marketable security investments are heavily concentrated in a few situations, making relative performance potentially more volatile than in widely diversified investment vehicles. Our long term performance goals are as stated in the revised “Ground Rules” and I will be quite happy if we achieve those limited objectives over a period of years. The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual basis:
我们在上半年表现的异常好。不计入我们所控股的公司（在年初的时候，它们占了我们净资产的1/3强）的价值变动，我们整体的收益率达到16%。但是任何的兴奋和激动都是没有必要的。因为我们在公开市场上的投资非常集中在几只股票上，使得我们相对表现的潜在波动幅度，比那些进行多元化的投资机构要大的多。我们的长期收益目标已经在修订后的“基本原则”中列明，如果多年的年均收益率能够达到这个较低的目标，我就已经非常开心了。下表按照惯例总结了最新的表现：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%
1965|14.2%|47.2%|36.9%
1966|-15.6%|20.4%|16.8%
1967|19.0%|35.9%|28.4%
1st half 1968|0.9%|16.0%|13.5%
Cumulative results|167.7%|1880.0%|1072.0%
Annual compounded rate|8.9%|29.6%|23.8%
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
Although we revise valuations of our controlled companies only at yearend, it presently appears that our share of their 1968 earnings will be something over $3 million. Those with primary responsibility for their operations, Ken Chace at Berkshire Hathaway, Louis Kohn at Hochschild Kohn, Jack Ringwalt at National Indemnity and Ben Rosner at Associated Cotton Shops, continue to meld effort and ability into results.
尽管我们只在年底对我们所控股的公司进行重新估值，但是现在很明显，我们所持有的控股公司的股权在1968年的收益，将会超过300万美元。这些公司的主要负责人，Berkshire Hathaway的Ken Chace，Hochschild Kohn的Louis Kohn，National Indemnity的Jack Ringwalt和Associated Cotton Shops的Ben Rosner，继续用他们的努力和能力创造出了这些成果。
This year, Diversified Retailing Company (owner of Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) issued its first published annual report. This was occasioned by the public sale of debentures to approximately 1,000 investors last December. Thus, DRC is in the rather unusual position of being a public company from a creditors’ viewpoint, but a private one (there are three stockholders -BPL owns 80%) for ownership purposes. I am enclosing the DRC report with this letter (except where duplicates go to one house hold) and plan to continue to send them along with future mid-year letters.
今年，Diversified Retailing Company（简称DRC，它拥有Hochschild Kohn和Associated Cotton Shops）首次公开发布了它的年报。主要是因为它在去年12月向近1000名投资者公开发售了债券。虽然从借贷者的角度来看，DRC是一个特殊的公众公司。但是，对于投资者来说，它是一家私营公司（它有三个股东，巴菲特合伙有限公司拥有80%的股权）。我在这封信中随附了DRC的报告（除非报告会重复寄给一个家庭），以后每年的年中信也将继续随附这份报告。
As I have mentioned before, we cannot make the same sort of money out of permanent ownership of controlled businesses that can be made from buying and reselling such businesses, or from skilled investment in marketable securities. Nevertheless, they offer a pleasant long term form of activity (when conducted in conjunction with high grade, able people) at satisfactory rates of return.
就像我之前提到过的，我们不可能在我们永久持有的“Controls”类型的企业上，通过买入和卖出或像有技巧的投资于公开市场证券那样，来获取收益。不过它们提供了一种令人愉悦的、回报率令人相当满意的长期投资机会（也是和地位高、能力强的人建立联系的机会）。
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the form sheet on the usual investment companies:
下面是投资公司的相关收益：
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1964|15.9%|14.3%|13.6%|12.6%|18.7%|22.3%
1965|10.2%|9.8%|19.0%|10.7%|14.2%|36.9%
1966|-7.7%|-10.0%|-2.6%|-6.9%|-15.6%|16.8%
1967|20.0%|22.8%|28.0%|25.4%|19.0%|28.4%
1st half 1968|5.1%|2.8%|4.4%|2.0%|0.9%|13.5%
Cumulative Results|175.7%|154.5%|218.6%|186.7%|167.7%|1072.0%
Annual Compounded Rate|9.2%|8.5%|10.6%|9.6%|8.9%|23.8%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1968 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957 -1967. Estimated for first half of 1968.
（2）
1957-1966年数据来源于1966年Moody银行和金融手册；1968年上半年数据为估计值。
Due to a sluggish performance by the Dow in the last few years, the four big funds now have, on average, about a one-half point per annum advantage over the Dow for the full period.
因为道指过去几年不太好的表现，四家大型基金从1957年到现在的平均收益率超过了道指1.5个百分点。
The Present Environment
现在的投资环境
I make no effort to predict the course of general business or the stock market. Period. However, currently there are practices snowballing in the security markets and business world which, while devoid of short term predictive value, bother me as to possible long term consequences.
我并没有试图去预测股票市场或者是商业的总体情况。然而目前在证券市场和商业世界中，有一些做法如滚雪球般越滚越大，虽然它们没有任何短期预测价值，但是长期的影响却让我感到不安。
I know that some of you are not particularly interested (and shouldn’t be) in what is taking place on the financial stage. For those who are, I am enclosing a reprint of an unusually clear and simple article which lays bare just what is occurring on a mushrooming scale. Spectacular amounts of money are being made by those participating (whether as originators, top employees. professional advisors, investment bankers, stock speculators, etc… ) in the chain-letter type stock-promotion vogue. The game is being played by the gullible, the self-hypnotized, and the cynical. To create the proper illusions, it frequently requires accounting distortions (one particularly progressive entrepreneur told me he believed in “bold, imaginative accounting”), tricks of capitalization and camouflage of the true nature of the operating businesses involved. The end product is popular, respectable and immensely profitable (I’ll let the philosophers figure in which order those adjectives should be placed).
我知道你们有些人对在金融界发生的事情不太感兴趣（也没必要）。对于那些感兴趣的人，我提供了一个思路异常清晰且简单的文章的复印件，这在如雨后春笋般层出不穷的文章中非常少见。大量的金钱被这些参与到股价链式反应的人（包括创始人、高级管理者、专业咨询者、投资银行家、股票投机者等等）创造出来。这场游戏的玩家是那些轻信者、自我催眠者和愤世嫉俗者。为了创造合理的幻想，经常需要使用扭曲的会计方法（一个很激进的企业家曾告诉过我，他相信“大胆有想象力的会计方法”）、资本配置的伎俩和对公司真实运营情况的伪装。最终的产品是流行、体面且巨大的盈利（我会让哲学家来指出这几个形容词应该如何排序）。
Quite candidly, our own performance has been substantially improved on an indirect basis because of the fall-out from such activities. To create an ever widening circle of chain letters requires increasing amounts of corporate raw material and this has caused many intrinsically cheap (and not so cheap) stocks to come to life. When we have been the owners of such stocks, we have reaped market rewards much more promptly than might otherwise have been the case. The appetite for such companies, however, tends to substantially diminish the number of fundamentally attractive investments which remain.
坦率的说，因为这些情况的存在，我们自己的收益间接受到了非常大的提升。为了扩大这种链式反应，需要增加新的企业素材，这就导致了很多与内在价值相比价格较为便宜（但不是特别便宜）的股票焕发了活力。因为我们拥有一些这样的股票，所以我们收割市场馈赠的速度要比没有这类股票时迅速得多。但是对这种公司的需求，导致剩下的非常具有吸引力的投资机会大幅减少了。
I believe the odds are good that, when the stock market and business history of this period is being written, the phenomenon described in Mr. May’s article will be regarded as of major importance, and perhaps characterized as a mania. You should realize, however, that his “The Emperor Has No Clothes” approach is at odds (or dismissed with a “SO What?” or an “Enjoy, Enjoy”) with the views of most investment banking houses and currently successful investment managers. We live in an investment world, populated not by those who must be logically persuaded to believe, but by the hopeful, credulous and greedy, grasping for an excuse to believe.
我认为这样的概率很高：当记录这段时间的股票市场和商业历史时，May先生的文章中所描述的现象将会被认为是最重要的，或许会被认为描述了最典型的疯狂特征。不过你需要意识到他在“皇帝没穿新装”这篇文章中的说法与大部分投资银行和现在成功的投资经理们的看法完全相反（或许他们会用“这又怎样？”或“享受吧！”来回应）。我们所在的投资界，成为主流的不是那些因为有逻辑而相信的人，而是那些怀抱希望、易受骗、贪婪、找个借口就相信的人。
Finally, for a magnificent account of the current financial scene, you should hurry out and get a copy of “The Money Game” by Adam Smith. It is loaded with insights and supreme wit. (Note: Despite my current “Support Your Local Postmaster” drive, I am not enclosing the book with this letter - it retails for $6.95.)
最后，想要了解当前金融界壮观的流水账，你应该赶紧去买一本Adam Smith的《金钱游戏》。这本书充满了洞见和聪明才智。(注：尽管我正在开展“支持当地邮政局长”的活动，但我不会随信附上这本书——它的零售价为6.95美元）。
Taxes
税收
Several unusual factors make the tax figure even more difficult than usual to estimate this year. We will undoubtedly have an above average amount of ordinary income. The picture on short term and long term capital gain is subject to unusually substantial variance. At the beginning of the year, I suggested that you use an 8% ordinary income factor (it won’t come in this manner but this figure embodies an adjustment for long term capital gain) applied to your BPL capital account on an interim basis to compute quarterly tax estimates. If a figure different from 8% seems more appropriate for your September 15th quarterly estimate. I will let you know by September 5th. If no change is necessary, you will next hear from me on November 1st with the Commitment Letter for 1969.
几个不常见的因素使得对税收的估计比往年更困难。毫无疑问，我们会获得超出平均的日常收入。但短期和长期的资本利得会有异常大的波动幅度。在今年年初，我建议你们用平常使用的8%的收入因子（目前来看这个数据可能不准确，但它反应了对长期收益的调整）来计算每季度的纳税预估值。如果对9月15日的季度估计值有比8%更合适的数据，我会在9月5日前告诉你们。如果没必要调整，你们将会在11月1日收到下一封信，此信会随附1969年的投资承诺协议。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB/glk