原文信息：
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | 12.0 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.4 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 6.5 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | (6.2) | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | 4.6 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 8.3 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | 6.4 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 10.7 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 23.0 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965—2017 | 19.1% | 20.9% | 9.9% |
| Overall Gain — 1964—2017 | 1,088,029% | 2,404,748% | 15,508% |
Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2017 was 19 to $211,750, a rate of 19.1% compounded annually.1
2017年伯克希尔的账面价值增长了653亿美元，A/B股每股账面价值增长23%(标普21.8%)。自现任管理层接手的53年来，每股账面价值已从19美元增至211750美元，年均复合增长率约为19.1%。
The format of that opening paragraph has been standard for 30 years. But 2017 was far from standard: A large portion of our gain did not come from anything we accomplished at Berkshire.
The 36 billion came from Berkshire’s operations. The remaining $29 billion was delivered to us in December when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code. (Details of Berkshire’s tax-related gain appear on page K-32 and pages K-89 — K-90.)
尽管如此，650亿美元的收益是实实在在的，这一点大可放心，但只有360亿美元来自伯克希尔的运营。其余的290亿美元是国会去年12月重修美国税法所赐。
After stating those fiscal facts, I would prefer to turn immediately to discussing Berkshire’s operations. But, in still another interruption, I must first tell you about a new accounting rule — a generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) — that in future quarterly and annual reports will severely distort Berkshire’s net income figures and very often mislead commentators and investors.
在陈述这些重要的财务事实之后，按惯例我应该立即开始讨论伯克希尔的运营情况。但是，我必须再引入一段插曲，向各位介绍一个GAAP会计准则新变化，这个变化将严重扭曲伯克希尔未来的季度和年度净收益数字，并常常误导评论家和投资者。
The new rule says that the net change in unrealized investment gains and losses in stocks we hold must be included in all net income figures we report to you. That requirement will produce some truly wild and capricious swings in our GAAP bottom-line. Berkshire owns 10 billion or more within a quarterly reporting period. Including gyrations of that magnitude in reported net income will swamp the truly important numbers that describe our operating performance. For analytical purposes, Berkshire’s “bottom-line” will be useless.
新准则规定，我们所持有股票的未实现投资损益的净变动，都必须被纳入到我们向各位报告的全部净收益数字中。按这一要求，我们基于GAAP报表最后一栏的净收益数字将会出现一些真正变化巨大且无常的波动。伯克希尔持有1700亿美元的按市值计价的股票(不含卡夫亨氏的持股)，这些持股的市值在一个季度报告期中，极易出现100亿美元以上的波动。在最终报告的净收益数字中，包含如此幅度的波动，将会模糊我们真正重要的经营性收益数字。出于分析的目的，伯克希尔最终报告的净收益数字将变得毫无意义。
The new rule compounds the communication problems we have long had in dealing with the realized gains (or losses) that accounting rules compel us to include in our net income. In past quarterly and annual press releases, we have regularly warned you not to pay attention to these realized gains, because they — just like our unrealized gains — fluctuate randomly.
新准则还加剧了我们长期以来关于报告收益的解释问题，因为GAAP要求一直要求我们必须将已实现的投资损益计入报告收益，而在过去的季报和年报中，我们一再告诫大家不要过度关注这些已实现投资损益，因为它们其实和未实现投资损益一样，都是随机波动的。
That’s largely because we sell securities when that seems the intelligent thing to do, not because we are trying to influence earnings in any way. As a result, we sometimes have reported substantial realized gains for a period when our portfolio, overall, performed poorly (or the converse).
这在很大程度上是因为，我们只在明智的时候才会出售股票，而不是试图以任何方式去影响当期收益。因此，当我们的投资组合的整体表现不佳(或极好)的一段时期内，我们有时却实现了大量投资收益。
With the new rule about unrealized gains exacerbating the distortion caused by the existing rules applying to realized gains, we will take pains every quarter to explain the adjustments you need in order to make sense of our numbers. But televised commentary on earnings releases is often instantaneous with their receipt, and newspaper headlines almost always focus on the year-over-year change in GAAP net income. Consequently, media reports sometimes highlight figures that unnecessarily frighten or encourage many readers or viewers.
关于未实现资本损益的的新准则，加剧了适用于已实现投资损益的现有准则所造成的业绩扭曲，所以，我们将在每个季度不厌其烦地进行解释你所需做出的调整，以便理解报告数字的真正意义。但电视财经节目对收益的评论往往都是报告的即时收益，而报纸头条几乎只关注GAAP收益的同比变化。因此，媒体报道有时会过度强调那些能够抓住受众眼球的数字，而这些数字会不必要引起他们的恐慌或激励。
We will attempt to alleviate this problem by continuing our practice of publishing financial reports late on Friday, well after the markets close, or early on Saturday morning. That will allow you maximum time for analysis and give investment professionals the opportunity to deliver informed commentary before markets open on Monday. Nevertheless, I expect considerable confusion among shareholders for whom accounting is a foreign language.
为了缓解这一问题，我们会一直坚持在周五晚间收盘以后或周六早晨发布财报。这样就可以让大家有尽可能多的时间来进行分析，让投资专家们有机会在周一开盘前发表深入的分析。尽管如此，我预计对于会计像是一门外语的股东来说，仍会有相当大的困惑。
At Berkshire what counts most are increases in our normalized per-share earning power. That metric is what Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I focus on — and we hope that you do, too. Our scorecard for 2017 follows.
Acquisitions 并购
There are four building blocks that add value to Berkshire: (1) sizable stand-alone acquisitions; (2) bolt-on acquisitions that fit with businesses we already own; (3) internal sales growth and margin improvement at our many and varied businesses; and (4) investment earnings from our huge portfolio of stocks and bonds. In this section, we will review 2017 acquisition activity.
伯克希尔增加内在价值的四大要素：(1)大规模独立收购；(2)与我们现有业务相匹配的补强收购；(3)在我们众多不同业务内部的销售和利润率增长；(4)我们庞大的股票和债券投资组合所产生的投资收益。在本节中，我们将回顾2017年的并购活动。
In our search for new stand-alone businesses, the key qualities we seek are durable competitive strengths; able and high-grade management; good returns on the net tangible assets required to operate the business; opportunities for internal growth at attractive returns; and, finally, a sensible purchase price.
That last requirement proved a barrier to virtually all deals we reviewed in 2017, as prices for decent, but far from spectacular, businesses hit an all-time high. Indeed, price seemed almost irrelevant to an army of optimistic purchasers.
事实证明，对于我们复盘的2017年几乎所有的并购交易来说，最后一项要求都是一个障碍。因为那些价格体面但远非惊艳的业务，其并购价格都创下了历史新高。事实上，对于那些乐观的收购者而言，价格似乎已经无关紧要。
Why the purchasing frenzy? In part, it’s because the CEO job self-selects for “can-do” types. If Wall Street analysts or board members urge that brand of CEO to consider possible acquisitions, it’s a bit like telling your ripening teenager to be sure to have a normal sex life.
为什么会出现如此疯狂的收购热潮？在一定程度上，这是CEO这样一种职位自身的特性使然，因为只有那些”敢干”的人才能上位。如果华尔街分析师和董事会敦促该品牌的CEO考虑可能的并购交易，这就有点像告诉成长中的青少年一定要有正常的性生活一样。
Once a CEO hungers for a deal, he or she will never lack for forecasts that justify the purchase. Subordinates will be cheering, envisioning enlarged domains and the compensation levels that typically increase with corporate size. Investment bankers, smelling huge fees, will be applauding as well. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.) If the historical performance of the target falls short of validating its acquisition, large “synergies” will be forecast. Spreadsheets never disappoint.
一旦CEO渴望达成交易，他/她将永远不会缺乏证明其收购合理性的预测报告。下属们想到伴随企业规模的扩大，自己管理范围和薪酬水平将得到提高，自然欢呼雀跃。嗅到了巨额服务费用的投资银行家也将为此鼓掌，(永远不要问理发师是否需要理发)。如果收购对象的历史表现并不能证明是一个好的收购的对象，那么将预测会产生巨大的”协同效应”。总之，预测表格永远不会让人失望。
The ample availability of extraordinarily cheap debt in 2017 further fueled purchase activity. After all, even a high-priced deal will usually boost per-share earnings if it is debt-financed. At Berkshire, in contrast, we evaluate acquisitions on an all-equity basis, knowing that our taste for overall debt is very low and that to assign a large portion of our debt to any individual business would generally be fallacious (leaving aside certain exceptions, such as debt dedicated to Clayton’s lending portfolio or to the fixed-asset commitments at our regulated utilities). We also never factor in, nor do we often find, synergies.
2017年，大量极低成本的债务进一步推高并购的热情。毕竟，如果以债务融资进行收购，那么即使是高价收购，通常也会提高每股收益。相比之下，在伯克希尔我们在完全股权的基础上来评估收购，因为我们对整体债务的偏好非常低，而将大部分债务负担转移给任何一个具体业务的做法，通常都是错误的(除了某些例外，比如Clayton贷款投资组合债务，或者我们受监管公用事业业务以固定资产担保的债务)。同时，我们也从未考虑、也几乎没有见过所谓的”协同效应”。
Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need. We held this view 50 years ago when we each ran an investment partnership, funded by a few friends and relatives who trusted us. We also hold it today after a million or so “partners” have joined us at Berkshire.
多年来，虽然我们对杠杆的厌恶抑制了我们的回报率，但这让查理和我晚上睡得更踏实。我们都认为，为了获得你不需要的东西，而拿你已经拥有的和真正需要的东西去冒险，那简直是疯了。50年前，当我们以信任自己的亲朋好友为基础，各自建立自己的投资合伙公司时，秉持的就都是这同样的理念。在伯克希尔已经拥有了上百万的”合伙人”的今天，这份理念一如当初。
Despite our recent drought of acquisitions, Charlie and I believe that from time to time Berkshire will have opportunities to make very large purchases. In the meantime, we will stick with our simple guideline: The less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own.
We were able to make one sensible stand-alone purchase last year, a 38.6% partnership interest in Pilot Flying J (“PFJ”). With about $20 billion in annual volume, the company is far and away the nation’s leading travel-center operator.
PFJ has been run from the get-go by the remarkable Haslam family. “Big Jim” Haslam began with a dream and a gas station 60 years ago. Now his son, Jimmy, manages 27,000 associates at about 750 locations throughout North America. Berkshire has a contractual agreement to increase its partnership interest in PFJ to 80% in 2023; Haslam family members will then own the remaining 20%. Berkshire is delighted to be their partner.
Pilot一直由非凡的Haslam家族管理。60年前Big Jim Haslam靠着一个加油站和一腔梦想奠定了起点，现在他的儿子Jimmy在覆盖北美750处地点管理着2.7万名员工。伯克希尔与Pilot已经达成协议，2023年将其拥有的PFJ合伙权益提高到80%。到那时，Haslam家族将拥有余下的20%，伯克希尔非常高兴成为他们的合伙人。
When driving on the Interstate, drop in. PFJ sells gasoline as well as diesel fuel, and the food is good. If it’s been a long day, remember, too, that our properties have 5,200 showers.
当你在州际公路上自驾，欢迎顺道来看看，PFJ既销售汽柴油燃料，也提供美味的食物。如果驾车一天，记得我们房间里还有5200个淋浴点。
Let’s move now to bolt-on acquisitions. Some of these were small transactions that I will not detail. Here is an account, however, of a few larger purchases whose closings stretched between late 2016 and early 2018.
- Clayton Homes acquired two builders of conventional homes during 2017, a move that more than doubled our presence in a field we entered only three years ago. With these additions — Oakwood Homes in Colorado and Harris Doyle in Birmingham — I expect our 2018 site built volume will exceed $1 billion.
克莱顿之家(ClaytonHomes)在2017年收购了两家传统住宅建筑商，这一动作让我们在三年前才开始涉足的领域的业务规模又增加了一倍多。拥有了这两个新增业务，即科罗拉多的OakwoodHomes和伯明翰的HarrisDoyle，我预计我们2018年的现场建造营收规模将超过10亿美元。
Clayton’s emphasis, nonetheless, remains manufactured homes, both their construction and their financing. In 2017 Clayton sold 19,168 units through its own retail operation and wholesaled another 26,706 units to independent retailers. All told, Clayton accounted for 49% of the manufactured-home market last year. That industry-leading share — about three times what our nearest competitor did — is a far cry from the 13% Clayton achieved in 2003, the year it joined Berkshire.
尽管如此，Clayton的业务重点依然是预制装配式房屋，包括制造业务和融资业务。2017年，Clayton通过自己的零售渠道售出了19168幢住宅，并向其他独立零售商批发出了26706幢。总的来说，Clayton去年在预制住宅的市场份额已经达到了49%。这样一个领先的份额大约是紧随其后竞争对手的三倍。要知道，2003年Clayton最初加入伯克希尔时的市场份额不过只有13%。
Both Clayton Homes and PFJ are based in Knoxville, where the Clayton and Haslam families have long been friends. Kevin Clayton’s comments to the Haslams about the advantages of a Berkshire affiliation, and his admiring comments about the Haslam family to me, helped cement the PFJ deal.
Clayton Homes和PFJ都位于Knoxville，在那里Clayton家族和Haslam家族维持着长期的友谊。正是Kevin Clayton向Haslam家族介绍了加入伯克希尔的种种优势，以及他对Haslam家族的赞扬帮助促成了PFJ收购交易。
- Near the end of 2016, Shaw Industries, our floor coverings business, acquired U.S. Floors (“USF”), a rapidly growing distributor of luxury vinyl tile. USF’s managers, Piet Dossche and Philippe Erramuzpe, came out of the gate fast, delivering a 40% increase in sales in 2017, during which their operation was integrated with Shaw’s. It’s clear that we acquired both great human assets and business assets in making the USF purchase.
在2016年底，我们的地面业务子公司ShawIndustries收购了快速成长的高端乙烯基地板经销商USF (U.S.Floors)。USF的两位经理人PietDossche和PhilippeErramuzpe迅速脱颖而出，公司2017年的销售额增长了40%，在此期间，他们的业务被完美整合到Shaw业务之中。显然，我们在USF的交易中获得了优质的商业资产和人力资产。
Vance Bell, Shaw’s CEO, originated, negotiated and completed this acquisition, which increased Shaw’s sales to $5.7 billion in 2017 and its employment to 22,000. With the purchase of USF, Shaw has substantially strengthened its position as an important and durable source of earnings for Berkshire.
Shaw的CEO-VanceBell发起并参与谈判完成了收购，使得Shaw在2017年销售额增至57亿美元，员工数增至2.2万人。凭借着对USF的收购，Shaw大大强化了其作为伯克希尔一个重要而持久的盈利来源的地位。
- I have told you several times about HomeServices, our growing real estate brokerage operation. Berkshire backed into this business in 2000 when we acquired a majority interest in MidAmerican Energy (now named Berkshire Hathaway Energy). MidAmerican’s activities were then largely in the electric utility field, and I originally paid little attention to HomeServices.
我已经不止一次对你们谈到过我们持续增长的房地产经纪子公司HomeServices。2000年当我们收购[MidAmerican_Energy|中美能源]的控股股权时获得了这一业务。中美能源当时的主要活动主要集中在公用电力事业领域，我最初很少关注家庭服务公司。
But, year-by-year, the company added brokers and, by the end of 2016, HomeServices was the second-largest brokerage operation in the country — still ranking, though, far behind the leader, Realogy. In 2017, however, HomeServices’ growth exploded. We acquired the industry’s third-largest operator, Long and Foster; number 12, Houlihan Lawrence; and Gloria Nilson.
但该公司经纪人逐年增加，到2016年底，家庭服务公司已经成了全美第二大经纪公司，尽管仍远远落后于行业第一的Realogy公司。然而，2017年家庭服务公司实现了爆炸性增长。我们收购了行业第三的Long&Foster公司，排名第十二的HoulihanLawrence公司和GloriaNilson公司。
With those purchases we added 12,300 agents, raising our total to 40,950. HomeServices is now close to leading the country in home sales, having participated (including our three acquisitions pro-forma) in $127 billion of “sides” during 2017. To explain that term, there are two “sides” to every transaction; if we represent both buyer and seller, the dollar value of the transaction is counted twice.
通过这些收购我们增加了1.23万名经纪人，使得我们经纪人总数达到了40950人。家庭服务公司2017年完成了”双边”价值1270亿美元的房屋交易(包括3家新收购公司)，现在在住宅销售额方面已经有了挑战全美第一地位的本钱。这里需要做一个解释，每一笔交易都有所谓的”双边”，如果我们在一笔交易中，既代表买家也代表卖家，则交易的账面价值会被计算两次。
Despite its recent acquisitions, HomeServices is on track to do only about 3% of the country’s home-brokerage business in 2018. That leaves 97% to go. Given sensible prices, we will keep adding brokers in this most fundamental of businesses.
尽管进行了近期的这些收购，但公司在2018年的房屋经纪业务中预计只占全美市场份额的3%，还有97%等待去拓展。在价格合理的前提下，我们将继续扩大经纪人队伍，他们是这个业务的根基。
- Finally, Precision Castparts, a company built through acquisitions, bought Wilhelm Schulz GmbH, a German maker of corrosion resistant fittings, piping systems and components. Please allow me to skip a further explanation. I don’t understand manufacturing operations as well as I do the activities of real estate brokers, home builders or truck stops.
最后是通过收购壮大起来的精密机件公司(PrecisionCastparts)，收购了德国耐腐蚀配件、管道系统和零部件制造商威廉舒尔茨公司(Wilhelm Schulz GmbH)。在这里请允许我跳过该业务并做一点解释。我对制造业务的理解，不如我对房地产经纪、住宅建筑以及卡车停靠中心业务的理解。
Fortunately, I don’t need in this instance to bring knowledge to the table: Mark Donegan, CEO of Precision, is an extraordinary manufacturing executive, and any business in his domain is slated to do well. Betting on people can sometimes be more certain than betting on physical assets.
幸运的是，我在此刻不需要具备这样的专业知识，因为PCC的CEO-MarkDonegan是一位非凡的制造业管理人才，在他专业范围内的所有生意，他都能处理得井井有条。有时在人身上下注，要比在实物资产上下注更靠谱。
Let’s now move on to operations, beginning with property-casualty (“p/c”) insurance, a business I do understand and the engine that for 51 years has powered Berkshire’s growth.
接下来，我们将转向公司的经营性业务，先从财产意外险业务(P/C)开始，这是一项我非常了解的业务，也是过去51年来推动伯克希尔增长的引擎。
Insurance 保险业务
Before I discuss our 2017 insurance results, let me remind you of how and why we entered the field. We began by purchasing National Indemnity and a smaller sister company for 6.7 million of tangible net worth that, by the nature of the insurance business, we were able to deploy in marketable securities. It was easy to rearrange the portfolio into securities we would otherwise have owned at Berkshire itself. In effect, we were “trading dollars” for the net worth portion of the cost.
在开始讨论2017年的保险业绩之前，我首先还是要向大家解释一下我们是如何以及为什么要进入这一行业的。1967年我们以860万美元收购了国民保险公司和一家较小的姊妹公司。通过收购我们获得了670万美元净有形资产，按照保险业务的特性，我们得以将这些资产投入到有价证券中，并非常容易的把这个投资组合重新配置为伯克希尔原来持有的证券。本质上说，我们以美元换美元的方式，将交易成本转换为保险净值。
The 19.4 million of “float” — money that belonged to others but was held by our two insurers.
Ever since, float has been of great importance to Berkshire. When we invest these funds, all dividends, interest and gains from their deployment belong to Berkshire. (If we experience investment losses, those, of course, are on our tab as well.)
Float materializes at p/c insurers in several ways: (1) Premiums are generally paid to the company upfront whereas losses occur over the life of the policy, usually a six-month or one-year period; (2) Though some losses, such as car repairs, are quickly paid, others — such as the harm caused by exposure to asbestos — may take many years to surface and even longer to evaluate and settle; (3) Loss payments are sometimes spread over decades in cases, say, of a person employed by one of our workers’ compensation policyholders being permanently injured and thereafter requiring expensive lifetime care.
财产意外险的浮存金主要通过以下几个方式获得：(1)保费通常都是先付给公司，而损失发生在保修期内，通常是六个月到一年；(2)尽管一些损失比如汽车修理很快得到理赔，但其他损失比如石棉损害，则可能需要多年后才被发现，而要进行评估和确定赔付金额，则需要更长的时间；(3)有些理赔周期会长达数十年，比如工人赔偿保险人遭受到永久性伤害后需要昂贵的终生护理。
Float generally grows as premium volume increases. Additionally, certain p/c insurers specialize in lines of business such as medical malpractice or product liability — business labeled “long-tail” in industry jargon — that generate far more float than, say, auto collision and homeowner policies, which require insurers to almost immediately make payments to claimants for needed repairs.
通常浮存金跟随保费规模的增长而增长。此外，某些财产意外险公司专门从事医疗事故或产品责任等业务，这些业务的行业术语被称为”长尾”业务，其获得的浮存金规模远远超过汽车和房产保险业务，后者要求保险公司当即赔付索赔人所需的维修费用。
Berkshire has been a leader in long-tail business for many years. In particular, we have specialized in jumbo reinsurance policies that leave us assuming long-tail losses already incurred by other p/c insurers. As a result of our emphasizing that sort of business, Berkshire’s growth in float has been extraordinary. We are now the country’s second largest p/c company measured by premium volume and its leader, by far, in float.
多年来，伯克希尔一直是长尾业务的领导者。特别是我们专门从事的大型再保险业务，即承担其他财产意外险公司已经发生的长尾损失。由于我们专注于此类业务，伯克希尔的浮存金增长一直极为可观。以保费收入衡量，我们目前是全美第二大财产意外险公司，而且是浮存金规模最大的保险公司。
Here’s the record:
下面是历史表现：
| Year 年份 | Premium Volume (in $ millions) 保费收入（百万美元） | Float (in $ millions) 期末浮存金（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 185 | 237 |
| 1990 | 582 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 19,343 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 30,749 | 65,832 |
| 2017 | 60,597 | 114,500 |
Our 2017 volume was boosted by a huge deal in which we reinsured up to 10.2 billion, a world’s record and one we won’t come close to repeating. Premium volume will therefore fall somewhat in 2018.
我们2017年的保费收入因一笔交易而大幅度增加，这笔交易中，我们为美国国际集团(AIG)最高200亿美元的长尾损失提供再保险。这笔交易的保费收入为102亿美元，创下了世界纪录，我们不可能再打破这个记录了。因此，2018年保费收入将会有所下降。
Float will probably increase slowly for at least a few years. When we eventually experience a decline, it will be modest — at most 3% or so in any single year. Unlike bank deposits or life insurance policies containing surrender options, p/c float can’t be withdrawn. This means that p/c companies can’t experience massive “runs” in times of widespread financial stress, a characteristic of prime importance to Berkshire that we factor into our investment decisions.
至少未来几年内，浮存金可能会继续缓慢增长。当浮存金最终出现下滑时，其幅度将非常有限，在任何一年最多下滑3%左右。与银行存款或包含退保选择权的人寿保险不同，财产意外险的浮存金不能被提取。这意味着，即使在金融危机期间，财产意外险也不会遭遇大规模”挤兑”，这是伯克希尔纳入投资决策之中最重要的特质。
Charlie and I never will operate Berkshire in a manner that depends on the kindness of strangers — or even that of friends who may be facing liquidity problems of their own. During the 2008-2009 crisis, we liked having Treasury Bills — loads of Treasury Bills — that protected us from having to rely on funding sources such as bank lines or commercial paper. We have intentionally constructed Berkshire in a manner that will allow it to comfortably withstand economic discontinuities, including such extremes as extended market closures.
查理和我永远不会以一种依靠陌生人善意的方式来运营伯克希尔，甚至是那些自身也可能面临流动性问题的朋友的善意。2008-2009年金融危机期间，我们喜欢持有大量的短期国债，以确保我们不必依靠银行信用额度或者商业票据之类的融资来源。我们有意构建的伯克希尔，能够轻松渡过各种经济困难时期，包括市场长期关闭的极端局面。
The downside of float is that it comes with risk, sometimes oceans of risk. What looks predictable in insurance can be anything but. Take the famous Lloyds insurance market, which produced decent results for three centuries. In the 1980’s, though, huge latent problems from a few long-tail lines of insurance surfaced at Lloyds and, for a time, threatened to destroy its storied operation. (It has, I should add, fully recovered.)
浮存金的不利一面在于它伴随着风险，有时甚至是巨大的风险。保险业中看似确定的东西可能会有万一。比如著名的劳合社保险市场，他们在长达三个世纪里取得了不错的业绩，然而在1980年代，一些长尾保险业务出现了巨大的潜在问题，并一度威胁到其传奇的运营。(我必须补充一句，他们现在已经完全恢复了)。
Berkshire’s insurance managers are conservative and careful underwriters, who operate in a culture that has long prioritized those qualities. That disciplined behavior has produced underwriting profits in most years, and in such instances, our cost of float was less than zero. In effect, we got paid then for holding the huge sums tallied in the earlier table.
伯克希尔的保险经理人们都是非常保守谨慎的承保人，他们的经营文化长期以来一直优先考虑这些品质。这种自律的行为在大多数年份都实现了承保盈利，在这种情况下，我们的浮存金成本低于零。事实上，我们过去因为持有前面表格所列出的巨额浮存金而获得了报酬。
I have warned you, however, that we have been fortunate in recent years and that the catastrophe-light period the industry was experiencing was not a new norm. Last September drove home that point, as three significant hurricanes hit Texas, Florida and Puerto Rico.
不过，我必须警告大家的是，我们近些年一直运气很好，整个行业一直没有遭遇大型灾难并不是一个新的常态。去年9月三次飓风袭击了得克萨斯州、佛罗里达州和波多黎各州证实了这一点。
My guess at this time is that the insured losses arising from the hurricanes are $100 billion or so. That figure, however, could be far off the mark. The pattern with most mega-catastrophes has been that initial loss estimates ran low. As well-known analyst V.J. Dowling has pointed out, the loss reserves of an insurer are similar to a self-graded exam. Ignorance, wishful thinking or, occasionally, downright fraud can deliver inaccurate figures about an insurer’s financial condition for a very long time.
我目前预测，飓风带来的保险损失约1000亿美元左右。不过这个数据可能远远不够。绝大多数特大灾难的模型的最初损失估计值都相对较低。正如知名分析师V.J.Dowling指出的那样，保险公司的损失储备金如同自评考试。无知、一厢情愿、甚至有时是彻头彻尾的欺诈，都可能在一段时期内提供保险财务状况不准确的数据。
We currently estimate Berkshire’s losses from the three hurricanes to be 2 billion after tax). If both that estimate and my industry estimate of $100 billion are close to accurate, our share of the industry loss was about 3%. I believe that percentage is also what we may reasonably expect to be our share of losses in future American mega-cats.
我们目前预测，伯克希尔在三场飓风中的损失约为30亿美元(税后约为20亿美元)。如果这个估计和我对行业1000亿美元的损失估计都接近准确数字，伯克希尔在保险行业损失所占的份额大约是3%。我认为这一比例也是我们合理预期伯克希尔在美国未来大型巨灾的损失比例。
It’s worth noting that the 100 billion.
值得注意的是，三次飓风造成的20亿美元的净损失，让伯克希尔GAAP会计准则下的账面价值减少了不到1%。在再保险行业中，许多公司账面价值减少了7-15%不等。对他们的伤害可能会更糟：如果Irma飓风横穿佛罗里达再向东延伸一点，可能会再带来1000亿美元的保险损失。
We believe that the annual probability of a U.S. mega-catastrophe causing $400 billion or more of insured losses is about 2%. No one, of course, knows the correct probability. We do know, however, that the risk increases over time because of growth in both the number and value of structures located in catastrophe-vulnerable areas.
我们认为，美国巨灾每年造成4000亿美元甚至更多保险损失的概率约为2%。当然，没有人知道正确的概率。但我们知道的是，易受灾地区的建筑物数量和价值都在增长，因此随着时间的推移，风险也在增加。
No company comes close to Berkshire in being financially prepared for a 12 billion or so, an amount far below the annual earnings we expect from our non-insurance activities. Concurrently, much — indeed, perhaps most — of the p/c world would be out of business. Our unparalleled financial strength explains why other p/c insurers come to Berkshire — and only Berkshire — when they, themselves, need to purchase huge reinsurance coverages for large payments they may have to make in the far future.
没有一家企业能够像伯克希尔一样为4000亿美元的巨灾损失做好财务准备。我们在此类巨灾损失中将承担约120亿美元左右，这远低于我们对公司每年从非保险业务中获得的预期收益。而此时，许多(也许是大部分)财险意外险公司将会破产。我们无与伦比的财务实力解释了，为什么其他财产意外险公司选择到[Berkshire_Hathaway|伯克希尔]购买大额再保险，以应对遥远的未来自己可能不得不支付的大额赔偿。
Prior to 2017, Berkshire had recorded 14 consecutive years of underwriting profits, which totaled 3.2 billion pre-tax from underwriting.
2017年之前，伯克希尔保险业务已连续14年实现承保盈利，累计税前收益为283亿美元。我经常告诉你们，我预计伯克希尔保险业务将在大多数年份将实现承保盈利，但也会不时遭遇亏损。我的警告在2017成为事实，我们因承保损失录得税前亏损32亿美元。
A large amount of additional information about our various insurance operations is included in the 10-K at the back of this report. The only point I will add here is that you have some extraordinary managers working for you at our various p/c operations. This is a business in which there are no trade secrets, patents, or locational advantages. What counts are brains and capital. The managers of our various insurance companies supply the brains and Berkshire provides the capital.
有关我们各类保险业务的诸多额外信息包含在年报10-K中。我在这里唯一要补充的一点是，你们拥有一批杰出的经理人，在我们的各类保险业务中为你们工作。这是一个没有商业机密、专利或地理优势的业务，最重要优势就是头脑和资本。我们各个保险公司的经理们提供了头脑，伯克希尔提供了资金。
For many years, this letter has described the activities of Berkshire’s many other businesses. That discussion has become both repetitious and partially duplicative of information regularly included in the 10-K that follows the letter. Consequently, this year I will give you a simple summary of our dozens of non-insurance businesses. Additional details can be found on pages K-5 — K-22 and pages K-40 — K-50.
Viewed as a group — and excluding investment income — our operations other than insurance delivered pre-tax income of 950 million over 2016. About 44% of the 2017 profit came from two subsidiaries. BNSF, our railroad, and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (of which we own 90.2%). You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 — K-10 and pages K-40 — K-44.
不包括投资收入，我们旗下非保险业务作为一个整体在2017年实现了200亿美元税前收益，比2016年增加9.5亿美元。2017年约44%收益来自于两家子公司：BNSF铁路和BHE[Energy_Industry|能源]。
Proceeding down Berkshire’s long list of subsidiaries, our next five non-insurance businesses, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically) Clayton Homes, International Metalworking Companies, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts had aggregate pre-tax income in 2017 of 5.4 billion these companies earned in 2016.
在伯克希尔一长串子公司中，接下来按收益排名的5家非保险业务为：克莱顿之家(ClaytonHomes)、国际金属加工公司(International Metalworking Companies)、[Lubrizol|路博润]、Marmon和Precision Castparts，2017年的税前收益为55亿美元，而2016年为54亿美元。
The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned 1.7 billion in 2016.
接下来的5家公司为：森林之河Forest River、Johns Manville、MiTek、Shaw和TTI，2017年的税前收益为21亿美元，高于2016年的17亿美元。
The remaining businesses that Berkshire owns — and there are many — recorded little change in pre-tax income, which was 3.5 billion in 2016.
其他剩余的许多公司的税前收益合计为37亿美元，而2016年为35亿美元。
Depreciation charges for all of these non-insurance operations totaled 11.5 billion. Berkshire is always looking for ways to expand its businesses and regularly incurs capital expenditures that far exceed its depreciation charge. Almost 90% of our investments are made in the United States. America’s economic soil remains fertile.
Amortization charges were an additional $1.3 billion. I believe that in large part this item is not a true economic cost. Partially offsetting this good news is the fact that BNSF (like all other railroads) records depreciation charges that fall well short of the sums regularly needed to keep the railroad in first-class shape.
摊销费用为13亿美元。我相信在很大程度上该项支出不是真正的经济成本。部分抵消这个好消息的是[BNSF_Railway|BNSF铁路]计入报表的折旧费用远远低于维持铁路一流状态所需的正常成本。
Berkshire’s goal is to substantially increase the earnings of its non-insurance group. For that to happen, we will need to make one or more huge acquisitions. We certainly have the resources to do so. At yearend Berkshire held 86.4 billion at yearend 2016. This extraordinary liquidity earns only a pittance and is far beyond the level Charlie and I wish Berkshire to have. Our smiles will broaden when we have redeployed Berkshire’s excess funds into more productive assets.
伯克希尔的目标是大幅增加非保险集团的收益。为实现这一目标，该公司需要进行一次或多次大规模并购。伯克希尔有资源实现这一目标。截至2017年底，伯克希尔持有的现金和美国国债(平均到期期限为88天)为1160亿美元，高于2016年底的864亿美元。这种回报微薄的非同寻常的流动性，远远超出查理和我所期望的水平。当我们把伯克希尔冗余资本重新配置到更具生产力的资产中时，我们才会笑得更加开心。
Investments 投资业务
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding — 325,442,152 shares — because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of 25.3 billion, and a cost basis of $9.8 billion.
下表我们列出了截至2017年末市值最大的15只普通股投资。由于我们是[Kraft_Heinz|卡夫亨氏]控股股东之一，所以采用”权益法”进行核算并未列入。目前，伯克希尔持有卡夫亨氏公司325,442,152股股票，在我们资产负债表上按GAAP会计准则以176亿美元入账，年末市值为253亿美元，而我们的成本为98亿美元。
12/31/17
| Shares* 股份数量 | Company 公司名称 | Percentage of Company Owned 股份占比 | Cost** (in millions) 成本（百万美元） | Market (in millions) 市值（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company [[American_Express | 美国运通]] | 17.6 | $ 1,287 |
| 166,713,209 | Apple Inc. [[Apple | 苹果]]公司 | 3.3 | 20,961 |
| 700,000,000 | Bank of America Corporation [[Bank_of_America | 美国银行]] | 6.8 | 5,007 |
| 53,307,534 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation 纽约梅林银行 | 5.3 | 2,230 | 2,871 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Company Ltd. [[BYD | 比亚迪]] | 8.2 | 232 |
| 6,789,054 | Charter Communications, Inc. [[Charter_Communications | 特许通讯]]公司 | 2.8 | 1,210 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company [[Coca_Cola | 可口可乐]] | 9.4 | 1,299 |
| 53,110,395 | Delta Airlines Inc. 达美航空 | 7.4 | 2,219 | 2,974 |
| 44,527,147 | General Motors Company [[General_Motors | 通用汽车]] | 3.2 | 1,343 |
| 11,390,582 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. [[Goldman_Sachs | 高盛]] | 3.0 | 654 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation [[Moodys | 穆迪]] | 12.9 | 248 |
| 74,587,892 | Phillips 66 | 14.9 | 5,841 | 7,545 |
| 47,659,456 | Southwest Airlines Co. 西南航空 | 8.1 | 1,997 | 3,119 |
| 103,855,045 | U.S. Bancorp [[US_Bancorp | 美国合众银行]] | 6.3 | 3,343 |
| 482,544,468 | Wells Fargo & Company [[Wells_Fargo | 富国银行]] | 9.9 | 11,837 |
| Others 其它 | 14,968 | 24,294 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market 股票投资合计 | $ 74,676 | $ 170,540 |
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
* 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金投资的持股。
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
** 此处为实际投资成本，也是计税依据，GAAP成本在少数情况下因准则要求的减记和增记而有所不同。
Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently of me , manages more than 25 billion that the two manage is more than $8 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.
表中的某些股票是由 Todd Combs 或 Ted Weschler 负责的，他们跟我一起管理伯克希尔的投资。他们每人都独立于我之外管理着超过120亿美元的资金，而我通常会通过查阅月度投资组合摘要的方式来了解他们作出的投资决定。在两人管理的250亿美元资金中包括伯克希尔某些子公司的80多亿美元养老金信托资产。如前所述，养老金投资不包括在伯克希尔所持资产的表格之中。
Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses , not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on their “chart” patterns, the “target” prices of analysts or the opinions of media pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be) our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall — and over time — we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.
查理和我将伯克希尔所拥有的可供出售普通股视为企业权益，而并不是基于技术分析、分析师目标价或媒体专家意见而进行买卖的股票代码。相反，我们只是相信，如果被投资方的业务是成功的(我们相信大多数都将如此)，那么我们的投资也将成功。有时我们获得的收益较少，偶尔收益巨大。有时我会犯一些代价高昂的错误。但总体来说，随着时间的推移，我们应该可以取得不错的结果。在美国，股票投资者是赶上了国运。
From our stock portfolio — call our holdings “minority interests” in a diversified group of publicly-owned businesses — Berkshire received $3.7 billion of dividends in 2017. That’s the number included in our GAAP figures, as well as in the “operating earnings” we reference in our quarterly and annual reports.
我们持有的股票可以被称作一个多样化的上市企业的”少数权益”，2017年伯克希尔从我们的股票投资组合中收到了37亿美元的股息，包含在我们报告的GAAP会计准则的收益数字中，以及我们季报和年报中”经营收益”的数字中。
That dividend figure, however, far understates the “true” earnings emanating from our stock holdings. For decades, we have stated in Principle 6 of our “Owner-Related Business Principles” (page 19) that we expect undistributed earnings of our investees to deliver us at least equivalent earnings by way of subsequent capital gains.
Our recognition of capital gains (and losses) will be lumpy, particularly as we conform with the new GAAP rule requiring us to constantly record unrealized gains or losses in our earnings. I feel confident, however, that the earnings retained by our investees will over time, and with our investees viewed as a group, translate into commensurate capital gains for Berkshire.
我们认列的资本损益将是波动不定的，尤其是我们将开始遵循新GAAP会计准则，要求我们在财报中持续认列未实现的投资损益。但我相信，随着时间的推移，被投资方保留的收益(被投资视为一整个群体)，将转化为伯克希尔相应的资本收益。
The connection of value-building to retained earnings that I’ve just described will be impossible to detect in the short term. Stocks surge and swoon, seemingly untethered to any year-to-year buildup in their underlying value. Over time, however, Ben Graham’s oft-quoted maxim proves true: “In the short run, the market is a voting machine; in the long run, however, it becomes a weighing machine.”
我刚刚描述的价值建立与留存收益之间的联系，在短期之内是不可能被发现的。股价的暴涨暴跌看似与其逐年上涨的潜在价值毫无联系。但随着时间的推移，本·格雷厄姆(Ben Graham)经常被引用的那句格言会被证明是正确的：“短期来看，市场是台投票机；但从长期来看，市场就会变成称重机。”
Berkshire, itself, provides some vivid examples of how price randomness in the short term can obscure long-term growth in value. For the last 53 years, the company has built value by reinvesting its earnings and letting compound interest work its magic. Year by year, we have moved forward. Yet Berkshire shares have suffered four truly major dips. Here are the gory details:
伯克希尔本身就提供了一些生动的例子，可以说明短期的股价随机波动如何掩盖价值的长期增长。在过去53年时间里，伯克希尔通过将收益再投资并让复利发挥其”魔力”的方式创造了价值。，我们年复一年向前迈进。然而，伯克希尔的股价也曾遭遇过四次大幅下跌，以下就是血淋淋的细节：
| Period 时间段 | High 高点 | Low 低点 | Percentage Decrease 下跌幅度 |
|---|---|---|---|
| March 1973-January 1975 | 93 | 38 | (59.1%) |
| 10/2/87-10/27/87 | 4,250 | 2,675 | (37.1%) |
| 6/19/98-3/10/2000 | 80,900 | 41,300 | (48.9%) |
| 9/19/08-3/5/09 | 147,000 | 72,400 | (50.7%) |
This table offers the strongest argument I can muster against ever using borrowed money to own stocks. There is simply no telling how far stocks can fall in a short period. Even if your borrowings are small and your positions aren’t immediately threatened by the plunging market, your mind may well become rattled by scary headlines and breathless commentary. And an unsettled mind will not make good decisions.
反对借钱来投资股票，这张表格提供了我能找到的最有力的证据。因为根本无法知道，股价在较短时间里会下跌多少。即使你的借款金额很小，而且你的持仓没有立即遭受暴跌股市的威胁，但令人惊恐的头条消息和让人无法呼吸的评论也可能会让你心神不宁。心绪不定的人无法作出良好的决策。
In the next 53 years our shares (and others) will experience declines resembling those in the table. No one can tell you when these will happen. The light can at any time go from green to red without pausing at yellow.
在接下来的53年里，伯克希尔的股票(以及其他股票)必将经历类似于表格中的下跌，而没人能告诉你这些事情什么时候会发生。“绿灯”可能会在任何时候不经”黄灯”直接变为”红灯”。
When major declines occur, however, they offer extraordinary opportunities to those who are not handicapped by debt. That’s the time to heed these lines from Kipling’s If :
但当大跌来临时，市场为那些没有债务缠身的人提供了非凡的投资机会。是时候想到吉卜林(Kipling)的这些诗句了：
“If you can keep your head when all about you are losing theirs…
如果你能在所有人都失去理智的时候保持冷静……
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting…
如果你能耐心等待，而不急不躁……
If you can think — and not make thoughts your aim…
如果你能审慎思考，而不走火入魔……
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you…
如果众人对你心存猜忌，你仍能自信如常，并体谅他们的猜忌……
Yours is the Earth and everything that’s in it.”
那么，你的修为就会如天地般博大，并拥有了属于自己的世界。
“The Bet” is Over and Has Delivered an Unforeseen Investment Lesson 十年赌约如期结束，并带来一堂意想不到的投资课
Last year, at the 90% mark, I gave you a detailed report on a ten-year bet I had made on December 19, 2007. (The full discussion from last year’s annual report is reprinted on pages 24 — 26.) Now I have the final tally — and, in several respects, it’s an eye-opener.
去年，我给了你们一份有关我在2007年12月19日作出的”十年赌约”的详细报告，当时这场对赌已经进行了90%。现在，我已经有了最终的统计结果，从几个方面让我大开眼界。
I made the bet for two reasons: (1) to leverage my outlay of $318,250 into a disproportionately larger sum that — if things turned out as I expected — would be distributed in early 2018 to Girls Inc. of Omaha; and (2) to publicize my conviction that my pick — a virtually cost-free investment in an unmanaged S&P 500 index fund — would, over time, deliver better results than those achieved by most investment professionals, however well-regarded and incentivized those “helpers” may be.
我在之所以押下赌注原因有二：(1)利用杠杆将我318,250美元的花费变成一个不成比例的更大金额。如果情况如我所料，这笔钱将在2018年初分配给奥马哈的Girls Inc；(2)宣传我的一个信念，也就是我的投资选择：投资一个非经管理的几无成本的标普500指数基金，随着时间的推移，将比大多数投资专家获得更好的结果，无论这些”帮手”是多么受人尊敬和高额业绩激励。
Addressing this question is of enormous importance. American investors pay staggering sums annually to advisors, often incurring several layers of consequential costs. In the aggregate, do these investors get their money’s worth? Indeed, again in the aggregate, do investors get anything for their outlays?
解决这个问题是极其重要的。美国投资者每年向投资顾问支付的费用惊人，而且往往会产生多层间接费用。总体而言，这些投资者的花费是否物有所值？投资者的花费实际上能获得什么回报吗？
Protégé Partners, my counterparty to the bet, picked five “funds-of-funds” that it expected to overperform the S&P 500. That was not a small sample. Those five funds-of-funds in turn owned interests in more than 200 hedge funds.
与我对赌的ProtégéPartners选择了5只”基金中的基金”(FOF)，预计它们的表现将会超过标普500指数，这是一个不小的样本，因为这5只基金持有200多个对冲基金的权益。
Essentially, Protégé, an advisory firm that knew its way around Wall Street, selected five investment experts who, in turn, employed several hundred other investment experts, each managing his or her own hedge fund. This assemblage was an elite crew, loaded with brains, adrenaline and confidence.
作为一家熟谙华尔街的咨询公司，实际上Protégé挑选了5个投资专家，然后由他们来雇佣数以百计的其他投资专家，每人都管理着自己的对冲基金。这是一个精英团队，他们智力超群、情绪高昂、信心满满。
The managers of the five funds-of-funds possessed a further advantage: They could — and did — rearrange their portfolios of hedge funds during the ten years, investing with new “stars” while exiting their positions in hedge funds whose managers had lost their touch.
这5只FOF的基金经理还拥有一个更大的优势：他们可以(也确实这样做了)在这十年时间里重新安排自己的对冲基金投资组合，与新的投资”明星”一起投资，同时退出那些失去了自己”触觉”的基金经理所管理的对冲基金。
Every actor on Protégé’s side was highly incentivized: Both the fund-of-funds managers and the hedge-fund managers they selected significantly shared in gains, even those achieved simply because the market generally moves upwards. (In 100% of the 43 ten-year periods since we took control of Berkshire, years with gains by the S&P 500 exceeded loss years.)
Protégé一方的每一位参与者都受到高度激励：无论是FOF基金的基金经理，还是他们选择的对冲基金的基金经理，都大幅分享了投资收益，即使是那些仅仅因为市场整体上涨而获得的收益。(自我们接手对伯克希尔43年以来，标普500指数上涨年份大幅超过下跌年份。)
Those performance incentives, it should be emphasized, were frosting on a huge and tasty cake: Even if the funds lost money for their investors during the decade, their managers could grow very rich. That would occur because fixed fees averaging a staggering 2.5% of assets or so were paid every year by the fund-of-funds’ investors, with part of these fees going to the managers at the five funds-of-funds and the balance going to the 200-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds.
应该强调的是，这种业绩激励措施就像在一个巨大美味蛋糕上的糖霜：哪怕这些基金在这十年里为投资者亏了钱，它们的经理人也可以变得非常富有。之所以会发生这种事情，是因为FOF基金的投资者每年支付的固定管理费在平均占投资资产的比例达到了惊人的2.5%，这些管理费一部分流向5个FOF基金的基金经理，剩余部分则流向200多个对冲基金的经理。
Here’s the final scorecard for the bet:
下表是这场赌约的最终结果：
| Year 年份 | Fund-of-Funds A FoF 基金 A | Fund-of-Funds B FoF 基金 B | Fund-of-Funds C FoF 基金 C | Fund-of-Funds D FoF 基金 D | Fund-of-Funds E FoF 基金 E | S&P Index Fund 标普指数基金 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | -16.5% | -22.3% | -21.3% | -29.3% | -30.1% | -37.0% |
| 2009 | 11.3% | 14.5% | 21.4% | 16.5% | 16.8% | 26.6% |
| 2010 | 5.9% | 6.8% | 13.3% | 4.9% | 11.9% | 15.1% |
| 2011 | -6.3% | -1.3% | 5.9% | -6.3% | -2.8% | 2.1% |
| 2012 | 3.4% | 9.6% | 5.7% | 6.2% | 9.1% | 16.0% |
| 2013 | 10.5% | 15.2% | 8.8% | 14.2% | 14.4% | 32.3% |
| 2014 | 4.7% | 4.0% | 18.9% | 0.7% | -2.1% | 13.6% |
| 2015 | 1.6% | 2.5% | 5.4% | 1.4% | -5.0% | 1.4% |
| 2016 | -3.2% | 1.9% | -1.7% | 2.5% | 4.4% | 11.9% |
| 2017 | 12.2% | 10.6% | 15.6% | N/A | 18.0% | 21.8% |
| Final Gain 累计收益率 | 21.7% | 42.3% | 87.7% | 2.8% | 27.0% | 125.8% |
| Average Annual Gain 年化收益率 | 2.0% | 3.6% | 6.5% | 0.3% | 2.4% | 8.5% |
Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, have received their annual audits from Protégé. The 2016 figures for funds A, B and C were revised slightly from those originally reported last year. Fund D was liquidated in 2017; its average annual gain is calculated for the nine years of its operation.
注：根据我与Protégé Partners达成的协议，这些基金的名称从未公开披露。但我已经收到Protégé的年度审计报告。2016年基金ABC的数据略有修正。基金D已在2017年清盘，该基金的年平均收益按其运营的九年计算得出的。
The five funds-of-funds got off to a fast start, each beating the index fund in 2008. Then the roof fell in. In every one of the nine years that followed, the funds-of-funds as a whole trailed the index fund.
这5只FOF基金最初起步迅速，在2008年中全都跑赢了指数基金，但随后就急转直下。在其后九年里， FOF基金整体表现每一年都落后于指数基金。
Let me emphasize that there was nothing aberrational about stock-market behavior over the ten-year stretch. If a poll of investment “experts” had been asked late in 2007 for a forecast of long-term common-stock returns, their guesses would have likely averaged close to the 8.5% actually delivered by the S&P 500. Making money in that environment should have been easy. Indeed, Wall Street “helpers” earned staggering sums. While this group prospered, however, many of their investors experienced a lost decade.
让我强调一下，在过去十年里，股市的行为没有任何异常之处。如果在2007年底对投资”专家”进行一次有关长期普通股预期回报率的统计调查，他们的预测很可能将接近于标普500指数8.5%的实际回报率。在那种环境之下，赚钱原本应该是件很容易的事情。事实上，华尔街的”帮手”们赚得盆满钵满。但是，这个群体变富的同时，他们的许多投资者却经历了”失落的十年”。
Performance comes, performance goes. Fees never falter.
绩效总是有起有落，但费用从未下降。
The bet illuminated another important investment lesson: Though markets are generally rational, they occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look unimaginative for a sustained period — or even to look foolish — is also essential.
这场赌约还揭示了另一个重要的投资教训：尽管市场总体上是理性的，但偶尔也会作出疯狂的事情。抓住市场那时提供的投资机会并不需要很高的智商，经济学学位，或懂得Alpha和Beta等华尔街术语。投资者需要的是一种能力，既能无视乌合之众的恐惧或热情，又能专注于一些简单的基本面因素。另外，愿意在一段持续的时间里表现的毫无建树，甚至于看起来像个傻子，也是至关重要的。
Originally, Protégé and I each funded our portion of the ultimate 500, face amount of zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds (sometimes called “strips”). These bonds cost each of us 500,000 payable in ten years.
最初Protégé和我都各自购买了50万美元面值的零息美国国债(有时被称作”资产剥离债券strips”)，来为我们100万美元最终奖金提供资金。这些债券让我们都花了318,250美元，也就是略低于面值的64折，其中50万美元将在10年内支付。
As the name implies, the bonds we acquired paid no interest, but (because of the discount at which they were purchased) delivered a 4.56% annual return if held to maturity. Protégé and I originally intended to do no more than tally the annual returns and distribute $1 million to the winning charity when the bonds matured late in 2017.
顾名思义，我们购买的这种债券不支付利息，但(由于购买时的折价)如果持有至到期，年化回报率为4.56%。我和Protégé最初计划只统计年度回报，并在2017年末债券到期时，向获胜者的慈善机构分发100万美元。
After our purchase, however, some very strange things took place in the bond market. By November 2012, our bonds — now with about five years to go before they matured — were selling for 95.7% of their face value. At that price, their annual yield to maturity was less than 1%. Or, to be precise, .88%.
Given that pathetic return, our bonds had become a dumb — a really dumb — investment compared to American equities. Over time, the S&P 500 — which mirrors a huge cross-section of American business, appropriately weighted by market value — has earned far more than 10% annually on shareholders’ equity (net worth).
考虑到这个可怜的回报率，与美国股票相比，我们的债券已经成为一个愚蠢的投资。随着时间推移，反映美国企业巨大截面并按市值适当加权的标普500指数，每年的股东权益(净值)的年化回报率远超10%。
In November 2012, as we were considering all this, the cash return from dividends on the S&P 500 was 2.5% annually, about triple the yield on our U.S. Treasury bond. These dividend payments were almost certain to grow. Beyond that, huge sums were being retained by the companies comprising the 500. These businesses would use their retained earnings to expand their operations and, frequently, to repurchase their shares as well. Either course would, over time, substantially increase earnings-per-share. And — as has been the case since 1776 — whatever its problems of the minute, the American economy was going to move forward.
2012年11月，当我们考虑这一切时，标普500指数股息分红的年化回报率为2.5%，为美国国债收益率的三倍。而股息的支付几乎肯定还会增长。此外，标普500指数的成分公司还有留存了巨额未分配收益。这些企业使用他们的留存收益扩大业务，并频繁回购股票。随着时间的推移，这两种做法都将大幅提高每股收益。而且，自1776年以来，无论途中遭遇了什么危机，美国的经济都将继续向前发展。
Presented late in 2012 with the extraordinary valuation mismatch between bonds and equities, Protégé and I agreed to sell the bonds we had bought five years earlier and use the proceeds to buy 11,200 Berkshire “B” shares. The result: Girls Inc. of Omaha found itself receiving 1 million it had originally hoped for.
2012年末，由于债券和股票之间的估值极度错配，Protégé和我决定卖出五年前购买的债券，并使用这些现金购买11200股伯克希尔B股。其结果是：奥马哈的慈善机构Girls Inc上个月收到了2222279美元的捐款，而不是最初期望的100万美元。
Berkshire, it should be emphasized, has not performed brilliantly since the 2012 substitution. But brilliance wasn’t needed: After all, Berkshire’s gain only had to beat that annual .88% bond bogey — hardly a Herculean achievement.
The only risk in the bonds-to-Berkshire switch was that yearend 2017 would coincide with an exceptionally weak stock market. Protégé and I felt this possibility (which always exists) was very low. Two factors dictated this conclusion: The reasonable price of Berkshire in late 2012, and the large asset build-up that was almost certain to occur at Berkshire during the five years that remained before the bet would be settled. Even so, to eliminate all risk to the charities from the switch, I agreed to make up any shortfall if sales of the 11,200 Berkshire shares at yearend 2017 didn’t produce at least $1 million.
债券投资转为伯克希尔股票的唯一风险在于，2017年底恰逢异常疲软的股市。但是，Protégé和我认为这样的可能性尽管存在但非常小。有两个因素决定了这一结论：伯克希尔在2012年底的估值合理，以及在赌约结束之前的5年中，伯克希尔几乎肯定会实现大量的资产积累。尽管如此，为了消除这一转变给慈善机构带来的所有风险，我同意如果2017年底出售这11200股伯克希尔B股不能带来至少100万美元的慈善捐助，我将弥补所有的差额。
Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.
“投资”是一种放弃今天的消费以换取明天更多的消费能力的活动。“风险”是指无法实现这一目标的可能性。
By that standard, purportedly “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a long-term investment in common stocks. At that time, even a 1% annual rate of inflation between 2012 and 2017 would have decreased the purchasing-power of the government bond that Protégé and I sold.
I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier — far riskier — than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates.
我想很快承认，在未来的任何一天，一周甚至一年里，股票的风险都将远远高于美国短期国债。然而，随着投资者投资期限的拉长，假设股票的购买价格是当时利率的合理倍数，多元化的美国股票投资组合的风险将逐渐低于债券。
It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons — among them, pension funds, college endowments and savings-minded individuals — to measure their investment “risk” by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.
A final lesson from our bet: Stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity. During the ten-year bet, the 200-plus hedge-fund managers that were involved almost certainly made tens of thousands of buy and sell decisions. Most of those managers undoubtedly thought hard about their decisions, each of which they believed would prove advantageous. In the process of investing, they studied 10-Ks, interviewed managements, read trade journals and conferred with Wall Street analysts.
来自我们赌约的最后一个教训是：坚持做出重大的、简单的投资决策，避免频繁交易。在十年赌约期间，超过200名对冲基金经理几乎肯定做出了数以万计的买卖决策。毫无疑问，大多数基金经理都认真思考了资金的决策，他们认为每一个决策都会被证明是有利的。在投资过程中，他们研究10-K表格，采访企业管理层，研读贸易期刊，并和华尔街分析师们进行讨论。
Protégé and I, meanwhile, leaning neither on research, insights nor brilliance, made only one investment decision during the ten years. We simply decided to sell our bond investment at a price of more than 100 times earnings (95.7 sale price/.88 yield), those being “earnings” that could not increase during the ensuing five years.
与此同时，Protégé和我在这十年只做了一个投资决定，既没有深入的研究和洞察力，也没有天才的智商。我们只是决定以超过100倍市盈率出售未来5年收益不会增加的债券投资(95.7价格/0.88回报率)。
We made the sale in order to move our money into a single security — Berkshire — that, in turn, owned a diversified group of solid businesses. Fueled by retained earnings, Berkshire’s growth in value was unlikely to be less than 8% annually, even if we were to experience a so-so economy.
After that kindergarten-like analysis, Protégé and I made the switch and relaxed, confident that, over time, 8% was certain to beat .88%. By a lot.
经过一些幼儿园般的简单分析，Protégé和我做出了改变并放松下来，我们坚信随着时间的推移，8%的收益绝对能够击败0.88%很多。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
The annual meeting falls on May 5th and will again be webcast by Yahoo!, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 8:45 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo! will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both the interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.
我们的年会将在5月5日举行，雅虎将再次网络直播，网址：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream。网络直播将于美中时间上午8:45进行直播。雅虎还将在大会开始之前和午饭时间采访公司的董事、高管及各界知名人士。采访及会议将同时翻译为中文。
Our partnership with Yahoo! began in 2016 and shareholders have responded enthusiastically. Last year, real-time viewership increased 72% to about 3.1 million and replays of short segments totaled 17.1 million.
我们与雅虎的合作关系始于2016年，股东们反应强烈。去年，雅虎的实时收视率增长了72%达到约310万，而短视频播放次数达到1710万。
For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:15 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting, which usually runs from 15 to 45 minutes. Shopping will end at 4:30.
对于亲身参会的投资者们，CenturyLink的大门将于周六早晨7点开放，以方便在我们的股东电影开播之前购物，股东电影将于8:30开始。而问答环节将于9:15开始，持续至下午3:30，期间将进行1小时的午餐。最后，在下午3:45，我们将开始正式的股东大会，通常进行15-45分钟。购物时间将在下午4:30结束。
On Friday, May 4th, our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink will be open from noon until 5 p.m. We added that extra shopping time in 2015, and serious shoppers love it. Last year about 12,000 people came through the doors in the five hours we were open on Friday.
在5月4日(周五)，伯克希尔在CenturyLink的展览将从中午开始开放至下午5点。我们在2015年增加了额外的购物时间，并且得到了许多购物者的喜欢。去年，在周五开放的五个小时中大约有1.2万人参与了购物活动。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. (Your Chairman discourages freebies.) Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies.
购物中心是毗邻会场的一个面积为19.43万平方英尺的大厅，来自数十个伯克希尔子公司的产品将会在购物展上出售。向许多伯克希尔的经理人问好，他们将出现在展位前负责销售。还有一定要来看看我们非常棒的BNSF铁路布局图，向我们所有的公司致敬。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our sixth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; even with Brooks running shoes, our times would be embarrassing.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
我们旗下的专业跑鞋公司布鲁克斯(Brooks)将再次为我们的股东大会提供一款特别纪念款跑鞋。购买一双后，你可以穿着他们在周日上午8点举行的第六次年度伯克希尔5公里赛跑活动。参与的详细信息将在参观指南中列出，并会发送至您的大会邀请函中。参赛者们会发现，他们将与许多伯克希尔的高管、董事及合伙人们并肩作战。参与5公里跑的人数正逐年增加，来一起帮助我们创造一个新的纪录吧。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 43% from 2016.
GEICO保险也将在购物中心设置一个展位，并将配备来自全美的顶级顾问人员。在去年的股东大会中，我们的保险销售量创出了纪录水平，较2016年增长了43%。
So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.
因此停下来问问价格吧。通常GEICO保险会给您一个股东折扣(通常为8%)。我们可以为美国51个州中的44个州的消费者提供这种特殊折扣。(补充一点：如果您有资格享受另一个折扣，例如某些团体可以享受的折扣，那么折扣是不可叠加的)。带着你保单详细信息过来问问我们的价格，这可以为你们中的许多人省下不少钱，把省下的这些钱购买其它一些伯克希尔的产品。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry more than 40 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Berkshire shareholders are a bookseller’s dream: When Poor Charlie’s Almanack (yes, our Charlie) made its debut some years ago, we sold 3,500 copies at the meeting. The book weighed 4.85 pounds. Do the math: Our shareholders left the building that day carrying about 8.5 tons of Charlie’s wisdom.
请一定要要去书虫书吧看看。这家奥马哈本地的图书零售商将带来超过40种图书及DVD，这其中包括几本新书。伯克希尔的股东们都有一个图书销售员的梦想：几年前当我们的查理出版的《穷查理宝典》出现在购物大厅上，我们共售出了3500本。这本书单本重达4.85磅。做个算术题：我们的股东们那天在离开这栋建筑时带走了大约8.5吨芒格的智慧。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that most airlines substantially increase prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
附在本报告内的委托书材料里，详细介绍了您可以如何获得参加本次会议和其他活动的所需凭证。请记住，飞往奥马哈的大多数航班都大幅提高了伯克希尔周末几日的机票价格。如果你从很远的地方来，请比较一下飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。这两个城市之间的车程大概2.5小时，因此飞到堪萨斯城可以节省很多费用。一对夫妇节省的费用可以达到1000美元甚至更多。把节省下来的钱花在我们这里吧。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 1stand Monday, May 7th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. Last year, the one-week volume for the store was a staggering $44.6 million. Bricks and mortar are alive and well at NFM.
内布拉斯加州家具商场(NFM)，占地77英亩，位于Dodge和Pacific之间的72街上。我们将再次提供”伯克希尔周末”的折扣价。要获得NFM的伯克希尔折扣，您必须在5月1日周二至5月7日周一(含)购买，同时也必须出示您的会议凭证。去年，这家店当周的销量达到了惊人的4460万美元。实体销售在NFM仍然活跃。
The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday and 11 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
期间几家知名的家具制造商同样推出了折扣价。这些制造商通常都有严格的折扣规定，本着股东周末的精神，它们为您破例了。我们感谢它们的合作。在”伯克希尔周末”期间，NFM的开放时间是周一至周六上午10点至晚上9点，周日上午11点至晚上8点。从周六下午5点半到8点，NFM将举办一场野餐会，邀请大家参加。
NFM will again extend its shareholder’s discount offerings to our Kansas City and Dallas stores. From May 1st through May 7th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to those NFM stores will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.
NFM将再次向其堪萨斯城和达拉斯的分店提供伯克希尔股东折扣。从5月1日到5月7日，凡出示参加股东大会凭证或其他持有伯克希尔公司股权凭证(如代理声明)的股东，在这些门店购物将会享受与在奥马哈商店相同的折扣。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 4th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).
波仙珠宝店(Borsheims)将再次举办两个仅限于伯克希尔股东的活动。第一场是5月4日周五下午6点到9点的鸡尾酒会。第二场是大型售卖活动，将于5月6日周日上午9点至下午4点举行。周六波仙将一直营业到下午6点。记住，你买的越多，你省的就越多(我的女儿在我们去这家商店的时候是这么告诉我的)。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
整个周末都将会有大量的人聚集在波仙。因此，为了您的方便，该商店提供股东价格的时间是从4月30日周一到5月12日周六。在此期间，请通过出示您的会议凭证或代理商声明来证明您拥有我们的股票，并确认您是股东。
On Sunday afternoon, on the upper level above Borsheims, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. Ajit, Charlie, Bill Gates and I will likely drop by as well.
周日下午，在波仙珠宝店的上层，我们邀请BobHamman和SharonOsberg两位世界顶级的桥牌专家与我们股东们互动。如果他们建议您下注，那么请转变话题。阿吉特，查理，比尔盖茨和我也可能会顺便来看看。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.) I will participate on an advisory basis only.
我的朋友Ariel Hsing周日也会来到商场里，在乒乓球比赛中迎战挑战者。我在Ariel九岁的时候就认识了她，即使这样，我也无法在她身上得分。Ariel曾代表美国参加了2012年的奥运会。如果你不介意让自己难堪的话，那么从当天下午1点开始可以与她较量，试试你的乒乓球技艺。比尔盖茨去年表现很好，所以他可能会再次挑战她。(我的建议是：把宝押在Ariel身上)我将仅以顾问的身份参加。
Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, serving from 12 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 2nd( but not before ). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.
Gorat’s牛排馆将于5月6日周日专门为伯克希尔公司的股东开放，营业时间是从中午12点到晚上10点。如果您想提前预约，请在4月2日(不要提前)拨打402-551-3733预约。如果您想证明您是一个老练的食客，那么请点T骨牛排和土豆饼。
We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
与去年相同的三名财经记者将会主持问答环节，并向查理和我提出股东们通过电子邮件向他们提交的问题。记者和他们的电子邮件地址是：她那个时代最杰出的商业记者 Carol Loomis：loomisbrk@gmail.com；CNBC Becky Quick：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com； 纽约时报 Andrew Ross Sorkin：arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每个记者将从提交的问题中选择他/她认为对股东最感兴趣最重要的6个问题进行提问。他们告诉我，如果您的问题简洁，不是在最后一刻才提交，与伯克希尔相关而且在你发送的电子邮件中包含不超过两个问题，那么你的问题最有可能被选中。(请在您的电子邮件中注明，如果您的问题被选中，您是否愿意您的名字被提及。)
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
跟踪伯克希尔公司的三位分析师将接着提出一系列问题。今年的提出保险相关问题的行业专家将会是 Dowling & Partners 公司的 Gary Ransom。有关非保险业务的问题将由 Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb 的 Jonathan Brandt 和晨星公司的 Gregg Warren 提出。由于我们将要进行的是股东大会，我们希望分析师和记者提的问题能够有助于我们的股东对他们的投资的理解和了解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.
查理和我都不会得到我们将会面临的问题是什么。有些肯定会很难，而这恰恰是我们喜欢的方式。一个人提多个问题将不被允许，我们想给尽可能多的人提问的机会。我们的目标是在您离开会场时比来的时候更了解伯克希尔公司，让你在奥马哈度过一段美好时光。
All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. After the 54th, all questions come from the audience. Charlie and I have often tackled more than 60 by 3:30.
总的来说，我们预计会至少回答54个问题，其中每个分析师和记者都会提出6个问题，而剩下的18个问题将留给观众。在54个问题之后，所有的问题都将来自观众。根据以前的经验，查理和我一般在3:30之前就回答了超过60个问题。
The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
来自观众的提问者将通过11次抽签选出，抽签将于年会当日的上午8:15举行。安装在主场和分会场的11个麦克风都将有一次抽签活动。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze that information before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).
虽然我谈论的是我们的股东在年会上获得的知识，查理和我认为所有的股东都应该同时获取伯克希尔所发布的新信息，如果可能的话，也应该有足够的时间在交易发生之前消化和分析这些信息。这就是为什么我们试图在周五晚些时候或周六早上发布财报，以及为什么我们的年会总是在周六举行(这一天也会缓解交通和停车问题)。
We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day — and as I write this letter — that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.
我们没有与大型机构投资者或分析师一对一谈话的惯例，而是像对待其他普通股东一样地来对待他们。对我们来说，没有什么比收入有限的股东对我们更重要了，因为他们相信我们，将自己积蓄中的很大一部分投资于我们。当我管理公司的日常事务时以及当我写这封信的时候，我心中想的就是这些股东。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
出于充分的理由，我经常称赞我们运营经理的成就。他们是真正的全明星，经营自己的业务，就好像这些业务是他们家族拥有的唯一资产一样。我还相信，我们的经理们的心态是以股东利益为导向，就像在大型上市公司一样。我们的大多数经理都没有工作的财务需求。对他们来说，打出商业上的”本垒打”的乐趣和薪水一样重要。
If managers (or directors) own Berkshire shares — and many do — it’s from open-market purchases they have made or because they received shares when they sold their businesses to us. None , however, gets the upside of ownership without risking the downside. Our directors and managers stand in your shoes.
如果经理(或董事)持有伯克希尔的股票(许多人都拥有)的话，那一定是他们从公开市场购买的，或者因为他们在将自己的业务出售给我们时获得了我们的股份。然而，没有人能在不冒风险的情况下获得持股的好处。我们的董事和经理们的处境和你们一样。
We continue to have a wonderful group at headquarters. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 32,700-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3, state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter — and the list goes on and on.
我们公司总部的团队一直很棒。这个团队可以有效地处理大量的美国SEC和其他监管要求，提交了32700页的联邦所得税申报表，监督了3935份州所得税申报表，回应无数股东和媒体调查，发布年报，准备这个全国最大的年会，协调董事会的活动，并核实这封信的真实性，其他的例子不胜枚举。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help at the annual meeting in whatever way they are needed. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.
他们愉快而高效地处理所有这些业务任务，让我的生活变得轻松愉快。而且他们的努力并不限于与伯克希尔公司紧密相关的活动。例如，去年他们接待了从40所大学(从200名发出申请的大学中选出)送到奥马哈的大学生，这些学生到这里来向我进行提问。他们还处理我收到的各种各样的请求，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买汉堡包和薯条(当然要蘸亨氏番茄酱)作为午餐。此外，他们还兴致勃勃地在年会上做能做的一切。他们为在伯克郡工作而自豪，我为他们感到骄傲。
I’ve saved the best for last. Early in 2018, Berkshire’s board elected Ajit Jain and Greg Abel as directors of Berkshire and also designated each as Vice Chairman. Ajit is now responsible for insurance operations, and Greg oversees the rest of our businesses. Charlie and I will focus on investments and capital allocation.
我把最好的留到了最后。在2018年初，伯克希尔的董事会选出Ajit Jain和Greg Abel为伯克希尔董事和公司副董事长。Ajit现在负责保险业务，Greg负责监管我们的其他业务。查理和我将专注于投资和资本配置。
You and I are lucky to have Ajit and Greg working for us. Each has been with Berkshire for decades, and Berkshire’s blood flows through their veins. The character of each man matches his talents. And that says it all.
Come to Omaha — the cradle of capitalism — on May 5th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to your visit.
5月5日，来资本家的摇篮奥马哈与伯克希尔大家庭碰面吧。我们所有人都期待你们的到来。
February 24, 2018
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
Footnotes
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All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for the A shares. ↩