原文信息：
Charlie Munger - The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway 查理·芒格——伯克希尔·哈撒韦的设计师
Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday.
查理·芒格于2023年11月28日去世，距他百岁生辰仅余33天。
Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him. In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management.
尽管在奥马哈出生并长大，他一生中80%的时间都在其它地方度过。因此，直到1959年，我才第一次遇见他，当时他35岁。1962年，他决定从事资产管理工作。
Three years later he told me — correctly! — that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.
三年后他说，我控股伯克希尔是愚蠢的决定。千真万确！但是，他向我保证，既事已至此，他会告诉我如何纠正错误。
In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.
Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.” With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.
尽管如此，查理在1965年及时地建议我：“沃伦，别再买伯克希尔这样的公司了。不过你现已控制了公司，就用它来以合理价格购买优秀企业，而不是以优秀价格购买合理企业。换句话说，放弃从你的英雄——本·格雷厄姆那里学到的一切吧，它管用，但仅限于小资金。”兜兜转转中，最后我还是听从了他的建议。
Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.
多年后，查理成为我在伯克希尔的合伙人，当我的老毛病又犯时，是查理一再让我恢复理智。直至去世前，他始终扮演着这个角色。最终，我们与那些早期投资我们的人一起，获得了远超查理和我梦想中的好结果。
In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision.
事实上，查理是我们伯克希尔的“设计师”，而我只是“总承包商”——日复一日地执行他的远景规划。
Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never — never — reminded me of my mistake.
查理从未试图以创建者自居，而是让我接受顶礼膜拜、享受赞誉。在某种意义上，他既像我的兄长，又似慈父。即使他清楚自己才是对的，还是将决定权交给我，而当我犯了错误，他却从来、始终不曾埋怨过。
In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.
现实中，人们总将伟大的建筑与其设计师联系在一起，那些浇筑混凝土或安装窗户的人不久则会被遗忘。伯克希尔已然是一家伟大的公司，我虽长期负责施工，查理则将作为设计师永世被铭记。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东们：
Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.
伯克希尔拥有超过300万股东账户。我负责每年写一封信，以便对我们多元和变化的股东群体有所帮助，其中大多数股东们都想对他们的投资多一些了解。
Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.
Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot”stocks).
作家们发现如果能明确自己的目标读者，会有利于写作，可是他们通常又希望粉丝越多越好。我们伯克希尔的目标就简单多了：我们希望把积蓄托付给伯克希尔的投资者不要把股份视为买卖的工具（就像积攒资金为了买农场或物业，而不是拿着闲钱去买彩票或“热门”的股票）。
Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.
多年来，伯克希尔已经吸引了数量庞大的“终身”股东及其继任者。我们珍惜他们的存在，且认为他们有权每年从公司的CEO那里直接听到好消息和坏消息，而不是从投资者关系部门或公关顾问处听那些亘古不变的乐观论调和甜言蜜语。【译注：标粗处对应原文斜体格式的字，表强调。下同。】
In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks,I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.
在描绘**伯克希尔**想要什么样的股东时，我很幸运找到了一个完美的典范——我的妹妹伯蒂。请允许我介绍她。
For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.
对新手来说，伯蒂聪明、睿智，也喜欢挑战我的想法。不过我们从未有过激烈的争吵或者其它让我们关系接近破裂的事情，以后也不会有。
Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.
此外，伯蒂和她三个女儿的大部分积蓄都是伯克希尔的股份，这一拿就是几十年，而且每年伯蒂都会读我写的东西。我的任务就是预测她想了解什么然后给予诚实的回答。
Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news — reading four newspapers daily — but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible — very sensible — instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.
伯蒂跟你们大部分人一样，能看懂很多会计科目，但并不准备去考CPA。她会看财经新闻——每天阅读四份报纸，但并不认为自己是财经专家。她很明智，非常明智，凭直觉就懂得要始终忽略专家们的意见。道理很简单，假设她能预测出谁是明天的赢家，自己会到处去说从而为自己惹来更多竞争对手吗？这就像找黄金的人拿着地图去跟邻居们分享自己发现的金矿在哪。
Bertie understands the power — for good or bad — of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.
伯蒂很清楚激励机制（正面或负面的）的力量和人性的弱点，她也会通过察言看得出来去识别人们的动机。她知道谁在“兜售”，谁值得信任。总之，她并不傻。
So, what would interest Bertie this year?
好了，伯蒂今年对什么感兴趣呢？
Operating Results, Fact and Fiction 经营成果：真实与虚幻
Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information — some important, some trivial.
让我们从数字开始。官方年报从K-1开始整整有124页，载有大量信息：有重要的，也有些无关紧要。
Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.
在这些信息中，很多股东和财经记者会关注K-72页。在那里，他们将能找到众所周知的、加了下划线的“净利润（亏损）”。2021-2023年分别是900亿、负230亿和960亿美元。
What in the world is going on?
到底怎么回事？
You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements … present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company … and the results of its operations … for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 …”
你想从财报中获得有用的信息并得知：“净利润”的核算规则经由严格认证的美国财务会计标准委员会（FASB）颁布，获得敬业勤勉的美国证券交易委员会（SEC）授权，通过了德勤会计师事务所（D&T）世界级的专业人士审计确认。在K-67页，德勤言之凿凿地说：“我们认为，财务报表在所有重要方面都是公允地…反映了公司截至2023年12月31日前三年中每一年的的财务状况…和经营成果…”
So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job — and, legally, they have.
如此神圣却又毫无用处的“净利润”指标，借助互联网和传媒，迅速传遍了世界上的每一个角落。所有参与方都觉得自己圆满完成了本职工作（当然，从法律意义上是说得过去的。）
We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful — but only as a starting point — in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.
然而，我们却觉得浑身不自在。在伯克希尔，我们认为“净利润”得是个实用的概念，伯蒂至少能从中找到点对业务评估（当然这只是评估工作的开始）有用的东西。因此，伯克希尔同时也为伯蒂和你们披露我们称之为“营运利润”的财务指标：2021年为276亿美元，2022年是309亿美元以及2023年的374亿美元。
The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.
强制披露的数字与我们青睐的数字之间主要区别在于后者排除了未实现的资本利得或损失，而其一天的波动有时甚至超过50亿美元。讽刺的是，我们偏爱的几乎就是2018年“改进”前的官方会计披露准则。伽利略几个世纪前的经历告诉我们，不要轻易违背政府高层的命令。但是，在伯克希尔，我们可以坚持自己。【译注：伽利略曾因宣扬哥白尼的“日心说”被教廷压迫，并于1633年被迫签了“悔过书”。】
Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a very important component of Berkshire’s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?
不要误会资本利得的重要性：我预计在未来几十年中，它仍是伯克希尔价值增量中非常重要的组成部分。否则为什么我们要把你们（包括伯蒂）的巨额资金投入到股票投资中去呢？就像在我一直以来的投资生涯中用自有资金所做的。
I can’t remember a period since March 11, 1942 — the date of my first stock purchase — that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.
自从1942年4月11日我第一次买股票以来，我不记得有什么时候自己不是将大部分资产投到股票（美国股票）中。迄今为止，我感觉良好。当我在1942年那个重大的日子“扣动扳机”时，道琼斯工业平均指数跌破了100点，到放学时，我已经损失了5美元左右。不过事情很快出现了转机，现在指数已经徘徊在38000点了。对投资者来说，美国是一个伟大的国家，他们需要做的只是静静地坐着，不要听任何人的意见。
It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”
What We Do 我们做什么
Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.
伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们希望拥有其良好业绩表现是根基牢固、可持续的好生意的全部或一部分。在资本主义制度下，有些生意能够长期繁荣而有些则将是天坑。要想知道未来谁是赢家，谁是输家比你想象中的还要难。但凡那些宣称知晓答案的人通常不是自欺就是在欺人。
At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies — and simply sitting tight — can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can — ugh! — sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.
伯克希尔尤其偏爱那些能够有效运用盈余资金实现高额再投资回报的公司。拥有一家这样的企业，只需安坐不动，就能获得不计其数的财富。哪怕他们的子孙，有时也可以一辈子都过上悠闲的生活。
We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.
我们也希望钟爱的这些生意是由能干且值得信任的人来管理的，但这一点更难判断，毕竟伯克希尔也有让人失望的时候。
In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice — and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.
1863年，美国第一任审计长 Hugh McCulloch曾给所有国有银行写过一封信。他的指示中包含了如下警告：“永远不要抱着可以防止被骗的侥幸心理与无赖打交道。”许多自认为能解决无赖问题的银行家们已经领受到了McCulloch先生的智慧，我也同样如此。人并不容易看透，真诚和同理心是很容易伪装的。跟1863年一样，这是个事实。
This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one — and I missed plenty — another always came along.
兼具上述两种特征的企业一直以来都是我们的收购目标，有段时间存在大量这类潜在标的可供挑选，即使我错过了其中一家，总还有另外一家出现。
Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.
现在这种好日子已经过去了，规模限制了我们，当然竞争对手多了无疑也是事实。
Berkshire now has — by far — the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies — a who’s who of American business — was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)
迄今为止，伯克希尔是GAAP（美国通用会计准则）标准下净资产规模最大的美国企业，得益于创纪录的运营收入和强劲的股价表现，年底这一数字高达5610亿美元。标普500成份股中其它499家企业（美国企业界的名人录）2022年的净资产总额合计是8.9万亿美元。（2023年的数据尚未发布，但大幅超过9.5万亿的概率不大。）
By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).
按照这个标准，伯克希尔占比近6%。想要这庞大的规模再翻一倍，比如在五年内，是不现实的。特别是考虑到我们还强烈反对增发股份（一种快速提高净资产的行为。）
There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.
在美国能有效推动伯克希尔发展的企业已经不多了，而且它们业已经过我们和其他人的反复挑选。有一些我们有能力估值，有些则无能为力。何况即使是我们有能力评估的公司，也得有足够吸引力的价格才行。美国之外，我们基本上也没什么有实质意义的资本配置。总而言之，我们不可能有令人瞠目结舌的表演。
Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.
尽管如此，管理伯克希尔还是一如既往地有趣，我多数时候也能乐在其中。乐观看，伯克希尔经过59年的整合，将旗下部分或100%拥有的众多业务加权计算，我们比美国现存大部分大公司的发展前景都要好一些。依赖运气和勇气，在我们几十个伟大的决策中跑出来了几个超级大赢家。而且我们有一小群长期任职的经理人从来没想过离开，65岁不过是他们又一个生日而已。
Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well — who wouldn’t wish to do so? — our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.
伯克希尔受益于异乎寻常的坚定且清晰的目标。同时我们强调善待员工、社区和供应商（谁不愿意这样做呢？），我们将永远效忠于我们的国家和股东。我们始终不会忘记：虽然你们的钱跟我们的混在一起，但它并不属于我们。
With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire — but it is now.
有鉴于此，同时考虑到我们的业务组合，伯克希尔应该做得比美国企业的平均水平好一点，当然，更重要的是，还应该保持极低的资本永久性损失风险。任何超过“稍好一点”的愿望，都是痴心妄想，当伯蒂重仓伯克希尔的时候，我们还没有如此温和的抱负，但现在理当如此。
Our Not-So-Secret Weapon 我们不太秘密的武器
Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can — and will-unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t happen often — but they will happen.
偶尔，市场和/或经济环境会导致一些质地优良的大型公司的股票或债券出现严重的定价错误。确实，流动性会且仍将会不可预料地收紧甚至突然消失，就像1914年那四个月以及2001年的那几天发生的一样。如果你认为美国现在的投资者已经比过去更成熟稳重了，回想一下2008年9月份发生的事情。自从发明狼烟通讯以来，人类已经取得了长足的进步，现在信息的传播速度和令人惊叹的科技使得全球性的瞬时崩溃更为容易，当然这种瞬时恐慌不会经常出现，但是一定还会发生。
Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.
伯克希尔有巨额资金和确定性的履约能力，能够迅速响应市场失灵，也许可为我们偶尔创造大规模的获利机会。虽然相比早年，股市已经不知道大了多少倍，但今天的活跃参与者跟我读书那会，既没有更稳定的情绪，也没有表现出更好的受教育水平。不管出于什么原因，现在的股市远比我年轻时更像赌场。现在的赌场开在在很多人的家里，每天引诱着那里的住户。
One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street — to use the term in its figurative sense — would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’ juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed — not by everyone but always by someone.
金融领域有个事实永远不应被忘记：华尔街也许愿意看到客户赚钱，但真正给他们自己带来油水的是参与者的狂热。在这种时候，无论卖多么愚蠢的东西都会畅销（即使不是所有人，但总有人会这样做）。
Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.
有时候，场面变得丑陋不堪。政客们被激怒了；大多数明目张胆的犯罪分子带着大笔财富全身而退；而你们隔壁的朋友则只剩下迷茫和贫穷，有时还会变得凶狠，将金钱置于道德之上。
One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been — and will be — rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.
伯克希尔有一条投资原则过去没有，未来也不会变：永远不要出现永久性的资本损失。感谢美国的顺风车和复利的威力，如果你在一生中做了几个好决定，同时避免严重的错误，这个竞技场将一如既往地为我们带来丰厚的回报。
I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced.This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire’s goal will be to function as an asset to the country — just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 — and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.
我相信伯克希尔能够处理前所未有的金融危机，这是我们不愿放弃的能力。当必然会发生的经济问题出现时，伯克希尔的目标是作为国家的资产发挥其应有的功能，就像我们在2008-2009年所贡献的微薄之力一样——去帮助扑灭金融大火，而不是成为那些有意或无意点燃大火的众多公司之一。
Our goal is realistic. Berkshire’s strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and near-paralysis.
我们的目标是现实的，伯克希尔的优势来自于巨额的扣除息税折旧摊销后的多元化业务收入（伯克希尔禁止用“EBITDA（译者注：即未扣除息税折旧摊销的‘利润’）”来衡量收入）。同时我们对现金的需求极低，哪怕国家遭遇长期的全球性经济疲软、恐慌，甚至近乎瘫痪，我们也能安然无恙。
Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.
Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets.We did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.
你们的公司同样持有大量的现金和美国国债，超远传统智慧所认为的必要比例。在08年金融危机时，伯克希尔经营性现金流充裕，无需依赖任何商业票据、银行贷款或债券市场。我们不曾尝试预测何时会发生经济危机，而是时刻准备着。
Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years — indeed in most decades — our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior — akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage — quotational shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided — on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.
极端保守的财务政策是我们向所有加入伯克希尔的合伙人作出的承诺。在大部分年份，实际上是大部分十年期，我们的小心谨慎都很可能被证明是毫无必要的，就像是给一个公认为防火的堡垒买保险一样多余。但是伯克希尔不想给伯蒂以及任何将积蓄托付给我们的人带来永久性的财产损失（长时间的市值缩水是不可避免的）。
Berkshire is built to last.
伯克希尔追求基业长青。
Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable 令人放心的非控股企业
Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions — Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.
American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts.In the past — but definitely not now — both were even mismanaged.
美国运通创始于1850年，可口可乐则于1886发端自亚特兰大的一间药房里。（伯克希尔对新企业兴趣不大。）历史上，两家企业皆尝试过非相关多元化扩张且都收效甚微，也都有过一段时间（明显不是现在）经营不善。
But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.
但它们与时俱进，在主营业务上都取得了巨大的成功。其中最重要的是他们的产品走向了世界，作为核心产品的可乐与运通卡享誉全球。而且液体和可靠的金融信用是人们在这个世界上永远的刚需。
During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke — extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.
整个2023年，我们没有交易一股运通和可口可乐（我们已经像瑞普·凡·温克尔那样安然地睡了20多年）。这两家公司去年都通过增加利润和分红来回报我们的不作为。事实上，我们去年在美国运通上的对应收益已经远远超过了多年前我们购买它时所付出的13亿美元。【译注： Rip Van Winkle是美国作家华盛顿·欧文(Washington Irving)创作的著名短篇小说《瑞普·凡·温克尔》中的主人公，其上山打猎时喝了仙酒，一觉睡了二十年。】
Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 — about 16% in the case of AMEX — and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”
Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependnt. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.
虽然我们去年没有增持这两家公司的股份，但由于伯克希尔进行了股票回购，你们在可口可乐和运通上的间接持股还是有所增加。这样的回购有利于增加你们关于伯克希尔旗下每项资产的持股比例。鉴于一个如此显而易见却又经常被忽略的事实，我再次强调：所有的股票回购都应该考虑价格因素。低于内生价值的回购是明智的，否则就是愚蠢的行为。
The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.
This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.
At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.
年底的时候，伯克希尔持有西方石油27.8%的普通股股份，同时拥有一份期权，给予我们超过五年的时间以固定价格大幅增持其股份的选择权。尽管我们很喜欢西方石油的股份和期权，但无意收购或管理它。我们特别喜欢它在美国的石油和天然气储备，及其在碳捕捉技术创新上的领先地位——虽然这项技术的经济性尚未得到证实，这两项业务都很符合我国的利益。
Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign — potentially unstable — suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.
就在不久以前，美国还在高度依赖海外石油资源，碳捕捉也没什么支持者。实际上，1975年的时候，美国的石油产量仅800万日均桶油当量（BOEPD），远低于全国需求水平。受益于二战期间的国防动员，美国曾一度占据了有利的能源地位，最后却落到严重依赖国外不稳定供应体系的地步。人们预测本土石油供应量将进一步下降，同时伴随着的则是未来需求量的持续增长。
For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate — though not come close to eliminating — this erosion of American self-sufficiency.
有很长一段时间，随着产量进一步下探到2007年500万桶日均桶油当量，悲观的论调似乎被证明是正确的。与此同时，美国政府自1975年开启了战略石油储备（SPR）以缓解（尽管不能完全消除）日益下滑的自给率。
And then — Hallelujah! — shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very — very — nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.
结果在2011年，感谢上帝！页岩气开采具备了经济性，一举解决了我们的能源依存度问题。现在美国石油产量已经超过1300万桶日均桶油当量，已不再受制于OPEC。西方石油一家的本土石油年产量每年都接近SPR的总库存。而假如国内产量现在还维持在500万桶，我国会深陷焦虑，因为那就意味着我们要严重依赖非美能源供应，一旦海外石油供应不上，SPR库存将在数月内清空。
Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.
在维奇·霍卢布的领导下，西方石油正在做着有利于国家和股东的正确事情。没人知道油价下个月、下一年或是下个十年会到多少，但维奇知道如何从岩石中分离石油，这是一项了不起的才能，造福着股东们和她的国家。
Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.
Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.
伯克希尔现在分别持有这五家公司约9%的股份（小提示：日本企业计算流通股的方式与美国不同。）同时承诺未来对每家公司的持股上限都不会超过9.9%。我们五家的总成本是1.6万亿日元，去年底他们的总市值为2.9万亿日元。然而由于日元近年来持续走软，换算成美元去年底我们实现的收益则只有61%或80亿美元。
Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.
格雷格和我都不相信自己能预测主要货币的市场价格，我们也不相信能雇佣到具备此能力的人。因此我们大部分收购资金来源于发行的1.3万亿日元债，这批债券在日本很受欢迎，我觉得我们应该是持有以日元计价的债务规模最大的美国公司。截至2023年底，根据GAAP规则，日元贬值累计为我们带来了19亿美元的收益，并已在2020-23年间按期确认为收入。
In certain important ways, all five companies — Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo — follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.
Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States.Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1/3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.
同时，五家管理层对他们自己薪水的要求远没有美国企业惯有的那样激进。还需注意，他们每家都只将约1/3的净利润用于分红，剩下大笔资金则用于强化他们众多业务的竞争力，以及小部分用于回购。跟伯克希尔一样，他们也不喜欢增发股票。
An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.
这项投资另外一个好处是我们有机会在全球范围内与这五家管理良好、受人尊敬的大企业合作，他们的业务范围远比我们广泛。从他们的角度看，这些日本的CEO们也欣喜地看到伯克希尔将持续拥有巨量的流动性资源，无论什么规模的合作项目，我们都可以立即响应。
Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly”prices.The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.
我们是2019年7月4日开始购买日本股票的，考虑到伯克希尔目前的体量，通过公开市场建仓需要很大的耐心和较长的时间才能等到好价格，这个过程就像是战舰转弯，这是我们早期没有遇到过的重大劣势。
The Scorecard in 2023 2023年的成绩单
Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
我们每季度都会发布类似下面格式的经营性利润（或损失）摘要。以下是全年汇总：
| (in $ millions) | 2023 | 2022 |
|---|---|---|
| Insurance-underwriting | $ 5,428 | $ (30) |
| Insurance-investment income | 9,567 | 6,484 |
| Railroad | 5,087 | 5,946 |
| Utilities and energy | 2,331 | 3,904 |
| Other businesses and miscellaneous items | 14,937 | 14,549 |
| Operating earnings | $ 37,350 | $ 30,853 |
At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.
在2023年5月6日的股东会上，我展示了当天凌晨发布的一季报并对全年进行了展望。
(1) 2023年大部分非保险业务业绩将面临下滑风险；
(3) 投资收益将确定性大幅增长。因为我们持有的巨额美国国债将开始兑付远超往年的收益。
(4) 保险业务应该会有好的表现。因为承包收益与宏观经济表现关系不大，另外，财险价格业有所提高。
Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.
回过头看，保险业务符合预期。但是在判断BNSF和BHE上却犯了错误。让我们来看看到底什么回事？
Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way — measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity — of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
铁路对美国经济的未来至关重要。从成本，燃料消耗和碳排放强度看，铁路无疑是重型货物远距离运输的最有效方式。卡车在短途运输中更方便，但在我国很多商品必须经过大几百甚至几千英里才能送达客户。国家运转离不开铁路，而且这是个资本密集型的行业。实际上，相比大部分行业，铁路行业简直就是钱堆出来的。
BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.
作为北美覆盖北美六大铁路系统中最大的一家，BNSF拥有23759英里干线，99条隧道，13495座桥梁，7521台机车。资产负债表上显示各类固定资产总共有700亿美元。但我预计重置以上资产至少需要5000亿美元和数十年的时间。
BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries.
BNSF每年仅仅维持当前的业务水平，所花费的资本开支就要超过折旧。无论投什么行业，对股东来说这都不是好消息，何况还是资金密集型的行业。
At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $1.5 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.
自14年前收购以来，BNSF超过GAAP标准折旧费用的额外资本开支已累计达到惊人的220亿美元，即每年超过15亿美元。唉！这就意味着BNSF支付给其所有者——伯克希尔的股息将一直远远低于其公告的净利润，除非我们提高铁路公司的债务规模，但这又是我们不想做的。
Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.
从结果来看，相对于收购价格，BNSF的回报还是可以接受的，尽管低于当初预期且资产重置价值也不高，但我和伯克希尔董事会并不觉得意外。这也解释了为什么2010年我们买下它时只付出了其重置价值的一小部分代价。
North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls.Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.
北美的铁路系统每天运送着大量煤炭、谷物、汽车和进出口商品等货物。单程长距离运输常给回程带来收益问题；经常性的极端天气影响铁轨、桥梁和设备的使用；洪水更是可能成为一场噩梦，所有这些都不会令我们惊讶。当我坐在一如既往舒适的办公室时，铁路系统的许许多多员工却需要在户外令人难受，有时还带有危险的环境下工作。
An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.
有个日益严峻的问题是越来越多美国人不愿意在铁路系统这种艰苦还经常会感到孤独的环境中工作。另外工程师们还要面对这样一个事实：3.35亿美国人口中，有些绝望或患有精神障碍的人会选择在100车编组的火车前卧轨自杀，而特别重的列车根本没办法在1英里内停下来。你愿意成为这个无助的工程师吗？这种心理创伤会让我们永远挥之不去，而它在北美大概每天发生一次，在欧洲就更频繁了。
Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.
铁路行业的工资谈判可能最终落在总统和国会手里。此外，美国的铁路还要求每天承运大量我们避之不及的危险物品，“公共承运人”这个词恰恰定义了该责任。
Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
由于收入下降，去年BNSF的净利润超预期下滑。虽然燃料成本也在下降，但美国政府要求的工资增长幅度远超通胀水平，这种差别在未来的谈判中可能还会发生。
Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase.I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.
尽管运送了更多的货物，但由于在资本开支上比其它五大北美铁路公司任何一家都要高，BNSF的净利率相比他们五家有所下滑。不过我相信鉴于我们独一无二的广泛服务范围，相对利润率理应能提高。
I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.
对于BNSF为国家做出的贡献，以及为了保证美国商业动脉畅通，零度以下冬天还奋斗在北达科他州户外的人们，我感到由衷的自豪。在运行有序时，人们不大会注意到铁路的存在，然而一旦出了问题，全国各地的人立即就会发现它的不可或缺。
A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire.You can count on that.
相信在一个世纪以后，BNSF仍将是我们这个国家和伯克希尔的主要资产，你大可放心。
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Most of its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected.But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
我们第二个业绩不及预期且更令人失望的公司是BHE。公司旗下大部分地区的大型电力和燃气管网业务的表现都符合预期，但少数州的监管环境却可能导致业务不赚钱甚至破产（这在加州最大的公用事业公司身上已成为现实，夏威夷州也面临危险）。公用事业曾被誉为美国最稳定的行业，在当前监管环境中，却连利润和资产价值都难以预测。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，由于各州承诺给于固定比例的净资产回报（有时还额外奖励超常表现），电力公司为业务发展募集到了巨额资金。通过这种方式，人们进行了大量投资，以满足未来若干年可能产生的电力需求。这些超前的项目也侧面反应了这样一个事实：电力公司建设发电和输变电项目经常要很多年时间才能完工。BHE在西部建设的大型跨州输电工程是2006年开工的，且仍需数年才能建成。最终，它将服务于十个州，占美国大陆面积的30%。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactory-return pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
受益于公私电力系统并存的模式，即使伴随人口增长和工业需求超预期的增加，电灯始终亮着。无论是监管当局、投资者还是公众，似乎都具备了“安全边际”。然而现在，固定但令人满意的资本回报合约在少数州被撕毁，投资者们担心这一行为会进一步蔓延，气候变化更增加了他们的忧虑。地下输电也许能排上用场，但在几十年前，谁愿意如此昂贵的建设成本买单呢？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased — and will likely continue to increase — if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们已经对已经发生的损失做了充分的估计，这些损失由森林火灾导致。相比以前，火灾发生的频率和强度都上升了，如果雷暴变得更频繁，可能还会继续上升。【译注：convective storm对流风暴，国内称为雷暴，是一种常伴有雷电的强对流天气。】
It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
我们需要很多年才能最终确认森林火灾带来的损失，并据此更明智地评估未来在脆弱的西部州投资的可行性。至于监管环境在其它地方是否会发生变化还有待观察。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其它电力公司恐将面临像太平洋燃气与电力公司以及夏威夷电力公司那样的生存问题。没收资产的处理方式显然对BHE不利，但不管是它还是伯克希尔都善于在意外中生存。我们的保险业务就经常跟意外打交道，毕竟它的基础商品就是承担风险，当然其它业务也会有意外。伯克希尔可以承受财务上的意外，但绝不会故意花冤枉钱。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
不管发生哪种情况，电力行业的最终结局可能都会不妙。某些公用事业对美国居民储蓄应该不再具备吸引力了，并将被迫转入公共电力模式。内布拉斯加在1930年代做出了这个选择，全国各地也有很多公共电力系统在运营。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定该选择哪个模式。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当一切尘埃落定，美国的电力需求和随之而来的资本支出将是惊人的。我没有预料到甚至没考虑过监管调整对发展的不利影响，我和BHE的两位合伙人为此付出了高昂的代价。
Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume — from $17 million to $83 billion — we have much room to grow.
问题说得够多了。我们的保险业务去年表现得特别好，销售收入、浮存金和承包利润都创出了新高。财险业务（P/C）是我们繁荣和增长的核心，我们从事这项业务已经57年了，尽管销量从1700万到830亿美元已经增长了近5000倍，未来还是有很大的空间。
Beyond that, we have learned — too often, painfully — a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.
除此之外，我们频繁地从痛苦中学到了：什么样的保险业务和什么样的人是我们要远离的。最重要的教训是我们的保险从业者可以是瘦的、胖的、男的、女的、年轻的、年长的、外国的或本国的，但他们无论生活质量有多高，都不能是坐在办公室里的乐观主义者。
Surprises in the P/C business — which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired — are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation — both monetary and the “legal”variety — is a wild card.
财险行业的意外总是负面的，它可以发生在半年或一年合约到期后的几十年后。该行业的会计准则就是针对这一现实而设计的，然而估算误差可能会相当大。如果遇到当江湖骗子，甄别工作经常会费时费钱。伯克希尔将继续试图准确评估未来可能发生的赔付金额，但通胀（货币的和“法律”的）是个未知数。
I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day — aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end — I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
保险业务我已经讲过太多次，新进股东可以直接看年报第18页。这里我想强调的是，如果阿吉特贾因没有在1986年加入伯克希尔，我们不可能取得今天的地位。在那个幸运日到来之前（除了在1951年开始与盖可保险走上难以置信且永远美妙的旅程），我基本都是在荒野中徘徊，争取建立自己的保险事业。
Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.
Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.
伯蒂，你可以为自己拥有如此出色的财险业务的一部分而自豪，它的业务遍及全球，拥有无与伦比的资金实力、声誉和人才，它在2023年大放异彩。
What is it with Omaha? 奥马哈有什么？
Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper.
欢迎参加2024年5月4日举办的伯克希尔年度股东大会。你们将在舞台上看到三位经理人，他们负责管理你们的公司。你们或许想知道他们有什么共同之处，当然长相肯定不一样，让我们深入了解一下：
Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire — and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow — was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.
格雷格·阿贝尔，出生在加拿大（仍在玩曲棍球），现负责运营伯克希尔旗下所有非保险业务，从各方面来说，他已准备好接任伯克希尔下一任CEO。在上世纪90年代，格雷格曾在奥马哈离我仅几街区的地方住过6年。当然，那段时间我从没见过他。
A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).
大约在那十年前，阿吉特·贾因（他在印度出生、长大并接受教育）一家人也住在奥马哈，就在离我家（自1958年起我住那）大约一英里远的地方。他和他妻子廷库都有很多奥马哈的朋友。当然，这是三十多年前的事情了，后来他们搬去了纽约（那里是再保险业务的重地）
Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
缺席这个舞台的只有查理，他和我都出生在奥马哈，离咱们五月的聚会地点两英里远。他头十年住在距离伯克希尔长期以来的办公地点约半英里的地方。我们早年都在奥马哈公立学校就读，奥马哈的童年给我们带来了不可磨灭的影响，然而很久以后我们才认识。
（一个也许让你吃惊的脚注：查理一生经历了美国45位总统中的15位。有人说拜登是第46位总统，但这个数字将格罗弗·克利夫兰算作第22和第24名，因其任期不连续。美国是一个非常年轻的国家。）
Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.
回到公司层面，伯克希尔于1970年从待了81年的新英格兰搬到了奥马哈，把麻烦丢掉后，在新家蓬勃发展
As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie — yes that Bertie — spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.
作为“奥马哈效应”的最后一个例证是：伯蒂，是的，就是那个伯蒂，成长于奥马哈的一个中产阶级社区，几十年以后，成为我们国家最伟大的投资者之一。
You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1/3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
你也许会以为她一开始就把所有钱都投了伯克希尔，然后就只是坐等收获，但这不是事实。自从1956年组建家庭后，她在理财方面折腾了20年：持有债券、1/3投共同基金以及较为频繁地交易股票。她的潜力仍然未被发掘。
Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts(think nine figures).
然而在1980年，当她46岁时，与她哥哥的催促无关，伯蒂决定做出改变：仅保留共同基金和伯克希尔。在接下来的43年里，她没有做过任何一笔新的交易。在这期间，她变得非常富有，即使是进行了大额（猜是9位数）慈善捐赠后。
Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances,Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
数百万美国投资者本可以都像她一样：回归理性，仅仅运用她小时候在奥马哈学到的常识来投资。另外谨慎起见，伯蒂每年五月都会回到奥马哈来重新充电。
So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?
所以到底是什么原因呢？是奥马哈的水吗？奥马哈的空气吗？还是发生了某种奇怪的行星现象，类似于牙买加出短跑运动员、肯尼亚出马拉松运动员或俄罗斯出国际象棋高手？难道一定要等到哪天AI来解开这个谜团吗？
Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.
保持开放的意识。五月来奥马哈吧！呼吸这里的空气，喝喝这里的水，然后向伯蒂和她三位漂亮的女儿打声招呼。谁知道呢，又没什么坏处，而且无论如何，你都会度过一段美好的时光，遇见一大群友好的人。
To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.
更重要的是，我们将推出第四版《穷查理宝典》。带回去一本，查理的智慧将会改善你的生活，正如我这样。
February 24, 2024
Warren E.Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| 2020 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| 2021 | 29.6 | 28.7 |
| 2022 | 4.0 | (18.1) |
| 2023 | 15.8 | 26.3 |
| Compounded Annual Gain - 1965-2023 | 19.8% | 10.20% |
| Overall Gain - 1964-2023 | 4,384,748% | 31,223% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.