原文信息：
- 标题：1967 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1968-01-24
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
January 24, 1968
Our Performance in
1967 我们在1967年的表现
By most standards, we had a good year in 1967. Our overall performance was plus 35.9% compared to plus 19.0% for the Dow, thus surpassing our previous objective of performance ten points superior to the Dow. Our overall gain was 27,376,667 which has nothing to do with 1967 performance but should give all of you a feeling of vigorous participation in The Great Society on April 15th.
在大多数的标准之下，我们在1967年的收益都非常好。我们的收益是35.92%，而道指的增长率是19.0%。所以我们超越了之前设定的关于高出道指10个百分点的目标。我们的整体收益是19,384,250美元。即使在非常严重的通货膨胀的情况下，这也可以买一大堆百事可乐了。并且因为我们卖掉了在公开市场上持有非常长时期的大量股份，我们的应税所得是27,376,667美元，但是这对1967年的收益并没有什么贡献。不过，这在4月15日会给你们一种踊跃参与建设大同社会的感觉。
The minor thrills described above are tempered by any close observation of what really took place in the stock market during 1967. Probably a greater percentage of participants in the securities markets did substantially better than the Dow last year than in virtually any year in history. In 1967, for many, it rained gold and it paid to be out playing the bass tuba. I don’t have a final tabulation at this time but my guess is that at least 95% of investment companies following a common stock program achieved better results than the Dow - in many cases by very substantial amounts. It was a year when profits achieved were in inverse proportion to age - and I am in the geriatric ward, philosophically.
任何近距离观察了1967年股票市场整体表现的人，对上述的收益就不会过于震惊了。在股票市场上进行投资的绝大部分投资者的收益，超出道指的幅度很有可能比历史上任何一年都要大。在1967年，对于很多人来说天上在下金币；对于表演低音大号的人来说，出去就是在赚钱。现在我还没有取得最终的数据，但是我认为至少95%的投资在普通股上的投资公司取得的收益要好过道指，有些会超出很多。这一年，利润的取得与年龄成反比，但是从投资思想上来说，我已经属于老年人群了。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
下述表格反映了多年来道指、合伙基金分成给普通合伙人之前（超出6%收益的25%）、有限合伙人的收益情况：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%
1965|14.2%|47.2%|36.9%
1966|-15.6%|20.4%|16.8%
1967|19.0%|35.9%|28.4%
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
下表列出了累计收益及年化收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow|Partnership Results|Limited Partners’ Results
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1957 – 58|26.9%|55.6%|44.5%
1957 – 59|52.3%|95.9%|74.7%
1957 – 60|42.9%|140.6%|107.2%
1957 – 61|74.9%|251.0%|181.6%
1957 – 62|61.6%|299.8%|215.1%
1957 – 63|94.9%|454.5%|311.2%
1957 - 64|131.3%|608.7%|402.9%
1957 - 65|164.1%|943.2%|588.5%
1957 - 66|122.9%|1156.0%|704.2%
1957 - 67|165.3%|1606.9%|932.6%
Annual Compounded Rate|9.3%|29.4%|23.6%
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they have stood at the top in size since BPL was formed- this year, however, Dreyfus Fund overtook them) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in conmmon stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
下面我们更新了我们经常与之对比的两家最大的开放式基金（从巴菲特合伙有限公司成立以来，他们一直是最大的，但今年被Dreyfus Fund超越了）和两家最大的封闭式基金的数据。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1964|15.9%|14.3%|13.6%|12.6%|18.7%|22.3%
1965|10.2%|9.8%|19.0%|10.7%|14.2%|36.9%
1966|-7.7%|-10.0%|-2.6%|-6.9%|-15.6%|16.8%
1967|20.0%|22.8%|28.0%|25.4%|19.0%|28.4%
Cumulative Results|162.3%|147.6%|206.2%|181.5%|165.3%|932.6%
Annual Compounded Rate|9.2%|8.6%|10.7%|9.9%|9.3%|23.6%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1967 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1966. Estimated for 1967.
（2）
1957-1966年数据来源于1966年Moody银行和金融手册；1967年数据为估计值。
Last year I said:
“A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities.”
“
一些共同基金和私募基金可以获得比道指更好的收益，而且有一些的收益比巴菲特合伙基金还要好很多。他们的技术跟我们很不相似，而且不在我们的能力范围之内。”
In 1967 this condition intensified. Many investment organizations performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to over 100%. Because of these spectacular results, money, talent and energy are converging in a maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly intensified speculation with concomitant risks -but many of the advocates insist otherwise.
在1967年这种情况更加普遍，很多投资机构表现的要比巴菲特合伙公司要好，他们的收益率超过了100%。因为这些巨大的收益，金钱、智力和精力以最大的限度投入到这些公司中，以求在股票市场上取得巨大且快速的利润。对于我来说，这是伴随着巨大风险的投机行为；但是其他投资者不这样认为。
My mentor, Ben Graham, used to say. “Speculation is neither illegal, immoral nor fattening (financially).” During the past year, it was possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal but if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to expect that we won’t have some discomfort.
我的导师本·格雷厄姆曾经说过：“投机既不是非法的、也不是不道德的，但是也无法让你（在财务上）变胖”。过去的一年。有些人很可能因为不停的进食投机性的甜点而在财务上变得虚胖。我们还在继续吃燕麦，但如果消化不良的情况普遍出现，指望我们一点也不会感到不适，是不太可能的。
Analysis of 1967 Results
关于1967年投资结果的分析
The overall figures given earlier conceal vast differences in profitability by portfolio category during 1967.
之前的整体数据隐藏了我们在1967年不同投资类型投资所获取利润的巨大差异。
We had our worst performance in history in the “Workout” section. In the 1965 letter, this category was defined as,
我们在“Workouts”类投资上取得了有史以来最差的表现。在1965年的信中，这类投资被描述为：
“…securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity — sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category, we are not talking about rumors or inside information pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk does not pertain primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in, to a degree). but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected corporate development does not materialize.”
“……
这是有时间表的一类投资。收益来自于公司的重新安排，例如出售、合并、重组、拆分等等。我们不会根据流言或“内部消息”来做决定，而是基于已公开的声明。除非能从报纸上看到这些声明，否则我们会一直等待。这部分的投资风险跟股票市场的表现无关（或许有些时候有一点关系），而是与能够阻碍既定计划的因素有关。”
The streets were filled with upset applecarts - our applecarts - during 1967. Thus, on an average investment of 153,273. For those of you whose slide rule does not go to such insulting depths, this represents a return of .89 of 1%. While I don’t have complete figures. I doubt that we have been below 10% in any past year. As in other categories, we tend to concentrate our investments in the workout category in just a few situations per year. This technique gives more variation in yearly results than would be the case if we used an across-the-board approach. I believe our approach will result in as great (or greater) profitability on a long-term basis, but you can’t prove it by 1967.
在1967年，这类投资令人失望——特别是我们的投资。我们在这类投资上的平均投资额是17,246,879美元，而总体收益是153,273美元。或许你们之中有些人还没有意识到这是如此令人感到难堪的结果，这代表了投资收益率为0.89%。虽然我手上没有完整的数据，但是我猜测我们以前从来没有低于10%的收益率。就像其他类型的投资一样，我们希望在“Workouts”类型的投资中每年集中投资于几个标的。相比一般的做法，这种方式会使得每年的收益率波动非常大。但是我坚信以长期的角度来看，我们的收益率会非常好，不过在1967年你不能证明这一点。
Our investment in controlled companies was a similar drag on relative performance in 1967, but this is to be expected in strong markets. On an average investment of 2,894,571. I am pleased with this sort of performance, even though this category will continue to underperform if the market continues strong during 1968. Through our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing and Berkshire Hathaway), we acquired two new enterprises in 1967. Associated Cotton Shops and National Indemnity (along with National Fire & Marine, an affiliated company). These acquisitions couldn’t be more gratifying. Everything was as advertised or better. The principal selling executives, Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt, have continued to do a superb job (the only kind they know), and in every respect have far more than lived up to their end of the bargain.
我们“Controls”部分的投资，在1967年也拖累了我们的收益，但这是在牛市中正常的表现。我们投入的资金平均为20,192,776美元，整体收益为2,894,571美元。对于这个收益我比较满意，即使1968年仍然是个大牛市，而这部分的收益继续低于道指。我们在1967年通过我们的两个控股公司（多元零售公司和伯克希尔哈撒韦）收购了两个新的企业—— Cotton Shops和National Indemnity （还有它的子公司National Fire & Marine）。这些收购好的不能再好了，所有的事情都如同广告一样梦幻，甚至有过之而无不及。主要的营销管理者，Ben Rosner和Jack Ringwalt，继续做出超级棒的工作（这也是他们唯一可能的表现），在任何方面都比收购前还要出色。
The satisfying nature of our activity in controlled companies is a minor reason for the moderated investment objectives discussed in the October 9th letter. When I am dealing with people I like, in businesses I find stimulating (what business isn’t ?), and achieving worthwhile overall returns on capital employed (say, 10 -12%), it seems foolish to rush from situation to situation to earn a few more percentage points. It also does not seem sensible to me to trade known pleasant personal relationships with high grade people, at a decent rate of return, for possible irritation, aggravation or worse at potentially higher returns. Hence, we will continue to keep a portion of our capital (but not over 40% because of the possible liquidity requirements arising from the nature of our partnership agreement) invested in controlled operating businesses at an expected rate of return below that inherent in an aggressive stock market operation.
这种令人满意的“Controls”类型投资的特点，只是我们在去年10月9日信中所调低收益目标的一个较为不太重要的原因。当我们能和喜欢的人一起工作、能在有刺激性的行业（哪个行业不是呢？），并且能够达到相对满意的资本回报率时（例如10%-12%），为了追求多出几个点的收益率，而疲于应付各种情况，看起来显得非常愚蠢。虽然收益率相对不是特别高，但是能够和水平比较高的人建立起非常良好的私人关系，对于我来说，把它们换成收益率更高，但是只有让人愤怒、悲伤或更差的人际关系的投资，简直是毫无必要。所以我们会继续将我们的部分资金投资在“Controls”类型的投资上（但是受限于现在合伙协议所要求的流动性，它们的比例不会超过40%），即使他们的收益低于那些更为激进的投资。
With a combined total of 3,047,844, the more alert members of the class will have already concluded we had a whale of a year in the “Generals - Relatively Undervalued” category. On a net average investment of 14,096,593, or 72%. Last year I referred to one investment which substantially outperformed the general market in 1964, 1965 and 1966 and because of its size (the largest proportion we have ever had in anything - we hit our 40% limit) had a very material impact on our overall results and, even more so, this category. This excellent performance continued throughout 1967 and a large portion of total gain was again accounted for by this single security. Our holdings of this security have been very substantially reduced and we have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.
由于我们投资在“Workouts”和“Controls”类型上的资金为37,439,655美元，而总收益为3,047,844美元，较具警觉性的同学已经得出了结论——今年我们最大的收益来源为“Generals-相对低估”类型的投资。我们投资在这种类型上的资金平均为19,487,996美元，我们的总体收益为14,096,593美元，收益率为72%。去年我提到过一项投资，它在1964年1965年和1966年，都获得了大幅超过市场平均水平的收益，而且由于它的规模（在我们所有的投资中占比最大，达到了我们40%的限额），所以对我们的总体收益影响非常大。它在1967年的收益一如既往的非常好，而且我们整体收益的很大一部分都来源于这一只证券。但是我们在这只证券上的仓位已经大幅削减了，所以我们现在在这种类型的投资上，再也没有能够在规模和潜力上与之相比的投资了。
The “Generals - Private Owner” section produced good results last year (5,141,710 average investment), and we have some mildly interesting possibilities in this area at present.
“Generals
-可私有化”类型的投资，去年的结果也比较好（1,297,215美元的平均投资，获取了5,141,710美元的收益）。目前在这种类型的投资中，我们还有一些收益可能较小的投资。
Miscellaneous
其他
We begin the new year with net assets of 1,600,000 withdraw at yearend, primarily because of the reduced objectives announced in the October 9th letter. This makes good sense for them, since most of them have the ability and motivation to surpass our objectives and I am relieved from pushing for results that I probably can’t attain under present conditions.
我们今年年初的净资产是68,108,088美元。我们的合伙人在年底撤资了1,600,000美元，主要因为我们在去年10月9日的信中调低了我们的收益目标。因为他们都很有能力，而且有动机超越我们的目标，所以我认为这对他们有好处。而且我也可以从在当前市场状况下很可能达不到那种收益的困难情况中解脱出来。
Some of those who withdrew (and many who didn’t) asked me, “What do you really mean?” after receiving the October 9th letter. This sort of a question is a little bruising to any author, but I assured them I meant exactly what I had said. I was also asked whether this was an initial stage in the phasing out of the partnership. The answer to this is, “Definitely, no”. As long as partners want to put up their capital alongside of mine and the business is operationally pleasant (and it couldn’t be better), I intend to continue to do business with those who have backed me since tennis shoes.
在接到10月9日的信时，一些撤回资金的人（也有很多没有问过我）问我：“你真正的意思到底是什么？”这种问题对于所有的作者来说都是一种挫伤，但是我跟他们确认了，我的意思就是我所说过的那些话。我也被问到这是否是想要解散合伙基金的开始。对于这个问题的答案是“绝对不是”。只要合伙人想把他们的资金跟我的放在一起，而且这个合伙公司运营得非常令人愉快（现在令人感觉再好不过了），我就会继续跟这些从最开始就支持我的合伙人一起做投资。
Gladys Kaiser has joined us and is doing the same sort of top-notch job that we have long received from Donna, Bill and John. The office group, spouses and children have over $15 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1968, so we have not had a need for NoDoz during business hours.
Gladys Kaiser
加入了我们，他的工作和Donna, Bill以及 John一样，都做的一级棒。我们的办公人员和他们的配偶及孩子们于1968年1月份在巴菲特合伙有限公司拥有的份额为1500万美元，所以我们在上班时间根本不需要咖啡因。
Within a few days, you will receive:
接下来几天，你们会收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1967 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
一封你们缴纳1967年联邦所得税所需要的所有关于巴菲特合伙公司信息的信。这封信中的信息只用于计税。
- An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1967, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
一封Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司关于1967年的审计工作的信，包含对巴菲特合伙公司运营情况和财务情况以及你们个人账户的审计。
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1968. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
一封关于你们在1968年1月1日在合伙基金中的资金份额的信。这些金额已经通过审计。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July15th, summarizing the first half of this year.
如果关于这封信或今年发生的其他事情有任何不清楚的地方，请随时联系我。我的下一封信将会在7月15日发出，用于总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett