First Half Performance

上半年的表现：

During the first half of 1965, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter call the “Dow”) declined from 874.13 to 868.03. This minor change was accomplished in a decidedly non-Euclidian manner. The Dow instead took the scenic route, reaching a high of 939.62 on May 14th. Adding back dividends on the Dow of 13.49 gives an overall gain through ownership of the Dow for the first half of 7.39 or 0.8%.

1965年上半年道琼斯工业指数（以下简称“道指”）从874.13点下降到868.03点。这种微小的变化是通过非欧几里德方式完成的 ¹，因为道指曾经走出一个很漂亮的曲线，在5月14日的时候到达过939.62的高点。上半年，加上13.49个点的分红后道指增加了7.39个点，也就是上涨了0.8%。

We had one of our better periods with an overall gain, before allocation to the general partner, of 10.4% or a 9.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow. To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results:

上半年是我们收益较好的年份之一。未扣除给普通合伙人的分红之前，我们的收益达到了10.4%，超出了道指9.6个百分点。下表更新了道琼斯工业指数、未扣除普通合伙人分成前的合伙基金收益、有限合伙人收益：

Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)

---|---:|---:|---:

1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%

1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%

1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%

1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%

1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%

1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%

1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%

1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%

1st half 1965|0.8%|10.4%|9.3%

Cumulative results|133.2%|682.4%|449.7%

Annual compounded rate|10.5%|27.4%|22.2%

(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.

（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。

(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.

（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。

(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.

（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。

Our constant admonitions have been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that may devote a portion of resources to control situations; and, (2) that our results, relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media usually will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in very strong markets.

我们一直以来的提醒依然如下：（1）短期结果（少于三年）几乎没有任何意义。特别是像我们这种有时候需要把大量的资金投入到“Controls”类型中的投资方式。（2）相比道指和其他投资基金，我们的投资表现在熊市中会相对较好，在牛市中会相对平平。

With the latter point in mind, it might be imagined that we struggled during the first four months of the half to stay even with the Dow and then opened up our margin as it declined in May and June. Just the opposite occurred. We actually achieved a wide margin during the upswing and then fell at a rate fully equal to the Dow during the market decline.

或许有人会根据第二点认为我们在上半年的前4个月中拼命努力以求追上道指的涨幅，而在5月和6月道指下降的时候，我们就扩大了我们的领先优势。但是实际上恰恰相反。我们在道指上升的时候有很大的领先优势，在道指下降的时候，我们基本上也在同步下降。

I don’t mention this because I am proud of such performance – on the contrary, I would prefer it if we had achieved our gain in the hypothesized manner. Rather, I mention it for two reasons: (1) you are always entitled to know when I am wrong as well as right; and, (2) it demonstrates that although we deal with probabilities and expectations, the actual results can deviate substantially from such expectations, particularly on a short-term basis. As mentioned in the most recent annual letter, our long-term goal is to achieve a ten percentage point per annum advantage over the Dow. Our advantage of 9.6 points achieved during the first six months must be regarded as substantially above average. The fortitude demonstrated by our partners in tolerating such favorable variations is commendable. We shall most certainly encounter periods when the variations are in the other direction.

我提及这些不是因为我认可这种表现，恰恰相反，我更喜欢通过实现我们一向的假设来获取我们的收益。我提到我们的表现有如下两个原因：（1）不管我做的是对还是错，你们都有权知道；（2）尽管我们按照概率和期望来行事，但是实际的结果可能跟这些期望偏离的很远，特别是在较短的时期内。就像在去年的信中所说的那样，我们长期的目标是达到超越道指10个百分点的收益。我们上半年就有超过道指9.6个百分点的收益，可以被看作是远远高出平均水平了。我们的合伙人面对如此令人满意的收益波动的态度是非常值得赞赏的，毕竟我们也许在某个时期会遇到完全相反的波动。

During the first half, a series of purchases resulted in the acquisition of a controlling interest in one of the situations described in the “General Private Owner” section of the last annual letter. When such a controlling interest is acquired, the assets and earning power of the business become the immediate predominant factors in value. When a small minority interest in a company is held, earning power and assets are, of course, very important, but they represent an indirect influence on value which, in the short run, may or may not dominate the factors bearing on supply and demand which result in price.

上半年，通过一系列的购买，我们已经完成了在去年信中所提到的“Generals-可私有化”投资中的一项投资。当我们完成控股的时候，这家企业的资产和盈利能力就马上变成了评估价值最主要的因素。当我们只在一家公司拥有非常少的股权的时候，虽然盈利能力和资产也非常重要，但是他们只是通过自身价值来间接影响股票价格。在由供需双方博弈而产生价格的股票市场中，这些因素也许会也许不会占据主导地位。

When a controlling interest is held, we own a business rather then a stock, and a business valuation is appropriate. We have carried our controlling position at a conservative valuation at midyear and will reevaluate it in terms of assets and earning power at yearend. The annual letter, issued in January, 1966, will carry a full story on this current control situation. At this time it is enough to say that we are delighted with both the acquisition cost and the business operation, and even happier about the people we have managing the business.

当我们达到控股地位的时候，我们所拥有的是一个企业而不是它的股票。这个时候用企业的价值进行估值是更为合适的。年中我们是以非常保守的估值方式来计算我们“Controls”类投资的。在年底的时候，我们将会对他们的资产价值和盈利能力进行重新评估。在1966年1月份的信中，我将会详细描述目前这项“Controls”类投资的具体细节。不过现在我可以说的是，我们非常满意我们的购买价格以及这个企业的运营状况，更加满意企业现在管理层的能力。

Investment Companies

投资公司：

We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 bi ll i o nan d a re p ro bab l y t y p i c a l o f m os t o f t h e$ 30 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown in the following table. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.

我们经常将我们的投资结果和两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式基金做对比。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund 、Tri-Continental Corporation、Lehman Corporation的资产大概共有40亿美元。他们是拥有总额达300亿美元资产的投资基金公司中的典型代表。我认为他们的投资收益跟那些管理着更多资产的大多数投资咨询公司的收益差不多。

---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:

1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%

1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%

1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%

1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%

1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%

1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%

1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%

1964|15.9%|14.3%|14.0%|13.6%|18.7%|22.3%

1st half 1965|0.0%|-0.6%|2.7%|0.0%|0.8%|9.3%

Cumulative Results|114.9%|102.8%|111.7%|115.4%|133.2%|449.7%

Annual Compounded Rate|9.4%|8.7%|9.2%|9.5%|10.5%|22.2%

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。

(2) From 1965 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for 1965.

（2）

1957-1964年数据来源于1965年Moody银行和金融手册；1965年数据为估计值。

Last year I mentioned that the performance of these companies in some ways resembles the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when if falls, back goes the duck. The water level was virtually unchanged during the first half of 1965. The ducks, as you can see from the table, are still sitting on the pond.

去年我提到过这些公司的表现，在某种程度上可以比作池塘中的鸭子。当水位（股市）上涨时，鸭子也跟着上涨；当它下降时，鸭子也跟着下降。1965年上半年的水位基本上没有变动。就像你在表格中可以看到的那样，这些鸭子也仍旧呆在池塘的同一高度上。

As I mentioned earlier in the letter, the ebb of the tide in May and June also substantially affected us. Nevertheless, the fact we had flapped our wings a few times in the preceding four months enabled us to gain a little altitude on the rest of the flock. Utilizing a somewhat more restrained lexicon, James H. Lorie, director of the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices was quoted in the May 25, 1965, WALL STREET JOURNAL as saying: “There is no evidence that mutual funds select stocks better than by the random method.”

就像我在这封信中之前提到的一样，5月和6月的退潮也大幅影响了我们。不过由于我们在前4个月的几次奋力疾飞，使得我们能够在上半年提升一定的高度。更为正式的表述如下：华尔街日报在1965年5月25日引用了芝加哥大学证券价格研究中心的主任 James H. Lorie的话——“没有证据表明共同基金选股的结果好于随机选择”。

Of course, the beauty of the American economic scene has been that random results have been pretty darned good results. The water level has been rising. In our opinion, the probabilities are that over a long period of time, it will continue to rise, though, certainly not without important interruptions. It will be our policy, however, to endeavor to swim strongly, with or against the tide. If our performance declines to a level you can achieve by floating on your back, we will turn in our suits.

当然，美国经济优异的前景才会让随机选择的结果相当不错，因为池塘的水位一直在上涨。我们认为在相当长的一段时间内，如果没有非常强力的干扰因素，这种持续上涨的可能性会继续上升。但是我们的方法是不管是顺流而动还是逆流而上，我们都会拼命去游。如果我们的表现已经下跌到你躺着漂浮时就可以达到的水准，那么我们就会穿衣上岸。

Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals

提前投资和提前撤资：

We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert such advance payments to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time it is paid to us.

我们接受合伙人或者潜在合伙人的提前投资，在年底时这笔资金将从提前投资之日起以6%的年化利率计算利息。虽然没有强制要求这笔资金在年底时转换为合伙基金份额，但在投入这笔资金时应该要有这种打算。

Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use us like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for a truly unexpected need for funds. Predictable needs for funds such as quarterly federal tax payments should be handled by a beginning-of-the-year reduction in capital rather than through advance withdrawals from B.P.L. during the year. The withdrawal privilege is to provide for the unanticipated.

同样，我们也允许合伙人在年底前提前赎回不超过他们在合伙基金中所占份额20%的资金。这笔资金也是从提前撤资之日起按照6%的年化利率来计算利息。这个利息将从他们的合伙份额中扣除。我仍旧要重复，这并不意味着我们的合伙基金会像银行一样，这只是给了我们合伙人一项在不虞之需时可以撤出部分投资的权利。可预测的资金需求，如季度联邦税，应通过年初减少资本而不是在年内从巴菲特合伙公司提前支取来解决。提款特权是为了应对不虞之需。

The willingness to borrow (through advance payments) and lend (through advance withdrawals) at the same 6% rate may sound downright “un-Buffettlike”. (You can be sure it doesn’t start my adrenaline flowing.) Certainly such a no-spread arbitrage is devoid of the commercial overtones an observer might impute to the preponderance of our transactions. Nevertheless, we think it makes sense and is in the best interest of all partners.

这种以6%的年利率来借入（提前投资）或贷出（提前撤资），或许很不“巴菲特”（可以肯定这不会让我的肾上腺素上升）。这种无收益的内部套利模式完全没有商业价值，旁观者或许会认为我们没有没有经过深思熟虑。但是，我认为这很重要而且能够让所有合伙人的利益最大化。

The partner who has a large investment in indirect ownership of a group of liquid assets should have some liquidity present in his partnership interest other than at yearend. As a practical matter, we are reasonably certain that advance withdrawals will be far more than covered by advance payments. For example, on June 30, 1965, we had $98, 851 o f a d v an ce w i t h d r a w a l s an d$ 652,931 of advance payments.

将大量资金投资在合伙基金上的投资者，通过合伙基金间接持有流动资产，他们或许在年底之前需要一些流动资金。在实际操作中，我们有理由认为提前投入会比提前撤出的资金要多。例如，截至1965年6月30日，我们的提前撤资是98,851美元，而提前投资是652,931美元。

Why then the willingness to pay 6% for the net of advance payments over advance withdrawals when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner’s allocation is zero unless we do) although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude regarding the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable.

既然我们可以从商业银行用低得多的利率来借款，为什么我们还愿意为提前投入的资金支付6%的利率？答案就是我们希望，基于长期的角度来看我们能够获得超出6%的收益（除非这样，否则普通合伙人的收益为零）；不过短期内我们能否达到6%需要看运气。更重要的是，我对短期借款和提前投资有非常不同的看法——提前投资可能很快会成为我们合伙基金的一部分。提前投资可以让我们在年中以不同时间获取资金，而不是都在一月份集中获得。从另外一个方面来说，提前投资的6%利率，可以让我们的合伙人获得比短期无风险投资更高的收益，这是一种双赢。

Miscellaneous

其他

The bold expansion program to 909 1⁄4 square feet described in the annual letter was carried off without a hitch (the Pepsi’s never even got warm).

去年信中所提到的准备扩大办公室面积到909.25平方英尺【约84.47平方米】的计划还没开始就被取消了（百事可乐还没有化冰）。

John Harding joined us in April and is continuing the record whereby all the actions in the personnel field have been winning ones.

John Harding

在4月份的时候加入了我们，并继续延续了他在个人领域各项成绩均为优胜的纪录。

As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the commitment letter for 1966, estimate of the 1965 tax situation, etc.

像去年一样，我们会在11月1日左右写一封信（给我们的合伙人以及在那时希望成为潜在合伙人的人），包括合伙人协议的修订、对1966年展望、对1965年税收状况的估计等等。

Cordially,

Warren E. Buffett

意即，并非两点之间的一条直线，而是有大幅波动。 ↩

B
Coopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

1965 Semi annual Letter to Limited Partners CM上半年的表现：

First Half Performance

上半年的表现：

Investment Companies

投资公司：

Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals

提前投资和提前撤资：

Miscellaneous

其他

Graph View

Table of Contents

BCoopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

1965 Semi annual Letter to Limited Partners CM上半年的表现：

First Half Performance

上半年的表现：

Investment Companies

投资公司：

Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals

提前投资和提前撤资：

Miscellaneous

其他

Footnotes

Graph View

Table of Contents

B
Coopinio投资智慧库