原文信息：
THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958
1958年股票市场总体情况
::: :::lang eng A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: “The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least”. ::: :::lang chs 一个管理着中等规模投资信托的朋友最近写道：“美国人善变的品性和性格导致了1958年股票市场的大幅波动，至少可以用‘亢奋’这个词来形容它。” ::: :::lang eng I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices, I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it. ::: :::lang chs 我认为这句话概括了1958年股票市场上业余和专业投资者主流心理的变化。过去的一年，几乎所有的因素都被用来证明应当去市场“投资”。可以肯定的是，现在的股票市场比前些年有着更多情绪善变的人。他们能在股票市场中呆多久，取决于他们认为容易的快钱可以赚多久。虽然无法断言他们可以让自己账户数字持续增加并推动股票价格上涨多久，但我可以断定，他们呆的越久，后市的反应就会越激烈。 ::: :::lang eng I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected. ::: :::lang chs 我并没有试图去预测股市——我的工作是去发现被低估的股票。但是我也确信，人们认为一定能够在股市中赚钱的普遍想法必然会带来麻烦。如果这种情况发生了，即使被低估股票的价格，而非内在价值，也会受到很大影响。
RESULTS IN 1958
1958年的投资成果
“Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.” ::: :::lang chs “相对来说，我们在熊市的表现很可能会比在牛市的时候要好，所以大家应该对上述投资收益保持冷静，因为今年只是我们应当在熊市中获取超出市场平均收益的典型的一年。当某一年市场整体表现相当好时，能够与之持平我就很满意了。” ::: :::lang eng The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market. ::: :::lang chs 上述的说法描述了我们在1958年的情况，我的预言生效了。道琼斯工业指数从435点增加到583点，再加上20点的分红之后，年化收益达到了38.5%。我们5个合伙基金的表现稍稍好于这个38.5%的平均值。按照这两个年度年底的市场价值，我们每个合伙基金的收益在36.7%到46.2%之间。考虑到我们有大量的资金已经并且仍然投资于受快速上涨股票市场影响很小的证券上，我认为这个结果已经相当好了。我仍然认为我们在下降或持平的股票市场中的投资收益会高于平均值，但是在上涨的股票市场中我们只能做到尽量跟上它的脚步。 ::: :::lang eng
TYPICAL SITUATION
典型情况
::: :::lang eng So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market. ::: :::lang chs 我认为回顾一下我们在1958年的特定操作，或许可以让你们更好地理解我们的运作方式。去年我提到过分别占我们不同合伙基金10%-20%的一项最大投资。我指出这个公司的股价下降或持平对我们有利，因为在这种情况下我们可以建立更大的仓位。当然，在牛市中这笔投资也会拖我们的后腿。 ::: :::lang eng This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value 10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about 50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for personal reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of:
- Very strong defensive characteristics; ::: :::lang eng
- Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and; ::: :::lang eng
- Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share. :::
- 很强的防御特性；
- 以令人满意的速度建立的牢固价值基础；
- 证据表明价值终将回归，不管是一年还是十年。如果是后一种情况，价值可能会更大，约达每股250美元。
Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.
在一年左右的时间，我们以51美元左右的均价成功地获取了Commonwealth约12%的股权。很显然，如果它的股价保持不变会对我们很有利。我们所持股份的价值随着该公司规模的增加而相应增加，特别是当我们成为第二大股东后有了充足的投票权来保证兼并计划实施时。
Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.
Commonwealth
只有大约300个股东，每个月平均大概只有2笔交易。所以你们能够理解为什么我会说股票市场的波动对我们某些投资的股价影响很小了。
Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which railed the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any “Leakage” regarding our portfolio holdings.
但不幸的是，有人也在买，导致了股价升高到65美元，这是我们既不会买也不会卖的价格。极其微小的买盘都会让这支不太活跃股票的价格波动巨大，这就是为什么需要保持我们的投资组合信息不被“泄露”的原因。
Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.
当年下半年，因为我们成功地发现了一个能够以非常有吸引力的价格成为某个公司最大股东的机会，我们就以高出市场价约20%，每股80美元的价格卖出了Commonwealth的股票。
It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.
很明显，我们可以一直持有这只股价为50美元的股票，且可以继续缓慢而耐心的一点一点买入。即使我们将因为这只股票而导致在去年这样的牛市中看起来表现不好，我也会很开心。去年能够在Commonwealth上实现盈利，某种程度上是偶然且幸运的。所以根据我们某一年的表现来预测长期投资成果有很大局限性。但是我坚信投资在这些被低估的证券上，会给我们的长期收益带来很大的确定性。
I might mention that the buyer of the stock at 80 with an intrinsic value 50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.
我应当指出用80美元购买我们所卖出股票的人，将来也会有很好的收益。但是以80美元来购买内在价值为135美元的股票，与以50美元购买内在价值为125美元的股票相比，大有不同。而且对于我来说我们有其他更好的机会去布署这笔资金。这个机会比Commonwealth的机会更大，需要占用我们所有合伙基金总资金的25%。虽然这项投资购买价相对于内在价值的折扣并不比我们其他的投资要大（甚至只比其中一些要大），但是因为我们是第一大股东，这通常会给我们巨大的优势来决定价格回归价值的时间长短。在这项投资中，我们基本可以保证能够在持有期间获得超出道琼斯指数的收益。
THE CURRENT SITUATION
现在的情况
The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.
股票市场价格越高，被低估的股票就越少，也就越难找到足够数量的有吸引力的证券。我也就更倾向于把资金部署到“Workouts”上，但是要找出合适的机会也很困难。
To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.
所以为了扩大这种机会，我试图在某些被低估的证券上，利用获取大股东的地位来创造我自己的“Workouts”。这种策略会印证我之前的预测——在熊市中获得高于平均水平的表现。我希望这种标准是被用来评价我的标尺。你们如果有任何问题，请随时联系我。
WARREN E. BUFFETT
2-11-59