A Reminder

一个提示：

In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. “And a Prediction.” While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:

在1962年1月24日写的1961年度信中，我增加了一个段落——“一项预测”。虽然我不想给我的读者们增加阅读负担，但我认为非常有必要全部复述这一段内容：

And a Prediction

一项预测

Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.

定期阅读者（我或许是在自夸）会知道当我开始讨论预测时，往往已经偏离了习惯。预测是我羞于去做的事情，而我的习惯也未改变。

I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don’t have the faintest idea.

我肯定不会去预测一两年后企业整体状况或股票市场的走势，因为我对此根本没有任何洞见。

I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.

我认为可以肯定的是，未来十年中股票市场有涨幅超过20%或25%的年份，也有跌幅超过上述幅度的年份，而且大多数年份的涨跌幅会在这两者之间。我对这些情况可能造成的影响没有什么关注，而且我认为对于长期投资者来说，这些完全不重要。

Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.

长期来看，加上分红，我认为道指能够带来年均5%到7%的收益。尽管近些年表现较好，但任何人想要从股票市场中获取大幅超过这个比例的收益都可能会失望。

Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.

我们的工作是努力使得我们年度收益超越道指，而不是担心这个绝对值是正还是负。我认为在道指下降25%的时候，我们的投资组合只下降15%，要好过于我们的投资组合和道指都上涨20%。我曾向合伙人重点强调过这一点，他们都以点头表示不同程度的赞同。对我来说，最重要的是你们要完全理解我这样说的原因，不仅要点头同意，还要深入到骨子里。

For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.

由于我们的投资方式，在道指下跌或持平时，我们相对收益会最好。因此寻求这种优势很可能会让收益率大幅波动。或许某些年份道指会超越我们，但如果我们能在长时间内取得超越道指年均10个点的收益，我就会相当满意了。

Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten—no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.

具体来说，就是如果道指在某一年下降了35%或40%（我认为这在接下来的十年中很可能会发生，但我不知道是哪一年），我们或许会亏损15%或20%。如果指数持平，我们希望能够有10%的收益。如果指数上升20%甚至更多，我们希望能够跟上这个涨幅。这样以来，多年以后在道指年复合增长率为5%到7%的情况下，我们的投资收益率可以达到15%到17%。

The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won’t all be!

上述的预测可能过于草率，从1965年或1970年回看，或许会发现这个预测是对的，又或许是完全错误的。即使这种预测天生就有很大的犯错可能，但我仍然希望让合伙人了解我是怎么想的。在某一年，这种预测的偏离或许会很大。1961年就是这样，只不过幸运的是，偏离在了好的方向。但是不可能会一直这样！

The First Half of 1962:

1962 年上半年基本情况：

Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.

从1961年底到1962年6月30日，道指从731.14点下降到561.28点，加上约11美元的分红，投资于此的整体亏损率为21.7%。附表A反映了我们合伙基金成立以来道指的统计数据。

As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.

道指的上述表现，给了我们表现和超越的机会。结合在牛市中能够与之持平的表现，我们的长期收益将会令我们相当满意。我们的目标是在道指下降1%的时候，我们仅下降0.5%。如果能做到这一点，就意味着我们在股票上的投资是相对较为保守的。

As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months’ or even one-year’s results are not to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance. While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable higher realization.

附表B反应了我们合伙基金的整体表现，1962年上半年是我们的相对表现最好的时间段之一——道指下降21.7%，我们只下降了7.5%。这14.2个点的优势很可能会在道指继续下降时持续扩大，而在其上升时缩小差距。请记住我之前一说再说的提示——对六个月或一年的表现不能太当真。短期来看，投资结果波动会很大。外部环境让我们上半年表现的异常好，以后也可能会让我们表现的相对异常差。我们的表现中包含了几乎没有什么变化的对Dempster Mill Manufacturing 公司的投资，尽管近几个月这项投资很可能会实现预期收益。

Investment Companies during the First Half

投资公司上半年的表现：

Past letters have stressed our belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for investment performance. To the extent that funds are invested in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through investment companies, investment counselors, bank trust departments, or do-it-yourself, our belief is that the overwhelming majority will achieve results roughly comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the deviations from the Dow are much more likely to be toward a poorer performance than a superior one.

我在之前的信中强调过，以道指作为标准并不低。不管是通过投资公司、投资顾问、银行信托还是自行投资，我们认为大多数投资于普通股的资金收益率，也仅仅能跟道指的收益率差不多。而且我们认为与道指相比，它们表现较差的可能性更大。

To illustrate this point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited partners’ results against the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a program of common stock investment and the two largest closed-end investment companies. The tabulation in Appendix C shows the five-years’ results, and you will note the figures are extraordinarily close to those of the Dow. These companies have total assets of about $3.5 billion.

为了描述这一点，我们将道指的收益、我们的有限合伙人的收益与两家最大的投资于普通股的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式基金公司的收益持续进行对比。在附表C中列出了过去五年的数据，你会发现他们的表现与道指相当接近。这些基金公司的资产相加约为35亿美元。

In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are mailing it before results are available for the closed-end companies. However, the two mutual funds both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors Trust having a minus 23% overall performance, and Investors Stock Fund realizing a minus 25.4%. This is not unusual as witness the lead article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 13, 1962 headed “Funds vs. Market.” Of the 17 large common stock funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from the peak on the Dow of 734, to the date of the article, although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor.

为了能够让你们按时收到这封信，我在那两家封闭式基金上半年的投资结果还未公布前就已经把它寄出了。不过，那两家开放式基金的表现都比道指要差，Massachusetts Investors Trust的收益为负23%，Investors Stock Fund的收益为负25.4%。华尔街日报在1962年6月13日的头条专门刊出“基金和市场”，这已经是很常见的事情了。从道指734点的高点到我写这封信为止，17个大型共同基金的表现都更差，即使与道指相比个别基金的差距要小些。

Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called “growth” funds which, almost without exception, were down considerably more than the Dow. The three large “growth” (the quotation marks are more applicable now) funds with the best record in the preceding few years, Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and Wellington Equity Fund averaged an overall minus 32.3% for the first half. It is only fair to point out that because of their excellent records in 1959-61, their overall performance to date is still better than average, as it may well be in the future. Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had caused such a rush of new investors to come to them that the poor performance this year was experienced by very many more holders than enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier years. This experience tends to confirm my hypothesis that investment performance must be judged over a period of time with such a period including both advancing and declining markets. There will continue to be both; a point perhaps better understood now than six months ago.

遭受打击最大的是所谓的“成长型”基金，几乎无一例外的大幅落后于道指的表现。过去若干年表现最好的三个大型“成长型”基金（用引号现在更合适了），Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund和Wellington Equity Fund在上半年平均下降了32.3%。需要指出的是，他们在1956-61年都有非常好的表现，所以到目前为止他们的平均收益仍然好于指数，而且未来可能仍是如此。不过，讽刺的是，过去超好的表现吸引了大量新加入的投资者，所以今年尝受这个投资苦果的投资者要比前些年享受投资收益的人多得多。这个经验进一步确认了我的假设——对投资表现的判断需要较长的时间段，最好是包含一个完成的牛熊周期。以后的市场还会有牛熊，相比6个月前，现在这一点或许更容易理解了。

In outlining the results of investment companies, I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to them or because our investments are similar to theirs. It is done because such funds represent a public batting average of professional, highly-paid investment management handling a very significant $20 billion of securities. Such management, I believe, is typical of management handling even larger sums. As an alternative to an interest in the partnership, I believe it reasonable to assume that many partners would have investments managed similarly.

列出这些投资公司的结果，不是因为我们运行的方式或投资标的跟他们类似。而是因为这些基金代表了那些有着高水平且高收费的投资专家的基金，他们所持证券的总体规模达200亿美元。我认为这四家基金公司的投资管理水准，即使在更大规模的基金中，也能作为一种典型代表。而且，如果我们的合伙人将资金从我们的合伙基金中赎回而投向别处，我认为很多人的资金去处很可能与这些基金类似。

Asset Values

资产价值：

The above calculations of results are before allocation to the General Partner and monthly payments to partners. Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not plus 6% on a market value basis (with deficiencies carried forward) there is no allocation to the General Partner. Therefore, non-withdrawing partners have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and partners who have withdrawn at the rate of 6% per annum have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first half of 10.5%. Should our results for the year be less than plus 6% (and unless there should be a material advance in the Dow, this is very probable) partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in their market value equity at December 31, 1962. This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity next year will be on a proportionately reduced basis. For example, if our results were an overall minus 7% for the year, a partner receiving monthly payments who had a market value interest of $100, 000 o n J an u a ry 1, 1962 w o u l d ha v e an e q u i t y a t Dece mb er 31, 1962 o f$ 87,000. This reduction would arise from the minus 7% result, or $7, 000 pl u s m o n t h l y p a y m e n t so f$ 500 for an additional $6, 000. T h u s, w i t h$ 87,000 of market equity on January 1, 1963, monthly payments next year would be $435.00.

上述收益的计算未扣除给普通合伙人的分成和每月支付给合伙人的资金。当然，如果基于市场价值计算收益未达到6%（将用未来年度的收益弥补），普通合伙人将没有分成。由此计算，在上半年，未参与“月度支付”的合伙人的合伙基金资产市场价值下降了7.5%，参与了“月度支付”的合伙人由于每年总共会拿回6%的资金，他们的资产市场价值下降了10.5%。如果我们今年的收益率少于6%（目前来看很可能会这样，除非道指大涨），那么参与了“月度支付”的合伙人在1962年12月31日时的资产市场价值必定会下降。这就意味着，明年的“月度支付”基准将会降低。举例来说，如果我们今年的整体收益是负7%，在1962年1月1日拥有合伙基金价值为10万美元且参与了“月度支付”的合伙人，在1962年12月31日将只剩8.7万美元了。也就是从原有的价值（10万美元）减去了7,000美元（10万美元×7%）和年度支付的6,000美元（10万美元×6%）。所以，基于1963年1月1日的资产价值8.7万美元来计算，这一年的“月度支付”将会减少到435美元（8.7万美元×6%/12）。¹

None of the above, of course, has any applicability to advance payments received during 1962 which do not participate in profits or losses, but earn a straight 6%.

上面所描述的情况不会影响在1962年提前投入的资金。这些资金不参与我们合伙资金的利得和损失，会直接按照年收益率6%计算利息。

APPENDIX A

附表A

DOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE

道琼斯工业指数

Year

---|---|---|---|---|---

1956|499.47|—|—|—|—

1957|435.69|-63.78|21.61|-42.17|-8.4%

1958|583.65|147.96|20.00|167.96|38.5%

1959|679.36|95.71|20.74|116.45|20.0%

1960|615.89|63.47|21.36|42.11|-6.2%

1961|731.14|115.25|22.61|137.86|22.4%

6/30/62|561.28|169.86|11.00 Est.|-158.86|-21.7%

APPENDIX B

附表B

PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE

合伙基金投资结果

Year

年份|Partnership Result (1)
合伙基金收益率|Limited Partners’ Results (2)
有限合伙人收益率

---|---|---

1957|10.4%|9.3%

1958|40.9%|32.2%

1959|25.9%|20.9%

1960|22.8%|18.6%

1961|45.9%|35.9%

6/30/62|-7.5%|-7.5%

(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partners.

（1）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。

(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.

（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（1）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。

APPENDIX C

附表C

YEARLY RESULTS

每年投资收益

Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)

---|---|---|---|---

1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%

1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%

1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%

1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%

1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%

6/30/92|23.0%|-25.4%|N.A.|N.A.

(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.

（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。

(2) From Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual - 1962.

（2）

来源于1962年Moody银行和金融手册。

CUMULATIVE RESULTS

累积收益

---|---|---|---|---|---|---

1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%

1957-58|26.4%|29.2%|24.7%|30.0%|26.9%|44.5%

1957-59|37.8%|42.5%|34.8%|40.9%|52.3%|74.7%

1957-60|36.4%|41.6%|38.2%|44.8%|42.9%|107.2%

1957-61|71.4%|76.9%|70.8%|77.4%|74.9%|181.6%

1957-6/30/62|31.9%|32.0%|N.A.|N.A.|37.0%|160.5%

为了更好地理解这一段的数值演算，翻译时把部分计算方式进行了细化。 ↩

B
Coopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

1962 Semi annual Letter to Limited Partners CM一个提示：

A Reminder

一个提示：

The First Half of 1962:

1962 年上半年基本情况：

Investment Companies during the First Half

投资公司上半年的表现：

Asset Values

资产价值：

APPENDIX A

附表A

APPENDIX B

附表B

APPENDIX C

附表C

Graph View

Table of Contents

BCoopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

1962 Semi annual Letter to Limited Partners CM一个提示：

A Reminder

一个提示：

The First Half of 1962:

1962 年上半年基本情况：

Investment Companies during the First Half

投资公司上半年的表现：

Asset Values

资产价值：

APPENDIX A

附表A

APPENDIX B

附表B

APPENDIX C

附表C

Footnotes

Graph View

Table of Contents

B
Coopinio投资智慧库