原文信息：
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| 2020 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2020 | 20.0% | 10.2% |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2020 | 2,810,526% | 23,454% |
Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔哈撒韦有限公司的股东：
Berkshire earned 21.9 billion of operating earnings, 26.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold and, finally, an $11 billion loss from a write-down in the value of a few subsidiary and affiliate businesses that we own. All items are stated on an after-tax basis.
依据通用会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔在2020年的利润为425亿美元，这425亿美元的利润由以下四个部分组成：
- 219亿美元的营业利润。
- 49亿美元的已实现投资收益。
- 267亿美元的未实现投资收益，来自我们所持有股票的净投资收益的增长。
- 最后，110亿美元的减值来自我们拥有的一些子公司和附属企业。
以上均为税后数据。
Operating earnings are what count most, even during periods when they are not the largest item in our GAAP total. Our focus at Berkshire is both to increase this segment of our income and to acquire large and favorably-situated businesses. Last year, however, we met neither goal: Berkshire made no sizable acquisitions and operating earnings fell 9%. We did, though, increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by both retaining earnings and repurchasing about 5% of our shares.
在有些年份，以通用会计准则列示，即使营业利润并不是四个部分中金额最大的，但它依然是我们最看重的部分。我们在伯克希尔的重点有两个，一是增加我们旗下企业的收入，二是收购大型的、我们喜欢的生意。但去年，我们两个目标都没有实现：伯克希尔没有进行大规模收购，同时营业利润下降了9%。不过，通过保留盈余和回购约5%的股票，我们确实提高了伯克希尔的每股内在价值。
The two GAAP components pertaining to capital gains or losses (whether realized or unrealized) fluctuate capriciously from year to year, reflecting swings in the stock market. Whatever today’s figures, Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I firmly believe that, over time, Berkshire’s capital gains from its investment holdings will be substantial.
和通用会计准则相关的两个部分，无论是已实现的还是未实现的投资收益或损失，每年都在我们账面上反复变动，这反映了股票市场的波动。无论今天的数据是什么，我和我的长期合作伙伴查理·芒格都坚信，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的投资收益将是可观的。
As I’ve emphasized many times, Charlie and I view Berkshire’s holdings of marketable stocks — at yearend worth $281 billion — as a collection of businesses. We don’t control the operations of those companies, but we do share proportionately in their long-term prosperity. From an accounting standpoint, however, our portion of their earnings is not included in Berkshire’s income. Instead, only what these investees pay us in dividends is recorded on our books. Under GAAP, the huge sums that investees retain on our behalf become invisible.
正如我多次强调的那样，查理和我把伯克希尔在年底持有的价值2,810亿美元的上市公司股票视为一系列生意。我们并不控制这些公司的运营，但我们确实按比例分享了它们的长期繁荣。然而，从会计的角度来看，我们所占的利润份额并不包含在伯克希尔的收入中。相反，只有当我们投资的这些公司给我们派息时，这些股息才会被记录在我们的报表中。在通用会计准则的规定之下，那些我们投资的公司替我们保留的巨额收益变成了一种隐形的收益。
What’s out of sight, however, should not be out of mind: Those unrecorded retained earnings are usually building value — lots of value — for Berkshire. Investees use the withheld funds to expand their business, make acquisitions, pay off debt and, often, to repurchase their stock (an act that increases our share of their future earnings). As we pointed out in these pages last year, retained earnings have propelled American business throughout our country’s history. What worked for Carnegie and Rockefeller has, over the years, worked its magic for millions of shareholders as well.
然而，眼虽不见，但心中不忘，那些未被我们记录的留存收益通常正在为伯克希尔创造价值——很多的价值。我们投资的公司使用那些留存的收益扩张业务、进行收购、偿还债务，通常还会回购股票（这一行为增加了我们在他们未来收益中所占的份额）。正如去年我们讨论这个问题时指出的那样，纵观美国历史，留存收益推动了美国企业的发展。多年来，对卡内基和洛克菲勒起作用的方法，对数百万股东同样在起着魔法般的作用。
Of course, some of our investees will disappoint, adding little, if anything, to the value of their company by retaining earnings. But others will over-deliver, a few spectacularly. In aggregate, we expect our share of the huge pile of earnings retained by Berkshire’s non-controlled businesses (what others would label our equity portfolio) to eventually deliver us an equal or greater amount of capital gains. Over our 56-year tenure, that expectation has been met.
当然，我们投资的一些公司也有让人失望的情况，他们使用留存收益的做法几乎没有增加公司的价值。但也有其他一些公司会超额完成任务，其中少数公司表现出色。总而言之，我们期望伯克希尔在非控股业务（别人会认为是我们的股票投资组合）中留存的巨额收益，最终会给我们带来等量或更多的投资回报。在我们长达56年的投资生涯中，这一期望得到了满足。
The final component in our GAAP figure — that ugly $11 billion write-down — is almost entirely the quantification of a mistake I made in 2016. That year, Berkshire purchased Precision Castparts (“PCC”), and I paid too much for the company.
按照通用会计准则编制的报表数据中的最后一个部分是，令人难堪的那110亿美元的巨额减值，这110亿美元的减值几乎全部是我2016年犯的一个错误的数量化结果。那一年，伯克希尔收购了精密铸件公司（PCC），我为这家公司花了太多钱。
No one misled me in any way — I was simply too optimistic about PCC’s normalized profit potential. Last year, my miscalculation was laid bare by adverse developments throughout the aerospace industry, PCC’s most important source of customers.
In purchasing PCC, Berkshire bought a fine company — the best in its business. Mark Donegan, PCC’s CEO, is a passionate manager who consistently pours the same energy into the business that he did before we purchased it. We are lucky to have him running things.
I believe I was right in concluding that PCC would, over time, earn good returns on the net tangible assets deployed in its operations. I was wrong, however, in judging the average amount of future earnings and, consequently, wrong in my calculation of the proper price to pay for the business.
我认为我对精密铸件公司的以下结论是正确的：随着时间的推移，精密铸件公司会从它所部署的净有形资产上获得良好的回报。然而，我对精密铸件公司未来平均收益的判断是错误的，因此，我也就错误地计算了为企业支付的合理价格。
PCC is far from my first error of that sort. But it’s a big one.
精密铸件公司不是我第一次犯这样的错误，但这是一个大错误。
Two Strings to Our Bow 我们弓上的两根弦
Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire — but only in part. To understand how and why we differ from the prototype conglomerate, let’s review a little history.
伯克希尔经常被贴上“大型企业集团”的标签，这是一个贬义词，指的是拥有大量五花八门的、不相关业务的控股公司。是的，这是对伯克希尔的描述，但只是部分描述。为了理解我们如何以及为什么与传统的大型企业集团不同，让我们回顾一下历史。
Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. That was not a great pond in which to fish.
长期以来，大型企业集团通常会局限于100%收购其他企业。然而，这一战略带来了两个主要问题，第一个问题是无法解决的，就是大多数真正伟大的企业都无意让任何人收购它们。因此，渴望收购的大型企业集团不得不专注于那些缺乏强大和持久竞争优势的一般公司。那不是一个钓鱼的好池塘。
Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. (“I’ll pay you 5,000 cats.”)
除此之外，当大型企业集团陷入这个由普通公司组成的领域时，他们常常发现自己需要支付惊人的控制权溢价，以诱捕他们的猎物。有抱负的大型企业集团知道如何解决这个溢价支付的问题，他们只需要将自己公司的股价抬到极度高估的价格，以此作为昂贵收购的支付对价就可以了。（我会把我的两只价值5000美元的猫送给你，作价1万美元买下你的狗。）
Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.
通常情况下，促进大型企业集团股票估值过高的手段，包括促销手段和富有想象力的会计操作，这些手段非常具有迷惑性，有时甚至会越界成为欺诈行为。当这些招数成功时，这家大型企业集团将自己的股价推高到商业价值的三倍，以便给计划收购的目标公司提供两倍于其合理价格的报价。
Investing illusions can continue for a surprisingly long time. Wall Street loves the fees that deal-making generates, and the press loves the stories that colorful promoters provide. At a point, also, the soaring price of a promoted stock can itself become the “proof” that an illusion is reality.
投资幻想可以持续相当长的时间。华尔街喜欢交易产生的费用，而媒体则喜欢那些各式各样的推销者提供的故事。在某种程度上，一支股票飙升的股价本身也是幻想变成现实的证明。
Eventually, of course, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.
当然，最终派对结束时，许多“商业皇帝”被发现没有穿衣服。金融史上充满了著名的大型企业集团家的名字，他们最初被记者、分析师和投资银行家奉为商业天才，但他们运作的企业最终却成了垃圾企业堆放场。
Conglomerates earned their terrible reputation.
大型企业集团最终赢得了糟糕的名声。
Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us.
It took me a while to wise up. But Charlie — and also my 20-year struggle with the textile operation I inherited at Berkshire — finally convinced me that owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.
我花了很长时间才明白这个道理。但查理，加上我在伯克希尔公司接手纺织业务后20年的艰辛经历，最终让我相信，和100%控股一家收益微薄的企业相比，拥有一家出色企业的非控股股权更有利可图，更令人愉快，而且工作量也少得多。
For those reasons, our conglomerate will remain a collection of controlled and non-controlled businesses. Charlie and I will simply deploy your capital into whatever we believe makes the most sense, based on a company’s durable competitive strengths, the capabilities and character of its management, and price.
If that strategy requires little or no effort on our part, so much the better. In contrast to the scoring system utilized in diving competitions, you are awarded no points in business endeavors for “degree of difficulty.” Furthermore, as Ronald Reagan cautioned: “It’s said that hard work never killed anyone, but I say why take the chance?”
如果这一战略的实施只需要我们付出极少的努力，或者根本不需要我们付出努力，那就更好了。与跳水比赛中使用的计分规则不同，你在商业活动中不因难度系数高而得分。此外，正如罗纳德·里根所警告的：有人说努力工作不会要命，但我要说，为什么要冒这个险呢？
The Family Jewels and How We Increase Your Share of These Gems 家族珍宝以及我们如何增加你的珍宝份额
On page A-1 we list Berkshire’s subsidiaries, a smorgasbord of businesses employing 360,000 at yearend. You can read much more about these controlled operations in the 10-K that fills the back part of this report. Our major positions in companies that we partly own and don’t control are listed on page 7 of this letter. That portfolio of businesses, too, is large and diverse.
在A-1页，我们列出了伯克希尔的子公司，年底这些各具特色的企业雇佣了36万名员工。你可以在本报告后面的10-K文件中阅读更多关于这些控制类公司的信息。我们在我们部分拥有但不具有控制权的公司中的主要头寸列在这封信的第7页，这个投资组合也非常庞大和多样化。
Most of Berkshire’s value, however, resides in four businesses, three controlled and one in which we have only a 5.4% interest. All four are jewels.
然而，伯克希尔的大部分价值存在于四类生意中，其中三类为控制类生意，另外一类是我们仅持有5.4%股权的非控制类生意。四类都是珍宝。
The largest in value is our property/casualty insurance operation, which for 53 years has been the core of Berkshire. Our family of insurers is unique in the insurance field. So, too, is its manager, Ajit Jain, who joined Berkshire in 1986.
Overall, the insurance fleet operates with far more capital than is deployed by any of its competitors worldwide. That financial strength, coupled with the huge flow of cash Berkshire annually receives from its non-insurance businesses, allows our insurance companies to safely follow an equity-heavy investment strategy not feasible for the overwhelming majority of insurers. Those competitors, for both regulatory and credit-rating reasons, must focus on bonds.
总的来说，保险舰队运营的资金规模远远超过任何一家全球竞争对手。如此的财务实力，加上伯克希尔每年从其非保险业务中获得的巨额现金流，使得我们的保险公司能够安全地执行股权重仓投资策略，这对绝大多数保险公司来说是不可行的。出于监管和信用评级的原因，这些竞争对手必须把重点放在债券上。
And bonds are no t the place to be these days. Can you believe that the income recently available from a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond — the yield was 0.93% at yearend — had fallen 94% from the 15.8% yield available in September 1981? In certain large and important countries, such as Germany and Japan, investors earn a negative return on trillions of dollars of sovereign debt. Fixed-income investors worldwide — whether pension funds, insurance companies or retirees — face a bleak future.
如今债券不是好的投资标的。最近的10年期美国国债的年底收益率是0.93%，比1981年9月15.8%的收益率下降了94%，你能相信吗？在某些重要的大国，如德国和日本，投资者在数万亿美元的主权债券上获得的是负回报。全球的固定收益投资者，无论是养老基金、保险公司还是退休基金，都面临着暗淡的未来。
Some insurers, as well as other bond investors, may try to juice the pathetic returns now available by shifting their purchases to obligations backed by shaky borrowers. Risky loans, however, are not the answer to inadequate interest rates. Three decades ago, the once-mighty savings and loan industry destroyed itself, partly by ignoring that maxim.
一些保险公司，同样也是其他债券投资者，可能会试图转向购买那些由不可靠的借款人负责偿还的债券，以期获得比当前可怜的回报更高一些的收益。然而，高风险贷款并不是解决利率低下、回报不足问题的办法。30年前，一度强大的储蓄和贷款行业把自己毁了，部分原因是忽视了这条箴言。
Berkshire now enjoys $138 billion of insurance “float” — funds that do not belong to us, but are nevertheless ours to deploy, whether in bonds, stocks or cash equivalents such as U.S. Treasury bills. Float has some similarities to bank deposits: cash flows in and out daily to insurers, with the total they hold changing very little. The massive sum held by Berkshire is likely to remain near its present level for many years and, on a cumulative basis, has been costless to us. That happy result, of course, could change — but, over time, I like our odds.
伯克希尔现在拥有1380亿美元的保险浮存金，这些资金不属于我们，但我们可以将这些浮存金投资于债券、股票或者美国国债这样的现金等价物。浮存金与银行存款有一些相似之处，保险公司每天都有现金进进出出，但保险公司持有的现金总额变化很小。伯克希尔持有的巨额资金很可能会在未来许多年保持在当前的水平，从多年累积结果看，使用这些资金对我们来说是没有成本的。当然，这个令人高兴的零成本结果可能会改变，但随着时间的推移，我喜欢我们的赔率。
I have repetitiously — some might say endlessly — explained our insurance operation in my annual letters to you. Therefore, I will this year ask new shareholders who wish to learn more about our insurance business and “float” to read the pertinent section of the 2019 report, reprinted on page A-2. It’s important that you understand the risks, as well as the opportunities, existing in our insurance activities.
在我每年给大家写的信中，我已经重复——有些人可能会说没完没了——解释了我们的保险业务。因此，今年我请希望更多了解我们保险业务和浮存金的新股东阅读2019年报告的相关部分，重印在A-2页。重点是你要了解我们投保活动所存在的风险和机会。
Our second and third most valuable assets — it’s pretty much a toss-up at this point — are Berkshire’s 100% ownership of BNSF, America’s largest railroad measured by freight volume, and our 5.4% ownership of Apple. And in the fourth spot is our 91% ownership of Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”). What we have here is a very unusual utility business, whose annual earnings have grown from 3.4 billion during our 21 years of ownership.
我们第二大和第三大最有价值的资产——现在还很难定论哪个是第二哪个是第三——是伯克希尔100%拥有的、美国运输量最大的北伯林顿铁路公司（BNSF），以及我们对苹果公司5.4%的股权。排名第四的是我们持有91%股权的伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（BHE）。这是一个非常独特的公用事业公司，在我们拥有它的21年里，它的年利润从1.22亿美元增长到了34亿美元。
I’ll have more to say about BNSF and BHE later in this letter. For now, however, I would like to focus on a practice Berkshire will periodically use to enhance your interest in both its “Big Four” as well as the many other assets Berkshire owns.
Last year we demonstrated our enthusiasm for Berkshire’s spread of properties by repurchasing the equivalent of 80,998 “A” shares, spending $24.7 billion in the process. That action increased your ownership in all of Berkshire’s businesses by 5.2% without requiring you to so much as touch your wallet.
Following criteria Charlie and I have long recommended, we made those purchases because we believed they would both enhance the intrinsic value per share for continuing shareholders and would leave Berkshire with more than ample funds for any opportunities or problems it might encounter.
In no way do we think that Berkshire shares should be repurchased at simply any price. I emphasize that point because American CEOs have an embarrassing record of devoting more company funds to repurchases when prices have risen than when they have tanked. Our approach is exactly the reverse.
Berkshire’s investment in Apple vividly illustrates the power of repurchases. We began buying Apple stock late in 2016 and by early July 2018, owned slightly more than one billion Apple shares (split-adjusted). Saying that, I’m referencing the investment held in Berkshire’s general account and am excluding a very small and separately-managed holding of Apple shares that was subsequently sold. When we finished our purchases in mid-2018, Berkshire’s general account owned 5.2% of Apple.
伯克希尔对苹果的投资生动地展现了回购的力量。我们从2016年末开始购买苹果股票，一直到2018年7月初完成购买，经拆股调整后，我们持有的苹果股票略多于10亿股。说到这里，我指的是在伯克希尔一般账户中持有的苹果股票，并不包括后来被出售的、非常少的、单独管理的苹果股票。当我们在2018年年中完成购买时，伯克希尔的一般账户持有苹果5.2%的股份。
Our cost for that stake was 775 million annually, and have also — in 2020 — pocketed an additional $11 billion by selling a small portion of our position.
我们的投资成本是360亿美元。从那以后，我们收到了平均每年约7.75亿美元的定期分红，并在2020年通过出售一小部分头寸获得额外的110亿美元。
Despite that sale — voila! — Berkshire now owns 5.4% of Apple. That increase was costless to us, coming about because Apple has continuously repurchased its shares, thereby substantially shrinking the number it now has outstanding.
But that’s far from all of the good news. Because we also repurchased Berkshire shares during the 2.5 years, you now indirectly own a full 10% more of Apple’s assets and future earnings than you did in July 2018.
This agreeable dynamic continues. Berkshire has repurchased more shares since yearend and is likely to further reduce its share count in the future. Apple has publicly stated an intention to repurchase its shares as well. As these reductions occur, Berkshire shareholders will not only own a greater interest in our insurance group and in BNSF and BHE, but will also find their indirect ownership of Apple increasing as well.
这种令人愉快的动态仍在继续。伯克希尔自去年年底以来回购了更多股票，未来可能会进一步减少股票数量。苹果也公开表示有意回购其股票。随着这些回购的发生，伯克希尔的股东不仅在我们的保险集团、BNSF和BHE中会拥有更大的利益，而且还会发现他们对苹果的间接权益也在增加。
The math of repurchases grinds away slowly, but can be powerful over time. The process offers a simple way for investors to own an ever-expanding portion of exceptional businesses.
And as a sultry Mae West assured us: “Too much of a good thing can be… wonderful.”
正如性感的梅·韦斯特向我们保证的那样：好事太多可能会……太棒了。
Investments 投资
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend were our largest in market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding — 325,442,152 shares — because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for that investment using the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of 11.3 billion.
下面我们列出了15笔年底市值最大的普通股投资。我们没有把我们持有的卡夫亨氏325,442,152股列在其中，因为伯克希尔是卡夫亨氏控股集团中的一份子，因此必须使用权益法来入账。按照通用会计准则规定，在伯克希尔的资产负债表上，我们持有卡夫亨氏控股的账面价值为133亿美元，这一数字意味着，2020年12月31日，伯克希尔拥有的卡夫亨氏经审计净资产份额的价值。但请注意，这一天，相应份额的股票市值只有113亿美元。
| Shares* | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost at 12/31/20 (in millions)** | Market at 12/31/20 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 25,533,082 | AbbVie Inc. | 1.4 | $ 2,333 | $ 2,736 |
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 18.8 | 1,287 | 18,331 |
| 907,559,761 | Apple Inc. | 5.4 | 31,089 | 120,424 |
| 1,032,852,006 | Bank of America Corp. | 11.9 | 14,631 | 31,306 |
| 66,835,615 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. | 7.5 | 2,918 | 2,837 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Co. Ltd. | 8.2 | 232 | 5,897 |
| 5,213,461 | Charter Communications, Inc. | 2.7 | 904 | 3,449 |
| 48,498,965 | Chevron Corporation | 2.5 | 4,024 | 4,096 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.3 | 1,299 | 21,936 |
| 52,975,000 | General Motors Company | 3.7 | 1,616 | 2,206 |
| 81,304,200 | Itochu Corporation | 5.1 | 1,862 | 2,336 |
| 28,697,435 | Merck & Co., Inc. | 1.1 | 2,390 | 2,347 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 13.2 | 248 | 7,160 |
| 148,176,166 | U.S. Bancorp | 9.8 | 5,638 | 6,904 |
| 146,716,496 | Verizon Communications Inc. | 3.5 | 8,691 | 8,620 |
| Others*** | 29,458 | 40,585 | ||
| Total Equity Investments Carried at Market | $ 108,620 | $ 281,170 |
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
*** Includes a 9 billion.
A Tale of Two Cities 双城故事
Success stories abound throughout America. Since our country’s birth, individuals with an idea, ambition and often just a pittance of capital have succeeded beyond their dreams by creating something new or by improving the customer’s experience with something old.
美国到处都有成功的故事。自从我们国家诞生以来，那些有理想、有抱负、往往仅有微薄资本的人，通过创造新东西或用旧东西改善顾客体验，取得了远超他们梦想的成功。
Charlie and I journeyed throughout the nation to join with many of these individuals or their families. On the West Coast, we began the routine in 1972 with our purchase of See’s Candy. A full century ago, Mary See set out to deliver an age-old product that she had reinvented with special recipes. Added to her business plan were quaint stores staffed by friendly salespeople. Her first small outlet in Los Angeles eventually led to several hundred shops, spread throughout the West.
查理和我走遍全国，加入了很多这样的个人或家族创建的生意。在西海岸，我们从1972年购买喜诗糖果开始了这样的惯例做法。一个世纪前，玛丽·西开始推出一种用特殊配方改良后的古老产品。在她的商业计划中，她还开设了一些古色古香的商店，里面配有友好的销售人员。她在洛杉矶开的第一家小专卖店最终复制出了几百家店，遍布整个西部。
Today, Mrs. See’s creations continue to delight customers while providing life-long employment for thousands of women and men. Berkshire’s job is simply not to meddle with the company’s success. When a business manufactures and distributes a non-essential consumer product, the customer is the boss. And, after 100 years, the customer’s message to Berkshire remains clear: “Don’t mess with my candy.” (The website is https://www.sees.com/; try the peanut brittle.)
今天，喜诗的产品继续受到客户的欢迎，同时为成千上万的男女提供终身就业。伯克希尔的工作很简单，就是不要干涉喜诗公司的成功。当企业生产和分销一种非必需的消费品时，客户就是老板。而且100年后，客户向伯克希尔传递的信息依然清晰：别乱动我的糖果。（喜诗的网址是 https://www.sees.com/；试试花生糖。）
Let’s move across the continent to Washington, D.C. In 1936, Leo Goodwin, along with his wife, Lillian, became convinced that auto insurance — a standardized product customarily purchased from agents — could be sold directly at a much lower price. Armed with $100,000, the pair took on giant insurers possessing 1,000 times or more their capital. Government Employees Insurance Company (later shortened to GEICO) was on its way.
让我们跨越大陆来到华盛顿。1936年，利奥·古德温和他的妻子莉莲开始相信，汽车保险——一种通常从代理人那里购买的标准化产品——可以直接以低得多的价格出售。两人拿着10万美元，和拥有资本超过他们1000倍甚至更多的大型保险公司展开了较量。政府雇员保险公司（后来简称为GEICO）踏上了它的发展旅途。
By luck, I was exposed to the company’s potential a full 70 years ago. It instantly became my first love (of an investment sort). You know the rest of the story: Berkshire eventually became the 100% owner of GEICO, which at 84 years of age is constantly fine-tuning — but not changing — the vision of Leo and Lillian.
整整70年以前，我有幸接触到了这家公司并理解了它的潜力。它立刻成为了我的最爱（投资中的最爱）。接下来的故事大家都知道了：伯克希尔最终100%拥有了GEICO，这家84岁高龄的公司一直在微调，但始终没有改变利奥和莉莲当初的愿景。
There has been, however, a change in the company’s size. In 1937, its first full year of operation, GEICO did 35 billion.
然而，该公司的规模发生了变化。1937年，也就是GEICO运营的第一个全年，它做了238,288美元的生意，去年的数字是350亿美元。
Today, with much of finance, media, government and tech located in coastal areas, it’s easy to overlook the many miracles occurring in middle America. Let’s focus on two communities that provide stunning illustrations of the talent and ambition existing throughout our country.
今天，许多金融、媒体、政府和科技公司都位于沿海地区，人们很容易忽视正在美国中部发生的许多奇迹。让我们关注两个地区，它们是人们的才能和抱负遍布整个国家的完美诠释和证明。
You will not be surprised that I begin with Omaha.
我从奥马哈开始，我想你不会感到惊讶。
In 1940, Jack Ringwalt, a graduate of Omaha’s Central High School (the alma mater as well of Charlie, my dad, my first wife, our three children and two grandchildren), decided to start a property/casualty insurance company funded by $125,000 in capital.
1940年，毕业于奥马哈中心中学（也是查理、我父亲、我第一任妻子、我们的三个孩子和两个外孙的母校）的杰克·林格沃特决定用125,000美元的资本创办一家财产/意外保险公司。
Jack’s dream was preposterous, requiring his pipsqueak operation — somewhat pompously christened as National Indemnity — to compete with giant insurers, all of which operated with abundant capital. Additionally, those competitors were solidly entrenched with nationwide networks of well-funded and long-established local agents. Under Jack’s plan, National Indemnity, unlike GEICO, would itself use whatever agencies deigned to accept it and consequently enjoy no cost advantage in its acquisition of business. To overcome those formidable handicaps, National Indemnity focused on “odd-ball” risks, which were deemed unimportant by the “big boys.” And, improbably, the strategy succeeded.
杰克的梦想是荒谬的，他给公司取了个非常响亮的名字——赔偿保险公司，这要求他以弱小的公司实力与那些拥有充足资本的大型保险公司竞争。此外，这些竞争对手凭借遍布全国、资金雄厚、历史悠久的当地代理商网络确立了牢固的地位。杰克的计划，与GEICO不同的是，国民赔偿保险公司本身将使用任何屈尊接受它的代理机构，因此在收购业务时没有成本优势。为了克服这些可怕的障碍，国民赔偿保险公司将重点放在了被大公司认为不重要的特殊风险上。这一策略出人意料地成功了。
Jack was honest, shrewd, likeable and a bit quirky. In particular, he disliked regulators. When he periodically became annoyed with their supervision, he would feel an urge to sell his company.
杰克诚实、精明、讨人喜欢，也有点古怪。他尤其不喜欢监管机构。当他对他们的监督时不时感到厌烦时，他就会有卖掉公司的冲动。
Fortunately, I was nearby on one of those occasions. Jack liked the idea of joining Berkshire, and we made a deal in 1967, taking all of 15 minutes to reach a handshake. I never asked for an audit.
幸运的是，有一次我就在附近。杰克喜欢加入伯克希尔的想法，于是我们在1967年达成了一笔交易，只用了15分钟就达成了协议，我也从没要求过对公司进行审计。
Today National Indemnity is the only company in the world prepared to insure certain giant risks. And, yes, it remains based in Omaha, a few miles from Berkshire’s home office.
今天，国民赔偿保险公司是世界上唯一一家准备为某些巨大风险承保的公司。当然，它的总部仍然在奥马哈，距离伯克希尔的总部只有几英里。
Over the years, we have purchased four additional businesses from Omaha families, the best known among them being Nebraska Furniture Mart (“NFM”). The company’s founder, Rose Blumkin (“Mrs. B”), arrived in Seattle in 1915 as a Russian emigrant, unable to read or speak English. She settled in Omaha several years later and by 1936 had saved $2,500 with which to start a furniture store.
多年来，我们又从奥马哈家族手中收购了四家企业，其中最著名的是内布拉斯加家具卖场（NFM）。该公司的创始人罗斯·布卢姆金（Rose Blumkin, B夫人）1915年作为一名俄罗斯移民来到西雅图，当时她既不会读也不会说英语。几年后，她定居在奥马哈，到1936年她攒下了2500美元，用这笔钱开了一家家具店。
Competitors and suppliers ignored her, and for a time their judgment seemed correct: World War II stalled her business, and at yearend 1946, the company’s net worth had grown to only 50 (that’s not a typo).
竞争对手和供应商都没有重视她，在一段时间内，他们的判断似乎是正确的，二战让她的生意止步不前，1946年底，公司的净资产仅增长到72,264美元，收银台和银行中的现金存款加起来总共只有50美元（不是打错字）。
One invaluable asset, however, went unrecorded in the 1946 figures: Louie Blumkin, Mrs. B’s only son, had rejoined the store after four years in the U.S. Army. Louie fought at Normandy’s Omaha Beach following the D-Day invasion, earned a Purple Heart for injuries sustained in the Battle of the Bulge, and finally sailed home in November 1945.
然而，有一笔非常重要的资产没有记录在1946年的数字中：B夫人唯一的儿子路易·布卢姆金（Louie Blumkin）在美国军队服役四年后重新回到了这家商店。在诺曼底登陆后，路易参加了诺曼底奥马哈海滩的战斗，并因在Bulge战役中受伤而获得了紫心勋章，最终在1945年11月乘船回国。
Once Mrs. B and Louie were reunited, there was no stopping NFM. Driven by their dream, mother and son worked days, nights and weekends. The result was a retailing miracle.
一旦B夫人和路易重聚，就没有什么能阻止NFM。在梦想的驱使下，母亲和儿子不分昼夜、常年无休地工作。结果创造了零售业的一个奇迹。
By 1983, the pair had created a business worth $60 million. That year, on my birthday, Berkshire purchased 80% of NFM, again without an audit. I counted on Blumkin family members to run the business; the third and fourth generation do so today. Mrs. B, it should be noted, worked daily until she was 103 — a ridiculously premature retirement age as judged by Charlie and me.
到1983年，两人已经创造了价值6000万美元的生意。那一年，在我生日那天，伯克希尔收购了NFM 80%的股份，而且同样没有进行审计。我依靠布卢姆金的家族成员来经营企业，今天，B夫人家族的第三代和第四代依然在经营着这个生意。需要指出的是，B夫人每天都在工作，一直到103岁，在查理和我看来，这是个可笑的过早退休的年龄。
NFM now owns the three largest home-furnishings stores in the U.S. Each set a sales record in 2020, a feat achieved despite the closing of NFM’s stores for more than six weeks because of COVID-19.
目前，NFM拥有美国最大的三家家具用品商店，每一家都在2020年创下了销售记录，这是在新冠疫情导致商店关闭六周多的情况下取得的佳绩。
A post-script to this story says it all: When Mrs. B’s large family gathered for holiday meals, she always asked that they sing a song before eating. Her selection never varied: Irving Berlin’s “God Bless America.”
这个故事的后记说明了一切：当B夫人家的一大家子聚在一起过节吃饭时，她总是要求他们在吃饭前唱首歌，她的选择始终如一，就是欧文·柏林的《上帝保佑美国》。
Let’s move somewhat east to Knoxville, the third largest city in Tennessee. There, Berkshire has ownership in two remarkable companies — Clayton Homes (100% owned) and Pilot Travel Centers (38% owned now, but headed for 80% in 2023).
让我们往东来到田纳西州的第三大城市诺克斯维尔。在那里，伯克希尔拥有两家著名公司，克莱顿房屋（Clayton Homes，100%持股）和Pilot Travel Centers（目前持股38%，但到2023年将达到80%）。
Each company was started by a young man who had graduated from the University of Tennessee and stayed put in Knoxville. Neither had a meaningful amount of capital nor wealthy parents.
每一家公司都是由一位毕业于田纳西大学并留在诺克斯维尔的年轻人创立的。两人都没有足够的资金，也没有富裕的父母。
But, so what? Today, Clayton and Pilot each have annual pre-tax earnings of more than $1 billion. Together they employ about 47,000 men and women.
但，那又怎样？如今，克莱顿和Pilot的年税前利润都超过了10亿美元。这两家公司共雇用了大约4.7万名男女员工。
Jim Clayton, after several other business ventures, founded Clayton Homes on a shoestring in 1956, and “Big Jim” Haslam started what became Pilot Travel Centers in 1958 by purchasing a service station for $6,000. Each of the men later brought into the business a son with the same passion, values and brains as his father. Sometimes there is a magic to genes.
吉姆·克莱顿（Jim Clayton）在经历了几次创业之后，于1956年以微薄资金创建了克莱顿房屋（Clayton Homes）。1958年，大吉姆·哈斯拉姆（Big Jim Haslam）以6000美元的价格购买了一个服务站，创建了后来的Pilot Travel Centers。后来他们各自的一个儿子都加入了他们的公司，他们的儿子有着和父亲一样的激情、价值观和头脑。不得不说，有时候基因也有魔力。
“Big Jim” Haslam, now 90, has recently authored an inspirational book in which he relates how Jim Clayton ’s son, Kevin, encouraged the Haslams to sell a large portion of Pilot to Berkshire. Every retailer knows that satisfied customers are a store’s best salespeople. That’s true when businesses are changing hands as well.
现年90岁的大吉姆·哈斯拉姆最近写了一本励志书，书中讲述了吉姆·克莱顿的儿子凯文是如何鼓励哈斯拉姆一家将Pilot的大部分股权出售给伯克希尔公司的。每个零售商都知道满意的顾客是商店最好的销售员。当企业易手时也是如此。
When you next fly over Knoxville or Omaha, tip your hat to the Claytons, Haslams and Blumkins as well as to the army of successful entrepreneurs who populate every part of our country. These builders needed America’s framework for prosperity — a unique experiment when it was crafted in 1789 — to achieve their potential. In turn, America needed citizens like Jim C., Jim H., Mrs. B and Louie to accomplish the miracles our founding fathers sought.
当你下次飞到诺克斯维尔或奥马哈上空时，请向克莱顿、哈斯拉姆和布卢姆金斯家族以及遍布美国各地的成功企业家们致敬。这些建设者以美国成功的制度为基础激发出他们的潜能，这样一场独特的实验始于1789年的精心安排。反过来，美国也需要像吉姆·克莱顿、吉姆·哈斯拉姆、B夫人和路易这样的公民来实现我们的国父们所追求的奇迹。
Today, many people forge similar miracles throughout the world, creating a spread of prosperity that benefits all of humanity. In its brief 232 years of existence, however, there has been no incubator for unleashing human potential like America. Despite some severe interruptions, our country’s economic progress has been breathtaking.
今天，世界各地许多人造就了类似的奇迹，创造了惠及全人类的广泛繁荣。然而，在短暂的232年历史中，还没有一个像美国这样释放人们潜能的孵化器。尽管有一些严重的中断，美国的经济发展还是令人惊叹的。
Beyond that, we retain our constitutional aspiration of becoming “a more perfect union.” Progress on that front has been slow, uneven and often discouraging. We have, however, moved forward and will continue to do so.
此外，我们还保留着宪法所赋予我们的成为一个更完美联邦国家的愿望。在这方面的进展缓慢、不均衡，而且常常令人沮丧。然而，我们已经向前迈进，并将继续这样做。
Our unwavering conclusion: Never bet against America.
我们坚定不移的结论是：永远不要赌美国输。
The Berkshire Partnership 伯克希尔合伙企业
Berkshire is a Delaware corporation, and our directors must follow the state’s laws. Among them is a requirement that board members must act in the best interest of the corporation and its stockholders. Our directors embrace that doctrine.
伯克希尔是特拉华州的一家公司，我们的董事必须遵守州的法律。其中一项要求是，董事会成员必须基于公司及其股东的最佳利益行事。我们的董事们信奉这一信条。
In addition, of course, Berkshire directors want the company to delight its customers, to develop and reward the talents of its 360,000 associates, to behave honorably with lenders and to be regarded as a good citizen of the many cities and states in which we operate. We value these four important constituencies.
此外，当然，伯克希尔的董事们希望公司能让客户满意、培养并奖励36万名员工中的人才、和贷款机构保持良好的关系，并在我们经营的许多城市和州被视为好公民。我们非常看重这四组重要团体。
None of these groups, however, have a vote in determining such matters as dividends, strategic direction, CEO selection, or acquisitions and divestitures. Responsibilities like those fall solely on Berkshire’s directors, who must faithfully represent the long-term interests of the corporation and its owners.
Beyond legal requirements, Charlie and I feel a special obligation to the many individual shareholders of Berkshire. A bit of personal history may help you to understand our unusual attachment and how it shapes our behavior.
除了法律要求之外，查理和我觉得对伯克希尔的许多个人股东负有特殊义务。一些个人的经历可能会帮助你理解我们之间不同寻常的关联关系，以及这种关联如何塑造我们的行为。
Before my Berkshire years, I managed money for many individuals through a series of partnerships, the first three of those formed in 1956. As time passed, the use of multiple entities became unwieldy and, in 1962, we amalgamated 12 partnerships into a single unit, Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”).
在我进入伯克希尔之前，我通过一系列合伙企业为许多人管理资金，其中最早的三个合伙企业是在1956年成立的。随着时间的推移，使用多个实体变得难以处理，在1962年，我们将12家合伙企业合并为一家，就是巴菲特合伙有限公司（BPL）。
By that year, virtually all of my own money, and that of my wife as well, had become invested alongside the funds of my many limited partners. I received no salary or fees. Instead, as the general partner, I was compensated by my limited partners only after they secured returns above an annual threshold of 6%. If returns failed to meet that level, the shortfall was to be carried forward against my share of future profits. (Fortunately, that never happened: Partnership returns always exceeded the 6% “bogey.”) As the years went by, a large part of the resources of my parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins and in-laws became invested in the partnership.
到那一年，我和我妻子几乎所有的钱，都和许多有限合伙人的资金一起投资到了合伙基金中。我没有工资，也不收任何管理费用。相反，作为普通合伙人，我只有在有限合伙人的年回报率超过6%时才会得到回报。如果合伙企业回报率达不到6%，差额将由我未来的利润份额补偿。（幸运的是，这种情况从未发生，合伙人回报率总是超过6%这条“标准线”。）随着时间的流逝，我的父母、兄弟姐妹、叔叔阿姨、堂兄弟姐妹和姻亲的大部分资金都投入到了合伙企业中。
Charlie formed his partnership in 1962 and operated much as I did. Neither of us had any institutional investors, and very few of our partners were financially sophisticated. The people who joined our ventures simply trusted us to treat their money as we treated our own. These individuals — either intuitively or by relying on the advice of friends — correctly concluded that Charlie and I had an extreme aversion to permanent loss of capital and that we would not have accepted their money unless we expected to do reasonably well with it.
查理在1962年成立了他的合伙公司，运作方式和我差不多。我们都没有任何机构投资者，我们的合作伙伴中也很少有金融行家。那些加入我们公司的人相信我们会像对待自己的钱一样对待他们的钱。这些人或凭直觉，或根据朋友们的建议，正确地得出了这样的结论：查理和我对资本的永久亏损极其厌恶，除非我们预期用他们的钱投资会做得相当不错，否则我们不会接受他们的钱。
I stumbled into business management after BPL acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. Later still, in 1969, we decided to dissolve BPL. After yearend, the partnership distributed, pro-rata, all of its cash along with three stocks, the largest by value being BPL’s 70.5% interest in Berkshire.
1965年BPL收购伯克希尔哈撒韦的控制权后，我无意中进入了企业管理领域。后来，在1969年，我们决定解散BPL。过了年底，这家合伙企业按比例分配了所有现金和三支股票，其中价值最高的是BPL在伯克希尔哈撒韦公司70.5%的股权。
Charlie, meanwhile, wound up his operation in 1977. Among the assets he distributed to partners was a major interest in Blue Chip Stamps, a company his partnership, Berkshire and I jointly controlled. Blue Chip was also among the three stocks my partnership had distributed upon its dissolution.
与此同时，查理在1977清盘了他的合伙企业。在他分配给合伙人的资产中，蓝筹印花（Blue Chip Stamps）是最主要的一家，这是他的合伙人、伯克希尔和我共同控制的一家公司。蓝筹印花也是我的合伙公司解散时分配的三支股票之一。
In 1983, Berkshire and Blue Chip merged, thereby expanding Berkshire’s base of registered shareholders from 1,900 to 2,900. Charlie and I wanted everyone — old, new and prospective shareholders — to be on the same page.
Therefore, the 1983 annual report — up front — laid out Berkshire’s “major business principles.” The first principle began: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” That defined our relationship in 1983; it defines it today. Charlie and I — and our directors as well — believe this dictum will serve Berkshire well for many decades to come.
因此，在1983年的年报最前面列出了伯克希尔的主要商业原则，第一条原则是这么说的：虽然我们的形式是公司，但我们的态度是合伙关系。这定义了我们在1983年和股东的关系，今天这个关系依然没变。查理和我以及我们的董事们都相信，这句格言在未来几十年里还会对伯克希尔大有裨益。
Ownership of Berkshire now resides in five large “buckets,” one occupied by me as a “founder” of sorts. That bucket is certain to empty as the shares I own are annually distributed to various philanthropies.
伯克希尔的财富现在存放在五个“桶”中，其中一个由我作为创始人占据。这个桶确定会变空，因为我拥有的股票每年都会捐献给各种慈善机构。
Two of the remaining four buckets are filled by institutional investors, each handling other people’s money. That, however, is where the similarity between those buckets ends: Their investing procedures could not be more different.
其余四个桶中有两个是机构投资者所占有，每个机构投资者都管理别人的资金。然而，这是两个投资机构唯一的相同之处，他们的投资决策程序截然不同。
In one institutional bucket are index funds, a large and mushrooming segment of the investment world. These funds simply mimic the index that they track. The favorite of index investors is the S&P 500, of which Berkshire is a component. Index funds, it should be emphasized, own Berkshire shares simply because they are required to do so. They are on automatic pilot, buying and selling only for “weighting” purposes.
其中一个“桶”装的是指数基金，这是投资界一个规模庞大、迅速发展的领域。这些基金只是简单模仿它们追踪的指数。标普500指数（S&P 500）是指数基金中最受欢迎的，伯克希尔是标普500指数成分股之一。应该强调的是，指数基金之所以持有伯克希尔的股票，只是因为它们被要求这么做。它们处于“自动驾驶状态”，买卖只是为了对标成分股权重。
In the other institutional bucket are professionals who manage their clients’ money, whether those funds belong to wealthy individuals, universities, pensioners or whomever. These professional managers have a mandate to move funds from one investment to another based on their judgment as to valuation and prospects. That is an honorable, though difficult, occupation.
另一个“桶”的背后是机构投资者中的专业投资人，他们管理客户的资金，无论这些客户是富有的个人、大学、退休人员或任何人。这些专业基金经理的职责是根据他们对估值和前景的判断，将资金从一项投资转移到另一项投资。这是一个光荣但艰难的职业。
We are happy to work for this “active” group, while they meanwhile search for a better place to deploy the funds of their clientele. Some managers, to be sure, have a long-term focus and trade very infrequently. Others use computers employing algorithms that may direct the purchase or sale of shares in a nano-second. Some professional investors will come and go based upon their macro-economic judgments.
我们很高兴为这个活跃的群体工作，同时他们也在寻找更好的地方来配置客户的资金。可以肯定的是，一些基金经理着眼长远，交易频率低。还有一些人使用计算机，利用算法可以在一纳秒内指导股票的买卖。一些专业投资者会根据他们对宏观经济的判断买进卖出。
Our fourth bucket consists of individual shareholders who operate in a manner similar to the active institutional managers I’ve just described. These owners, understandably, think of their Berkshire shares as a possible source of funds when they see another investment that excites them. We have no quarrel with that attitude, which is similar to the way we look at some of the equities we own at Berkshire.
第四个“桶”的背后是那些个人股东，他们的运作方式与我刚才描述的活跃的基金经理类似。可以理解的是，当这些股东看到其他另他们兴奋的投资时，他们会把自己持有的伯克希尔股票视为可能的资金来源。我们对这种态度没有异议，这与我们看待伯克希尔持有的一些股票的方式类似。
All of that said, Charlie and I would be less than human if we did not feel a special kinship with our fifth bucket: the million-plus individual investors who simply trust us to represent their interests, whatever the future may bring. They have joined us with no intent to leave, adopting a mindset similar to that held by our original partners. Indeed, many investors from our partnership years, and/or their descendants, remain substantial owners of Berkshire.
综上所述，如果查理和我对我们的第五个“桶”没有特别的亲密感，那我们就没有人性了。第五“桶”的背后是是百万以上的个人投资者，不管未来会发生什么，他们相信我们会代表他们的利益。他们与我们风雨同舟且并不打算离开，他们的心态与我们最初的合作伙伴相似。事实上，我们合伙公司时代的许多投资者，以及或他们的后代，仍然是伯克希尔坚实的股东。
A prototype of those veterans is Stan Truhlsen, a cheerful and generous Omaha ophthalmologist as well as personal friend, who turned 100 on November 13, 2020. In 1959, Stan, along with 10 other young Omaha doctors, formed a partnership with me. The docs creatively labeled their venture Emdee, Ltd. Annually, they joined my wife and me for a celebratory dinner at our home.
斯坦·特鲁尔森（Stan Truhlsen）就是这些老兵的一个典型代表，他是奥马哈市一位开朗慷慨的眼科医生，也是我的私人朋友，他在2020年11月13日迎来了自己的100岁生日。1959年，斯坦和其他10名年轻的奥马哈医生与我结成了伙伴关系。他们创造性地将合伙企业命名为Emdee, Ltd。每年，他们都会来我家和我以及我的妻子一起吃庆祝晚餐。
When our partnership distributed its Berkshire shares in 1969, all of the doctors kept the stock they received. They may not have known the ins and outs of investing or accounting, but they did know that at Berkshire they would be treated as partners.
Two of Stan’s comrades from Emdee are now in their high-90s and continue to hold Berkshire shares. This group’s startling durability — along with the fact that Charlie and I are 97 and 90, respectively — serves up an interesting question: Could it be that Berkshire ownership fosters longevity?
Berkshire’s unusual and valued family of individual shareholders may add to your understanding of our reluctance to court Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. We already have the investors we want and don’t think that they, on balance, would be upgraded by replacements.
伯克希尔不同寻常的、珍贵的个人股东大家庭可能会让你更加理解我们不愿讨好华尔街分析师和机构投资者原因。我们已经有了我们想要的投资者，总的来说，我们不认为有更好的投资者可以替代他们。
There are only so many seats — that is, shares outstanding — available for Berkshire ownership. And we very much like the people already occupying them.
可获得的座位就这么多（指伯克希尔的流通股份），我们们非常喜欢已经坐在座位上的人们。
Of course, some turnover in “partners” will occur. Charlie and I hope, however, that it will be minimal. Who, after all, seeks rapid turnover in friends, neighbors or marriage?
当然，合伙人变动也会发生。不过，查理和我希望变动数量是最小化的。毕竟，谁会追求经常更换朋友、邻居或另一半呢？
In 1958, Phil Fisher wrote a superb book on investing. In it, he analogized running a public company to managing a restaurant. If you are seeking diners, he said, you can attract a clientele and prosper featuring either hamburgers served with a Coke or a French cuisine accompanied by exotic wines. But you must not, Fisher warned, capriciously switch from one to the other: Your message to potential customers must be consistent with what they will find upon entering your premises.
1958年，菲尔·费舍尔写了一本优秀的投资书籍。在书中，他将经营一家上市公司比作经营一家餐厅。他说，如果你在寻找食客，你可以以搭配可口可乐的汉堡或搭配带有异国情调的葡萄酒的法国美食来吸引顾客。但是，费雪警告说，你不能随意地从一类食物转换到另一类食物，你给潜在客户的信息必须与他们进入你的营业场所后发现的信息一致。
At Berkshire, we have been serving hamburgers and Coke for 56 years. We cherish the clientele this fare has attracted.
在伯克希尔，我们提供汉堡和可乐已经56年了。我们珍惜这些食物所吸引的顾客。
The tens of millions of other investors and speculators in the United States and elsewhere have a wide variety of equity choices to fit their tastes. They will find CEOs and market gurus with enticing ideas. If they want price targets, managed earnings and “stories,” they will not lack suitors. “Technicians” will confidently instruct them as to what some wiggles on a chart portend for a stock’s next move. The calls for action will never stop.
美国和其他地方的数千万其他投资者和投机者有各种各样的股票可以选择，以满足他们的口味。他们将会找到拥有诱人想法的首席执行官和市场大拿。如果他们想要以股价为目标，想要经修饰的盈利和各种故事，他们不会缺少这样的机会。“技术人员”会很有信心地告诉他们图表上的一些波动预示着股价的下一步走势。要求采取行动的呼声永不停止。
Many of those investors, I should add, will do quite well. After all, ownership of stocks is very much a “positive-sum” game. Indeed, a patient and level-headed monkey, who constructs a portfolio by throwing 50 darts at a board listing all of the S&P 500, will — over time — enjoy dividends and capital gains, just as long as it never gets tempted to make changes in its original “selections.”
我要补充一点，这些投资者中的许多人会做得很好。毕竟，持有股票是一个正和游戏。事实上，一只耐心、头脑冷静的猴子，通过向列出了标普500指数成分股的飞盘投掷50枚飞镖来构建投资组合，随着时间的推移，它将享受股息和投资收益，只要它不受诱惑改变最初的选择。
Productive assets such as farms, real estate and, yes, business ownership produce wealth — lots of it. Most owners of such properties will be rewarded. All that’s required is the passage of time, an inner calm, ample diversification and a minimization of transactions and fees. Still, investors must never forget that their expenses are Wall Street’s income. And, unlike my monkey, Wall Streeters do not work for peanuts.
生产性资产，如农场、房地产，当然还有企业股权，都能创造大量财富。大多数拥有这些财产的人都会得到回报。获得回报需要的是时间的流逝、内心的平静、充足的多样化、最少化交易和最小化交易费用。不过，投资者决不能忘记，他们的支出就是华尔街的收入。但是，和猴子不一样的是，华尔街的人可不是为了花生而工作的。
When seats open up at Berkshire — and we hope they are few — we want them to be occupied by newcomers who understand and desire what we offer. After decades of management, Charlie and I remain unable to promise results. We can and do , however, pledge to treat you as partners.
当伯克希尔有空位的时候，当然我们希望这样的空位少一些，我们希望那些理解我们并渴望我们所提供的服务的新伙伴能占据这些空位。诚然，经过几十年的管理，查理和我仍然不能许诺结果，但我们可以并确实保证将你们视为合作伙伴。
And so, too, will our successors.
我们的继任者也将如此。
A Berkshire Number that May Surprise You 让你吃惊的一个数字
Recently, I learned a fact about our company that I had never suspected: Berkshire owns American-based property, plant and equipment — the sort of assets that make up the “business infrastructure” of our country — with a GAAP valuation exceeding the amount owned by any other U.S. company. Berkshire’s depreciated cost of these domestic “fixed assets” is 154 billion. Next in line on this list is AT&T, with property, plant and equipment of 127 billion.
最近，我了解到一个从未察觉到的关于我们公司的事实：伯克希尔拥有美国的财产、工厂和设备，这类资产构成了我们国家的商业基础设施，其GAAP估值超过了任何其他美国公司所拥有的数额。这些国内固定资产折旧后的成本为1,540亿美元。紧随其后的是美国电话电报公司（AT&T），其拥有的财产、厂房和设备，折旧后的成本是1270亿美元。
Our leadership in fixed-asset ownership, I should add, does not , in itself, signal an investment triumph. The best results occur at companies that require minimal assets to conduct high-margin businesses — and offer goods or services that will expand their sales volume with only minor needs for additional capital. We, in fact, own a few of these exceptional businesses, but they are relatively small and, at best, grow slowly.
我应该补充一点，我们在固定资产拥有金额方面的领导地位，本身并不是投资成功的信号。最好的结果出现在那些只需要极少资产就能带来高利润并且只需要很少额外资本就能扩大销售额的生意中。事实上，我们拥有一些这样的杰出企业，但它们相对较小，发展也比较缓慢。
Asset-heavy companies, however, can be good investments. Indeed, we are delighted with our two giants — BNSF and BHE: In 2011, Berkshire’s first full year of BNSF ownership, the two companies had combined earnings of 8.3 billion.
当然，重资产公司也能成为好的投资。事实上，我们很高兴看到我们的两大巨头BNSF和BHE，2011年，伯克希尔拥有BNSF的第一个全年，这两家公司的利润合计为42亿美元。2020年，对许多企业来说都是艰难的一年，但这两家公司却赚了83亿美元。
BNSF and BHE will require major capital expenditures for decades to come. The good news is that both are likely to deliver appropriate returns on the incremental investment.
BNSF和BHE在未来几十年将需要大量的资本支出。好消息是，两家公司都很可能运用增量投资获得合适的回报。
Let’s look first at BNSF. Your railroad carries about 15% of all non-local ton-miles (a ton of freight moved one mile) of goods that move in the United States, whether by rail, truck, pipeline, barge or aircraft. By a significant margin, BNSF’s loads top those of any other carrier.
让我们先看看BNSF。按吨/英里计算，BNSF的铁路运输了美国境内所有非本地货物的15%，无论是通过铁路、卡车、管道、驳船还是飞机。BNSF存在显著的优势，运输量超过任何其他承运人。
The history of American railroads is fascinating. After 150 years or so of frenzied construction, skullduggery, overbuilding, bankruptcies, reorganizations and mergers, the railroad industry finally emerged a few decades ago as mature and rationalized.
美国铁路的历史令人赞叹。在经历了150年左右的疯狂建设、欺诈、过度建设、破产、重组和合并之后，铁路行业终于在几十年前变得成熟并合理化了。
BNSF began operations in 1850 with a 12-mile line in northeastern Illinois. Today, it has 390 antecedents whose railroads have been purchased or merged. The company’s extensive lineage is laid out at http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf.
BNSF于1850年开始运营，在伊利诺斯州东北部修建了一条12英里长的线路。如今，已有390家之前的铁路公司被收购或合并。该公司的历史沿革可以在以下网址找到：http://www.bnsf.com/bnsf-resources/pdf/about-bnsf/History_and_Legacy.pdf
Berkshire acquired BNSF early in 2010. Since our purchase, the railroad has invested 20 billion in excess of its depreciation charges. Railroading is an outdoor sport, featuring mile-long trains obliged to reliably operate in both extreme cold and heat, as they all the while encounter every form of terrain from deserts to mountains. Massive flooding periodically occurs. BNSF owns 23,000 miles of track, spread throughout 28 states, and must spend whatever it takes to maximize safety and service throughout its vast system.
伯克希尔在2010年初收购了BNSF。自从被收购以来，公司在固定资产上投资了410亿美元，超过了折旧费用200亿美元。铁路是一项户外运动，火车必须在极冷和极热的环境下可靠地行驶，因为它们总是会遇到从沙漠到山脉的各种地形。大规模洪水周期性发生。BNSF拥有23000英里的铁路，遍布28个州，必须不惜一切代价在其庞大的系统中最大化安全和服务。
Nevertheless, BNSF has paid substantial dividends to Berkshire — 2 billion. This conservative policy allows BNSF to borrow at low rates, independent of any guarantee of its debt by Berkshire.
不过，BNSF已经向伯克希尔支付了总计418亿美元的巨额股息。当然，BNSF支付股息的前提是，它满足了自身的业务需求和保留了20亿美元的现金余额。这种保守的运营策略让BNSF能以较低的利率借款，而不依赖伯克希尔对其债务进行任何担保。
One further word about BNSF: Last year, Carl Ice, its CEO, and his number two, Katie Farmer, did an extraordinary job in controlling expenses while navigating a significant downturn in business. Despite a 7% decline in the volume of goods carried, the two actually increased BNSF’s profit margin by 2.9 percentage points. Carl, as long planned, retired at yearend and Katie took over as CEO. Your railroad is in good hands.
关于BNSF还有一点：去年，该公司首席执行官卡尔和公司二号人物凯蒂•法默（Katie Farmer）在业务低迷的时候出色地控制了开支。尽管货运量下降了7%，但两人合力将公司的利润率提高了2.9个百分点。卡尔如计划的那样，在年底退休了，凯蒂接任了首席执行官一职。你的铁路交到了优秀管理者手中。
BHE, unlike BNSF, pays no dividends on its common stock, a highly-unusual practice in the electric-utility industry. That Spartan policy has been the case throughout our 21 years of ownership. Unlike railroads, our country’s electric utilities need a massive makeover in which the ultimate costs will be staggering. The effort will absorb all of BHE’s earnings for decades to come. We welcome the challenge and believe the added investment will be appropriately rewarded.
与BNSF不同的是，BHE不支付普通股股息，这在电力行业是非常不寻常的做法。这种斯巴达式的政策贯穿了我们控股后的21年。与铁路不同，我们国家的电力设施需要大规模的改造，最终的成本将是惊人的。大规模改造将在未来几十年消耗BHE所有的利润。我们欢迎挑战，同时也相信增加的投资将得到适当的回报。
Let me tell you about one of BHE’s endeavors — its $18 billion commitment to rework and expand a substantial portion of the outdated grid that now transmits electricity throughout the West. BHE began this project in 2006 and expects it to be completed by 2030 — yes, 2030.
让我来告诉你一个关于BHE的项目，承诺投入180亿美元，对已经过时的电网进行重建和扩建，这些电网现在正在向整个西部输送电力。BHE在2006年开始这个项目，预计在2030年完成，是的，2030年。
The advent of renewable energy made our project a societal necessity. Historically, the coal-based generation of electricity that long prevailed was located close to huge centers of population. The best sites for the new world of wind and solar generation, however, are often in remote areas. When BHE assessed the situation in 2006, it was no secret that a huge investment in western transmission lines had to be made. Very few companies or governmental entities, however, were in a financial position to raise their hand after they tallied the project’s cost.
可再生能源的出现使我们的项目成为社会必需品。历史上，长期以来盛行的燃煤发电都位于人口密集的地区。然而，风能和太阳能发电的最佳地点往往是在偏远地区。当BHE在2006年评估情况时，对西部输电线路进行巨额投资已不是什么秘密。然而，很少有公司或政府机构在计算完项目所需成本后有财力进行投入。
BHE’s decision to proceed, it should be noted, was based upon its trust in America’s political, economic and judicial systems. Billions of dollars needed to be invested before meaningful revenue would flow. Transmission lines had to cross the borders of states and other jurisdictions, each with its own rules and constituencies. BHE would also need to deal with hundreds of landowners and execute complicated contracts with both the suppliers that generated renewable power and the far-away utilities that would distribute the electricity to their customers. Competing interests and defenders of the old order, along with unrealistic visionaries desiring an instantly-new world, had to be brought on board.
应该指出的是，BHE决定投资是基于对美国政治、经济和司法体系的信任。可观的收入产生之前，需要先投入数十亿美元投入。输电线路必须跨越各州和其他司法管辖区的边界，每个州都有自己的规则和选民。BHE还需要与数百名土地所有者打交道，并同时与生产可再生能源的供应商和向客户输送电力的公用事业公司签订复杂的合同。BHE在扮演一个不切实际的、渴望新世界的梦想家身份的同时，还要和既得利益者和旧秩序的捍卫者周旋。
Both surprises and delays were certain. Equally certain, however, was the fact that BHE had the managerial talent, the institutional commitment and the financial wherewithal to fulfill its promises. Though it will be many years before our western transmission project is completed, we are today searching for other projects of similar size to take on.
惊喜和延迟都会必然发生。然而，同样可以确定的是，BHE有管理才能、制度保障和财力来履行我们的承诺。虽然我们的西部输电项目要多年才能完成，但我们今天还在寻找其他类似规模的项目来投资。
Whatever the obstacles, BHE will be a leader in delivering ever-cleaner energy.
无论遇到何种障碍，BHE都将成为提供更清洁能源的领导者。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
Last year, on February 22nd, I wrote you about our plans for a gala annual meeting. Within a month, the schedule was junked.
去年2月22日，我写信告诉大家我们计划召开一个盛大的年会。不到一个月，这个计划就被废弃了。
Our home office group, led by Melissa Shapiro and Marc Hamburg, Berkshire’s CFO, quickly regrouped. Miraculously, their improvisations worked. Greg Abel, one of Berkshire’s Vice Chairmen, joined me on stage facing a dark arena, 18,000 empty seats and a camera. There was no rehearsal: Greg and I arrived about 45 minutes before “showtime.”
由伯克希尔首席财务官梅利莎·夏皮罗和马克·汉堡领导的总部小组迅速重组。他们的即兴表演奇迹般地奏效了。伯克希尔副董事长之一格雷格·亚伯（Greg Abel）和我一起上台，面对着一个黑暗的体育场、1.8万个空座位和一台摄像机。没有彩排，我和格雷格在开场前45分钟到达现场。
Debbie Bosanek, my incredible assistant who joined Berkshire 47 years ago at age 17, had put together about 25 slides displaying various facts and figures that I had assembled at home. An anonymous but highly-capable team of computer and camera operators projected the slides onto the screen in proper order.
黛比·博萨内克（Debbie Bosanek）是我不可思议的助手，47年前，17岁的她加入了伯克希尔公司。她整理了25张幻灯片，展示了我在家里收集的各种事实和数据。一个由电脑和摄影师组成的匿名但能力很强的团队将幻灯片按适当的顺序投射到屏幕上。
Yahoo streamed the proceedings to a record-sized international audience. Becky Quick of CNBC, operating from her home in New Jersey, selected questions from thousands that shareholders had earlier submitted or that viewers had emailed to her during the four hours Greg and I were on stage. See’s peanut brittle and fudge, along with Coca-Cola, provided us with nourishment.
雅虎向创纪录规模的国际观众直播了整个过程。CNBC的贝琪·奎克（Becky Quick）在她位于新泽西州的家中工作，从数千个股东早前提交的问题，或观众在我和格雷格上台的四个小时里通过电子邮件发给她的问题中挑选问题。喜诗的花生糖和软糖，还有可口可乐，为我们提供了能量。
This year, on May 1st, we are planning to go one better. Again, we will rely on Yahoo and CNBC to perform flawlessly. Yahoo will go live at 1 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (“EDT”). Simply navigate to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream.
今年，5月1日，我们计划开一个更好的网络股东大会。同样，我们将再次依赖雅虎和CNBC的完美表现。雅虎直播将于东部夏令时（EDT）下午1点开始，只需登陆以下网站就可以观看：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream
Our formal meeting will commence at 5:00 p.m. EDT and should finish by 5:30 p.m. Earlier, between 1:30-5:00, we will answer your questions as relayed by Becky. As always, we will have no foreknowledge as to what questions will be asked. Send your zingers to BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com. Yahoo will wrap things up after 5:30.
我们的正式会议将于美国东部时间下午5:00开始，下午5:30结束。在那之前的1:30-5:00之间，我们会回答由贝琪转达的问题。像往常一样，我们无法预知会被问到哪些问题。请将你的生动问题发送到 BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com。雅虎直播将在5:30后结束。
And now — drum roll, please — a surprise. This year our meeting will be held in Los Angeles and Charlie will be on stage with me offering answers and observations throughout the 3.5-hour question period. I missed him last year and, more important, you clearly missed him. Our other invaluable vice-chairmen, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel, will be with us to answer questions relating to their domains.
现在鼓声响起来，我有一个惊喜告诉大家，今年我们的会议将在洛杉矶举行，查理将会在台上和我一起回答三个半小时的问题。去年我很想念他，更重要的是，你们显然也很想念他。我们优秀的副主席 Ajit Jain 和 Greg Abel，也将加入我们并回答与他们相关的问题。
Join us via Yahoo. Direct your really tough questions to Charlie! We will have fun, and we hope you will as well.
通过雅虎加入我们，把你的难题抛给查理吧！我们会玩得很开心，希望你们也一样。
Better yet, of course, will be the day when we see you face to face. I hope and expect that will be in 2022. The citizens of Omaha, our exhibiting subsidiaries and all of us at the home office can’t wait to get you back for an honest-to-God annual meeting, Berkshire-style.
当然，更好的是有一天我们能面对面地交流。我希望并期待那将是在2022年。奥马哈市的市民、我们的会展子公司以及我们总部的所有人都迫不及待地想让你们回来参加伯克希尔式的、不折不扣的年度会议。
February 27, 2021
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
2021年2月27日
董事会主席