原文信息：
- 标题：1960 Letter to Limited Partners
- 发表时间：1961-01-30
- 翻译：诚明散人
- 整理：诚明散人
1960 Letter
WARREN E. BUFFETT
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
The General Stock Market in 1960:
1960 年股票市场总体情况：
A year ago, I commented on the somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which had advanced from 583 to 679, or 16.4%. Although practically all investment companies showed gains for that year, less than 10% of them were able to match or better the record of the Industrial Average. The Dow-Jones Utility Average had a small decline and the Railroad Average recorded a substantial one.
一年之前我说过道琼斯工业指数在1959年失灵了，当时它从583点增长到679点，涨幅为16.4%。虽然实际上基本所有投资公司的收益都为正，但只有不到10%的公司能够超过或追平道琼斯工业指数的涨幅。道琼斯公共事业指数有小幅的下降，而道琼斯铁路指数下降的则非常多。
In 1960, the picture was reversed. The Industrial Average declined from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average still left it with an overall loss of 6.3%. On the other hand, the Utility Average showed a good gain and, while all the results are not now available, my guess is that about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the Industrial Average. The majority of investment companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in the range of plus or minus 5%. On the New York Stock Exchange, 653 common stocks registered losses for the year while 404 showed gains.
但是在1960年这种情况恰恰相反。道琼斯工业指数从679点下跌到616点，跌幅为9.3%，加上分红后跌幅为6.3%。而道琼斯公共事业指数增长较多。虽然所有的业绩还不能完全得到，但我猜测90%的投资公司业绩会好于道琼斯工业指数。主流的投资公司今年的投资收益大概在正负5%之间。今年在纽交所交易的股票中，亏损的有653个而盈利的有404个。
Results in 1960:
1960 年的投资成果：
My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve a long-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more or less parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.
我一直以来的目标，是让我们的合伙基金长期来看能战胜道琼斯工业指数。我认为道琼斯工业指数的变化在较长的一段时间内，或多或少会跟那些头部的投资公司的收益差不多。除非我们能够取得更好的投资收益，否则我们的合伙基金就没有必要存在。
However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.
但是就像我已经指出的那样，我们想要取得更好的收益并不意味着我们要持续战胜道琼斯工业指数。而是通过以下的方式来达到更好的投资收益——在熊市或持平的市场中取得高于指数的成绩，在牛市中跟得上甚至可能低于指数增长。
I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the Average 30% to be much superior to a year when both we and the Average advanced 20%. Over a period of time there are going to be good and bad years; there is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed about the sequence in which they occur. The important thing is to be beating par; a four on a par three hole is not as good as a five on a par five hole and it is unrealistic to assume we are not going to have our share of both par three’s and par five’s.
我认为在道琼斯工业指数下降30%的时候我们的投资组合只下降15%，要好过于我们的投资组合和道琼斯工业指数都上升20%。长期来看，股票市场会有好的年份也会有坏的年份。因为这些年份而高兴或沮丧，对于我们的投资结果没有任何帮助。重要的是少于标准杆，在三杆洞用了四杆就没有在五杆洞用五杆好。同时用三杆洞和五杆洞的标准来衡量成绩是不合理的。
The above dose of philosophy is being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known limitations.
阐述上述的投资理念，是因为今年我们有了新的合伙人，我想确保他们能够理解我们的目标、我们评价投资成果的标准以及我的一些局限。
With this background it is not unexpected that 1960 was a better-than-average year for us. As contrasted with an overall loss of 6.3% for the Industrial Average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating throughout the year. Our results for the four complete years of partnership operation after expenses but before interest to limited partners or allocation to the general partner are:
根据上述背景，就不难期望1960年我们的表现要好于指数。相较于道琼斯工业指数下降6.3%，我们的7个合伙基金的收益为22.8%。扣除运营费用但未扣除给有限合伙人的权益和普通合伙人的分成，我们的合伙基金在前四个完整年度的表现为：
Year|Partnerships Operating Entire Year|Partnership Gain|Dow-Jones Gain
---|:---:|:---:|:---:
1957|3|10.4%|-8.4%
1958|5|40.9%|38.5%
1959|6|25.9%|19.9%
1960|7|22.8%|-6.3%
It should be emphasized again that these are the net results to the partnership; the net results to the limited partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they had selected.
应当再次强调上述结果是整个合伙基金的投资成果。有限合伙人的净收益还需要再根据他们的合伙协议进行调整。
The overall gain or loss is computed on a market to market basis. After allowing for any money added or withdrawn, such a method gives results based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the partnership at the beginning, of the year and what would have been realized upon liquidation at year end and is different, of course, from our tax results, which value securities at cost and realize gains or losses only when securities are actually sold.
上述收益是按照市场价值的变化来计算的。除去因为追加或撤回投资的影响，上述方式计算出的结果取决于我们的投资组合在年初和年底的清算价值。这个价值不同于纳税基准，后者按照证券买入成本记账，并且只有在卖出时才计算相应的利得和损失。
On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:
以复利方式计算，累积收益如下：
Year|Partnership Gain|Dow-Jones Gain
---|:---:|:---:
1957|10.4%|-8.4%
1958|55.6%|26.9%
1959|95.9%|52.2%
1960|140.6%|42.6%
Although four years is entirely too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence there is points toward confirming the proposition that our results should be relatively better in moderately declining or static markets. To the extent that this is true, it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively, although decidedly less conventionally, invested than if we owned “blue-chip” securities. During a strongly rising market for the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching their performance.
尽管仅用四年的情况来做出推断会显得时间太短，但在某种程度上已经可以佐证我的投资理念了——我们在下降或持平的股市中会表现的更好。进一步来说，我们的投资组合可能更为保守，但跟传统的投资于“蓝筹”股的那种保守不同。相较于后者在大幅上涨的股市中的表现，我们或许很难跟得上。
Multiplicity of Partnerships
合伙基金数量的增加：
A preceding table shows that the family is growing. There has been no partnership which has had a consistently superior or inferior record compared to our group average, but there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in about the same proportions. This variation, of course, could be eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate much detail and a moderate amount of expense.
之前的表格显示出我们的合伙基金家族成员正在增加。任何一个合伙基金都不会一直比我们总体收益均值表现的更好或更差。尽管我努力让所有的合伙基金以几乎相同的比例投资于相同的证券，但它们每年仍会有少许差异。这种差异当然可以通过将所有合伙基金合并为一个基金来消除，而且这个做法可以减少一些运营费用和很多琐碎的工作。
Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the next few years. The problem is that various partners have expressed preferences for varying partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without unanimous consent of partners.
坦白说，接下来几年我很想这样做。问题是不同的合伙人通过不同的合伙协议签署了不同的合伙需求。如果所有的合伙人不能达成一致意见，那么合并就无从谈起。
Advance Payments
提前追加资金：
Several partners have inquired about adding money during the year to their partnership. Although an exception has been made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements during mid-year where we have more than one family represented among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed partnerships an additional interest can only be acquired at the end of the year.
有些合伙人想要在年中增加投资。尽管有部分例外，但是因为每个合伙基金中有不止一个家庭，我们很难在年中修订合伙协议。所以在有多个家庭的合伙基金中，追加的投资权益只能在年底调整。
We do accept advance payments during the year toward a partnership interest and pay interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the end of the year. At that time, subject to amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus interest is added to the partnership capital and thereafter participates in profits and losses.
我们当然接受合伙人为了增加合伙权益而在年底前提前追加的资金，而且会以6%的年利率按不同的追加时间计算这部分资金的利息。到年底时我们会修订合伙协议，将这笔资金加上利息后计入到合伙基金，并从那时开始计算损益。
Sanborn Map: Sanborn Map：
Last year mention was made of an investment which accounted for a very high and unusual proportion (35%) of our net assets along with the comment that I had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960. This hope materialized. The history of an investment of this magnitude may be of interest to you.
去年我提到有一项投资占了我们总资产的一个相当高且不寻常的比例（35%），而且我希望能够在1960年完成这项投资。这个愿望实现了。这项大额投资的历程也许会让你们感兴趣。
Sanborn Map Co. is engaged in the publication and continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of the United States. For example, the volumes mapping Omaha would weigh perhaps fifty pounds and provide minute details on each structure. The map would be revised by the paste-over method showing new construction, changed occupancy, new fire protection facilities, changed structural materials, etc. These revisions would be done approximately annually and a new map would be published every twenty or thirty years when further pasteovers became impractical. The cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha customer would run around $100 per year.
Sanborn Map Co
. 致力于出版并持续更新美国所有城市的详细地图。例如，奥马哈的地图就重达50磅，它能够提供每栋建筑的细节。这种地图用粘贴覆盖法来更新新的建筑、更改的建筑、新的防火设施、变动的结构材料等等。这种更新几乎每年都会做一次，大概二三十年后当粘贴覆盖法已经很难再继续使用时，就会出版一个全新的地图。奥马哈的客户想要保持地图的更新，每年需要花费100美元。
This detailed information showing diameter of water mains underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of roof, etc., was primarily of use to fire insurance companies. Their underwriting departments, located in a central office, could evaluate business by agents nationally. The theory was that a picture was worth a thousand words and such evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the degree of conflagration exposure in an area, advisable reinsurance procedure, etc. The bulk of Sanborn’s business was done with about thirty insurance companies although maps were also sold to customers outside the insurance industry such as public utilities, mortgage companies, and taxing authorities.
这些地图上的细节有地下水管的管径、灭火器的位置、屋面的材质等等，主要用于火灾保险公司。位于保险公司总部的承保部门可以通过遍及全国的代理人来评估保险业务。这个原理就是一图胜千言。这种评估方式可以判定风险排序是否合适、某个区域大火灾风险可能发生的程度、合理的再保险程序等等。虽然Sanborn的地图也卖给公共事业、抵押公司、税务部门等等保险行业以外的行业，但他的业务主要来自于大概三十家保险公司。
For seventy-five years the business operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort. In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry became fearful that Sanborn’s profits would become too great and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn’s board of directors to act in a watch-dog capacity.
75年以来，这项业务或多或少可以称为垄断，每年的利润几乎不受经济衰退的影响，也不需要进行营销。在这项业务的早期，保险行业害怕Sanborn的利润会变得过大，于是在它的董事会安置了一些保险公司的重要人物作为监督员。
In the early 1950’s a competitive method of under-writing known as “carding” made inroads on Sanborn’s business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over 100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power.
19世纪50年代早期，一种被称为“梳理”的很有竞争力的承保方式抢占了Sanborn公司的业务，使得它的地图业务税后利润从30年代后期的年均50多万美元，下降到1958年和1959年的不到10万美元。考虑到这个阶段经济在上行，这个数值表明它颇具规模且稳定的赚钱能力几乎已经丧失殆尽。
However, during the early 1930’s Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.
不过，从30年代早期，Sanborn公司开始逐步增加证券投资规模。它的地图业务基本没有什么资金需求，所以任何未分配利润都可以用于这类投资。一段时间之后，它大概投资了250万美元，其中一半是债券一半是股票。就这样，特别是在最近10年，在地图业务不景气的时候，投资业务却繁盛起来。
Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at 45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about 65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of 110 less the 20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing.
让我来阐述一下这两块业务间极端的分歧。1938年，道琼斯工业指数在100-120之间，Sanborn公司的股价为每股110美元。1958年，道琼斯工业指数在550左右，Sanborn公司的股价为每股45美元。但是与此同时，Sanborn公司所持有的证券价格从每股20美元上升到每股65美元。实际上这就意味着，1938年购买Sanborn公司股票的人给予它的地图业务每股90美元的估值（110美元减去20美元的证券投资），在当年商业和股票市场都较为萧条。而在1958年强有力的经济环境下，同样的地图业务被估值为每股负20美元。购买者不愿为1美元付出70美分的对价，并且还可以额外免费得到地图业务。
How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would have cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite “carding” over $500 million of fire premiums were underwritten by “mapping” companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn’s product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings.
这怎么可能？不论是1938年还是1958年，Sanborn公司对于保险行业来说都能提供很大的信息价值。要另起炉灶获取他们这么多年来收集的详尽信息，可能要花费数千万美元。尽管有“梳理”方式存在，仍有超过5亿美元保费的火灾保险业务利用“地图”公司承保。Sanborn公司的产品、信息的销售和包装方式并未改变，这种惯性最终会体现在收入中。
The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about 7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director’s and committee fees.
证券投资如此成功，以至于在很多的董事眼中复兴地图业务毫无必要。Sanborn公司的年销售额大约为200万美元，同时还拥有市场价值为700万美元的证券。证券投资的收益很大，公司的财务状况完全无需担忧，保险公司对地图的售价很满意，股东们依然可以收到分红。不过，这些股息在8年的时间里被削减了5次，而我可能永远都不会找到任何建议削减工资和董事及委员会费用的纪录。
Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had been only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.
在我进入董事会之前，14位董事中有9位是在保险行业身居要职的人，他们在已公开发行的105,000股股票中一共只拥有46股。这些人之中拥有股票最多的人也只拥有10股，他们在大型公司中位居高位，而这些公司本来至少应该利用它们的部分富余资金来购买一定数量的股票。这些公司中的某几家也确实拥有一些少量的Sanborn股票。但与它们所拥有的投资组合相比，这仅仅是一点点象征性的投资。在过去的10年中，在任何和Sanborn股票相关的交易中，保险公司都只是卖出者。
The tenth director was the company attorney, who held ten shares. The eleventh was a banker with ten shares who recognized the problems of the company, actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings. The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn who owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware of the problems of the business, but kept in a subservient role by the Board of Directors. The final member of our cast was a son of a deceased president of Sanborn. The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock.
第10位董事是公司的律师，他持有10股。第11位董事是一个银行家，他开始也只持有10股，不过他意识到公司所存在的问题并主动指了出来，后来他增加了持股量。还有两位董事是Sanborn公司的高管，他们一共拥有大约300股股票。这两位高管都很有能力，且意识到了公司存在的问题。但是董事会只安排他们担任一些辅助性的工作。最后一名董事是Sanborn公司已故总裁的儿子，他的寡母拥有15,000股股票。
In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business, demanded the top position in the company, was turned down, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares (dispersed among customers of a brokerage firm) and one of about 8,000. These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a separation of the investment portfolio from the map business, as did we.
1958年末，这位已故总裁的儿子对公司的形势感到不满，要求担任公司的高管。被拒绝后，他向公司递交了辞呈并被批准。随后我们出价并成功购买了他母亲所拥有的股票。当时还有另外两笔数量较多的股票，一笔大约有10,000股（分散在一个经纪公司的客户手中），另一笔大约有8,000股。这些人对当时的情况很不满意，非常希望拆分公司的证券投资，我们也是如此。
Subsequently our holdings (including associates) were increased through open market purchases to about 24,000 shares and the total represented by the three groups increased to 46,000 shares. We hoped to separate the two businesses, realize the fair value of the investment portfolio and work to re-establish the earning power of the map business. There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply map profits through utilization of Sanborn’s wealth of raw material in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to the most usable form for the customer.
经过公开市场购买，我们（包括合作伙伴）最终拥有的股票数量达到24,000股，于是三家的持股总量达到46,000股。我们希望拆分公司的两项业务，获取证券投资的公允价值并重建地图业务的盈利能力。利用Sanborn公司丰富的原材料并结合电子技术，将数据转换成对顾客最有用的形式，将有机会使地图业务利润成倍增加。
There was considerable opposition on the Board to change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider, although management was in complete accord with our plan and a similar plan had been recommended by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Management Experts). To avoid a proxy fight (which very probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would have been certain of winning) and to avoid time delay with a large portion of Sanborn’s money tied up in blue-chip stocks which I didn’t care for at current prices, a plan was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock, involving 50% of the 1,600 stockholders, was exchanged for portfolio securities at fair value. The map business was left with over 1 million was eliminated. The remaining stockholders were left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially higher earnings per share, and an increased dividend rate.
任何形式的变动，董事会中都会有很多人表示反对，尤其是当这种变动是由一个局外人发起的时候，即使公司的管理层完全同意我们的计划，Booz, Allen & Hamilton（管理专家）也推荐了类似的计划。为了避免代理权之争（很可能不会发生，而且我们肯定会获胜），以及不再让Sanborn公司的大部分资金都被绑定在那些以当前股价水平来看我不太喜欢的蓝筹股上，我们制定了一个计划，使得所有想撤出的股东都能按照公平的价格退出。SEC对这一计划的公正性表示赞同。Sanborn公司大约72%的股票，持有人占总股东人数1,600人的一半，都按照公平价格转换成了证券组合。最后Sanborn公司除了地图业务还剩下125万美元的政府和市政债券作为留存资金，而且超过100万美元的潜在公司资本利得税也被免除。剩下的其他股东也获得了有所改善的资产价值，大幅度上升的每股盈利，以及增加了的股息率。
Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated description of this investment operation. However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring our results over a short span of time such as a year. Such control situations may occur very infrequently. Our bread-and-butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action. To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is possible that more opportunities will be available in “control situations.”
有必要说一下，上面这个小小的情景剧是对这项投资过程非常简短的描述。但是它确实指出了我们对投资组合运行保密的必要性，以及用一年这样的较短时间来衡量投资成果的无效性。这种控股状况1很难频繁发生。我们主要的利润来源还是在于购买被低估的证券并在他们的价格回归后卖出，以及那些不受股市影响而只取决于公司本身状况的特定投资。随着我们合伙基金继续增大，很可能会有更多的“Controls”投资机会。
The auditors should be mailing your financial statement and tax information within about a week. If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or this letter, be sure to let me know.
审计人员会在一周内将你的财务信息和纳税信息报告寄出。如果你们对他们的报告和这封信有任何问题，请务必告知我。
Warren E. Buffett
1-30-61
就是指后来信中的“Controls”类投资。
Footnotes
-
“control situations” ↩