原文信息：
- 标题：1963 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1964-01-18
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 18, 1964
Our Performance in
1963 我们在1963年的表现
1963 was a good year. It was not a good year because we had an overall gain of $3,637,167 or 38.7% on our beginning net assets, pleasant as that experience may be to the pragmatists in our group. Rather it was a good year because our performance was substantially better than that of our fundamental yardstick —the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). If we had been down 20% and the Dow had been down 30%, this letter would still have begun “1963 was a good year.” Regardless of whether we are plus or minus in a particular year, if we can maintain a satisfactory edge on the Dow over an extended period of time, our long term results will be satisfactory — financially as well as philosophically.
1963年是一个好年份。这并不是因为我们获得了3,637,167美元的收益，也就是按照年初净资产价值计算的收益率为38.7%。虽然我们合伙人中的务实主义者或许会对这种收益感到非常满意，但我们认为它是一个好年份，是因为我们的表现大幅超越了我们的评判标准——道琼斯工业指数（以下简称“道指”）。如果我们的基金下降了20%，而道指下降了30%，我仍然会在这封信的开始写道“1963年是一个好年份”。不管某个具体年份我们的收益是正还是负，只要相对于道指，我们能够在相当长的时期内保持一个令人满意的领先幅度。那么我们的长期表现将会是令人满意的，不管是从金融的角度还是从哲学的角度来看。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results for all full years of BPL’s and predecessor partnerships’ activities:
下表更新了道琼斯工业指数、未扣除普通合伙人分成前的合伙基金收益、有限合伙人收益，这些收益只包括当年运行已满一年的合并前的合伙基金以及新的巴菲特合伙基金：
Year|Overall Results From Dow (1)|Partnership Results (2)|Limited Partners’ Results (3)
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
1963|20.7%|38.7%|30.5%
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
（1）加回分红后的道指的变化值。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.
（3）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（2）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
One wag among the limited partners has suggested I add a fourth column showing the results of the general partner —let’s just say he, too, has an edge on the Dow.
有些有限合伙人劝我再加一列用于显示普通合伙人的收益。让我们这样说吧，普通合伙人的收益也远超道指。
The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results based on the preceding table:
下表列出在上表的基础上以复利计算的累积收益：
Year|Overall Results From Dow|Partnership Results|Limited Partners’ Results
---|---:|---:|---:
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1957 – 58|26.9%|55.6%|44.5%
1957 – 59|52.3%|95.9%|74.7%
1957 – 60|42.9%|140.6%|107.2%
1957 – 61|74.9%|251.0%|181.6%
1957 – 62|61.6%|299.8%|215.1%
1957 – 63|95.1%|454.5%|311.2%
Annual Compounded Rate|10.0%|27.7%|22.3%
It appears that we have completed seven fat years. With apologies to Joseph we shall attempt to ignore the biblical script. (I’ve never gone overboard for Noah’s ideas on diversification either.)
上述表格显示出我们合伙基金成立7年来的出色表现。我需要向Joseph道歉，因为忽视了他的圣谕（不过我也从来没有接受过Noah关于多元化的想法）。
In a more serious vein, I would like to emphasize that, in my judgment; our 17.7 margin over the Dow shown above is unattainable over any long period of time. A ten percentage point advantage would be a very satisfactory accomplishment and even a much more modest edge would produce impressive gains as will be touched upon later. This view (and it has to be guesswork — informed or otherwise) carries with it the corollary that we must expect prolonged periods of much narrower margins over the Dow as well as at least occasional years when our record will be inferior (perhaps substantially so) to the Dow.
言归正传，我需要强调的是，在我的判断中，我们超出道指17.7个点的收益率不可能在很长时期内持续保持。超出道指10个点的收益已经令人非常满意了，即使只超出道指几个点也会得到非常好的收益，这一点将会在后面讨论。这种看法（是一种有依据或没有依据的猜测）伴随着以下的推论：我们必须了解在较长的时间内我们相对于道指的优势会有所缩减，而且在某些个别年份我们的表现可能还不如（或许会大幅落后）道指。
Much of the above sermon is reflected in “The Ground Rules” sent to everyone in November, but it can stand repetition.
上述布道的大部分内容在10月份寄给大家的“投资原则”中都有，但是有必要再次重复。
Investment Companies
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage about 25 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the vast majority or other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们经常将我们的投资结果和两家最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的多元化封闭式基金做对比。按照他们的政策，这两家最大的开放式基金的资金有95%-100%的资金都投资在普通股上。这四家公司，Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund 、Tri-Continental Corporation、Lehman Corporation的资产大概共有40亿美元。他们是拥有总额达250亿美元资产的投资基金公司中的典型代表。我认为他们的投资收益跟那些管理着更多资产的大多数投资咨询公司的收益差不多。
The purpose or this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index or investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands’ annual fees of over $7 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates they achieved results slightly less favorable than the Dow.
我列出上述数据是想说明道指作为投资评判标准并不低。上述四个基金的天才管理者们每年收取的年费约为700万美元，而这只是整个基金行业的很小一部分。这些拥有高收入、高智商的管理者的基金公司所获得的平均收益率却比道指稍低。
Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the Partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore, feel they offer a meaningful standard of performance.
我们的投资组合和运营方式跟上述基金有很大不同。但是如果我们的合伙人想赎回资金而另投别处，估计也只能投入到与这些公司收益差不多的机构中，所以我认为它们可以作为一个有意义的参考。
YEARLY RESULTS
年度收益
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-14.4%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
1963|20.0%|16.5%|23.8%|19.5%|20.7%|30.5%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1963 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62; Estimated for 1963
（2）
1957-1962年数据来源于1963年Moody银行和金融手册；1963年数据为估计值。
COMPOUNDED
累积收益
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust|Investors Stock|Lehman|Tri-Cont.|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1957-58|26.4%|29.2%|24.7%|30.0%|26.9%|44.5%
1957-59|37.8%|42.5%|34.8%|40.9%|52.3%|74.7%
1957-60|36.4%|41.6%|38.2%|44.8%|42.9%|107.2%
1957-61|71.3%|76.9%|70.8%|77.4%|74.9%|181.6%
1957-62|54.5%|53.2%|46.2%|59.7%|61.6%|215.1%
1957 – 63|85.4%|78.5%|81.0%|90.8%|95.1%|311.2%
Annual Compounded Rate|9.2%|8.6%|8.8%|9.7%|10.0%|22.3%
The Dow, of course, is an unmanaged index, and it may seem strange to the reader to contemplate the high priests of Wall Street striving vainly to surpass or even equal it. However, this is demonstrably the case. Moreover, such a failure cannot be rationalized by the assumption that the investment companies et al are handling themselves in a more conservative manner than the Dow. As the table above indicates, and as more extensive studies bear out, the behavior of common stock portfolio managed by this group, on average, have declined in concert with the Dow. By such a test of behavior in declining markets, our own methods of operation have proven to be considerably more conservative than the common stock component of the investment company or investment advisor group. While this has been true in the past, there obviously can be no guarantees about the future.
华尔街的顶尖投资者们异常努力也很难超越或达到道指这种无人管理的指数，这一点或许会让读者们非常奇怪。然而这就是事实。并且这种失败也不能被理所当然的认为这些投资公司的运营方法比道指要保守。就像上面的表格显示出的那样，而且更多的研究也会指出，这些公司所拥有的投资组合会随着道指的下降而下降。而在这些下降的市场中，我们的投资方法可以让我们看起来比这些投资公司更为保守。不过即使在过去这是正确的，并不代表着在将来它会一直正确。
The above may seem like rather strong medicine, but it is offered as a factual presentation and in no way as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, the results achieved are the only ones attainable. To behave unconventionally within this framework is extremely difficult. Therefore, the collective record of such investment media is necessarily tied to the record of corporate America. Their merits, except in the unusual case, do not lie in superior results or greater resistance to decline in value. Rather, I feel they earn their keep by the ease of handling, the freedom from decision making and the automatic diversification they provide, plus, perhaps most important, the insulation afforded from temptation to practice patently inferior techniques which seem to entice so many world-be investors.
上述的说法似乎很尖刻，但是他只是描述了一种事实，而不是想要去批评谁。按照他们机构的框架以及他们所运营数十亿资产的规模，得到这种投资结果是唯一合理的可能。想要在这种框架下做出不同寻常的行为是极度困难的。所以这些投资公司的表现跟美国企业的整体表现是一致的。除了某些例外，他们的优势不在于取得超好的收益或抵御价值的下跌。不过我认为这些公司有他们存在的价值，他们能提供易于持有、随意买卖以及多元化的投资标的。更重要的是。他们为投资者们提供了可以隔离市场风险的一种可能，否则这些投资者将会用那些吸引着众多投资者的二流技术去市场中博弈。
The Joys of Compounding
复利的快乐
Now to the pulse-quickening portion of our essay. Last year, in order to drive home the point on compounding, I took a pot shot at Queen Isabella and her financial advisors. You will remember they were euchred into such an obviously low-compound situation as the discovery of a new hemisphere.
Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus1 in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.
既然复利在如此大的事情中已经显示了威力，现在就让我们转向艺术品这种小一点的范围。法国的弗朗西斯一世在1540年购买达芬奇的名画蒙娜丽莎时花费了4,000 埃居（écu）。你们之中一些人或许没有跟踪过这种货币的汇率，这笔钱大概值2万美元。
If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over 1 quadrillion or over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase of paintings qualifying as an investment.
如果弗朗西斯能够脚踏实地，他（和他的信托人）可以找到税后复利率为6%的投资机会，那么这笔投资现在的价值是1,000,000,000,000,000美元，也就是一千万亿，相当于美国国债的3000倍。所有的增值都只是因为6%的复利率。我想这足以结束你们家关于是否要投资画作等艺术品的争论了。
However, as I pointed out last year, there are other morals to be drawn here. One is the wisdom of living a long time. The other impressive factor is the swing produced by relatively small changes in the rate of compound.
就像我去年已经指出的那样，还有其他的寓意需要被强调。一个就是活的长久的智慧，另外一个就是复利率的微小变动会导致结果的巨大差异。
Below are shown the gains from $100,000 compounded at various rates:
下表列出了10万美元在各种不同复利率和时间长度情况下的变化：
||4%|8%|12%|16%
---|---:|---:|---:|---:
10 Years|115,892|341,143
20 Years|366,094|1,846,060
30 Years|906,260|8,484,940
It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens. If, over a meaningful period of time, Buffett Partnership can achieve an edge of even a modest number of percentage points over the major investment media, its function will be fulfilled.
Some of you may be downcast because I have not included in the above table the rate of 22.3% mentioned on page 3. This rate, of course, is before income taxes which are paid directly by you — not the Partnership. Even excluding this factor, such a calculation would only prove the absurdity of the idea of compounding at very high rates — even with initially modest sums. My opinion is that the Dow is quite unlikely to compound for any important length of time at the rate it has during the past seven years and, as mentioned earlier, I believe our margin over the Dow cannot be maintained at its level to date. The product of these assumptions would be a materially lower average rate of compound for BPL in the future than the rate achieved to date. Injecting a minus 30% year (which is going to happen from time to time) into our tabulation of actual results to date, with, say, a corresponding minus 40% for the Dow brings both the figures on the Dow and BPL more in line with longer range possibilities. As the compounding table above suggests, such a lowered rate can still provide highly satisfactory long term investment results.
你们有些人也许会感到失落，因为我没在表格中列出复利率为22.3%的变化。当然，这个复利率是缴纳所得税之前的收益率——需要你们而非合伙公司去交税。不过即使扣除税收的影响、即使初始投资很少，计算结果也能显示想要保持如此高收益率想法的怪异之处。我的想法是道指不可能长久保持与过去七年或之前类似的年均收益率，并且我相信我们目前相比道指的优势幅度也不可能长久的保持下去。所以在这种假设下，巴菲特基金以后的年化收益率将会比目前的要低。如果在我们的表格中加上一行，让我们在某年道指下降40%时的收益率为负30%（这很可能会时常发生），就会让道指和巴菲特合伙基金的收益率回归较为正常的水平。就像上述表格显示的那样，这样低的收益率在相当长的时间后，也可以产生令人满意的投资收益。
Our Method of Operation
我们的投资方法
At this point I always develop literary schizophrenia. On the one hand, I know that we have in the audience a number of partners to whom details of our business are interesting. We also have a number to whom this whole thing is Greek and who undoubtedly wish I would quit writing and get back to work.
在这部分我常常会变成文字精神分裂者。一方面我知道有一部分合伙人对我们的运营情况很感兴趣。另一方面，我们也有一部分合伙人认为这一部分内容很无聊，而且毫无疑问想要我放弃写作，赶紧回去工作。
To placate both camps, I am just going to sketch briefly our three categories at this point and those who are interested in getting their doctorate can refer to the appendix for extended treatment of examples.
为了平衡这两种想法，我在此只描述我们三类投资的梗概，那些对于它们的具体内容很感兴趣的人可以在附录中发现更多更详细内容和案例。
Our three investment categories are not differentiated by their expected profitability over an extended period of time. We are hopeful that they will each, over a ten or fifteen year period, produce something like the ten percentage point margin over the Dow that is our goal. However, in a given year they will have violently different behavior characteristics, depending primarily on the type of year it turns out to be for the stock market generally. Briefly this is how they shape up:
长期来看，我们三类投资的收益最终不会有太大差别。我们希望以10年或15年这样的时间段来看，他们能够比道指的收益高10个点。不过因为某一具体年份股票市场的变化不同，这三类投资的收益也会因他们的特性而有非常大的差别。具体如下：
“Generals” - A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in sympathy with the Dow and will turn in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the Dow. Contrarywise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.
“Generals”
——投资于被低估的股票，这部分收益主要取决于量的因素，但是也需要考虑到质的因素。他们的价格很少或几乎不太会马上回归价值。他们缺少活力和市场推动者。他们的主要优势是折扣价，也就是说整个公司的市值大幅低于私有化的估值。我需要再次强调量的因素是第一位的、非常关键，但是质的因素也很重要。我们喜欢好的管理层，我们喜欢令人满意的商业模式，我们喜欢因为之前不太活跃的管理层或者是股东群体导致的股价某种程度的“变酸”。但是，我们最看重的是价值。这类投资会跟道指表现得类似，会跟随道指大幅下降，也会跟随道指大幅上涨。我们期望长时间内能够获得比道指更令人满意的收益率。
“Workouts” - These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or “inside information” pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us; during bull markets, it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
“Workouts”
——这是有时间表的一类投资。收益来自于公司的重新安排，例如出售、合并、重组、拆分等等。我们不会根据流言或“内部消息”来做决定，而是基于已公开的声明。除非能从报纸上看到这些声明，否则我们会一直等待。这部分的投资风险跟股票市场的表现无关（或许有些时候有一点关系），而是与能够阻碍既定计划的因素有关。这些因素包括反信托法和其他的政府行为、股东的反对、税收因素等等。很多“Workouts”投资的总收益很小。我的一位朋友说我们只是在其他人赚了95美分后，去赚最后的5分钱硬币。但是，可预测性加上较短的持有时间，可以产生令人非常满意的年化收益率。相对于“Generals”，这部分投资每年可以获得非常稳定的绝对收益。在熊市中他们可以让我们获得大的优势，但是在牛市中他也会拖我们的后腿。我们期望长时间内这部分投资能够获得跟“Generals”一样比道指更令人满意的收益率。
“Controls” - These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block or stock, controls develop from the general category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company’s stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company’s activities; whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the management’s capabilities. The general we have been buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation or this business.
“Controls”
——这部分投资很少见，但是一旦发生，就会是非常大的规模。除非我们一开始就买了很大比例的股票，否则一般来说“Controls”都是从“Generals”而来的。主要因为在我们购买某只股票时的很长时间段内，它的价格一直没有回归价值，以致于我们可以购买到这个公司很大比例的股票。到那时，我们就会处于某种程度上控股或者是完全控股的位置；我们是否会有所行动取决于我们对于公司的未来以及管理层能力的判断。我们最近几个月大幅购入的“Generals”，拥有非常优秀的管理层和非常令我们满意的经营策略。如果这种持续的购买会让我们将来某个时候某种程度上控股该公司，考虑到它的运营情况，我们很可能不会主动改变什么东西。
We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
我们不会为了行动而行动。如果其他的效果都相同，我们宁愿让其他人来做这些工作。但是如果到了必须要行动才能优化资产配置的时候，我们也不会坐视不理。
Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the marketplace.
不管主动与否，“Controls”类投资必须要有利可图。必要条件是要有一个有吸引力的买入价格。一旦达成“Controls”，我们对投资标的的估值不再取决于经常非理性波动的股票市场，而是企业的内在价值。
Our willingness and financial ability to assume a controlling position gives us two-way stretch on many purchases in our group of generals. If the market changes its opinion for the better, the security will advance in price. If it doesn’t, we will continue to acquire stock until we can look to the business itself rather than the market for vindication of our judgment.
我们有开展控股投资的意愿和资金实力，这会给我们很多的“Generals”投资带来额外的选择机会。如果市场改变了它对这支股票的看法，那么这支股票的价格会上升；反之我们会继续持有这支股票，直到我们可以让企业本身而非股票市场来证明我们的判断。
Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, re-directing the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit-if it looks at all close, we pass.
这类投资的结果必须要用数年时间才能检验。合理的建仓本身就需要很长时间。而且如果有必要，还需要进行加强管理和优化资产配置等能够影响出售或合并的操作。这些都会让这类投资结果需要用数年而非数月来检验。由于这些原因，在“Controls”类的投资中，我们需要找到有非常大利润空间的标的；如果它们不够大，我们就会略过。
Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of work.
“Controls”
类投资在建仓时受股票市场的影响较大，控股后他们的表现将类似于“Workouts”。
As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among the three categories is largely determined by the accident or availability. Therefore, in a minus year for the Dow, whether we are primarily in generals or workouts is largely a matter of luck, but it will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one or many reasons why a single year’s performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.
就像我之前提到过的一样，我们在这三类投资上的资金配比很大程度上是比较偶然的。所以在道指下降的一年，我们是以“Generals”投资为主还是在“Workouts”上布置了大量的资金，很大程度上取决于运气。要想有超越道指的表现，还需要做其他大量的工作。这就是为什么单独一年的表现并不重要，不管是好还是坏，都不应该太当真。
If there is any trend as our assets grow, I would expect it to be toward controls which heretofore have been our smallest category. I may be wrong in this expectation - a great deal depends, of course, on the future behavior of the market on which your guess is as good as mine (I have none). At this writing, we have a majority of our capital in generals, workouts rank second, and controls are third.
如果说随着我们资产规模的增加，会有什么趋势的话，我希望我们可以增加“Controls”类投资，目前我们在这类投资上的比例最小。或许我会失望，因为这类投资要基于未来市场的表现。对于股票市场未来的走向，我和你们是一样的（没有任何想法）。目前，按照资金比例，我们最大的投资类型是“Generals”，第二是“Workouts”，第三是“Controls”。
Miscellaneous
其他
We are starting off the year with net assets of 1 million or $5 million. Our idea inventory has always seemed to be 10% ahead of our bank account. If that should change, you can count on hearing from me.
我们今年年初的净资产是17,454,900美元。我们资产规模的迅速增长总是会引发关于会稀释我们未来投资表现的担忧。到目前为止，以高于道指增长率的幅度来看，我们合伙基金规模的增长带来的效应是正的。不过这个也不能太当真。规模的增大有时有利有时不利。我的观点是，如果我们现在的资金只有100万或500万，我们投资组合的收益率也不会更好。我的投资想法总比我们的基金规模看起来要多10%。如果有任何改变，我会马上告诉你。
Susie and I have an investment of 1,247,190.
我和Susie在我们的合伙基金中拥有的份额是2,392,900美元。我第一次不得不从合伙基金中撤回投资用于我的日常开支，但是这是不得不做出的选择，否则会让国税局失望。我和Susie有一些非公开上市的证券（只有不到300个股东），这是多年前留下来的，总额不到我们合伙基金份额的1%。也就是说，我们有一只未公开上市的本地公司的股票，是在1960年购买的而且我们希望永久持有它。除了这些，我们所有的资金都放在了巴菲特合伙公司中，而且会一直放在这里。我不能保证收益，但我能保证我的收益和你们一样。另外，我的“生生不息”的亲戚们——我的三个孩子、母亲、父亲、两个姐妹、两个大舅哥、我的岳父、四个阿姨、四个堂兄弟、五个侄子和侄女在我们的合伙基金中直接或间接持有的资产为1,247,190美元。
Bill Scott is also in with both feet, having an interest along with his wife or $237,400, the large majority or their net worth. Bill has done an excellent job and on several or our more interesting situations going into 1964, he has done the majority or the contact work. I have also shoved off on him as much as possible of the administrative work so if you need anything done or have any questions, don’t hesitate to ask for Bill if I’m not around.
Bill Scott
也坚定地和我们站在一起，他和他的妻子在合伙基金中拥有的资金是237,400美金，占他们净资产的很大一部分。Bill的工作非常出色，在1964年以来的几次有趣事件中，他完成了主要的联络工作。我也尽可能多的把管理工作交给他负责，所以如果你们有任何问题，我不在的时候都可以问他。
Beth and Donna have kept an increasing work load flowing in an excellent manner. During December and January, I am sure they wish they had found employment elsewhere, but they always manage to keep a mountain of work ship-shape.
Beth
和Donna在工作量大增的情况下做的也非常好。在每年的12月和1月份的时候，我确信她们会很想换到其他公司工作，不过她们始终把多如小山般的工作处理的井井有条。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has done their usual excellent job of meeting a tough timetable. We have instructed them to conduct two surprise checks a year (rather than one as in past years) on our securities, cash, etc., in the future. These are relatively inexpensive, and I think make a good deal of sense in any financial organization.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
继续及时地完成了他们出色的工作。我们以后会请他们每年对我们的证券和现金进行两次审计，而不是过去的每年一次。这花费不了多少，却会对我们合伙公司的运行非常有好处。
Within the next week you will receive:
接下来几周你们将会收到：
(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1963 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
（1）一封你们纳税所需要的所有关于巴菲特合伙公司信息的信。这封信中的信息只用于计税。
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1963, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
（2）
一封Peat, Marwick, Mitchell公司关于1963年的审计工作的信，包含对巴菲特合伙公司运营情况和财务情况以及你们个人账户的审计。
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/64. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
（3）一封关于你们在1964年1月1日在合伙基金中的资金份额的信。这些金额和审计金额是一致的。
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.
（4）
列示了所有合伙人均在合伙协议上得到“A”的信。
Let me know if anything needs clarifying. As we grow, there is more chance of missing letters, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if it appears we might have erred. Our next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half.
如果有任何不清楚的地方，请随时联系我。因为规模的增大，很多事情可能会有出错，例如少字、缺名或数字移位等。所以如果我们有错漏，请随时告知。我们下一封信将会在7月15日发出，用于总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
APPENDIX
附录 TEXAS NATIONAL PETROLEUM 得克萨斯国民石油
This situation was a run-of-the-mill workout arising from the number one source of workouts in recent years — the sellouts of oil and gas producing companies.
这是一个仍在正常运营的企业的“Workouts”，来自于近些年“Workouts”的最大的来源——油气开采公司的出售。
TNP was a relatively small producer with which I had been vaguely familiar for years.
TNP
是一个相对较小的开采商，我很多年前就对他有模糊的了解了。
Early in 1962 I heard rumors regarding a sellout to Union Oil of California. I never act on such information, but in this case it was correct and substantially more money would have been made if we had gone in at the rumor stage rather than the announced stage. However, that’s somebody else’s business, not mine.
早在1962年我就听到传言，说他们会卖给加利福尼亚联合石油（UOC）。我从来不会根据这样的信息来行动，不过在这个案例上这些流言是正确的。如果我们能在听到这些流言而非得到公开信息的时候就行动，我们获得的收益会大得多。然而那是其他人的赚钱方式，不是我的。
In early April, 1962, the general terms of the deal were announced. TNP had three classes of securities outstanding:
1962年4月初，交易的概要被公布出来了。TNP在外发行了三类证券：
(1) 6 1/2% debentures callable at 104 1/4 which would bear interest until the sale transpired and at that time would be called. There were 264,000 principal amount before the sale closed.
(2) About 3.7 million shares of common stock of which the officers and directors owned about 40%. The proxy statement estimated the proceeds from the liquidation would produce $7.42 per share. We purchased 64,035 shares during the six months or so between announcement and closing.
(3) 650,000 warrants to purchase common stock at 7.42 for the workout on the common resulted in $3.92 as a workout on the warrants. We were able to buy 83,200 warrants or about 13% of the entire issue in six months.
（3）65万股可以以每股3.5美元购买普通股的认股权证。按照管理层之前估计的每股7.42美元的价值，每股认股权证的价值为3.92美元。我们在6个月内购买了8.32万认股权证，约占13%。
The risk of stockholder disapproval was nil. The deal was negotiated by the controlling stockholders, and the price was a good one. Any transaction such as this is subject to title searches, legal opinions, etc., but this risk could also be appraised at virtually nil. There were no anti-trust problems. This absence of legal or anti-trust problems is not always the case, by any means.
股东不同意交易的风险几乎没有，这笔交易是由控股股东商定的，而且交易价格相当不错。很多这类的交易都需要考虑到职位的寻求、法律的意见等等，这笔交易也几乎没有这方面的风险，同时也没有任何反信托方面的问题。从某种程度上来说，不是所有的这种类型的交易都没有法律或者是反信托问题的。
The only fly in the ointment was the obtaining of the necessary tax ruling. Union Oil was using a standard ABC production payment method of financing. The University of Southern California was the production payment holder and there was some delay because of their eleemosynary status.
唯一的小问题，是需要得到必要的税务裁决。UOC在会计上用的是标准的ABC产品支付方法。南加州大学（USC）是这种产品支付的持有者，因为他们慈善捐赠的地位会让出售交易产生某些延迟。
This posed a new problem for the Internal Revenue Service, but we understood USC was willing to waive this status which still left them with a satisfactory profit after they borrowed all the money from a bank. While getting this ironed out created delay, it did not threaten the deal.
这会给国税局带来新的问题，但是我们理解USC很希望放弃这种慈善捐赠的地位，从而让他们即使是从银行借钱来做成这笔交易也可以获得令人满意的利润。所以这虽然会导致延迟，但是并不会阻碍这笔交易。
When we talked with the company on April 23rd and 24th, their estimate was that the closing would take place in August or September. The proxy material was mailed May 9th and stated the sale “will be consummated during the summer of 1962 and that within a few months thereafter the greater part of the proceeds will be distributed to stockholders in liquidation.” As mentioned earlier, the estimate was $7.42 per share.
我们在4月23日和24日跟公司沟通的时候，他们估计这笔交易将会在8月或9月份完成。在5月9日寄出的相关材料中明确了这笔交易“将会在1962年的夏天完成，之后交易所带来的大部分收益将会在几个月内分配给各个股东”。就像之前提到过的，每股大概会分到7.42美元。
Bill Scott attended the stockholders meeting in Houston on May 29th where it was stated they still expected to close on September 1st.
Bill Scott
参加了5月29日在休斯顿举行的股东会议，那个时候他们仍然期望9月1日能够完成交易。
The following are excerpts from some of the telephone conversations we had with company officials in ensuing months:
下面是从我们那几个月跟公司管理人员沟通谈话记录中的节选：
On June 18th the secretary stated “Union has been told a favorable IRS ruling has been formulated but must be passed on by additional IRS people. Still hoping for ruling in July.”
6月18日，秘书说：“UOC获悉比较令人欣慰的国税局裁定已经形成，但必须要完成其内部的流程。仍有希望能在7月份完成。”
On July 24th the president said that he expected the IRS ruling “early next week.”
7月24日，公司的主席说，他希望税务局的裁定能够在“下周早些时候通过”。
On August 13th the treasurer informed us that the TNP, Union Oil, and USC people were all in Washington attempting to thrash out a ruling.
8月13日，财务人员告诉我们，TNP、UOC和USC的相关人员全部集中在华盛顿以推动通过这项税务裁决。
On September 18th the treasurer informed us “No news, although the IRS says the ruling could be ready by next week.
9月18日，财务人员告诉我们“没有新的消息，虽然国税局说这项裁决或许在下周可以通过。”
The estimate on payout was still $7.42.
预估最终的价格仍然是7.42美元。
The ruling was received in late September, and the sale closed October 31st. Our bonds were called November 13th. We converted our warrants to common stock shortly thereafter and received payments on the common of 3.90 February 4, 1963, and 15 cent on April 24, 1963. We will probably get another 4 cent in a year or two. On 147,235 shares (after exercise of warrants) even 4 cent per share is meaningful.
最后，这项裁决在9月份晚些时候通过，于是这笔交易在10月31号完成。我们的债券在11月13日被赎回；也差不多在那个时候把我们的认股权证转换成了普通股，并且在1962年12月14日获得了每股3.5美元的资金支付，在1963年2月4日获得了每股3.9美元，在1963年4月24日获得了每股15美分。在接下来的一到两年内，我们很可能还可以得到每股4美分的收益。以147,235股（在认股权证的权利行使之后）来计算，即使每股4美分也有不少钱。
This illustrates the usual pattern: (1) the deals take longer than originally projected; and (2) the payouts tend to average a little better than estimates. With TNP it took a couple of extra months, and we received a couple of extra percent.
这项交易描述了此类投资的正常状况：（1）交易要比预期的时间要长。（2）收益比预期的稍微要好。TNP这笔交易多用几个月的时间，而我们的收益也多出了几个百分点。
The financial results of TNP were as follows:
我们在TNP的这笔交易的最终收益如下：
(1) On the bonds we invested 14,446. This works out to an overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.
（1）我们在债券上投资了260,773美元，平均持有时间少于5个月。我们得到了6.5%的利息，实现了14,446美元的收益。以此计算年收益率大概是20%。
(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of 2,946. From an investment or 731,000 in October. Based on the time the money was employed, the rate or return was about 22% per annum.
（2）在股票和认股权证上，我们已经获得了89,304美元的收益，将来还可以得到2,946美元的收益。我们在4月份的投资额是146,000美元，而到了10月份我们的投资额已经达到731,000美元。按照资金投入的时间，年化收益率可以达到22%。
In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.
上述收益率都是以总投资额为基础来计算的。我相信将贷款用“Workouts”是绝对安全的，但是用于“Generals”就会非常危险。
We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts possible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We certainly don’t go into all the deals that come along — there is considerable variation in their attractiveness. When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.
我们并不认为对TNP的投资是一个了不起的成就。我们有很多“Workouts”类投资要比它好，不过也有一些相对较差。这笔投资是“Workouts”类投资的一个典型代表。我们尽力获取所有相关的信息、持续关注它们的变化并按照我们的经验对它们估值。我们当然不会对所有我们知道的交易进行投资——它们的获利空间有很大差别。如果交易失败，它们的市场价值将会缩水非常多。所以你无法承担太多的失败，尽管我们确信将来我们可能偶尔也会失败。
DEMPSTER MILL MFG
. 邓普斯特机器制造公司
This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at 72 in book value of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.
这笔投资是在1956年以Generals类型开始的。那时它的股价是18美元，而账面价值是每股72美元，其中流动资产（现金、应收账款和存货）减去所有的负债后的价值是每股50美元。Dempster过去的盈利能力很高，但是目前只是平均水平。
The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.
质的方面不太好（处在一个相对困难的行业而且管理的不太好），但是价格非常有吸引力。经验表明，一百个这种案例中大概会有七八十个可以在一到三年内获得可观的利润。虽然在购买的时候不知道何种因素会使得价值回归，或许是行业状态的改善、或许是一个购买要约、或许是投资者心理的变化等等，但是整体的前景是不错的。
We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.
接下来的5年里我们仍旧陆续购买了少量的股票。在这期间我成了该公司的董事，并且对于现在的管理层的运营能力越来越失望，同时对于公司资产和运营状况也越来越熟悉。在评估了量的因素以后，我发现它们仍然非常有吸引力。
By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at 16-$25 range.
到了1961年中期，我们已经拥有了30%的股权（我们曾经提出几次少量的购买要约，但是没有达成什么成交），不过我们在1961年8月和9月以每股30.25美元做成了几笔很大的交易，后来又以相同的价格完成了多次要约收购，使得我们的持股比例达到70%。我们在前5年的买入价大概是在16~25美元之间。
On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.
控股后我们把执行副主席提升为主席，想看看他在不受之前政策的约束下能否做出改善，结果仍然不太好。所以我们在1962年4月23日让Harry Bottle作了主席。
Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.
Harry
是这项工作的完美人选。我之前已经复述过他的成就了，不过资产负债表比任何言语都更能够说明重新布署资产后的成效。
||11/30/61|7/31/63 (unaudited)
---|---:|---:
Cash
现金|89,000
US Gov’t Securities – at cost</br
国债-以成本计算||$289,000
Other marketable securities – at market (which exceeds cost)</br
其他公开上市证券-以市值计算||$2,049,000
Total Cash and Securities </br**
现金及证券总额|2,436,000
||
Accounts receivable (net)</br
应收账款|864,000
Inventory</br
存货|890,000
Prepaid expenses, etc.</br
预付账款|12,000
Current Assets </br**
流动资产|4,202,000
||
Other Assets</br
其他资产|62,000
Net Plant and Equipment</br
厂房和设备净值|862,000
Total Assets </br**
总资产|5,126,000
||
Notes Payable</br
应付账款|$1,230,000|
Other Liability</br
其他负债|274,000
Total Liabilities</br**
负债合计|274,000
||
Shares outstanding</br
股份数量|60,146|62,146
Net worth</br
净资产|4,852,000
Total liabilities and net worth</br**
负债和股东权益|5,126,000
Harry:
Harry
做了以下工作：
(1) took the inventory from over 1 million reducing carrying costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;
（1）将存货从400多万美元（很多存货周转的非常慢）降低到100万美元之下。减少了存储成本，并降低了很多风险。
(2) correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over $400,000;
（2）将释放出来的资金用于购买公开市场上的证券，并由此赚取了超过40万美元的收益。
(3) cut administration and selling expense from 75,000 per month;
（3）将每月管理和销售费用从15万美元降低到7.5万美元。
(4) cut factory overhead burden from 4.50 per direct labor hour;
（4）将工厂的上头成本从每工时6美元降低到4.5美元。
(5) closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them with more productive distributors;
（5）关闭了5个不能盈利的分支机构（保留了3个可以盈利的），取而代之的是增加了更多的产品分销商。
(6) cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;
（6）
清算了位于内布拉斯加Columbus的令人头痛的辅助运营工厂。
(7) eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities) while producing no profits;
（7）清理了不能产生收益的工作岗位，释放了相当可观的资金（用于投资有利可图的证券）。
(8) adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually no loss of volume; and most important;
（8）调整了维修部件的价格，由此产生了20万美元的额外收益，同时没有任何销量上的损失。
(9) through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the capital employed.
（9）更为重要的是，通过上述方式和其他措施重建了公司资本本应该达到的营运能力。
In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.
在1963年，我们需要面临的大量的企业所得税（Harry以令我非常吃惊的速度弥补了我们前些年度的可抵税亏损）以及企业的大量流动资金迫使我们必须做出某种程度上的清算或是出售。
We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax on Dempster securities.
我们计划在1963年底开始行动。虽然清算会产生很多问题，但是在效果上可以使得我们的股东获取双倍的盈利，并且能够消除Dempster所持证券的资本利得的税务问题。
At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives us a realization of about 200,000 reserve for various contingencies.
在几次接近达成交易却均告失败以后，几乎是在最后一刻才将资产出售。尽管出售的过程也有些波折，但是最终基本上是以账面价值来出售的。加上我们所持有的证券所得，这笔交易带给了我们每股80美元的收益。Dempster（现在改名为First Beatrice Corp.——我们把名字也一起出售了）现在的资产几乎全部都是现金和公开上市的证券。根据我们的审计报告，我们对First Beatrice的估值是以它的资产价值（包含证券的市场价值）为基础的，且扣除了20万美元的以备未来不时之需的留存收益。
I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our business is making excellent purchases — not making extraordinary sales.
需要补充的是，我们认为那些设备的买家也会把Dempster经营的很好。他们给我们的印象是有一群非常有能力的人，而且有很好的计划来扩张生意并提升利润。如果没有上述的交易，我们会很乐意以非公司的形式继续经营Dempster。不过我们也非常高兴能够以合理的价格出售它。我们的工作是以非常有利的价格来购买，而不是以非常高的价格去卖出。
Harry works the same way I do — he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next belt-tightening operation we have, he’s our man.
Harry
的工作方式和我很相似——他喜欢大的胡萝卜。他现在是巴菲特有限公司的有限合伙人。如果下次有什么需要系紧安全带的行动，他将会使我们的驾驶员。
The Dempster saga points up several morals:
通过Dempster的投资长跑，我们得到以下教训：
(1) Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.
（1）我们的生意需要非常好的耐心。它跟那些飞到天上去的备受追捧的投资组合几乎完全不同。不像他们在备受欢迎期间的表现，我们的表现暗淡无光。
It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.
这种数月或者数年几乎没有变动的股价对我们来说是一种优势，这也是为什么我们在那时购买它们。这也反映出必须要在相当长的一段时间后才能对我们的表现进行评估的原因。我们认为三年是一个最短的时间段。
(2) We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”
（2）我们不能探讨我们目前的投资行动。这种大嘴巴的做法不会提升我们的投资收益，相反在某种程度上会严重损害它们。因为这个原因，任何人包括我们的合伙人都不应该问我们对某只证券是否感兴趣，如果你问的话，我们就需要执行“宪法第五修正案”。
补注：écu 翻译为「埃居」，法国当时的一种金币。参考：维基百科
Footnotes
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Ponge ↩