原文信息：
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | 12.0 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.4 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 6.5 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | (6.2) | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | 4.6 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 8.3 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | 6.4 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 10.7 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2016 | 19.0% | 20.8% | 9.7% |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2016 | 884,319% | 1,972,595% | 12,717% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2016 was 19 to $172,108, a rate of 19% compounded annually.1
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”
在这52年里的前半段时间里，伯克希尔的账面价值大致等于企业真正重要的内在价值，之所以相近是因为我们大多数资源都部署在定期以市价重估的有价证券中(需扣除出售时将产生的税款)。按华尔街的话说，伯克希尔的资产负债表很大程度上是按市场计价的。
By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards.
然而到了1990年代初，我们资本配置的重点转向对其他企业的完全所有权，这一重大转变大大降低了公司内在价值和资产负债数据的相关性。之所以出现这种脱节，是因为适用于我们控股公司的GAAP会计准则，在许多重要方面不同于评估有价证券。具体来说，通常会计准则要求我们所拥有的企业，衰败时账面价值需要被减记，而胜出时账面价值却永远不会被重估。
We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased — a few of the winners very big — but have not written those up by a penny.
我们已经经历过两种结果：就像在婚姻中出现的情况一样，在企业合并案中，往往会在”我愿意”之后出现意料之外的结果。我做了一些十分愚蠢的收购决定，为我们所收购公司的经济商誉付出了太多。这导致了后来的商誉减值，伯克希尔的账面价值因此而减少。在我们收购的企业中，也有一些赢家，其中一些规模非常大，但这些成功企业商誉的增值，一分钱都没有反映出来。
We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large — and growing — unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.
我们对这种不对称的会计准则并无反对。但随着时间的推移，这必然会扩大伯克希尔的内在价值和账面价值之间的差距。现在我们的赢家获得的巨额且不断增长的未记录增值，为伯克希尔创造的内在价值远远超过其账面价值。这种增值在我们的财产意外险公司中特别巨大，在许多其他业务中也是如此。
Over time, stock prices gravitate toward intrinsic value. That’s what has happened at Berkshire, a fact explaining why the company’s 52-year market-price gain — shown on the facing page — materially exceeds its book-value gain.
What We Hope to Accomplish 我们希望达成的目标
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power per share to increase every year. Actual earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of periodic weakness in the U.S. economy. In addition, insurance mega-catastrophes or other industry-specific events may occasionally reduce earnings at Berkshire, even when most American businesses are doing well.
伯克希尔副董事长兼我的搭档查理·芒格，跟我预计伯克希尔的经常性(normalized)每股盈利能力每年都会增加。当然，实际收益有时会因为美国经济的周期性疲软而下降，此外，即使大多数美国企业表现良好，保险业务的特大灾难或其他行业的特定事件，也可能降低伯克希尔的收益。
It’s our job, though, to over time deliver significant growth, bumpy or not. After all, as stewards of your capital, Berkshire directors have opted to retain all earnings. Indeed, in both 2015 and 2016 Berkshire ranked first among American businesses in the dollar volume of earnings retained, in each year reinvesting many billions of dollars more than did the runner-up. Those reinvested dollars must earn their keep.
我们的工作就是随着时间的推移，实现公司收益的大幅增长，尽管过程会起伏不定。毕竟，作为你们资本的管理人，伯克希尔董事们选择了保留全部收益。事实上，2015年和2016年，伯克希尔的留存收益在美国企业中排名第一，每年的再投资金额比第二名多出数十亿美元。这些再投资的资金必须获得适当的回报。
Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we achieve will be minor; very occasionally, the cash register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally and financially to act fast when opportunities present themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds will fill the economic skies, and they will briefly rain gold. When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.
在一些年份，公司潜在的盈利能力实现的收益会很小，而其他一些年份，又特别巨大。查理和我并没有大幅增加盈利能力的神奇计划，仅仅有一个远大的梦想，以及在精神上和财务上做好准备，以便在机会出现时迅速采取行动。每隔十年左右，经济环境就会周期性地出现恶化，但随后投资机会就会短暂闪现。当倾盆金雨降临时，我们必须带着澡盆而不是汤匙冲出门去。这就是我们要做的事。
I earlier described our gradual shift from a company obtaining most of its gains from investment activities to one that grows in value by owning businesses. Launching that transition, we took baby steps — making small acquisitions whose impact on Berkshire’s profits was dwarfed by our gains from marketable securities. Despite that cautious approach, I made one particularly egregious error, acquiring Dexter Shoe for 6 billion.
前些年我已经解释过，我们正从一家通过投资获得大部分收益的公司逐渐转变为一家通过拥有公司实现价值增长的公司。在启动这一转型时，我们通过一些小规模的收购迈出了一小步，这些收购对伯克希尔收益的影响与我们有价证券投资获得的收益相比，还微不足道。尽管收购采取了非常谨慎的做法，但我还是犯了一个特别严重的错误。1993年时我以4.34亿美元收购Dexter鞋业，随后这家公司的价值迅速归零。但是让情况得更加糟糕的是，我在收购时使用25203股伯克希尔的股票进行了支付，截止2016年底这些股票的价值已超过60亿美元。
That wreck was followed by three key happenings — two positive, one negative — that set us firmly on our present course. At the beginning of 1996, we acquired the half of GEICO we didn’t already own, a cash transaction that changed our holding from a portfolio investment into a wholly-owned operating business. GEICO, with its almost unlimited potential, quickly became the centerpiece around which we built what I believe is now the world’s premier property/casualty business.
在这次灾难收购之后，又发生了三次关键性的收购，其中两次是有利的，一次是不利的。1996年初我们收购了GEICO另一半的所有权，这是一笔全现金交易，使我们的持股从证券投资转变为全资控股经营业务。GEICO凭借其几乎无限的增长潜力，很快成为我们的核心业务，我相信现在它是世界上首屈一指的财产意外险公司。
Unfortunately, I followed the GEICO purchase by foolishly using Berkshire stock — a boatload of stock — to buy General Reinsurance in late 1998. After some early problems, General Re has become a fine insurance operation that we prize. It was, nevertheless, a terrible mistake on my part to issue 272,200 shares of Berkshire in buying General Re, an act that increased our outstanding shares by a whopping 21.8%. My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that — despite the Biblical endorsement — is far from blessed when you are buying businesses).2
不幸的是，在收购GEICO之后，在1998年末，我愚蠢地使用伯克希尔的股票(一揽子优质企业组合)收购了通用再保险公司。在经历了早期一些问题之后，通用再保险已经成为我们所珍视的一家优秀的保险公司。尽管如此，我在收购通用再保险时发行了272,200股伯克希尔股票，这使得伯克希尔流通股大幅增加了21.8%，这是一个严重的错误。由于我的错误，伯克希尔公司的股东付出的远远多于他们得到的（尽管《圣经》称赞这种做法，但当你收购企业时，上帝却不会因此赐福给你）。2
Early in 2000, I atoned for that folly by buying 76% (since grown to 90%) of MidAmerican Energy, a brilliantly-managed utility business that has delivered us many large opportunities to make profitable and socially-useful investments. The MidAmerican cash purchase — I was learning — firmly launched us on our present course of (1) continuing to build our insurance operation; (2) energetically acquiring large and diversified non-insurance businesses and (3) largely making our deals from internally-generated cash. (Today, I would rather prep for a colonoscopy than issue Berkshire shares.)
2000年初为了弥补自己愚蠢的收购行为，我收购了中美能源76%的股份(后增持到90%)。这是一家管理出色的公用事业公司，为我们带来了许多对社会有意义的盈利的投资机会。通过对中美能源的现金收购的学习，坚定地让我们走上了目前的道路：1、继续补强收购我们保险业务；2、积极收购大型且多元化的非保险业务业务；3、在很大程度上使用内部产生的现金来进行收购。(今天我宁愿准备做结肠镜检查，也不愿意发行伯克希尔股票)
Our portfolio of bonds and stocks, de-emphasized though it is, has continued in the post-1998 period to grow and to deliver us hefty capital gains, interest, and dividends. Those portfolio earnings have provided us major help in financing the purchase of businesses. Though unconventional, Berkshire’s two-pronged approach to capital allocation gives us a real edge.
在1998年之后的时期，尽管伯克希尔债券和股票的投资组合被淡化了，但其规模继续增长，并为我们带来巨额的资本利得，以及利息和股息回报。这些投资收益为我们在收购其他企业时提供了重要的资金。尽管伯克希尔双管齐下的资本配置方式非同寻常，但却给我们带来了实实在在的优势。
Here’s our financial record since 1999, when the redirection of our business began in earnest. During the 18-year period covered, Berkshire’s outstanding shares grew by only 8.3%, with most of the increase occurring when we purchased BNSF. That, I’m happy to say, was one issuance of stock that made good sense.
After-Tax Earnings (in billions of dollars)
税后利润（单位：十亿美元）
| Year 年份 | Operations (1) 税后营业利润 | Capital Gains (2) 税后资本利得 |
|---|---|---|
| 1999 | 0.67 | 0.89 |
| 2000 | 0.94 | 2.39 |
| 2001 | (0.13) | 0.92 |
| 2002 | 3.72 | 0.57 |
| 2003 | 5.42 | 2.73 |
| 2004 | 5.05 | 2.26 |
| 2005 | 5.00 | 3.53 |
| 2006 | 9.31 | 1.71 |
| 2007 | 9.63 | 3.58 |
| 2008 | 9.64 | (4.65) |
| 2009 | 7.57 | 0.49 |
| 2010 | 11.09 | 1.87 |
| 2011 | 10.78 | (0.52) |
| 2012 | 12.60 | 2.23 |
| 2013 | 15.14 | 4.34 |
| 2014 | 16.55 | 3.32 |
| 2015 | 17.36 | 6.73 |
| 2016 | 17.57 | 6.50 |
(1) Including interest and dividends from investments, but excluding capital gains or losses.
(1) 经营收益包含投资产生的利息和股息，但不包括资本损益；
(2) In very large part, this tabulation includes only realized capital gains or losses. Unrealized gains and losses are also included, however, when GAAP requires that treatment.
(2) 投资收益在很大程度上只包含已实现资本损益，但GAAP要求进行调整时，部分未实现的资本损益也包括在内。
Our expectation is that investment gains will continue to be substantial — though totally random as to timing — and that these will supply significant funds for business purchases. Concurrently, Berkshire’s superb corps of operating CEOs will focus on increasing earnings at the individual businesses they manage, sometimes helping them to grow by making bolt-on acquisitions. By our avoiding the issuance of Berkshire stock, any improvement in earnings will translate into equivalent per-share gains.
我们的预期是，投资收益将继续大幅增长，尽管就时间而言是完全随机的，并且这些投资收益将为我们后续的企业收购提供大量的资金。与此同时，伯克希尔优秀的运营CEO团队将致力于增加他们所管理的各项业务的经营收益，有时候他们会进行补强型收购来助力增长，通过避免发行伯克希尔股票，收益的任何增长都将转化为相当比例的每股收益增长。
Our efforts to materially increase the normalized earnings of Berkshire will be aided — as they have been throughout our managerial tenure — by America’s economic dynamism. One word sums up our country’s achievements: miraculous. From a standing start 240 years ago — a span of time less than triple my days on earth — Americans have combined human ingenuity, a market system, a tide of talented and ambitious immigrants, and the rule of law to deliver abundance beyond any dreams of our forefathers.
我们大幅提高经营性每股收益所采取的努力将得到美国经济活力的助力，正如我们在过去整个管理期间过发生过的一样。如果要用一个词来描述我们国家取得的成就，那就是奇迹。从240年前的起点开始，美国人已经将人类的智慧、市场体系、才会横溢雄心勃勃的移民以及法治融合在一起，创造出我们先辈梦寐以求的财富。
You need not be an economist to understand how well our system has worked. Just look around you. See the 75 million owner-occupied homes, the bountiful farmland, the 260 million vehicles, the hyper-productive factories, the great medical centers, the talent-filled universities, you name it — they all represent a net gain for Americans from the barren lands, primitive structures and meager output of 1776. Starting from scratch, America has amassed wealth totaling $90 trillion.
你们不需要成为一名经济学家，就能了解我们的体系运作得多好。看看你们周围，看看这7500万套自有住房、肥沃的农田、2.6亿辆汽车、高产工厂、健全的医疗中心、人才济济的大学，它们都代表着美国人从1776年贫瘠的土地、原始社会结构和贫弱的产出中，获得的净收益。美国白手起家，已经累积了90万亿美元的财富。
It’s true, of course, that American owners of homes, autos and other assets have often borrowed heavily to finance their purchases. If an owner defaults, however, his or her asset does not disappear or lose its usefulness. Rather, ownership customarily passes to an American lending institution that then disposes of it to an American buyer. Our nation’s wealth remains intact. As Gertrude Stein put it, “Money is always there, but the pockets change.”
当然，那些有车有房以及拥有其他资产的美国人们往往为了买这些资产负债累累，然而，如果资产所有者违约，这些资产并不会消失或者丧失其用途。所有权通常会转移给借贷机构，然后该机构将其转卖给其他买家。我们国家的财富仍然完好无损。正如Gertrude Stein所说：钱总在那里，只是装钱的口袋不断改变。
Above all, it’s our market system — an economic traffic cop ably directing capital, brains and labor — that has created America’s abundance. This system has also been the primary factor in allocating rewards. Governmental redirection, through federal, state and local taxation, has in addition determined the distribution of a significant portion of the bounty.
总之，正是我们的市场经济体系创造了美国今天的富足，它就像一个交警，巧妙引导资本、智慧、人才和劳动力的流动。这个体系还是利益分配奖励过程中的主要因素。此外，政府通过联邦、州和地方税收的重定向，决定了一大部分财富的再分配。
America has, for example, decided that those citizens in their productive years should help both the old and the young. Such forms of aid — sometimes enshrined as “entitlements” — are generally thought of as applying to the aged. But don’t forget that four million American babies are born each year with an entitlement to a public education. That societal commitment, largely financed at the local level, costs about 600 billion, which is about 3.5% of GDP.
例如，美国已经决定，那些处于盛年的公民应该帮助年老者和年幼者。这类形式的帮助有时被称为”权利”，通常被认为适用于年老者。但是不要忘了每年出生的400万婴儿，他们有权利接受公共教育。这一社会投入大多由地方政府提供资金支持，每个婴儿大约花费15万美元。每年的总开支超过了6000亿美元，大约相当于GDP的3.5%。
However our wealth may be divided, the mind-boggling amounts you see around you belong almost exclusively to Americans. Foreigners, of course, own or have claims on a modest portion of our wealth. Those holdings, however, are of little importance to our national balance sheet: Our citizens own assets abroad that are roughly comparable in value.
无论我们的财富如何分配，你们所看到的令人难以置信的财富完全属于美国人。当然，外国人也拥有我们财富的一小部分。然而这一部分资产对于我们国家的资产负债表无足轻重：我们的公民拥有的海外资产价值大致相当。
Early Americans, we should emphasize, were neither smarter nor more hard working than those people who toiled century after century before them. But those venturesome pioneers crafted a system that unleashed human potential, and their successors built upon it.
我们应该强调一点，早期的美国人既不会比他们之前几个世纪辛苦劳作的人们更聪明，也不比他们更努力工作。但是这些富有冒险精神的前辈们创造出了一个能够释放人类潜能的系统，他们的后辈也在此基础上加强这个系统。
This economic creation will deliver increasing wealth to our progeny far into the future. Yes, the build-up of wealth will be interrupted for short periods from time to time. It will not , however, be stopped. I’ll repeat what I’ve both said in the past and expect to say in future years: Babies born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.
这一经济创造在未来为我们的子孙后代带来越来越多的财富。当然财富累积的过程总会时不时被短期打断。然而，它不会被阻止。我将重复过去我已经说过的话，并且在未来也会重复说：现在在美国出生的人是历史上最幸运的一代人。
America’s economic achievements have led to staggering profits for stockholders. During the 20th century the Dow-Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497, a 17,320% capital gain that was materially boosted by steadily increasing dividends. The trend continues: By yearend 2016, the index had advanced a further 72%, to 19,763.
美国的经济成就已经为股东们带来了惊人的利润。在20世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数从66点涨至11497点，实现了17320%的资本收益，其中主要得益于股息的稳定增加。这一趋势仍将持续下去。截至2016年底，该指数进一步增长了72%至19763点。
American business — and consequently a basket of stocks — is virtually certain to be worth far more in the years ahead. Innovation, productivity gains, entrepreneurial spirit and an abundance of capital will see to that. Ever-present naysayers may prosper by marketing their gloomy forecasts. But heaven help them if they act on the nonsense they peddle.
在未来几年美国企业以及一篮子股票的价值必定更高。创新、生产力提高、企业家精神和充足的资本都将确保这一点实现。无处不在的怀疑论者们可能通过宣传他们的悲观预期而发迹。但是如果他们按照他们宣传的废话行动，那么只有上帝才能帮助他们了。
Many companies, of course, will fall behind, and some will fail. Winnowing of that sort is a product of market dynamism. Moreover, the years ahead will occasionally deliver major market declines — even panics — that will affect virtually all stocks. No one can tell you when these traumas will occur — not me, not Charlie, not economists, not the media. Meg McConnell of the New York Fed aptly described the reality of panics: “We spend a lot of time looking for systemic risk; in truth, however, it tends to find us.”
当然，许多公司将被甩在后面，一些公司将会倒闭。这种淘汰是市场活力的产物。而且，未来几年偶尔会发生市场大幅下跌甚至恐慌，这将影响到几乎所有股票。没人能告诉你们这些冲击将何时发生。我做不到、查理做不到，经济学家们也做不到，媒体更无能为力。纽约联储的Meg McConnell曾贴切地对这一恐慌现实进行了描述：“我们花了大量时间去寻找系统性风险，然而事实上它往往先找到我们。”
During such scary periods, you should never forget two things: First, widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases. Second, personal fear is your enemy. It will also be unwarranted. Investors who avoid high and unnecessary costs and simply sit for an extended period with a collection of large, conservatively-financed American businesses will almost certainly do well.
在这种可怕时期中，你们应该牢记两点：首先，大范围的恐慌是投资者的朋友，因为你可以低位买入优质资产；其次，个人的恐慌是你的敌人，因为这是毫无必要的。那些避免高昂和不必要的成本，只是长期持有许多大型且财务保守的美国企业股票的投资者们，将必定获得不错的回报。
As for Berkshire, our size precludes a brilliant result: Prospective returns fall as assets increase. Nonetheless, Berkshire’s collection of good businesses, along with the company’s impregnable financial strength and owner-oriented culture, should deliver decent results. We won’t be satisfied with less.
至于伯克希尔，我们的规模成为卓越业绩的巨大障碍：随着资产规模的增加，未来预期回报率将会下滑。尽管如此，伯克希尔良好的业务组合，以及公司坚不可摧的财务实力和以股东利益为导向的企业文化，应该能实现出不错的回报。我们不会满足于低回报。
Share Repurchases 股票回购
In the investment world, discussions about share repurchases often become heated. But I’d suggest that participants in this debate take a deep breath: Assessing the desirability of repurchases isn’t that complicated.
From the standpoint of exiting shareholders, repurchases are always a plus. Though the day-to-day impact of these purchases is usually minuscule, it’s always better for a seller to have an additional buyer in the market.
For continuing shareholders, however, repurchases only make sense if the shares are bought at a price below intrinsic value. When that rule is followed, the remaining shares experience an immediate gain in intrinsic value. Consider a simple analogy: If there are three equal partners in a business worth 900, each of the remaining partners realizes an immediate gain of 1,100, however, the continuing partners each suffer a loss of $50. The same math applies with corporations and their shareholders. Ergo, the question of whether a repurchase action is value-enhancing or value-destroying for continuing shareholders is entirely purchase-price dependent.
然而，对于继续持有的股东来说，只有在股价低于内在价值的时候，回购才有意义。当遵循这一规则时，剩余的股票将立即获得内在价值的提升。考虑一个简单的类比：如果一家价值3000美元的企业中有三个平等的合伙人，其中一个合伙人的股权被公司以900美元的价格回购，那么剩下的两个合伙人将立即获得50美元收益。如果退出的合伙人得到了1100美元，那么剩下的两个合伙人将分别损失50美元。同样的计算方法也同样适用于企业及其股东。因此，“回购行为对于继续持有的股东而言是价值增加还是价值破坏”，完全取决于回购价格。
It is puzzling, therefore, that corporate repurchase announcements almost never refer to a price above which repurchases will be eschewed. That certainly wouldn’t be the case if a management was buying an outside business. There, price would always factor into a buy-or-pass decision.
When CEOs or boards are buying a small part of their own company, though, they all too often seem oblivious to price. Would they behave similarly if they were managing a private company with just a few owners and were evaluating the wisdom of buying out one of them? Of course not.
It is important to remember that there are two occasions in which repurchases should not take place, even if the company’s shares are underpriced. One is when a business both needs all its available money to protect or expand its own operations and is also uncomfortable adding further debt. Here, the internal need for funds should take priority. This exception assumes, of course, that the business has a decent future awaiting it after the needed expenditures are made.
重要的是要记住，在两种情况下，即使公司的股价被低估，应不应该回购。一种情况是，当一家企业需要所有可用的资金来保护或扩大其运营业务，而又不愿意进一步增加更多债务时。在这种情况下，内部的资金需求应该优先考虑。当然，这一例外情况的前提假设是，在做出必要的资本开支后，企业拥有一个光明的未来。
The second exception, less common, materializes when a business acquisition (or some other investment opportunity) offers far greater value than do the undervalued shares of the potential repurchaser. Long ago, Berkshire itself often had to choose between these alternatives. At our present size, the issue is far less likely to arise.
My suggestion: Before even discussing repurchases, a CEO and his or her Board should stand, join hands and in unison declare, “What is smart at one price is stupid at another.”
To recap Berkshire’s own repurchase policy: I am authorized to buy large amounts of Berkshire shares at 120% or less of book value because our Board has concluded that purchases at that level clearly bring an instant and material benefit to continuing shareholders. By our estimate, a 120%-of-book price is a significant discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a spread that is appropriate because calculations of intrinsic value can’t be precise.
回顾伯克希尔自己的回购政策：我被授权以账面价值的120%或更低的价格，购买大量伯克希尔的股票。因为我们的董事会已经得出结论，按照这一价格水平回购，能够给继续持有的股东带来立即的实质性收益。我们估计，120%的账面价值相对于伯克希尔的内在价值拥有一个巨大的折扣，由于内在价值的计算不可能精确，所以这一价差是恰当的。
The authorization given me does not mean that we will “prop” our stock’s price at the 120% ratio. If that level is reached, we will instead attempt to blend a desire to make meaningful purchases at a value-creating price with a related goal of not over-influencing the market.
赋予我这一权限并不意味着，我们将以120%比率去支撑我们的股价水平。如果达到这一水平，我们将尝试把”以增值的价格进行有意义回购”这一愿望和”不过度影响市场价格”这一目标融合在一起。
To date, repurchasing our shares has proved hard to do. That may well be because we have been clear in describing our repurchase policy and thereby have signaled our view that Berkshire’s intrinsic value is significantly higher than 120% of book value. If so, that’s fine. Charlie and I prefer to see Berkshire shares sell in a fairly narrow range around intrinsic value, neither wishing them to sell at an unwarranted high price — it’s no fun having owners who are disappointed with their purchases — nor one too low. Furthermore, our buying out “partners” at a discount is not a particularly gratifying way of making money. Still, market circumstances could create a situation in which repurchases would benefit both continuing and exiting shareholders. If so, we will be ready to act.
迄今为止，回购我们的股票被证明是很难的事情，这很可能是因为我们已经明确描述了我们的回购政策，也已经表明了我们的观点，即”伯克希尔的内在价值远高于120%的账面价值”。如果是这样，那也没关系。查理和我更愿意看到，伯克希尔的股价在一个围绕内在价值相当狭窄的范围内交易，既不希望它们以不合理的高价出售(拥有感到失望的股东并不有趣)，也不希望交易的价格太低。而且，折价购买合伙人的股权也不是一种令人满意的赚钱方式。尽管如此，市场环境也可能创造出一种局面：回购既有利于继续持有的股东，也有利于退出的股东。如果是这样，我们将准备采取行动。
One final observation for this section: As the subject of repurchases has come to a boil, some people have come close to calling them un-American — characterizing them as corporate misdeeds that divert funds needed for productive endeavors. That simply isn’t the case: Both American corporations and private investors are today awash in funds looking to be sensibly deployed. I’m not aware of any enticing project that in recent years has died for lack of capital. (Call us if you have a candidate.)
本节最后一个发现是：随着回购话题越来越热门，一些人们几乎称其为反美行为：他们将回购定性为转移生产所需资金的企业不当行为。事实并非如此，美国企业和私人投资者们拥有大量寻求合理部署的资金。这些年我并没有看到任何诱人的项目因资金缺乏而夭折。(如果你有此类项目，请给我们打电话)。
Insurance 保险业务
Let’s now look at Berkshire’s various businesses, starting with our most important sector, insurance.
The property/casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:
我们被财产意外险业务吸引的一个原因是其财务特征：财产意外险公司提前收到保费，之后再支付理赔金。在极端情况下，例如大量因接触石棉而提出的索赔，款项支付可能长达数十年。这种先收后付的模式使得保险公司持有大量流动资金，我们称之为浮存金，这些资金最终会流向投保人。与此同时，保险公司能够用浮存金为自己的利益进行投资。虽然单个保单和索赔进进出出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模相对于保费通常维持一个相对稳定的关系。因此，随着我们业务的扩张，浮存金规模也相应增长。至于它们是如何增长的，如下图所示：
| Year 年份 | Float (in millions) 浮存金（单位：百万美元） |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
| 2016 | 91,577 |
We recently wrote a huge policy that increased float to more than $100 billion. Beyond that one-time boost, float at GEICO and several of our specialized operations is almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of large run-off contracts whose float is certain to drift downward.
我们最近签了一份大额保单，能够将浮存金增加到1000亿美元。除了这类一次性增加外，GEICO保险和我们的一些专业业务的浮存金几乎必定会以很快的速度增长。然而，国民保险的再保险部门是许多大额流动性合同的缔约方，这些合同的浮存金必定会下滑。
We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual — at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. It will never be compromised.
随着时间的推移，我们可能会经历浮存金规模的下滑。如果是这样的话，那么下滑将是缓慢的，任何一年的下滑都不会超过3%。我们保险合同的性质要求，我们永远不会受到对我们的现金资源具有重要意义的即时或短期需求的影响。这种结构是经过精心设计的，是我们保险业务无与伦比的财务实力的关键组成部分。这个现金要求将永远不会妥协。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过了我们运营费用和最终损失赔付的总和，那么我们的保险业务将实现承保盈利，该利润将增加浮存金创造的投资收益。当我们赚到这样的利润时，我们将享受免费资金的使用，更好的是，我们持有这些资金获得报酬。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.
不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果，这导致了激烈的竞争，甚至异常激烈，有时会导致整个财产意外险行业遭受巨大的承保亏损。实际上，这一损失就是保险行业保持其浮存金所付出的代价。但和美国其他行业的公司相比，竞争动态几乎会确保保险公司，将保持净有形资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。
This outcome is made more certain by the dramatically lower interest rates that now exist throughout the world. The investment portfolios of almost all P/C companies — though not those of Berkshire — are heavily concentrated in bonds. As these high-yielding legacy investments mature and are replaced by bonds yielding a pittance, earnings from float will steadily fall. For that reason, and others as well, it’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly in the case of companies that specialize in reinsurance.
这一结果因现在全世界的低利率政策而变得更加确定。几乎所有财产意外险公司的投资组合都集中于债券上(不包括伯克希尔)，随着这些高收益的历史债券到期，并被收益率更低的债券所取代，浮存金的投资收益将持续减少。出于这个以及其他原因，未来十年保险行业的业绩将低于过去十年的纪录，这是毋庸置疑的事情，尤其对于那些专门从事再保险业务的公司。
Nevertheless, I very much like our own prospects. Berkshire’s unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage; occasionally, they offer us major opportunities. When others are constrained, our choices expand.
尽管如此，我还是非常看好我们自己的发展前景。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力使我们在投资方面相比其他保险公司更加灵活。我们拥有更多的投资选择是我们的一大优势，偶尔会提供给我们重大的机会。当其他公司受到限制时，我们的投资选择就会增加。
Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 14 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $28 billion. That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
此外，我们的财产意外险公司拥有卓越的承保记录。伯克希尔现在已经连续14年实现承保盈利，期间我们的税前承保收益累计达到了280亿美元。这样的业绩记录并非偶然：严格的承保记录是我们所有的保险经理们每天都关注点，他们都知道，尽管浮存金很有价值，但其优势也可能被糟糕的承保业绩所埋没。对于承保纪律，所有的保险公司都只是嘴上说说而已。而在伯克希尔，这是一种信仰。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as a typical liability is a major mistake. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses — a huge $27 billion to more than six million claimants in 2016 — and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.
那么浮存金将如何影响我们的内在价值？当我们计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金的总额被作为负债减掉，就好像我们明天就要将其全部支付而无法补充一样。但将浮存金严格视作典型负债是错误的。它应该被视为一个循环基金。我们每天都要支付过去的索赔和相关费用，2016年就向600多万索赔人支付了270亿美元的巨额费用，这减少了我们的浮存金。但同样肯定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，收取的保费又增加了浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing 1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.
如果我们的循环浮存金没有成本且可以长期保持规模(我相信会是这样)，那么这种负债的真正价值会显著低于会计上的账面负债。因为新的业务会替代旧的索赔，因此欠下的每1美元永远都不会从公司消失，这跟持有明天就将付出而无法收回的1美元截然不同。然而根据GAAP准则这两种类型的负债被认为是完全相同的。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that is included in our book-value figure. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
我们在收购保险公司时产生了155亿美元的”商誉”资产，这增加了账面价值，并部分抵消了这一被夸大的浮存金负债。很大程度上这种商誉体现了我们为保险业务获得浮存金能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的收购成本与真实价值无关。举例来说，如果一家保险公司蒙受了长期大额的承保损失，那么无论其原始取得成本如何，账面上的任何商誉资产都应被视作是毫无价值的。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill — what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it — to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire 28 billion. Yet we have subsequently increased our float by $64 billion, a gain that in no way is reflected in our book value. This unrecorded asset is one reason — a huge reason — why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value far exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔并不是这样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司商誉真正的经济价值远超其历史账面价值。如果我们收购拥有类似商誉的保险公司，我们很乐意为类似质量的浮存金支付费用。事实上，2000年我们在保险业务中为商誉支付的155亿美元几乎全部计入账面价值，当时的浮存金规模是280亿美元，然而，我们之后浮存金规模增加了640亿美元，这部分的价值丝毫没有反映到我们的账面价值上，这些未记录的资产价值，就是我们认为伯克希尔内在商业价值远高于其账面价值的一个巨大的原因。
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that in most cases possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
首先，浮存金规模最高的是由阿吉特·贾因管理的伯克希尔再保险集团。阿吉特对别人不敢兴趣或没有资本承保的风险提供保险。他的运营结合了能力、速度和果断。更重要的是，他的思维方式在保险界独一无二。然而，他从来没有将伯克希尔暴露在与我们资源不相称的风险之中。
Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe — a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced — Berkshire as a whole would likely record a large profit for the year. Our many streams of non-insurance earnings would see to that. Additionally, we would remain awash in cash and be eager to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.
事实上，伯克希尔在规避风险方面远比其他大多数大型保险公司要保守。举例来说，如果保险业因某种特大灾难而遭受2500亿美元的损失，这一损失大约为保险行业经历过最大损失的3倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，由于其众多的非保险收益来源，依然将实现可观的利润。此外，我们也将保持现金充沛，并渴望在一个可能陷入动荡的保险市场中寻找大量的承保机会。而其他的主要保险或再保险公司即使不面临破产，也会出现严重亏损。
When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our small and struggling reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders. If there were ever to be another Ajit and you could swap me for him, don’t hesitate. Make the trade!
1986年的那个周六，阿吉特走进了伯克希尔的办公室，那时的他甚至没有一点保险业方面的经验。尽管如此，时任我们的保险经理人MikeGoldberg还是让他管理再保险业务。在这种鼓励和推动下，阿吉特在保险界崭露头角，并且很快大放异彩，为伯克希尔的股东创造了数百亿美元的价值。如果有另外一个Ajit，你可以用我本人交换他，不要犹豫，马上交易！
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed until recently by Tad Montross. After 39 years at General Re, Tad retired in 2016. Tad was a class act in every way and we owe him a ton of thanks. Kara Raiguel, who has worked with Ajit for 16 years, is now CEO of General Re.
我们另一个再保险业务巨头是由TadMontross管理通用再保险公司。在通用再保险公司工作了39年后，Tad于2016年退休了。他在各个方面都是佼佼者，我们对他感激万分。与Ajit一起工作了16年的Kara Raiguel接任通用再保险的CEO。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
本质上，一个稳健的保险公司需要遵守四大承保纪律，它必须：(1)理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险；(2)谨慎的评估风险发生的可能性及其可能造成的损失；(3)设定合理的保费。平均而言，保费在满足可能发生的损失及运营费用的总和后，将带来利润；(4)如果在无法获得合适保费的情况下愿意放手。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance. Tad never listened to that nonsensical excuse for sloppy underwriting, and neither will Kara.
许多保险公司都能遵守前三条规则，却忽视了第四条。他们根本无法放弃竞争对手正在积极争取的业务。老话说：“别人都这么做，我们也必须这么做”，这在许多行业都会招致麻烦，但保险行业尤为突出。Tad从来都不听那些草率荒谬的承保借口，Kara也将如此。
Finally, there is GEICO, the company that set my heart afire 66 years ago (and for which the flame still burns). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 55 years of service in 2016.
最后是GEICO保险，这家公司66年前在我的心中燃起了火焰，至今仍在燃烧。该公司由Tony Nicely管理着，他18岁就加入这家公司，到2016年已有55个年头。
Tony became CEO of GEICO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony, who brings his combination of brilliance, dedication and soundness to the job. (The latter quality is essential to sustained success. As Charlie says, it’s great to have a manager with a 160 IQ — unless he thinks it’s 180.) Like Ajit, Tony has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire.
1993年Tony成为GEICO保险的CEO，自那以后公司蓬勃发展。没有比Tony更好的经理人了，他将他的才华、奉献精神和稳健性融入工作。(后一种品质对于持续成功至关重要，正如查理所说，拥有一个智商是160的经理很不错，除非他自认为智商为180)。和Ajit一样，Tony也为伯克希尔创造了数百亿美元的价值。
On my initial visit to GEICO in 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed over the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. The company’s annual sales were then $8 million; In 2016, GEICO did that much business every three hours of the year.
1951年当我第一次造访GEICO保险时，我就被这家公司相对于行业巨头所拥有的巨大成本优势所震撼。我很清楚GEICO将会成功，因为它理应成功。那时GEICO的年销售额是800万美元，2016年该公司每三个小时就能做这么多业务。
Auto insurance is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them — and only a low-cost operation can deliver those. In fact, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading — right now! — and go to geico.com or call 800-847-7536.
汽车保险是大多数家庭的主要开支。节约对他们来说很重要——只有低成本的运营才能实现这些目标。实际上，至少40%阅读这封信的人可以通过向GEICO保险投保来省钱。所以停止阅读，现在就访问geico.com或拨打800-847-7536咨询一下吧。
GEICO’s low costs create a moat — an enduring one — that competitors are unable to cross. As a result, the company gobbles up market share year after year, ending 2016 with about 12% of industry volume. That’s up from 2.5% in 1995, the year Berkshire acquired control of GEICO. Employment, meanwhile, grew from 8,575 to 36,085.
GEICO的成本优势创造了一条竞争对手无法逾越的护城河，所以该公司能够年复一年持续扩大市场份额。到2016年底，我们的市场份额达到12%，高于1995年我们取得控制权时的2.5%。与此同时，其员工数量也从8575人增至36085人。
GEICO’s growth accelerated dramatically during the second half of 2016. Loss costs throughout the auto-insurance industry had been increasing at an unexpected pace and some competitors lost their enthusiasm for taking on new customers. GEICO’s reaction to the profit squeeze, however, was to accelerate its new-business efforts. We like to make hay while the sun sets , knowing that it will surely rise again.
从2016年下半年开始，GEICO的增长显著加快。期间，整个汽车保险行业的损失成本正在以令人意想不到的速度增长，一些竞争对手因此开始失去了吸引新客户的热情。但GEICO公司对于利润空间被压缩的应对措施是加快扩大其新业务的努力。趁热打铁，把握时机。
GEICO continues on a roll as I send you this letter. When insurance prices increase, people shop more. And when they shop, GEICO wins.
在我写这封信件的时候，GEICO保险仍然保持着良好的发展势头，当保险价格开始上升时，人们就会买入更多保险，当他们购买时，GEICO最终也会成为赢家。
Have you called yet? (800-847-7536 or go to geico.com)
你打过电话咨询了吗？(800-847-7536或访问geico.com)
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a collection of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually one much superior to that reported by their competitors. Over the past 14 years, this group has earned 943 million to $11.6 billion.
我们除了拥有的三大保险公司，我们还有其他一些规模较小的公司，它们主要承保商业保险。整体而言，这些公司是一个规模庞大、不断增长且价值不菲的业务。它们始终保持承保盈利，并且通常比同行报告的利润好得多。在过去14年中，该集团从承保业务赚得了47亿美元收益(约占其保费收入的13%)，同时浮存金从9.43亿美元增长到116亿美元。
Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which is included in this grouping. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge, a move that proved to be a home run: We expected significant losses in the early years while Peter built the personnel and infrastructure needed for a world-wide operation. Instead, he and his crew delivered significant underwriting profits throughout the start-up period. BHSI’s volume increased 40% in 2016, reaching $1.3 billion. It’s clear to me that the company is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.
不到三年前，我们成立了伯克希尔特种保险公司(BHSI)，我们也将其纳入该集团。我们第一个决定就是让Peter Eastwood去管理这个公司。事后证明，这绝对是一个英明的决定：最初我们预计公司成立前几年将在会出现重大承保亏损，因为Peter正在组建全球运营所需的人员和基础设施。相反，Peter和他的团队在整个初创期都获得了可观的承保利润。BHSI在2016年的业务量已经达到13亿美元，增长了40%。显而易见，该公司注定将成为全球一流的财产意外险公司。
Here’s a recap of pre-tax underwriting earnings and float by division:
以下按业务部门划分的税前承保业绩和浮存金规模摘要：
| Insurance Operations 保险部门 | Underwriting Profit (in millions) 2016 2016 年承保利润（百万美元） | Underwriting Profit (in millions) 2015 2015 年承保利润（百万美元） | Yearend Float (in millions) 2016 2016 年浮存金总额（百万美元） | Yearend Float (in millions) 2015 2016 年浮存金总额（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance [[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]再保险 | $ 822 | $ 421 | $ 45,081 |
| General Re [[General_Re | 通用再保险]] | 190 | 132 | 17,699 |
| GEICO [[GEICO | 盖可保险]] | 462 | 460 | 17,148 |
| Other Primary 其他优先保险 | 657 | 824 | 11,649 | 9,906 |
| $ 2,131 | $ 1,837 | $ 91,577 | $ 87,722 |
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a range of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that time will only make more valuable.
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses 受监管的资本密集型业务
Our BNSF railroad and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), our 90%-owned utility business, share important characteristics that distinguish them from Berkshire’s other activities. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. These two very major companies accounted for 33% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings last year.
我们拥有的BNSF铁路和拥有90%股份的BHE能源，与伯克希尔其他业务有着不同的重要特征。所以，我们把他们的各项财务数据从我们GAAP的负债表和收益表中分离出来，在这封信中为它们分配了独立板块单独来谈。这两家大型公司合计占伯克希尔税后收益的33%。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 6:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是，对非常长期的、受监管的资产进行了巨额投资。这些资产部分资金来自伯克希尔不提供担保的大额长期债务。事实上这些资产并不需要我们的信贷支持，因为每家公司都有盈利能力，即使在经济状况恶化时，也远超其利息支付需求。比如，去年在铁路行业令人失望的一年里，BNSF的利息覆盖倍数超过了6:1(我们对利息覆盖倍数的定义是息税前利润/利息，而不是息税折旧摊销前利润/利息，尽管后者被普遍使用，但我们觉得存在严重缺陷)。
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service for which demand is remarkably steady. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: an ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of the company being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. That economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
与此同时，有两个因素保证BHE能源能在任何情况下都有能力偿付债务。第一个是所有公共事业的共同点：抗经济衰退的盈利能力，这来自于这些公司独家提供社会基础服务的结果，所以需求非常稳定。第二个只有少数几个公共事业公司享有的特定优势，即不断扩大的多元化的收益来源，使BHE免受任何单一监管机构的伤害。这些多元化的收益来源，加上强大母公司的固有优势，让BHE及其公共事业子公司能够大幅度降低债务成本。这一经济因素对我们和我们的客户都有利。
All told, BHE and BNSF invested $8.9 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to their segments of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns — and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
总的来说，BHE能源和BNSF铁路去年在工厂和设备方面投资了89亿美元，这是对美国的基础设施关键组成部分做出的重大贡献。只要它们能够承诺合理的回报，我们很愿意进行此类投资。在这方面，我们对未来的监管有绝对的信心。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的这种自信心是合理的，不仅因为我们过去的经验，还有我们对社会清晰的认识，即社会永远需要在交通和能源方面进行大规模投资。以确保资金持续流向重大项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合各地政府的自身利益。同时以获得监管机构及其所代表的民众信任的方式开展业务，也符合我们自身利益。
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 7.1¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.9¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.5¢, Illinois 9.2¢, Minnesota 10.0¢. The national average is 10.3¢. We have promised Iowans that our base rates will not increase until 2029 at the earliest. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
低廉的价格是让这些支持者们满意的有力方式。在爱荷华州，BHE能源的平均零售价是7.1美分/千瓦时，该州的另一家主要电力公司Alliant的均价是9.9美分。这里有一些来自附近州的行业可比数据：内布拉斯加州9美分、密苏尔州9.5美分、伊利诺伊州9.2美分、明尼苏达州10美分。全美的平均价格大概是10.3美分。我们已经向爱荷华州承诺，最早要到2029年我们的基本费率才会上涨。我们最低的价格为那些工薪阶层的客户节省了真金白银。
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance the load is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads ranged from 4¢ to 5¢.
对于BNSF铁路而言，主要的铁路公司之间价格比较则要困难得多，因为他们在货物组合和平均运输里程上都存在着巨大的差异。然而，为了提供一个粗略的衡量标准，去年我们收费略低于3美分/吨英里，然而其他四大铁路公司的客户平均运输成本从4美分到5美分不等。
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to rivaling Iowa, where last year the megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 55% of all megawatt-hours sold to our Iowa retail customers. New wind projects that are underway will take that figure to 89% by 2020.
BHE能源和BNSF铁路已经成为美国追求环保型技术的领头羊。在风力发电方面，没有一个州能够跟爱荷华州相比，去年我们在那里生产的风电兆瓦数相当销售给零售客户所有兆瓦数的55%。到2020年，正在进行的风电项目将会使这个比例达到89%。
Bargain-basement electric rates carry second-order benefits with them. Iowa has attracted large high-tech installations, both because of its low prices for electricity (which data centers use in huge quantities) and because most tech CEOs are enthusiastic about using renewable energy. When it comes to wind energy, Iowa is the Saudi Arabia of America.
此外，低廉的电价带来了二级好处。目前，爱荷华州已经吸引了大量高科技设施前来。一方面是因为其低廉的电价非常有吸引力(数据中心使用大量电力)；另一方面是因为，很多高科技企业的CEO热衷于使用可再生能源。谈及风能资源，爱荷华州可以被称作是美国的沙特阿拉伯。
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. Those economics make railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion — and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic — in a major way.
BNSF铁路和其他一级铁路公司一样，仅仅用一加仑柴油就可以运输一吨货物近500英里。这些经济效益使得铁路的燃油效率是卡车的4倍！而且，铁路运输很大程度上减少了公路拥堵情况，以及严重拥堵所带来的纳税人出资的巨大维护开销。
All told, BHE and BNSF own assets that are of major importance to our country as well as to shareholders of Berkshire. Here are the key financial figures for both:
| BNSF | Earnings (in millions) 2016 | Earnings (in millions) 2015 | Earnings (in millions) 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 19,829 | $ 21,967 | $ 23,239 |
| Operating expenses | 13,144 | 14,264 | 16,237 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 6,685 | 7,703 | 7,002 |
| Interest (net) | 992 | 928 | 833 |
| Income taxes | 2,124 | 2,527 | 2,300 |
| Net earnings | $ 3,569 | $ 4,248 | $ 3,869 |
| Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90% owned) | Earnings (in millions) 2016 | Earnings (in millions) 2015 | Earnings (in millions) 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 367 | $ 460 | $ 527 |
| Iowa utility | 392 | 292 | 270 |
| Nevada utilities | 559 | 586 | 549 |
| PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah) | 1,105 | 1,026 | 1,010 |
| Gas pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River) | 413 | 401 | 379 |
| Canadian transmission utility | 147 | 170 | 16 |
| Renewable projects | 157 | 175 | 194 |
| HomeServices | 225 | 191 | 139 |
| Other (net) | 73 | 49 | 54 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 3,438 | 3,350 | 3,138 |
| Interest | 465 | 499 | 427 |
| Income taxes | 431 | 481 | 616 |
| Net earnings | $ 2,542 | $ 2,370 | $ 2,095 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire | $ 2,287 | $ 2,132 | $ 1,882 |
HomeServices may appear out of place in the above table. But it came with our purchase of MidAmerican (now BHE) in 1999 — and we are lucky that it did.
上表中出现的家庭服务公司(HomeServices)可能有些不适当。但这家公司是在1999年跟随我们收购的[MidAmerican_Energy|中美能源]而来，我们非常幸运的买到了它。
HomeServices owns 38 realty companies with more than 29,000 agents who operate in 28 states. Last year it purchased four realtors, including Houlihan Lawrence, the leader in New York’s Westchester County (in a transaction that closed shortly after yearend).
目前，家庭服务公司在美国28个州拥有38家经纪公司，超过2.9万名经纪人。去年，该公司收购了4家房产经纪商，其中就包括纽约Westchester地区的龙头房产公司Houlihan Lawrence(这项收购交易刚刚在年底时完成)。
In real estate parlance, representing either a buyer or a seller is called a “side,” with the representation of both counting as two sides. Last year, our owned realtors participated in 244,000 sides, totaling $86 billion in volume.
在房地产术语中，买方或者卖方被称作是”一方”，双方的代理被称作是”两方”。去年，我们自营的房地产经纪人参与了24.4万人次交易，总的交易额为860亿美元。
HomeServices also franchises many operations throughout the country that use our name. We like both aspects of the real estate business and expect to acquire many realtors and franchisees during the next decade.
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务
Our manufacturing, service and retailing operations sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们的制造、服务和零售业务生产销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机各种各样的产品。不过让我们先来看一看整个业务板块的资产负债表和利润表。
Balance Sheet 12/31/16 (in millions)
| Assets | Amount | Liabilities and Equity | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 8,073 | Notes payable | $ 2,054 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 11,183 | Other current liabilities | 12,464 |
| Inventory | 15,727 | Total current liabilities | 14,518 |
| Other current assets | 1,039 | ||
| Total current assets | 36,022 | ||
| Deferred taxes | 12,044 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 71,473 | Term debt and other liabilities | 10,943 |
| Fixed assets | 18,915 | Non-controlling interests | 579 |
| Other assets | 3,183 | Berkshire equity | 91,509 |
| $ 129,593 | $ 129,593 |
Earnings Statement
| (in millions) | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 120,059 | $ 107,825 | $ 97,689 |
| Operating expenses | 111,383 | 100,607 | 90,788 |
| Interest expense | 214 | 103 | 109 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 8,462 | 7,115 | 6,792 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2,831 | 2,432 | 2,324 |
| Net earnings | $ 5,631 | $ 4,683 | $ 4,468 |
Included in this financial summary are 44 businesses that report directly to headquarters. But some of these companies, in turn, have many individual operations under their umbrella. For example, Marmon has 175 separate business units, serving widely disparate markets, and Berkshire Hathaway Automotive owns 83 dealerships, operating in nine states.
表中包括44家向总部直接汇报业务的企业。但其中部分企业旗下又包含许多独立业务。例如Marmon公司旗下拥有175家独立运行的业务子公司，向很多不同的市场提供服务，而伯克希尔汽车销售公司(BHA)在美国拥有83家经销商，业务覆盖美国9个州。
This collection of businesses is truly a motley crew. Some operations, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific returns that, in a couple of instances, exceed 100%. Most are solid businesses generating good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
上这个企业集群真是五花八门。以未杠杆化的净有形资产回报率衡量，部分业务的回报率极高，少数情况下超过了100%，大多数是稳健的企业，回报率介于12-20%之间。
A few, however — these are serious blunders I made in my job of capital allocation — produce very poor returns. In most cases, I was wrong when I originally sized up the economic characteristics of these companies or the industries in which they operate, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. In a couple of instances, I stumbled in assessing either the fidelity or ability of incumbent managers or ones I later put in place. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. Fortunately, Charlie — never bashful — is around to say “no” to my worst ideas.
不过，有少数几家公司的回报率非常低，这是我在资本配置时犯的严重错误。在多数情况下，当时我对公司或其所在行业的经济动态的评估是错误的。我们正在为我的误判付出代价。有时候，我在评估现任或继任经理人的忠诚度和能力方面犯了错误。可以肯定的是，我将来还会犯更多错误。幸运的是，查理从不会碍于面子，他会对我最糟糕的想法直接说”NO”。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in the manufacturing, service and retailing group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2016 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and carrying very little debt, earned 24% after-tax on that capital.
作为一个整体来，这些制造、服务和零售业务企业是一家非常优秀的企业。2016年，它们占用的净有形资产平均为240亿美元，尽管持有大量超额现金且几乎没有债务，但其投入资本税后回报率为24%。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show on our balance sheet for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Absent a recession, earnings from the group will likely grow in 2017, in part because Duracell and Precision Castparts (both bought in 2016) will for the first time contribute a full year’s earnings to this group. Additionally, Duracell incurred significant transitional costs in 2016 that will not recur.
当然，如果是以过高的价格买入经济效益极佳的企业，它也可能是笔糟糕投资。我们已经为大多数业务所拥有的净有形资产支付了大量的溢价，其成本反映在我们报告的庞大的商誉和其它无形资产数字上。但总的来说，我们在该行业部署的资本为我们带来了可观的回报。如果在2017年没有经济衰退，该业务集团的收益可能会实现增长，部分原因是2016年完成收购的金霸王(Duracell)和精密机件(PrecisionCastparts)公司将首次为该集团贡献全年收益。此外，2016年Duracell曾经发生高额转型成本，本年度将不会再次发生。
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors — both current and potential — read this report. In a few of our businesses, we might be disadvantaged if outsiders knew our numbers. Therefore, in certain of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 90 - 94. Be aware, though, that it’s the growth of the Berkshire forest that counts. It would be foolish to focus over-intently on any single tree.
该业务集团有太多的公司，我们无法一一单独评论，而且它们(现有和潜在)的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们一些业务上，如果其他人知道某些数字，我们可能处于不利地位。因此那些对伯克希尔的价值没有实质性影响的业务，我们只披露需要披露的内容。你可以在完整报告中找到我们业务运营的大量细节。但要知道，真正重要的是整个伯克希尔森林的增长，把注意力过度集中于任何一棵树上都是非常愚蠢的。
For several years I have told you that the income and expense data shown in this section does not conform to GAAP. I have explained that this divergence occurs primarily because of GAAP-ordered rules regarding purchase-accounting adjustments that require the full amortization of certain intangibles over periods averaging about 19 years. In our opinion, most of those amortization “expenses” are not truly an economic cost. Our goal in diverging from GAAP in this section is to present the figures to you in a manner reflecting the way in which Charlie and I view and analyze them.
几年以来我一直告诉你，本节列示的收入和支出数据并不符合GAAP会计准则。我已经解释过，出现这种差异的主要原因是因为GAAP准则关于购买法会计调整的规定，要求在平均19年内全额摊销某些无形资产。但在我们看来，大多数摊销”费用”并不是真正的经济成本。我们在本节中以非GAAP准则的方式向你展示这些数据，这也是查理和我看待和分析这些数据的方式。
On page 54 we itemize 1.5 billion, up $384 million from 2015. My judgment is that about 20% of the 2016 charge is a “real” cost.
在年报中我们详细列出了总额为154美元尚未摊销的无形资产。随着新的收购的进行，将产生更多待摊销无形资产。2016年扣除摊销费用后按GAAP准则计算的税前收益为15亿美元，比2015年增加3.84亿美元。我个人的判断是，2016年的摊销费用有20%是”真实”的成本。
Eventually amortization charges fully write off the related asset. When that happens — most often at the 15-year mark — the GAAP earnings we report will increase without any true improvement in the underlying economics of Berkshire’s business. (My gift to my successor.)
最终，摊销费用将完全冲销相关资产。当这种情况发生时(通常需要15年左右)，我们报告的按GAAP准则计算的税前收益将会增加，但伯克希尔业务的基本经济状况并不会出现任何实质性的改善，这是我留给继任者的礼物。
Now that I’ve described a GAAP expense that I believe to be overstated, let me move on to a less pleasant distortion produced by accounting rules. The subject this time is GAAP-prescribed depreciation charges, which are necessarily based on historical cost. Yet in certain cases, those charges materially understate true economic costs. Countless words were written about this phenomenon in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation was rampant. As inflation subsided — thanks to heroic actions by Paul Volcker — the inadequacy of depreciation charges became less of an issue. But the problem still prevails, big time , in the railroad industry, where current costs for many depreciable items far outstrip historical costs. The inevitable result is that reported earnings throughout the railroad industry are considerably higher than true economic earnings.
现在我已经描述了一个我认为被夸大的在GAAP准则下的费用支出，那么让我继续讨论会计准则产生的另一个非常令人不快的失真。这个主题是GAAP准则下的折旧费用必须要基于历史成本。然而，在某些情况下，基于历史成本的折旧费用，严重低估了真实的经济成本。在1970-80年代通货膨胀肆虐期间，有关这一现象的文章数不胜数。由于Paul Volcker的铁腕政策，通货膨胀开始消退，折旧费用不足的问题才变得不那么重要了。但这个问题在铁路行业依然严重。因为许多折旧项目的当前成本远远超过其历史成本，一个不可避免的结果是，整个铁路行业的报告的盈利远远高于其真实的经济收益。
At BNSF, to get down to particulars, our GAAP depreciation charge last year was $2.1 billion. But were we to spend that sum and no more annually, our railroad would soon deteriorate and become less competitive. The reality is that — simply to hold our own — we need to spend far more than the cost we show for depreciation. Moreover, a wide disparity will prevail for decades.
具体到BNSF铁路来说，我们去年GAAP准则下的折旧费用为21亿美元。但如果我们每年维护性资本支出只投入这么多资金的话，我们铁路设施的运行状况将很快出现恶化。公司的竞争力也将随之下降。因此，现实的情况是，为了保持竞争力，我们需要在BNSF铁路投入的资本支出远远超过我们列示的折旧费用。此外，在未来几十年中，这个巨大的差额将持续存在。
All that said, Charlie and I love our railroad, which was one of our better purchases.
尽管如此，查理和我都非常看好我们的铁路业务，这也是我们最好的收购项目之一。
Too many managements — and the number seems to grow every year — are looking for any means to report, and indeed feature , “adjusted earnings” that are higher than their company’s GAAP earnings. There are many ways for practitioners to perform this legerdemain. Two of their favorites are the omission of “restructuring costs” and “stock-based compensation” as expenses.
太多公司的[Management|管理层]正在寻找一切办法来报告”调整后收益”，甚至报告的数字高于GAAP准则的收益。对于会计人员来说有很多办法来施展他们的财技。他们最喜欢忽略的两项成本是”重组费用”和”股权补偿”。
Charlie and I want managements, in their commentary , to describe unusual items — good or bad — that affect the GAAP numbers. After all, the reason we look at these numbers of the past is to make estimates of the future. But a management that regularly attempts to wave away very real costs by highlighting “adjusted per-share earnings” makes us nervous. That’s because bad behavior is contagious: CEOs who overtly look for ways to report high numbers tend to foster a culture in which subordinates strive to be “helpful” as well. Goals like that can lead, for example, to insurers underestimating their loss reserves, a practice that has destroyed many industry participants.
查理和我希望公司管理层在财报附注部分详细描述，影响GAAP业绩数字的非正常项目，不管是好的还是坏的。毕竟，我们研究这些历史业绩数字是为了更好地对未来做出估计。但管理层经常试图通过强调”调整后的每股收益”来掩盖非常真实的成本，这让我们感到非常紧张，因为不良行为极具传染性：那些刻意寻找粉饰报表方法的管理层，往往会培养一种鼓励下属也努力粉饰报表的企业文化。比如，保险公司管理层这样的目标会导致公司低估其损失赔款准备金，过去这种行为已经摧毁了许多保险公司。
Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.”3 In truth, business is too unpredictable for the numbers always to be met. Inevitably, surprises occur. When they do, a CEO whose focus is centered on Wall Street will be tempted to make up the numbers.
每当我们听到分析师们赞叹那些总能「实现目标」的管理层时，查理和我都替分析师感到难为情3。事实上，商业前景是很难预测的，因此公司也很难总是达成业绩预期。意外总是不可避免地出现，预期的业绩就会无法实现。当问题出现时，一个以华尔街为中心的CEO为了股价就会忍不住诱惑去粉饰财务数字。
Let’s get back to the two favorites of “don’t-count-this” managers, starting with “restructuring.”4 Berkshire, I would say, has been restructuring from the first day we took over in 1965. Owning only a northern textile business then gave us no other choice. And today a fair amount of restructuring occurs every year at Berkshire. That’s because there are always things that need to change in our hundreds of businesses. Last year, as I mentioned earlier, we spent significant sums getting Duracell in shape for the decades ahead.
让我们回到那些「不要计算在内」的管理层最喜欢的两个科目，首先是「重组费用」4。我认为，从1965年我们接手开始，伯克希尔就一直在不停地在重组。当时公司仅拥有一个北方纺织业务，在重组方面并没有什么选择余地。如今，每年伯克希尔都会进行大量重组，这是因为公司数百家子公司中，总有一些业务需要改变。正如我之前提到的，去年我们在Duracell公司重组上投入了大量资金，以确保公司在未来几十年中能维持市场竞争力。
We have never, however, singled out restructuring charges and told you to ignore them in estimating our normal earning power. If there were to be some truly major expenses in a single year, I would, of course, mention it in my commentary. Indeed, when there is a total rebasing of a business, such as occurred when Kraft and Heinz merged, it is imperative that for several years the huge one-time costs of rationalizing the combined operations be explained clearly to owners. That’s precisely what the CEO of Kraft Heinz has done, in a manner approved by the company’s directors (who include me). But, to tell owners year after year, “Don’t count this,” when management is simply making business adjustments that are necessary, is misleading. And too many analysts and journalists fall for this baloney.
但是，我们从未将公司重组费用单独列出，然后告诉你，在估计伯克希尔正常盈利能力时，不要考虑这些费用。如果在某一年中有一些真正重大的费用开支，我当然会在公司附注部分中说明。事实上，当一家企业发生全面重组的话，例如卡夫和亨氏合并时，我们认为必须在几年时间内向股东清楚解释，花费巨额资金去合并经营的合理化理由。而卡夫亨氏公司的CEO也是这么做的，他们的做法得到了包括我在内的公司董事的批准。但是，当公司只是简单地进行必要的业务调整时，管理层却年复一年的告诉股东”不要把这计算在内”，这是具有误导性的。许多股票分析师和财经记者也都轻信了这种粉饰后的财务数字。
To say “stock-based compensation” is not an expense is even more cavalier. CEOs who go down that road are, in effect, saying to shareholders, “If you pay me a bundle in options or restricted stock, don’t worry about its effect on earnings. I’ll ‘adjust’ it away.”
不仅如此，如果说”股票补偿”不是一项经营开支，那管理层就太傲慢了。实际上这样做的CEO是在告诉股东：“如果公司付给我一大笔股票期权或限制性股票来作为薪酬，那就不用担心它们对公司收益的表现，因为我会把这些开支调整掉的”。
To explore this maneuver further, join me for a moment in a visit to a make-believe accounting laboratory whose sole mission is to juice Berkshire’s reported earnings. Imaginative technicians await us, eager to show their stuff.
为了更好地探索这一财技，让我们观摩一个虚构的会计实验室，这个实验室的唯一目标就是粉饰伯克希尔的财报。富于想象力的会计师正在等着我们，迫切地想要展示他们的财技。
Listen carefully while I tell these enablers that stock-based compensation usually comprises at least 20% of total compensation for the top three or four executives at most large companies. Pay attention, too, as I explain that Berkshire has several hundred such executives at its subsidiaries and pays them similar amounts, but uses only cash to do so. I further confess that, lacking imagination, I have counted all of these payments to Berkshire’s executives as an expense.
请注意，我曾告诉这些支持者，“股票补偿”通常占大多数公司前三四名高管薪酬总额的20%。更应当注意的是，伯克希尔子公司有数百名这样的高管，他们获得薪水也有这么多，但我们仅用现金来支付。不仅如此，由于缺乏想象力，我将这些向伯克希尔高管支付的费用都计入公司的经营开支中。
My accounting minions suppress a giggle and immediately point out that 20% of what is paid these Berkshire managers is tantamount to “cash paid in lieu of stock-based compensation” and is therefore not a “true” expense. So — presto! — Berkshire, too, can have “adjusted” earnings.
但是，一些会计人员可能会笑出声，立即向我指出，这些支付给伯克希尔高管的薪资报酬中，20%的报酬可以计入”代替股票补偿而支付的现金”科目中，因此这些费用可以不计入”真正”费用支出。所以，伯克希尔也可以报告”调整后收益”。
Back to reality: If CEOs want to leave out stock-based compensation in reporting earnings, they should be required to affirm to their owners one of two propositions: why items of value used to pay employees are not a cost or why a payroll cost should be excluded when calculating earnings.
让我们回归现实。如果一个公司的CEO想要在报告收益中不计入”股票补偿”费用，他们应该被要求向股东解释以下两个问题：为什么支付给公司职员的现金替代品不应计入公司成本，或者为什么在计算公司收益时将工资成本排除在外？
During the accounting nonsense that flourished during the 1960s, the story was told of a CEO who, as his company revved up to go public, asked prospective auditors, “What is two plus two?” The answer that won the assignment, of course, was, “What number do you have in mind?”
在1960年代粉饰财报的情况非常普遍。曾经有这样一个故事：一位CEO在公司即将上市时问未来的审计师：“2+2等于几？“当然赢得这项工作的回答是：“你心里想要的数字是多少？”。
Finance and Financial Products 金融和金融产品
Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). Each is the leader in its field.
我们的三个租赁相关的业务是由CORT(家具)、XTRA(半挂拖车)和Marmon(主要是油罐车租赁、还包括冷藏货车、联运式油罐集装箱车和起重机)构成。这三家公司都是其所在行业的领导者。
We also include Clayton Homes in this section. This company receives most of its revenue from the sale of manufactured homes, but derives the bulk of its earnings from its large mortgage portfolio. Last year, Clayton became America’s largest home builder, delivering 42,075 units that accounted for 5% of all new American homes. (In fairness, other large builders do far more dollar volume than Clayton because they sell site-built homes that command much higher prices.)
这个板块还包括克莱顿之家(ClaytonHomes)。这家公司大部分营收来自预制房销售，但大部分利润来自其庞大的抵押贷款组合。去年，克莱顿房屋成为美国最大的房屋制造商，共计交付42075栋住宅，占美国新建住宅总数的5%。公平地说，其他大型建筑商销售额远超克莱顿，因为他们主要销售的是价格高得多的现场建造的房屋。
In 2015, Clayton branched out, purchasing its first site-builder. Two similar acquisitions followed in 2016, and more will come. Site-built houses are expected to amount to 3% or so of Clayton’s unit sales in 2017 and will likely deliver about 14% of its dollar volume.
2015年，克莱顿房屋开始扩大业务规模，收购了第一家现场建造房屋公司。2016年，克莱顿房屋又进行了另外两次类似的收购。而且未来还会有更多收购。2017年，预计现场建造房屋在克莱顿的房屋销售总量中占比将达到3%以上，销售额占比将达到14%左右。
Even so, Clayton’s focus will always be manufactured homes, which account for about 70% of new American homes costing less than $150,000. Clayton manufactures close to one-half of the total. That is a far cry from Clayton’s position in 2003 when Berkshire purchased the company. It then ranked third in the industry in units sold and employed 6,731 people. Now, when its new acquisitions are included, the employee count is 14,677. And that number will increase in the future.
尽管如此，克莱顿的业务重心仍将是预制房制造上，在美国总成本低于15万美元的新建房屋中，预制房占比超过70%。而克莱顿目前在预制房的市场份额约为一半，这比2003年伯克希尔收购克莱顿时已有大幅提升。当时克莱顿的销售额位列行业第三，员工数量仅为6731人。现在算上新收购的公司在内，员工总数上升到14677人。未来这个数字还将继续扩大。
Clayton’s earnings in recent years have materially benefited from extraordinarily low interest rates. The company’s mortgage loans to home-buyers are at fixed-rates and for long terms (averaging 25 years at inception). But Clayton’s own borrowings are short-term credits that re-price frequently. When rates plunge, Clayton’s earnings from its portfolio greatly increase. We normally would shun that kind of lend-long, borrow-short approach, which can cause major problems for financial institutions. As a whole, however, Berkshire is always asset-sensitive, meaning that higher short-term rates will benefit our consolidated earnings, even as they hurt at Clayton.
克莱顿近年来的盈利从超低的利率中受益匪浅。公司发放给购房者的房屋抵押贷款是长期的固定利率贷款(平均贷款年限长达25年)。但公司自身的负债是定期重新定价的短期借款。当市场利率下行，克莱顿的贷款组合收益会大幅上升。我们通常会避免这种短债长贷的商业模式，这可能对金融机构造成严重的问题。但是，伯克希尔整体上属于敏感性资产，这意味着短期利率上行，伯克希尔合并收益将会上升，尽管这对克莱顿造成损害。
Last year Clayton had to foreclose on 8,304 manufactured-housing mortgages, about 2.5% of its total portfolio. Customer demographics help explain that percentage. Clayton’s customers are usually lower-income families with mediocre credit scores; many are supported by jobs that will be at risk in any recession; many, similarly, have financial profiles that will be damaged by divorce or death to an extent that would not be typical for a high-income family. Those risks that our customers face are partly mitigated because almost all have a strong desire to own a home and because they enjoy reasonable monthly payments that average only $587, including the cost of insurance and property taxes.
去年，克莱顿不得不取消了8304笔预制房抵押贷款的赎回权，约占总的贷款组合的2.5%。客户结构的统计数据有助于解释这一违约比例。克莱顿的客户通常是信用评分较差的低收入家庭，许多人都从事于经济衰退时首先受到冲击的工作来维持生计。同时，许多人的财务状况也会因离婚或亲人离世而遭受打击，这对于高收入家庭来说通常影响较小。但是，几乎所有人都强烈希望拥有一套住房，同时他们每月只需偿还包含保险和房产税在内的共587美元按揭，因此我们客户所面临的这些风险在一定程度上得到缓解。
Clayton also has long had programs that help borrowers through difficulties. The two most popular are loan extensions and payment forgiveness. Last year about 11,000 borrowers received extensions, and 3,800 had 150 million — our assistance programs end up helping Clayton as well as its borrowers.
同时，克莱顿一直以来都有帮助贷款人度过财务困境的项目。其中，最受欢迎的两个项目是贷款延期和还款豁免。去年，约有11000人获得了贷款延期，3800人的340万美元预定还款被豁免。当批准这些项目时，公司不会赚到任何利息或手续费收入。我们的经验是，过去两年中，93%接受这些项目支持的贷款人仍然居住在自己的住房中。由于我们在丧失抵押品赎回权方面损失惨重，去年高达1.5亿美元，但是我们的援助项目最终帮助克莱顿及其贷款人。
Clayton and Berkshire have been a wonderful partnership. Kevin Clayton came to us with a best-in-class management group and culture. Berkshire, in turn, provided unmatched staying power when the manufactured-home industry fell apart during the Great Recession. (As other lenders to the industry vanished, Clayton supplied credit not only to its own dealers but also to dealers who sold the products of its competitors.) At Berkshire, we never count on synergies when we acquire companies. Truly important ones, however, surfaced after our purchase of Clayton.
克莱顿和伯克希尔维持了非常良好的合作伙伴关系。Kevin Clayton带来了一流的管理团队和企业文化。反过来，当预制房在经济衰退面临危机时，伯克希尔为克莱顿提供了无与伦比的财力支持。随着该行业其他贷款机构的退出，克莱顿不仅为自己的经销商提供信贷支持，也为销售竞争对手房屋的经销商提供贷款。伯克希尔收购其他公司时从来不期望协同效应，但在收购克莱顿之后，创造了非常重要的协同效应。
Marmon’s railcar business experienced a major slowdown in demand last year, which will cause earnings to decline in 2017. Fleet utilization was 91% in December, down from 97% a year earlier, with the drop particularly severe at the large fleet we purchased from General Electric in 2015. Marmon’s crane and container rentals have weakened as well.
Marmon公司的铁路货车租赁业务去年经历了需求的大幅放缓，这将导致2017年收益下降。去年12月，车队的租赁率为91%，低于去年同期的97%。我们在2015年从通用电气收购的大型车队的租赁率下降尤其严重。同时，Marmon公司的起重机和集装箱的租赁率也出现不同程度的下降。
Big swings in railcar demand have occurred in the past and they will continue. Nevertheless, we very much like this business and expect decent returns on equity capital over the years. Tank cars are Marmon’s specialty. People often associate tank cars with the transportation of crude oil; in fact, they are essential to a great variety of shippers.
铁路货车市场需求的大幅波动过去曾经发生过，而这种情况未来将持续下去。尽管如此，我们仍然非常看好这项业务，并预计未来几年中这个业务将为我们创造良好的股权回报率。油罐车租赁业务是Marmon公司的强项。人们通常将油罐车与原油运输联系一起，但实际上，这种油罐车可以用于运输多种多样的货物。
Over time, we expect to expand our railcar operation. Meanwhile, Marmon is making a number of bolt-on acquisitions whose results are included in the Manufacturing, Service and Retailing section.
未来我们预计将继续扩大铁路货车租赁业务的规模。与此同时，Marmon公司也在进行一系列补强型并购交易，其结果将包括在制造、服务和零售业务板块中。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for our finance-related companies:
以下是我们金融相关业务税前收益的摘要：
| (in millions) | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkadia (our 50% share) | $ 91 | $ 74 | $ 122 |
| Clayton | 744 | 706 | 558 |
| CORT | 60 | 55 | 49 |
| Marmon — Containers and Cranes | 126 | 192 | 238 |
| Marmon –- Railcars | 654 | 546 | 442 |
| XTRA | 179 | 172 | 147 |
| Net financial income* | 276 | 341 | 283 |
| $ 2,130 | $ 2,086 | $ 1,839 |
* Excludes capital gains or losses
Investments 投资业务
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. The 325,442,152 shares Berkshire owns of Kraft Heinz are carried on our balance sheet at a GAAP figure of 28.4 billion. Our cost basis for the shares is $9.8 billion.
下表我们列出了年末市值最大的15只普通股投资。由于我们是[Kraft_Heinz|卡夫亨氏]控股股东之一，所以采用”权益法”进行核算并未列入。目前，伯克希尔持有卡夫亨氏公司325,442,152股股票，在我们资产负债表上按GAAP会计准则以153亿美元入账，年末市值为284亿美元，而我们的成本为98亿美元。
| Shares* | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost at 12/31/16 (in millions)** | Market at 12/31/16 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 16.8 | $ 1,287 | $ 11,231 |
| 61,242,652 | Apple Inc | 1.1 | 6,747 | 7,093 |
| 6,789,054 | Charter Communications, Inc | 2.5 | 1,210 | 1,955 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.3 | 1,299 | 16,584 |
| 54,934,718 | Delta Airlines Inc | 7.5 | 2,299 | 2,702 |
| 11,390,582 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc | 2.9 | 654 | 2,727 |
| 81,232,303 | International Business Machines Corp | 8.5 | 13,815 | 13,484 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 12.9 | 248 | 2,326 |
| 74,587,892 | Phillips 66 | 14.4 | 5,841 | 6,445 |
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,6921,791 | |
| 43,203,775 | Southwest Airlines Co | 7.0 | 1,757 | 2,153 |
| 101,859,335 | U.S. Bancorp | 6.0 | 3,239 | 5,233 |
| 26,620,184 | United Continental Holdings Inc | 8.4 | 1,477 | 1,940 |
| 43,387,980 | USG Corp | 29.7 | 836 | 1,253 |
| 500,000,000 | Wells Fargo & Company | 10.0 | 12,730 | 27,555 |
| Others | 10,697 | 17,560 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 65,828 | $ 122,032 |
* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
* 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金投资的持股
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
** 此处为实际投资成本，也是计税依据，GAAP成本在少数情况下因准则要求的减记和增记而有所不同。
Some of the stocks in the table are the responsibility of either Todd Combs or Ted Weschler, who work with me in managing Berkshire’s investments. Each, independently , manages more than 21 billion that the two manage is about $7.6 billion of pension trust assets of certain Berkshire subsidiaries. As noted, pension investments are not included in the preceding tabulation of Berkshire holdings.
表中的一些股票是由ToddCombs或TedWeschler投资的，他们与我一起管理伯克希尔的投资。同时，他们各自独立管理着超过100亿美元的资产。我通常通过查看每个月的股票交易单来了解他们所做的投资决策。两人管理的210亿美元资产中，包括伯克希尔子公司约76亿美元的养老金资产。如前所述，养老金投资不包括在上面伯克希尔的持股列表中。
Excluded from the table — but important — is our ownership of 300 million per year, also carries with it a valuable warrant allowing Berkshire to purchase 700 million common shares of Bank of America for 10.5 billion. If it wishes, Berkshire can use its preferred shares to satisfy the $5 billion cost of exercising the warrant.
我们持有的美国银行50亿美元优先股并不包括在上表中，但这笔投资非常重大，每年这些优先股支付3亿美元的股息，并附有一份优厚的认股权证，伯克希尔有权在2021年9月2日之前的任何时点，以50亿美元够买美国银行7亿股普通股。到去年年末，这一特权将为我们带来105亿美元的利润。如果愿意，伯克希尔可以使用优先股来支付行权时所需的50亿美元资金。
If the dividend rate on Bank of America common stock — now 30 cents annually — should rise above 44 cents before 2021, we would anticipate making a cashless exchange of our preferred into common. If the common dividend remains below 44 cents, it is highly probable that we will exercise the warrant immediately before it expires.
如果美国银行普通股的分红率在2021年前上升至44% (现在每年为30%)，我们预计将提前把优先股转化为普通股，并且不用支付任何现金。如果普通股分红率保持在44%以下，我们很可能持有优先股直到权证到期之前才会行权。
Many of our investees, including Bank of America, have been repurchasing shares, some quite aggressively. We very much like this behavior because we believe the repurchased shares have in most cases been underpriced. (Undervaluation, after all, is why we own these positions.) When a company grows and outstanding shares shrink, good things happen for shareholders.
我们投资的许多公司(包括美国银行在内)一直在回购股票，其中一些公司回购规模相当惊人。我们非常喜欢股票回购，因为我们相信这些回顾股票的公司大多数情况下都被低估了。毕竟，低估也是我们持有这些股票的原因之一。当一个公司规模不断扩大，但是公司流通股数量不断减少，股东将会非常受益。
It’s important for you to understand that 95% of the $86 billion of “cash and equivalents” (which in my mind includes U.S. Treasury Bills) shown on our balance sheet are held by entities in the United States and, consequently, is not subject to any repatriation tax. Moreover, repatriation of the remaining funds would trigger only minor taxes because much of that money has been earned in countries that themselves impose meaningful corporate taxes. Those payments become an offset to U.S. tax when money is brought home.
你必须明白，我们资产负债表上列示的860亿美元的”现金及等价物”(包括美国国债)，其中95%是伯克希尔美国子公司持有的。因此，不需要缴纳任何汇回税。此外，其余资金返还美国时也只需要缴纳较小的税费，因为这些资金大部分都是在那些独立征税的国家赚取的，当这些海外资金转回美国时，已经缴纳税可以抵消美国政府征收的税费。
These explanations are important because many cash-rich American companies hold a large portion of their funds in jurisdictions imposing very low taxes. Such companies hope — and may well be proved right — that the tax levied for bringing these funds to America will soon be materially reduced. In the meantime, these companies are limited as to how they can use that cash. In other words, off-shore cash is simply not worth as much as cash held at home.
这些解释之所以重要是因为，许多现金充裕的美国企业将很大部分现金都滞留在税收非常低的司法管辖权。这些公司希望(而且很可能被证明是正确的)美国政府很快大幅下调对回流资金征收的税费。与此同时，这些公司在运用这些资金方面受到诸多限制。也就是说，离岸资金不如国内资金有价值。
Berkshire has a partial offset to the favorable geographical location of its cash, which is that much of it is held in our insurance subsidiaries. Though we have many alternatives for investing this cash, we do not have the unlimited choices that we would enjoy if the cash were held by the parent company, Berkshire. We do have an ability annually to distribute large amounts of cash from our insurers to the parent — though here, too, there are limits. Overall, cash held at our insurers is a very valuable asset, but one slightly less valuable to us than is cash held at the parent level.
伯克希尔大量现金在美国的地理优势被部分抵消，因为大部分现金被保险子公司持有，尽管这些现金有许多投资选择，但是选择却有诸多限制。如果这些现金是由伯克希尔母公司持有，我们的投资选择将不受限制。尽管我们有能力每年从保险子公司向母公司分配大量现金，但这也有许多限制。总的来说，我们保险子公司持有的现金是一项非常有价值的资产，但对我们来说，这些现金资产如果是母公司持有将更具价值。
Sometimes the comments of shareholders or media imply that we will own certain stocks “forever.” It is true that we own some stocks that I have no intention of selling for as far as the eye can see (and we’re talking 20/20 vision). But we have made no commitment that Berkshire will hold any of its marketable securities forever.
Confusion about this point may have resulted from a too-casual reading of Economic Principle 11 on pages 110 - 111, which has been included in our annual reports since 1983. That principle covers controlled businesses , not marketable securities. This year I’ve added a final sentence to #11 to ensure that our owners understand that we regard any marketable security as available for sale, however unlikely such a sale now seems.
对于这一点的困惑可能是因为他没有认真解读《股东手册》第11条经济原则。自1983年以来，这一经济原则一直包含在我们的年报中。这一原则适用的我们控股的企业，而不是有价证券。今年，我在第11条经济原则最后补充了一句话，以确保我们所有股东都能明白，我们认为任何有价证券都有可能被出售，无论这种出售现在看起来是多么的不可能。
Before we leave this investment section, a few educational words about dividends and taxes: Berkshire, like most corporations, nets considerably more from a dollar of dividends than it reaps from a dollar of capital gains. That will probably surprise those of our shareholders who are accustomed to thinking of capital gains as the route to tax-favored returns.
在我们结束投资部分之前，我想对股息税率说几句略带教育性的话。伯克希尔和大多数公司一样，从一美元的股息中获得的回报远高于一美元的资本利得。对于那些习惯性将资本利得看做获得税收优惠待遇的股东来说，这可能有些意外。
But here’s the corporate math. Every $1 of capital gains that a corporation realizes carries with it 35 cents of federal income tax (and often state income tax as well). The tax on dividends received from domestic corporations, however, is consistently lower, though rates vary depending on the status of the recipient.
但是，我们可以做有关一些企业回报的简单计算。公司每实现每一美元资本利得，需要缴纳35%的联邦所得税(通常还有州所得税)，但是，从国内公司征收的股息税则要低得多，尽管具体税率取决于企业性质。
For a non-insurance company — which describes Berkshire Hathaway, the parent — the federal tax rate is effectively 10.5 cents per 1 of dividends. That rate applies, for example, to the substantial dividends we receive from our 27% ownership of Kraft Heinz, all of it held by the parent company. (The rationale for the low corporate taxes on dividends is that the dividend-paying investee has already paid its own corporate tax on the earnings being distributed.)
对一家非保险公司来说(伯克希尔母公司是一家非保险公司)，收到股息的联邦税率为10.5%。此外，如果一家非保险公司持有被投资公司超过20%的股份，那么股息的联邦税率仅为7%。比如，伯克希尔持有卡夫亨氏27%的股份，母公司收到的大量股息适用的税率就是7%。(对股息征收较低的公司税的原因在于，支付股息的被投资公司已经为分配的收益缴纳了自己的公司税。)
Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries pay a tax rate on dividends that is somewhat higher than that applying to non-insurance companies, though the rate is still well below the 35% hitting capital gains. Property/casualty companies owe about 14% in taxes on most dividends they receive. Their tax rate falls, though, to about 11% if they own more than 20% of a U.S.-based investee.
伯克希尔保险子公司支付的股息税率要高于非保险公司，虽然该税率要远低于35%的资本利得税。财产意外险公司收到的大部分股息需要缴纳14%的税款。然而，如果保险公司持有美国被投资公司20%以上的股份，那么税率会下降到11%。
And that’s our tax lesson for today.
这就是我们今天需要学习的税务课。
“The Bet” (or how your money finds its way to Wall Street) 一个赌注——你的钱是如何流向华尔街的
In this section, you will encounter, early on, the story of an investment bet I made nine years ago and, next, some strong opinions I have about investing. As a starter, though, I want to briefly describe Long Bets, a unique establishment that played a role in the bet.
这本节中，我首先会讲述一个我在9年前做的投资对赌的故事，然后分享一些我在投资上的观点。作为开始，我想简单的介绍一下LongBets，这是一家在我的对赌中发挥重要作用的独特机构。
Long Bets was seeded by Amazon’s Jeff Bezos and operates as a non-profit organization that administers just what you’d guess: long-term bets. To participate, “proposers” post a proposition at Longbets.org that will be proved right or wrong at a distant date. They then wait for a contrary-minded party to take the other side of the bet. When a “doubter” steps forward, each side names a charity that will be the beneficiary if its side wins; parks its wager with Long Bets; and posts a short essay defending its position on the Long Bets website. When the bet is concluded, Long Bets pays off the winning charity.
LongBets是由亚马逊的杰夫贝佐斯(JeffBezos)发起成立的，是一家管理长期赌注的非盈利组织。为参与对赌，“赌约发起者”在Longbets.org网站上提出一个命题，该命题将在很久之后被证明是对是错。然后，他们会等待一个持相反观点的人在赌约的另外一端下注。当一名”怀疑者”站出来时，赌约的双方会各自指定一家慈善组织作为他们赌约获胜的受益人；在LongBets上下注，然后在LongBets网站上写一篇短文来为命题辩护。当赌约结束时，LongBets会向获胜方的慈善组织支付对赌款项。
Here are examples of what you will find on Long Bets’ very interesting site:
LongBets网站很有意思，以下是两个例子。
In 2002, entrepreneur Mitch Kapor asserted that “By 2029 no computer — or ‘machine intelligence’ — will have passed the Turing Test,” which deals with whether a computer can successfully impersonate a human being. Inventor Ray Kurzweil took the opposing view. Each backed up his opinion with $10,000. I don’t know who will win this bet, but I will confidently wager that no computer will ever replicate Charlie.
2002年，企业家MitchKapor宣称，“到2029年，没有任何电脑或是智能设备能通过图灵测试”。图灵测试能判断计算机是否能够模拟人类的思维能力。发明家Ray Kurzweil持相反的观点。双方对各自的观点押下了1万美元的赌注。我不知道谁能赢，但我敢打赌，没有任何电脑能复制查理。
That same year, Craig Mundie of Microsoft asserted that pilotless planes would routinely fly passengers by 2030, while Eric Schmidt of Google argued otherwise. The stakes were 500 with me. (I like his assumption that I’ll be around in 2030 to contribute my payment, should we lose.)
同年，微软的CraigMundie宣传，到2030年无人驾驶飞机将能正常的搭载乘客。而谷歌的EricSchmidt则持相反的观点。赌注为每人1千美金。最近为了缓解Eric的压力我主动提出加入赌注，他迅速分给我500美元。我喜欢他的假设，如果我们输了，我会在2030年左右支付。
Now, to my bet and its history. In Berkshire’s 2005 annual report, I argued that active investment management by professionals — in aggregate — would over a period of years underperform the returns achieved by rank amateurs who simply sat still. I explained that the massive fees levied by a variety of “helpers” would leave their clients — again in aggregate — worse off than if the amateurs simply invested in an unmanaged low-cost index fund. (See pages 114 - 115 for a reprint of the argument as I originally stated it in the 2005 report.)
现在，说说我自己的赌约和历史过程。在2005年伯克希尔的年报中，我认为，从整体来看，由专业人员进行的主动投资管理业绩，其长期表现会落后于呆坐不动的业余投资者。我解释道，从整体来看，相比那些投资于一只低成本的被动指数基金的业余投资者，各种”投资顾问”收取的高额费用，会让他们客户的业绩表现更糟糕。
Subsequently, I publicly offered to wager $500,000 that no investment pro could select a set of at least five hedge funds — wildly-popular and high-fee investing vehicles — that would over an extended period match the performance of an unmanaged S&P-500 index fund charging only token fees. I suggested a ten-year bet and named a low-cost Vanguard S&P fund as my contender. I then sat back and waited expectantly for a parade of fund managers — who could include their own fund as one of the five — to come forth and defend their occupation. After all, these managers urged others to bet billions on their abilities. Why should they fear putting a little of their own money on the line?
随后，公开提出了一个50万美元的赌约：任何一位职业投资者都可以选择至少5只对冲基金(一种很受欢迎高收费的投资工具)，在一段很长的时间内，他们的业绩表现将会落后于，只收取象征性费用的被动投资标普500指数基金的业绩表现。我提出赌约期限为10年，并提名一只低成本的Vanguard标普指数基金作为我的赌注。随后，我坐下来充满期待的等待着，各位基金经理站出来捍卫自己的职业(他们可以把自己管理的基金包括在5只基金之中)。毕竟这些基金经理催促着客户为他们的能力下了数十亿美元的赌注。既然这样，他们为什么会害怕拿自己的一点钱出来玩一下这个赌约呢？
What followed was the sound of silence. Though there are thousands of professional investment managers who have amassed staggering fortunes by touting their stock-selecting prowess, only one man — Ted Seides — stepped up to my challenge. Ted was a co-manager of Protégé Partners, an asset manager that had raised money from limited partners to form a fund-of-funds — in other words, a fund that invests in multiple hedge funds.
随之而来的是一片寂静。尽管有成千上万的专业投资经理人，通过吹嘘自己的选股能力积累了惊人的财富，但只有一人TedSeides站了出来接受了我的挑战。Ted是Protégé Partners的联合投资经理人，这是一家资产管理公司，从有限合伙人手中筹集资金成立了一个基金中的基金(FOF，fund-of-funds)。换句话说，Ted的基金是投资多只对冲基金的基金。
I hadn’t known Ted before our wager, but I like him and admire his willingness to put his money where his mouth was. He has been both straight-forward with me and meticulous in supplying all the data that both he and I have needed to monitor the bet.
在赌约设立之前，我并不认识Ted，但是我喜欢他，钦佩他愿意把钱下注到自己曾经说过的话上。他对我直言不讳，而且一丝不苟地提供我们监测赌约所需的所有数据。
For Protégé Partners’ side of our ten-year bet, Ted picked five funds-of-funds whose results were to be averaged and compared against my Vanguard S&P index fund. The five he selected had invested their money in more than 100 hedge funds, which meant that the overall performance of the funds-of-funds would not be distorted by the good or poor results of a single manager.
在十年赌约ProtégéPartners这一方，Ted挑选了5只FOF基金作为投资标的。它们业绩表现将平均化，并与我选择的Vanguard标普指数基金进行对比。Ted选择的5只FOF基金将其资金投资到了100多只对冲基金中，这意味着基金的整体表现不会因某一位基金经理的表现好坏而受到影响。
Each fund-of-funds, of course, operated with a layer of fees that sat above the fees charged by the hedge funds in which it had invested. In this doubling-up arrangement, the larger fees were levied by the underlying hedge funds; each of the fund-of-funds imposed an additional fee for its presumed skills in selecting hedge-fund managers.
当然，Ted选择的5只FOF基金都有一层费用，高于直接投资对冲基金的费用。这种叠加的收费模式中，大部分的费用是由基础对冲基金收取的；而每只FOF基金，都对其在挑选对冲基金的假想技能方面，而收取额外的费用。
Here are the results for the first nine years of the bet — figures leaving no doubt that Girls Inc. of Omaha, the charitable beneficiary I designated to get any bet winnings I earned, will be the organization eagerly opening the mail next January.
以下是赌约前9年的对赌结果。对赌的结果显示，我指定的慈善受益人Girls Inc. of Omaha(将获得我赢得的赌金)将在明年1月份迫不及待地打开邮件领取奖金，这是毋庸置疑的。
| Year | Fund of Funds A | Fund of Funds B | Fund of Funds C | Fund of Funds D | Fund of Funds E | S&P Index Fund |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008 | -16.5% | -22.3% | -21.3% | -29.3% | -30.1% | -37.0% |
| 2009 | 11.3% | 14.5% | 21.4% | 16.5% | 16.8% | 26.6% |
| 2010 | 5.9% | 6.8% | 13.3% | 4.9% | 11.9% | 15.1% |
| 2011 | -6.3% | -1.3% | 5.9% | -6.3% | -2.8% | 2.1% |
| 2012 | 3.4% | 9.6% | 5.7% | 6.2% | 9.1% | 16.0% |
| 2013 | 10.5% | 15.2% | 8.8% | 14.2% | 14.4% | 32.3% |
| 2014 | 4.7% | 4.0% | 18.9% | 0.7% | -2.1% | 13.6% |
| 2015 | 1.6% | 2.5% | 5.4% | 1.4% | -5.0% | 1.4% |
| 2016 | -2.9% | 1.7% | -1.4% | 2.5% | 4.4% | 11.9% |
| Gain to Date | 8.7% | 28.3% | 62.8% | 2.9% | 7.5% | 85.4% |
Footnote: Under my agreement with Protégé Partners, the names of these funds-of-funds have never been publicly disclosed. I, however, see their annual audits.
(根据我与ProtégéPartners达成的协议，这些母基金的名称从未公开披露。然而，我看过他们的年度审计。)
The compounded annual increase to date for the index fund is 7.1%, which is a return that could easily prove typical for the stock market over time. That’s an important fact: A particularly weak nine years for the market over the lifetime of this bet would have probably helped the relative performance of the hedge funds, because many hold large “short” positions. Conversely, nine years of exceptionally high returns from stocks would have provided a tailwind for index funds.
截至目前，该标普指数基金的年均复合增长率为7.1%，长期来看，这一回报率很容易被证明是股市典型的回报水平。有一个很重要的事实是：整个赌约期间，如果股市表现相当疲软，这可能有助于对冲基金的相对表现，因为许多对冲基金持有大量的”空头”仓位。反过来，如果股市异常狂热，将对指数基金有所助益。
Instead we operated in what I would call a “neutral” environment. In it, the five funds-of-funds delivered, through 2016, an average of only 2.2%, compounded annually. That means 220,000. The index fund would meanwhile have gained $854,000.
事实是，9年期间我们处于一个”中性”的股市环境中。期间，截至2016年5只FOF基金平均年化回报率仅为2.2%，这意味着投资于这5只基金的100万美元将获得22万美元。与此同时，投资指数基金将获得85.4万美元。
Bear in mind that every one of the 100-plus managers of the underlying hedge funds had a huge financial incentive to do his or her best. Moreover, the five funds-of-funds managers that Ted selected were similarly incentivized to select the best hedge-fund managers possible because the five were entitled to performance fees based on the results of the underlying funds.
请记住，管理基础对冲基金的100多名基金经理，每人都有巨大的经济动机去获取最大的投资收益。此外，由于母基金的基金经理是根据基础对冲基金的业绩的表现来获得业绩报酬，Ted选择的5只FOF基金经理同样有动机尽可能选择最好的对冲基金。
I’m certain that in almost all cases the managers at both levels were honest and intelligent people. But the results for their investors were dismal — really dismal. And, alas, the huge fixed fees charged by all of the funds and funds-of-funds involved — fees that were totally unwarranted by performance — were such that their managers were showered with compensation over the nine years that have passed. As Gordon Gekko might have put it: “Fees never sleep.”
我可以确定，在任何情况下，两级基金的经理人都是诚实和聪明的人。然而，对于他们的投资者来说，结果是惨淡的，真的非常惨淡。遗憾的是，所有对冲基金和FOF基金收取了巨额固定管理费用(该管理费用与基金的业绩表现完全无关)，以致于基金经理们在过去9年里旱涝保收。正如电影《华尔街》主角Gordon Gekko所言：“收费(金钱)永不眠”。(Fees never sleep)(Greed is good贪婪无罪)
The underlying hedge-fund managers in our bet received payments from their limited partners that likely averaged a bit under the prevailing hedge-fund standard of “2 and 20,” meaning a 2% annual fixed fee, payable even when losses are huge, and 20% of profits with no clawback (if good years were followed by bad ones). Under this lopsided arrangement, a hedge fund operator’s ability to simply pile up assets under management has made many of these managers extraordinarily rich, even as their investments have performed poorly.
在我们的赌约中，对冲基金经理从有限合伙人那里获得的报酬，可能平均略低于现行对冲基金标准的”2/20”费率。即每年固定2%管理费，即使亏损巨大也要照付不误，另外利润分成20%且不能追回(如果盈利年份后出现亏损年份)。在这种不公平的安排下，对冲基金的操盘手只需有能力简单地积累可管理的基金资产，那么许多基金经理就会变得非常富有，即使他们的投资表现非常糟糕。
Still, we’re not through with fees. Remember, there were the fund-of-funds managers to be fed as well. These managers received an additional fixed amount that was usually set at 1% of assets. Then, despite the terrible overall record of the five funds-of-funds, some experienced a few good years and collected “performance” fees. Consequently, I estimate that over the nine-year period roughly 60% — gulp! — of all gains achieved by the five funds-of-funds were diverted to the two levels of managers. That was their misbegotten reward for accomplishing something far short of what their many hundreds of limited partners could have effortlessly — and with virtually no cost — achieved on their own.
不过，收费还没完。别忘了还有上层FOF基金经理需要”喂养”。这些经理人通常会额外收取资产1%的固定管理费。此外，尽管期间5只FOF基金的整体业绩表现不佳，但一些经理人仍经历了几年好日子，并收取了”业绩”提成费用。因此，我估计在过去9年里，5只FOF基金获得的所有收益中约有60%流向了两级基金经理的腰包！这是他们收取的不当回报。因为数百位有限合伙人通过投资指数基金，在几乎不用付出成本的情况下，自己轻松就可以实现他们所谓的业绩。
In my opinion, the disappointing results for hedge-fund investors that this bet exposed are almost certain to recur in the future. I laid out my reasons for that belief in a statement that was posted on the Long Bets website when the bet commenced (and that is still posted there). Here is what I asserted:
在我看来，这次赌约暴露出的，令对冲基金投资者失望的结果，几乎肯定会在未来重演。赌约开始时，我在LongBets网站上发布了一份声明中阐述了我的理由，以下是我的观点：
Over a ten-year period commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S&P 500 will outperform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.
从2008年1月1日开始并于2017年12月31日结束的过去十年里，标准普尔500指数的表现将超过对冲基金的基金组合的表现，因为基金的业绩需要扣除管理费、运营成本和支出。
A lot of very smart people set out to do better than average in securities markets. Call them active investors.
许多非常聪明的人打算在证券市场上获得超过平均水平的投资回报，我们将其称为主动投资者。
Their opposites, passive investors, will by definition do about average. In aggregate their positions will more or less approximate those of an index fund. Therefore, the balance of the universe—the active investors—must do about average as well. However, these investors will incur far greater costs. So, on balance, their aggregate results after these costs will be worse than those of the passive investors.
而与他们相对的是被动投资者，按照定义，他们寻求获得市场平均收益。总的来说，他们的仓位大致接近指数基金的仓位。因此，市场的平衡方，即主动投资者也必须达到市场平均水平。然而，这些投资者将承担更高的成本。因此，总的来说，在扣除这些成本后，他们总体的投资收益将比被动投资者更差。
Costs skyrocket when large annual fees, large performance fees, and active trading costs are all added to the active investor’s equation. Funds of hedge funds accentuate this cost problem because their fees are superimposed on the large fees charged by the hedge funds in which the funds of funds are invested.
当巨额的年度管理费、业绩报酬和频繁交易的成本，都被累加到主动投资者的费用等式中时，其承担的成本就会飙升。而FOF基金加剧了这一成本问题，因为他们在对冲基金收费的基础上再次收取管理费。
A number of smart people are involved in running hedge funds. But to a great extent their efforts are self-neutralizing, and their IQ will not overcome the costs they impose on investors. Investors, on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a group of funds of funds.
有很多聪明的投资者都参与到对冲基金的运营。但在很大程度上，他们付出的努力被自我抵消了，他们高智商带来的超额收益并不能克服他们强加给投资者的成本。平均而言，随着时间的推移，投资低成本指数基金的业绩表现会超过投资FOF基金。
So that was my argument — and now let me put it into a simple equation. If Group A (active investors) and Group B (do-nothing investors) comprise the total investing universe, and B is destined to achieve average results before costs, so, too, must A. Whichever group has the lower costs will win. (The academic in me requires me to mention that there is a very minor point — not worth detailing — that slightly modifies this formulation.) And if Group A has exorbitant costs, its shortfall will be substantial.
这就是我的观点，现在我把它放进一个简易等式中。如果A组(主动投资者)和B组(被动投资者)构成了整个投资市场，而且B组在扣除成本前，必定要取得平均回报水平，那么A组也必须如此。成本更低的一组将获胜。如果A组成本过高，其亏空将是巨大的。
There are, of course, some skilled individuals who are highly likely to out-perform the S&P over long stretches. In my lifetime, though, I’ve identified — early on — only ten or so professionals that I expected would accomplish this feat.
当然，部分有经验的人很有可能长期超过标准普尔指数的表现。然而，在我的一生中，我很早就发现，能完成这一壮举的也不过十个左右的专业人士罢了。
There are no doubt many hundreds of people — perhaps thousands — whom I have never met and whose abilities would equal those of the people I’ve identified. The job, after all, is not impossible. The problem simply is that the great majority of managers who attempt to over-perform will fail. The probability is also very high that the person soliciting your funds will not be the exception who does well. Bill Ruane — a truly wonderful human being and a man whom I identified 60 years ago as almost certain to deliver superior investment returns over the long haul — said it well: “In investment management, the progression is from the innovators to the imitators to the swarming incompetents.”
毫无疑问，有成百上千甚至成千上万我从未见过的人，他们的能力可与我认识的这十人相媲美。毕竟，跑赢指数并非不可能。不过问题在于，绝大多数试图跑赢指数的经理最终都会失败。向你募集资金的人很有可能不会不是做的非常好多人。比尔·鲁安是真正了不起的人，60年前我就认为，从长期来看，他几乎肯定能带来优秀的投资回报。他说很好：“在投资管理中，从创新者到模仿者，再到众多的无为者，这是一个巨大进步。”
Further complicating the search for the rare high-fee manager who is worth his or her pay is the fact that some investment professionals, just as some amateurs, will be lucky over short periods. If 1,000 managers make a market prediction at the beginning of a year, it’s very likely that the calls of at least one will be correct for nine consecutive years. Of course, 1,000 monkeys would be just as likely to produce a seemingly all-wise prophet. But there would remain a difference: The lucky monkey would not find people standing in line to invest with him.
像部分业余投资者一样，在短期内一些专业投资者也会因为走运而获得高收益，这让寻找一位物超所值且收费高昂的罕见基金经理变得更为复杂。如果1000位经理人在年初进行市场预测，则至少有一位经理的预测很可能在未来连续九年里连续都是正确的。当然，1000只猴子中也有可能出现一个貌似无所不知的预言家。但二者间仍然存在差异：幸运的猴子不会发现人们排队找他进行投资。
Finally, there are three connected realities that cause investing success to breed failure. First, a good record quickly attracts a torrent of money. Second, huge sums invariably act as an anchor on investment performance: What is easy with millions, struggles with billions (sob!). Third, most managers will nevertheless seek new money because of their personal equation — namely, the more funds they have under management, the more their fees.
最后，有三个相互关联的事实，导致成功的投资酝酿着失败。首先，良好的投资业绩记录很快就会吸引到大量的资金；其次，巨额资金总是会成为沉重的投资业绩之锚：几百万的资金容易管理，几十亿的资金就很难了；第三，尽管如此，大多数经理人还是会为了个人利益而去寻求获取新的资金，因为管理的资金越多，收取的管理费就越多。
These three points are hardly new ground for me: In January 1966, when I was managing $44 million ,I wrote my limited partners: “I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results. Therefore,…I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL. I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.”
这三点对我来说不是什么新鲜事：1966年1月，当时我管理着4400万美元的资金，我给我的有限合伙人写了一封信：“我认为，资金规模越大越可能损害未来的投资业绩，而不是增加业绩。对于我个人利益而言，这不一定适用，但对您的业绩来说是真的。因此，……我打算BPL不再接受新的合伙人。我已经通知Susie，如果我们有更多的孩子，就由她来为他们寻找其他合伙人。”
The bottom line: When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients. Both large and small investors should stick with low-cost index funds.
最终是：当数万亿美元由收取高昂管理费的华尔街人士管理时，通常获得丰厚利润的是管理人，而不是客户。无论大型和小型投资者均应坚持投资低成本指数基金。
If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors, the hands-down choice should be Jack Bogle. For decades, Jack has urged investors to invest in ultra-low-cost index funds. In his crusade, he amassed only a tiny percentage of the wealth that has typically flowed to managers who have promised their investors large rewards while delivering them nothing — or, as in our bet, less than nothing — of added value.
如果要树立一座雕像来纪念为美国投资者做出最大贡献的人，那么JackBogle必是首选 。几十年来，Bogle一直敦促投资者投资于超低成本的指数基金。在他的长期奋斗中，大量财富流向了基金经理的腰包，而他只积累了其中很小一部分。这些经理人向投资者许诺了巨额回报，但却没有带来任何超额回报，或者像我们赌约中那样，带来的回报几近于无。
In his early years, Jack was frequently mocked by the investment-management industry. Today, however, he has the satisfaction of knowing that he helped millions of investors realize far better returns on their savings than they otherwise would have earned. He is a hero to them and to me.
Bogle早年常常被投资管理行业嘲笑。然而，今天他欣慰地获悉，他已帮助数以百万计的投资者的储蓄，实现了比其他情况下高得多的投资回报。他是他们的英雄，也是我的英雄。
Over the years, I’ve often been asked for investment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal about human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500 index fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have usually followed my suggestion.
多年来，经常有人请求我提供投资建议，并且在回答的过程中，我学到了很多关于人类行为的知识。我通常给的建议是，投资低成本的标普500指数基金。值得称赞的是，我那些收入不高的朋友通常都采纳了我的建议。
I believe, however, that none of the mega-rich individuals, institutions or pension funds has followed that same advice when I’ve given it to them. Instead, these investors politely thank me for my thoughts and depart to listen to the siren song of a high-fee manager or, in the case of many institutions, to seek out another breed of hyper-helper called a consultant.
然而，我相信，当我把这一建议提供给超级富豪、机构或养老基金时，他们谁都没有采纳我的建议。相反，这些投资者会礼貌地对我的建议表示感谢，然后去听收取收费高额经理人的言论，或者许多机构会向另一种称为投资顾问的超级助手寻求建议。
That professional, however, faces a problem. Can you imagine an investment consultant telling clients, year after year, to keep adding to an index fund replicating the S&P 500? That would be career suicide. Large fees flow to these hyper-helpers, however, if they recommend small managerial shifts every year or so. That advice is often delivered in esoteric gibberish that explains why fashionable investment “styles” or current economic trends make the shift appropriate.
然而，这些专业人士面临着一个问题。你能想象一个投资顾问会年复一年地告诉客户，不断增加对复制标普500指数的基金的投资吗？那简直是自毁前程。然而，如果这些超级助手每年都建议小幅改变投资策略，他们就会收到大笔费用。这些建议往往是用艰涩难懂的胡扯来解释，为什么时髦的投资”风格”或当前的经济趋势适于进行这种改变。
The wealthy are accustomed to feeling that it is their lot in life to get the best food, schooling, entertainment, housing, plastic surgery, sports ticket, you name it. Their money, they feel, should buy them something superior compared to what the masses receive.
有钱人习惯性地认为，他们的命运理所应当获得最好的食物、教育、娱乐、住房、整形手术、体育彩票等等。他们认为，他们的钱应该买到比其他普通大众更优质的东西。
In many aspects of life, indeed, wealth does command top-grade products or services. For that reason, the financial “elites” — wealthy individuals, pension funds, college endowments and the like — have great trouble meekly signing up for a financial product or service that is available as well to people investing only a few thousand dollars. This reluctance of the rich normally prevails even though the product at issue is –on an expectancy basis — clearly the best choice. My calculation, admittedly very rough, is that the search by the elite for superior investment advice has caused it, in aggregate, to waste more than $100 billion over the past decade. Figure it out: Even a 1% fee on a few trillion dollars adds up. Of course, not every investor who put money in hedge funds ten years ago lagged S&P returns. But I believe my calculation of the aggregate shortfall is conservative.
在生活中的很多方面，财富确实可以换来优质的产品或服务。因此，对金融”精英”而言，包括富人、养老基金、大学捐赠基金等，他们很难接受去投资那些普通投资者只花几千美元也能投资的金融产品或服务。富人的这种不情愿通常很普遍，即使这些产品(在预期的基础上)明显是最佳的投资选择。我估算(尽管非常粗略)，精英阶层为了寻求优质投资建议，在过去十年里导致的损失超过1000亿美元。算一算：几万亿美元资产即使收取1%的管理费也有这么多。当然，并非十年前所有投资对冲基金的投资者都会落后于标普指数的回报率。但我认为，我对总亏空的估算仍是保守的。
Much of the financial damage befell pension funds for public employees. Many of these funds are woefully underfunded, in part because they have suffered a double whammy: poor investment performance accompanied by huge fees. The resulting shortfalls in their assets will for decades have to be made up by local taxpayers.
大部分的损失都是来自公务员的养老基金。不幸地是，这些养老基金许多都面临资金不足，部分原因是他们遭受了双重打击：投资表现不佳叠加巨额管理费。由此造成的亏空将由当地纳税人在未来几十年里补足。
Human behavior won’t change. Wealthy individuals, pension funds, endowments and the like will continue to feel they deserve something “extra” in investment advice. Those advisors who cleverly play to this expectation will get very rich. This year the magic potion may be hedge funds, next year something else. The likely result from this parade of promises is predicted in an adage: “When a person with money meets a person with experience, the one with experience ends up with the money and the one with money leaves with experience.”
人类的行为不会改变。富人、养老基金、捐赠基金等仍会认为，他们应该获得一些”额外”的投资建议。那些巧妙地利用这一预期心理的投资顾问将变得非常富有。今年的灵丹妙药可能是投资对冲基金，明年可能又是别的。这一系列承诺可能的结果，在一句谚语中得到印证：“当一个有钱的人遇到一个有经验的人时，有经验的人最终会得到金钱，而有钱的人离开时得到了经验。”
Long ago, a brother-in-law of mine, Homer Rogers, was a commission agent working in the Omaha stockyards. I asked him how he induced a farmer or rancher to hire him to handle the sale of their hogs or cattle to the buyers from the big four packers (Swift, Cudahy, Wilson and Armour). After all, hogs were hogs and the buyers were experts who knew to the penny how much any animal was worth. How then, I asked Homer, could any sales agent get a better result than any other?
很久以前，我的姐夫Homer Rogers是奥马哈一个牧场的佣金经纪人。我问他是如何诱导农民或农场主，雇佣他来帮他们把猪或牛销售给四大罐头食品公司的买家(SWIFT、Cudahy、Wilson和Armour)。毕竟，猪就是猪，而买家也很专业，他们非常清楚牲畜究竟值多少钱。然后，我问Homer，有销售代理比其他代理做得更好吗？
Homer gave me a pitying look and said: “Warren, it’s not how you sell ‘em, it’s how you tell ‘em.” What worked in the stockyards continues to work in Wall Street.
Homer同情地看了我一眼说：沃伦，卖什么不重要要，重要的是怎么卖”。在牧场行之有效的东西，同样适用于华尔街。
And, finally, let me offer an olive branch to Wall Streeters, many of them good friends of mine. Berkshire loves to pay fees — even outrageous fees — to investment bankers who bring us acquisitions. Moreover, we have paid substantial sums for over-performance to our two in-house investment managers — and we hope to make even larger payments to them in the future.
最后，我要向华尔街伸出橄榄枝，他们中的很多人是我的好朋友。伯克希尔愿意向为我们带来收购机会的投资银行家支付费用，甚至是高得离谱的费用。此外，我们已经为我们的两位投资经理支付了大笔超额业绩报酬，我们希望将来能向他们支付更多。
To get biblical (Ephesians 3:18), I know the height and the depth and the length and the breadth of the energy flowing from that simple four-letter word — fees — when it is spoken to Wall Street. And when that energy delivers value to Berkshire, I will cheerfully write a big check.
根据《圣经》(以弗所书3:18)，当华尔街说到”费用FEES”时，我认识到这几个字所释放出能量的高度、深度、长度和宽度。当这种能量给伯克希尔带来价值的时候，我会欣然签一张大支票。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
Last year we partnered with Yahoo to air the first-ever webcast of our annual meeting. Thanks to Andy Serwer and his Yahoo crew, the production was a success in all respects, registering 1.1 million unique visits in real-time viewing and 11.5 million more in replays (many of those, to be sure, called up by viewers interested in only certain segments of the webcast).
去年，我们与雅虎合作，首次通过网络直播了年会。感谢AndySerwer和他的雅虎团队，从各方面来看此次直播很成功。有110万独立访问者实时观看了直播，有超过1150万次重播(当然其中很多重播是由那些只对直播的部分片段感兴趣的观众点击的)。
Berkshire’s thank-you mail for initiating the webcast included many notes from three constituencies: the elderly who find travel difficult; the thrifty who find it expensive to travel to Omaha; and those who cannot attend a Saturday meeting for religious reasons.
伯克希尔网络直播收到的感谢信主要包括三类人：有出行困难的老人，感觉前往奥马哈费用昂贵的节俭人士，以及由于宗教原因而不能参加周六会议的人。
The webcast cut attendance at last year’s meeting to about 37,000 people (we can’t get a precise count), which was down about 10%. Nevertheless, both Berkshire’s subsidiaries and Omaha hotels and restaurants racked up huge sales. Nebraska Furniture Mart’s sales broke their 2015 record volume by 3%, with the Omaha store recording one-week volume of $45.5 million.
网络直播使去年出席会议的人数减少至3.7万人(我们无法准确统计)，下降约10%。然而，伯克希尔子公司和奥马哈的酒店和餐馆都实现了巨大销售额。内布拉斯加家具商场打破了2015年的销售记录，销售增长3%。奥马哈店一周的销售额为4550万美元。
Our Berkshire exhibitors at CenturyLink were open from noon until 5 p.m. on Friday and drew a crowd of 12,000 bargain-hunting shareholders. We will repeat those Friday shopping hours this year on May 5th. Bring money.
在CenturyLink伯克希尔的参展公司从周五中午到下午5点对外开放，吸引了1.2万名淘便宜货的股东。今年5月5日，我们的营业时间与去年相同。请带上钱过来。
The annual meeting falls on May 6th and will again be webcast by Yahoo, whose web address is https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream. The webcast will go live at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time. Yahoo will interview directors, managers, stockholders and celebrities before the meeting and during the lunch break. Both those interviews and meeting will be translated simultaneously into Mandarin.
年会在 5 月 6 日举行，雅虎将再次进行网上直播，网址是https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream ，网络直播将在中部夏令时间上午9点开始。雅虎将在会议开始前和午休期间采访董事、经理、股东和知名人士。这些采访和会议将同声传译成中文。
For those attending the meeting in person, the doors at the CenturyLink will open at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday to facilitate shopping prior to our shareholder movie, which begins at 8:30. The question-and-answer period will start at 9:30 and run until 3:30, with a one-hour lunch break at noon. Finally, at 3:45 we will begin the formal shareholder meeting. It will run an hour or so. That is somewhat longer than usual because three proxy items are to be presented by their proponents, who will be given a reasonable amount of time to state their case.
对于那些亲自参加会议的人，CenturyLink将在周六早上7点开门，方便他们在股东电影播放前购物。电影将在8:30开始播放。股东问答在9:30开始，一直持续到下午3:30，中午有一小时午休。最后下午3:45，我们将开始正式的股东会议，会议将持续一个小时左右。由于三个代理项目将由其提议者提出，他们将有合理的时间进行陈述其理由，所以会议会比往常稍长。
On Saturday morning, we will have our sixth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be the porch of a Clayton Home, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager — in my one brief flirtation with honest labor — I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). The competition will begin about 7:45, and I’ll take on ten or so competitors selected a few minutes earlier by my assistant, Deb Bosanek.
周六上午，我们将开展第六届国际报纸投递挑战赛。目标地点仍是克莱顿之家的门廊，其与投掷线的距离刚好为35英尺。在我青少年时期，我曾短暂做过送报纸的工作，我投递了大概50万份报纸，所以我觉得自己很擅长这个游戏。向我挑战吧！让我难堪吧！打倒我吧！报纸大概有36到42页，你必须自己折叠它们(不许用橡皮筋)。比赛将在早晨7:45开始，我将与几分钟前由我的助手DebBosanek挑选的十名左右的投掷手进行对决。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of our subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our companies. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
您的购物地点是一个毗邻会场的19.43万平方英尺的大厅，伯克希尔旗下的数十家子公司的产品将在这里出售。向那些为自己产品站台的伯克希尔经理们问好吧。记得看看BNSF铁路的布局图，它为了向我们所有的公司致敬而设计，您和您的孩子一定会为它着迷。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle we eat throughout the Saturday meeting takes its toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
我们经营的Brooks跑鞋将在会议期间再次推出特别纪念款。买一双穿上它参加我们周日早晨8点举行的第四届”伯克希尔5公里”比赛活动吧，起跑点设在CenturyLink。参会的全部详细信息将包含在跟会议入场券一起寄过去的《参会者指南》中。参赛者将发现自己与伯克希尔的经理、董事和同事一起跑步。(不过查理和我要多睡会儿，因为我们在周六吃了太多的软糖和花生脆)。这项活动的参赛者正在逐年增多，也帮我们创下另一个记录。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. At last year’s meeting, we set a record for policy sales, up 21% from 2015. I predict we will be up again this year.
购物区的GEICO展位配备来自全国各地的多位顶尖顾问。去年会议上我们创下保单销售新记录，较2015年增长21%。我预计今年我们的销量还会增长。
So stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on other Berkshire products.
别忘了在展位下停下看一下报价，多数情况下GEICO会为你提供股东折扣(通常8%左右)。在我们经营的51个司法区有44个允许这个特别折扣。(补充一点：折扣不能和其他折扣同时使用，比如某个享受特别折扣的团体。)带上您现有的保单信息来看看我们的报价，您就会发现真的可以省好多钱。用省下的钱买我们的其他产品吧！
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. This Omaha-based retailer will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. The best book I read last year was Shoe Dog , by Nike’s Phil Knight. Phil is a very wise, intelligent and competitive fellow who is also a gifted storyteller. The Bookworm will have piles of Shoe Dog as well as several investment classics by Jack Bogle.
记得去书虫书吧看看。这家总部位于奥马哈的书商将会在那里展出约35本书和DVD，其中包括几本新书。我去年读过的最好的书是Nike的Phil Knight写的《Shoe Dog》。Phil是一个非常聪明、睿智和竞争性很强的人，也是一个天生的会讲故事的人。书虫书吧将有一堆《Shoe Dog》以及Jack Bogle撰写的几本经典投资书籍。
The Bookworm will once again offer our history of the highlights (and lowlights) of Berkshire’s first 50 years. Non-attendees of the meeting can find the book on eBay. Just type in: Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition).
书虫书吧将再次伯克希尔50周年纪念册，讲述伯克希尔50年的起起伏伏，未参会者可以在EBAY上找到这本书，只需键入：Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Celebrating 50 years of a Profitable Partnership (2nd Edition)。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Keep in mind that airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend — though I must admit I have developed some tolerance, bordering on enthusiasm, for that practice now that Berkshire has made large investments in America’s four major carriers. Nevertheless, if you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
本报告的附件材料可以告诉您如何获得年会及其他活动的所需凭证。机票有时会在伯克希尔周末前提价，尽管我必须承认，伯克希尔对美国四大航空公司进行了大量投资，我对这种做法有利一定的容忍度，甚至抱有热情。尽管如此，如果您从很远的地方来，您可以比较飞到堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用，两个城市之间车程为2.5小时。飞到堪萨斯可能为你节省一大笔钱，一对夫妇大概可以节省1000多美元。把省下的钱花在我们的产品上！
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, May 2nd and Monday, May 8th inclusive, and must also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend,” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
在位于道奇和太平洋之间的72街，占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具商城，我们将再次举行”伯克希尔周末”折扣价活动。要获得NFM的折扣优惠，您必须在5月2日(周二)至5月8日(周一)之间进行购买，别忘带着您的参会凭证。几家平常没有折扣活动的著名制造品牌也会参加特价活动，本着股东周末的特别精神为您破例。我们非常感谢他们的配合。在”伯克希尔周末”NFM将在工作日从上午10点营业至晚上9点，周六将从上午10点营业至晚上9点半，周日从上午10点营业至晚上8点。周六晚5点半至8点，NFM将举办一场野餐活动，我们邀请所有股东参加。
This year we have good news for shareholders in the Kansas City and Dallas metro markets who can’t attend the meeting or perhaps prefer the webcast. From May 2ndthrough May 8th, shareholders who present meeting credentials or other evidence of their Berkshire ownership (such as brokerage statements) to their local NFM store will receive the same discounts enjoyed by those visiting the Omaha store.
在Kansas City和Dallas不能出席会议，或更喜欢网络直播的股东们，今年我们有好消息给他们了。从5月2日到5月8日，股东向当地NFM出示会议入场券或证明是伯克希尔股东的其它文件(如经纪声明)，可享受与在奥马哈店股东一样的折扣。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 5th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 7th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. Remember, the more you buy, the more you save (or so my daughter tells me when we visit the store).
在波仙珠宝店，我们还将举行两场只有股东可以参加的活动。第一场将于5月5日(周五)下午6点到9点举行鸡尾酒会。第二场大型售卖活动将在5月7日(周日)举行早上9点至下午4点举行。周六波仙将营业至下午6点。记住，你买的越多，省的钱也越多(当我们逛商店时我女儿告诉我的)。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1st through Saturday, May 13th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
周末期间波仙珠宝将迎来大量客流。因此，为了您的方便，股东价格优惠期间定于5月1日周一到5月13日周六。在此期间，请您出示自己的参会凭据，或出示能显示您持有我们股票的经纪声明，以便确定您的股东身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician and motivational speaker from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. If they suggest wagering on the game, change the subject. I will join them at some point and hope Ajit, Charlie and Bill Gates will do so also.
周日在波仙珠宝外面的商场，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师和励志演讲家NormanBeck将会进行令人眼花缭乱的魔术表演。在商场上层，我们邀请到了世界顶级桥牌专家BobHamman和SharonOsberg，股东可在周日下午和他们切磋牌艺。不要跟他们赌钱。我会在某个时候加入牌局，并希望能把Ajit查理和比尔盖茨也请过来。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine, and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Ariel represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. Now, she’s a senior at Princeton (after interning last summer at JPMorgan Chase). If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates did pretty well playing Ariel last year, so he may be ready to again challenge her. (My advice: Bet on Ariel.)
我的朋友Ariel Hsing周日也会来到商场，接受乒乓球的挑战。我第一次见到她时才9岁，即便那会儿我也一分都赢不了她。她在2012年就已经代表美国出征过奥运会，现在是普林斯顿大学的大四学生(去年夏天在摩根大通实习)。如果您不介意输球的尴尬的话，可以和她切磋一下球技，活动下午1点开始。去年比尔·盖茨表现就不错，所以他今年可能准备再次挑战她(我赌Ariel会赢)。
Gorat’s will be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7th, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 3rd( but not before ). Show you are a sophisticated diner by ordering the T-bone with hash browns.
5月7日周日Gorat’s餐馆将再次为伯克希尔股东独家开放，预定请于4月3日(请勿提前)拨打402-551-3733。为了显示您是一个资深食客，点一份T形牛骨和土豆饼。
We will have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of the New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我们将再次邀请同样的三位财经记者主持大会期间的问答环节，他们会向我和查理提出股东通过电子邮件发送的问题。三名记者和他们的邮件分别是：杰出的商业记者CarolLoomis： loomisbrk@gmail.com；来自CNBC的BeckyQuick： BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；来自《纽约时报》的AndrewRossSorkin： arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important to shareholders. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位记者会从收到的问题中，选出他们认为最有意思最重要的6个问题。几位记者告诉我，为了增加您的问题被选中的几率，您的问题要简洁，避免在最后一刻才发送出去，要和伯克希尔相关，并且一封邮件里问题数量不要超过两个。(在邮件里说明，如果您的问题被选中您是否希望透露自己的名字)。
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Since what we will be conducting is a shareholders’ meeting, our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
三名关注伯克希尔的分析师会提出另外一组问题。今年的保险业专家是来自巴克莱银行Barclays的Jay Gelb。与我们非保险业务相关的问题，将会由来自Ruane,Cunniff&Goldfarb公司的JonathanBrandt和晨星(Morningstar)的GreggWarren提出。我们希望分析师和记者提出的问题有助于增进股东们对自己投资的了解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us. Our goal is for you to leave the meeting knowing more about Berkshire than when you came and for you to have a good time while in Omaha.
查理和我对于将要回答的问题并没有什么线索。当然有些问题会很刁钻，这是我们喜欢的方式。一个问句里包含多个问题是不允许的，我们想要让尽可能多的人有机会向我们提问。我们的目标是让你在离开会议时，比来的时候更了解伯克希尔，并在奥马哈度过一段美好的时光。
All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
我们预计总共会收到至少54个问题，其中分析师和记者每人可以问6个问题，听众可以提出18个问题。听众的问题将通过11次抽签的方式选出来，抽签时间为年度会议当天早上的8:15。在大会场馆和主要分会场一共安置有11个麦克风，每个麦克风将会进行一次抽签。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday (a day that also eases traffic and parking problems).
在我谈论让股东获取信息的主题时，我要提请大家注意，查理和我相信所有的股东都应该能够同时接收到伯克希尔发布的新信息；而且如果条件允许的话，股东应该在进行交易前用充足的时间消化和分析这些信息。正是出于这个原因，我们尽量在周五晚间或周六早间发布财报数据，年度大会也总是在周六举办(这一天还可以缓解交通和停车问题)。
We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his or her savings. As I run the company day-to-day — and as I write this letter — that is the shareholder whose image is in my mind.
我们并不采用和大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一的交谈的惯常做法，而是像对待所有其他股东一样对待他们。对我们来说，没有人比收入有限的股东更重要的了，因为他们基于信任把大部分积蓄托付于于我们打理。在我每天经营这家公司的时候，在我写这封信的时候，这些股东就会在我的脑海浮现。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
处于充分的理由，我常常夸赞公司的运营经理所取得的成就，他们都是全明星级别的经理人，经营自己的业务就好像这些资产是他们家族拥有的唯一财产一样谨慎。我也相信我们的管理者心态是以股东利益为导向，就像在大型上市公司中管理一样。我们大多数经理人并不需要为钱而工作。对他们来说，打出商业”全垒打”所带来的愉悦跟收到薪水支票同样重要。
Equally important, however, are the men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This team efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,450-page Federal income tax return, oversees the filing of 3,580 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter — and the list goes on and on.
在我们公司总部办公室工作的24名男女雇员也同样重要。他们高效地处理SEC和其它监管要求，提交了30450页联邦所得税申报表，还要监管3580份州税申报表，回应无数的股东和媒体问询，发布年度报告，准备美国最大规模的企业年会，协调董事会的活动，对这封信进行事实审核……这份任务列表还可以写很长。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. In addition, they cheerfully pitch in to help Carrie Sova — our talented ringmaster at the annual meeting — deliver an interesting and entertaining weekend for our shareholders. They are proud to work for Berkshire, and I am proud of them.
他们愉快高效处理了所有这些业务任务，让我的生活倍感轻松愉悦。他们还努力处理一些并非和伯克希尔严格相关的活动：比如，去年他们接待了40所大学(从200所申请大学挑选出来的)派出的学生到奥马哈和我进行一天的问答活动。他们还处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅程，甚至午餐时还帮我买汉堡和炸薯条(当然裹满了亨氏番茄酱)。此外，他们还兴致勃勃的帮助我的助理Carrie Sova安排年会事宜，从而让我们的股东度过了一个有趣且愉快的周末。他们为能为伯克希尔工作而自豪，我也为他们感到骄傲。
I’m a lucky guy, very fortunate in being surrounded by this excellent staff, a team of highly-talented operating managers and a boardroom of very wise and experienced directors. Come to Omaha — the cradle of capitalism — on May 6th and meet the Berkshire Bunch. All of us look forward to seeing you.
我是一个幸运的人，很幸运有这些优秀的员工，一支才华横溢的运营经理团队以及一个由非常聪明且经验丰富的董事组成的董事会围绕在我身边。5月6日，来资本家的摇篮奥马哈与伯克希尔大家族碰面吧。我们所有人都期待看到你们。
February 25, 2017
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
原文：My error caused Berkshire shareholders to give far more than they received (a practice that — despite the Biblical endorsement — is far from blessed when you are buying businesses). 原译文：我的错误导致伯克希尔股东付出的远远超过他们所获得的。尽管这笔收购得到了圣经的庇护，但当你收购企业时，发行股票的方式远远谈不上幸福。 修改为：由于我的错误，伯克希尔公司的股东付出的远远多于他们得到的（尽管《圣经》称赞这种做法，但当你收购企业时，上帝却不会因此赐福给你）。
原文：Charlie and I cringe when we hear analysts talk admiringly about managements who always “make the numbers.”
原译文：在听到一些分析师大举赞扬那些总能”制造数字”达成目标的公司管理层时，查理和我都会感到害怕。
修改为：每当我们听到分析师们赞叹那些总能「实现目标」的管理层时，查理和我都替分析师感到难为情。
原文：Let’s get back to the two favorites of “don’t-count-this” managers, starting with “restructuring.”