原文信息：
- 标题：1962 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1963-01-18
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 18, 1963
The Ground Rules
基本原则
Some partners have confessed (that’s the proper word) that they sometimes find it difficult to wade through my entire annual letter. Since I seem to be getting more long-winded each year, I have decided to emphasize certain axioms on the first pages. Everyone should be entirely clear on these points. To most of you this material will seem unduly repetitious, but I would rather have nine partners out of ten mildly bored than have one out of ten with any basic misconceptions.
一些合伙人坦白（这是一个合适的词），他们有时候发现读完我的一整封信实在太困难了。既然我可能每年都会变得更啰嗦些，于是我决定把我们最重要的原则放在第一页。每个人都应该完全清楚这些原则。对你们很多人来说可能太过重复了，但是我宁愿让十分之九的合伙人感觉到无聊，而不愿意让十分之一的人对我们的基本概念理解有误。
- In no sense is any rate of return guaranteed to partners. Partners who withdraw one-half of 1% monthly are doing just that—withdrawing. If we earn more than 6% per annum over a period of years, the withdrawals will be covered by earnings and the principal will increase. If we don’t earn 6%, the monthly payments are partially or wholly a return of capital.
我们对收益率没有任何的承诺。合伙人每月可以拿回投资的0.5%，不过这只是撤回年初的本金而已。如果我们年度收益超过了6%，那就可以弥补这个撤回的资金，并且增加他们在下一年初的投资本金。如果我们没有达到6%的收益，那么“月度支付”的部分或全部都来自于合伙人当年年初的本金。
- Any year in which we fail to achieve at least a plus 6% performance will be followed by a year when partners receiving monthly payments will find those payments lowered.
如果任何一年我们的收益率没有达到6%，那么在下一年选择了“月度支付”的合伙人每月收到了钱就会比原来少。
- Whenever we talk of yearly gains or losses, we are talking about market values; that is, how we stand with assets valued at market at yearend against how we stood on the same basis at the beginning of the year. This may bear very little relationship to the realized results for tax purposes in a given year.
只要我们提到利得或损失，我们都是在说市场价值。在年初和年底对于合伙基金资产的估值都是基于同一个标准的。这跟任何一年需要纳税的实际利润基本没有什么关系。
- Whether we do a good job or a poor job is not to be measured by whether we are plus or minus for the year. It is instead to be measured against the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, leading investment companies, etc. If our record is better than that of these yardsticks, we consider it a good year whether we are plus or minus. If we do poorer, we deserve the tomatoes.
我们做的好还是坏，并不以我们今年的收益是正还是负来做评判标准，而是根据整个股票市场的表现，例如道琼斯工业指数，头部的投资基金公司等等。如果我们的收益比他们要好，不管我们的收益是正还是负，我们都认为这是一个好年份。而如果我们比他们表现的要差，我们就活该被扔番茄。
- While I much prefer a five-year test, I feel three years is an absolute minimum for judging performance. It is a certainty that we will have years when the partnership performance is poorer, perhaps substantially so, than the Dow. If any three-year or longer period produces poor results, we all should start looking around for other places to have our money. An exception to the latter statement would be three years covering a speculative explosion in a bull market.
我认为三年是用来检验我们投资成果的最短的时间段，虽然我更喜欢用五年这样的时间段来检验。几乎可以肯定的是，某些年份我们表现的会比道指要差，甚至大幅落后。但是，如果在任何连续的三年或更长的时间内，我们表现的都要更差，那么我们应该把我们的资金投向别处。不过，包含一个非常疯狂的大牛市的三年是一种例外。
- I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.
我不会预测整个股市或商业的波动。如果你认为我可以或者这对投资很重要，你就不应该成为我们的合伙人。
- I cannot promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:
我无法向合伙人保证投资收益。不过却可以确保以下几点：
- Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;
我们选择投资目标时基于价值而非热点；
- That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity of commitments; and
我们会用单笔投资的安全边际和投资证券的多样化来降低资本永久亏损的风险（不是短期的账面浮亏）；
- My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.
我和妻子、孩子们的所有资产基本上都会投入到合伙基金中。
Our Performance in
1962 我们1962年的投资结果
I have consistently told partners that we expect to shine on a relative basis during minus years for the Dow, whereas plus years of any magnitude may find us blushing. This held true in 1962.
我曾不停地告诉合伙人，我希望在熊市中有优异的表现，而在牛市中表现平平。1962年就是如此。
Because of a strong rally in the last few months, the general market as measured by the Dow really did not have such a frightening decline as many might think. From 731 at the beginning of the year, it dipped to 535 in June, but closed at 652. At the end of 1960, the Dow stood at 616, so you can see that while there has been a good deal of action the past few years, the investing public as a whole is not too far from where it was in 1959 or 1960. If one had owned the Dow last year (and I imagine there are a few people playing the high flyers of 1961 who wish they had), they would have had a shrinkage in market value of 79.04 or 10.8%. However, dividends of approximately 23.30 would have been received to bring the overall results from the Dow for the year to minus 7.6%. Our own overall record was plus 13.9%. Below we show the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results for all full years of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.’s and predecessor partnerships’ activities:
因为最后几个月的强劲反弹，以道指为指示表的整个股票市场下跌的幅度并不像人们想象的那么大。道指从年初的731点，跌倒6月份的535点，不过在年底又反弹到652点。而在1960年底，道指是616点。所以，你可以看到即使过去几年有很多好的投资操作，投资者们作为一个整体相比1959或60年并没有走太远。如果去年有人投资了道指（我认为一些在1961年股市中节节高升的人在年初会希望继续拥有道指），他们的市场价值将缩水79.04点，也就是下降了10.8%。加上差不多23.3个点的分红，收益率会变成负7.6%。我们的总体收益是正13.9%。下表列出了道琼斯工业指数、未扣除普通合伙人分成前的合伙基金收益、有限合伙人收益，这些收益只包括当年运行已满一年的合并前的合伙基金以及新的巴菲特合伙基金：
Year
年份|Overall Results from Dow
道指收益|Partnership Results (1)
合伙基金收益|Limited Partners Results (2)
有限合伙人受益
---|---|---|---
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1958|38.5%|40.9%|32.2%
1959|20.0%|25.9%|20.9%
1960|-6.2%|22.8%|18.6%
1961|22.4%|45.9%|35.9%
1962|-7.6%|13.9%|11.9%
(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（1）对于1957-1961这些年度，这个数据包括了当年所有的运行满一年的合伙基金，且已扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成。
(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.
（2）对于1957-1961这些年度，以目前的合伙协议为基准，从（1）中扣除了给普通合伙人的分成。
The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results in the same three categories, as well as the average annual compounded rate:
下表列出了上述三个科目的以复利计算的累积收益和年化收益：
Year
年份|Overall Results from Dow
道指收益|Partnership Results
合伙基金收益|Limited Partners Results
有限合伙人收益
---|---|---|---
1957|-8.4%|10.4%|9.3%
1957-58|26.9%|55.6%|44.5%
1957-59|52.3%|95.9%|74.7%
1957-60|42.9%|140.6%|107.2%
1957-61|74.9%|251.0%|181.6%
1957-62|61.6%|299.8%|215.1%
Annual Compounded Rate|8.3%|26.0%|21.1%
My (unscientific) opinion is that a margin of ten percentage points per annum over the Dow is the very maximum that can be achieved with invested funds over any long period of years, so it may be well to mentally modify some of the above figures.
我有一个看法（没有科学依据）——长期超出道指10个点的年化收益率已经是投资机构所能够获得的最大值了，所以我们上述的投资结果需要你们在心里自行调整。
Partners have sometimes expressed concern as to the effect of size upon performance. This subject was reflected upon in last year’s annual letter. The conclusion reached was that there were some situations where larger sums helped and some where they hindered, but on balance, I did not feel they would penalize performance. I promised to inform partners if my conclusions on this should change. At the beginning of 1957, combined limited partnership assets totaled 7,178,500 at the beginning or 1962. To date, anyway, our margin over the Dow has indicated no tendency to narrow as funds increase.
合伙人有时会担心我们的规模会影响投资表现。去年的信中我已经阐述过相关内容了。结论是规模增大对某些投资有利对某些不利，不过总体来说我认为这不会影响我们的投资表现。如果我的想法有任何变化，我一定会告知大家。我们合伙基金总额在1957年初是303,726美元，到1962年初是7,178,500美元。截至目前，与道指相比，我们的收益率优势并没有随着规模的增长而缩减。
Investment Companies
投资公司
Along with the results of the Dow, we have regularly included the tabulations on the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a common stock policy, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage over 20 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results parallel those of most bank trust departments and investment counseling organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
除了道指，我们还经常列出两家最大的投资于普通股的开放式基金（共同基金）和两家多元化封闭式基金的投资收益。这四家公司——Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund 、Tri-Continental Corporation、Lehman Corporation的资产大概共有30亿美元。他们是拥有总额达200亿美元资产的投资公司中的典型代表。我认为他们的投资收益跟那些管理着更多资产的大多数银行信托和投资咨询机构的收益差不多。
The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of approximately $7 million and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. Nevertheless, the public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates results slightly less favorable than the Dow. In no sense is this statement intended as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, I consider such average results virtually the only possible ones. Their merits lie in other than superior results.
我列出上述数据是想说明道指作为投资评判标准并不低。上述四个基金的天才管理者们每年收取的年费约为700万美元，而这只是整个基金行业的很小一部分。这些拥有高收入、高智商的管理者的基金公司所获得的平均收益率却比道指稍低。我并不是在批评他们。毕竟，以他们的组织架构和投资规模，我认为取得与道指持平的收益是唯一可能的结果而已。他们的优势并不在于获得超高的收益。
Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the companies mentioned above. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore feel they offer a meaningful test of performance.
我们的投资组合和运营方式跟上述基金有很大不同。但是如果我们的合伙人想赎回资金而另投别处，估计也只能投入到与这些公司收益差不多的机构中，所以我认为它们可以作为一个有意义的参考。
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust (1)|Investors Stock (1)|Lehman (2)|Tri-Cont. (2)|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|42.7%|47.5%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|9.0%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|20.0%|20.9%
1960|-1.0%|-0.6%|2.5%|2.8%|-6.2%|18.6%
1961|25.6%|24.9%|23.6%|22.5%|22.4%|35.9%
1962|-9.8%|-13.4%|-13.0%|-10.0%|-7.6%|11.9%
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）按照加回支付给持有人的所有分红后的每年的价值变化计算。
(2) From 1962 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-61. Estimated for 1962.
（2）
1957-1961年数据来源于1962年Moody银行和金融手册；1962年数据为估计值。
COMPOUNDED
累积收益
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust|Investors Stock|Lehman|Tri-Cont.|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1957|-11.4%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1957-58|26.4%|29.2%|24.7%|30.0%|26.9%|44.5%
1957-59|37.8%|42.5%|34.8%|40.9%|52.3%|74.7%
1957-60|36.4%|41.6%|38.2%|44.8%|42.9%|107.2%
1957-61|71.3%|76.9%|70.8%|77.4%|74.9%|181.6%
1957-62|54.5%|53.2%|48.6%|59.7%|61.6%|215.1%
Annual Compounded Rate|7.5%|7.4%|6.8%|8.1%|8.3%|21.1%
The Joys of Compounding
复利的乐趣
I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately 30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like 2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point.
我曾从一个不太可信的渠道得知Isabella给Columbus进行环球航海的初始投资为3万美元。这曾经被看作是一笔表现相当不错的风险投资。不过抛开发现新大陆带来的心理冲击，我必须指出即使拥有那些土地占有权，这笔投资的回报也并不是另一个IBM。粗略估计，3万美元的投资按每年4%的复利计算，在1962年将增值到2,000,000,000,000美元（如果你不是政府统计人员，你可以直接用2万亿美元这个表述）。在相同的计算方式下，赞同曼哈顿的印第安人卖地的历史学家们也能够找到庇护所。这种有趣的数据描述了活的长久以及即使相对较低的复利的价值。对于寿命的长短，我无能为力。
The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over a decade or two.
不过，下面的表格描述了10万美元在5%、10%和15%的复利下，10年、20年和30年后的价值。 看到如此小的复利差异可以在数年内累积成非常可观的金额，总会令人吃惊。而且从这个表中也可看出为什么虽然我们想要更高的收益率，但我们认为只比道指高几个点也已经很不错了。因为在十或二十年之后，这笔钱也会变得相当可观。
||5%|10%|15%
---|---|---|---
10 Years|259,374|$404,553
20 Years|672,748|$1,636,640
30 Years|1,744,930|$6,621,140
Our Method of Operation
我们的运营方式
Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow, in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.
我们的投资收益来源于三大类。这三个部分有不同的特点，资金配置比例的不同会导致某些年度我们的表现与道指有很大差别。一般来说，这三个部分之间的资金配置比例是有计划的，但各种因素的变动也会导致很多偶然性。
The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself .Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
第一类由普通的被低估的证券（以后简称“Generals”）组成。我们对这类证券所代表的公司没有话语权，也没有时间表来获知价格回归价值的时间。多年来，这类投资占据了我们资金的最大比例，投资回报也最多。通常我们会在5到6只这类Generals上都配置相当多的资金（每个占我们总资金的5%-10%），在另外10到15只上配置较少的资金。
Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any compelling reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. Combining this individual margin of safety with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.
有时候价格回归特别快，有时候却需要好多年。购买时很难知道它们会因何种特别的原因让价格回升。但是，因为缺乏活力或其他能够令市场迅速钟爱的因素，他们会的价格会异常的低。以这个价格购入，会得到超出该价格很多的价值。在每次这样的交易中，超出价格部分的价值就构成了令人满意的安全边际。这种个股的安全边际结合择股多样化，就会形成一个很有效的安全包以及价格上涨的潜力。我们从没有想过要在这些”Generals”上赚到最后一分钱。通常在买入价和我们以私有化角度计算的内在价值之间某个价格卖出就已经令我们很满意了。
Many times generals represent a form of “coattail riding” where we feel the dominating stockholder group has plans for the conversion of unprofitable or under-utilized assets to a better use. We have done that ourselves in Sanborn and Dempster, but everything else equal we would rather let others do the work. Obviously, not only do the values have to be ample in a case like this, but we also have to be careful whose coat we are holding.
很多时候，当控股股东有计划将不太盈利或未充分利用的资产变成其他更好的用途时，对“Generals”会产生“燕尾服效应”。我们自己也在Sanborn和Dempster上做过类似的操作。不过，如果能得到相同的结果，我们宁愿把这项工作交给别人来做。很显然，在这种投资上，我们不仅要让资产增值，还要时刻警惕着我们拿的是谁的“燕尾服”。
The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961. This is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market, and in 1962, not only did we not make any money out of our general category, but I am even doubtful if it did better than the Dow.
一般来说与道指相比，这些“Generals”会表现得更好。但价格便宜并不意味着不会继续下跌。整个股票市场都断崖式下跌时，这部分大概也会和指数跌幅差不多。长期来看，”Generals”的表现会比道琼斯工业指数要好，像在1961年这种快速上升的年份，这部分投资表现的非常好。当然，在下跌的市场中，例如1962年，这部分也最易受影响。我们不仅没有从这部分投资中赚到钱，我甚至怀疑我们没有跑赢道指。
Our second category consists of “work-outs“. These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., I lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.
第二类是“Workouts”。他们的表现取决于公司自身的操作，而不是市场上买卖双方的力量对比。也就是说，这部分投资有一个时间表，我们可以预期何时收回多少投资，什么因素会导致结果的变化，一般来说只有很小的风险。公司的合并、清算、重组、拆分等等都会产生“Workouts”投资的机会。这些年这类投资的机会主要来源于石油开采商被卖给大型联合石油公司时。
This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow, or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year.
不管股票市场如何变化，这类投资每年都可以带来相对稳定的收益。很显然，如果某一年我们这部分投资比例较大，那么在熊市中我们就会表现非常好，在牛市中就会表现非常差。
We were fortunate in that we had a good portion of our portfolio in work-outs in 1962. As I have said before, this was not due to any notion on my part as to what the market would do, but rather because I could get more of what I wanted in this category than in the generals. This same concentration in work-outs hurt our performance during the market advance in the second half of the year.
我们应该庆幸，在1962年“Workouts”类投资占比相对较多。我曾经说过，这部分的比例不会基于市场将会如何，而是与“Generals”相比我们是否能够收益更多。不过，也因为这些“Workouts”的比例，拖后了我们在1962年下半年的表现。
Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in five to ten of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio, since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. For instance, you will note when you receive our audit report, that we paid 1,500,000 borrowed from such sources. Since 1962 was a down year in the market, you might think that such borrowing would hurt results. However, all of our loans were to offset work-outs, and this category turned in a good profit for the year. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% per annum range. My self-imposed standard limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth, although something extraordinary could result in modifying this for a limited period of time.
多年来，“Workouts”类的资金占比一直位居第二。大多时候，我们都有10到15个这类投资，有的才刚刚开始，有的已经在收尾。我确信可以用借款来对冲“Workouts”类资金的占比，因为这部分的投资远离重大事件和市场行为的影响，相对很安全。例如，你们也许会留意到在你们收到的审计报告中，这一年我们支付给了银行和中介7.5万美元的费用。我们借贷利率大概是5%，所以我们的借款总额累计差不多是150万美元。因为1962年是个熊市，你们或许会认为这笔借款会损害我们的收益。但是我们所有的借款都只会用来对冲“Workouts”，而且这种操作带了相当好的收益。如果扣除借款的优势，这类投资年化收益率会下降到10%-20%。我把借款金额限制在我们合伙基金净资产的25%以内，不过有异常好的机会时，我也会在一个相对较短的时间内对此有所调整。
You will note on our yearend balance sheet (part of the audit you will receive) securities sold short totaling some $340,000. Most of this occurred in conjunction with a work-out entered into late in the year. In this case, we had very little competition for a period of time and were able to create a 10% or better profit (gross, not annualized) for a few months tie-up of money. The short sales eliminated the general market risk.
你们会注意到我们年底的资产负债表（在你们将会收到的审计报告里）中有价值为34万美元的卖空证券，其中大部分都是因为我们接近年底时投资“Workouts”所产生的。在一定的时间内这类投资几乎很少有竞争者，它们能够在几个月内带来10%以上的收益（毛利润率，而非年收益率）。这类卖空能够对冲股票市场的风险。
The final category is I[^1] “control” situations, where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. Usually, it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company’s stock, and we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation.
第三类是“Controls”。这类情况下，我们可以控制一个公司或占据较大的股权，以至于能够影响公司的决策。这类投资要很多年才能见效。某个年份它们或许不会带来任何收益，因为在我们建仓时股价波澜不惊对我们最有利。这部分投资同样受股票市场的影响较小。有时，我们本来想做“Generals”类型的投资，但后来会变成“Controls”类型。当价格一直处于低位时，这种状况就很可能会发生。通常如果它们在我们尚未大量建仓之前就大幅上涨，我们就会在高位卖出并完成这笔“Generals”类型的投资。
Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company
邓普斯特机器制造公司
The high point of 1962 from a performance standpoint was our present control situation —73% owned Dempster Mill. Dempster has been primarily in farm implements (mostly items retailing for $1,000 or under), water systems, water well supplies and jobbed plumbing lines.
从投资表现来看，我们在1962年的亮点是我们拥有73%股权的Dempster Mill。Dempster的主要业务是制作农具（主要是零售价在1,000美元或以下的物品）、供水系统、水井用品和水暖管线。
The operations for the past decade have been characterized by static sales, low inventory turnover and virtually no profits in relation to invested capital.
过去十年，它的销售增长基本停滞、存货周转率很低、资本投资回报几乎为零。
We obtained control in August, 1961 at an average price of about 16 in earlier years, but the vast majority in an offer of $30.25 in August. When control of a company is obtained, obviously what then becomes all-important is the value of assets, not the market quotation for a piece of paper (stock certificate).
我们在1961年8月以每股均价28美元获得控股权，早些年我们曾用每股16美元的低价买到过一些，不过大部分股票是在8月份以每股30.25美元买入的。当获得控股权之后，最重要的就是资产的价值，而不是对一张纸（股权证明）的报价。
Last year, our Dempster holding was valued by applying what I felt were appropriate discounts to the various assets. These valuations were based on their status as non-earning assets and were not assessed on the basis of potential, but on the basis of what I thought a prompt sale would produce at that date. Our job was to compound these values at a decent rate. The consolidated balance sheet last year and the calculation of fair below.
去年，我是以各类资产的合理折扣对我们所持有的Dempster股权进行估值的。这些估值基于将它们看作是无盈利能力的资产，而不是基于它们未来的收益，也就是说基于当时我计算出的清算价值。我们的工作是使这些资产以不错的复利增长。合并资产负债表和我们计算的公允价值列示如下：
(000’s omitted) （
缩小了1000倍）
Assets
资产|Book Figure
账面价值|Valued @
调整系数|Adjusted Valuation
调整后的价值|Liabilities
负债|
---|---|---|---|---|---
Cash</br
现金|166|Notes Payable
应付账款|$1,230
Accts. Rec. (net)</br
应收账款|884|Other Liabilities
其他负债|$1,088
Inventory</br
存货|2,522
Ppd. Exp. Etc.</br
预付账款|21
Current Assets</br
流动资产|3,593|Total Liabilities
负债总计|$2,318
Cash Value Life ins., etc.</br
现金支付的寿险等|45|Net Work per Books:
帐面资产净值|$4,601
Net Plant Equipment</br
生产设备净值|800|Net Work as Adjusted to Quickly Realizable Values
调整后的净值|$2,120
Total Assets</br
总资产|4,438|Shares outstanding 60,146 Adj. Value per Share
调整后的每股价值|$35.25
Dempster’s fiscal year ends November 30th, and because the audit was unavailable in complete form, I approximated some of the figures and rounded to $35 per share last year.
Dempster
的财年截止时间是11月30日，因为还没有完成审计，我只好对某些数值进行估计，认为去年大概每股值35美元。
Initially, we worked with the old management toward more effective utilization of capital, better operating margins, reduction of overhead, etc. These efforts were completely fruitless. After spinning our wheels for about six months, it became obvious that while lip service was being given to our objective, either through inability or unwillingness, nothing was being accomplished. A change was necessary.
开始时，我们与旧的管理层合作，想要努力提升资产效率、运营利润，消减上头成本等，但完全没有效果。运转了6个月后才发现，很显然他们只是在动嘴皮子，不管是因为无能还是懈怠，他们没有达到任何目标。所以有必要做出改变了。
A good friend, whose inclination is not toward enthusiastic descriptions, highly recommended Harry Bottle for our type of problem. On April 17, 1962 I met Harry in Los Angeles, presented a deal which provided for rewards to him based upon our objectives being met, and on April 23rd he was sitting in the president’s chair in Beatrice.
我的一个好朋友，没有进行天花乱坠的描述但强烈推荐了Harry Bottle来解决我们的问题。1962年4月17日，我在洛杉矶见到了Harry，提出了一个基于目标达成情况的报酬方案，4月23日起他就作为Dempster的主席在Beatrice开始工作了。
Harry is unquestionably the man of the year. Every goal we have set for Harry has been met, and all the surprises have been on the pleasant side. He has accomplished one thing after another that has been labeled as impossible, and has always taken the tough things first. Our breakeven point has been cut virtually in half, slow-moving or dead merchandise has been sold or written off, marketing procedures have been revamped, and unprofitable facilities have been sold.
Harry
毫无疑问是年度最佳。我们为他设定的每个目标他都达到了，而且他带来的所有意外都是真正的惊喜。他达成了一个又一个被认为不可能完成的任务，并且总是率先解决最困难的事情。我们的盈亏平衡点降低了一半，进展缓慢或一滩死水的业务被卖掉或清算，市场营销被重建，无利润的设施被清理。
The results of this program are partially shown in the balance sheet below, which, since it still represents non-earning assets, is valued on the same basis as last year.
下面的资产负债表显示了这些措施的部分结果。计算的标准和去年一样，也是基于将它们看作是无盈利能力的资产。
(000’s omitted) （
缩小了1000倍）
Assets|Book Figure|Valued @|Adjusted Valuation|Liabilities|
---|---|---|---|---|---
Cash|60|Notes payable|$0
Marketable securities|834|Other liabilities|$346
Accts. Rec. (net)|676|Total liabilities|$346
Inventory|981
Cash value life ins.|41|Net Worth:
Recoverable Income Tax|170|Per Books|$4,077
Ppd. Exp. Etc.|4|As Adjusted to quickly realizable values|$3,125
|||||Add: proceeds from potential exercise of option to Harry Bottle|$60
Current Assets|2,766|Shares outstanding|60,146
Misc. Invest. |5|Add: shs. Potentially outstanding under option|2,000
Net Plant Equipment|700|Total shs.|62,146
Total Assets|3,471|Adjusted value per share|$51.26
Three facts stand out:
对比可发现三个事实：
(1) Although net worth has been reduced somewhat by the housecleaning and writedowns ($550,000 was written out of inventory; fixed assets overall brought more than book value), we have converted assets to cash at a rate far superior to that implied in our year-earlier valuation.
（1）尽管因为清算和减值（存货减值了55万；固定资产总体价值高于账面价值），我们的净资产总量下降了，但是在清算时我们将资产变成现金的能力比去年要强。
(2) To some extent, we have converted the assets from the manufacturing business (which has been a poor business) to a business which we think is a good business —securities.
（2）某种程度上，我们把制造业模式（不太好的生意模式）转变成了一个好的生意模式——证券投资。
(3) By buying assets at a bargain price, we don’t need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”
（3）因为买入价格较低，我们不需要吃干榨尽就可以取得超级高的收益率。这是我们投资哲学的基石：“不要指望卖的好。只要买入价足够低，哪怕是非常平庸的卖价，也可以取得好的投资收益。卖的好只是锦上添花。”
On January 2, 1963, Dempster received an unsecured term loan of 35 per share at Dempster, or considerably more than we paid for the whole company. Thus our present valuation will involve a net of about 35 in a security operation comparable to that of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.
在1963年1月2日，Dempster获得了125万美元的定期无抵押贷款。这些贷款以及从原来的资产中“释放”出的资金，使得我们拥有了按Dempster股票数量计算可达每股35美元的证券组合。这部分资产的价格已经比我们当初购买该公司的价格还要高了。于是我们现在在Dempster公司拥有的净资产包含大约每股16美元的制造业务板块和每股35美元的证券业务板块，后者和巴菲特合伙基金的投资标的类似。
We, of course, are devoted to compounding the $16 in manufacturing at an attractive rate and believe we have some good ideas as to how to accomplish this. While this will be easy if the business as presently conducted earns money, we have some promising ideas even if it shouldn’t.
当然我们会致力于让每股16美元的制造业务板块以非常有吸引力的复利持续增长，而且相信我们有很好的主意可以达成这个目标。如果这部分业务能够继续赚钱当然更好，如果不能我们还有别的办法。
It should be pointed out that Dempster last year was 100% an asset conversion problem and therefore, completely unaffected by the stock market and tremendously affected by our success with the assets. In 1963, the manufacturing assets will still be important, but from a valuation standpoint it will behave considerably more like a general since we will have a large portion of its money invested in generals pretty much identical with those in Buffett Partnership, Ltd. For tax reasons, we will probably not put workouts in Dempster. Therefore, if the Dow should drop substantially, it would have a significant effect on the Dempster valuation. Likewise, Dempster would benefit this year from an advancing Dow which would not have been the case most of last year.
需要指出的是，Dempster去年存在的问题全部是资产转化方面的，这种问题不受股票市场的影响，只受我们处置资产的影响。在1963年，虽然制造业资产仍然很重要，但是从某种观点上来看，它已经变得有些类似于我们的“Generals”投资了，因为我们把大量的资金投入到了和巴菲特合伙基金所持有的类似证券上。所以如果道指下降很多，那么Dempster的价值也会受很大影响。如果道指不是像去年一样下降而是大幅上涨，那么Dempster也会受益。
There is one final point of real significance for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. We now have a relationship with an operating man which could be of great benefit in future control situations. Harry had never thought of running an implement company six days before he took over. He is mobile, hardworking and carries out policies once they are set. He likes to get paid well for doing well, and I like dealing with someone who is not trying to figure how to get the fixtures in the executive washroom gold-plated.
对于巴菲特合伙基金来说，最重要的一点是我们现在跟一位管理者建立起了一种联系，这在未来将会让我们受益良多。Harry在接受这个职位前6天，从来没有想过他会运营一个设备制造公司。他行动迅速、工作努力，一旦制定了政策就会把它们执行到底。他喜欢因为做的好而获取好报酬，而我喜欢那些不把心思花在如何配置金碧辉煌的办公室洗手间的家具上的人。
Harry and I like each other, and his relationship with Buffett Partnership, Ltd. should be profitable for all of us.
Harry
和我互相喜欢对方，他和巴菲特合伙公司的关系将会使我们大家都受益。
The Question of Conservatism
关于保守的疑问
Because I believe it may be even more meaningful after the events of 1962 I would like to repeat this section from last year’s letter:
因为我认为经历了1962年股票市场的人，会意识到这一部分的意义。所以我把去年信中的相关内容重复如下：
The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
上述关于我们投资类别的描述可以看出我们的投资组合是如何的保守。很多年前很多人认为购买中长期市政债或国债才叫做保守。但那种做法很多时候会让资产市值大幅缩水，而且几乎肯定无法保持或增加实际购买力。
Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
考虑到通胀，很多人现在认为以任何市盈率和分红率购买蓝筹股都可以称为保守投资。但是不像上述债券投资那样已经有了后视镜来发现问题，我感觉这种蓝筹股投资很危险。在我的头脑中，这种投资根本不保守，它是一种投机，只是在赌贪婪善变的庸众会将市盈率推到多高。
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
你不会因为大众的赞同而正确，也不会因为重要人物的赞同而正确。但是很多情况下，上述两种情况的同时发生足以让人认为已经通过保守测试而展开行动。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在大多数交易中，你只有在正确的假设、正确的事实、正确的推理前提下才会正确。真正的保守只能通过知识和推理来得到。
I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.
需要补充的是，不能因为我们的投资组合不同于传统就认为我们比标准的投资方式更为保守或激进，仅应该依据我们的投资方法和投资结果来做判断。
I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 0.5% of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.
我认为可以通过我们在熊市中的表现来检测我们投资方式是如何保守的。或许应该在一个大熊市中来检测。不过，在1957年和1960年相对温和的熊市中已经证明了我们投资方式的保守性。我欢迎任何合伙人用任何能客观测试保守性的方法对我们进行检测。我们从来没有哪怕是净资产万分之0.5的亏损，我们投资所得与损失比率为100比1。当然，很可能只是因为我们处在一个长牛阶段中。但是，即使在牛市，很多人也会亏损（你们或许认识一些这样的人），所以我认为上述事实已经足够清楚。
In 1962, we did realize a loss on one commitment or 1.0% and our ratio or realized gains to losses was only slightly over 3 to 1. However, compared to more conventional (often termed conservative which is not synonymous) methods of common stock investing, it would appear that our method involved considerably less risk. Our advantage over the Dow was all achieved when the market was going down; we lost a bit of this edge on the way up.
在1962年我们确实遭遇了一项约为1%的损失，而且我们的利得和损失的比例仅仅稍微超过了3:1。但是相对于传统的普通股投资（名义上的保守，实际上不保守），我们的方法风险更低。股市下跌时我们相对于道指的领先优势已全部达成；股市上涨时我们只损失了部分领先优势。
The Usual Prediction
常规预测
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two, since I don’t have the faintest idea.
我肯定不会去预测一两年后企业整体状况或股票市场的走势，因为我对此根本没有任何洞见。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years, there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25% a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor. If you will take the first table on page 3 and shuffle the years around, the compounded result will stay the same. If the next four years are going to involve, say, a +40%, -30%, +10% and –6%, the order in which they fall is completely unimportant for our purposes as long as we all are around at the end of the four years. Over a long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of the last decade, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
我认为可以肯定的是，未来十年中股票市场有涨幅超过20%或25%的年份，也有跌幅超过上述幅度的年份，而且大多数年份的涨跌幅会在这两者之间。我对这些情况可能造成的影响没有什么关注，而且我认为对于长期投资者来说，这些完全不重要。如果你把我们在第3页表格中的年份重新排列，所得的年均收益也不会有变化。如果接下来四年的收益分别是+40%、-30%、+10%和-6%，只要第四年底时我们还在，这些收益率的顺序对我们四年后的年均收益率不会有任何影响。长期来看，加上分红，我认为道指能够带来年均5%的收益。尽管之前十年表现的较好，但任何人想要从股票市场中获取大幅超过这个比例的收益都可能会失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
我们的工作是努力使得我们年度收益超越道指，而不是担心这个绝对值是正还是负。我认为在道指下降25%的时候，我们的投资组合只下降15%，要好过于我们的投资组合和道指都上涨20%。
For the reasons outlined in our method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
由于我们的投资方式，在道指下跌或持平时，我们相对收益会最好。因此寻求这种优势很可能会让收益率大幅波动。或许某些年份道指会超越我们，但如果我们能在长时间内取得超越道指年均10个点的收益，我就会相当满意了。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten —no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. It is certainly doubtful we could match a 20% or 25% advance from the December 31, 1962 level. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% per year.
具体来说，就是如果道指在某一年下降了35%或40%（我认为这在接下来的十年中很可能会发生，但我不知道是哪一年），我们或许会亏损15%或20%。如果指数持平，我们希望能够有10%的收益。如果指数上升20%甚至更多，我们希望能够跟上这个涨幅。几乎可以确信我们很难再次达到像在1962年12月31日那样高出道指20或25个点的收益率了。这样以来，多年以后在道指年复合增长率为5%的情况下，我们的投资年化收益率可以达到15%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. Variations in any given year from the behavior described above would be wide, even if the long-term expectation was correct. Certainly, you have to recognize the possibility of substantial personal bias in such hopes.
上述的预测可能过于草率，毫无疑问在1965年或1970年回看时会很容易发现这一点。即使长期预测是正确的，价格波动在某一年也可能会很大。而且你们也应当了解这种预测中可能会存在很多个人偏见。
Miscellaneous
其他
This year marked the transition from the office off the bedroom to one a bit (quite a bit) more conventional. Surprising as it may seem, the return to a time clock life has not been unpleasant. As a matter of fact, I enjoy not keeping track of everything on the backs of envelopes.
今年是我们把办公室从卧室搬到了一个稍微（很大的“稍微”）传统的工作场所的一年。令我吃惊的是，这种回归到正常上下班时间的生活并没有让我感到不愉悦。实际上我很享受不用再把什么东西都写在信封上的快乐。
We are starting off this year with net assets of 1,377,400.00. Also, my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, three aunts, four cousins, five nieces and nephews have interests directly or indirectly totaling $893,600.00.
今年年初我们的净资产达到了9,405,400美元。在1962年初，我和Susie有三个“非公开市场的证券”投资，其中两项已经卖掉了，第三项将会永久的保有。那两项资产出售以后，我们把资金投入到我们的合伙基金中，所以我们当前在合伙基金中的资金为1,377,400美元。另外，我的三个孩子、母亲、父亲、两个姐妹，两个大舅哥、我的岳父、三个阿姨、4个堂兄弟、5个侄子侄女在我们的合伙基金中直接或间接持有的资产为893,600美元。
Bill Scott who has fit into our operation splendidly has an interest (with his wife) of $167,400.00; A very large portion of his net worth. So we are all eating our own cooking.
Bill Scott（
和他的妻子）拥有的资金是167,400美金，这占他们净资产的很大一部分。所以我们是在吃我们自己做的饭。
You will note from the auditor’s certificate that they made a surprise check during the year and this will be a continuing part of their procedure. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. again did an excellent job on the audit, meeting our rather demanding time schedules.
你们大概留意到了去年的审计工作完成的非常不错，以后他们也将会持续这样。Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.再次做出了非常完美的审计工作，完全合乎我们的时间要求。
Susie was in charge of equipping the office which means we did not follow my “orange crate” approach to interior decorating. We have an ample supply of Pepsi on hand and look forward to partners dropping in.
Susie
负责了我们办公室的装修，也就是说我们没有按照我的“橘黄色老爷车”的样式来装饰办公室。我们手上现在有足够多的百事可乐，欢迎随时来访。
Beth Feehan continues to demonstrate why she is the high priestess of the CPS (certified professional secretary, that is) group.
Beth Feehan
继续表现出她可以作为高级CPS（持证专业秘书）的原因了。
Partners did a wonderful job of cooperating in the return of agreements and commitment letters, and I am most appreciative of this. It makes life a lot easier. Enclosed you will find Schedule “A” to your partnership agreement. You will be receiving your audit and tax figures very soon, and if you have questions on any of this be sure to let me hear from you.
合伙人在寄回合伙协议上跟我们合作的非常完美，令我非常赞赏，这可以让我过得更轻松一些。你们会发现我在你们的合伙协议上全都打了“A”。你们很快会收到你们的审计和税收信息。如果有任何问题，请务必联系我。
Cordially,
Warren E. Buffett
[^1]
相比于1961年的信，此处多了一个“I”，不知是否有误。存疑。