原文信息：
- 标题：1961 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1962-01-24
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
1961 Letter
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 24, 1962
Our Performance in
1961 我们在1961年的表现
I have consistently told partners that it is my expectation and hope (it’s always hard to tell which is which) that we will do relatively well compared to the general market in down or static markets, but that we may not look so good in advancing markets. In strongly advancing markets I expect to have real difficulty keeping up with the general market.
我曾不断的告诉我们的合伙人，我对投资结果的期望和期待（非常难将两者分清）是在熊市或持平的市场中能够有相对较好的表现，而在牛市中则没有那么好。在强劲上涨的牛市中，我认为我们可能很难跟得上。
Although 1961 was certainly a good year for the general market, and in addition, a very good year for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectations in the previous paragraph remain unchanged.
虽然1961年对于整个市场来说是个好年份，而且不管是从绝对值还是从相对值来看，对于我们来说更是一个好年份。不过我在上一段话中告知大家的那种期望并没有改变。
During 1961, the general market as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) showed an over-all gain of 22.2% including dividends received through ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partnerships operating throughout the entire year, after all expenses of operation, but before payments to limited partners or accrual to the general partner, averaged 45.9%. The details of this gain by partnership are shown in the appendix along with results for the partnerships started during the year.
1961年，包含分红的道琼斯工业指数（以后简称“道指”）上涨了22.2%。1961年之前成立的合伙基金，按扣除运营费用但不扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成计算，平均收益为45.9%。1961年之前以及年中成立的合伙基金收益明细见附表。
We have now completed five full years of partnership operation, and the results of these five years are shown below on a year-by-year basis and also on a cumulative or compounded basis. These results are stated on the basis described in the preceding paragraph; after expenses, but before division of gains among partners or payments to partners.
我们的合伙基金已经运行五个完整年度了，这五年的运营结果按照年度收益和累积收益列示如下。当然，这个结果也是按照我们上述的计算标准：扣除费用，但不扣除给合伙人的分红和分成。
Year
年份|Partnerships Operating Entire Year
当年合伙基金数量|Partnership Gain
合伙基金收益率|Dow-Jones Industrials Gain*
道指收益率
---|---|---|---
1957|3|10.4%|-8.4%
1958|5|40.9%|38.5%
1959|6|25.9%|19.9%
1960|7|22.8%|-6.3%
1961|7|45.9%|22.2%
* 包含拥有道指可以收到的分红。
On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:
以复利计算的累积收益如下：
Year
年份区间|Partnership Gain
合伙基金收益率|Dow-Jones Industrials Gain
道指收益率
---|---|---
1957|10.4%|-8.4%
1957-58|55.6%|26.9%
1957-59|95.9%|52.2%
1957-60|140.6%|42.6%
1957-61|251.0%|74.3%
These results do not measure the gain to the limited partner, which of course, is the figure in which you are most interested. Because of the varying partnership arrangements that have existed in the past, I have used the over-all net gain (based on market values at the beginning and end of the year) to the partnership as being the fairest measure of over-all performance.
这些收益并不是有限合伙人可以拿到手的收益，当然你们最关心的就是后者。因为我们过去有很多不同的合伙协议，所以最合理的方式就是基于我们所有合伙基金（年初和年末的市场价值）来计算总体净收益。
On a pro-forma basis adjusted to the division of gains entailed in our present Buffett Partnership, Ltd. agreement, the results would have been:
按照现在的巴菲特有限合伙公司的协议，将上面的收益进行调整后，结果如下：
Year
年份|Limited Partners’ Gain
有限合伙人收益率|Dow Gain
道指收益率
---|---|---
1957|9.3%|-8.4%
1958|32.2%|38.5%
1959|20.9%|19.9%
1960|18.6%|-6.3%
1961|35.9%|22.2%
COMPOUNDED
累积收益
Year
年份区间|Limited Partners’ Gain
有限合伙人收益率|Dow Gain
道指收益率
---|---|---
1957|9.3%|-8.4%
1957-58|44.5%|26.9%
1957-59|74.7%|52.2%
1957-60|107.2%|42.6%
1957-61|181.6%|74.3%
A Word About Par
关于投资评价标准的解释
The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.
我选择合伙人的超高标准以及和他们以后的关系，决定了我们要使用相同的衡量标准。如果我的表现不好，合伙人应该撤回投资；事实上我也应该为自己的资金另择它径。如果我的表现良好，也要让我确信确实如此。这样的话我认为我就能够适应。
The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.
这里的问题是我们需要确认我们关于好或不好的定义是一致的。我认为行动之前要先建立起评价标准。否则可以用这样或那样的因素，把任何结果打扮成好结果。
I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
我一直用道琼斯工业指数来作为我们的评判标准。我认为用来评判我们投资结果的时间段最短需要三年，而最好的时间段应该包含一个完整的周期，使得道指在开始和结束时基本持平。
While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.
虽然道指并不是一个完美的标准（其他标准也一样），但它有如下优势：已被大众广泛接受、有长期不间断的数据且能够相对准确地显示股票市场的涨落。不过，我并不反对使用其他衡量股票市场的标准，例如其他的股票指数、头部多元化的股票共同基金、银行信托基金等等。
You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.
你们或许会认为我选择了一个相对较低的标准，毕竟似乎超越一个由30支头部股票组成且没有人管理的指数看起来很容易。实际上，这个指数已被证明难以超越。Arthur Wiesenberger所写的一本经典著作列出了所有头部共同基金在1946-1960年这15年间的投资表现。现在有约200亿美元的资金被投入到共同基金，所以相对来说这些基金可以代表数百万投资者。虽然无法得到翔实的数据，但我认为大多数头部投资咨询机构和银行信托的表现与这些共同基金类似。
Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.
Wiesenberger
在他的“图表和数据”中列出了70个基金1946年以来的表现。由于种种原因我剔除了其中的32个基金，这些基金属于平衡基金（因此无法跟得上股票市场的上涨）和特殊的工业基金等等，用它们进行比较不太公平，这32个基金中有31个的表现都比道琼斯工业指数要差，所以剔除他们无损于我们的推论。
Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about 6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.
剩下的38个共同基金的运营方式与道指具有可比性。相比道指，其中32个表现的较差，另外6个表现的较好。1960年底，32个表现较差的基金资产总计有65亿美元，6个表现较好的基金资产总计有10亿美元。而这6个表现较好的基金也只领先了道指几个点。
Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don’t have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:
下面我列出了我们的合伙基金运营期间（剔除1961年，因为我没有那些基金的数据，但大概与1957-60年相比不会有太大变化），两个最大的开放式基金（共同基金）和两个最大的封闭式基金每年的表现：
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust|Investors Stock|Lehman|Tri-Cont.|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1957|-12.0%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1958|44.1%|47.6%|40.8%|33.2%|38.5%|32.2%
1959|8.2%|10.3%|8.1%|8.4%|19.9%|20.9%
1960|-0.9%|-0.1%|2.6%|2.8%|-6.3%|18.6%
(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)
（
数据来源于Moody银行和金融手册，1961年）
COMPOUNDED
累积收益
Year|Mass. Inv. Trust|Investors Stock|Lehman|Tri-Cont.|Dow|Limited Partners
---|---|---|---|---|---|---
1957|-12.0%|-12.4%|-11.4%|-2.4%|-8.4%|9.3%
1957-58|26.8%|29.3%|24.7%|30.0%|26.9%|44.5%
1957-59|37.2%|42.6%|34.8%|40.9%|52.2%|74.7%
1957-60|36.0%|42.5%|38.3%|44.8%|42.6%|107.2%
Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about 1 billion; Tri-Continental Corporation about 350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.
Massachusetts Investors Trust
的资产大概有18亿美元；Investors Stock Fund 的资产大概有10亿美元；Tri-Continental Corporation 的资产大概有5亿美元；Lehman Corporation 的资产大概有3.5亿美元，加在一起的资产总量超过35亿美元。
I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.
我列出上述数据，并不是想要贬低这些投资公司的投资成果。如果要我来管理这么庞大的资金，且受到我们现在所投资的公司的流动性和体量的限制，我的表现即使能够同样好，却也很难更好了。我列出这些数据是想说明道指作为投资评判标准并不低，大部分的投资基金想要超越或与它持平都很难。
Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.
我们的投资组合与道指成分股很不一致。我们的运营方式跟共同基金也有很大不同。
However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.
大部分合伙人，如果没有把资金投入到我们的合伙基金中，也很可能会投入到跟道指收益差不多的机构中，所以我认为用道指作为评价标准是合理的。
Our Method of Operation
我们的运营方式
Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.
我们的投资收益来源于三大类。这三个部分有不同的特点，资金配置比例的不同会导致某些年度我们的表现与道指有很大差别。一般来说，这三个部分之间的资金配置比例是有计划的，但各种因素的变动也会导致很多偶然性。
The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
第一类由普通的被低估的证券（以后简称“Generals”）组成。我们对这类证券所代表的公司没有话语权，也没有时间表来获知价格回归价值的时间。多年来，这类投资占据了我们资金的最大比例，投资回报也最多。通常我们会在5到6只这类Generals上都配置相当多的资金（每个占我们总资金的5%-10%），在另外10到15只上配置较少的资金。
Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.
有时候价格回归特别快，有时候却需要好多年。购买时很难知道它们会因何种特别的原因让价格回升。但是，因为缺乏活力或其他能够令市场迅速钟爱的因素，他们会的价格会异常的低。以这个价格购入，会得到超出该价格很多的价值。在每次这样的交易中，超出价格部分的价值就构成了令人满意的安全边际。这种个股的安全边际结合择股多样化，就会形成一个很有效的安全包以及价格上涨的潜力。多年来，我们买入的时机一般要比卖出的时机好。我们从没有想过要在这些”Generals”上赚到最后一分钱。通常在买入价和我们以私有化角度计算的内在价值之间某个价格卖出就已经令我们很满意了。
The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
一般来说与道指相比，这些Generals会表现得更好。但价格便宜并不意味着不会继续下跌。整个股票市场都断崖式下跌时，这部分大概也会和指数跌幅差不多。长期来看，“Generals”的表现会比道琼斯工业指数要好，像在1961年这种快速上升的年份，这部分投资是我们投资组合中表现最好的。当然，在下跌的市场中这部分也最易受影响。
Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.
第二类是“Workouts”。他们的表现取决于公司自身的操作，而不是市场上买卖双方的力量对比。也就是说，这部分投资有一个时间表，我们可以预期何时收回多少投资，什么因素会导致结果的变化，一般来说只有很小的风险。公司的合并、清算、重组、拆分等等都会产生“Workouts”投资的机会。这些年这类投资的机会主要来源于石油开采商被卖给大型联合石油公司时。
This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs.
不管股票市场如何变化，这类投资每年都可以带来相对稳定的收益。很显然，如果某一年我们这部分投资比例较大，那么在熊市中我们就会表现非常好，在牛市中就会表现非常差。多年来，“Workouts”类的资金占比一直位居第二。大多时候，我们都有10到15个这类投资，有的才刚刚开始，有的已经在收尾。我确信可以用借款来对冲“Workouts”类资金的占比，因为这部分的投资远离重大事件和市场行为的影响，相对很安全。如果扣除借款的优势，这类投资收益率会下降到10%-20%。我把借款金额限制在我们合伙基金净资产的25%以内。通常我们不会借款，如果有，也一定只是用于对冲“Workouts”。
The final category is “control” situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company’s stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.
第三类是“Controls”。这类情况下，我们可以控制一个公司或占据较大的股权，以至于能够影响公司的决策。这类投资要很多年才能见效。某个年份它们或许不会带来任何收益，因为在我们建仓时股价波澜不惊对我们最有利。这部分投资同样受股票市场的影响较小。有时，我们本来想做“Generals”类型的投资，但后来会变成“Controls”类型。当价格一直处于低位时，这种状况就很可能会发生。如果它们在我们尚未大量建仓之前就大幅上涨，我们就会在高位卖出并完成这笔“Generals”类型的投资。我们现在也在布署若干年后可能会变为“Controls”类型的投资。
Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company
邓普斯特机器制造公司
We are presently involved in the control of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, Nebraska. Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued security five years ago. A block later became available, and I went on the Board about four years ago. In August 1961, we obtained majority control, which is indicative of the fact that many of our operations are not exactly of the “overnight” variety
我们现在控股了Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, Nebraska。我们在这个项目上的第一笔投资始于五年前，那时我们是作为“Generals”来买入的。后来购入了更多的股份，我在四年前进入了董事会。到1961年8月，我们控股了该公司。由此可见，我们的操作不是“一夜之间”完成的。
Presently we own 70% of the stock of Dempster with another 10% held by a few associates. With only 150 or so other stockholders, a market on the stock is virtually non-existent, and in any case, would have no meaning for a controlling block. Our own actions in such a market could drastically affect the quoted price.
现在我们拥有该公司70%的股票，另外还有10%由一些机构拥有。剩余大概150个左右的股东无法组成有效的股票交易市场，对于我们这个控股股东来说也没有意义，因为作为控股股东，我们的行为会极大地影响股票价格。
Therefore, it is necessary for me to estimate the value at yearend of our controlling interest. This is of particular importance since, in effect, new partners are buying in based upon this price, and old partners are selling a portion of their interest based upon the same price. The estimated value should not be what we hope it would be worth, or what it might be worth to an eager buyer, etc., but what I would estimate our interest would bring if sold under current conditions in a reasonably short period of time. Our efforts will be devoted toward increasing this value, and we feel there are decent prospects of doing this.
因此，在年底我有必要对我们控股的这笔投资进行估值。这非常重要，因为新的合伙人会按此价购买而老合伙人会按此价卖出相应的合伙份额。我认为这笔投资的价值既不应该按照我们渴望的价值也不应该按照一个急切购买者的报价来衡量，而是应该按照短期内我们能卖出的价格来衡量。我们致力于增加这个价值，而且我感觉前景会很不错。
Dempster is a manufacturer of farm implements and water systems with sales in 1961 of about 4.5 million, or 50 per share, and at yearend we valued our interest at 28, and this holding currently represents 21% of partnership net assets based on the $35 value.
Dempster
是一个农田水利设施的制造商，1961年的销售额约为900万美元。近些年，投入的资本仅能够获得名义上的利润。这反映出该公司管理能力的不足以及困顿的行业现状。现在，它的合并净资产（账面价值）为450万美元，也就是每股75美元；合并运营资本大概每股50美元，年底我们对它的估值为每股35美元。虽然我没有得到什么神谕，但我认为这个价格对于新老合伙人都很公平。当然，如果盈利能力能够有所改善，估值就应该上调；即使无法改善，清算价值也会高于这个价格。我们达到目前控股股权的平均购买成本为每股28美元。按照每股35美元计算，这笔投资占我们合伙基金净资产的21%。
Of course, this section of our portfolio is not going to be worth more money merely because General Motors, U.S. Steel, etc., sell higher. In a raging bull market, operations in control situations will seem like a very difficult way to make money, compared to just buying the general market. However, I am more conscious of the dangers presented at current market levels than the opportunities. Control situations, along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of our portfolio from these dangers.
当然，这笔投资不会因为通用汽车、美国钢铁等等股票价格的上升而增值。在汹涌的牛市中，相比于只购买“Generals”类型的证券，“Controls”类投资的赚钱方法非常难。但是在当前的股票市场中，我关心风险多于机会。“Controls”和“Workouts”从某种程度上可以让我们的投资组合远离这些风险。
The Question of Conservatism
关于保守的疑问
The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
上述关于我们投资类别的描述可以看出我们的投资组合是如何的保守。很多年前很多人认为购买中长期市政债或国债才叫做保守。但那种做法很多时候会让资产市值大幅缩水，而且几乎肯定无法保持或增加实际购买力。
Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
考虑到通胀，很多人现在认为以任何市盈率和分红率购买蓝筹股都可以称为保守投资。但是不像上述债券投资那样已经有了后视镜来发现问题，我感觉这种蓝筹股投资很危险。在我的头脑中，这种投资根本不保守，它是一种投机，只是在赌贪婪善变的庸众会将市盈率推到多高。
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
你不会因为大众的赞同而正确，也不会因为重要人物的赞同而正确。但是很多情况下，上述两种情况的同时发生足以让人认为已经通过保守测试而展开行动。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
在大多数交易中，你只有在正确的假设、正确的事实、正确的推理前提下才会正确。真正的保守只能通过知识和推理来得到。
I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.
需要补充的是，不能因为我们的投资组合不同于传统就认为我们比标准的投资方式更为保守或激进，仅应该依据我们的投资方法和投资结果来做判断。
I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 1/2 of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.
我认为可以通过我们在熊市中的表现来检测我们投资方式是如何保守的。或许应该在一个大熊市中来检测。不过，在1957年和1960年相对温和的熊市中已经证明了我们投资方式的保守性。我欢迎任何合伙人用任何能客观测试保守性的方法对我们进行检测。我们从来没有哪怕是净资产百分之0.5的亏损，我们投资所得与损失比率为100比1。当然，很可能只是因为我们处在一个长牛阶段中。但是，即使在牛市，很多人也会亏损（你们或许认识一些这样的人），所以我认为上述事实已经足够清楚。
The Question of Size
关于规模的疑问
Aside from the question as to what happens upon my death (which with a metaphysical twist, is a subject of keen interest to me), I am probably asked most often: “What affect is the rapid growth of partnership funds going to have upon performance?”
除了问我死后会怎么样（以形而上学的观念来看，这是对我的热切关心），我被问最多的问题就是：“规模快速膨胀的合伙基金会对我们投资表现有什么影响？”
Larger funds tug in two directions. From the standpoint of “passive” investments, where we do not attempt by the size of our investment to influence corporate policies, larger sums hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust department investing in securities with very broad markets, the effect of large sums should be to penalize results only very slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General Motors is only slightly more costly (on the basis of mathematical expectancy) than buying 1,000 or 100 shares.
基金的扩大会产生两种相反的效果。从我们的“被动”投资类型来看，因为投资比例不够大而无法影响企业的决策，资金的增大会损害这类投资的表现。对于共同基金或信托来说，因为有着非常广阔的投资市场，资金的增大对投资结果只有微弱的影响。买一万股通用汽车与买一千或一百股对于平均成本（基于数学期望）几乎没有影响。
In some of the securities in which we deal (but not all by any means) buying 10,000 shares is much more difficult than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible. Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the portfolio, I would say increased sums are only slightly disadvantageous. This category includes most of our work-outs and some generals.
但对于我们购买的一些证券（远不是所有），买一万股要比买一百股难得多，有时候根本不可能买到。所以，对于我们投资组合的某一部分，规模增大确实影响收益。但对于我们投资组合的大部分来说，规模的增大只有微弱的不利影响。这类投资包含绝大多数的“Workouts”和一些“Generals”。
However, in the case of control situations increased funds are a definite advantage. A “Sanborn Map” cannot be accomplished without the wherewithal. My definite belief is that the opportunities increase in this field as the funds increase. This is due to the sharp fall-off in competition as the ante mounts plus the important positive correlation that exists between increased size of company and lack of concentrated ownership of that company’s stock.
不过，对于“Controls”类型的投资，资金规模的增大绝对是有利的。没有这样规模的资金，我们无法完成“Sanborn Map”项目。我认为，我们的规模越大，我们在这类投资上的机会就越多。当购买的金额以及标的公司的规模更大，且该公司的股权更为分散时，我们遇到的竞争就会急剧下降。
Which is more important — the decreasing prospects of profitability in passive investments or the increasing prospects in control investments? I can’t give a definite answer to this since to a great extent it depends on the type of market in which we are operating. My present opinion is that there is no reason to think these should not be offsetting factors; if my opinion should change, you will be told. I can say, most assuredly, that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have been better if we had been operating with the much smaller sums of 1956 and 1957.
哪一个更重要？是被动投资下的负面影响还是控制型投资下的正面影响？我无法给出一个绝对的答案，因为这在很大程度上取决于我们处于什么类型的股票市场。我现在的看法是没有理由认为上述影响因素不会相互抵消。如果我的想法有什么变更，会立刻告诉你们。我可以肯定的是，即使与1956年和1957年的规模一样，我们在1960年和1961年也不会取得更好的投资收益率。
And a Prediction
一项预测
Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
定期阅读者（我或许是在自夸）会知道当我开始讨论预测时，往往已经偏离了习惯。预测是我羞于去做的事情，而我的习惯也未改变。
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don’t have the faintest idea.
我肯定不会去预测一两年后企业整体状况或股票市场的走势，因为我对此根本没有任何洞见。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.
我认为可以肯定的是，未来十年中股票市场有涨幅超过20%或25%的年份，也有跌幅超过上述幅度的年份，而且大多数年份的涨跌幅会在这两者之间。我对这些情况可能造成的影响没有什么关注，而且我认为对于长期投资者来说，这些完全不重要。
Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
长期来看，加上分红，我认为道指能够带来年均5%到7%的收益。尽管近些年表现较好，但任何人想要从股票市场中获取大幅超过这个比例的收益都可能会失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
我们的工作是努力使得我们年度收益超越道指，而不是担心这个绝对值是正还是负。我认为在道指下降25%的时候，我们的投资组合只下降15%，要好过于我们的投资组合和道指都上涨20%。我曾向合伙人重点强调过这一点，他们都以点头表示不同程度的赞同。对我来说，最重要的是你们要完全理解我这样说的原因，不仅要点头同意，还要深入到骨子里。
For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
由于我们的投资方式，在道指下跌或持平时，我们相对收益会最好。因此寻求这种优势很可能会让收益率大幅波动。或许某些年份道指会超越我们，但如果我们能在长时间内取得超越道指年均10个点的收益，我就会相当满意了。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten—no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
具体来说，就是如果道指在某一年下降了35%或40%（我认为这在接下来的十年中很可能会发生，但我不知道是哪一年），我们或许会亏损15%或20%。如果指数持平，我们希望能够有10%的收益。如果指数上升20%甚至更多，我们希望能够跟上这个涨幅。这样以来，多年以后在道指年复合增长率为5%到7%的情况下，我们的投资收益率可以达到15%到17%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won’t all be!
上述的预测可能过于草率，从1965年或1970年回看，或许会发现这个预测是对的，又或许是完全错误的。即使这种预测天生就有很大的犯错可能，但我仍然希望让合伙人了解我是怎么想的。在某一年，这种预测的偏离或许会很大。1961年就是这样，只不过幸运的是，偏离在了好的方向。但是不可能会一直这样！
Miscellaneous
其他
We are now installed in an office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first-class secretary, Beth Henley, and an associate with considerable experience in my type of securities, Bill Scott. My father is sharing office space with us (he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in securities. None of our brokerage is done through him so we have no “vicuna coat” situation.
我们现在的办公地点在810 Kiewit Plaza，我们有第一流的秘书——Beth Henley和一个有丰富经验的副手——Bill Scott。我的父亲和我们共用一间办公室（他也分担了相应的费用）。他做的是证券经纪业务，但是我们没有任何证券买卖是通过他办理的，所以我们没有任何“裙带”关系。
Overall, I expect our overhead, excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to run less than 1/2 of 1% of net assets. We should get our money’s worth from this expenditure, and you are most cordially invited to drop in and see how the money is being spent.
总之，我希望我们的上头成本，扣除贷款利息和内布拉斯加无形资产税，要小于净资产的百分之0.5。我们会让这些费用物有所值，随时欢迎你们来访并了解这笔钱是如何花费的。
With over 90 partners and probably 40 or so securities, you can understand that it is quite a welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the details.
在拥有90多个合伙人和大概40个证券的情况下，你们或许能够理解省略诸多细节会让我轻松太多。
We presently have partners residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to 1,025,000.00, and other relatives of mine have a combined interest totaling 25,000, but I am giving some thought to increasing it this year.
我们现在的合伙人从加利福尼亚到佛蒙特都有，我们在1962年初的净资产已达到7,178,500美元。我和妻子Susie在合伙基金中拥有1,025,000美元，我其他的亲戚拥有的总额共计为782,600美元。去年新合伙人的资金门槛是25,000美元，今年我想会有所提高。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing tax figures much earlier than in the past. They assure me this performance can be continued.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company
的审计工作完成的非常出色，提供的税收数据也比往年要早。他们跟我保证说会继续保持这种表现。
Let me hear from you regarding questions you may have on any aspects of this letter, your audit, status of your partnership interest, etc. that may puzzle you.
如果你对这封信、你的审计或合伙基金权益等困扰你的东西有任何疑问，请随时联系我。
Cordially Warren E. Buffett.
APPENDIX
Partnerships Operating Throughout
1961 1961年之前已成立的合伙基金
Partnership
合伙基金名称|1/1/61 Capital at Market
1961年初的市场价值|Overall Gain in 1961*
1961年的总体收益|Percentage Gain
收益率
---|---|---|---
Buffett Associates|486,874.27|225,387.80|46.3%
Buffett Fund|351,839.29|159,696.93|45.4%
Dacee|235,480.31|116,504.47|49.5%
Emdee|140,005.24|67,387.28|48.1%
Glenoff|78,482.70|39,693.80|50.5%
Mo-Buff|325,844.71|149,163.71|45.8%
Underwood|582,256.82|251,951.26|43.3%
||2,200,783.34|1,009,785.25|45.9%
Partnerships Started in
1961 1961年中成立的合伙基金
Partnership
合伙基金名称|Paid-in
投资时间及金额|Overall Gain in 1961
1961年总体收益|Percentage Gain
收益率
---|---|---|---
Ann Investments|100,100 (1-30-61)|35,367.93|35.3%
Buffett-TD|250,100 (50,000 on 5-31-61)|70,294.08|28.1%
Buffett-Holland|125,000 (5-17-61)|16,703.76|13.3%
* Gain in net assets at market values plus payments to limited partners during year.
*当年以市场价值计算的净收益加上支付给有限合伙人的权益。