原文信息：
- 标题：1964 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1965-01-18
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 18, 1965
Our Performance in
1964 我们1964年的表现
Although we had an overall gain of $4,846,312.37 in 1964, it was not one of our better years as judged by our fundamental yardstick, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). The overall result for BPL was plus 27.8% compared to an overall plus 18.7% for the Dow. The overall result for limited partners was plus 22.3%. Both the advantage of 9.1 percentage points on a partnership basis and 3.6 points by the limited partners were the poorest since 1959, which was a year of roughly comparable gains for the Dow.
尽管我们在1964年的总收益是4,846,312.37美元，但是以我们最基础的衡量标准道琼斯工业指数（以下简称“道指”）来衡量，这并不是我们表现较好的一年。道指包含分红的收益是18.7%，巴菲特合伙公司的总体收益是27.8%，有限合伙人的收益是22.3%。不管是合伙基金的9.1个点的优势，还是有限合伙人的3.6个点的优势，都是从1959年以来表现最差的一年。那年我们的收益跟道指基本差不多。
Nevertheless, I am not depressed. It was a strong year for the general market, and it is always tougher for us to outshine the Dow in such a year. We are certain to have years when the Dow gives us a drubbing and, in some respects, I feel rather fortunate that 1964 wasn’t the year. Because of the problems that galloping markets pose for us, a Dow repeat in 1965 of 1964 results would make it most difficult for us to match its performance, let alone surpass it by a decent margin.
不过我并不沮丧。今年的股票市场是一个较强的牛市。对于我们来说，在这样的市场中我们很难超越道指。我们很确信有些年份道指会大幅超越我们，不过好在1964年不是这样的年份。由于快速上涨的市场带给我们的问题，假如道指在1965年重现1964年的业绩，我们将很难追上它的脚步，更不用说以不错的优势超越它了。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partner’s results:
下表更新了道琼斯工业指数、未扣除普通合伙人分成前的合伙基金收益、有限合伙人收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.6%|38.7%|30.5%
1964|18.7%|27.8%|22.3%
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。这个表格包括了所有当年运行已满一年的合伙基金。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
下表列出了以复利计算的累积收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow|Partnership Results|Limited Partners’ Results
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1957 – 58|26.9%|55.6%|44.5%
1957 – 59|52.3%|95.9%|74.7%
1957 – 60|42.9%|140.6%|107.2%
1957 – 61|74.9%|251.0%|181.6%
1957 – 62|61.6%|299.8%|215.1%
1957 – 63|94.9%|454.5%|311.2%
1957 - 64|131.3%|608.7%|402.9%
Annual Compounded Rate|11.1%|27.7%|22.3%
Investment Companies **
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95-100% invested in common stock, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corporation, and Lehman Corporation, manage about 30 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们经常将我们的投资结果和两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式基金做对比。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund 、Tri-Continental Corporation、Lehman Corporation的资产大概共有45亿美元，有约550,000个投资者。他们是拥有总额达300亿美元资产的投资基金公司中的典型代表。我认为他们的投资收益跟那些管理着更多资产的大多数投资咨询公司的收益差不多。
The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of over $8 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.
我在下表列出相关数据是想说明道指作为投资评判标准并不低。上述四个基金的天才管理者们每年收取的年费约为800万美元，而这只是整个基金行业的很小一部分。这些拥有高收入、高智商的管理者的基金公司所获得的平均收益率却比道指稍低。
YEARLY RESULTS
年度收益
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.7%|18.3%|20.6%|30.5%
1964|15.9%|14.3%|13.6%|12.6%|18.7%|22.3%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1964 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for 1964.
（2）
1957-1963年数据来源于1964年Moody银行和金融手册；1964年数据为估计值。
COMPOUNDED
累积收益
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1957-58|26.4%|29.2%|24.7%|30.0%|26.9%|44.5%
1957-59|37.8%|42.5%|34.8%|40.9%|52.3%|74.7%
1957-60|36.4%|41.6%|38.2%|44.8%|42.9%|107.2%
1957-61|71.3%|76.9%|70.8%|77.4%|74.9%|181.6%
1957-62|54.5%|53.2%|46.2%|59.7%|61.6%|215.1%
1957 – 63|85.4%|78.5%|80.8%|88.9%|94.9%|311.2%
1957 - 64|114.9%|104.0%|105.4%|112.7%|131.3%|402.9%
Annual Compounded Rate|10.0%|9.3%|9.4%|9.9%|11.1%|22.3%
The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: “Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4) literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?” (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience - which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year’s experience -twenty times.”)
上述一再列出的表格中的数据会让合伙人问：“这样的投资结果到底为什么会发生在如此聪明的投资基金身上？毕竟他们拥有:（1）聪明且富有干劲的员工；（2）几乎无限的资源；（3）广泛接触企业的机会；（4）上百年累积的投资经验。”（最后一点让我想起了一个小故事：一个去找工作的人，说他有20年的从业经验。他的前任老板证实了这件事，但是他是这样解读的：“一年的经验乘以20次”）
This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on 300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attracting this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.
上述的问题非常重要，你们也希望它会被投资经理和投资者们作为一个应当深思熟虑的主题。毕竟，300亿美元的资金，哪怕只有一个百分点，每年也会是3亿美元。奇怪的是，实际上几乎任何有关华尔街的出版物都没有讨论过这个问题；而且在证券分析会、专题研讨会、学术研讨会中，关于这种话题的讨论也几乎没有出现过。我认为，在评判美国主要企业组织的管理能力和表现之前，任何投资管理机构的首要工作就是分析他们自己的技术和结果。
In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is “safe” and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.
在大部分案例中，他们的表现无法超越甚至与难以与道指持平，这并不能反映出他们缺乏智力和诚信。我认为导致这种结果的因素更多来源于：（1）集体决策——无论规模大小，优秀的投资机构不可能让各方都真正参与决策，这可能是我的一个坏印象；（2）一种倾向——与其他享有盛誉的大型组织的政策和资产组合（某种程度上）趋于一致；（3）机构框架——在那里平均是安全的，而独立行动的回报无法与对应的风险相匹配；（4）某些限制——必须从属于特定且不合理的多元化；（5）惰性——最后也是最重要的因素。
Perhaps the above comments are unjust. Perhaps even our statistical comparisons are unjust. Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, I believe both our partners and their stockholders feel their managements are seeking the same goal - the maximum long-term average return on capital obtainable with the minimum risk of permanent loss consistent with a program of continuous investment in equities. Since we should have common goals, and most partners, as an alternative to their interest in BPL, would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with these investment companies, I feel their performance record is meaningful in judging our own results.
或许上面的评论是不公平的。或许即使把我们的收益与他们的相比较也是不公平的。因为我们的投资组合和运营方式与上述那些投资公司有很大不同。但是我坚信，不管是我们的合伙人还是他们的投资者都会认为两者的目标是一样的，即：在本金永久损失风险最低的情况下，使得持续投资证券的长期平均收益最大化。既然我们有着相同的目标，而且如果我们的合伙人撤资而另投别处，估计也只能将他们的资金投入到与这些公司差不多收益的机构中。所以，我认为它们的收益可以作为一个有意义的参考。
There is no question that an important service is provided to investors by investment companies, investment advisors, trust departments, etc. This service revolves around the attainment of adequate diversification, the preservation of a long-term outlook, the ease of handling investment decisions and mechanics, and most importantly, the avoidance of the patently inferior investment techniques which seem to entice some individuals. All but a few of the organizations do not specifically promise to deliver superior investment performance although it is perhaps not unreasonable for the public to draw such an inference from their advertised emphasis on professional management.
毫无争议，这些投资公司、投资咨询公司、信托公司等给投资者们提供了非常重要的服务。这些服务包含了适当的多元化、相对的低风险以及便于操作的投资机制等等，更重要的是避免了投资者们被明显是二流的投资技术引诱到市场中。尽管除了个别投资机构，所有的机构都不会特别承诺能够带来超级的投资收益，但是公众们从他们特别强调专业管理的广告词中得出这种承诺或许未必没有道理。
One thing I pledge to you as partners - just as I consider the previously stated performance comparison to be meaningful now, so will I in future years, no, matter what tale unfolds. Correspondingly, I ask that you, if you do not feel such a standard to be relevant, register such disagreement now and suggest other standards which can be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.
不管以后的事实如何演变，有一件事是我可以承诺我们合伙人的——不管现在还是将来，这种业绩对比都是有意义的。当然，如果你认为这个标准不合适，你可以随时提出异议并提供你认为应当使用的非后视镜标准。
One additional thought - I have not included a column in my table for the most widely-used investment advisor in the world - Bell management. People who watch their weight, golf scores, and fuel bills seem to shun quantitative evaluation of their investment management skills although it involves the most important client in the world - themselves. While it may be of academic interest to evaluate the management accomplishments of Massachusetts Investors Trust or Lehman Corporation, it is of enormous dollars-and-cents importance to evaluate objectively the accomplishments of the fellow who is actually handling your money - even if it’s you.
另外，在表格中我没有列出被最多使用的投资咨询者——Bell管理公司。显而易见，他们的体重、高尔夫成绩、燃油费账单都会令他们的投资管理技术量化指标相形见拙，尽管他们拥有世界上最重要的客户——他们自己。尽管评价Massachusetts Investors Trust或Lehman Corporation的运营成效可能只是基于某些学术兴趣，但实际上客观评价管理你们资金的人或者你们自己的运营成效，事关你们的资金，必须要引起重视。
The Question of Conservatism **
关于保守的疑问
In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren’t those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?” If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.
看到表格中这些投资公司的表现，有一个问题也许会被问到：“是的，不过难道不是因为这些公司运营的比我们的合伙公司更保守吗？”如果你问那些投资公司这些问题，也许他们会很真诚的回答说他们更保守。如果你去问你能找到的100个证券分析师，我确信他们大部分也会认为那些投资公司更为保守。但是我不同意这个答案。我九成以上的资产都在合伙公司中，我的大部分亲戚也有资产在其中。当然，这种做法只是显示出我真的相信自己的看法，未必能证明它一定正确。
It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.
毫无争议，相比我们，这些投资公司更为传统。对于很多人来说，传统就等同于保守。但我认为这是不对的。传统或非传统，本身都不意味着保守。
Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts, but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.
真正的保守来自于聪明的假设、正确的事实和合理的推理。这些特质产生的结果或许会与传统一样，但大多都会异于传统。或许，在世界上某个角落还经常召开“地球是平的”这样的会议呢！
We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don’t. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether other conventional or unconventional - whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.
我们不会因为重要人物、名人或大众的赞同而自鸣得意，也不会因为他们的反对而沾沾自喜。大众意见对真正的想法毫无意义。我们能够真正面带微笑坐下来的时候是这样的：在我们的能力圈内、事实清晰且确定、事件进展很明显。这种情况下，不管是传统还是非传统，不管其他人同意还是反对，我们认为我们处在保守状态。
The above may seem highly subjective. It is. You should prefer an objective approach to the question. I do. My suggestion as to one rational way to evaluate the conservativeness of past policies is to study performance in declining markets. We have only three years of declining markets in our table and unfortunately (for purposes of this test only) they were all moderate declines. In all three of these years we achieved appreciably better investment results than any of the more conventional portfolios.
上面的说法或许太过主观。确实如此。你们或许更喜欢客观的答案。我也是。我认为衡量投资方式是否保守的合理方法是看它们在熊市中的表现。在我们的表格中，只有3年是熊市，而不幸的是（仅为了测试用）这些都不是大熊市。在这三个年份里，我们的表现都远超过这些传统的投资公司。
Specifically, if those three years had occurred in sequence, the cumulative results would have been:
如果这三年是连续的，那么累积收益如下：
Fund|The Cumulative Results
---|---:
Tri-Continental Corp.|-9.7%
Dow|-20.6%
Mass. Investors Trust|-20.9%
Lehman Corp.|-22.3%
Investors Stock Fund|-24.6%
Limited Partners|+45.0%
We don’t think this comparison is all important, but we do think it has some relevance. We certainly think it makes more sense than saying “We own (regardless of price) A.T. &T., General Electric, IBM and General Motors and are therefore conservative.” In any event, evaluation of the conservatism of any investment program or management (including self-management) should be based upon rational objective standards, and I suggest performance in declining markets to be at least one meaningful test.
虽然我们并不认为这些比较异常重要，但是我们确实认为它们有某种相关性。我们确信这比如下的说法更有意义：“我买了（不管股价如何）AT&T、通用电气、IBM、通用汽车，所以我更保守。”在任何状况下，评估任何投资机构（包含个人）是否保守，应该基于合理客观的标准，而我认为他们在熊市中的表现是一个有意义的测试。
The Joys of Compounding **
复利的乐趣
Readers of our early annual letters registered discontent at a mere recital of contemporary investment experience, but instead hungered for the intellectual stimulation that only could be provided by a depth study of investment strategy spanning the centuries. Hence, this section.
我们早期年度信的读者对仅仅复述当代投资经验表示不满，他们渴望通过对几个世纪的投资策略进行深入研究，获得思想上的启迪。所以，请看下述部分。
Our last two excursions into the mythology of financial expertise have revealed that purportedly shrewd investments by Isabella (backing the voyage of Columbus) and Francis I (original purchase of Mona Lisa) bordered on fiscal lunacy. Apologists for these parties have presented an array of sentimental trivia. Through it all, our compounding tables have not been dented by attack.
我们前两次对金融专家神话的探究揭示出，Isabella（支持哥伦布航行）和Francis I（第一个购买蒙娜丽莎画作的人）所谓精明的投资近乎疯狂。这些当事人的辩护人则提出了一系列感伤的琐事。尽管如此，我们的复利表格到现在还没有真正地被打击到。
Nevertheless, one criticism has stung a bit. The charge has been made that this column has acquired a negative tone with only the financial incompetents of history receiving comment. We have been challenged to record on these pages a story of financial perspicacity which will be a bench mark of brilliance down through the ages.
不过，确实有一个批评刺中了它。那就是有人指责本专栏只对历史上的财务无能者发表负面评论。下面我们将会挑战历史上被公认的一个最为聪明的交易。
One story stands out. This, of course, is the saga of trading acumen etched into history by the Manhattan Indians when they unloaded their island to that notorious spendthrift, Peter Minuit in 1626. My understanding is that they received 20 per square foot estimate seems reasonable giving a current land value for the island of 12 1/2 billion). To the novice, perhaps this sounds like a decent deal. However, the Indians have only had to achieve a 6 1/2% return (The tribal mutual fund representative would have promised them this.) to obtain the last laugh on Minuit. At 6 1/2%, 42,105,772,800 (205 billion.
故事开始了。这当然就是曼哈顿的印第安人在1626年把他们的小岛卖给臭名昭著的挥霍者——Peter Minuit的故事。我印象中的交易价是24美元。用这个价格，Minuit得到了22.3平方英里的土地，约合621,688,320平方英尺。为了方便比较，虽然很难得到精确的估值，但现在每平方英尺20美元似乎是一个合理的估价，由此整个小岛的价值是12,433,766,400美元（约125亿美元）。对于新手来说，这是一笔相当令人满意的交易。但是印第安人只需要达到6.5%的年化收益（部落共同基金可以达到这个承诺），就能够笑到最后。以6.5%的复利，在388年后的今天，24美元将会变成42,105772,800美元（420亿美元）。如果将复利率增加0.5个百分点变成7%，这个结果将会是2050亿美元。
So much for that.
这个故事到此为止。
Some of you may view your investment policies on a shorter term basis. For your convenience, we include our usual table indicating the gains from compounding $100,000 at various rates:
你们有些人或许会认为你们的投资年限比上述时间要短一些。为了你们的方便，下面的表格描述了10万美元在不同时间长度和复利率下的价值变化：
||4%|8%|12%|16%
---|---:|---:|---:|---:
10 Years|115,892|341,143
20 Years|366,094|1,846,060
30 Years|906,260|8,484,940
This table indicates the financial advantages of:
这个表格反应出了如下因素在财务上的优势：
(1) A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methusalah Technique)
（1）长寿（用非常博学的词汇描述就是“寿命延长术”）；
(2) A high compound rate
（2）高复利；
(3) A combination of both (especially recommended by this author)
（3）上述两者的结合（本文作者特别强调这一点）
To be observed are the enormous benefits produced by relatively small gains in the annual earnings rate. This explains our attitude which while hopeful of achieving a striking margin of superiority over average investment results, nevertheless, regards every percentage point of investment return above average as having real meaning.
很明显，相对较小的年化收益率也能够得到非常大的利润。这就解释了我们为什么想要达到超出均值较多的收益率，因为收益率每多出一个百分点都会有很大影响。
Our Goal **
我们的目标
You will note that there are no columns in the preceding table for the 27.7% average of the Partnership during its eight-year lifespan or the 22.3% average of the limited partners. Such figures are nonsensical for the long term for several reasons: (Don’t worry about me “holding back” to substantiate this prophecy.)
你们大概会注意到之前复利的表格中没有列出我们合伙基金27.7%和有限合伙人22.3%的年化收益率随着时间的变化情况。我们的这种收益率长期来看不可能一直持续，有如下原因（别担心我会用 “隐瞒 “来证实这一预言）：
(1) Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.
（1）任何以这种复利计算的大笔资金都会让国债的增加达到警戒速度。
(2) During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6% - 7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman – “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen“. It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the “kitchen.”
（2）
我们这八年投资时间中的股票市场增长率不太可能在未来继续保持。以20或30年的时间段来看，我认为道指的年化增长率更可能是6%-7%，而不是这些年的11.1%。这一项因素就会使我们的投资年化收益率降低4个百分点。1965年道指只需要有20.5%的下降，就会使这九年的增长率降低到7%。对于投资基金来说，这样（或更坏）的年份肯定会时不时出现。如果你们所持的基金（例如巴菲特合伙基金）市场价值下降20%或30%会让你们情绪或财务紧张，你们应该避免进行普通股投资。这里可以借用Harry Truman的诗——“如果你无法忍受热浪，就请远离厨房”。所以，请在进入“厨房”前好好地思考这个问题。
(3) We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.
（3）我们认为相对道指，长期保持合伙基金16.6个百分点、有限合伙人11.2个百分点的优势几乎不可能。我们合伙基金的表现已经连续8年超越道指了，不过有限合伙人的收益有一年要低于道指。一定会有一些年份（注意此处的复数），合伙基金的表现要比道指差，这时普通合伙人大概要咬牙切齿了（我希望不会有太多的有限合伙人这样做）。如果发生了这种情况，我们相对于道指的平均领先优势会大幅降低。但是我想说我认为我们将继续在一些年份里获得非常可观的优势。到目前为止我们仍然受益于我们还没有表现较为普通或较差的年份，不过很显然不能期望一直会这样。
So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of the frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.
所以，我们能期望什么样的结果？不过，我说的所有的事情都只是猜测，而且我的投资哲学的基础是：预测总是揭示了预测者的脆弱，而非揭示了未来。
Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unfold along the following basis:
但是，作为合伙人你们需要注意我的猜测，即使他们可能很脆弱。我希望我们长期的结果会基于下述的基础展现：
(1) An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average — say, on the order or minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;
（1）道指（加上分红）年均增长率约为7%，虽然每年的变化幅度会很大，或许极端的时候会在负40%到正50%之间，大部分年份会在负10%到正20%之间。
(2) An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks; and
（2）合伙基金的年化收益率，在扣除给普通合伙人的分成之前，大概会多出10个百分点，同样有很大波动，或许某些年份低于道指10个百分点，或许有些年份高于道指25个百分点。
(3) The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending, on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).
（3）上述两项假设会使合伙基金的年化收益率为17%，有限合伙人的收益率为14%。当然每年的收益率会有很大不同，这取决于上述两点中所说的极端情况会不会发生。
I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-range expectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accomplish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.
需要强调的是，上述都只是猜测，或许会受个人利益、自我意识的影响。任何有金融历史知识的人都知道这种猜测可能会出现很大的错误。虽然我很想不写这部分，但这个问题被合伙人问过太多次了。长期期望收益是我们的合伙人最关注的事情了，所以我需要做这个预测，即使事后看来这愚不可及。我更为一本正经的观点是，投资经理们——不管是掮客、咨询者还是信托机构或投资公司相关人员，必须明确指出他们想要达到的目标以及检测他们是否达到这些目标的标准。
Our Method of Operation **
我们的投资方法
In past annual letters I have always utilized three categories to describe investment operations we conduct. I now feel that a four-category division is more appropriate. Partially, the addition of a new section - “Generals Relatively Undervalued” - reflects my further consideration of essential differences that have always existed to a small extent with our “Generals” group. Partially, it reflects the growing importance of what once was a very small sub-category but is now a much more significant part of our total portfolio. This increasing importance has been accompanied by excellent results to date justifying significant time and effort devoted to finding additional opportunities in this area. Finally, it partially reflects the development and implementation of a new and somewhat unique investment technique designed to improve the expectancy and consistency of operations in this category. Therefore, our four present categories are:
我在过去的年度信中经常把我们的投资分为三类。现在我觉得分为四类更为合适。新加的一类——“Generals-相对低估”类投资，反映了我对一直存在于我们“Generals”类投资中的之前还不太明显的重要区别的进一步思考。这也反映这种类型的投资已经从原来的在“Generals”类下的微不足道增长为我们投资组合的重要组成部分了。这部分的重要性伴随着合适的投资时机带来的优异收益和在这个领域不停发现机会的努力而持续增长。它也反应出一项新的且独特的投资技术的发展和执行提升了这类投资的期望和连续性。所以，现在我们的投资分为如下四类：
1. “Generals -Private Owner Basis” - a category of generally undervalued stocks, determined by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation of the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again, let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But, we demand value.
1. “Generals
-可私有化”，投资于被低估的股票，这部分收益主要取决于量的因素，但是也需要考虑到质的因素。他们的价格很少或几乎不太会马上回归价值。他们缺少活力和市场推动者。他们的主要优势是折扣价，也就是说整个公司的市值大幅低于私有化的估值。我需要再次强调量的因素是第一位的、非常关键，但是质的因素也很重要。我们喜欢好的管理层，我们喜欢令人满意的商业模式，我们喜欢因为之前不太活跃的管理层或者是股东群体导致的股价某种程度的“变酸”。但是，我们最看重的是价值。
Many times in this category we have the desirable “two strings to our bow” situation where we should either achieve appreciation of market prices from external factors or from the acquisition of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. While the former happens in the overwhelming majority of cases, the latter represents an insurance policy most investment operations don’t have. We have continued to enlarge the positions in the three companies described in our 1964 midyear report where we are the largest stockholder. All three companies are increasing their fundamental value at a very satisfactory rate, and we are completely passive in two situations and active only on a very minor scale in the third. It is unlikely that we will ever take a really active part in policy-making in any of these three companies, but we stand ready if needed.
我们多次描述过这类投资是“一弓两弦”，一种情况是外部因素使得股票价格回归，一种情况是我们以很好的折扣获取控股地位。在大多数情况下，前者会发生；但后者可以作为一种保险措施，而这是其他投资所没有的。我们继续增加我们在1964年年中信中提到过的三家公司的持股比例，那时我们就已经是这三家公司的最大股东了。这三家公司都以令人满意的速度在增加他们的基础价值，我们对其中两家公司没有做任何事情，对另外一家稍稍推了一把。我们不太会对这三家公司的政策制定有什么实质干预，但是如果需要，我们可以随时行动。
2. “Generals -Relatively Undervalued” - this category consists of securities selling at prices relatively cheap compared to securities of the same general quality. We demand substantial discrepancies from current valuation standards, but (usually because of large size) do not feel value to a private owner to be a meaningful concept. It is important in this category, of course, that apples be compared to apples - and not to oranges, and we work hard at achieving that end. In the great majority of cases we simply do not know enough about the industry or company to come to sensible judgments -in that situation we pass.
2. “Generals
-相对低估”，这类投资由与其他同等质量的证券相比价格相对较低的证券构成。我们要求其价格与当前的价值有巨大差异，但是（通常因为其规模）我们不太可能把私有化作为一种可能的投资结果。对于这类投资而言，必须用苹果类比苹果而不是橘子，我们努力工作以确保这一点。绝大部分机会中，我们无法足够了解这个行业或公司以做出判断——这时我们就会放弃。
As mentioned earlier, this new category has been growing and has produced very satisfactory results. We have recently begun to implement a technique, which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards; e.g.,[^1] we buy something at 12 times earnings when comparable or poorer quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so the latter only sell at 10 times.
就像之前提到的，这部分投资的比例在增长且有令人满意的结果。我们最近开始执行一项技术，可以大幅降低整体价值波动的风险。例如，我们以12倍的市盈率买入了一家公司的股票，而这时与之相似或质量稍差的公司的股票市盈率是20倍。不过经过股票市场重新调整价格后，后者的市盈率变为10倍。1
This risk has always bothered us enormously because of the helpless position in which we could be left compared to the “Generals -Private Owner” or “Workouts” types. With this risk diminished, we think this category has a promising future.
与“Generals-可私有化”和“Workouts”类投资相比，因为处于完全无助的地位，以前这类投资的风险给我们带来很大的困扰。但是因为这项技术对冲了风险，我们认为这类投资会有比较确定的未来。
3. “Workouts” - these are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or “inside information” pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. It’s a little like looking for parking meters with some time left on them. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent average annual rates of return after allowance for the occasional substantial loss. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline it should usually pile up a big edge for us; during bull markets it will probably be a drag on performance. On a long-term basis, I expect the workouts to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
3. “Workouts”
——这是有时间表的一类投资。收益来自于公司的重新安排，例如出售、合并、重组、拆分等等。我们不会根据流言或“内部消息”来做决定，而是基于已公开的声明。除非能从报纸上看到这些声明，否则我们会一直等待。这部分的投资风险跟股票市场的表现无关（或许有些时候有一点关系），而是与能够阻碍既定计划的因素有关。这些因素包括反信托法和其他的政府行为、股东的反对、税收因素等等。很多“Workouts”投资的总体收益很小。有点像去找尚未用完时间的计费停车位。但是，即使考虑到偶尔的损失，可预测性加上较短的持有时间仍然可以产生令人非常满意的年化收益率。相对于“Generals”，这部分投资每年可以获得非常稳定的绝对收益。在熊市中它们可以让我们获得很大的优势，但是在牛市中它也会拖我们的后腿。我们期望长期来看这部分投资能够获得跟 “Generals”一样比道指更令人满意的收益率。
4. “Controls” - these are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block of stock, controls develop from the general - private owner category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing pricewise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company’s stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume a degree of or perhaps complete control of the company’s activities. Whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the managements capabilities.
4. “Controls”
——这部分投资很少见，但是一旦发生就会是非常大的规模。除非我们一开始就买了很大比例的股票，否则一般来说“Controls”都是从“Generals-可私有化”而来的。他们主要来源于在我们购买某只股票时的很长时间段内，它的价格一直没有回归价值，以致于我们可以购买到这个公司很大比例的股票。到那时，我们就会处于某种程度上控股或者是完全控股的位置；我们是否会有所行动取决于我们对于公司的未来以及管理层能力的判断。
We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal, I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital, you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
我们不会为了行动而行动。如果其他的效果都相同，我们宁愿让其他人来做这些工作。但是如果到了必须要行动才能优化资产配置的时候，我们也不会坐视不理。
Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the market place.
不管主动与否，“Controls”类投资必须要有利可图。必要条件是要有一个有吸引力的买入价格。一旦达成“Controls”，我们对投资标的的估值不再取决于经常非理性波动的股票市场，而是企业的内在价值。
Any of the three situations where we are now the largest stockholders mentioned under Generals - Private Owner could, by virtue of the two-way stretch they possess, turn into controls. That would suit us fine, but it also suits us if they advance in the market to a price more in line with intrinsic value enabling us to sell them, thereby completing a successful generals - private owner operation.
我们之前在“Generals-可私有化”类投资中提到的三家公司，因为“一弓两弦”的效应，都可以转化为“Controls”类投资，这会令我们很满意。但如果他们的价格达到了内在价值使得我们可以卖出他们，由此让我们完成一项“Generals-可私有化”类投资，我们也会很满意。
Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit -if it appears at all close, we quitclaim.
这类投资的结果必须要用数年时间才能检验。合理的建仓本身就需要很长时间。而且如果有必要，还需要进行加强管理和优化资产配置等能够影响出售或合并的操作。这些都会让这类投资结果需要用数年而非数月来检验。由于这些原因，在“Controls”类的投资中，我们需要找到有非常大利润空间的标的；如果它们不够大，我们就会略过。
Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.
“Controls”
类的投资在建仓时受股票市场的影响较大，控股后他们的表现将类似于“Workouts”。
You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the “Bigger Fool Theory”) is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results.
你们或许有兴趣了解，我们之前所控股的公司—Dempster Mill Manufacturing的买家后来把它经营的非常好。这符合我们的期望，也令我们感到很安心。如果一项投资要取决于是否有人接盘（华尔街称之为“博傻理论”），这显然不是好的决定。用很好的折扣价来买入以至于价格回归到平均水平就能够获取很好的收益——这是多么令人安心的投资！
As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among categories is largely determined by the accident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mix between generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter of chance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasons why single year’s performance is of minor importance and good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.
就像我之前提到过的一样，我们在这各类型投资上的资金配比很大程度上是比较偶然的。所以在某个年份，我们在“Generals”、“Workouts”、“Controls”上的资金配比很大程度上取决于运气，而这个比例很大程度上决定了我们相对道指的表现。这就是为什么单独一年的表现并不重要，不管是好还是坏，都不应该太当真。
To give an example of just how important the accident of division between these categories is, let me cite the example of the past three years. Using an entirely different method of calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL in entirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value by category is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expenses excluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroup comparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals (both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape up as follows:
让我用前三年的投资结果来举例说明我们各类投资资金比例配置的偶然性所带来的重要影响。跟衡量巴菲特合伙公司整体收益的标准不同，这里可以按月来计算市场价值的变动，而且可以较为精确的扣除贷款和运营费用（这为不同投资类型比较提供了最准确的依据，但不能反映巴菲特合伙公司的总体结果）。“Generals”（两类合在一起）、“Workouts”和道指的数据如下：
Year|Generals|Workouts|Dow
---|---:|---:|---:
1962|-1.0%|14.6%|-8.6%
1963|20.5%|30.6%|18.4%
1964|27.8%|10.3%|16.7%
Obviously the workouts (along with controls) saved the day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category that year, our final result would have been much poorer, although still quite respectable considering market conditions during the year. We could just as well have had a much smaller percentage of our portfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not any notion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore, it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain lucky regarding mix of categories.
很显然，“Workouts”（和“Controls”一起）在1962年拯救了我们的收益。如果这一年我们在这类投资上布署的比例较低，我们的投资结果就会较差，即使相较于道指，我们的收益还可以。当年我们或许会在“Workouts”上布署较少的资金，这很可能会发生，因为我并不能预测市场将来的走势。所以需要意识到，我们在1962年只是比较幸运地把资金布署在合适的地方而已。
In 1963 we had one sensational workout which greatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account of themselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had been normal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorer compared to the Dow. Here it wasn’t our mix that did much for us, but rather excellent situations.
1963年我们有一个“Workouts”取得了骄人的成绩，同时“Generals”的收益也非常好，那是个丰收的一年。如果“Workouts”表现更为正常一些（像1962年一样），相对道指我们不会有那么大的优势。这也不是我们有意为之，只是恰好如此而已。
Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag on performance. This would be normal in any event during a big plus year for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater drag than expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect it would have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but we don’t play the game in retrospect.
最后，1964年“Workouts”拖了我们的后腿，虽然这一年的收益在道指有很大涨幅时是比较正常的，但如果“Wokouts”表现的更差，则会更加拖累我们的整体收益。事后来看，我们或许应该全部投资于“Generals”，但是我们没有带着这样的预测眼镜来玩这个投资游戏。
I hope the preceding table drives home the point that results in a given year are subject to many variables - some regarding which we have little control or insight. We consider all categories to be good businesses and we are very happy we have several to rely on rather than just one. It makes for more discrimination within each category and reduces the chance we will be put completely out of operation by the elimination of opportunities in a single category.
我希望通过上述的表格可以得出一个观点——任何一年的收益都会有很多变量，有些是我们无法控制和预见的。我们认为我们这四类投资都是好的投资，并且我们很高兴我们有四类而不是只有一类投资。对任何一类投资的偏见，都将导致我们机会的减少。
Taxes **
税收
We have had a chorus of groans this year regarding partners’ tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a few if the tax sheet had gone out blank.
今年，我们听到了很多关于合伙人纳税义务的抱怨。当然，如果不用交税，我们中有些人也会抱怨。
More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of “tax considerations” than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher maintains that a majority of life’s errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do. This is certainly the case when an emotionally supercharged element like taxes enters the picture (I have another friend -a noted East Coast philosopher who says it isn’t the lack of representation he minds -it’s the taxation).
聪明人出于”税务考量”而犯下的投资错误，可能比其他任何原因都要多。我的一位朋友是西海岸著名的哲学家，他认为人生中的大多数错误都是由于忘记了自己真正想要做什么而造成的。当像税收这样导致情绪化的因素出现时，情况肯定会是这样（我有另一位朋友—一位著名的东海岸哲学家，说他介意的不是没有代表权，而是税收）。
Let’s get back to the West Coast. What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn’t the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case.
让我们回到西海岸。在投资领域，人们真正想做的是什么？不是交最少的税，尽管这可能是实现目的的一个考虑因素。然而，手段和目的不应混淆，目的是要获得最大的税后复合收益率。很明显，如果两种行动方案承诺的税前复利率相同，其中一种需要纳税，另一种不需要，那么后一种方案更优。然而，我们发现这种情况很少发生。
It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities obtainable at current prices, And, with 3,000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully “tax-generating” change).
从3000个股票中挑选出20个，要想在现在和已经很受欢迎时的一年后以完全不同的价格（包括所选股票和备选股票）获得最佳投资组合，这不可能。如果我们的目标是获得最大的税后复合收益率，我们就必须拥有以当前价格计算的最具吸引力的证券，而面对3000个瞬息万变的变量，这必然意味着变化（希望是”产生税收”的变化）。
It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to “get even” in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.
显然，一只股票去年或上个月的表现本身并不能成为现在持有或不持有它的理由。很明显，无法从已经下跌的证券中”扯平”并不重要；去年持有某只上涨股票所带来的内心喜悦，对于决定该股票是否应该属于今年的最佳投资组合也并不重要。
If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expectable performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates).
如果有收益，改变投资组合就要交税。除非是在非常特殊的情况下（我承认确实有这样的情况），否则，如果预期业绩差异很大，税金的多少就显得不那么重要了。我一直不明白，既然长期资本收益的税率比大多数行业都低（税收政策表明，挖沟被认为不如交易股票凭证更符合社会需求），为什么这种税会给很多人带来如此沉重的打击。
I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There are only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset - and that’s a little too ultimate for me even the zealots would have to view this “cure” with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away - you certainly don’t pay any taxes this way, but of course you don’t pay for any groceries, rent, etc., either; and (3) lose back the gain if your mouth waters at this tax-saver, I have to admire you -you certainly have the courage of your convictions.
我的听众中有很大一部分实用主义者，所以我最好放弃理想主义。最终避免缴税的方法只有三种：（1）与资产同归于尽—这对我来说有点太极端了，即使是狂热分子也不得不对这种”疗法”褒贬不一；（2）将资产赠与他人—这样当然不用缴税，当然也无法支付任何日用品、房租等费用；（3）把收益亏损回去—如果你对这种省税方法垂涎三尺，我不得不佩服你——你肯定有坚持信念的勇气。
So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPL to try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will do our level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury -at the lowest rates the rules will allow.
因此，巴菲特合伙有限公司的政策仍将是努力实现投资收益最大化，而不是税收最小化。我们将尽最大努力，在规则允许的最低税率下，为财政部门创造最大收益。
An interesting sidelight on this whole business of taxes, vis-à-vis investment management, has appeared in the last few years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called “swap funds” which are investment companies created by the exchange of the investment company’s shares for general market securities held by potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been the deferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman, sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capital gains taxes while trading a single security for a diversified portfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund’s shares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoided entirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned two paragraphs earlier eventuates.
在过去几年中，税收与投资管理的关系出现了一个有趣的现象。这就是所谓的“互换基金”，即通过将投资公司的股票换成潜在投资者持有的普通证券而成立的投资公司。最主要的销售理由是，在以单一证券换取多样化投资组合时，可以推迟缴纳资本利得税（由热情的销售人员发音时，“推迟”的发音有时与“取消”的发音非常接近）。只有在赎回“互换基金”基金份额时，才需要支付税款。对于幸运的人来说，当前面两段中提到的那些令人“愉快”的替代方案出现时，就可以完全避免交税。
The reasoning implicit in the swapee’s action is rather interesting. He obviously doesn’t really want to hold what he is holding or he wouldn’t jump at the chance to swap it (and pay a fairly healthy commission - usually up to $100,000) for a grab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbed investors. In all fairness, I should point out that after all offerees have submitted their securities for exchange and had a chance to review the proposed portfolio they have a chance to back out but I understand a relatively small proportion do so.
被交换者的行为所隐含的推理相当有趣。显然，他并不是真的想持有他所持有的股票，否则他就不会抓住这个机会（并支付一笔相当可观的佣金—通常高达10万美元）来交换其他税负过重的投资者所持有的一袋类似的烫手山芋。为了公平起见，我应该指出，在所有接受者提交其证券进行并有机会审查拟交换的投资组合后，他们有机会退出，但我知道这样做的比例相对较小。
There have been twelve such funds (that I know of) established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several more are currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal since sales totaled well over 250,000 to $700,000 per year), but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors of securities, virtually his every move creates capital gains tax liabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs such liabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quite sensitive to taxes or they wouldn’t own shares in the swap fund in the first place.
自1960年这个想法出现以来，已经成立了12个这样的基金（据我所知），目前还有几个基金正在筹建中。这个想法并非没有吸引力，因为销售总额已超过6亿美元。所有基金都保留了一位投资经理，通常向其支付资产价值的0.5%。这位投资经理面临着一个有趣的问题：他的职责是对基金进行明智的管理（在五大基金中，这笔费用目前每年从 25 万美元到 70 万美元不等），但由于证券出资人的税基较低，他的一举一动几乎都会产生资本利得税负债。当然，他也知道，如果他产生了这种税负，他也是在为那些可能对税收相当敏感的人这样做的——否则他们一开始就不会拥有“互换基金”的股票。
I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I am sure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answer to an individual’s combined tax and investment problems. Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube to measure the ability of some of the most respected investment advisors when they are trying to manage money without paying (significant) taxes.
我这样说有点强词夺理，我相信在某些情况下，“互换基金”可能是解决个人税务和投资综合问题的最佳选择。不过，我觉得它们提供了一个非常有趣的试验渠道，可以用来衡量一些最受尊敬的投资顾问在不缴纳（巨额）税款的情况下管理资金的能力。
The three largest swap funds were all organized in 1961, and combined have assets now of about 2 billion of institutional money.
三个最大的“互换基金”都成立于1961年，目前的总资产约为3亿美元。其中一个基金， Diversification Fund，以财政年度为基础进行报告，因此很难提取相关数据与自然年度比较。另外两个基金，Federal Street Fund 和Westminster Fund （分别是三者中的第一和第三大基金）由投资顾问管理，他们管理着至少20亿美元的机构资金。
Here’s how they shape up for all full years of existence
以下是这两家基金公司成立以来所有完整年度的情况：
Year|Federal Street|Westminster|Dow
---|---:|---:|---:
1962|-19.0%|-22.5%|-7.6%
1963|17.0%|18.7%|20.6%
1964|13.8%|12.3%|18.7%
Annual Compounded Rate|2.6%|1.1%|9.8%
This is strictly the management record. No allowance has been made for the commission in entering and any taxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have been added back to performance.
这是严格按照字面意思计算的管理记录，没有扣除佣金，而且为股东支付的任何税款都已加回到业绩中。
Anyone for taxes?
还有人对缴税有疑问吗？
Miscellaneous **
其他
In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS it was reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in 1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout the world. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add 227 1/4 square feet to its facilities in the spring of 1965.
12月21日汽车新闻板块报道说，福特汽车计划于1965年在全球花费7亿美元增加6,742,000平方英尺的工厂。巴菲特合伙有限公司也不甘落后，计划在1965年春天增加227.25平方英尺的办公面积。
Our growth in net assets from 100) on May 5, 1956 when the first predecessor limited partnership.(Buffett Associates, Ltd. ) was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for an occasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughly contemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 1⁄4 square feet, a highly capable is going to join our organization with responsibility for the administrative (and certain other) functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more of Bill Scott’s time for security analysis which is his forte. I’ll have more to report on this in the midyear letter.
我们在1956年5月5日成立了第一个合伙基金，那时候的资产是105,100美元（猜中了谁投资的100美元没有任何奖品），到了1965年1月1日我们管理的资产已经达到26,074,000美元，这时候就需要重新部署我们的日常工作了。所以，我们同时大胆的把办公面积从682平方英尺的增加到909.25平方英尺，以便更好的实现我们的管理功能。这项行动主要是为了能够把Bill Scott解放出来，让他能够有时间专注于他的最爱——证券分析。我在下一封年中信中会更详细地说明这件事。
Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and his wife have an investment in the Partnership of 3,406,700 in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother , two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-Law, four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1,942,592. So we all continue to eat home cooking.
Bill（
工作仍然非常出色）和他的妻子在合伙基金中的资金是298,749美元，这是他们绝大部分的净资产。我们的新同事（在他现在的雇主找到替代人选之前，他的名字暂时保密）和他的妻子及孩子们也在合伙基金中投入了非常多的资金。Susie和我在合伙基金中拥有的资金是3,406,700美元，这几乎是我们所有的净资产，除了我们一直拥有的Mid-Continent Tab Card公司——一个我在1960年买的本地公司的股权，那时候它的股东不超过10个人。另外我的三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个大舅哥、我的岳父、四个阿姨、4个堂兄弟、6个侄子和侄女在我们的合伙基金中直接或间接持有的资产为1,942,592美元。所以我们仍然在吃我们自己做的饭。
We continue to represent the ultimate in seasonal businesses —open one day a year. This creates real problems in keeping the paper flowing smoothly, but Beth and Donna continue to do an outstanding job of coping with this and other problems.
我们仍然代表着最后的最具季节性的生意——每年只开张一天。这会给文件无缝流转方面带来很大的麻烦，但是Beth和Donna继续做着非常出色的工作来应对这种和那种问题。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has distinguished itself in its usual vital role of finding out what belongs to whom. We continue to throw impossible deadlines at them —and they continue to perform magnificently. You will note in their certificate this year that they have implemented the new procedure whereby they now pounce on us unannounced twice a year in addition to the regular yearend effort.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
继续在审核资金方面发挥重要作用。虽然我们继续缩短审计时间，但是他们仍旧完成的非常好。你们或许会注意到他们保证今年会执行新的审核程序，除了年底的常规审核外，每年还会有两次审计。
Finally -and most sincerely -let me thank you partners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to us promptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spend working where we should be -by the cash register. I am extremely fortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my time thinking about where our money should be invested, rather than getting bogged down in the minutiae that seems to overwhelm so many business entities. We have an organizational structure which makes this efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have a group of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am most appreciative and we are all wealthier.
最后让我衷心感谢我们的合伙人，你们配合的非常好而且恰到好处，因此能够最大限度的节约我们的时间，使我们可以把它花在我们的工作上。我非常幸运能够把我的大部分时间用于思考在什么地方投资，而不是其他细枝末节的事情上。我们的组织结构让这种效率变成可能，更重要的是我们的合伙人让它变为现实。对于这些我非常感激，而且我们也都在变富。
Our past policy has been to admit close relatives of present partners without a minimum capital limitation. This year a flood of children, grandchildren, etc., appeared which called this policy into question; therefore, I have decided to institute a $25,000 minimum on interests of immediate relatives of present partners.
我们过去的政策允许当前合伙人的亲戚们不受最低投资基金的限制。今年有非常多合伙人的儿孙们投资进来，以致于我们的这项政策出现了问题。因此，我决定将现在合伙人亲戚们的最低投资金额调整为25,000美元。
Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
接下来几周你们将会收到：
(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1964 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
（1）一封你们缴纳1964年联邦所得税所需要的所有关于巴菲特合伙公司信息的信。这封信中的信息只用于计税。
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1964, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
（2）
一封Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司关于1964年的审计工作的信，包含对巴菲特合伙公司运营情况和财务情况以及你们个人账户的审计。
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 111165. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
（3）一封关于你们在1965年1月1日在合伙基金中的资金份额的信。这些金额已经通过审计。
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.
（4）
列示了所有合伙人均在合伙协议上得到“A”的信。
Let Bill or me know if anything needs clarifying. Even with our splendid staff our growth means there is more chance of missing letters, overlooked instructions, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if you have any question at all that we might have erred. My next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half of this year.
如果有任何不清楚的地方，请随时联系我和Bill。即使我们拥有非常棒的员工，随着规模的增大，很多事情可能也会有出错，例如少字、缺名或数字移位等。所以如果我们有错漏，请随时告知。我们下一封信将会在7月15日发出，用于总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
[^1]
此处电子版英文有误，对照扫描版可知应为标点符号“,”，而非“I”。