原文信息：
- 标题：2024 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：2025-02-22
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译：和子
- 整理：和子
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东们：
This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.
这封信是伯克希尔年度报告的一部分。作为一家上市公司，我们有义务定期向您披露许多具体的事实和数据。
“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.
然而，“报告”二字蕴含更大的责任。除了法定披露内容，我们还将进一步阐明更多关于您投资的现状以及我们的思考。我们力求以将心比心的方式与您坦诚沟通——如果您是伯克希尔的CEO，而我和我的家人是信任您管理我们积蓄的被动投资者——我们希望您也能这样与我们沟通。
This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”
这种理念促使我们每年都要如实报告您通过伯克希尔股权所间接拥有的众多企业或好或坏的进展。不过，在讨论特定子公司的问题时，我们将恪守60年前汤姆·墨菲给我的建议：“点名表扬，分类批评。”
Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire 错误——是的，伯克希尔也会犯错
Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies.
At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.
还有些时候，我在评估伯克希尔聘用的经理人的能力或忠诚度时会看走眼。忠诚方面的失望带来的伤害可以超过财务影响，痛苦堪比婚姻破裂。
A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.
在人事决策上，我们只能期待有尚可的成功率。最大的错误在于拖延纠正错误，就像查理·芒格说的”吮手指”一样：麻烦不会凭空消失，需要立即行动，不论多么令人不适。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.
2019-2023年间，我在给您的信中使用了16次”错误”或”失误”这样的词。许多其他大公司在这段时间内从未使用过这类字眼。我应该指出，亚马逊在2021年的信中作了一些极为坦率的评论。而其它地方通常都是报喜不报忧。
I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)
我也曾担任过一些大型上市公司的董事，在这些公司的董事会会议或分析师电话会议上，“疏忽”或”错误”都是禁词。这种暗示完美管理的禁忌总是让我感到不安（当然，有时出于潜在法律问题的考虑，减少讨论是明智的——我们生活在一个诉讼频繁的社会中。）
* * * * * * * * * * * *
At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.
在94岁高龄，离格雷格·阿贝尔接替我出任 CEO 并执笔年度信的日子已不远。格雷格认同伯克希尔的信条，即“报告”是伯克希尔 CEO 每年对股东应尽的义务。他也明白，一旦你开始愚弄股东，这些胡言乱语最终也会让自己信以为真，愚弄了自己。
Pete Liegl – One of a Kind 皮特·利格尔——独一无二
Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.
让我暂且打住，先向您讲述皮特·利格尔的非凡故事。这位大多数伯克希尔股东都不熟悉的人为他们的财富增值贡献了数十亿美元。皮特在 11 月去世，享年 80 岁，去世前仍在工作。
I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.
2005 年 6 月 21 日，我第一次听说森林河公司——这家由皮特创立并管理的印第安纳州公司。这天，我收到了一位中间人的来信，详细说明了这家房车（RV）制造商的相关数据。写信人说，森林河公司的 100% 股东皮特特别希望将公司卖给伯克希尔。他还告诉了我皮特希望得到的报价。我喜欢这种坦诚务实的方式。
I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.
我向一些RV经销商做了一些核实，得到了让人满意的反馈，便安排在 6 月 28 日于奥马哈见面。皮特带着他的妻子莎伦和女儿丽莎一起来了。见面时，皮特保证他愿意继续经营这家公司，但如果能够确保家人的财务安全，他会更安心。
Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.
Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)
接下来我们讨论了另一个需要明确的问题。我问皮特他期望的薪酬是多少，并补充说无论他说多少，我都会同意。（我得说明，这不是我会向他人建议普遍采用的方法。）
Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.
皮特停顿了一下，他的妻子、女儿和我都向前倾身。他让我们大吃一惊：“嗯，我看了伯克希尔的委托声明，我不希望挣得比我的老板还多，所以每年给我10万美元就行。“在我从椅子上惊掉下巴、回过神来后，皮特补充说：“不过我们今年会赚 X（他报了一个数字），我希望将超出这个数字的利润的 10% 作为年度奖金。”我回答说：“好的，皮特。但如果森林河公司进行任何重大收购，我们会根据投入的额外资本做出适当调整。”我没有精确定义“适当”或“重大”，但这些模糊的说法从未引发任何问题。
The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.
我们四个人随后在奥马哈的快乐谷俱乐部共进晚餐，从此过上了幸福的生活。在接下来的19年里，皮特表现出色。没有哪位竞争对手能与之匹敌。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m dealing.
But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.
但我也曾在企业潜力以及经理人的能力和忠诚度方面遇到许多令人愉快的惊喜。我们的经验是，一项单一的成功决策随时间的推移可能产生惊人的影响。（想想政府员工保险公司 GEICO 作为商业决策，阿吉特·贾恩作为管理决策，以及我找到查理·芒格这样独一无二的合作伙伴、私人顾问和坚定朋友的幸运。）错误会淡去，而成功将隽永。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!
还有一点，选择CEO时我从不关心候选人上过什么学校。从不！
Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)
固然，有许多出自名校的卓越经理人。但也有很多像皮特这样的人，可能正因就读了一所不太知名的学校乃至干脆不在乎完成学业而受益。看看我的朋友比尔·盖茨——他认定投身一个即将改变世界的爆炸式新兴行业远比留在学校拿可以裱在墙上的一纸文凭重要得多。（读一读他的新书《源代码》。）
Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”
不久前，我通过电话联系了杰西卡·图恩克尔。她的继祖父本·罗森纳在很久以前替查理和我经营过一家公司。本是一位零售天才，我记得他的受教育程度不高。在准备这封信时，我向杰西卡确认了本的学历——杰西卡答复：“本只上到了小学六年级。”
I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture.
我很幸运曾在三所优秀的大学接受教育，并且我笃信终身学习的重要性。然而，我观察到，很大一部分商业才能是与生俱来的，先天远胜于后天培养。
Pete Liegl was a natural.
皮特·利格尔就是天生的人才。
Last Year’s Performance 去年的表现
In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.
在 2024 年，尽管我们 189 家运营子公司中有 53% 的盈利出现了下降，伯克希尔的表现仍比我预期要好。这得益于国库券收益率上升，我们大幅增持了这些高流动性短期证券，从而带来了可预期的投资收入大幅增长。
Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.
我们的保险业务也实现了盈利的大幅增长，主要归功于 GEICO 的出色表现。在过去五年里，托德·库姆斯对 GEICO 进行了重大革新，提高了效率，并使承保实践与时俱进。GEICO 这颗我们长期持有的宝石确实需要重新打磨，托德一直不懈地完成这项工作。2024 年虽未完全大功告成，但业绩改善已十分亮眼。
In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.
总体而言，2024 年财产意外险（“P/C”）的定价有所提高，这反映了对流动风暴造成损失的急剧增加。气候变化或许正在宣告它的到来。然而，2024 年并未发生任何“巨灾”事件。未来某一天，任何一天，都可能发生真正惊人的保险损失——还不能保证一年内只发生一次。
The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter.
财产意外险业务对伯克希尔至关重要，因此值得在本信后面部分中进一步讨论。
Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.
伯克希尔的铁路和公用事业业务——这是我们除保险以外规模最大的两块业务——其总体收益有所改善。然而，两者仍有大量工作要完成。
Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares.
年末，我们将公用事业业务的持股比例从约 92% 提高到 100%，成本约为 39 亿美元，其中 29 亿美元以现金支付，其余以伯克希尔 “B” 类股支付。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.
总体而言，我们在 2024 年实现了运营收益 474 亿美元。我们经常——有些读者可能会抱怨我们没完没了地——强调这个指标，而不是 K-68 页上报告的 GAAP 规定收益。
Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.
我们的指标不包括我们所持有的股票和债券的资本利得或损失，无论是已实现还是未实现的。随着时间推移，我们认为收益极有可能占上风——否则我们为什么要买入这些证券呢？——尽管逐年数字会剧烈无常、难以预测。我们对这类投资承诺的持有期限几乎总是远远超过一年。在很多情况下，我们考虑的问题跨度都是数十年。这些长期投资有时会让收银机响起教堂钟声般的叮当声。
Here’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.
以下是我们眼中 2023-2024 年盈利的构成细目。所有计算均扣除了折旧、摊销和所得税。EBITDA 虽是华尔街偏爱的指标，但由于其缺陷，我们并不采用。
| (in $ millions) | 2024 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Insurance-underwriting | $9,020 | $5,428 |
| Insurance-investment income | 13,670 | 9,567 |
| BNSF | 5,031 | 5,087 |
| Berkshire Hathaway Energy | 3,730 | 2,331 |
| Other controlled businesses | 13,072 | 13,362 |
| Non-controlled businesses* | 1,519 | 1,750 |
| Other** | 1,395 | (175) |
| Operating earnings | $47,437 | $37,350 |
* Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership, such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.
** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and approximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated debt.
* 包括伯克希尔持股比例在20%到50%之间的某些企业，如卡夫亨氏、西方石油和Berkadia。
** 包括我们使用非美元计价债务产生的约11亿美元（2024年）和约2.11亿美元（2023年）的外汇收益。
Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed 惊喜，惊喜！一项重要的美国纪录被打破了
Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.
六十年前，现任管理层接管了伯克希尔。这个决定是一个错误——我的错误——并困扰了我们二十年。我必须强调，查理当即看穿了我所犯的明显错误：尽管我为伯克希尔支付的价格看起来很便宜，但它的业务——一家大型北方纺织企业——正走向消亡。
The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.
偏偏是美国财政部率先收到了关于伯克希尔命运的无声警告。1965 年，公司没有缴纳一分钱所得税，这一尴尬局面在公司持续了十年。这样的经济表现对于光鲜的新创公司或许可以理解，但发生在美国工业的支柱企业身上时，就是亮起了黄灯的警讯。伯克希尔即将崩塌。
Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.
快进 60 年。试想当年那家公司——仍以伯克希尔·哈撒韦的名义运营——缴纳的企业所得税比美国政府从任何公司收到的都要多得多时，财政部会有多惊讶！哪怕是市值达数万亿美元的美国科技巨头，其纳税额也从未达到过这样的水平。
To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)
确切地说，伯克希尔去年向美国国税局缴了四笔税款，总计 268 亿美元。这大约相当于全美企业所得税总额的 5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府和 44 个州缴纳了可观的所得税。）
Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)
请注意，一个促成这一破纪录缴税额的关键因素：在 1965-2024 同一时期，伯克希尔股东只拿过一次现金分红。1967 年 1 月 3 日，我们支付了唯一的一次股息——101755 美元，即每股 A 股 10 美分。（我不记得当初为何向伯克希尔董事会提出这一建议。现在看来这简直像一场噩梦。）
For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than$101 billion … and counting.
六十年来，伯克希尔股东支持公司持续再投资，这使公司不断扩大应税收入。向美国财政部支付的现金所得税在最初十年微不足道，如今累计已超过 1010 亿美元……且仍在持续增长中。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year.
巨大的数字可能并不直观。让我换个说法来描述一下我们去年缴纳的 268 亿美元税款。
If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.
如果伯克希尔在整个2024年——因为 2024 年是闰年，想象366个日日夜夜——每20分钟向财政部寄一张100万美元的支票，那么到了年底我们仍然会欠联邦政府一大笔钱。事实上，要到次年 1 月中旬，财政部才会通知我们可以稍稍歇口气、睡个觉，然后准备缴纳 2025 年的税款。
Where Your Money Is 您的钱在哪里
Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%.
伯克希尔的股权运作是双管齐下的。一方面，我们拥有许多企业的控制权，持有被投资公司至少 80% 的股份。通常情况下，我们的持股比例达到 100%。
These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.
这 189 家子公司与可交易的普通股有相似之处，但远非完全相同。这组合价值数千亿美元，其中包含少数稀有的宝石、许多不错但远非卓越的企业，以及一些表现令人失望的落后者。我们没有持有任何成为主要拖累的业务，但确实有几项是我当初本不该买下的。
In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.
在另一方面，我们也持有十几家规模庞大且利润丰厚的知名企业的一小部分股权，这些公司家喻户晓，例如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪。其中许多公司在其运营所需的净有形权益上取得了极高的回报。截至年底，我们部分所有权的投资组合价值 2720 亿美元。可以理解，真正出色的企业以整体出售的机会很少，但这些明珠的一小部分股份可以在华尔街的周一至周五买到，而且偶尔还能以优惠价格购入。
We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.
我们在选择股权投资方式时一视同仁，会根据何处能最好地运用您（以及我家人）的储蓄来投资上述两种类型的资产。通常情况下，没有什么机会显得特别诱人；极少数情况下，我们会发现自己深陷机会堆中。格雷格已经生动展现了他在这类时刻迅速行动的能力，就像查理所做的那样。
With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.
在可交易股票方面，我的判断失误更容易被纠正。需要强调的是，伯克希尔目前的规模降低了这一宝贵的灵活性。我们已无法说进就进、说退就退。建立或退出一项投资有时需要一年的时间甚至更长。此外，持有少数股权意味着即便需要，我们也无法更换该公司的管理层；就算对其决策不满，我们也无法控制资本流向。
With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.
对于控股子公司，我们虽然可以自行做出上述决策，但在处理错误时的灵活性要小得多。实际上，除非我们认为公司面临无休止的问题，否则伯克希尔几乎从不出售控股型业务。相应地，有些企业所有者正因为我们这种坚定持重的作风而主动找到伯克希尔。这偶尔会成为我们的明显优势。
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Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from 272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.
尽管一些评论人士目前认为伯克希尔持有着异常庞大的现金头寸，但您的绝大部分资金仍然投资于股票，这一偏好不会改变。去年，我们持有的可交易股票总值从 3540 亿美元降至 2720 亿美元，但我们非上市控股股权的价值有所上升，且仍远远高于可交易投资组合的价值。
Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.
伯克希尔的股东可以放心，我们将永远把他们的绝大部分资金投入股票上——主要是美国的股票，尽管其中许多公司具有重要的国际业务。不管是控股还是部分持股，伯克希尔都永远不会将持有现金等价物置于拥有优质企业之上。
Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.
Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.
然而，只要其商品或服务受到国民的需求，企业以及那些拥有特定才能的个人通常都能找到应对货币不稳定的方法。个人技能也是如此。由于我缺乏运动天赋、优美嗓音、医疗或法律技能，或者任何特殊才能，我一生不得不依靠股票投资。实际上，我一直依赖美国企业的成功，并将继续如此。
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One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.
无论如何，要推动社会所需商品和服务产出的持续增长，就需要公民明智——更理想的是富有想象力——地部署储蓄。这种制度被称为资本主义。它有缺点和弊端——在某些方面如今比以往更为严重——但它也能创造出其他经济体制无法比拟的奇迹。
America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.
美国就是最好的例证。在短短 235 年的历史中，我们国家取得的进步，远超 1789 年宪法通过、国家力量释放之际最乐观的殖民者的想象力。
True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.
的确，我们的国家在初期有时会通过向海外借款来补充国内的储蓄。但与此同时，我们也需要许多美国人坚持储蓄，然后需要这些储蓄者或其他美国人将由此产生的资本明智地加以运用。如果美国把自己生产的一切都拿来消费，这个国家将只能原地踏步了。
The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist.
美国的发展过程并非总是美好——我们国家历来不乏恶棍和投机者，企图利用那些错误信任并将积蓄托付给他们的人。但是，尽管存在这些不法行为（直到今天仍大行其道），也尽管有大量资本投入最终因残酷竞争或颠覆性创新而付诸东流，美国人的储蓄依然创造出了任何殖民时期的人都无法企及的产出规模和质量。
From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.
从仅 400 万人口的出发——尽管在早期经历了一场残酷的内战使美国人自相残杀——美国转瞬之间便改变了世界。
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In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.
以非常微小的方式，伯克希尔股东也通过放弃分红、选择再投资而不是消费，参与了美国奇迹之中。最初，这种再投资规模很小，几乎不足为道，但随着时间推移，它呈现出爆炸式增长，反映出持续储蓄文化与长期复利魔力的结合。
Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.
However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.
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So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.
所以，谢谢你，山姆大叔。也希望未来有一天，您在伯克希尔的这些侄儿侄女们能向您支付比 2024 年更大笔的款项。请明智地使用这笔钱。照顾好那些人生中并非因自身过错却抽到了下下签的人。他们值得过上更好的生活。永远不要忘记，我们需要您维持货币稳定，而要做到这一点需要您的智慧与审慎。
Property-Casualty Insurance 财产意外险
P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.
财产意外险业务仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。这个行业所遵循的财务模式在大型企业中很少见——非常少见。
Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.
通常，公司在销售产品或服务之前或同时就会产生劳动力、材料、库存、厂房和设备等成本。因此，公司的 CEO 在出售产品之前就能很好地了解产品的成本。如果售价低于成本，管理者很快就会意识到问题所在——现金大量流失是很难被忽视的。
When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. (We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)
而承保财产意外险时，我们预先收取保费，而很久之后才能知道我们的产品成本是多少——有时真相大白的时刻可能延后 30 年甚至更久。（我们至今仍在为 50 多年前发生的石棉赔付敞口支付巨额赔款）
This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.
这种运营模式的一个理想效果是：在发生大部分费用之前就能为财产意外险公司带来现金，但风险在于：在 CEO 和董事们意识到发生了什么之前，公司可能已经在亏损——有时还是巨额亏损。
Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.
某些险种可以最大限度减少这种错配，比如作物险或冰雹险——这类损失能被快速报告、评估并赔付。然而，其他险种可能会让高管和股东们在公司濒临破产前还洋洋自得。想想医疗事故险或产品责任险。在这些“长尾”险种中，财产意外险公司可能多年——甚至数十年——向所有者和监管机构报告巨额但虚假的利润。如果 CEO 是个盲目乐观者或骗子，这种会计处理尤其危险。这些可能性并非空想：历史中这两类情况均大量存在。
In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.
近几十年来，这种“先收钱，后赔付”的模式使伯克希尔能够投资大量资金（“浮存金”），同时通常实现我们认为较小的承保盈利。我们对“意外”支出进行了估算，而到目前为止，这些估算都足够充分。
We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.
我们不会被经营过程中发生的巨额且不断增长的赔付款吓倒。（在我写这段话时，正想着野火肆虐的情景。）我们的职责就是通过定价覆盖这些风险，并在意外发生时冷静地承担损失。同样，我们的职责还包括对抗“失控”的巨额赔偿判决、虚假诉讼和彻头彻尾的欺诈行为。
Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.
在阿吉特·贾因的领导下，我们的保险业务已从一家默默无闻的奥马哈本地公司发展成为世界级的行业领导者，以对风险的把握和直布罗陀般稳固的财务实力而闻名。此外，格雷格、我们的董事和我本人在伯克希尔中的投资，相对于我们所获得的任何报酬来说都非常巨大。我们不使用期权或其他单方面的薪酬形式；如果您赔钱，我们也赔钱。这种做法鼓励了谨慎，但不能确保未卜先知。
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P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance.
财产意外险的增长依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险——就不需要保险。
Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.
回想135年前，世界上还没有汽车、卡车或飞机。现在仅美国就有3亿辆汽车，这支庞大的车队每天都在造成巨大损失。不断增长的飓风、龙卷风和野火造成的财产损失巨大，其模式和最终成本越来越难以预测。
It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.
为这些保险业务提供十年期保单是愚蠢的——简直是疯狂——但我们相信一年期的风险承担通常是可控的。如果我们改变主意，我们会改变更改所提供的保险条款。在我的一生中，汽车保险公司普遍放弃了年度保单并转向半年期保单。这种改变减少了浮存金，但允许更智能的承保。
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No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.
没有其他私人保险公司愿意承担伯克希尔所能承担的风险。有时，这种优势可能很重要。但当定价不充分时，我们也需要收缩。我们永远不能为了留在游戏中而承保定价不充分的保单，这种政策无疑是自杀。
Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”
正确地为财产意外险定价既是一门艺术，也是一门科学，且绝对不是适合乐观主义者的业务。招募阿吉特的伯克希尔高管迈克·戈德堡说得最好：“我们希望我们的承保人每天都能带着紧张感来上班，但不要被吓倒。”
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All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.
综上所述，我们喜欢财产意外险业务。伯克希尔不管在财务上还是心理上都能毫不眨眼地承受极端损失。我们也不依赖再保险公司，这给了我们实质且持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有出色的经理人（都不是乐观主义者），并且特别善于运用财产意外险业务带来的巨额资金进行投资。
Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.
在过去二十年里，我们的保险业务通过承保获得了 320 亿美元的税后利润，约合每 1 美元销售额税后利润 3.3 美分。同时，我们的浮存金从 460 亿美元增长到了 1710 亿美元。浮存金未来可能会随时间略有增加，并且通过精明的承保（再加上一点运气），有望实现零成本。
Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments 伯克希尔增加日本投资
A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan.
尽管伯克希尔主要专注于美国市场，但也有一个小而重要的例外：我们在日本的投资正不断增长。
It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world.
自伯克希尔开始购买五家日本公司的股票后已过去近六年。这些公司运营方式与伯克希尔颇为相似，且都非常成功。按字母顺序排列，这五家公司分别是：伊藤忠、丸红、三菱、三井和住友。每一家大型公司都拥有大量业务的权益，其中许多业务立足于日本，但也有一些在全球范围内运营。
Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.
伯克希尔于 2019 年 7 月首次买入上述五家公司的股票。我们只是查看了它们的财务记录，就对其股票的低价感到惊讶。随着时间推移，我们对这些公司的欣赏不断增长。格雷格已经多次与他们会面，我也定期关注他们的进展。我们两人都喜欢他们的资本配置、管理层以及他们对待投资者的态度。
Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.
Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10% of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five increase somewhat.
我们对这五家公司的持股着眼于非常长的长期，我们承诺支持他们的董事会。从一开始，我们就同意将伯克希尔的持股保持在每家公司股份的10%以下。从一开始，我们就同意将伯克希尔在每家公司的持股比例保持在 10% 以下。但当我们接近这一上限时，这五家公司同意适度放宽限制。随着时间的推移，您可能会看到伯克希尔对这五家公司的持股比例有所增加。
At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.
截至年底，伯克希尔累计成本（以美元计）为 138 亿美元，我们持股的市值总计 235 亿美元。
Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality. We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.
与此同时，伯克希尔一直在持续增加日元计价的借款——但不是按照任何固定公式进行的。这些借款全都是固定利率，没有“浮动利率”。格雷格和我对未来的外汇汇率没有看法，因此寻求近乎货币中性的头寸。然而，根据 GAAP 规则，我们必须定期在收益中计入我们借入的日元所产生的损益。截止年底，由于美元走强，我们账面上包含了 23 亿美元的税后汇兑收益，其中 2024 年发生约 8.5 亿美元。
I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future.
我预计格雷格和他未来的继任者将持有这一日本仓位数十年之久，而伯克希尔也会在未来找到与这五家公司进行富有成效合作的其他途径。
We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about 135 million.
我们也很满意当前我们的日元平衡策略所展现的数字。截至撰写本文时，预计 2025 年我们日本投资将带来约 8.12 亿美元的年度股息收入，而我们日元计价债务的利息成本约为 1.35 亿美元。
The Annual Gathering in Omaha 奥马哈年度集会
I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.
我希望您能在 5 月 3 日来奥马哈与我们相聚。今年我们的日程安排有所调整，但基本内容保持不变。我们的目标是让您的许多问题得到解答，与朋友欢聚，并在离开时对奥马哈这座城市留下美好的印象。奥马哈整座城市都期待着您的到来。
We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.
和往年一样，将有同一批志愿者为您提供各式各样的伯克希尔产品，让您的钱包变轻、让您的一天变得更美好。照旧，我们将在周五中午至下午 5 点开放售货，届时有可爱的 Squishmallows 毛绒玩具、Fruit of the Loom 内衣、Brooks 跑鞋以及许多其他诱人的商品任您选购。
Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.
同样地，我们今年只会有一本书出售。去年我们推出了《穷查理年鉴》，并一售而空——5,000 本书在周六闭店前就被抢购一空。
This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.
今年我们将推出《伯克希尔·哈撒韦60年》。2015 年，我请凯莉·索瓦尝试编写一部轻松愉快的伯克希尔历史。当时她在众多职责中负责统筹股东大会的大部分活动。我给予了她自由的创作空间，她很快就创作出了一本无论独创性、内容还是设计都让我惊叹的书。
Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.
后来，凯莉离开伯克希尔成家，现在已有三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔办公室的员工都会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队对阵 3A 级别对手的棒球赛。我邀请了一些老同事加入，我们的聚会，凯莉通常也会带着家人一起来。今年聚会上，我厚着脸皮问她是否愿意制作一个 60 周年纪念版特刊，收录查理的照片、语录以及一些少为人知的故事。
Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.
尽管需要照顾三个年幼的孩子，凯莉仍然立刻答应了。所以，我们将在周五下午和周六上午 7 点到下午 4 点各提供 5,000 本新版书籍供销售。
Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.
凯莉拒绝为她在这本新版“查理”特刊上所付出的巨大努力收取任何报酬。我提议由我们俩共同在 20 本书上签名，赠送给每位向位于南奥马哈、服务无家可归成人和儿童的 Stephen Center 捐款 5000 美元的股东。凯泽家族自我的老友、凯莉的祖父比尔·凯泽老先生开始，几十年来一直在资助这个值得敬重的机构。我会等额配捐通过出售这 20 本签名书所筹集的任何善款。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.
贝基·奎克将报道我们周六调整后的大会。贝基对伯克希尔了如指掌，总能安排与经理人、投资者、股东以及偶尔出现的名人的有趣访谈。她和她的 CNBC 团队在向全世界直播我们大会实况和存档大量伯克希尔相关资料方面做得非常出色。要感谢我们的董事史蒂夫·伯克提出了存档的主意。
We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.
今年我们不会播放电影，而是会在早上 8 点稍早开始。我会先做一些开场白，然后我们立即进入问答环节，由贝基和现场观众交替提问。
Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.
格雷格和阿吉特将与我一起回答问题，我们会在上午 10:30 休息半小时。上午 11:00 重新开始时，只有格雷格会与我同台。今年我们将在下午 1:00 结束正式日程，但展览区的商店将开放至下午 4:00。
You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)
您可以在第 16 页找到周末活动的全部详情。尤其请留意周日清晨备受欢迎的 Brooks 跑步活动。（届时我在睡懒觉。）
* * * * * * * * * * * *
My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)
去年我在信中提到过的我聪明又漂亮的姐姐伯蒂将与她的两个同样漂亮的女儿一同出席会议。旁观者一致认为，产生这一炫目成果的基因只在我们家族的女性这边传承。（呜咽。）
Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.
伯蒂今年 91 岁了，我们每周日都会通过老式电话交流。我们谈论老年生活的乐趣，讨论诸如各自手杖优劣这样令人“兴奋”的话题。就我而言，手杖的用途仅限于避免摔个嘴啃泥。
But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have no data to counter her assertion.
不过伯蒂经常巧妙地“压我一头”，宣称她还能享受一项额外好处：她告诉我，当一个女人拄着手杖时，男人就不会再对她“搭讪”了。伯蒂解释说，男人的自尊心使得拄着拐杖的小老太太根本称不上合适的目标。目前，我没有数据来反驳她的说法。
But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will bring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.
不过我表示怀疑。大会期间，我在台上看不太清楚。如果与会者能帮忙留意一下伯蒂，我将不胜感激。让我知道手杖是否真的发挥了作用——我打赌伯蒂身边依然会被男性团团围住。对于达到一定年纪的人来说，这一幕会让人想起《乱世佳人》中郝思嘉周围簇拥着一群男性仰慕者的情景。
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.
伯克希尔的董事们和我都非常高兴您能来奥马哈，我预测您会玩得开心，并可能结交一些新朋友。
February 22, 2025
2025年2月22日
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board 董事长
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 49.5% | 10.0% |
| 1966 | (3.4%) | (11.7%) |
| 1967 | 13.3% | 30.9% |
| 1968 | 77.8% | 11.0% |
| 1969 | 19.4% | (8.4%) |
| 1970 | (4.6%) | 3.9% |
| 1971 | 80.5% | 14.6% |
| 1972 | 8.1% | 18.9% |
| 1973 | (2.5%) | (14.8%) |
| 1974 | (48.7%) | (26.4%) |
| 1975 | 2.5% | 37.2% |
| 1976 | 129.3% | 23.6% |
| 1977 | 46.8% | (7.4%) |
| 1978 | 14.5% | 6.4% |
| 1979 | 102.5% | 18.2% |
| 1980 | 32.8% | 32.3% |
| 1981 | 31.8% | (5.0%) |
| 1982 | 38.4% | 21.4% |
| 1983 | 69.0% | 22.4% |
| 1984 | (2.7%) | 6.1% |
| 1985 | 93.7% | 31.6% |
| 1986 | 14.2% | 18.6% |
| 1987 | 4.6% | 5.1% |
| 1988 | 59.3% | 16.6% |
| 1989 | 84.6% | 31.7% |
| 1990 | (23.1%) | (3.1%) |
| 1991 | 35.6% | 30.5% |
| 1992 | 29.8% | 7.6% |
| 1993 | 38.9% | 10.1% |
| 1994 | 25.0% | 1.3% |
| 1995 | 57.4% | 37.6% |
| 1996 | 6.2% | 23.0% |
| 1997 | 34.9% | 33.4% |
| 1998 | 52.2% | 28.6% |
| 1999 | (19.9%) | 21.0% |
| 2000 | 26.6% | (9.1%) |
| 2001 | 6.5% | (11.9%) |
| 2002 | (3.8%) | (22.1%) |
| 2003 | 15.8% | 28.7% |
| 2004 | 4.3% | 10.9% |
| 2005 | 0.8% | 4.9% |
| 2006 | 24.1% | 15.8% |
| 2007 | 28.7% | 5.5% |
| 2008 | (31.8%) | (37.0%) |
| 2009 | 2.7% | 26.5% |
| 2010 | 21.4% | 15.1% |
| 2011 | (4.7%) | 2.1% |
| 2012 | 16.8% | 16.0% |
| 2013 | 32.7% | 32.4% |
| 2014 | 27.0% | 13.7% |
| 2015 | (12.5%) | 1.4% |
| 2016 | 23.4% | 12.0% |
| 2017 | 21.9% | 21.8% |
| 2018 | 2.8% | (4.4%) |
| 2019 | 11.0% | 31.5% |
| 2020 | 2.4% | 18.4% |
| 2021 | 29.6% | 28.7% |
| 2022 | 4.0% | (18.1%) |
| 2023 | 15.8% | 26.3% |
| 2024 | 25.5% | 25.0% |
| Compounded Annual Gain - 1965-2024 | 19.9% | 10.4% |
| Overall Gain - 1964-2024 | 5,502,284% | 39,054% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.