原文信息：
- 标题：1966 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1967-01-25
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
610 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
January 25, 1967
The First Decade
第一个十年
The Partnership had its tenth anniversary during 1966. The celebration was appropriate — an all-time record (both past and future) was established for our performance margin relative to the Dow. Our advantage was 36 points which resulted from a plus 20.4% for the Partnership and a minus 15.6% for the Dow.
1966年我们的合伙基金迎来了十周年。庆祝是应当的，今年我们相对道指的表现，创造了我们有记录以来的历史（不论过去还是未来）。我们领先道指的幅度是36个百分点，我们合伙基金的年收益率为20.4%，而道指是负15.6%。
This pleasant but non-repeatable experience was partially due to a lackluster performance by the Dow. Virtually all investment managers outperformed it during the year. The Dow is weighted by the dollar price of the thirty stocks involved. Several of the highest priced components, which thereby carry disproportionate weight (Dupont, General Motors), were particularly poor performers in 1966. This, coupled with the general aversion to conventional blue chips, caused the Dow to suffer relative to general investment experience, particularly during the last quarter.
获得这种令人喜悦却无法重复的收益的原因部分是由于道指暗淡无光的表现。可能所有的投资经理今年都超越了道指。道指是以30只股票的价格为基础来编制的。一些高价股票就占据了相当不平衡的比重（Dupont, General Motors），而他们在1966年的表现很差。伴随着大众对传统蓝筹股的厌恶，这使得道指比正常情况下的跌幅要大，特别是上一个季度。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
下述表格反映了多年来道指、合伙基金分成给普通合伙人之前（超出6%收益的25%）、有限合伙人的收益情况：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%
1965|14.2%|47.2%|36.9%
1966|-15.6%|20.4%|16.8%
Cumulative results|141.1%|1028.7%|641.5%
Annual compounded rate|9.7%|29.0%|23.5%
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
下表列出了累积收益及年化收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow|Partnership Results|Limited Partners’ Results
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1957 – 58|26.9%|55.6%|44.5%
1957 – 59|52.3%|95.9%|74.7%
1957 – 60|42.9%|140.6%|107.2%
1957 – 61|74.9%|251.0%|181.6%
1957 – 62|61.6%|299.8%|215.1%
1957 – 63|94.9%|454.5%|311.2%
1957 - 64|131.3%|608.7%|402.9%
1957 - 65|164.1%|943.2%|588.5%
1957 - 66|122.9%|1156.0%|704.2%
Annual Compounded Rate|11.4%|29.8%|23.9%
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
下面我们更新了我们经常与之对比的两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式基金的数据。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1964|15.9%|14.3%|13.6%|12.6%|18.7%|22.3%
1965|10.2%|9.8%|19.0%|10.7%|14.2%|36.9%
1966|-7.7%|-10.0%|-2.6%|-6.9%|-15.6%|16.8%
Cumulative Results|118.1%|106.3%|142.8%|126.9%|141.1%|641.5%
Annual Compounded Rate|8.6%|7.9%|9.8%|9.0%|9.7%|23.5%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1966 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for 1966.
（2）
1957-1965年数据来源于1966年Moody银行和金融手册；1966年数据为估计值。
These investment company performance figures have been regularly reported here to show that the now is no patsy as an investment standard. It should again be emphasized that the companies were not selected on the basis of comparability to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. There are important differences including: (1) investment companies operate under both internally and externally imposed restrictions on their investment actions that are not applicable to us; (2) investment companies diversify far more than we do and, in all probability, thereby have less chance for a really bad performance relative to the now in a single year; and (3) their managers have considerably less incentive for abnormal performance and greater incentive for conventionality.
这些投资公司的投资表现一直都列在这一板块，所以现在列出并不是为了作为我们投资标准的替罪羊。我需要再次强调披露这些公司的数据并不是为了与巴菲特合伙公司作为对比。我们之间有非常大的区别：（1）投资公司的投资行动受到内部和外部的严格限制，但是我们没有。（2）投资公司相对于我们来说更为多元化，所以在某种程度上来说它们在某个年度下跌的幅度也会有机会比我们更小。（3）他们的投资经理较少有动机去寻求超乎寻常的表现，而是更多的倾向于传统。
However, the records above do reveal what well-regarded, highly paid, full-time professional investment managers have been able to accomplish while working with common stocks. These managers have been favorites of American investors (more than 600,000) making free choices among many alternatives in the investment management field. It is probable that their results are typical of the overwhelming majority of professional investment managers.
但是上述的结果确实能够揭示出这些收入很高、待遇很好、全职进行投资的专业投资经理们在投资于普通股时所能够达到的收益。这些经理很受可以在投资领域自由作出选择的美国投资者们（超过60万人）喜欢。他们的投资结果是大部分的专业投资经理的典型代表。
It is not true, however, that these are the best records achieved in the investment field. A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities. However, they are generally managed by very bright, motivated people and it is only fair that I mention the existence of such superior results in this general discussion of the record of professional investment management.
不过他们在投资领域中收益并不是最好的。一些共同基金和私募基金可以获得比道指更好的收益，而且有一些的收益比巴菲特合伙基金还要好很多。他们的技术跟我们很不相似，而且不在我们的能力范围之内。不过他们通常是由一群非常聪明、非常有干劲的人所管理的。为求公平起见，在我提到专业投资经理的收益记录时，需要特别提到这种收益超高的情况的存在。
Trends in Our Business
我们的趋势
A keen mind working diligently at interpreting the figures on page one could come to a lot of wrong conclusions.
沉溺于的解读第一页中我们的收益数字的人，或许会得到很多错误的结论。
The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty-five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy.
前十年的投资收益很难在后十年再被复制甚至接近。某个年龄为25岁充满渴望的小伙子，用105,100美元初始资金，在市场和商业环境都非常切合他的投资哲学的幸运的十年中，或许可以取得这种收益。
They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty-six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one-fifth to one-tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.
但一个年龄已满36岁、胃口已被满足，拥有目前我们合伙基金54,065,345美元的资金，却只能找到之前1/15-1/10的好点子去执行他的投资哲学时，是很难达到这种收益的。
Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri. May 5. 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)
Buffett Associates. Ltd. （
巴菲特有限合伙公司的前身）于1956年5月5日在密苏里河西岸成立，当时只有四个家庭和三个很好的朋友参与投资，资金一共有105,100美元。（我试图从1957年1月第一封一页半纸的致合伙人的信中发现一些洞见未来的聪明闪光点。但是，很明显有人删改了我的复印件，把那些我或许曾经做过的洞见都移除了。）
At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the “value to a private owner” criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty-five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.
那时，特别是有些年份，有大量的证券以低于估值的价格售出，这个估值是指我们用来选择普通股的“私有化的价值”标准。我们也有了很多“Workouts”的机会，它们的体量正合我意。问题总是要投资于哪一个，而不是要找什么去投资。所以，我们可以同时拥有15-25个投资标的，并且对这些投资标的的内在可能充满激情。
In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one’s own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3) substantially more competition.
过去几年，这种状况有非常大的改变。我们现在只能找到很少几个我能够理解的、体量合适的、能够带来超出道指10个百分点收益这种标准的证券。过去的三年里，每年我们都只遇到过2个或3个能满足我们这种标准的机会。幸运的是，大部分机会都被我们抓住了。但是，在过去早些年的时候，不用怎么努力就可以发现数十个相似的机会。很难客观评价是什么原因导致了一个人所能找到的这种机会的减少。不过有3个原因较为明显：（1）市场环境的改变；（2）我们的资金规模；（3）更激烈的竞争。
It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest (million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bank accounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.
很明显，一个基于只有几滴好主意的生意肯定不如基于多如流水般主意的好。不过，迄今为止这几滴好主意带来的收益和流水般的主意一样多。这一方面是因为一个人只能消化这么多（百万美元级的好主意并不能给千元级的银行账户带来更多好处。在我投资的早期，这令我印象非常深刻）；另一方面是因为在主意比较少时会让人更广泛的利用它们。近些年，我们绝对是因为后一方面的原因。但是，相比多如流水的主意，点滴的主意更容易干涸。
These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don’t go for the “If you can’t lick ‘em, join ‘em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward “If you can’t join ‘em, lick ‘em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi-conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz. (That’s a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)
不过，这种境况不会让我跳出我的能力圈去做投资决定（我不接受“如果不能打败他们就加入他们”的理念，我的理念是“如果不能加入他们就打败他们”）。如果我从来都无法理解的技术是投资某个企业的最为关键因素，那么我们不会去投资。我对半导体和集成电路的了解，跟对chrzaszcz（这是一种波兰昆虫。学生们，如果你们不知道如何发音，试着把他们读成thrzaszcz）的约会习惯了解的一样多。
Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so-called “fashion” investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.
另外，我们也不会跟随经常流行的试图以市场行为而不是企业价值来投资证券的做法。这种所谓的“流行”的投资方法在近些年经常能够赚到快而多的收益。它代表了一种投资技术，对于它的合理性，我既无法证实也无法证伪。它完全不能满足我的智力要求（或许是我的偏见），也很不适合我的品性。我不会用这种方法来投资我自己的资金，当然也绝不会用你们的资金。
Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
最后，我不会在投资中寻找“活性”，即使它们提供了某种非常漂亮的收益预期，而且似乎人类的主要问题都可以由此得到解决。
What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.
我的合伙人们，我能够向你们承诺的是我将努力工作以保持这几滴好主意并努力实现它们，但是如果它们完全干涸了，我会真诚而及时的通知你们。那时我们都可以做出改变。
Analysis of 1966 Results
对1966年结果的分析
All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1966. Specifically, we had a total overall gain of $8,906,701 derived as follows:
1966年我们四类投资都表现的很好。所以，我们总体的收益达到8,906,701美元，具体如下：
Category|Average Investment|Overall Gain
---|---:|---:
Controls|1,566,302
Generals – Private Owner|1,004,362
Generals – Relatively Undervalued|5,124,254
Workouts|1,714,181
Miscellaneous, including US Treasury Bills|$1,332,609|$(18,422)
Total Income||$9,390,677
Less: General Expense||$483,976
Overall Gain||$8,906,701
A few caveats are necessary before we get on with the main discussion:
在进入正式讨论之前，有几点需要注意：
- An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. we’ll be glad to give you a copy.
关于这几类投资的解释已经在1965年1月18日的信中列明了。如果你们需要重拾记忆或者你们已经找不到那封信了，我们很乐意再提供一份复印件。
- The classifications are not iron-clad. Nothing is changed retroactively but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary.
这种分类不是不可改变的。虽然回溯的时候不会有所变更，但当初做分类决定的时候有某种随意性。
- Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be understated relative to partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the above figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on December 31 would have an average investment of 125 producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50% result by the customary approach. In other words, the above figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.
不同于合伙基金按照年初资产价值计算回报率，每类投资的回报率是按照平均资产来计算的。例如，我们在1月1日购买的证券是100美元，在12月31日涨到了150美元，我们会按照125美元为基础计算，得到收益率为40%，而不是50%。也就是说，以上的数据用每月平均资产价值来计算年度平均资产。
- All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage, basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable average investment category.
所有的结果都按照100%拥有的资金为基础计算的，没有包含杠杆1。利息和其他费用从总体收益中扣除，而不会分布到各类投资收益中。直接涉及到各类投资的费用，例如已卖空股票的分红等，直接从各类投资收益中扣除。当直接借入证券并卖空时，净投资额（做多减做空）平均分配至不同的投资类型。
- The above table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.
上述表格只有有限用途。每类投资的结果主要来自于一或两项投资。它们不表示已经收集了大量数据（例如所有美国男性的道德水平等等），从中可以推导出某些结论。它们只是表示一些不经常、不均匀的现象会根据不同的行为产生很不确定的结果，并且只能被我们使用。
- Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self-checking.
最后，这种计算并不像我们在数钱时那么用心，也可能因为没有做整体的自我检查而产生某些文字上或数学上的错误。
Controls
There were three main sources of gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies. These arose through: (1) retained business earnings applicable to our holdings in 1966; (2) open market purchases of additional stock below our controlling interest valuation and; (3) unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by the controlled companies. The total of all positive items came to $2,600,838 in 1966.
1966年我们在控股的公司上收益主要有三个来源：（1）1966年可以分配的留存收益；（2）以低估价在公开市场购买更多的股票；（3）所控股的公司持有的未回归价值的证券。在1966年整体利好达到2,600,838美元。
However, due to factors mentioned in my November 1, 1966 letter, specific industry conditions, and other relevant valuation items, this gain was reduced by 1,566,058 for the year.
但是，由于我在1966年11月1日信中提到的因素，特殊的工业状况以及其他相关估值因素，使得我们在1966年12月31日所拥有的“Controls”收益的公允价值降低到1,034,780美元。所以这一年的整体收益降低至1,566,058美元。
We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high percentage of net assets invested in businesses and not stocks during 1966. The same money in general market holdings would probably have produced a loss, perhaps substantial, during the year. This was not planned and if the stock market had advanced substantially during the year, this category would have been an important drag on overall performance. The same situation will prevail during 1967.
毫无疑问，我们非常幸运地在1966年布署了很大比例的资金在这类投资而不是股票上。同样的钱如果投资在“Generals”类普通股上，也许会产生损失，甚至是非常大的损失。当然这并没有提前计划。如果股市大幅上升，这类投资也会拖我们的后腿。1967年可能也会是这样。
Generals -Private Owner
Our performance here falls in the “twenty-one dollars a day, once a month” category. In the middle of 1965 we started purchasing a very attractive widely held security which was selling far below its value to a private owner. Our hope was that over a two or three year period we could get $10 million or more invested at the favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the company operated were understandable and we could check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with competitors, distributors, customers, suppliers, ex-employees, etc. Market conditions peculiar to the stock gave us hope that, with patience, we could buy substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the price.
这部分的表现是“一天二十一美元，每个月一次”2。在1965年中期，我们开始以远远低于私有化的价格购买极具吸引力的、被广泛持有的股票。我们的希望是可以在两到三年里用非常低的价格购买1000万美元或更多的股票。公司运营的各种生意我们都能理解，而且可以通过竞争者、经销商、客户、前雇员等等检查其竞争能力的强弱。这只股票特殊的市场状况，让我们有希望能够在不影响股价的情况下耐心地买入大量的股票。
At yearend 1965 we had invested 2,358,412 so that $401,432 was contributed to performance luring 1965. We would have preferred, of course, to have seen the market below cost since our interest was in additional buying, not in selling. This would have dampened Buffett Partnerships Ltd.’s 1965 performance and perhaps reduced the euphoria experienced by limited partners (psychically, the net result to all partners would have been a standoff since the general partner would have been floating) but would have enhanced long term performance. The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our cost had already slowed down our buying program and thereby reduced ultimate profit.
在1965年我们投资了1,956,980美元，而我们所持有股票的市场价值达到了2,358,412美元，这在1965年带来了401,432美元的潜在收益。当然，因为我们想要买入更多而不是卖出，所以我们更希望看到市场价格低于成本。这或许会影响巴菲特合伙公司1965年的表现，也或许会减少有限合伙人的兴奋度（但所有合伙人的整体情绪将保持不变，因为普通合伙人会转为大喜），但是会提升长期收益。股价高出我们成本的这种情况已经减缓了我们的买入计划，所以也会降低我们最终的收益。
An even more dramatic example of the conflict between short term performance and the maximization of long term results occurred in 1966. Another party, previously completely unknown to me, issued a tender offer which foreclosed opportunities for future advantageous buying. I made the decision that the wisest course (it may not have been) for us to follow was to dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of 867,749 was applicable to 1966.
1966年出现了短期收益和长期收益最大化之间非常明显的冲突。一个我之前完全不认识的交易方，发布了一个要约收购，让我们丧失了未来继续购买的机会。所以我认为对于我们来说，最为明智的做法就是（或许不是）卖掉我们的股份，所以我们最终在二月份取得了1,269,181美元的收益，其中867,749美元的收益被计入1966年。
While any gains looked particularly good in the market environment that intimately developed in 1966, you can be sure I don’t delight in going round making molehills out of mountains. The molehill, of course, was reflected in 1966 results. However, we would have been much better off from a long range standpoint if 1966 results had been five percentage points worse and we were continuing to buy substantial quantities of the stock at the depressed prices that might have been expected to prevail in this year’s market environment.
尽管在1966年的市场环境下，任何收益都是好收益。但是你们可以确信我不会只满足于制作小土堆而不是大山。当然，我们在1966年也有小土堆。但是，从长期收益的角度来看，如果1966年的收益降低5个百分点，对我们或许会更好。因为那时我们可以继续按照低估的价格购买大量的股票，在今年的市场情况下那样的低价是可以期望的。
Good ideas were a dime a dozen, such a premature ending would not be unpleasant. There is something to be said, of course, for a business operation where some of the failures produce moderate profits. However, you can see how hard it is to develop replacement ideas by examining our average investment in the Private Owner category - we came up with nothing during the remainder of the year despite lower stock prices, which should have been conducive to finding such opportunities.
好主意有很多，这种尚未成熟就结束的交易不会让我们不开心。当然，如果对于一项投资来说失败也可以带来相当好的利润，也是值得称道的。不过，你也可以看到想要把一般的投资变成“Generals-可私有化”类型是多么的艰难——尽管现在的股价是如此之低，一般来说可以找到某些机会，但是我们今年没有任何新的机会。
Generals - Relatively Undervalued
Our relative performance in this category was the best we have ever had - due to one holding which was our largest investment at yearend 1965 and also yearend 1966. This investment has substantially out-performed the general market for us during each year (1964, 1965, 1966) that we have held it. While any single year’s performance can be quite erratic, we think the probabilities are highly favorable for superior future performance over a three or four year period. The attractiveness and relative certainty of this particular security are what caused me to introduce Ground Rule 7 in November, 1965 to allow individual holdings of up to 40% of our net assets. We spend considerable effort continuously evaluating every facet of the company and constantly testing our hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative investment choices. Such constant evaluation and comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our investment operation.
我们在这部分投资的表现是我们历史上最好的一年，主要来自于一个不管在1965年还是1966年都是我们最大规模的投资。这项投资的收益在我们持有期间（1964、1965、1966）每年都能够超出市场均值很多。虽然任何一年的收益都可能极不稳定，但是我们认为以三到四年为期，未来的收益大概率是非常好的。这种吸引力和相对确定的特性也是为什么我会在1965年11月修改“基本原则”第7条以便能够将单项投资的资金比例放宽到我们基金净资产的40%的原因。我们异常努力地持续评估公司的各个方面并持续检验我们关于投资这个公司会好于其他投资选择的假设。在价格变动时，这种持续的评估和比较对我们的投资运营是非常关键的。
It would be much more pleasant (and indicate a more favorable future) to report that our results in the Generals -Relatively Undervalued category represented fifteen securities in ten industries, practically all of which outperformed the market. We simply don’t have that many good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas are continually measured against present ideas and we will not make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable performance. This policy has resulted in limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly about the relative merits of our largest holding. Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much smaller portion of total performance than in earlier years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.
我非常高兴（这也代表更令人高兴的未来）地向你们报告，我们在“Generals-相对低估”类型上的投资——分布在10个行业的15个公司，都取得了超出市场平均的收益。我们一般没有那么多好主意。就像上一段提到的，新的主意会持续地与现有的主意进行对比，如果效果不好我们就不会做出改变。这项政策使得我们近些年很少进行调仓，因为我们认为我们现在的持股有很大的相对优势。这种情况意味着，相比前些年我们有着流水一般的好主意的时候，现在我们已实现的收益占总收益的比例要小得多。
The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.
这类投资中的投资集中度，几乎肯定有时候让我们的短期表现产生让人不太舒服的大幅波动。已经有几项投资在比我们的报告期还长的“短期”出现了这种情况。这也是为什么我认为频繁的报告是愚蠢的，并且会误导像我们这种追求长期收益的投资机构。
Personally, within the limits expressed in last year’s letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped-for good long term performance.
由于我在去年信中提到的关于多元化的局限，我个人很希望用大量短期波动带来的痛苦（忘记快乐吧）来换取长期最大化的收益。但是我不想因为寻求更好的长期收益，而招致巨大的永久本金损失的风险。下面让我表达的再清晰一些：作为获取长期较好的收益的代价，在我们的集中投资的方式下，合伙人应当明白我们会有大幅落后于市场平均表现的时候（特别是在快速上升的市场），这会对冲像我们在1965年和1966年这种较好表现的时候。
All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that “even five minutes is a long time if one’s head is being held under water.” This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
所有这些讨论中涉及的“长期”让我们的一个合伙人注意到：“对于一个头被浸入水中的人来说，即使只有5分钟也是很长时间”。这也是为什么我们只在投资中用占比较低的贷款。1966年的平均银行借款远低于平均净资产的10%。
One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this category in 1966. Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about 728,141 on an average holding period of six and a half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a really substantial position.
关于“Generals-相对低估”的最后探讨。在这部分，有一项投资虽然对1966年的收益有帮助，但损害了我们的长期收益。在1966年，我们在这类投资中只有一个真正重要的好主意。我们在暮春的时候开始买入，并达到了大约160万美元（只能以较小的买入量来保持价格稳定），那时外部条件使得股价上升到我们认为相对不再有吸引力。虽然我们在1966年持股六个半月时间内的整体收益是728,141美元，但是我认为下述情况会更好——如果股价在相当长的时间内没有上升而可以让我们可以购入大量的股票。
Workouts
In last year’s letter I forecast reduced importance for workouts. While they were not of the importance of some past years. I was pleasantly surprised by our experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of 16,112 on an average investment of $7,870,151 so that we really had a case of an extraordinarily good second half offsetting a poor first half.
去年信中我预告说“Workouts”类投资的重要性将会减少。虽然它们没有前几年那么重要了，但是我仍旧很开心在1966年我们能够在这类投资上布署7,666,314美元的资金。另外，因为我们打算在这类投资上使用借款，所以我们所使用的净资产要少于上述的金额，同时我们的资金回报率也要好于之前提过的22.4%。不过，在这类投资上我们也有很大的波幅。在6月30日，我们在这部分投资上平均投资金额为7,870,151美元、收益是16,122美元，所以我们在下半年异常好的表现确实弥补了上半年较差的表现。
In past years, sometimes as much as 30-40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts, but it is highly unlikely that this condition will prevail in the future. Nevertheless, they may continue to produce some decent returns on the moderate amount of capital employed.
过去，有时我们会将我们净资产的30%-40%投资于这类投资，但是未来可能不会是这样。不过我们仍旧会继续在这不太大的资金布署上获取相当可观的收益。
Miscellaneous
其他
Operationally, we continue to function well above rated capacity with Bill, John, Elizabeth and Donna all contributing excellent performances. At Buffett Partnership. Ltd. we have never had to divert investment effort to offset organizational shortcomings and this has been an important ingredient in the performance over the years.
因为Bill, John, Elizabeth和Donna的工作都异常出色，运营上我们继续做的非常好。在巴菲特合伙有限公司，我们从来不会要解决机构问题而分散投资精力，这一点对于我们这么多年的表现非常重要。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., aided for the second year by their computer, turned in the usual speedy, efficient and comprehensive job.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co
.连续两年用他们的电脑辅助工作，使得他们的速度、效率及效果一如既往。
We all continue to maintain more than an academic interest in the Partnership. The employees and I, our spouses and children, have a total of over $10 million invested at January 1, 1967. In the case of my family, our Buffett Partnership, Ltd. investment represents well over 90% of our net worth.
我们继续在合伙公司中拥有超出学院派标准的资金比例。我们的员工和我及我们的配偶、子女在1967年1月1日共有超过1000万美元的资金。我们家90%以上的净资产都在了巴菲特合伙有限公司。
Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
接下来几周你们将会收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1966 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
一封你们缴纳1966年联邦所得税所需要的所有关于巴菲特合伙公司信息的信。这封信中的信息只用于计税。
- An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1966, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
一封Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司关于1966年的审计工作的信，包含对巴菲特合伙公司运营情况和财务情况以及你们个人账户的审计。
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1967. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
一封关于你们在1967年1月1日在合伙基金中的资金份额的信。这些金额已经通过审计。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 15 summarizing the first half of this year.
如果有任何不清楚的地方，请随时联系我。我的下一封信将会在7月15日发出，用于总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
WEB eh