原文信息：
- 标题：1967 October Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1967-10-09
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
October 9, 1967
To My Partners:
致合伙人：
Over the past eleven years, I have consistently set forth as the BPL investment goal an average advantage in our performance of ten percentage points per annum in comparison with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Under the environment that existed during that period. I have considered such an objective difficult but obtainable.
过去11年，我一直把巴菲特合伙有限公司的长期平均收益率比道琼斯工业指数多10个百分点作为目标。在那个时期的市场环境下，我曾经认为这个目标虽然很难但可以实现。
The following conditions now make a change in yardsticks appropriate:
下面的情况让现在的标准发生了改变：
- The market environment has changed progressively over the past decade, resulting in a sharp diminution in the number of obvious quantitatively based investment bargains available;
过去十年股票市场环境日益发生改变，使得价格低于价值的股票急剧减少。
- Mushrooming interest in investment performance (which has its ironical aspects since I was among a lonely few preaching the importance of this some years ago) has created a hyper-reactive pattern of market behavior against which my analytical techniques have limited value;
对投资业绩的极大兴趣（讽刺的是，多年前我曾很孤独的鼓吹它们的重要性）已经让市场行为过度反应，这使得我的分析技巧已基本无用武之地。
- The enlargement of our capital base to about $65 million when applied against a diminishing trickle of good investment ideas has continued to present the problems mentioned in the January, 1967 letter; and
我们基金规模已经增长到6500万美元，与此同时仍在减少的投资想法会继续导致1967年1月信中已提到的问题的产生。
- My own personal interests dictate a less compulsive approach to superior investment results than when I was younger and leaner.
个人的原因导致追求更高投资收益的冲动比我年轻且瘦弱的时候变少了。
Let’s look at each of these factors in more detail.
下面让我详细阐述这些因素。
The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. “Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent - his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.
以投资为目的对证券和商业进行的评估，包含了“质”和“量”的因素。在一个极端上，只看重“质”的因素的分析者会说：“买好的公司（好的前景、行业和管理层等），价格自会照顾好它自己”。在另一个极端上，只看重“量”的人会说：“以好的价格购买，公司（或股票）自会照顾好它们自己”。令人愉悦的是，在证券世界中这两种方式都可以挣到钱。当然，任何分析都会不同程度的包含这两者。在任何学校，分析师进行分类时都会考虑到它们相对于另外因素的比例是多少，而不是只考虑某一组因素而排除另一组因素。
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a “high-probability insight”. This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.
有趣的是，尽管我认为我上的主要是“量”的学校（当我写这些的时候，没有人从课间休息回到课堂——我大概是留下来的最后一位学生），但是这些年我真正重要的想法很大程度上是靠“质”的因素——我称之为“高概率洞见”。这也是我们的收银机不停鸣叫的原因。然而，“质”的方面的洞见不常有，所以这方面的投资机会也不多。不过，“量”的方面不需要洞见，因为那些数据会像棒球棒一样向你脑袋上砸过来，立刻让你明白是否应该投资。所以，在“质”的因素上判断正确的投资者可以赚到大钱。但是，至少在我的观念中，基于显而易见的“量”的因素，可以赚到更确定的钱。
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It may be due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it’s vice versa - I’ll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still may be a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance during the past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
这种统计数据上的争论已经消失很多年了。这也许是因为过去二十年对投资标的持续不断的反复梳理，所以没有了类似30年代的经济动荡对证券的负面偏见和由此产生的数百只新低估证券。也许是因为社会对收购竞标的接受度越来越高，因此使用率也越来越高（也可能是反过来的，我让行为学家们去想吧），而收购竞标自然会把重点放在议价问题上。也许是因为证券分析队伍的爆炸性增长导致对证券的分析力度远远超出了几年前的水平。不管是什么原因，结果是大量的低估证券基本消失了，但时不时仍会有一些——它们取决于“量”的因素，这也是我们的利润来源。也会偶尔有一些我能够对“质”做出判断的证券，这些很可能会给我们带来极大的收益。但是这些证券非常稀少。我们过去三年良好表现的大部分原因要归功于这种类型的一个想法。
The next point of difficulty is the intensified interest in investment performance. For years I have preached the importance of measurement. Consistently I have told partners that unless our performance was better than average, the money should go elsewhere. In recent years this idea has gained momentum throughout the investment (or more importantly, the investing) community. In the last year or two it has started to look a bit like a tidal wave. I think we are witnessing the distortion of a sound idea.
第二个困难是对投资业绩的极大兴趣。很多年来，我一直宣传投资标准的重要性。我也持续告诉合伙人除非我们表现的好于平均水平，否则他们的资金应该投往别处。最近几年，这种想法已经通过投资团体获取了动能，在过去的一两年里似乎开始变成潮流。我认为我们正在见证一个好主意是如何被扭曲的。
I have always cautioned partners that I considered three years a minimum in determining whether we were “performing”. Naturally, as the investment public has taken the bit in its teeth, the time span of expectations has been consistently reduced to the point where investment performance by large aggregates of money is being measured yearly, quarterly, monthly, and perhaps sometimes even more frequently (leading to what is known as “instant research”). The payoff for superior short term performance has become enormous, not only in compensation for results actually achieved, but in the attraction of new money for the next round. Thus a self-generating type of activity has set in which leads to larger and larger amounts of money participating on a shorter and shorter time span. A disturbing corollary is that the vehicle for participation (the particular companies or stocks) becomes progressively less important - at times virtually incidental - as the activity accelerates.
我一直在提醒我们的合伙人注意，我认为三年是衡量投资表现所需的最短时间段。自然而然的，等到公众开始尝到甜头时，他们所期望的时间就不断的缩减，以至于会用每年、每季度、每个月甚至更短的时间来衡量（所谓的“即刻研究”）拥有大量资金的基金的投资表现。超短期的回报变得越来越大，不仅是因为实际上所达成的投资结果，更多的是因为吸引到的下一轮新钱的涌入。所以这种可以自我繁衍的情况就会导致越来越多的钱参与到越来越短的交易之中。令人悲伤的是，当这些活动激增时，它们的载体（特定的公司和股票）变得越来越不重要——这本应是非常重要的。
In my opinion what is resulting is speculation on an increasing scale. This is hardly a new phenomenon; however, a dimension has been added by the growing ranks of professional (in many cases formerly quite docile) investors who feel they must “get aboard”. The game is dignified, of course, by appropriate ceremonies, personages and lexicon. To date it has been highly profitable. It may also be that this is going to be the standard nature of the market in the future. Nevertheless, it is an activity at which I am sure I would not do particularly well. As I said on page five of my last annual letter,
我认为这些导致了投机的激增。很难说这是一个新的现象，然而越来越多的专业投资者（他们以前一般是相当温和的）认为他们必须 “榜上有名”，这也成为了一种刺激因素。当然也因为一些庆典、大人物和专业词汇，使得这场游戏变得似乎崇高起来。到目前为止，他们的盈利都非常好。或许在未来的市场中，这种情况也将持续下去，但是，这种操作肯定是我无法胜任的。就像我在去年的信中提到过的：
“Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called ‘fashion’ investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach – hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.”
“
另外，我们也不会跟随经常流行的、试图以市场行为而不是企业价值来投资证券的做法。这种所谓的“流行”的投资方法在近些年经常能够赚到快而多的收益。它代表了一种投资技术，对于它的合理性，我既无法证实也无法证伪。它完全不能满足我的智力（或许是我的偏见），也很不适合我的品性。我不会用这种方法来投资我自己的资金，当然也绝不会用你们的资金。”
Any form of hyper-activity with large amounts of money in securities markets can create problems for all participants. I make no attempt to guess the action of the stock market and haven’t the foggiest notion as to whether the Dow will be at 600, 900 or 1200 a year from now. Even if there are serious consequences resulting from present and future speculative activity, experience suggests estimates of timing are meaningless. However, I do believe certain conditions that now exist are likely to make activity in markets more difficult for us for the intermediate future.
任何形式的、用大量资金在证券市场上做高频交易的行为都会给所有的参与者带来很大的问题。我并没有试图去预测股票市场的行为，也没有任何关于道指是否会在未来的一年里达到600点、900点或者是1200点的模糊不清的想法。尽管现在和将来的投机活动会产生非常严重的后果，但是经验表明无法预测它们何时会产生。但是我确信现在市场上存在的诸多因素，会使得我们在不远的将来的投资活动变得更加困难。
The above may simply be “old-fogeyism” (after all, I am 37). When the game is no longer being played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, etc. I have been scornful of such behavior by others in the past. I have also seen the penalties incurred by those who evaluate conditions as they were - not as they are. Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
上述的说法或许过于“老派”了（毕竟我已经37岁了）。当游戏不再按照你的方式进行时，一般人都会说新的方式是错的，会导致很大的麻烦等等。在过去我曾经鄙视过其他人的这种行为。我也曾经看到过，用以前的而不是现在的方式，来评判现在的情况的人，已经受到了惩罚。更重要的是我无法跟上现在的情况。但是有一点我是非常清楚的。我不会抛弃之前我能够理解的、符合逻辑的投资方式（尽管实施起来是很困难的）。尽管拥抱新的方式或许意味着可以有更多更容易的利润。但是这种新的方式我无法完全理解，也无法成功的实施，而且或许会导致本金非常大的永久性损失。
The third point of difficulty involves our much greater base of capital. For years my investment ideas were anywhere from 110% to 1000% of our capital. It was difficult for me to conceive that a different condition could ever exist. I promised to tell partners when it did and in my January, 1967 letter had to make good on that promise. Largely because of the two conditions previously mentioned, our greater capital is now something of a drag on performance. I believe it is the least significant factor of the four mentioned, and that if we were operating with one-tenth of our present capital our performance would be little better. However, increased funds are presently a moderately negative factor.
第三个困难是我们更大的资金量。很多年来我的投资点子大概在我们资金量的110%到1000%之间。对于我来说很难想象会有其他不同情况的存在。我承诺过如果发生变化，我会告诉我们的合伙人。所以在1967年1月的信中我履行了这个承诺。主要因为上述的两个原因，我们更大的资金量，现在变成了我们投资收益的一种拖累。我认为这个因素是之前提到过的四个因素中最不重要的。即使我们的资金量是现在的1/10，我们的收益也只会好一点点。但是增加的资金，现在确实是一个较为负面的因素。
The final, and most important, consideration concerns personal motivation. When I started the partnership I set the motor that regulated the treadmill at “ten points better than the DOW”. I was younger, poorer and probably more competitive. Even without the three previously discussed external factors making for poorer performance. I would still feel that changed personal conditions make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill. I have observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities of life, particularly business, continuing (and becoming accentuated as years pass) long after they ceased making sense. Bertrand Russell has related the story of two Lithuanian girls who lived at his manor subsequent to World War I. Regularly each evening after the house was dark, they would sneak out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in their rooms; this despite the fact that food was bountiful at the Russell table. Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the war, it was somewhat out of place in the English countryside. He received assenting nods and continued stealing.
最后而且最重要的是对个人动机的考量。当我开始运营合伙基金的时候，我让脚踏车设立在能够“超越道指10个百分点”的速度上。那时候我更年轻、更贫穷、或许更有竞争力。即使没有之前提过的三个外部因素，我仍旧认为个人情况的改变也会降低脚踏车的速度。我看到过很多案例，即使“习惯”已经不再有意义，但是在生活中特别是在商业活动中仍旧会持续很长的时间（随着时间的流逝会变得更加突出）。Bertrand Russell曾经提到过一战后住在他庄园里的两个女孩的故事。每天晚上熄灯后，她们就会蹑手蹑脚的溜出去偷邻居家的蔬菜，拿回自己的房间里藏起来，尽管实际上Russell家的食物非常丰盛。Russell向女孩们解释说她们的这种行为在战争期间的立陶宛或许很有意义，但是在英国的乡下已经毫无用武之地了。女孩们对他点头认可，但是仍旧继续偷窃。
He finally contented himself with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might seem to the neighbors, was really not so different from that of the elder Rockefeller.
最后他安慰自己说，这些女孩们的行为或许对于邻居来说比较奇怪，但是跟古老的洛克菲勒家族并没有什么不同。
Elementary self-analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all-out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All-out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non-economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
基本的自我分析告诉我，我已经无法全力以赴去完成已经向那些信任我并将资金托付给我的人宣布过的目标。不过，全力以赴也并不会使结果更好。我想有一个能够允许考虑非经济效应的经济目标。这意味着要在投资领域之外活动，或者只是简单的在投资领域之内追寻不能承诺带来较大经济回报的目标。后者或许会是持续投资于一个相对令人满意（但谈不上优秀）的“Controls”类型的目标——我喜欢他们的员工和商业特性，即使另外的投资或许能够带来更高的收益。但是，更有趣的（特别是当个人财富增值较少时）是继续拥有它们，并且希望通过包括金融策略等方面的决策，来提升它们的表现，尽管不会大幅提升。
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long-term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.
所以，我喜欢把自己局限在那些简单、安全、有利可图且令人愉悦的事情上。这不会使我们的运营比以前更保守，因为我认为，从某种程度上我们一直运行的较为保守。长期来看，我们面临的风险并不会减少，只是潜在的收益增长会有所降低。
Specifically, our longer term goal will be to achieve the lesser of 9% per annum or a five percentage point advantage over the Dow. Thus, if the Dow averages -2% over the next five years, I would hope to average +3% but if the Dow averages +12%, I will hope to achieve an average of only +9%. These may be limited objectives, but I consider it no more likely that we will achieve even these more modest results under present conditions than I formerly did that we would achieve our previous goal of a ten percentage point average annual edge over the Dow. Furthermore, I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort (I’m quite sure the converse is true).
不过，我们将会把所期望的长期年化收益率调整到9%和超过道指5个百分点之中的较小者。所以，在接下来的5年里，当道指平均下降-2%时，我希望我们能够获得+3%的收益率；当道指平均上升+12%时，我希望我们能够达到+9%。这些目标或许比较低，但是我认为在当前环境下达成这些目标的可能性，并不比我们之前想要达成的超过道指10个百分点的可能性要高。另外，我希望较低的目标可以只需要较低程度的努力（反过来无疑是正确的）。
I will incorporate this new goal into the Ground Rules to be mailed you about November 1, along with the 1968 Commitment Letter. I wanted to get this letter off to you prior to that mailing so you would have ample time to consider your personal situation, and if necessary get in touch with me to clear up some of the enclosed, before making a decision on 1968. As always, I intend to continue to leave virtually all of my capital (excluding Data Documents stock), along with that of my family, in BPL. What I consider satisfactory and achievable may well be different from what you consider so. Partners with attractive alternative investment opportunities may logically decide that their funds can be better employed elsewhere, and you can be sure I will be wholly in sympathy with such a decision.
我将会在11月1日寄给你们的“基本原则”中将这个新目标写进去，同时附上1968年的投资承诺协议。我想着让你们早些收到这封信，以便有充足的时间考虑你们个人的情况，或者在必要的情况下，可以在做出1968年的决定之前联系我以澄清疑虑。像往常一样，我仍会继续将我和我家庭的全部资产（除了Data Documents的股票）投入到巴菲特合伙有限公司。我认为满意和能够达到的目标，或许跟你们认为的有很大不同。有更具吸引力的选择机会的合伙人，或许会理智的得出他们的资金布署在别处会更好的决定。你们可以放心，对此决定，我完全可以理解。
I have always found behavior most distasteful which publicly announces one set of goals and motivations when actually an entirely different set of factors prevails. Therefore, I have always tried to be l00% candid with you about my goals and personal feelings so you aren’t making important decisions pursuant to phony proclamations (I’ve run into a few of these in our investment experience). Obviously all the conditions enumerated in this letter haven’t appeared overnight. I have been thinking about some of the points involved for a long period of time. You can understand, I am sure, that I wanted to pick a time when past goals had been achieved to set forth a reduction in future goals. I would not want to reduce the speed of the treadmill unless I had fulfilled my objectives to this point.
我一直认为“说一套做一套”的行为令人很不舒服。所以，我一直想要百分百地向你们坦诚我的目标和个人感觉，这样你们就不会因为虚假的声明而做出重大的决定（我曾经在投资中经历过几件类似的事情）。很显然，这封信中所说的情况并不是一夜之间就发生的。对其中几个观点，我已经思考很长时间了。你们或许可以理解，我想要选择一个合适的时间——过去的目标已经实现时，来设立未来较低的目标。除非我已经尽力，否则我实在不愿意降低脚踏车的速度。
Please let me know if I can be of any help in deciphering any portion of this letter.
如果需要进一步阐释这封信的任何内容，请务必告诉我。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB eh