原文信息：
- 标题：1963 Semi-annual Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1963-07-10
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
July 10, 1963
First Half Performance
上半年的表现
During the first half of 1963, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) advanced from 652.10 to 706.88. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of $10.66 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%.
上半年道琼斯工业指数（以下简称“道指”）从652.10点增长到706.88点，加上拥有道指期间可获得差不多10.66美元的分红，道指在上半年的涨幅是10%。
Our incantation has been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that devotes a portion of resources to control situations, and; (2) That our results relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media, will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in bubbling markets.
我们认为：（1）用较短的期间（少于三年）来评判投资表现几乎没有什么意义，特别是因为我们的投资有一定的比例放在了“Controls”上。（2）相对于道指和其他的股票型基金投资公司，我们在熊市中的表现会更好一些，在牛市中可能仅仅只能够跟上市场的脚步。
Nevertheless, our first-half performance, excluding any change in Dempster valuation (and its valuation did change —I’m saving this for dessert later in the letter) was plus 14%. This 14% is computed on total net assets (not non-Dempster assets) and is after expenses, but before monthly payments (to those who take them) to partners and allocation to the General Partner. Such allocations are academic on an interim basis, but if we were also plus 14% at yearend, the first 6% would be allocated to partners according to their capital, plus three-quarters of the balance of 8% (14% -6%), or an additional 6%, giving the limited partners a plus 12% performance.
如果把Dempster价值变化排除在外（它的价值确实改变了，这部分将作为餐后甜点在后面描述），我们上半年的收益是正14%。这个14%的收益率是基于净资产总额（包含Dempster的资产）计算的，扣除了运营费用，但是没有扣除给合伙人（选择了此项权利的人）的“月度支付”以及给普通合伙人的分成。上述给普通合伙人分成的说法只是临时用来计算收益率的假设，未必一定会发生。不过如果今年年底的时候，我们仍然取得了正14%的收益，那么要先把6%的收益依据资金份额分给合伙人，剩余8%（14%-6%）的收益的3/4（8%×3/4=6%）也会按照资金份额分给有限合伙人，那么有限合伙人的年终收益就是正12%（6%+6%）。
Despite the relatively pleasant results of the first half the admonitions stated two paragraphs earlier hold in full force. At plus 14% versus plus 10% for the Dow, this six months has been a less satisfactory period than the first half of 1962 when we were minus 7.5% versus minus 21.7% for the Dow. You should completely understand our thinking in this regard which has been emphasized in previous letters.
尽管我们上半年的投资收益看起来比较好，但是我们之前提到过的说法依然有效。相对于道指10%的涨幅，我们上半年有14%的收益，而1962年上半年当道琼斯下降了21.7%时我们只下降了7.5%，这样看来今年上半年的结果并没有去年上半年的好。你们应该记住我们之前在信中提到过的这种标准。
During the first half we had an average net investment in “generals” (long positions in generals minus short positions in generals) of approximately 1,100,000 for a percentage gain from this category of roughly 21%. This again illustrates the extent to which the allocation of our resources among various categories affects short-term results. In 1962 the generals were down for the year and only an outstanding performance by both of the other two categories, “work-outs” and “controls,” gave us our unusually favorable results for that year.
上半年我们在Generals上的净投资（长期持有减去卖空数量）大约为5,275,000美元。我们在这类投资（投资分类可参照上年度信）上的收益大概是1,100,000美元，收益率为21%。这再次印证了我们三类投资上的资金布署比例会影响我们的短期收益。例如，在1962年 Generals类投资市价下降了很多，而另外两类投资Work-outs和Controls却有出色的表现，使得我们当年的收益相对道指表现的较好。
Now this year, our work-outs have done poorer than the Dow and have been a drag on performance, as they are expected to be in rising markets. While it would be very nice to be 100% in generals in advancing markets and 100% in work-outs in declining markets, I make no attempt to guess the course of the stock market in such a manner. We consider all three of our categories to be good businesses on a long-term basis, although their short-term price behavior characteristics differ substantially in various types of markets. We consider attempting to gauge stock market fluctuations to be a very poor business on a long-term basis and are not going to be in it, either directly or indirectly through the process of trying to guess which of our categories is likely to do best in the near future.
今年我们的“Workouts”表现的比道指要差，拖了我们的后腿，但这是他们在牛市中的正常表现。或许最好能够在牛市中把资金100%投入到“Generals”，而在熊市中把资金100%投入到“Workouts”，但是我不会尝试去预测股票市场的走势。我们认为长期来看我们的三类投资都会是好的投资，尽管他们短期内的表现可能会因为不同的市场环境而有很大不同。我们认为从长期投资的角度来看，测量股票市场的波动是无意义的。我们不会这样做，并且我们也不会直接或间接地通过这些测量来的预测我们哪类投资短期内会表现的最好。
Investment Companies
投资公司
Shown below are the usual statistics on a cumulative basis for the Dow and Buffett Partnership. Ltd. (including predecessor partnerships) as well as for the two largest open-end (mutual funds) and two largest closed-end investment companies following a diversified common-stock investment policy:
下表列出了道指、巴菲特合伙基金（包含合并前的合伙基金）、两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式基金的投资收益：
Year|Dow|Mass.Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Tri-Cont. (2)
---|---|---|---|---
1957|-8.4%|-11.4%|-12.4%|-2.4%
1957 – 58|26.9%|26.4%|29.2%|30.0%
1957 – 59|52.3%|37.8%|42.5%|40.9%
1957 – 60|42.9%|36.4%|41.6%|44.8%
1957 – 61|74.9%|71.3%|76.9%|77.4%
1957 – 62|61.6%|54.5%|53.2%|59.7%
1957 – 6/30/63|77.8%|72.4%|69.3%|75.7%
Annual Compounded Rate|9.3%|8.7%|8.4%|9.1%
Year|Lehman (2)|Partnership (3)|Limited Partners (4)
---|---|---|---
1957|-11.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1957 – 58|24.7%|55.6%|44.5%
1957 – 59|34.8%|95.9%|74.7%
1957 – 60|38.2%|140.6%|107.2%
1957 – 61|70.8%|251.0%|181.6%
1957 – 62|46.2%|299.8%|215.1%
1957 – 6/30/63|60.8%|355.8%|252.9%
Annual Compounded Rate|7.6%|26.3%|21.4%
Footnotes :
注：
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1963 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62. Estimated for first half 1963.
（2）
1957-1962年数据来源于1963年Moody银行和金融手册；1963年上半年数据为估计值。
(3) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(4) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.
（4）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（3）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality, etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market.
上述结果继续显示出那些收费很高、看起来很好的投资建议并没有取得与无人管理的蓝筹股指数同样的收益。这并不是在谴责那些基金公司或跟他们投资方式和收益类似的投资咨询机构以及信托公司。这些机构向数以百万的投资者们提供了大量的服务，使得他们可以拥有相对分散、较为便利、无需担忧且质量较高的投资标的。但是，他们的服务并不包括（很多时候，也无法包括）取得超出市场平均水平的收益。
Our partnership’s fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly cannot represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don’t achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation
我们合伙基金存在的原因是能够在本金长期亏损风险较低的情况下，取得比这些投资机构更高的长期年化收益。我们不能确保一定能达成这些目标。我们可以确保并将承诺的是：如果排除了那些因投机而过度上涨的年份，在长度较为合理的时期内我们不能达到这个目标，我的合伙基金将会终止运营。
Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company
邓普斯特机器制造公司
In our most recent annual letter, I described Harry Bottle as the “man of the year”. If this was an understatement.
在去年的信中，我说Harry Bottle是“年度最佳”，或许这是一种低估。
Last year Harry did an extraordinary job of converting unproductive assets into cash which we then, of course, began to invest in undervalued securities. Harry has continued this year to turn under-utilized assets into cash, but in addition, he has made the remaining needed assets productive. Thus we have had the following transformation in balance sheets during the last nineteen months:
去年，Harry在将无效资产转化成现金方面做的异常出色。当然与此同时我们也开始投资于被低估的证券。Harry今年会继续把未充分利用的资产转化为现金，另外他还将那些剩下的可用资产充分利用了起来。所以，过去十九个月我们的资产负债表变化如下：
November 30, 1961 (000’s omitted)
1961年11月30日（缩小1000倍）：
Assets
资产|Book Figure
账面价值|Valued @
调整系数|Adjusted Valuation
调整后的价值|Liabilities
负债|
---|---|---|---|---|---
Cash</br
现金|166|Notes Payable
应付账款|$1,230
Accts. Rec. (net)</br
应收账款|884|Other Liabilities
其他负债|$1,088
Inventory</br
存货|2,522|
Ppd. Exp. Etc.</br
预付账款|21|Total Liabilities|$2,318
|||
Current Assets</br
流动资产|3,593|Net Worth:
净资产
|||||Per Books|$4,601
Cash Value Life ins., etc.</br
寿险的现金价值|45|As adjusted to quickly realizable values
调整后的速动资产|$2,120
Net Plant & equipment</br
厂房和设备|800
||||
Total Assets</br
资产总额|4,438|Share outstanding 60,146. Adj. Value per Share
每股价值|$35.25
June 30, 1963 (000’s omitted)
1963年6月30日（缩小1000倍）
Assets|Book Figure|Valued @|Adjusted Valuation|Liabilities|
---|---|---|---|---|---
Cash|60|Notes payable|$0
Marketable securities|834|Other liabilities|$346
Accts. Rec. (net)|676|Total liabilities|$346
Inventory|981
Cash value life ins.|41|Net Worth:
Recoverable Income Tax|170|Per Books|$4,077
Ppd. Exp. Etc.|4|As Adjusted to quickly realizable values|$3,125
|||||Add: proceeds from potential exercise of option to Harry Bottle|$60
Current Assets|2,766||$3,185
|||||Shares outstanding|60,146
Misc. Invest. |5|Add: shs. Potentially outstanding under option|2,000
Net Plant Equipment|700|Total shs.|62,146
Total Assets|3,471|Adjusted value per share|$51.26
November 30, 1963 (000’s omitted)
1963年11月30日（缩小1000倍）
Assets|Book Figure|Valued @|Adjusted Valuation|Liabilities|
---|---|---|---|---|---
Cash|144|Notes payable(paid 7/3/63)|$125
Marketable securities|2,029|Other liabilities|$394
Accts. Rec. (net)|1,073|Total liabilities|$519
Inventory|586
Ppd. Exp. Etc.|3|Net Worth:
|||||Per Books|$4,582
Current Assets|3,835|As Adjusted to quickly realizable values|$4,028
||||
Misc. Invest.|62|Shares outstanding|62,146
||||
Net Plant Equipment|650|Adjusted value per share|$64.81
||||
Total Assets|4,547|
I have included above the conversion factors we have previously used in valuing Dempster for B.P.L. purposes to reflect estimated immediate sale values of non-earning assets.
上述表格中特别列出了我们为合伙基金估算Dempster的价值时所使用的估算系数，这个系数反映了无盈利能力资产的快速变现价值。
As can be seen, Harry has converted the assets at a much more favorable basis than was implied by my valuations. This largely reflects Harry’s expertise and, perhaps, to a minor degree my own conservatism in valuation.
可以看出，按照我的计算方式，Harry把资产转变得更为有效了。这显示了Harry的专业水平以及我在估值上的保守程度。
As can also be seen, Dempster earned a very satisfactory operating profit in the first half (as well as a substantial unrealized gain in securities) and there is little question that the operating business, as now conducted, has at least moderate earning power on the vastly reduced assets needed to conduct it. Because of a very important-seasonal factor and also the presence of a tax carry forward, however, the earning power is not nearly what might be inferred simply by a comparison of the 11/30/62 and 6/30/63 balance sheets. Partly because of this seasonality, but more importantly, because of possible developments in Dempster before 1963 yearend, we have left our Dempster holdings at the same $51.26 valuation used at yearend 1962 in our figures for B.P.L’s first half. However, I would be very surprised if it does not work out higher than this figure at yearend.
也可以看出，Dempster上半年有非常令人满意的盈利（证券投资也有大量的浮盈）；按照削减后的资产，主营业务也有了正常的盈利能力。由于季节波动和税收因素，这种盈利能力不能够简单的由1962年11月30日和1963年6月30日的资产负债表对比而得出。部分由于季节因素，更重要的是由于在1963年底前Dempster可能发生的变化，我们仍旧按照1962年底的每股51.26美元来计算今年上半年巴菲特合伙公司在Dempster公司权益的价值。不过如果年底的数值没有现在的高，我会非常吃惊。
One sidelight for the fundamentalists in our group: B.P.L. owns 71.7% of Dempster acquired at a cost of 2,028,415.25. Our 71.7% share of 1,454,373.70. Thus, everything above ground (and part of it underground) is profit. My security analyst friends may find this a rather primitive method of accounting, but I must confess that I find a bit more substance in this fingers and toes method than in any prayerful reliance that someone will pay me 35 times next year’s earnings.
我们合伙公司的一个侧面特写：巴菲特合伙公司过去以1,262,577.27美元的成本获得了Dempster公司71.7%的股权。在1963年6月30日，Dempster公司位于奥马哈国民银行的小保险箱中有价值2,028,415.25美元的证券。按照71.7%的股权比例，我们拥有这部分证券的权益为1,454,373.70美元。所以，那个保险箱之外（包括保险箱里面的一部分）的任何资产都是利润。我从事证券分析的朋友们也许会认为这是一种老掉牙的计算方法。但是我必须澄清这种掰着手指头和脚趾头计算的方法要比那些依靠祈祷希望以来年盈利35倍价格卖出的方法重要的多！
Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals
提前投资和提前撤资
We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert the payment to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time of payment.
我们接受合伙人或者潜在合伙人的提前投资，在年底时这笔资金将从提前投资之日起以6%的年化利率计算利息。虽然没有强制要求这笔资金在年底时转换为合伙基金份额，但在投入这笔资金时应该要有这种打算。
Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use us like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for unanticipated need for funds.
同样，我们也允许合伙人在年底前提前赎回不超过他们在合伙基金中所占份额20%的资金。这笔资金也是从提前撤资之日起按照6%的年化利率来计算利息。这个利息将从他们的合伙份额中扣除。我仍旧要重复，这并不意味着我们的合伙基金会像银行一样，这只是给了我们合伙人一项在不虞之需时可以撤出部分投资的权利。
The willingness to both borrow and lend at 6% may seem “un-Buffett-like.” We look at the withdrawal right as a means of giving some liquidity for unexpected needs and, as a practical matter, are reasonably sure it will be far more than covered by advance payments.
这种以6%的年利率来借贷，或许很不“巴菲特”。我们把提前撤资权看作是弥补资金不虞之需的一种方式。在实际操作中，我们有理由认为提前投入会比提前撤出的资金要多。
Why then the willingness to pay 6% for advance payment money when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? For example, in the first half we obtained a substantial six-month bank loan at 4%. The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner’s allocation is zero unless we do)1 although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude in the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable. On June 30, 1963 we had advance withdrawals of 562,437.11.
既然我们可以从商业银行用低得多的利率来借款，为什么我们还愿意为提前投入的资金支付6%的利率？今年上半年我们从银行借入的为期6个月的贷款利率就只有4%。答案就是我们希望，基于长期的角度来看，我们能够获得超出6%的收益（如果没有达到，普通合伙人的分成就是零），尽管从短期的角度来看，能够获得6%的收益率有很大的随机性。更重要的是，我对短期借款和提前投资有非常不同的看法——提前投资可能很快会成为我们合伙基金的一部分。提前投资可以让我们在年中以不同的时间获取资金，而不是都集中在一月份获得。从另外一个方面来说，提前投资的6%利率，可以让我们的合伙人获得比短期无风险投资更高的收益，这是一种双赢。截至1963年6月30日，我们的提前撤资是21,832美元，而提前投资是562,437.11美元。
Taxes
税负
There is some possibility that we may have fairly substantial realized gains this year. Of course, this may not materialize at all and actually does not have anything to do with our investment performance this year. I am an outspoken advocate of paying large amounts of income taxes — at low rates. A tremendous number of fuzzy, confused investment decisions are rationalized through so-called “tax considerations.”
今年我们有可能会实现相当可观的收益，当然也可能根本不会实现，实际上这与我们今年的投资业绩完全无关。我直截了当地说过支持缴纳高额的所得税，但税率要低。因为很多模糊不清的投资决策都是通过所谓的“税务考量”来合理化的。
My net worth is the market value of holdings less the tax payable upon sale. The liability is just as real as the asset unless the value of the asset declines (ouch), the asset is given away (no comment), or I die with it. The latter course of action would appear to at least border on a Pyrrhic victory.
我的净资产是所持资产的市场价值减去出售时应缴纳的税款。除非资产价值下降（哎呦）、资产被送人（无可奉告）或我与资产同生共死，否则负债与资产一样真实。后一种做法似乎至少近乎于“殊死一搏”。
Investment decisions should be made on the basis of the most probable compounding of after-tax net worth with minimum risk. Any isolation of low-basis securities merely freezes a portion of net worth at a compounding factor identical with the assets isolated. While this may work out either well or badly in individual cases, it is a nullification of investment management. The group experience holding various low basis securities will undoubtedly approximate group experience on securities as a whole, namely compounding at the compounding rate of the Dow. We do not consider this the optimum in after-tax compounding rates.
投资决策应基于风险最小化且税后收益最大化。将低基证券分离出来，只是将净资产的一部分冻结在与被分离资产相同的收益率上。在不同的个案下既可能表现的好也可能表现的坏，这也体现了投资管理的无效性。持有各种低基证券的人获得的收益率跟道指的收益率相差不大。我们并不认为这是税后复利率的最佳值。
I have said before that if earnings from the partnership can potentially amount to a sizable portion of your total taxable income, the safe thing to do is to estimate this year the same tax you incurred last year. If you do this, you cannot run into penalties. In any event, tax liabilities for those who entered the partnership on 1/1/63 will be minimal because of the terms of our partnership agreement first allocating capital gains to those having an interest in unrealized appreciation.
我以前说过，如果合伙企业的收益占据您应纳税总收入的很大一部分，那么稳妥的做法是以去年相同的金额估算今年的税额。如果这样做，你就不会受到处罚。无论如何，1963年1月1日才加入合伙企业的人的纳税义务将是最小的，因为根据合伙协议我们会首先将资本收益分配给了那些在账面浮盈中拥有权益的人。
As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the partnership agreement, commitment letter for 1964, estimate of the 1963 tax situation, etc.
像过去一样，我们会在11月1日写一封信（给合伙人和有兴趣成为合伙人的人）来修订我们的合伙协议、探讨1964年的信并估算1963年的税收状况等等。
My closing plea for questions regarding anything not clear always draws a blank. Maybe no one reads this far. Anyway, the offer is still open.
我一再恳请大家对任何不清楚的地方提问，但总是没人回应。也许没人读到这里。不管怎样，我的提议仍然有效。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
Footnotes
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此处似乎少了一个标点符号“)”，由1965年信可以证实。 ↩