原文信息：
- 标题：1966 Semi-annual Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1966-07-12
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
July 12, 1966
First Half Performance
上半年的表现
During the first half of 1966, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) declined from 969.26 to 870.10. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.70 would have been received, reducing the overall loss of the Dow to about 8.7%.
1966年上半年道琼斯工业指数（以下简称“道指”）从969.26点下跌到870.1点，加上拥有道指期间可获得差不多14.70个点的分红，道指在上半年下降了8.7%。
It is my objective and my hope (but not my prediction!) that we achieve over a long period of time, an average yearly advantage of ten percentage points relative to the Dow. During the first half we did considerably better than expected with an overall gain of approximately 8.2%. Such results should be regarded as decidedly abnormal. I have previously complimented partners on the good-natured tolerance they display in shrugging off such unexpected positive variances. The nature of our business is such that over the years, we will not disappoint the many of you who must also desire a test of your capacity for tolerance of negative variances.
我们的目标以及我的希望（但不是我的预测！），是我们的年化收益率能够在一个较长的时期内超出道指10个百分点。上半年我们的表现要比想象中的好，收益大概为8.2%。这种收益可以看作是一种异常。我之前曾经赞美过我们的合伙人在面对这些意料之外的正向波动时能够镇定自若。我们合伙公司的性质就是这样。长时间来看，我们绝不会让大多数合伙人失望，不过你们偶尔也需要忍受反向波动对你们忍耐力的测试。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
下述表格反映了多年来道指、未扣除普通合伙人分成前的合伙基金收益、有限合伙人收益情况。
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%
1965|14.2%|47.2%|36.9%
1st half 1966|-8.7%|8.2%|7.7%
Cumulative results|141.1%|1028.7%|641.5%
Annual compounded rate|9.7%|29.0%|23.5%
- Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
- For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
- For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
Even Samson gets clipped occasionally. If you had invested $100.000 on January 1 equally among -
就连Samson的头发偶尔也会被剪掉1。如果1月1日你将10万美元的资金平均投资在以下的每只股票上：
a. the world’s largest auto company (General Motors);
a
. 全球最大的汽车公司（通用汽车公司）；
b. the world’s largest oil company (Standard of New Jersey);
b
. 全球最大的石油公司（新泽西标准石油公司）；
c. the world’s largest retailing company (Sears Roebuck);
c
. 全球最大的零售公司（西尔斯零售公司）；
d. the world’s largest chemical company (Dupont);
d
. 全球最大的化学公司（杜邦公司）；
e. the world’s largest steel company (U.S. Steel);
e
. 全球最大的钢铁公司（美国钢铁公司）；
f. the world’s largest stockholder-owned insurance company (Aetna);
f
. 全球最大的已上市的保险公司（安泰保险公司）；
g. the world’s largest public utility (American Telephone & Telegraph);
g
. 全球最大的公用事业公司（美国电话电报公司）；
h. the world’s largest bank (Bank of America);
h
. 全球最大的银行（美国银行）；
your total portfolio (including dividends received) would have been worth 100 billion. Everyone of them was selling lower on June 30.
你的投资组合（包含分红）在6月30日的价值为83,370美元，也就是损失了16.6%。上述8个大公司在1月1日的市场价值超过了1,000亿美金；到6月30日时，它们的股价全都下降了。
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the next page we bring up to date our regular comparison with the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
下面我们更新了我们经常与之对比的两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式基金的数据。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。
YEARLY RESULTS
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1964|15.9%|14.3%|13.6%|12.6%|18.7%|22.3%
1965|10.2%|9.8%|19.0%|10.7%|14.2%|36.9%
1st half 1966|-7.9%|-7.9%|-1.0%|-5.2%|-8.7%|7.7%
Cumulative Results|118.1%|106.3%|142.8%|126.9%|141.1%|641.5%
Annual Compounded Rate|8.6%|7.9%|9.8%|9.0%|9.7%|23.5%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1966 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.
（2）
1957-1965年数据来源于1965年Moody银行和金融手册；1966年上半年数据为估计值。
Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its conservative nature. If “conservative” is interpreted to mean “productive of results varying only slightly from average experience” I believe the characterization is proper. Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification among high grade securities. Since, over a long period, “average experience” is likely to be good experience, there is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this form of investment medium.
支持机构投资的人经常强调的是它们保守的特性。如果“保守”的定义是“取得的成绩相对平均值的波动幅度很小”，我认为上述的说法是可以的。这样的投资结果是由广泛多元化的投资于高等级证券所带来的。所以，很长时期以来“表现平平”被认为是好的，典型的投资者们用这种方法来获取相对平均的收益也不能说有什么错。
However, I believe that conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean “subject to substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value than total experience”. This simply has not been achieved, as the record of the four largest funds (presently managing over $5 billion) illustrates. Specifically, the Dow declined in 1957, 1960, 1962 and the first half of 1966. Cumulating the shrinkage in the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline of 20.6%. Following a similar technique for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7%, 20.9%, 22.3% and 24.6%. Including the interim performance for the first half of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the funds declines of 14.4%, 23.1%, 27.1% and 30.6%. Such funds (and I believe their results are quite typical of institutional experience in common stocks) seem to meet the first definition of conservatism but not the second one.
不过我认为最好是将“保守”解释为：“短期或永久价值的下跌幅度比传统方法要低”。就像这四家最大的基金（现在管理着超过50亿美元的资金）所显示的那样，它们并没有达到这种简单的要求。道指在1957、1960、1962和1966年上半年都是下降的，前三个完整年度的累积跌幅是20.6%。与此同时，这四家基金的跌幅分别为9.7%、20.9%、22.3%和24.6%。在1966年上半年，道指的跌幅是27.5%，而这四家公司的跌幅分别是14.4%、23.1%、27.1%和30.6%。这些基金公司（它们的投资结果是投资于普通股票的投资机构的典型代表）看起来比较符合关于保守的前一个定义，而不是后一个。
Most investors would climb a rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the above two interpretations of conservatism. The first might be better labeled “conventionalism” - what it really says is that “when others are making money in the general run of securities, so will we and to about the same degree; when they are losing money, we’ll do it at about the same rate.” This is not to be equated with “when others are making it, we’ll make as much and when they are losing it, we will lose less.” Very few investment programs accomplish the latter - we certainly don’t promise it but we do intend to keep trying. (I have always felt our objectives should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated during the desperate years when Yale was losing eight games a season. Said Herman, “I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.”)
如果能够理解上述两种关于保守的定义的区别，大部分投资者的水平将能够上一个台阶。第一种定义或许称为“保守主义”更为合适，它们的意思是“当别人赚钱时，我们也同样赚钱；当别人亏钱时，我们也一样亏钱”。这不同于“当别人赚钱时，我们也赚的差不多；但当别人亏钱时，我们亏的更少”。很少有机构能够达到后一种情况，我们也无法保证能够如此，但是我们一直在努力。（我一直认为我们目标比Herman Hickman当年的目标要高一些。在耶鲁大学橄榄球队一个赛季输了8场比赛的时候，他说：“我认为我的工作是让校友们愠怒却不反水”。）
Hochschild, Kohn & Co.
During the first half we, and two 10% partners, purchased all of the stock of Hochschild, Kohn & Co., a privately owned Baltimore department store. This is the first time in the history of the Partnership that an entire business has been purchased by negotiation, although we have, from time to time, negotiated purchase of specific important blocks of marketable securities. However, no new principles are involved. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the business are evaluated and weighed against price, both on an absolute basis and relative to other investment opportunities. HK (learn to call it that - I didn’t find out how to pronounce it until the deal was concluded) stacks up fine in all respects.
上半年，我们和另外两个均占比10%的合伙人购买了Hochschild, Kohn & Co.的全部股权，一个私人拥有的巴尔的摩零售商场。这是巴菲特合伙公司首次通过谈判购买整家公司，虽然之前我们时不时会通过谈判购买公开上市公司的大量股权。不过，这里没有什么新的原则。我们会对照价格评估这家企业的“量的因素”和“质的因素”，不仅从绝对价值的角度，也会从相较其他机会的相对价值的角度来评估。HK（我们试着这样叫Hochschild, Kohn & Co.，我发现直到完成了收购我才能将这个名字正确发音）在各方面的表现都很好。
We have topnotch people (both from a personal and business standpoint) handling the operation. Despite the edge that my extensive 75 cents an hour experience at the Penney’s store in Omaha some years back gives us (I became an authority on the Minimum Wage Act), they will continue to run the business as in the past. Even if the price had been cheaper but the management had been run-of-the-mill, we would not have bought the business.
我们有顶尖的人才（不管是从个人角度还是从商业角度）在管理这家公司。虽然我曾经有在奥马哈的Penney’s商场以每小时75美分打工的经验（我是最低工资法案的受益者），但我会让他们一如既往的继续管理这家公司。不过，即使购买价格更低但管理层却不能够继续运营这家公司，我们也不会购买这家公司。
It is impossible to avoid some public notice when a business with several thousand employees is acquired. However, it is important that you do not infer the degree of financial importance to BPL from its news value to the public. We have something over $50 million invested, primarily in marketable securities, of which only about 10% is represented by our net investment in HK. We have an investment of over three times this much in a marketable security where our ownership will never come to public attention. This is not to say an HK is not important - a 10% holding definitely is. However, it is not as significant relative to our total operation as it would be easy to think. I still prefer the iceberg approach toward investment disclosure.
一家涉及数千名雇员的企业被收购时，很难避免公众关注。不过，你们不应该把这项收购对于巴菲特合伙公司的重要程度等同于对公众的新闻价值。我们有超过5000万美元的投资，大部分都投资于上市公司的股票，而我们在HK上的投资额只占了10%。我们在某个上市公司股票上的投资额已经达到了这笔投资的3倍，却不会引起公众注意。这不是说HK不重要，一个占比10%的投资绝对是重要的。但是，这笔投资对于整个投资组合的影响绝对没有你们想的那么重要。我更喜欢用冰山在海水之上的部分来比喻已经披露的投资。
It is my intention to value HK at yearend at cost plus our share of retained earnings since purchase. This policy will be followed in future years unless there is a demonstrable change in our position relative to other department stores or in other objective standards of value. Naturally we wouldn’t have purchased HK unless we felt the price was quite attractive. Therefore, a valuation policy based upon cost may somewhat undervalue our holdings. Nevertheless, it seems the most objective figure to apply. All of our investments usually appear undervalued to me - otherwise we wouldn’t own them.
我打算在年底时用成本价加上收购以来的留存收益对HK进行估值。在将来的数年内，我们都会使用这项政策。除非相比其他商场或其他客观标准，我们的地位有很大变化。因为除非我们认为HK的价格很有吸引力，否则我们不会购买它。所以，以成本价来估值是低估了我们的权益。不过，这应该是最客观的指标了。对于我来说，我们所有的投资都是低估的，否则我们就不会拥有它们了。
Market Forecasting
Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”
“基本原则”第六条（来自于我们11月的信）说：“我不会预测整个股市或商业的波动。如果你认为我可以或者这对投资很重要，你就不应该成为我们的合伙人。”
Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don’t buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.
当然，这条原则会被看作令人困惑、异常复杂、模凌两可和模糊不清等等。但是，我认为我们绝大部分的合伙人都能够理解它。我们买卖股票，不是基于其他人认为市场走势会如何（我对市场走势没有任何看法），而是基于我们认为公司的前景会如何。股票市场在很大程度上会决定我们何时正确，但我们对公司分析的准确性会在很大程度上决定我们是否正确。也就是说，我们的精力将集中于什么会发生，而不是何时发生。
In our department store business I can say with considerable assurance that December will be better than July. (Notice how sophisticated I have already become about retailing.) What really counts is whether December is better than last December by a margin greater than our competitors’ and what we are doing to set the stage for future Decembers. However, in our partnership business I not only can’t say whether December will be better than July, but I can’t even say that December won’t produce a very large loss. It sometimes does. Our investments are simply not aware that it takes 365-1/4 days for the earth to make it around the sun. Even worse, they are not aware that your celestial orientation (and that of the IRS) requires that I report to you upon the conclusion of each orbit (the earth’s - not ours). Therefore, we have to use a standard other than the calendar to measure our progress. This yardstick is obviously the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow. We have a strong feeling that this competitor will do quite decently over a period of years (Christmas will come even if it’s in July) and if we keep beating our competitor we will have to do something better than “quite decently”. It’s something like a retailer measuring his sales gains and profit margins against Sears’ - beat them every year and somehow you’ll see daylight.
在我们的商场生意中，我可以几乎很肯定地说12月会比7月好。（请注意我在零售业上已经变得如此有哲思了）不过真正有意义的是，今年的12月的同比增幅是否比我们竞争对手的大，以及我们应当做些什么以达成明年12月的增幅。但是，在我们的投资合伙公司中，我不仅不能说12月会比7月好，甚至不能说12月不会有大幅的亏损。有时候确实会这样。我们的投资不会意识到地球绕太阳转一圈要用365.25天。它们更不会意识到你们的天文观（也是国税局的天文观）会要求我按照每一圈（地球的一圈，不是我们的一圈）的时间来向你们报告结果。所以，我必须用一个标准而不是日历来衡量我们的投资收益。很显然在证券上，这个标准就是道指。我们有非常强烈的感觉，这个标准在长期内表现的将会相当和缓（即使现在是7月，圣诞节也终将会到来），但是如果想要超越这个标准，我们必须做些好于“相当和缓”的事情。这就像零售公司要用Sears’的标准来衡量自己的销售和利润率，如果每年都能够超越Sears’，某一天他们终将迎来光明。
I resurrect this “market-guessing” section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn’t they let me in on it then; and, (2) if they didn’t know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you – or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn’t look so clear in retrospect.
我恢复了“市场预测”这个板块仅仅是因为在道指从2月份995点的高点下跌到5月份865点的低点的时候，我接到几个合伙人的电话说他们认为股市还会走低。我脑中通常会浮现出两个问题：（1）如果他们在2月份的时候知道道指会在5月份下降到865点，他们为什么不在那时就告诉我；（2）如果他们在2月份的时候不知道接下来3个月会发生什么，他们在5月份的时候又怎么会知道？也有一两个声音会在指数下降一百点的时候建议我们卖出并等待未来变得清晰。让我也用两点来回复：（1）未来对我来说从来都不清晰（如果你能看清未来几个月甚至几小时将发生什么，请告诉我）；（2）似乎没有人在指数上升一百点的时候打电话告诉我要注意未来还不清晰。即使回溯过往，2月份也未必会很清晰。
If we start deciding, based on guesses or emotions, whether we will or won’t participate in a business where we should have some long run edge, we’re in trouble. We will not sell our interests in businesses (stocks) when they are attractively priced just because some astrologer thinks the quotations may go lower even though such forecasts are obviously going to be right some of the time. Similarly, we will not buy fully priced securities because “experts” think prices are going higher. Who would think of buying or selling a private business because of someone’s guess on the stock market? The availability of a question for your business interest (stock) should always be an asset to be utilized if desired. If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take advantage of it. Its availability should never be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations in turn formulate your judgments. A marvelous articulation of this idea is contained in chapter two (The Investor and Stock Market Fluctuations) of Benjamin Graham’s “The Intelligent Investor”. In my opinion, this chapter has more investment importance than anything else that has been written.
如果我们开始基于猜测和冲动，来对某项能够获取长期大幅收益的投资做出是否参与的决定，那么我们将会陷入大麻烦。我们不会因为某个占星家说价格将会走低，而卖出我们认为价格仍具吸引力的公司（股票），即使某些时候这个占星家是对的。同理，我们也不会因为某些“专家”认为股价将上升，而买入价格相对价值已经偏高的股票。谁会因为某些人对股市走势的猜测就买入或卖出一家私营企业呢？你的商业利益（股票）的可用性问题，应该始终是指在你需要时资产可以变现的能力。但如果股票市场在任何一个方向上走的足够远，你都可以由此获益。这种可用性不应该变成一种依靠，你不应该用价格的短期涨跌来构建你的判断。关于这一观点的最出色的文章就收录在本杰明·格雷厄姆所著的《聪明的投资者》第二章（投资者与市场波动）中。在我看来，对于投资来说，这一章比其他任何文字都重要的多。
We will have a letter out about November 1 with the Commitment Letter for 1967 and an estimate of the 1966 tax situation.
我们会在11月1日左右写一封信，包括对1967年的展望、对1966年税收状况的估计等等。
Cordially,
WEB eh
Footnotes
-
大概是指《圣经》旧约中的参孙，他天生神力，但一旦头发被剪掉就会失去力量。 ↩