原文信息：
- 标题：1964 Semi-annual Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1964-07-08
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
July 8, 1964
First Half Performance
上半年的表现
The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available.
由于我们全家6月23日要到加利福尼亚去，所以我只好在这封信上做一些手脚，在6月18日就早早写好，以便你们能够按时收到这封信。我将会保持我们以前年度信的格式，留下一些空格让Bill来填写，因为要到6月30日以后我们才能得到那些数据。
During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “DOW”) advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones.
1964年上半年，道琼斯工业指数（以下简称“道指”）从762.95点增长到831.5点，加上14.4的分红，道指在上半年增长了10%。当我在6月18日写这封信的时候，我们的表现大概跟道指差不多。如果道琼斯基本持平而我们增长了5%，我会更高兴；但是如果道琼斯下降了10%而我们能持平，我仍然会更高兴。我一再强调我们想要在牛市中超越道指比在熊市或持平的市场中要困难。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners’ results:
下表更新了道琼斯工业指数、未扣除普通合伙人分成前的合伙基金收益和有限合伙人收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1st half 1964|10.9%|12.0%|10.5%
Cumulative results|116.1%|521.0%|354.4%
Annual compounded rate|10.8%|27.6%|22.2%
(See next page for footnotes to table.)
（请看下页的表格附注）
Footnotes to preceding table:
上页表格的附注：
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more.
上半年的买入操作令我非常满意。最令我满意的是我认为我已经建立了90%的仓位。巴菲特合伙公司现在是我们“Generals”类投资中的三家公司的最大单一股东。在它们价格低于私有化价值的时候，我们持续不断地购买它们的股票。其中一家公司，我们已经购买了差不多18个月的时间；另外两家也购买了差不多有一年。这种除了一周一周耐心地购买这些公司的股票其他什么都不做的状态，即使再持续一年、两年或更多年，一点也不会让我觉得奇怪。
What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn’t do much for our short-term performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me.
在上面三个公司上，我们想要看到的最好状况就是当这些公司的利润和资产价值持续大幅增长时，他们的股票价格却没什么变动，这个时候我们就可以持续购买它们。上述这种情况对我们的短期收益不会有太大帮助，特别是在持续上升的市场中。但是，这是一种令人非常满意的状态，对我们的长期收益非常有帮助。这种投资收益的实现一般来说是因为外部的因素导致市场价格回归价值，或是因为我们以非常有利的折扣价达到控股的地位。两种状况都很适合我。
It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.
不过更重要的是，我们要意识到很多我们所持有的“Generals”类型的投资将会处于持续被低估的状态，并且我们几乎没有取得控股地位的可能。我们希望市场能够在较为合理的时间段内证实我们的分析，但是在这类投资中我们的弓上并没有两条弦。
Investment Companies
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over 28 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们经常将我们的投资结果和两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式基金做对比。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund 、Tri-Continental Corporation、Lehman Corporation的资产大概共有40亿美元。他们是拥有总额达280亿美元资产的投资基金公司中的典型代表。他们的投资结果见下表。我认为他们的投资收益跟那些管理着更多资产的大多数投资咨询公司的收益差不多。
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1st half 1964|11.0%|9.5%|9.6%|8.6%|10.9%|10.5%
Cumulative Results|105.8%|95.5%|98.2%|105.1%|116.1%|354.4%
Annual Compounded Rate|10.1%|9.4%|9.6%|10.1%|10.8%|22.2%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1964 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964.
（2）
1957-1963年数据来源于1963年Moody银行和金融手册；1964年数据为估计值。
These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of great importance to B.P.L’s performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings.
上述的数据继续显示出那些很多收费较高而且令人尊敬的投资基金很难追赶得上蓝筹股指数的表现。这些公司在某种程度上可以比作是浮在池塘中的鸭子。当水位（市场）上涨时，这些鸭子跟着上升；当水位下降时，他们就跟着下降。不管是否事关动物保护，我认为这些鸭子只应该为它们依靠自己努力所获的结果负责（或受赞赏或受谴责），池塘水位的升高或者降低不应归因于它们。如同第一张表格显示的那样，市场的表现会对巴菲特合伙公司的表现有很大的影响。但是，我们有时候也会自行振翅高飞。
I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self-management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.
需要强调的是，我并不是说对于普通股投资表现，道指是唯一的衡量标准。不过，我确实是在说所有的投资公司（包括自行投资者）都应该用一个相对客观的标准来衡量，而且这个标准应事先选定，而不是事后才选择。
The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.
管理资金是一个大生意。投资经理会把他们的重点放在评估汽车工业、钢铁工业、化学工业等行业的公司治理上。他们会做大量的工作、会严阵以待，致力于找出哪些公司管理的好哪些公司管理的差。虽然他们会做大量的工作来客观衡量投资组合中公司的管理状况，但很奇怪的是他们不会将其应用于衡量他们自己。我们认为投资者和投资基金公司应该建立起一套有规律且客观的衡量标准，不仅用于来衡量他们的投资标的，也用于衡量他们自己的投资结果。
We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results—it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the “Ground Rules” regarding application of the standard—namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we’ll keep it that way. If we don’t measure up, we won’t change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.
我们会坚持这种较为合理的衡量标准，不管这会让我们的投资结果看起来怎么样。很明显，我们的衡量标准并不能保证我们的投资结果必然很好，它只能保证客观的评价。我需要强调我们在“基本原则”中的标准——因为我们的投资方式，所以必须要用至少三年的时间才能验证我们的投资结果，而且要排除那些投机特别严重的年份。不过我可以承诺的是：我们开始用的标准就是一米尺，而且我们会一直用这个标准；即使我们没有达到这个标准，我们也不会改变它。我认为，如果每个公司都能用一个好的标准来衡量他们的能力并有效施行，规模为数千亿资金的整个投资基金界将会更令人满意。当运营的是自己的生意，评估市场、人员、机器、方法等等时，大部分人都会用这种相对固定的标准去衡量，而资金管理是世界上最大的生意【却不以某种固定的标准去衡量】。
Taxes
税负
We entered 1964 with net unrealized gains of 2,826,248.76 (of which 96% are long term) so it appears very likely that at least all the unrealized appreciation attributable to your interest and reported to you in our letter of January 25, 1964, (item 3) will be realized this year. I again want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with how we are doing. It is possible that I could have made the above statement, and the market value of your B.P.L. interest could have shrunk substantially since January 1st, so the fact that we have large realized gains is no cause for exultation. Similarly when our realized gains are very small there is not necessarily any reason to be discouraged. We do not play any games to either accelerate or defer taxes. We make investment decisions based on our evaluation of the most profitable combination of probabilities. If this means paying taxes I’m glad the rates on long-term capital gains are as low as they are.
1964年初我们的账面浮盈是2,991,090美元，这些盈利都属于1963年已经加入的合伙人。到了今年6月30日，我们实现的资本利得是2,826,248.76美元（其中96%都来源于长期账面浮盈），所以1964年1月25日信中（第三条）提到的归属于你们的所有账面浮盈很可能都会在今年实现。我要再次强调这些因素不会影响我们的投资决策。很有可能，虽然我们实现了上述收益，但合伙基金的市场价值却会从1月1日起严重缩水。所以，实现了大量的收益并不一定是件值得大喜的事情。同理，虽然实现的利润较小，但也没必要灰心丧气。我们不会使用任何花招去加速或延迟纳税。我们的投资决策是基于使投资组合的利润最大化。如果这意味着要支付税款，我很乐意看到长期资本利得税的税率是那么低。
As previously stated in our most recent tax letter of April 1, 1964 the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1964 as your actual tax was for 1963. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
正如我们在1964年4月1日的信中所述，稳妥的做法是以1963年相同的金额估算1964年的税额。如果这样做，你就不会受到处罚。
The tax liability for partners who entered January 1st will, of course, be quite moderate, as it always is in the first year for any partner. This occurs because realized capital gains are first attributed to old partners having an interest in unrealized appreciation. This, again, of course, has nothing to do with economic performance. All limited partners, new and old, (except for Bill Scott, Ruth Scott and Susan Buffett per paragraph five of the Partnership Agreement) end up with exactly the same results. As usual, net ordinary income for all partners is nominal to date.
当然，1月1日新加入的合伙人的税负会相当低，因为任何合伙人第一年的税负总是很低。这是因为我们会首先将资本收益分配给了那些在账面浮盈中拥有权益的老合伙人。当然，这跟经济表现也无关。所有有限合伙人，无论新老（根据《合伙协议》第五段，Bill Scott, Ruth Scott 和Susan Buffett除外），最终的结果都完全一样。与往常一样，到目前为止所有合伙人的普通净收入都只是名义上的。
As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest, to us by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the Partnership Agreement, Commitment Letter for 1965, estimate or the 1964 tax situation, etc. In the meantime, keep Bill busy this summer clearing up anything in this letter that comes out fuzzy.
像去年一样，我们会在11月1日左右写一封信（给我们的合伙人以及在那时希望成为潜在合伙人的人），包括合伙人协议的修订、对1965年展望、对1964年税收状况的估计等等。同时，如果对这封信有任何问题，请联系Bill，让他在这个夏天为你们澄清吧。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett