原文信息：
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2019 | 20.3% | 10.0% |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2019 | 2,744,062% | 19,784% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Berkshire earned 24 billion of operating earnings, 53.7 billion gain from an increase in the amount of net unrealized capital gains that exist in the stocks we hold. Each of those components of earnings is stated on an after-tax basis.
基于GAAP会计准则， 2019年伯克希尔收益为814亿美元。这一数字包含：240亿美元经营收益，37亿美元已实现资本收益和537亿美元未实现资本收益。所有数字均为税后收益。
That $53.7 billion gain requires comment. It resulted from a new GAAP rule, imposed in 2018, that requires a company holding equity securities to include in earnings the net change in the unrealized gains and losses of those securities. As we stated in last year’s letter, neither Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, nor I agree with that rule.
537亿美元未实现资本收益必须做一个补充说明。根据2018年实施的一项新的会计准则，企业需要在收益中列入其所持有的权益证券未实现资本损益的净变化。正如我们在去年股东信中所说，我和伯克希尔的管理合伙人查理·芒格都不同意这一规则。
The adoption of the rule by the accounting profession, in fact, was a monumental shift in its own thinking. Before 2018, GAAP insisted - with an exception for companies whose business was to trade securities - that unrealized gains within a portfolio of stocks were never to be included in earnings and unrealized losses were to be included only if they were deemed “other than temporary.” Now, Berkshire must enshrine in each quarter’s bottom line - a key item of news for many investors, analysts and commentators - every up and down movement of the stocks it owns, however capricious those fluctuations may be.
事实上，会计行业采用这一新规则标志着会计专业理念的一次重大改变。2018年之前，GAAP会计准则坚持认为，股票投资组合当中未实现的资本收益永远不应该被计入收益，只有在被视为”永久性损失”的情况下，未实现的损失才会被计入收益。现在，根据新规，伯克希尔必须将这些数据计入每个季度的合并收益之中，不论这些证券的波动多么起伏不定，可能会造成怎样的影响。对于众多投资者、分析师和评论家来说，这是一个关键性的信息。
Berkshire’s 2018 and 2019 years glaringly illustrate the argument we have with the new rule. In 2018, a down year for the stock market, our net unrealized gains decreased by 4 billion. In 2019, rising stock prices increased net unrealized gains by the aforementioned 53.7 billion, pushing GAAP earnings to the \81.4 billion reported at the beginning of this letter. Those market gyrations led to a crazy 1,900% increase in GAAP earnings!
伯克希尔2018年和2019年的具体数据，清楚地说明了我们对新规的争论。2018年是股市下跌的一年，我们未实现的资本收益减少了206亿美元，于是我们报告的GAAP收益仅有40亿美元。2019年由于股票价格的上涨，我们未实现的资本收益增加了537亿美元，使得我们的GAAP收益达到了前面所报告的814亿美元。也就是说，股市的波动导致我们报告的GAAP收益猛增了1900％！
Meanwhile, in what we might call the real world, as opposed to accounting-land, Berkshire’s equity holdings averaged about $200 billion during the two years, and the intrinsic value of the stocks we own grew steadily and substantially throughout the period.
Charlie and I urge you to focus on operating earnings - which were little changed in 2019 - and to ignore both quarterly and annual gains or losses from investments, whether these are realized or unrealized.
查理和我提醒大家专注于经营收益(2019年几乎没有变化)，同时不要去关注季度或年度的投资损益，不管这些收益是已经实现的还是尚未实现的。
Our advising that in no way diminishes the importance of these investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect our equity holdings - as a group - to deliver major gains, albeit in an unpredictable and highly irregular manner. To see why we are optimistic, move on to the next discussion.
我们的建议并不是要降低这些投资对伯克希尔的重要性。查理和我都预计，我们的股票投资作为一个整体，虽然其收益表现不可预测且极端不规律，但是长期而言，注定会为我们带来巨大的收益。我们为何会如此乐观？下面的章节将会展开讨论。
The Power of Retained Earnings 留存收益的力量
In 1924, Edgar Lawrence Smith, an obscure economist and financial advisor, wrote Common Stocks as Long Term Investments, a slim book that changed the investment world. Indeed, writing the book changed Smith himself, forcing him to reassess his own investment beliefs.
1924年，一位名不见经传的经济学家和理财顾问埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯(Edgar Lawrence Smith)写了一本书《普通股的长期投资》(Common Stocks as Long Term Investments)，这本薄薄的小册子改变了整个投资世界的理念。事实上，撰写这本书也改变了史密斯本人，迫使他开始重新评估自己的投资信条。
Going in, he planned to argue that stocks would perform better than bonds during inflationary periods and that bonds would deliver superior returns during deflationary times. That seemed sensible enough. But Smith was in for a shock.
His book began, therefore, with a confession: “These studies are the record of a failure - the failure of facts to sustain a preconceived theory.” Luckily for investors, that failure led Smith to think more deeply about how stocks should be evaluated.
因此，本书一开始史密斯就承认：“这些研究是对失败的记录——失败的事实并不能支持预设的观点。“但这却是投资者的幸事，因为这一失败迫使史密斯更加深入地思考，应该如何去评估股票的价值。
For the crux of Smith’s insight, I will quote an early reviewer of his book, none other than John Maynard Keynes: “I have kept until last what is perhaps Mr. Smith’s most important, and is certainly his most novel, point. Well-managed industrial companies do not, as a rule, distribute to the shareholders the whole of their earned profits. In good years, if not in all years, they retain a part of their profits and put them back into the business. Thus there is an element of compound interest (Keynes’ italics) operating in favour of a sound industrial investment. Over a period of years, the real value of the property of a sound industrial is increasing at compound interest, quite apart from the dividends paid out to the shareholders.”
关于史密斯洞见的核心，我将引述一位他著作的早期评论家的话，不是别人，正是约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯(John Maynard Keynes)：“我一直读完全书，才大致搞清楚了史密斯先生最新奇的，当然也是最重要的观点到底是什么。一般来说，管理良好的工业企业通常不会将其赚取的所有收益都派发给股东。哪怕不是所有年景，至少在好年景，这些企业都会保留部分收益，并将其重新投入到自身业务中去。因此，留存收益有助于一个完备工业企业再投资创造出一个复利运营模式。多年来，除了向股东支付的股息之外，一个完备工业企业资产的真实价值正在以复利的方式增长。”
And with that sprinkling of holy water, Smith was no longer obscure.
得到了这位经济学大家的加持，史密斯一夜成名。
It’s difficult to understand why retained earnings were unappreciated by investors before Smith’s book was published. After all, it was no secret that mind-boggling wealth had earlier been amassed by such titans as Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, all of whom had retained a huge portion of their business earnings to fund growth and produce ever-greater profits. Throughout America, also, there had long been small-time capitalists who became rich following the same playbook.
很难理解为什么在史密斯的这本著作出版之前，留存收益的做法没有得到投资者的认可。毕竟大家都知道，卡耐基Carnegie、洛克菲勒Rockefeller和福特Ford等巨头当年都积累了令人瞠目结舌的财富。他们靠的就是保留大部分经营收益，为其增长提供资本，并创造出越来越多的收益。事实上，在全美范围内，有许多小资本家们也是按照同样的策略而发家致富的。
Nevertheless, when business ownership was sliced into small pieces - “stocks” - buyers in the pre-Smith years usually thought of their shares as a short-term gamble on market movements. Even at their best, stocks were considered speculations. Gentlemen preferred bonds.
然而，当企业所有权被分割成无数小片也就是”股票”时，史密斯时代之前的投资者通常认为，他们的股票是对市场走势的短期赌博，即使在市场最好的时候，股票投资也被认为就是投机行为，绅士们青睐的是债券。
Though investors were slow to wise up, the math of retaining and reinvesting earnings is now well understood. Today, school children learn what Keynes termed “novel”: combining savings with compound interest works wonders.
At Berkshire, Charlie and I have long focused on using retained earnings advantageously. Sometimes this job has been easy - at other times, more than difficult, particularly when we began working with huge and ever- growing sums of money.
In our deployment of the funds we retain, we first seek to invest in the many and diverse businesses we already own. During the past decade, Berkshire’s depreciation charges have aggregated $65 billion whereas the company’s internal investments in property, plant and equipment have totaled $121 billion. Reinvestment in productive operational assets will forever remain our top priority.
在部署我们的留存收益的时候，我们首先寻求投资于我们现已拥有的数量众多、种类繁杂的业务。在过去十年时间里，伯克希尔的折旧费用总计650亿美元，而其内部的不动产、厂房和设备的投资支出总计达到1210亿美元。对于生产性运营资产的再投资永远都是我们的首要任务。
In addition, we constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.
When we spot such businesses, our preference would be to buy 100% of them. But the opportunities to make major acquisitions possessing our required attributes are rare. Far more often, a fickle stock market serves up opportunities for us to buy large, but non-controlling, positions in publicly-traded companies that meet our standards.
当我们找到了这样的企业时，我们会倾向于100％收购它们。遗憾的是，符合我们标准的重大收购机会颇为稀有。在更多的时候，喜怒无常的股市不时为我们提供机会，让我们可以大量购买符合我们标准的上市公司的非控制性股份。
Whichever way we go - controlled companies or only a major stake by way of the stock market - Berkshire’s financial results from the commitment will in large part be determined by the future earnings of the business we have purchased. Nonetheless, there is between the two investment approaches a hugely important accounting difference, essential for you to understand.
无论我们采取何种方式投资(控股或者通过股市持有大笔股权)，伯克希尔的财务表现很大程度上都将取决于我们所投资的这些企业的未来盈利能力。尽管如此，投资者必须明白，两种投资方式有一个非常重大的会计差异。
In our controlled companies, (defined as those in which Berkshire owns more than 50% of the shares), the earnings of each business flow directly into the operating earnings that we report to you. What you see is what you get.
我们控股的企业(也就是伯克希尔持有50％以上股权的公司)，各个业务的收益都会直接计入我们报告的经营收益中。各位股东所见即所得。
In the non-controlled companies, in which we own marketable stocks, only the dividends that Berkshire receives are recorded in the operating earnings we report. The retained earnings? They’re working hard and creating much added value, but not in a way that deposits those gains directly into Berkshire’s reported earnings.
At almost all major companies other than Berkshire, investors would not find what we’ll call this “non-recognition of earnings” important. For us, however, it is a standout omission, of a magnitude that we lay out for you below.
除伯克希尔外的所有大企业，投资者都不会看到我们所说的至关重要的”未被认可收益”。但对于我们而言，这却是一项非常重要且不容忽视的遗漏，详述如下。
Here, we list our 10 largest stock-market holdings of businesses. The list distinguishes between their earnings that are reported to you under GAAP accounting - these are the dividends Berkshire receives from those 10 investees - and our share, so to speak, of the earnings the investees retain and put to work. Normally, those companies use retained earnings to expand their business and increase its efficiency. Or sometimes they use those funds to repurchase significant portions of their own stock, an act that enlarges Berkshire’s share of the company’s future earnings.
在这里，我们列出我们在股票市场上持股最大的10家企业。该表格分别列出了，根据GAAP会计准则向你报告的收益，也就是伯克希尔从这10个投资对象那里获得的股息，以及我们在投资对象保留并投入运营的收益中所占的份额。通常情况下，这些公司会利用留存收益来扩展业务并提高效率。有时他们用这些资金回购自己的股票中的很大一部分，此举扩大了伯克希尔在其未来收益中应占的份额。
| Company | Yearend Ownership | Dividends of Berkshire’s Share (in millions) (1) | Retained Earnings of Berkshire’s Share (in millions) (2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Express | 18.7% | $ 261 | $ 998 |
| Apple | 5.7% | 773 | 2,519 |
| Bank of America | 10.7% | 682 | 2,167 |
| Bank of New York Mellon | 9.0% | 101 | 288 |
| Coca-Cola | 9.3% | 640 | 194 |
| Delta Airlines | 11.0% | 114 | 416 |
| J.P.Morgan Chase | 1.9% | 216 | 476 |
| Moody’s | 13.1% | 55 | 137 |
| U.S.Bancorp | 9.7% | 251 | 407 |
| Wells Fargo | 8.4% | 705 | 730 |
| Total | $ 3,798 | $ 8,332 |
(1) Based on current annual rate.
(1) 股息基于当前分红率计算。
(2) Based on 2019 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.
Obviously, the realized gains we will eventually record from partially owning each of these companies will not neatly correspond to “our” share of their retained earnings. Sometimes, alas, retentions produce nothing. But both logic and our past experience indicate that from the group we will realize capital gains at least equal to - and probably better than - the earnings of ours that they retained.(When we sell shares and realize gains, we will pay income tax on the gain at whatever rate then prevails. Currently, the federal rate is 21%.)
显然，我们最终将从这些部分拥有的企业中获得的已实现收益，并不能完全等同于”我们”在其留存收益中应占的份额。虽然有时会遗憾，我们并未从留存收益获得任何利益。但逻辑常识和我们过往的经验表明，我们将从整个投资组合中实现的资本收益，至少等于(甚至高于)我们在他们留存收益中应占的份额。(当我们最终出售股票实现收益时，我们必须按照当时的税率缴纳联邦所得税，目前的适用税率为21％。)
It is certain that Berkshire’s rewards from these 10 companies, as well as those from our many other equity holdings, will manifest themselves in a highly irregular manner. Periodically, there will be losses, sometimes company-specific, sometimes linked to stock-market swoons. At other times - last year was one of those - our gain will be outsized. Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshire’s value.
可以肯定地说，伯克希尔从这10家公司以及我们持有的许多其他股权中所获得的回报，未来将以一种非常不规则的方式呈现出来。有时可能是企业自身的问题，有时可能是股市暴跌的缘故，亏损总会周期性出现。在另外一些时期当中(比如去年)，我们的收益将是爆炸式的增长。整体而言，我们投资企业的留存收益，对于伯克希尔价值的增长无疑是具有重大意义的。
Mr.Smith got it right.
史密斯先生是完全正确的。
Non-Insurance Operations 非保险业务
Tom Murphy, a valued director of Berkshire and an all-time great among business managers, long ago gave me some important advice about acquisitions: “To achieve a reputation as a good manager, just be sure you buy good businesses.”
Over the years Berkshire has acquired many dozens of companies, all of which I initially regarded as “good businesses.” Some, however, proved disappointing; more than a few were outright disasters. A reasonable number, on the other hand, have exceeded my hopes.
In reviewing my uneven record, I’ve concluded that acquisitions are similar to marriage: They start, of course, with a joyful wedding - but then reality tends to diverge from pre-nuptial expectations. Sometimes, wonderfully, the new union delivers bliss beyond either party’s hopes. In other cases, disillusionment is swift. Applying those images to corporate acquisitions, I’d have to say it is usually the buyer who encounters unpleasant surprises. It’s easy to get dreamy-eyed during corporate courtships.
回顾我时好时坏的投资记录时，我得出的结论是，一桩收购就好比是一场婚姻：当然，它们都是始于一场盛大的婚礼，但随后的现实往往与婚前的期望大不相同。美妙的是，有时新婚夫妇带来的幸福会超出双方的期望。而有时期望的幻灭也非常迅速。将这些画面放到公司收购上面，我不得不说，通常是收购方遭遇了令人不快的意外。在追求收购的阶段，人们总是容易满眼充满了梦幻般的期待。
Pursuing that analogy, I would say that our marital record remains largely acceptable, with all parties happy with the decisions they made long ago. Some of our tie-ups have been positively idyllic. A meaningful number, however, have caused me all too quickly to wonder what I was thinking when I proposed.
按照这个类比，我想说，我们的”婚姻”记录基本上令人满意，各方都对各自很久之前做出的决定感到高兴。我们的一些合作关系如同田园般惬意。但一个严肃的数字让我很快就想知道，我在”求婚”时到底在想些什么。
Fortunately, the fallout from many of my errors has been reduced by a characteristic shared by most businesses that disappoint: As the years pass, the “poor” business tends to stagnate, thereupon entering a state in which its operations require an ever-smaller percentage of Berkshire’s capital. Meanwhile, our “good” businesses often tend to grow and find opportunities for investing additional capital at attractive rates. Because of these contrasting trajectories, the assets employed at Berkshire’s winners gradually become an expanding portion of our total capital.
幸运的是，我的许多错误所带来的影响，已经被大多数企业所共有的一个令人失望特点所抵消：随着时间的推移，“糟糕”的企业往往会趋于停滞，进而进入一种状态：其业务运营所需的伯克希尔资本占比越来越小。与此同时，“优秀”的企业往往会继续增长，并找到以有吸引力的回报投资更多资本的机会。由于这两种截然相反的轨迹，伯克希尔的投资赢家使用的资本在我们总资本中的占比不断扩大。
As an extreme example of those financial movements, witness Berkshire’s original textile business. When we acquired control of the company in early 1965, this beleaguered operation required nearly all of Berkshire’s capital. For some time, therefore, Berkshire’s non-earning textile assets were a huge drag on our overall returns. Eventually, though, we acquired a spread of “good” businesses, a shift that by the early 1980s caused the dwindling textile operation to employ only a tiny portion of our capital.
作为这些金融变迁的一个极端例子，伯克希尔最初的纺织业务就是明证。我们于1965年初获得了该公司的控制权，而这个陷入困境的业务几乎需要伯克希尔的全部资本。因此，在一个时期内，伯克希尔的未能盈利的纺织资产给我们的总体回报造成了严重的拖累。不过，最终我们收购了一批”优秀”的企业，到1980年代初，这种转变使得日益萎缩的纺织业务仅占用了我们一小部分资本。
Today, we have most of your money deployed in controlled businesses that achieve good-to-excellent returns on the net tangible assets each requires for its operations. Our insurance business has been the superstar. That operation has special characteristics that give it a unique metric for calibrating success, one unfamiliar to many investors. We will save that discussion for the next section.
今天，我们将你们的大部分资本，部署在运营所需的净有形资产基础上获得良好乃至优异回报的控股企业之中。我们的保险业务一直是超级巨星。这一业务具有特殊的特点，赋予其衡量成功与否的独特指标，这对许多投资者来说是陌生的。我们将在下一节再作具体讨论。
In the paragraphs that follow, we group our wide array of non-insurance businesses by size of earnings, after interest, depreciation, taxes, non-cash compensation, restructuring charges - all of those pesky, but very real, costs that CEOs and Wall Street sometimes urge investors to ignore. Additional information about these operations can be found on pages K-6 - K-21 and pages K-40 - K-52.
在接下来的几段中，我们将各种非保险业务按收益规模分组，有关这些业务的更多信息请参阅详细年报。(收益扣除利息支出、折旧费用、税项、非现金支出、重组费用等所有这些令人讨厌但非常真实的成本，而公司CEO们和华尔街有时会告诉投资者们不要理会这些成本)。
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) - the two lead dogs of Berkshire’s non-insurance group - earned a combined $8.3 billion in 2019 (including only our 91% share of BHE), an increase of 6% from 2018.
Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate earnings in 2019 of $4.8 billion, little changed from what these companies earned in 2018.
接下来的五家非保险子公司ClaytonHomes、International MetalWorking、Lubrizol、Marmon和Precision Castpart在2019年的合计收益为48亿美元，与2018年相比几无变化。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Berkshire Hathaway Automotive, Johns Manville, NetJets, Shaw and TTI) earned $1.9 billion last year, up from the $1.7 billion earned by this tier in 2018.
按上述排名再接下来的5家子公司包括BH Automotive、Johns Manville、NetJets、Shaw和TTI，2019年合计收益为19亿美元，高于2018年的17亿美元。
The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns - and there are many - had aggregate earnings of $2.7 billion in 2019, down from $2.8 billion in 2018.
Our total net income in 2019 from the non-insurance businesses we control amounted to $17.7 billion, an increase of 3% from the $17.2 billion this group earned in 2018. Acquisitions and dispositions had almost no net effect on these results.
I must add one final item that underscores the wide scope of Berkshire’s operations. Since 2011, we have owned Lubrizol, an Ohio-based company that produces and markets oil additives throughout the world. On September 26, 2019, a fire originating at a small next-door operation spread to a large French plant owned by Lubrizol.
我必须补充最后一点，强调伯克希尔的广泛业务范围。2011年，我们收购了总部位于俄亥俄州的Lubrizol公司，这是一家在全球范围内生产和销售石油添加剂的公司。2019年9月26日，Lubrizol旗下一家法国大型工厂被隔壁一家小型企业引发的火灾波及。
The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive.
这场大火造成了重大的财产损失和业务中断。即使如此，公司将获得大额保险追偿，从而减轻公司的财产损失和业务中断损失。
But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by … uh, Berkshire.
但是，正如已故的保罗·哈维(PaulHarvey)在他著名的广播节目中所说的，“接下来故事如下。” Lubrizol投保的最大的保险公司之一是伯克希尔旗下的公司。
In Matthew 6:3, the Bible instructs us to “Let not the left hand know what the right hand doeth.” Your chairman has clearly behaved as ordered.
在马太福音6-3中，圣经指示我们：“你施舍的时候，不要故意让别人看到你做了什么。” 你们的董事长显然是遵照了圣经的嘱咐。
Property/Casualty Insurance 财产意外险业务
Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest P/C company in the world as measured by net worth. Insurance is a business of promises, and Berkshire’s ability to honor its commitments is unmatched.
自1967年以来，财产意外险业务一直是推动伯克希尔业绩增长的引擎。1967年，伯克希尔以860万美元收购了国民保险及其姊妹公司国民火灾及海事保险公司。如今，以净资产衡量，国民保险是世界上最大的财产意外险公司。保险业务重在履行承诺，而伯克希尔履行承诺的能力是无与伦比的。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.
我们被财产意外险业务吸引的原因之一是该行业的商业模式：保险公司先收取保费然后支付索赔。在极端情况下，比如接触石棉或严重的工作场所事故，一些保险赔付可能持续数十年。
This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums - money we call “float” - that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
这种”先收后付”的模式让保险公司持有大笔资金，我们称之为”浮存金”，这些资金最终会赔付给其他人。与此同时，保险公司会使用这笔浮存金投资获利。虽然单个保单和索赔来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模相对于保费收入保持相对稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也随之增长。下表所示为浮存金具体增长情况：
| Year | Float (in millions) |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
| 2018 | 122,732 |
| 2019 | 129,423 |
We may in time experience a decline in float. If so,the decline will be very gradual - at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.
随着时间的推移，我们可能会遭遇浮存金下滑。如果出现下滑，下滑幅度将是非常缓慢的，任一年度整体下滑最多不超过3％。我们的保险合同的性质决定了，我们永远不会受到对我们拥有的现金资源具有重大意义的短期或即时的偿付需求。这种结构是精心设计的，是我们保险公司无与伦比的财务实力的关键组成部分。这种能力绝不会受到冲击。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money - and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果保费收入超过我们的运营费用和最终赔付总额，我们的保险业务将录得承保盈利，这将增加浮存金产生的投资收益。当我们赚得这样的利润时，我们就可以享受使用免费的资金，而且更好的是，我们还会因为持有这些资金而获得报酬。
For the P/C industry as a whole, the financial value of float is now far less than it was for many years. That’s because the standard investment strategy for almost all P/C companies is heavily - and properly - skewed toward high-grade bonds. Changes in interest rates therefore matter enormously to these companies, and during the last decade the bond market has offered pathetically low rates.
对于整个财产意外险行业而言，目前浮存金的财务价值远低于多年前的水平。这是因为几乎所有财产意外险公司的标准投资策略都严重且恰当地倾向于高等级债券。因此，利率的变化对这些公司至关重要，而在过去十年里，债券市场提供的利率低得可怜。
Consequently, insurers suffered, as year by year they were forced - by maturities or issuer-call provisions - to recycle their “old” investment portfolios into new holdings providing much lower yields. Where once these insurers could safely earn 5 cents or 6 cents on each dollar of float, they now take in only 2 cents or 3 cents (or even less if their operations are concentrated in countries mired in the never-never land of negative rates).
由于债券到期日或发行人赎回条款的原因，保险公司年复一年地被迫将其”旧”的投资组合转换为收益率更低的新投资组合，因此，保险公司不免受到了利率的影响。这些保险公司曾经可以安全地从每一美元的浮存金中赚取5-6美分，但现在他们只赚到2-3美分(如果他们的业务集中在深陷负利率泥潭的国家，甚至更少)。
Some insurers may try to mitigate their loss of revenue by buying lower-quality bonds or non-liquid “alternative” investments promising higher yields. But those are dangerous games and activities that most institutions are ill-equipped to play.
一些保险公司可能会试图通过购买质量更低的债券或承诺高收益的非流动性”非标”投资来减缓收入的下滑。但是，这些都是危险的游戏和活动，大多数机构都没有足够的能力来应对(没有足够流动性来应付赔付)。
Berkshire’s situation is more favorable than that of insurers in general. Most important, our unrivaled mountain of capital, abundance of cash and a huge and diverse stream of non-insurance earnings allow us far more investment flexibility than is generally available to other companies in the industry. The many choices open to us are always advantageous - and sometimes have presented us with major opportunities.
伯克希尔的情况比一般保险公司要好。最重要的是，我们无与伦比的巨额资本、充裕的现金和多样化的非保险收益流，使我们拥有远高于业内其他公司的投资灵活性。我们拥有更多投资选择总是有利的，有时还会给我们带来重大的投资机会。
Our P/C companies have meanwhile had an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 16 of the last 17 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was a whopping $3.2 billion. For the entire 17-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled $27.5 billion, of which $400 million was recorded in 2019.
与此同时，我们的财产意外险业务有着出色的承保记录。在过去的17年里，伯克希尔有16年实现了承保盈利，只有2017年是个例外，当时我们的税前亏损高达32亿美元。在整整17年的时间里，我们的税前收益总计275亿美元，其中2019年录得4亿美元。
That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the rewards of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
这一记录并非偶然：严守纪律的风险评估是我们保险经理日常关注的焦点，他们知道，糟糕的承保业绩可能会淹没浮存金的投资回报。所有保险公司都只是嘴上说说而已。但在伯克希尔，这是一种老式宗教般的信仰。
As I have repeatedly done in the past, I will emphasize now that happy outcomes in insurance are far from a sure thing: We will most certainly not have an underwriting profit in 16 of the next 17 years. Danger always lurks.
正如我过去反复做过的那样，我现在要强调的是，保险业的良好结果远非一件确定无疑的事情：在未来17年的16年里，我们几乎肯定不会每年都实现承保盈利。危险总是隐藏其中。
Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years - even decades - to surface and ripen. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur-perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as wind or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, Berkshire will get its share of the losses and they will be big - very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, handling the loss will not come close to straining our resources, and we will be eager to add to our business the next day.
在评估保险风险方面的错误有可能是巨大的，有可能需要很多年甚至几十年的时间才能显现和成熟(想想石棉案)。一场使Katrina和Michael飓风相形见绌的大灾难将会发生，也许是明天，也许是几十年后。“最大的灾难”可能来自传统来源，如飓风或地震，也可能是完全出乎意料的事件，如网络攻击的灾难性后果超出了保险公司目前的预期。当这样的大灾难来袭时，伯克希尔就会承担其损失份额，而且损失将会很大，非常大。然而，与许多其他保险公司不同，处理损失不会使我们的流动性资源紧张，我们将渴望在第二天就增加业务。
Close your eyes for a moment and try to envision a locale that might spawn a dynamic P/C insurer. New York? London? Silicon Valley?
闭上眼睛，试着想象一个可能会出现一个精力充沛的财产意外险承保人的地方。纽约？伦敦？硅谷？
How about Wilkes-Barre?
威尔克斯-巴里(Wilkes-Barre)怎么样？
Late in 2012, Ajit Jain, the invaluable manager of our insurance operations, called to tell me that he was buying a tiny company-GUARD Insurance Group-in that small Pennsylvania city for S221 million (roughly its net worth at the time). He added that Sy Foguel, GUARD’s CEO, was going to be a star at Berkshire. Both GUARD and Sy were new names to me.
2012年末，我们保险业务非常宝贵的经理人阿吉特贾因(AjitJain)打电话告诉我，他将以2.21亿美元(大约是当时公司的账面价值)的价格收购宾夕法尼亚州那个小城的一家小公司：GUARD Insurance Group。他还说，GUARD的CEO-Sy Foguel将成为伯克希尔的明星。GUARD和Sy对我来说都是新名字。
Bingo and bingo: In 2019, GUARD had premium volume of $1.9 billion, up 379% since 2012, and also delivered a satisfactory underwriting profit. Since joining Berkshire, Sy has led the company into both new products and new regions of the country and has increased GUARD’s float by 265%.
转眼之间：2019年GUARD的保费收入达到19亿美元，较2012年增长了379％，承保盈利也令人满意。自从加入伯克希尔以来，Sy带领公司进入了新产品和新地区，并将GUARD的浮存金增加了265％。
In 1967, Omaha seemed an unlikely launching pad for a P/C giant. Wilkes-Barre may well deliver a similar surprise.
1967年，奥马哈似乎不太可能成为一个财产意外险的巨头跳板。Wilkes-Barre很可能会带来类似的惊喜。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy 伯克希尔能源公司
Berkshire Hathaway Energy is now celebrating its 20th year under our ownership. That anniversary suggests that we should be catching up with the company’s accomplishments.
We’ll start with the topic of electricity rates. When Berkshire entered the utility business in 2000, purchasing 76% of BHE, the company’s residential customers in Iowa paid an average of 8.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Prices for residential customers have since risen less than 1% a year, and we have promised that there will be no base rate price increases through 2028. In contrast, here’s what is happening at the other large investor-owned Iowa utility: Last year, the rates it charged its residential customers were 61% higher than BHE’s. Recently, that utility received a rate increase that will widen the gap to 70%.
我们就从电价这个话题开始。当伯克希尔在2000年进入公用事业领域时，它收购了BHE公司76％的股份，该公司在爱荷华州的居民客户的平均每度电价为8.8美分。自那之后，居民客户的电价每年上涨不到1％，我们承诺，到2028年基本电价不会上涨。相比之下，爱荷华州另一家大型投资者拥有的公司正发生的情况是：去年该公司对居民客户收取的电价比BHE高出61％。最近，公用事业公司的费率上涨，将使这一差距扩大到70％。
The extraordinary differential between our rates and theirs is largely the result of our huge accomplishments in converting wind into electricity. In 2021, we expect BHE’s operation to generate about 25.2 million megawatt-hours of electricity (MWh) in Iowa from wind turbines that it both owns and operates. That output will totally cover the annual needs of its lowa customers, which run to about 24.6 million MWh. In other words, our utility will have attained wind self-sufficiency in the state of Iowa.
我们的费率和他们之间的巨大差异，很大程度上是由于我们在将风能转化为电能方面取得的巨大成就。2021年，我们预计BHE在爱荷华州的运营，将通过其拥有和运营的风力涡轮机发电约2520万兆瓦时。这样的电力产量将完全满足其爱荷华州客户的年度需求，其年需求量约为2460万兆瓦时。换句话说，我们的公用事业公司将在爱荷华州实现风能自给自足。
In still another contrast, that other Iowa utility generates less than 10% of its power from wind. Furthermore, we know of no other investor-owned utility, wherever located, that by 2021 will have achieved a position of wind self-sufficiency. In 2000, BHE was serving an agricultural-based economy; today, three of its five largest customers are high-tech giants. I believe their decisions to site plants in lowa were in part based upon BHE’s ability to deliver renewable, low-cost energy.
另一个鲜明对比是，爱荷华州的另一家公用事业公司，风电占总发电量不到10％。此外，据我们所知，到2021年，无论在哪里，其他投资者拥有的公用事业公司都不可能实现风能自给自足。2000年，BHE服务于农业经济；如今公司的五大客户中有三个是高科技巨头。我认为，他们在爱荷华州建厂的决定，部分是基于BHE提供可再生、低成本能源的能力。
Of course, wind is intermittent, and our blades in Iowa turn only part of the time. In certain periods, when the air is still, we look to our non-wind generating capacity to secure the electricity we need. At opposite times, we sell the excess power that wind provides us to other utilities, serving them through what’s called “the grid.” The power we sell them supplants their need for a carbon resource - coal, say, or natural gas.
当然，风能是间歇能源，我们在爱荷华州的风机只运行了部分时间。在某些时段，当空气静止时，我们依靠非风力发电的能力来保证我们所需的电力。情况相反时，我们将风能提供给我们的多余电力出售给其他公用事业公司，通过所谓的”电网”为他们服务。我们卖给他们的电力替代了他们对碳资源的需求，比如煤或者天然气。
Berkshire Hathaway now owns 91% of BHE in partnership with Walter Scott, Jr. and Greg Abel. BHE has never paid Berkshire Hathaway a dividend since our purchase and has, as the years have passed, retained S28 billion of earnings. That pattern is an outlier in the world of utilities, whose companies customarily pay big dividends - sometimes reaching, or even exceeding, 80% of earnings. Our view: The more we can invest, the more we like it.
伯克希尔目前拥有91%的BHE是与小沃尔特·斯科特(WalterScott,Jr.)和[Greg_Abel|格雷格·阿贝尔]共同持有。自从我们收购以来，BHE从未向伯克希尔支付过股息，而且随着时间的推移，BHE保留了280亿美元的盈利。这种模式在公用事业领域是个异类，公用事业公司通常会支付高额股息，有时甚至超过80％的盈利。我们的观点是：我们可以投资的越多，我们就越青睐它。
Today, BHE has the operating talent and experience to manage truly huge utility projects - requiring investments of $100 billion or more - that could support infrastructure benefitting our country, our communities and our shareholders. We stand ready, willing and able to take on such opportunities.
今天，BHE拥有管理真正大型公用事业项目的人才和经验，这些基础设施项目需要1000亿美元或更多的投资，能够造福我们的国家、社区和我们的股东。我们随时准备、愿意和有能力接受这样的机会。
Investments 股票投资
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding - 325,442,152 shares - because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries the Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of $13.8 billion, an amount that represents Berkshire’s share of the audited net worth of Kraft Heinz at December 31, 2019. Please note, though, that the market value of our shares on that date was only $10.5 billion.
下表列出了截至去年年末我们所持市值最大的15只普通股。我们排除持有的[Kraft_Heinz|卡夫亨氏]，因为伯克希尔是其控股集团的一部分，所以必须用”权益法”对这笔投资进行核算。在资产负债表上，按GAAP会计准则，伯克希尔所持卡夫亨氏的股份价值138亿美元，这一数字代表了2019年末伯克希尔在卡夫亨氏经审计的账面价值中所占的份额。不过请注意，我们持有的卡夫亨氏市值仅为105亿美元。
| Shares* | Company | Percentage of Company Owned (12/31/19) | Cost** (in millions) | Market (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 18.7 | $ 1,287 | $ 18,874 |
| 250,866,566 | Apple Inc. | 5.7 | 35,287 | 73,667 |
| 947,760,000 | Bank of America Corp. | 10.7 | 12,560 | 33,380 |
| 81,488,751 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. | 9.0 | 3,696 | 4,101 |
| 5,426,609 | Charter Communications,Inc. | 2.6 | 944 | 2,632 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.3 | 1,299 | 22,140 |
| 70,910,456 | Delta Air Lines,Inc. | 11.0 | 3,125 | 4,147 |
| 12,435,814 | The Goldman Sachs Group,Inc. | 3.5 | 890 | 2,859 |
| 60,059,932 | JPMorgan Chase & Co. | 1.9 | 6,556 | 8,372 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 13.1 | 248 | 5,857 |
| 46,692,713 | Southwest Airlines Co. | 9.0 | 1,940 | 2,520 |
| 21,938,642 | United Continental Holdings Inc. | 8.7 | 1,195 | 1,933 |
| 149,497,786 | U.S.Bancorp | 9.7 | 5,709 | 8,864 |
| 10,239,160 | Visa Inc. | 0.6 | 349 | 1,924 |
| 345,688,918 | Wells Fargo & Company | 8.4 | 7,040 | 18,598 |
| Others*** | 28,215 | 38,159 | ||
| Total Equity Investments Carried at Market | $ 110,340 | $ 248,027 |
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
* 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金投资的持股。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
** 成本项为实际投资成本，也是计税依据
*** Includes $10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum Corporation consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock.
*** 其他项包括100亿美元西方石油的优先股和认股权证投资。
Charlie and I do not view the $248 billion detailed above as a collection of stock market wagers - dalliances to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” an earnings “miss,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.
查理和我并不认为以上2480亿美元股票投资是一系列股市赌博。我们不会因为”华尔街”的降级、预期美联储可能采取的行动、可能出现的政治动向、经济学家的预测，或者其他任何可能成为当前热门话题的东西，而结束持有这些股票。
What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These compannies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.
相反，我们把这些持仓看作是一个由我们部分拥有公司的集合。按加权计算，这些业务运营所需的净有形资产回报率超过20％。而且，这些公司赚取利润的同时，并没有过度举债。
Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared to the returns that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade - 2½% or even less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.
在任何情况下，那些大型、成熟且易于理解的企业的实现这种回报率都是非同寻常的。与很多投资者在过去十年里所接受的债券回报率相比(比如说30年期美国国债的收益率是2.5％或更低)，这些公司取得的回报率的确令人震惊。
Forecasting interest rates has never been our game, and Charlie and I have no idea what rates will average over the next year, or ten or thirty years. Our perhaps jaundiced view is that the pundits who opine on these subjects reveal, by that very behavior, far more about themselves than they reveal about the future.
预测未来利率走向从来都不是我们的游戏，查理和我不知道未来一年、十年或三十年的平均利率会是多少。我们或许有些偏见地认为，那些对这些话题上发表意见的砖家，恰恰是通过这种行为，揭示的更多是他们自己的愚蠢而非未来。
What we can say is that if something close to current rates should prevail over the coming decades and if corporate tax rates also remain near the low level businesses now enjoy, it is almost certain that equities will over time perform far better than long-term, fixed-rate debt instruments.
我们可以说的是，如果在未来几十年里，接近当前利率的利率占了上风，公司税也维持在当下享有的低水平，那么几乎可以肯定的是，随着时间的推移，股票的表现将远远好于长期固定利率债务工具。
That rosy prediction comes with a warning: Anything can happen to stock prices tomorrow. Occasionally, there will be major drops in the market, perhaps of 50% magnitude or even greater. But the combination of The American Tailwind, about which I wrote last year, and the compounding wonders described by Mr.Smith, will make equities the much better long-term choice for the individual who does not use borrowed money and who can control his or her emotions. Others? Beware!
这一乐观预测伴随着一项警告：明天的股价可能千变万化。有时股市会大幅暴跌，可能超过50％甚至更多。但对于那些不借钱炒股，并且能够控制自己情绪的人来说，去年我曾在文章中写过的”美国经济顺风车”，再加上史密斯所谓的”复利奇迹”，将使股票成为更好的长期投资选择。其他人呢？当心点吧！
The Road Ahead 未来之路
Three decades ago, my Midwestern friend, Joe Rosenfield, then in his 80s, received an irritating letter from his local newspaper. In blunt words, the paper asked for biographical data it planned to use in Joe’s obituary. Joe didn’t respond. So? A month later, he got a second letter from the paper, this one labeled “URGENT.”
30年前，我中西部的朋友Joe Rosenfield在80岁的时候，收到了当地一家报纸发来的一封令人恼火的信。报纸直截了当地要求Joe提供一些将在他讣告中使用的生平数据。Joe没有回信。接下来1个月后，他又收到了那家报纸发来的第二封信，而且还是封加急信。
Charlie and I long ago entered the urgent zone. That’s not exactly great news for us. But Berkshire shareholders need not worry: Your company is 100% prepared for our departure.
查理和我很早就已经进入了类似的”加急”阶段。对于我们来说，这显然不是什么喜讯。但是，伯克希尔的股东们不必焦虑：你的公司已经为我们的离开做好了百分百的准备。
The two of us base our optimism upon five factors. First, Berkshire’s assetsare deployed in an extraordinary variety of wholly or partly-owned businesses that, averaged out, earn attractive returns on the capital they use. Second, Berkshire’s positioning of its “controlled” businesses within a single entity endows it with some important and enduring economic advantages. Third, Berkshire’s financial affairs will uanfailingly be managed in a manner allowing the company to withstand external shocks of an extreme nature. Fourth, we possess skilled and devoted top managers for whom running Berkshire is far more than simply having a high-paying and/or prestigious job. Finally, Berkshire’s directors - your guardians - are constantly focused on both the welfare of owners and the nurturing of a culture that is rare among giant corporations. (The value of this culture is explored in Margin of Trust, a new book by Larry Cunningham and Stephanie Cuba that will be available at our annual meeting.)
我们之所以如此乐观，主要基于五大因素：第一，伯克希尔的资本被配置在各类全资或部分拥有的业务上，平均而言，其投入资本回报率很吸引人。第二，伯克希尔将其控股业务定位为一个单一实体，这赋予我们一些重要且持久的经济优势。第三，伯克希尔的财务事物管理将始终如一，使公司能够抵御极端外部事件的冲击。第四，我们拥有德才兼备的管理层。对于他们来说，管理伯克希尔远远不止是一份高薪和/或有声望的工作。第五，伯克希尔的董事们(股东的监护人)始终以股东利益为导向，并培育一种在大型企业中很罕见的文化。Larry Cunningham和Stephanie Cuba在合著的新书《信任边际》中，探讨了这种企业文化的价值。该书将在我们年会上首发。
Charlie and I have very pragmatic reasons for wanting to assure Berkshire’s prosperity in the years following our exit: The Mungers have Berkshire holdings that dwarf any of the family’s other investments, and I have a full 99% of my net worth lodged in Berkshire stock. I have never sold any shares and have no plans to do so. My only disposal of Berkshire shares, aside from charitable donations and minor personal gifts, took place in 1980, when I, along with other Berkshire stockholders who elected to participate, exchanged some of our Berkshire shares for the shares of an Illinois bank that Berkshire had purchased in 1969 and that, in 1980, needed to be offloaded because of changes in the bank holding company law.
还有一些特别实际的原因，促使查理和我想要确保伯克希尔在我们离开后的日子里继续繁荣昌盛：芒格家族持有的伯克希尔股票规模，远超过该家族的其他投资；而我高达99％的净资产都放在伯克希尔股票上。我从未卖出过伯克希尔的股票，以后也不打算这么做。除了慈善捐赠和少量个人礼物之外，我唯一一次处置伯克希尔股票是在1980年。当时我和其他参与的伯克希尔股东们一起，用我们的一些伯克希尔股票，交换了伯克希尔1969年收购的伊利诺伊州一家银行的股票。由于《银行控股公司法》的变化，1980年我们必须剥离该银行。
Today, my will specifically directs its executors - as well as the trustees who will succeed them in administering my estate after the will is closed - not to sell any Berkshire shares. My will also absolves both the executors and the trustees from liability for maintaining what obviously will be an extreme concentration of assets.
今天，我在遗嘱中特别指示其执行人，以及在遗嘱关闭后接替他们管理我的遗产的受托人，不要出售伯克希尔的股票。我的遗嘱还免除了遗嘱执行人和受托人，其维持资产过度集中的责任。
The will goes on to instruct the executors - and, in time, the trustees - to each year convert a portion of my A shares into B shares and then distribute the Bs to various foundations. Those foundations will be required to deploy their grants promptly. In all, I estimate that it will take 12 to 15 years for the entirety of the Berkshire shares I hold at my death to move into the market.
根据我的遗嘱，执行人和受托人每年会将我的一部分A股转换成B股，然后将B股分配给各个基金会。这些基金会将被要求迅速分配其所获得的赠款。总的来说，我估计在我去世后，我所持有的伯克希尔股票全部进入市场需要12-15年。
Absent my will’s directive that all my Berkshire shares should be held until their scheduled distribution dates, the “safe” course for both my executors and trustees would be to sell the Berkshire shares under their temporary control and reinvest the proceeds in U.S. Treasury bonds with maturities matching the scheduled dates for distributions. That strategy would leave the fiduciaries immune from both public criticism and the possibility of personal liability for failure to act in accordance with the “prudent man” standard.
如果没有我的遗嘱指示，我所有的伯克希尔股票都应该持有到预定的分配日期，我的遗嘱执行人和受托人最安全的路线是，出售他们临时控制下的伯克希尔股票，并且将其再投资于，到期日与预定分配日期相匹配的美国国债上。该策略将使受托人免受公众批评，也免受因未能按”审慎”标准行事而承担个人责任的可能性。
I myself feel comfortable that Berkshire shares will provide a safe and rewarding investment during the disposal period. There is always a chance - unlikely, but not negligible - that events will prove me wrong. I believe, however, that there is a high probability that my directive will deliver substantially greater resources to society than would result from a conventional course of action.
我个人感到安心的是，在处置期间伯克希尔股票将提供安全且有回报的投资。也许会发生一些事情证明我是错的，这种可能性虽然很低但也不能忽视。但我相信，我的指示很可能会为社会提供比传统方式多得多的资源。
Key to my “Berkshire-only” instructions is my faith in the future judgment and fidelity of Berkshire directors. They will regularly be tested by Wall Streeters bearing fees. At many companies, these super-salesmen might win. I do not, however, expect that to happen at Berkshire.
就我”仅限伯克希尔”的指示而言，其关键在于我对伯克希尔的董事们未来的判断力和忠诚度抱有信心。他们经常面临华尔街糖衣炮弹的考验。对许多公司来说，这些华尔街”超级销售员”可能会胜出。但我预计伯克希尔不会出现这种情况。
Boards of Directors 董事会
In recent years, both the composition of corporate boards and their purpose have become hot topics. Once, debate about the responsibilities of boards was largely limited to lawyers; today, institutional investors and politicians have weighed in as well.
近年来，企业董事会的构成及其宗旨都已成为人们关注的热点问题。曾经关于董事会责任的讨论主要局限于律师之间；而在今天，机构投资者和政界人士也加入了进来。
My credentials for discussing corporate governance include the fact that, over the last 62 years, I have served as a director of 21 publicly-owned companies (listed below). In all but two of them, I have represented asubstantial holding of stock. In a few cases, I have tried to implement important change.
就讨论企业治理的问题而言，我的资历包括，在过去62年里，我曾担任21家上市公司的董事。除了两家公司之外，我在其他公司中都持有大量股权。在少数情况下，我曾试图实施重要的改变。
Companies List: Berkshire, Blue Chip Stamps, Cap Cities-ABC, Coca-Cola, Data Documents, Dempster, General Growth, Gillette, Kraft Heinz, Maracaibo Oil, Munsingwear, Omaha National Bank, Pinkerton’s, Portland Gas Light, Salomon, Sanborn Map, Tribune Oil, U.S. Air, Vornado, Washington Post, Wesco Financial
(巴菲特担任过董事的公司：伯克希尔、蓝筹印花(Blue Chip Stamps)、大都会/ABC、可口可乐、数据文件(DataDocuments)、登普斯特(Dempster)、桑伯恩地图(Sanborn Map)、通用发展地产(General Growth)、[Gillette|吉列]、卡夫亨氏(Kraft Heinz)、Maracaibo Oil、Tribune Oil、万星威(Munsingwears)、奥马哈国民银行(Omaha National Bank)、平克顿(Pinkerton’s)、波特兰煤气(Portland Gas Light)、[Salomon_Brothers|所罗门]、全美航空(U.S.Airways)、沃拿多(Vornado)、华盛顿邮报(Washington Post)、威斯科金融(Wesco Financial))。
During the first 30 or so years of my services, it was rare to find a woman in the room unless she represented a family controlling the enterprise. This year, it should be noted, marks the 100th anniversary of the 19th Amendment, which guaranteed American women the right to have their voices heard in a voting booth. Their attaining similar status in a board room remains a work in progress.
在我服务于这些公司的前30年左右，董事会中很少会有女性，除非她代表着企业的控股家族。应该指出的是，今年是第19修正案出台100周年，该修正案保障了美国女性投票发声的权利。她们在董事会中获得类似地位的工作则仍在进行中。
Over the years, many new rules and guidelines pertaining to board composition and duties have come into being. The bedrock challenge for directors, nevertheless, remains constant: Find and retain a talented CEO - possessing integrity, for sure - who will be devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime. Often, that task is hard. When directors get it right, though, they need to do little else. But when they mess it up, …
多年以来，许多有关董事会组成和职责的新规则和指导方针已经出台。然而，董事们面临的根本挑战一如既往：找到并留住一位才华横溢的CEO(当然这位CEO具有诚实正直的品质)，并将其整个职业生涯都奉献给公司。通常情况下，这项任务是艰巨的。但是，一旦董事们做对这件事情，其他就什么都不用做了。但是，如果他们搞砸了这件事…
Audit committees now work much harder than they once did and almost always view the job with appropriate seriousness. Nevertheless, these committees remain no match for managers who wish to game numbers, an offense that has been encouraged by the scourge of earnings “guidance” and the desire of CEOs to “hit the number.” My direct experience (limited, thankfully) with CEOs who have played with a company’s numbers indicates that they were more often prompted by ego than by a desire for financial gain.
审计委员会现在比以往更加努力地工作，并且几乎总是以严苛的态度看待这项工作。尽管如此，这些委员会仍然不是那些希望玩数字游戏的经理人的对手，这种”犯罪行为”受到了收益”指导”的胁迫和CEO希望”达到预期数字”的愿望的鼓励。我与那些曾玩弄过公司业绩数字的CEO打交道的直接经验表明(谢天谢地经验有限)，他们通常是出于自负，而不是出于对经济利益的渴望。
Compensation committees now rely much more heavily on consultants than they used to. Consequently, compensation arrangemnents have become more complicated - what committee member wants to explain paying large fees year after year for a simple plan? - and the reading of proxy material has become a mind-numbing experience.
薪酬委员会现在比以往更加依赖顾问。因此，薪酬安排变得更加复杂，没有一个委员会成员想要去解释，为一个简单的薪酬计划年复一年地支付大笔费用，而且阅读代理材料已成为一种令人麻木的体验。
One very important improvement in corporate governance has been mandated: a regularly-scheduled “executive session” of directors at which the CEO is barred. Prior to that change, truly frank discussions of a CEO’s skills, acquisition decisions and compensation were rare.
Acquisition proposals remain a particularly vexing problem for board members. The legal orchestration for making deals has been refined and expanded (a word aptly describing attendant costs as well). But I have yet to see a CEO who craves an acquisition bring in an informed and articulate critic to argue against it. And yes, include me among the guilty.
收购提案对于董事会成员而言，仍然是一个特别棘手的问题。达成交易的法律流程已得到完善和扩展(这个词也恰当地描述了伴随的成本)。但是我还没有看到一位渴望进行收购的CEO会请来一位见多识广且能言善辩的批评家来反对收购。是的，这一点也包括我在内。
Overall, the deck is stacked in favor of the deal that’s coveted by the CEO and his/her obliging staff. It would be an interesting exercise for a company to hire two “expert” acquisition advisors, one pro and one con, to deliver his or her views on a proposed deal to the board - with the winning advisor to receive, say, ten times a token sum paid to the loser. Don’t hold your breath awaiting this reform: The current system, whatever its shortcomings for shareholders, works magnificently for CEOs and the many advisors and other professionals who feast on deals. A venerable caution will forever be true when advice from Wall Street is contemplated: Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.
总体而言，收购交易是CEO及其乐于助人的员工们垂涎已久的。对于一家公司来说，聘请两名”专家级”的收购顾问(一名赞成一名反对)向董事会传达他们对拟议交易的看法，这将是一项有趣的做法。比方说，最终意见胜出的顾问将获得失败的顾问十倍酬劳的奖励。但不要屏息期待这项改革的到来：当前的制度，无论对股东来说有什么缺点，对CEO、许多顾问、以及其他热衷于交易的专业人士来说都非常有效。当我们考虑到华尔街的建议时，一个古老的警告永远是正确的：不要问理发师你是否需要理发。
Over the years, board “independence” has become a new area of emphasis. One key point relating to this topic, though, is almost invariably overlooked: Director compensation has now soared to a level that inevitably makes pay a subconscious factor affecting the behavior of many non-wealthy members. Think, for a moment, of the director earning $250,000-300,000 for board meetings consuming a pleasant couple of days six or so times a year. Frequently, the possession of one such directorship bestows on its holder three to four times the annual median income of U.S. households. (I missed much of this gravy train: As a director of Portland Gas Light in the early 1960s, I received $100 annually for my service. To earn this princely sum, I commuted to Maine four times a year.)
多年来，董事会”独立性”已成为一个新的值得重视的领域。然而，与这个话题相关的一个关键点几乎总是被忽视，那就是现在飙升的董事的薪酬水平，不可避免地影响许多并不富裕董事成员潜意识的行为。试想一下，一位董事一年6次左右，在董事会上度过几天愉快的时光，就可以赚到25-30万美元。通常，拥有一个这样董事职位，其收入是美国家庭年收入中位数的3-4倍(我错过了许多赚钱的机会：在1960年代初，作为Portland Gas Light公司的董事，我每年收到100美元的服务费。为了赚到这笔可观的收入，我每年需要往返缅因州四次)。
And job security now? It’s fabulous. Board members may get politely ignored, but they seldom get fired. Instead, generous age limits - usually 70 or higher - act as the standard method for the genteel ejection of directors.
那现在的工作有保障吗？是的。董事会成员可能会被”礼貌地”忽视，但他们却很少被解雇。取而代之的是，慷慨的年龄限制(通常是70岁或更高)是礼貌解雇董事的标准方式。
Is it any wonder that a non-wealthy director (“NWD”) now hopes - or even yearns - to be asked to join a second board, thereby vaulting into the $500,000-600,000 class? To achieve this goal, the NWD will need help. The CEO of a company searching for board members will almnost certainly check with the NWD’s current CEO as to whether NWD is a “good” director. “Good,” of course, is a code word. If the NWD has seriously challenged his/her present CEO’s compensation or acquisition dreams, his or her candidacy will silently die. When seeking directors, CEOs don’t look for pit bulls. It’s the cocker spaniel that gets taken home.
难怪一位不怎么富有的董事(non-wealthy director，简称”NWD”)现在希望、甚至渴望被邀请加入第二家公司的董事会，从而帮助自己跃升至50-60万美元的收入阶层。为了实现这一目标，NWD将需要一些帮助。一家寻找董事会成员的公司CEO，几乎肯定会向NWD的现任CEO核实NWD是否是一个”好”董事。当然，所谓的”好”只是个暗号。如果NWD严重挑战现任CEO的薪酬或收购梦想，他的董事候选人资格将悄无声息地被抹去。在寻找董事时，CEO们并不是在寻找斗牛犬，只有乖乖的可卡犬才会被带回家。
Despite the illogic of it all, the director for whom fees are important - indeed, craved - is almost universally classified as “independent” while many directors possessing fortunes very substantially linked to the welfare of the corporation are deemed lacking in independence. Not long ago, I looked at the proxy material of a large American company and found that eight directors had never purchased a share of the company’s stock using their own money. (They, of course, had received grants of stock as a supplement to their generous cash compensation.) This particular company had long been a laggard, but the directors were doing wonderfully.
尽管这一切都不合逻辑，但对董事薪酬极其看重(甚至是渴望)的董事，如今几乎都被归类为”独立董事”，然而许多拥有与公司兴衰密切相关财富的董事，却被认为缺乏独立性。不久前，我查看了一家美国大公司的委托代理材料，发现有8名董事从未用自己的钱购买过该公司股票(当然，他们获得了股票激励，作为自己丰厚现金薪酬的补充)。这家公司长期以来一直表现落后，但董事们待遇却非常好。
Paid-with-my-own-money ownership, of course, does not create wisdom or ensure business smarts. Nevertheless, I feel better when directors of our portfolio companies have had the experience of purchasing shares with their savings, rather than simply having been the recipients of grants.
当然，用自己的钱购买股份并不能创造智慧，也不能确保商业成功。尽管如此，当我们投资组合公司的董事有用他们自己的钱去购买股票的经历，而不是仅仅接受赠款时，我会感觉更好。
Here, a pause is due: I’d like you to know that almost all of the directors I have met over the years have been decent, likable and intelligent. They dressed well, made good neighbors and were fine citizens. I’ve enjoyed their company. Among the group are some men and women that I would not have met except for our mutual board service and who have become close friends.
在这里，我应该停顿一下：我想让你知道，这些年来我遇到的几乎所有董事都很正派、讨人喜欢且聪明。他们穿着得体，是一位好邻居、也是一位好公民，我很享受和他们在一起。在这群人中，有一些除了我们共同的董事会服务，我是不会认识他们的，他们如今已经成为了我亲密的朋友。
Nevertheless, many of these good souls are people whom I would never have chosen to handle money or business matters. It simply was not their game.
尽管如此，这些善良的人中有许多是我永远不会选择来处理金钱或商业事务的人。因为这根本不是他们的游戏(能力圈)。
They, in turn, would never have asked me for help in removing a tooth, decorating their home or improving their golf swing. Moreover, if I were ever scheduled to appear on Dancing With the Stars, I would immediately seek refuge in the Witness Protection Program. We are all duds at one thing or another. For most of us, the list is long. The important point to recognize is that if you are Bobby Fischer, you must play only chess for money.
反过来，他们也永远不会在拔牙、装修房子或改善高尔夫球技方面向我求助。此外，如果我被安排参加”与星共舞”(Dancing with the Stars)节目，我会立即寻求证人保护计划的庇护。我们总会在这样或那样的一些事情上毫无建树。对于我们大多数人来说，这个清单会很长。但需要认识到的重要一点是，如果你是象棋棋手Bobby Fischer，你必须为了钱而下棋。
At Berkshire, we will continue to look for business-savvy directors who are owner-oriented and arrive with a strong specific interest in our company. Thought and principles, not robot-like “process,” will guide their actions. In representing your interests, they will, of course, seek managers whose goals include delighting their customers, cherishing their associates and acting as good citizens of both their communities and our country.
在伯克希尔，我们将继续寻找精通商业的董事，他们以股东利益为导向，并对我们的公司有强烈的特定兴趣。指导他们行动的是思想和原则，而不是机器人式的”程序”。当然在代表你的利益行使职责时，他们会寻找那些用心取悦客户、珍惜自己同事、努力成为自己所在社区和国家好公民的经理人。
Those objectives are not new. They were the goals of able CEOs sixty years ago and remain so. Who would have it otherwise?
这些目标并不新鲜。这是60年前有能力CEO们的目标，现在仍是如此。否则又有谁会具备这些能力呢？
Short Subjects 其他事项
In past reports, we’ve discussed both the sense and nonsense of stock repurchases. Our thinking, boiled down: Berkshire will buy back its stock only if a) Charlie and I believe that it is selling for less than it is worth and b) the company, upon completing the repurchase, is left with ample cash.
Calculations of intrinsic value are far from precise.Consequently, neither of us feels any urgency to buy an estimated $1 of value for a very real 95 cents. In 2019, the Berkshire price/value equation was modestly favorable at times, and we spent $5 billion in repurchasing about 1% of the company.
股票内在价值的计算很不精确。因此，以货真价实的95美分去购买估值1美元的资产，我们两人都不觉得有任何紧迫性。2019年，伯克希尔的价格/价值等式有时是适度有利于回购，我们花了50亿美元回购了公司约1％的股份。
Over time, we want Berkshire’s share count to go down. If the price-to-value discount (as we estimateit) widens, we will likely become more aggressive in purchasing shares. We will not, however, prop the stock at any level.
Shareholders having at least $20 million in value of A or B shares and an inclination to sell shares to Berkshire may wish to have their broker contact Berkshire’s Mark Millard at 402-346-1400. We request that you phone Mark between 8:00-8:30 a.m. or 3:00-3:30 p.m. Central Time, calling only if you are ready to sell.
持有价值至少2000万美元A/B类股，并有意向伯克希尔出售股票的股东，可能会希望他们的经纪人联系伯克希尔的MarkMillard，电话是402-346-1400。只有当你打定主意出售股票的情况下才能拨打电话，请在美国中部时间上午8:00-8:30或下午3:00-3:30之间给拨打。
In 2019, Berkshire sent $3.6 billion to the U.S. Treasury to pay its current income tax. The U.S. government collected $243 billion from corporate income tax payments during the same period. From these statistics, youI can take pride that your company delivered 1½% of the federal income taxes paid by all of corporate America.
2019年，伯克希尔向美国财政部汇出36亿美元，用于支付当期所得税。同期，美国政府征收了2430亿美元的企业所得税。从这些统计数据中，你可以为你的公司缴纳了美国所有公司联邦所得税的1.5％而感到自豪。
Fifty-five years ago, when Berkshire entered its current incarnation, the company paid nothing in federal income tax. (For good reason, too: Over the previous decade, the struggling business had recorded a net loss.) Since then, as Berkshire retained nearly all of its earnings, the beneficiaries of that policy became not only the company’s shareholders but also the federal government. In most future years, we both hope and expect to send far larger sums to the Treasury.
55年前，当伯克希尔被现有管理层接手时，公司无需缴纳任何联邦所得税(这也是有充分理由的：因为此前十年，这家陷入困境的公司录得净亏损)。从那时起，由于伯克希尔保留了几乎所有的收益，这项政策的受益者已不仅仅是公司股东，也包括联邦政府。在未来的多数年份里，我们都希望并期待着向财政部缴纳更大的金额。
On pages A-2 - A-3, you will find details about our annual meeting, which will be held on May 2, 2020. Yahoo, as usual, will be streaming the event worldwide. There will be one important change, however, in our format: I’ve had suggestions from shareholders, media and board members that Ajit Jain and Greg Abel - our two key operating managers - be given more exposure at the meeting. That change makes great sense. They are outstanding individuals, both as managers and as human beings, and you should hear more from them.
我们将于2020年5月2日召开年会，在年报中您可以找到详细信息。像往常一样，雅虎将在全球范围内直播这一活动。然而，我们的形式将有一个重要的变化：我收到了股东、媒体和董事会成员建议，让我们的两位关键运营经理阿吉特·贾因(AjitJain)和[Greg_Abel|格雷格·阿贝尔]在年会上有更多的出境率。这一变化非常有意义。无论是作为经理人还是个人，他们都是杰出的个体，你应该从他们那里听到更多。
Shareholders who this year send a question to be asked by our three long-serving journalists may specify that it be posed to Ajit or Greg. They, like Charlie and me, will not have even a hint of what the questions will be.
今年向我们三名长期服务的记者提出问题的股东，可以指定向阿吉特或格雷格提问。他们就像查理和我一样，将完全不知道这些问题会是什么。
The journalists will alternate questions with those from the audience, who also can direct questions to any of the four of us. So polish up your zingers.
记者将与观众轮流提问，观众也可以直接向我们四个人中的任何一个提问。所以，请准备好你的俏皮话。
On May 2nd, come to Omaha. Meet your fellow capitalists. Buy some Berkshire products. Have fun. Charlie and I - along with the entire Berkshire gang - are looking forward to seeing you.
February 22,2020
Warren E.Buffett
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席