原文信息：
- 标题：1967 Semi-annual Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1967-07-12
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
July 12, 1967
First Half Performance
上半年的表现
Again, this is being ,written in late June prior to the family’s trip to California. To maintain the usual chronological symmetry (I try to sublimate my aesthetic urges when it comes to creating symmetry in the profit and loss statement), I will leave a few blanks and trust that the conclusions look appropriate when the figures are entered.
由于我们全家要到加利福尼亚去，所以我再次在6月底前写好了这封信。为了保持我们一向的格式（当盈利和损失的可能性是一样的时候，我用我的审美来使之升华），我会留下一些空格，并确信当数据填上去的时候会使结论看起来很合适。
We began 1967 on a traumatic note with January turning out to be one of the worst months we have experienced with a plus 3.3% for BPL versus a plus 8.5% for the Dow. Despite this sour start, we finished the half about plus 21% for an edge of 9.6 percentage points over the Dow. Again, as throughout 1966, the Dow was a relatively easy competitor (it won’t be every year, prevailing thinking to the contrary notwithstanding) and a large majority of investment managers outdid this yardstick. The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual basis:
1967年一月份是令我们非常痛苦的一个月，这也是我们投资史上最差的一个月之一，我们的收益为3.3%而道指涨幅为8.5%。尽管开局很糟糕，但是我们上半年的收益是21%，超越了道指9.6个百分点。就像1966年一样，道指再次很容易被超越（不会每年都是这样，最好反过来想），大部分投资公司都表现的比它好。下表列出了道琼斯指数变化、合伙基金（在分成给普通合伙人之前）以及有限合伙人的收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%
1965|14.2%|47.2%|36.9%
1966|-15.6%|20.4%|16.8%
1st half 1967|11.4%|21.0%|17.3%
Cumulative results|148.3%|1419.8%|843.3%
Annual compounded rate|9.1%|29.6%|23.8%
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
BPL’s performance during the first hall reflects no change in valuation of our controlled companies and was thus achieved solely by the 63.3% of our net assets invested in marketable securities at the beginning of the year.
巴菲特合伙有限公司在上半年的表现没有计算我们“Controls”类型投资的价值变动。所以上半年的全部收益都来自于年初投资在公开市场证券上占净资产63.3%部分的变动。
Any revaluation of Diversified Retailing Company (DRC) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (B-H) will be made in December prior to the time the commitment letters become final and will be based upon all relevant criteria (including current operating, market and credit conditions) at that time.
我们将会在12月承诺协议生效前对Diversified Retailing Company （DRC，多元零售公司）和Berkshire Hathaway Inc. （B-H，伯克希尔哈撒韦）重新估值。这个估值会基于那时所有相关的因素（包括当时的运营、市场、信贷等情况）。
Both DRC and B-H made important acquisitions during the first half. The overall progress of DRC (80% owned) and both of its subsidiaries (Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) is highly satisfactory. However, B-H is experiencing and faces real difficulties in the textile business, while I don’t presently foresee any loss in underlying values. I similarly see no prospect of a good return on the assets employed in the textile business. Therefore, this segment of our portfolio will be a substantial drag on our relative performance (as it has been during the first half) if the Dow continues to advance. Such relative performance with controlled companies is expected in a strongly advancing market, but is accentuated when the business is making no progress. As a friend of mine says. “Experience is what you find when you’re looking for something else.”
上半年DRC和B-H都进行了重要的收购。DRC（我们拥有80%）的整体情况以及他的子公司（Hochschild Kohn 和Associated Cotton Shops）都非常令人满意。不过，B-H正在经历和面临着纺织行业真正的困难，尽管我现在还没有看到它的价值会有损失。同样的，我也没有看到布署在纺织行业的资产会带来好收益。所以，如果道指继续上涨，这部分投资将会拖后我们的相对表现（就像它们在上半年的情况）。这种包含“Controls”投资的相对低迷的表现在快速上升的市场中是正常的，但当这些投资没有进展时，它们就会显得更突兀。就像我一个朋友说的：“经验就是你寻找别的东西时所找到的东西”。
Investment Companies
投资公司
The usual comparison follows showing the results of the two largest open-end and two largest closed-end investment companies which pursue a policy of 95-100% investment in common stocks.
下表显示了我们经常与之对比的两家最大的开放式基金和两家最大的封闭式基金的数据，它们有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1964|15.9%|14.3%|13.6%|12.6%|18.7%|22.3%
1965|10.2%|9.8%|19.0%|10.7%|14.2%|36.9%
1966|-7.7%|-10.0%|-2.6%|-6.9%|-15.6%|16.8%
1st half 1967|11.3%|12.3%|19.3%|14.4%|11.4%|17.3%
Cumulative Results|143.3%|126.4%|185.4%|156.8%|148.3%|843.3%
Annual Compounded Rate|8.9%|8.1%|10.5%|9.4%|9.1%|23.8%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1967 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1966. Estimated for first half of 1967.
（2）
1957-1966年数据来源于1967年Moody银行和金融手册；1967年上半年数据为估计值。
The tide continues to be far more important than the swimmers.
潮流仍比游泳者更重要。
Taxes
税收
We entered 1967 with unrealized gains of 7,084,104 so it appears likely that we will realize in 1967 a fairly substantial portion of the unrealized gain attributable to your interest at the beginning of the year. This amount was reported to you as Item 3 of our February 2, 1967 letter. A copy of that letter, along with a tax letter, will be mailed to you in November giving a rough idea of the tax situation at that time.
我们1967年初账面浮盈为16,361,974美元。到6月30日，我们已经实现的净资产收益为7,084,104美元，所以你们在合伙基金中年初账面浮盈的很大一部分都会在1967年变成利得。这部分在1967年2月2日的信中已经向你们报告过了。这封信的复印件以及关于税收的另一封信，将会在11月寄给你们，在那时会提供关于税收的大概情况。
As I regularly suggest, the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1967 as your actual tax was for 1966. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
就像我经常建议的那样，对于短期估计的安全做法是按照1966年的实际税收情况来支付1967年预估的税收。如果这样，你们就不会有任何罚金。
Whatever our final figure, it looks now as if it will be very largely long term capital gain with only minor amounts, if any, of short term gain and ordinary income. (I consider the whole Income-Principal Myth fair game for one of my soft-spoken gently worded critiques. As I told Susie in the early days of our marriage, “Don’t worry about the income; just the outcome.”)
不管我们最终的数据如何，现在看起来长期资本收益占比很大，而短期收益和日常收入占比很小。（我想到了我关于收入原则之谜的温和评价，我和Susie还在新婚燕尔时，我对她说：“不要担心收入，只需要想支出”。）
Miscellaneous
其他
During the first half, Stan Perimeter resigned from the Dissolution Committee because of his present full-time involvement in investment management. Fred Stanback, Jr., a long time partner and experienced investor, was elected by the remaining members to fill the vacancy.
上半年，Stan Perimeter因为要全职做投资而辞去了清算委员会的职位。经过委员会其他成员的选举，我们的一个长期合伙人和很有经验的投资者，Fred Stanback, Jr.接替了这个职位。
As in past years, we will have a report out about November 11 along with the Commitment Letter, and the rough estimate of the 1967 tax situation, etc.
像往年一样，我们会在11月1日左右写一封信，包括投资承诺、对1967年税收状况的估计等等。
However, there will be a special letter (to focus your attention upon it) in October. The subject matter will not relate to change in the Partnership Agreement, but will involve some evolutionary changes in several “Ground Rules” which I want you to have ample time to contemplate before making your plans for 1968. Whereas the Partnership Agreement represents the legal understanding among us, the “Ground Rules” represent the personal understanding and in some ways is the more important document. I consider it essential that any changes be clearly set forth and explained prior to their effect on partnership activity or performance – hence, the October letter.
但是，十月份将会有一封特殊的信（为了让你们集中主意力）。它不会改变合伙协议，但确实会对“投资原则”进行大幅改动。我希望你们能够在制定1968年的计划之前有较多的时间来深思熟虑。合伙协议只代表了我们双方的法律安排，“基本原则”却代表了我们双方的私人互信，所以后者在某种程度上更加重要。我认为任何改变必须要在事前说清楚，所有解释要在实际对合伙基金收益有影响之前说明白。所以，请关注十月份的信。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEBeh