原文信息：
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | 12.0 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.4 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 6.5 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | (6.2) | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | 4.6 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 8.3 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | 6.4 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2015 | 19.2% | 20.8% | 9.7% |
| Overall Gain -– 1964-2015 | 798,981% | 1,598,284% | 11,355% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre—tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after—tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2015 was 19 to $155,501, a rate of 19.2% compounded annually.1
2015年伯克希尔的账面价值增长了154亿美元，A/B股每股账面价值增长6.4%(标普1.4%)。自现任管理层接手的51年来，每股账面价值已从19美元增至155501美元，年均复合增长率约为19.2%。
During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.”
前半个时期，伯克希尔的账面价值与真正重要的企业内在商业价值大致相等。这两个数字之所以近似是因为我们的大多数资产配置在有价证券上，这些证券定期定期按市场报价进行重估(减去出售时将产生的税收)。按照华尔街的说法，我们的大部分资产是”按市值计价的”。
By the early 1990s, however, our focus had changed to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that diminished the relevance of balance—sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules that apply to controlled companies are materially different from those used in valuing marketable securities. The carrying value of the “losers” we own is written down, but “winners” are never revalued upwards.
然而，到了1990年代初，我们的资本配置重点已经转向企业的完全所有权，这一转变减少了资产负债表数据的相关性。因为适用于控股公司的会计准则不同于评估公司有价证券，我们拥有的一些衰败企业的账面价值通常被减记，而那些优秀企业的账面价值却未曾重估。
We’ve had experience with both outcomes: I’ve made some dumb purchases, and the amount I paid for the economic goodwill of those companies was later written off, a move that reduced Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners – a few of them very big – but have not written those up by a penny.
我们对这两种企业都有经历：我做了一些愚蠢的投资，但我为那些衰败企业的经济信誉支付的金额后来被注销，此举降低了伯克希尔的账面价值。同时，我们也有一些成功的投资，其中一些是非常成功的，但却没能提高企业的账面价值。
Over time, this asymmetrical accounting treatment (with which we agree) necessarily widens the gap between intrinsic value and book value. Today, the large — and growing — unrecorded gains at our “winners” make it clear that Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. That’s why we would be delighted to repurchase our shares should they sell as low as 120% of book value. At that level, purchases would instantly and meaningfully increase per-share intrinsic value for Berkshire’s continuing shareholders.
随着时间的推移，相较于我们认可的处理方式，这种不对称的会计处理必然扩大了公司内在价值与账面价值之间的差距。现在，我们优秀企业不断增长但却未记录的经济商誉，清楚的表明伯克希公司的内在价值远远超过其账面价值，这就是为什么我们乐意将股票回购的价格上限提高到账面价值的120%。在这个水平线上，回购对于伯克希尔剩余的股东而言，会快速提高每股的内在价值。
The unrecorded increase in the value of our owned businesses explains why Berkshire’s aggregate market-value gain — tabulated on the facing page — materially exceeds our book-value gain. The two indicators vary erratically over short periods. Last year, for example, book-value performance was superior. Over time, however, market-value gains should continue their historical tendency to exceed gains in book value.
The Year at Berkshire 伯克希尔这一年
Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I expect Berkshire’s normalized earning power to increase every year. ( Actual year-to-year earnings, of course, will sometimes decline because of weakness in the U.S. economy or, possibly, because of insurance mega-catastrophes.) In some years the normalized gains will be small; at other times they will be material. Last year was a good one. Here are the highlights:
伯克希尔副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格，跟我预计伯克希尔的经常性(normalized)盈利能力每年都会增加。当然，实际的年收益有时会因为美国经济的疲软而下降，或者可能因为保险业遭遇大灾。在一些年份经营性盈利会较少，而另一些年份会较多。但去年是收获颇丰的一年，以下为其中的亮点：
- The most important development at Berkshire during 2015 was not financial, though it led to better earnings. After a poor performance in 2014, our BNSF railroad dramatically improved its service to customers last year. To attain that result, we invested about $5.8 billion during the year in capital expenditures, a sum far and away the record for any American railroad and nearly three times our annual depreciation charge. It was money well spent.
在2015年伯克希尔最重要的进展不是金融业务，虽然它带来了更好的收益。在2014年表现欠佳后，我们的BNSF铁路去年大幅改善了对客户的服务。而为了实现这一目的，我们在资本支出中投入了58亿美元，远超美国铁路历史的纪录，并且几乎是我们年度折旧费用的三倍，但它花的真值！
BNSF moves about 17% of America’s intercity freight (measured by revenue ton-miles), whether transported by rail, truck, air, water or pipeline. In that respect, we are a strong number one among the seven large American railroads (two of which are Canadian-based), carrying 45% more ton-miles of freight than our closest competitor. Consequently, our maintaining first-class service is not only vital to our shippers’ welfare but also important to the smooth functioning of the U.S. economy.
无论是通过铁路，公路，航空，水路还是管道运输，以吨英里的收入来计算，BNSF铁路承担了美国17%的城际货运量。在这方面，我们是美国七大铁路公司(其中两家在加拿大)中毋庸置疑最大的，吨英里的货运量超出最接近的竞争对手45%。因此，我们保持一流的服务不仅对我们的托运人的至关重要，而且对美国经济的平稳运行至关重要。
For most American railroads, 2015 was a disappointing year. Aggregate ton-miles fell, and earnings weakened as well. BNSF, however, maintained volume, and pre-tax income rose to a record 606 million from 2014). Matt Rose and Carl Ice, the managers of BNSF, have my thanks and deserve yours.
对于大多数美国铁路公司来说，2015年是令人失望的一年，货运总吨英里数下滑，利润也在降低。但BNFS销售规模保持不变，税前收益达到了创纪录的68亿美元，比2014年增长6.06亿美元。BNSF铁路的经理人Matt Rose和Carl Ice，他们理应得到你们的感谢。
- BNSF is the largest of our “Powerhouse Five,” a group that also includes Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Marmon, Lubrizol and IMC. Combined, these companies — our five most profitable non-insurance businesses — earned 650 million over 2014.
BNSF铁路是”五驾马车”中最大的一个，该集团还包括伯克希尔[Energy_Industry|能源]、IMC(以色列金属切削工具供应商)、[Lubrizol|路博润]以及Marmon集团，他们是伯克希尔5个最大的非保险业务，在2015的税前收益达到131亿美元，较2014年增加了6.5亿美元。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning 12.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the twelve-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
在这五个巨头中，2003年我们只拥有伯克希尔能源，当时税前收益为3.93亿美元，后来我们相继以全现金相继购买了其余4家中的3家，在收购BNSF铁路时，我们用全现金支付了70%，30%发行伯克希尔股票，使伯克希尔股本规模增加了6.1%。换句话说，这五驾马车在12年的时间里，为伯克希尔带来了每年127亿美元的税前收益，但只带来了轻微的股权稀释。我们的目标不仅仅是增加收益，还要确保我们能提高每股收益。
- Next year, I will be discussing the “Powerhouse Six.” The newcomer will be Precision Castparts Corp. (“PCC”), a business that we purchased a month ago for more than $32 billion of cash. PCC fits perfectly into the Berkshire model and will substantially increase our normalized per-share earning power.
明年，我将要着手”第六驾马车”的建设。新加入的公司将是Precision Castparts Corp(PCC)，我们在一个月前以320亿美元现金收购了它。PCC完全符合伯克希尔模式，并将大幅提高我们的经营性每股盈利能力。
Under CEO Mark Donegan, PCC has become the world’s premier supplier of aerospace components (most of them destined to be original equipment, though spares are important to the company as well). Mark’s accomplishments remind me of the magic regularly performed by Jacob Harpaz at IMC, our remarkable Israeli manufacturer of cutting tools. The two men transform very ordinary raw materials into extraordinary products that are used by major manufacturers worldwide. Each is the da Vinci of his craft.
在CEO-Mark Donegan带领下，PCC已经成为世界顶级的航空零部件供应商(其中大多数都是原件供应业务，尽管备件供应业务也很重要)。Mark的成就让我想起了Jacob Harpaz在IMC中展示的法宝，两人将普通的材料加工成非凡的切削产品，供全球主要制造厂商使用，每一个产品都是他们工艺中的杰作。
PCC’s products, often delivered under multi-year contracts, are key components in most large aircraft. Other industries are served as well by the company’s 30,466 employees, who work out of 162 plants in 13 countries. In building his business, Mark has made many acquisitions and will make more. We look forward to having him deploy Berkshire’s capital.
PCC的产品大都是大型飞机中的关键部件，通常根据多年的合同交付，公司在13个国家的162个工厂里拥有30466名员工为各行各业提供服务。Mark在构建自己的商业帝国时，做了很多收购，而且将来还会有更多，我们期待着他来部署伯克希尔的资本。
A personal thank-you: The PCC acquisition would not have happened without the input and assistance of our own Todd Combs, who brought the company to my attention a few years ago and went on to educate me about both the business and Mark. Though Todd and Ted Weschler are primarily investment managers — they each handle about $9 billion for us — both of them cheerfully and ably add major value to Berkshire in other ways as well. Hiring these two was one of my best moves.
个人致谢：收购PCC如果没有Todd Combs的投入和帮助是无法成功的，几年前他让我开始注意这家公司，并且一直教我这个行业的知识以及Mark的事情。尽管Todd Combs和Ted Weschler的主要职责都是投资经理，他们每人为我们管理约90亿美元，但他们两人都通过各种方式愉快且干练地为伯克希尔增加了重大价值。雇佣这二人是我所做过的最好的决定之一。
- With the PCC acquisition, Berkshire will own 10.25 companies that would populate the Fortune 500 if they were stand-alone businesses. (Our 27% holding of Kraft Heinz is the 0.25.) That leaves just under 98% of America’s business giants that have yet to call us. Operators are standing by.
- Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned 5.1 billion in 2014. Within this group, we have one company that last year earned more than 400 million and 250 million and 100 million and 50 million and $100 million. We love them all: This collection of businesses will expand both in number and earnings as the years go by.
我们数十家规模较小的非保险业务去年的税前收益为57亿美元，高于2014年的51亿美元。在这个集团中，有一家公司去年税前收益超过7亿美元，两家收益在4-7亿美元之间，7家收益在2.5-4亿美元之间，11家收益在0.5-1亿美元之间。我们喜欢所有业务：长期来看，这些企业的数量和收益都将不断增加。
- When you hear talk about America’s crumbling infrastructure, rest assured that they’re not talking about Berkshire. We invested $16 billion in property, plant and equipment last year, a full 86% of it deployed in the United States.
当你听到有人谈论美国摇摇欲坠的基础设施时，请放心，他们谈论的并不是伯克希尔。我们在去年投资了160亿美元的土地、厂房和设备，86%都部署在美国。
I told you earlier about BNSF’s record capital expenditures in 2015. At the end of every year, our railroad’s physical facilities will be improved from those existing twelve months earlier.
我在前面告诉过你们BNSF铁路在2015年创记录的资本支出。每年年底，我们铁路的设施建设将比前1年有所改善。
Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) is a similar story. That company has invested $16 billion in renewables and now owns 7% of the country’s wind generation and 6% of its solar generation. Indeed, the 4,423 megawatts of wind generation owned and operated by our regulated utilities is six times the generation of the runner-up utility.
We’re not done. Last year, BHE made major commitments to the future development of renewables in support of the Paris Climate Change Conference. Our fulfilling those promises will make great sense, both for the environment and for Berkshire’s economics.
- Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2015 — that makes 13 years in a row — and increased its float. During those years, our float — money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit — grew from 88 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold.
伯克希尔庞大且不断增长的保险业务在2015年实现了连续13年的承保盈利。这些年里，那些不属于我们、但我们可以将其用于为伯克希尔利益的投资浮存金，从410亿美元增长到了880亿美元。虽然，我们的浮存金的规模和价值并没有反映在伯克希尔的收益上，但浮存金产生了庞大的投资收益，因为它允许我们投资资产。
Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled 1.8 billion earned in 2015. Without a doubt, Berkshire’s largest unrecorded wealth lies in its insurance business. We’ve spent 48 years building this multi-faceted operation, and it can’t be replicated.
- While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year we contracted for 29 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost 300,000 to $143 million.
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us most definitely aren’t.) These purchases deploy capital in operations that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. That means no additional work for us, yet more earnings for Berkshire, a combination we find highly appealing. We will make many dozens of bolt-on deals in future years.
如果他们定价合理，查理和我都鼓励补强收购。(大部分提供给我们的交易报价显然不合理。)这些收购将资本配置在适合我们现有的运营业务中，并将由我们的专业的经理人团队管理。这意味着，我们不需要增加额外的工作，但伯克希尔的收益却增加了，我们认为这种结合非常具有吸引力。我们在未来几年将会做更多的补强性收购。
- Our Heinz partnership with Jorge Paulo Lemann, Alex Behring and Bernardo Hees more than doubled its size last year by merging with Kraft. Before this transaction, we owned about 53% of Heinz at a cost of 9.8 billion. The new company has annual sales of $27 billion and can supply you Heinz ketchup or mustard to go with your Oscar Mayer hot dogs that come from the Kraft side. Add a Coke, and you will be enjoying my favorite meal. (We will have the Oscar Mayer Wienermobile at the annual meeting — bring your kids.)
在去年我们与Jorge Paulo Lemann，Alex Behring和Bernardo Hees的亨氏伙伴关心通过与卡夫的合并，规模增加了1倍多。在这笔交易之前，我们花费了42.5亿美元购买亨氏的53%股份。现在，我们拥有3.254亿股卡夫亨氏股份(约27%)，成本为98亿美元。新公司每年有着270亿美元的销售额，可以为你提供亨氏番茄酱或者芥末酱，搭配卡夫的Oscar Mayer热狗，加一杯可口可乐，你就将享受到我最喜欢的一顿饭了(我们将在每年的年会上设置Oscar Mayer热狗车，带上你的孩子一起来。)
Though we sold no Kraft Heinz shares, “GAAP” (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) required us to record a $6.8 billion write-up of our investment upon completion of the merger. That leaves us with our Kraft Heinz holding carried on our balance sheet at a value many billions above our cost and many billions below its market value, an outcome only an accountant could love.
尽管我们并没有出售卡夫亨氏的股票，但GAAP会计原则要求我们在合并完成后，记录68亿美元的投资减记。这就使得我们资产负债表上的卡夫亨氏的控股权益，高出我们的成本数十亿，却比市值要低出数百亿，这样的结果只有会计师才会喜欢。
Berkshire also owns Kraft Heinz preferred shares that pay us 7.7 billion on our balance sheet. That holding will almost certainly be redeemed for $8.32 billion in June (the earliest date allowed under the preferred’s terms). That will be good news for Kraft Heinz and bad news for Berkshire.
伯克希尔还拥有着卡夫亨氏的优先股，每年支付我们7.2亿美元利息，在我们资产负债表上的价值为77亿美元。几乎肯定卡夫亨氏将会在今年6月(优先股条款允许的最早赎回日期)以83.2亿美元赎回，这对于卡夫亨氏来说将会是一个好消息，但对于伯克希尔来说就是个坏消息了。
Jorge Paulo and his associates could not be better partners. We share with them a passion to buy, build and hold large businesses that satisfy basic needs and desires. We follow different paths, however, in pursuing this goal.
JorgePaulo和他的团队是再好不过的合伙人了。我们与他们分享并购，重构并持有这些满足人们基本需求和欲望的大型企业的激情。但是在追求同一个目标的过程中，我们走的是不同的道路。
Their method, at which they have been extraordinarily successful, is to buy companies that offer an opportunity for eliminating many unnecessary costs and then — very promptly — to make the moves that will get the job done. Their actions significantly boost productivity, the all-important factor in America’s economic growth over the past 240 years. Without more output of desired goods and services per working hour — that’s the measure of productivity gains — an economy inevitably stagnates. At much of corporate America, truly major gains in productivity are possible, a fact offering opportunities to Jorge Paulo and his associates.
他们的方法一直以来都非常的成功，通过收购那些能够减少不必要成本的公司，然后迅速地采取行动完成工作。他们的行动极大的提升了生产力，而生产力是过去240年里美国经济增长的最重要的因素。如果每小时没有产出更多的有需求的商品和服务(这是衡量生产力提升的标准)，经济不可避免地会停滞不前。在美国大部分公司里，真正重大提升生产力是可能的，这一事实给JorgePaulo和他的团队提供了机会。
At Berkshire, we, too, crave efficiency and detest bureaucracy. To achieve our goals, however, we follow an approach emphasizing avoidance of bloat, buying businesses such as PCC that have long been run by cost-conscious and efficient managers. After the purchase, our role is simply to create an environment in which these CEOs — and their eventual successors, who typically are like-minded — can maximize both their managerial effectiveness and the pleasure they derive from their jobs. (With this hands-off style, I am heeding a well-known Mungerism: “If you want to guarantee yourself a lifetime of misery, be sure to marry someone with the intent of changing their behavior.”)
在伯克希尔，我们也渴望效率并且厌恶官僚主义。为了实现我们的目标，我们采取收购像PCC这样的公司，来强调避免机构臃肿，因为这些公司长期以来一直由注重成本和高效运营的经理人管理。在收购之后，我们的角色就仅仅是创造一个环境，让那些CEO以及他们志同道合的最终继任者，能够最大限度地提高他们的管理效率和从工作的获得的乐趣。(这种不干涉风格遵循了著名的芒格主义：如果你不想让自己生活在痛苦之中，就不要带着改变别人行为方式的目的去结婚。)
We will continue to operate with extreme — indeed, almost unheard of — decentralization at Berkshire. But we will also look for opportunities to partner with Jorge Paulo, either as a financing partner, as was the case when his group purchased Tim Horton’s, or as a combined equity-and-financing partner, as at Heinz. We also may occasionally partner with others, as we have successfully done at Berkadia.
我们将继续以极端(实际上几乎闻所未闻)权力下放的方式来运营伯克希尔。但我们也会寻找与像Jorge Paulo这样的伙伴合作的机会，要么像他的集团收购了TimHorton时那样仅作为融资方，要么像亨氏一样作为股权和融资合作伙伴。我们也会偶尔和他人合作，就像我们在Berkadia成功做过的那样。
Berkshire, however, will join only with partners making friendly acquisitions. To be sure, certain hostile offers are justified: Some CEOs forget that it is shareholders for whom they should be working, while other managers are woefully inept. In either case, directors may be blind to the problem or simply reluctant to make the change required. That’s when new faces are needed. We, though, will leave these “opportunities” for others. At Berkshire, we go only where we are welcome.
然而，伯克希尔只会在合作伙伴进行友好收购的情况下才会加入。可以肯定的是，某些恶意收购是合理的：一些CEO忘记了他们在为哪些股东工作，同时一些经理人也严重的不称职。不论哪种情况，董事可能会对问题视而不见，或者只是简单地不愿做出改变。这时就需要引进新的股东了。我们会把这些”机会”留给其他人。在伯克希尔，我们只去欢迎我们的地方。
- Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments — American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 8.4% versus 7.8% at yearend 2014) and Wells Fargo (going to 9.8% from 9.4%). At the other two companies, Coca-Cola and American Express, stock repurchases raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.2% to 9.3%, and our interest in American Express increased from 14.8% to 15.6%. In case you think these seemingly small changes aren’t important, consider this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one percentage point in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by about $500 million.
伯克希尔公司去年增持了其”四大巨头”的投资：美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行。我们买入了更多[IBM|IBM]和[Wells_Fargo|富国银行]的股份。其他两家公司可口可乐和美国运通，其股票回购也提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐公司的股权从9.2%增至9.3%，在美国运通的股权从14.8%增至15.6%。倘若你觉得这些看似微小的增加并不重要，我们可以做一个算术：伯克希尔在这四家公司的权益总和每增加一个百分点，我们在其年收益中应占份额就会增加约5亿美元。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. Their returns on tangible equity range from excellent to staggering. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
这四个投资对象拥有优秀的业务，由既有才华又以股东利益为导向的经理人管理。它们带来的净有形资产回报优秀甚至惊人。在伯克希尔，我们宁愿拥有优秀公司的一大部分非控股权益，也不愿拥有平庸公司的100%。正如与其拥有整颗水钻都不如拥有希望之钻的一部分。
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2015 earnings amounted to 1.8 billion last year. But make no mistake: The nearly $3 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
如果以伯克希尔公司的年终持股计算，我们在”四大巨头”2015年收益中应占份额达到47亿美元。然而，我们向你报告的收益中，我们只包含了他们支付的股息，去年约18亿美元。但毫无疑问：我们没有报告的这些公司近30亿美元的收益对我们来说，跟报告的部分一样有价值。
The earnings our investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock — a move that increases Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. The retained earnings of these companies also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time. If gains do indeed materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and so, too, will our unrealized capital gains.
我们的投资对象保留的收益通常用于回购股票，此举增加了伯克希尔在其未来收益中所占份额，而不需要我们再投入一分钱。这些公司的留存收益也为其他商业机会提供资金，这些机会通常被证明是有利可图的。所有这些让我们预计，这四大投资对象的每股收益将随着时间的推移而大幅增长。如果这些收益确实实现了，伯克希尔的股息就会增加，我们未实现的资本收益也会增加。
Our flexibility in capital allocation — our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses — gives us a significant edge over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they will operate. Woody Allen once explained that the advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chance of finding a date on Saturday night. In like manner — well, not exactly like manner — our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash. Beyond that, having a huge portfolio of marketable securities gives us a stockpile of funds that can be tapped when an elephant-sized acquisition is offered to us.
相比那些将收购局限于自己能运作的公司，我们在资本配置上的灵活性给了我们很大的优势，也就是说，我们愿意被动地将大笔资金投资于非控制企业上。伍迪·艾伦(Woody Allen)曾说，双性恋的优势在于它让你周六晚上找到约会对象的机会增加一倍。以相似的方式(当然并不完全一样)，我们对收购经营性业务和被动投资股票的胃口，为伯克希尔源源不断的现金找到明智的投资的几率增加一倍。除此之外，拥有金额庞大的有价证券组合，当出现重大规模收购时，为我们提供了可以利用的资金储备。
It’s an election year, and candidates can’t stop speaking about our country’s problems (which, of course, only they can solve). As a result of this negative drumbeat, many Americans now believe that their children will not live as well as they themselves do.
今年是个选举年，候选人不停地谈论我们国家的各种问题(当然这些问题只有他们能解决)。这种消极宣传的结果是，很多美国人现在认为他们的孩子不能像他们生活的那么好。
That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.
这种观点大错特错：今天在美国出生的婴儿是历史上最幸运的孩子。
American GDP per capita is now about $56,000. As I mentioned last year that — in real terms — is a staggering six times the amount in 1930, the year I was born, a leap far beyond the wildest dreams of my parents or their contemporaries. U.S. citizens are not intrinsically more intelligent today, nor do they work harder than did Americans in 1930. Rather, they work far more efficiently and thereby produce far more. This all-powerful trend is certain to continue: America’s economic magic remains alive and well.
现在美国的人均GDP为56000美元。就像我去年提到的那样，按实际价值计算，这个数字是我所出生的1930年人均GDP惊人的六倍，这远远超出了我的父母和同时代人们最疯狂的梦想。今天的美国公民本质上并不比1930年的美国人更聪明，也不是比1930更努力工作。相反，他们的工作效率要高出很多，从而生产出更多的产品。这种强大的趋势肯定会延续下去：美国的经济魔力依然存在，并且运转良好。
Some commentators bemoan our current 2% per year growth in real GDP — and, yes, we would all like to see a higher rate. But let’s do some simple math using the much-lamented 2% figure. That rate, we will see, delivers astounding gains.
一些评论家哀叹我们现在每年2%的实际GDP增长。是的，我们都希望看到更高的增长率。但是让我们用过分悲观的2%这个数字做一些简单的数学计算。我们将看到，这一增长率带来了惊人的收益。
America’s population is growing about .8% per year (.5% from births minus deaths and .3% from net migration). Thus 2% of overall growth produces about 1.2% of per capita growth. That may not sound impressive. But in a single generation of, say, 25 years, that rate of growth leads to a gain of 34.4% in real GDP per capita. (Compounding’s effects produce the excess over the percentage that would result by simply multiplying 25 x 1.2%.) In turn, that 34.4% gain will produce a staggering 76,000 annually for a family of four. Today’s politicians need not shed tears for tomorrow’s children.
美国人口每年增长0.8%(出生率-死亡率为0.5%，净移民率为0.3%)。因此2%的整体增长产生大约1.2%的人均增长。这可能听起来并不令人印象深刻。但对一代人来说，比如25年，这种增长速度会带来人均实际GDP增长34.4%。(复利效应产生的超额增长率，会超过简单的通过25x1.2%计算)。反过来，那34.4%的收益将为下一代带来惊人的实际人均GDP增加19000美元。如果平均分配，一个四口之家每年可获得76000美元。今天的政客们不需要为明天的孩子们流泪。
Indeed, most of today’s children are doing well. All families in my upper middle-class neighborhood regularly enjoy a living standard better than that achieved by John D. Rockefeller Sr. at the time of my birth. His unparalleled fortune couldn’t buy what we now take for granted, whether the field is — to name just a few — transportation, entertainment, communication or medical services. Rockefeller certainly had power and fame; he could not, however, live as well as my neighbors now do.
事实上，今天的孩子大部分都过得很好。我所居住的中产阶级社区的所有家庭，都比我出生时老约翰·D·洛克菲勒的生活水平要好的多。他无与伦比的财富买不到我们现在拥有的理所当然的东西，无论是交通、娱乐、通信或医疗服务领域(仅举几例)。洛克菲勒当然有权力和名声，然而他不能活得像我的邻居现在一样好。
Though the pie to be shared by the next generation will be far larger than today’s, how it will be divided will remain fiercely contentious. Just as is now the case, there will be struggles for the increased output of goods and services between those people in their productive years and retirees, between the healthy and the infirm, between the inheritors and the Horatio Algers, between investors and workers and, in particular, between those with talents that are valued highly by the marketplace and the equally decent hard-working Americans who lack the skills the market prizes. Clashes of that sort have forever been with us — and will forever continue. Congress will be the battlefield; money and votes will be the weapons. Lobbying will remain a growth industry.
尽管下一代分享的蛋糕将比今天的大得多，它将被如何分配仍被激烈争议。就像是现在的情况一样，在工作人员和退休人员之间，健康人和病患之间，在继承人和Horatio Algers之间，在股东与员工之间，特别是那些被市场高度重视的人才和同样努力但缺乏市场所重视技能的美国人之间，会为了更多的产品和服务而斗争。这种冲突永远伴随着我们，并将永远持续下去。国会将成为战场，金钱和选票将成为武器。游说将是保持增长的产业。
The good news, however, is that even members of the “losing” sides will almost certainly enjoy — as they should — far more goods and services in the future than they have in the past. The quality of their increased bounty will also dramatically improve. Nothing rivals the market system in producing what people want — nor, even more so, in delivering what people don’t yet know they want. My parents, when young, could not envision a television set, nor did I, in my 50s, think I needed a personal computer. Both products, once people saw what they could do, quickly revolutionized their lives. I now spend ten hours a week playing bridge online. And, as I write this letter, “search” is invaluable to me. (I’m not ready for Tinder, however.)
然而，好消息是，即使是”落败”那一方的成员，在未来也几乎肯定可以享受到(他们应该享受到)，比过去多得多的商品和服务。他们增加的奖金的质量也会显著提高。在生产人们想要的商品上，没有什么能与市场体系相媲美，在提供人们还不知道自己需要的商品上更是如此。我的父母年轻的时候，无法想象会有电视机，我在我50多岁的时候，也不曾认为我需要一台个人电脑。这两种产品，当人们看见他们能做什么之后，迅速彻底改变了他们的生活。我现在每周花十个小时在网上打桥牌。而且，在我写这封信时，“搜索”功能对于我来说是十分宝贵的。不过我还没准备好使用Tinder(一款交友软件)。
For 240 years it’s been a terrible mistake to bet against America, and now is no time to start. America’s golden goose of commerce and innovation will continue to lay more and larger eggs. America’s social security promises will be honored and perhaps made more generous. And, yes, America’s kids will live far better than their parents did.
240年来，和美国打赌一直是一个可怕的错误，而且现在仍然不是开始的时候。美国的商业和创新的金鹅将继续下更多和更大的蛋。美国对社会保障的承诺将兑现，也许会更慷慨。而且，是的，美国的孩子们的生活将远比他们的父辈要好。
Considering this favorable tailwind, Berkshire (and, to be sure, a great many other businesses) will almost certainly prosper. The managers who succeed Charlie and me will build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by following our simple blueprint of: (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. Management will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
考虑到这种有利的趋势，[Berkshire_Hathaway|伯克希尔]几乎肯定会蓬勃发展。接替查理和我的经理们将按照我们简单的蓝图，构建伯克希尔的每股内在价值：(1)不断提高我们众多子公司的基本盈利能力；(2)通过补强型收购进一步增加他们的收益；(3)受益于我们投资对象的增长；(4)当伯克希尔股价大幅低于内在价值时回购股票；(5)偶尔进行大规模收购。我们还将努力通过发行很少(如果有可能的话)的伯克希尔股份让你的成果最大化。
Intrinsic Business Value 企业内在价值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). It is possible, however, to make a sensible estimate. In our 2010 annual report we laid out the three elements — one of them qualitative — that we believe are the keys to an estimation of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 113-114.
尽管查理和我经常谈论企业内在价值，我们还是无法确切地告诉你们伯克希尔股票的这个数字是多少(事实上任何其他股票都是如此)。但是我们可以做出一个合理的估计。我们在2010年的年度报告中列出了三个要素(其中一个是定性的)，我们认为这三个因素是评估伯克希尔内在价值的关键。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2015 our per-share cash and investments increased 8.3% to 12,304 per share. We exclude in the second factor the dividends and interest from the investments we hold because including them would produce a double-counting of value. In arriving at our earnings figure, we deduct all corporate overhead, interest, depreciation, amortization and minority interests. Income taxes, though, are not deducted. That is, the earnings are pre-tax.
以下是两个定量因素最新情况：2015年我们的每股现金和投资增长了8.3%，达到159794美元(卡夫亨氏股份按市值计算)，而且来自我们众多业务的经营性收益(包括保险承保收益)增长了2.1%，达到每股12304美元。在第二个因素中，我们的每股投资剔除股息和利息收益，因为会产生价值的双重计算。我们在计算每股经营性收益时，扣除了所有公司的管理费用、利息费用、折旧费用、摊销费用和少数股东权益，但没有扣除所得税。也就是说，我们计算的是税前收益。
I used the italics in the paragraph above because we are for the first time including insurance underwriting income in business earnings. We did not do that when we initially introduced Berkshire’s two quantitative pillars of valuation because our insurance results were then heavily influenced by catastrophe coverages. If the wind didn’t blow and the earth didn’t shake, we made large profits. But a mega-catastrophe would produce red ink. In order to be conservative then in stating our business earnings, we consistently assumed that underwriting would break even over time and ignored any of its gains or losses in our annual calculation of the second factor of value.
我在上面的段落中”保险承保收益”使用斜体，是因为我们首次将保险承保收益纳入经营性收益。当我们最初引入伯克希尔两个支柱性定量因素的估值时，之所以没有计算在内，是因为当时我们保险承保业务的结果受到巨灾保险的严重影响。如果没有飓风和地震，我们会获得丰厚的承保收益。但是一场大灾难就会产生巨额亏损。在阐述我们的经营性收益时，为了保守起见，我们一直假定长期来看保险承保业务会盈亏平衡，因此在第二个价值因素的年度计算中，忽略了所有的保险承保损益。
Today, our insurance results are likely to be more stable than was the case a decade or two ago because we have deemphasized catastrophe coverages and greatly expanded our bread-and-butter lines of business. Last year, our underwriting income contributed 12,304 per share of earnings referenced in the second paragraph of this section. Over the past decade, annual underwriting income has averaged $1,434 per share, and we anticipate being profitable in most years. You should recognize, however, that underwriting in any given year could well be unprofitable, perhaps substantially so.
今天相比于十几二十年前，我们的保险业务很可能更加稳定，因为我们已经不在强调巨灾保险，并极大地拓展了我们的基础业务范围。去年，保险承保收益为上文提到的每股12304美元的收益贡献了1118美元。在过去的十年中，保险承保收益年均达到每股1434美元，而且我们预计，未来大部分年份都会赢利。但是你应该认识到，保险承保业务在任何一年都有可能大亏或是大赚。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 18.9% compounded annually, and our earnings ( including the underwriting results in both the initial and terminal year) have grown at a 23.7% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 45 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main goal is to build operating earnings.
自1970年以来，我们的每股投资以18.9%的年复合增长率增长，我们的收益(包括在第一年和最后一年的保险承保收益在内)的年复合增长率达到23.7%。在接下来的45年里，伯克希尔的股票价格的增长速度，与我们两种价值衡量标准值的增速非常相似，这并不是巧合。查理和我都希望看到这两个领域的收益都有所增长，但是我们的主要目标是增加经营性收益。
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring economic advantages to having them all under one roof). Our intent is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (Don’t get excited; this is not a switch we are considering.)
现在，让我们来看看我们运营的四个主要业务板块。它们彼此之间的资产负债表和收入特征都存在巨大差异。因此我们将它们作为四个独立业务分别呈现，这也是查理和我看待它们的方式。(虽然它们共处伯克希尔一个屋檐下拥有极其重要和持久的经济优势。) 我们的目标是假设我们角色互换，你是作报告的管理层而我们是缺席的股东，提供给我们想要知道的信息。
Insurance 保险业务
Let’s look first at insurance. The property-casualty (“P/C”) branch of that industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property-casualty company in the world, as measured by net worth. Moreover, its intrinsic value is far in excess of the value at which it is carried on our books.
我们先来看看保险业务，自从我们在1967年以860万美元的价格，收购了国民保险和它的姊妹公司国民火灾与海事保险公司以来，这个行业的财产意外险(P/C)业务一直是推动我们扩张的引擎。今天，从净资产衡量，国民保险是世界上最大的财产意外险公司。不仅如此，它的内在价值远超我们的账面价值。
One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
我们被财产意外险业务吸引的一个原因是它独特的经济特征：保险公司提前收取保费，然后支付索赔金。在极端的例子中，比如某些工伤赔偿金，支付期限甚至可以长达数十年。这种”先收后付”的模式让产险公司拥有大量现金，我们称之为浮存金，这些资金最终都会支付给投保人手中。但同时，保险公司可以用这些浮存金来为自己谋利益。虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模和保费收入维持一个相对稳定的关系。所以，随着我们业务扩张，我们的浮存金规模也在增长。浮存金是如何增长的如下表所示：
| Year | Float (in millions) |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
| 2015 | 87,722 |
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and several of our specialized operations are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual — at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. This structure is by design and is a key component in the strength of Berkshire’s economic fortress. It will never be compromised.
浮存金进一步的增长将难以实现。从好的方面来看，GEICO和我们专业保险业务几乎肯定都会保持良好的速度增长。国民保险再保险业务是一些浮存金快速下滑的非流动合同的缔约方。但即便我们的浮存金下滑，其速率也会十分平缓，每年整体下滑不会超3%。保险业务的特性决定了，我们拥有的现金资源肯定可以满足任何即时或短期的偿付需求。这个结构是经过特殊设计的，是伯克希尔经济堡垒的关键组成部分。它永远不会被放弃。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过了我们运营费用和最终损失的总和，那么我们将会实现承保盈利，而这些将会增加我们的浮存金产生的投资收益。当获得这样的利润，我们就可以享受免费使用资金，而且更好的是，我们因为持有这笔资金还获得了额外的收益。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates the world is now dealing with also virtually guarantees that earnings on float will steadily decrease for many years to come, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of insurers. It’s a good bet that industry results over the next ten years will fall short of those recorded in the past decade, particularly for those companies that specialize in reinsurance.
不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果。这导致了激烈竞争。激烈的竞争常常让整个财产保险行业遭受巨额承保损失。这个损失实际上就是保险行业为持有浮存金而支付的成本。尽管保险公司享受着浮存金带来的好处，但和美国其他行业的公司相比，竞争动态几乎会确保保险公司，将保持净有形资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。目前美国面临的长期低利率实际上也保证了浮存金未来获得的投资收益将减少，从而加剧了保险行业的利润下滑问题。保险行业未来十年的经营业绩，很有可能低于过去十年的记录，尤其对于那些专门从事再保险业务的公司来说。
As noted early in this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 13 consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $26.2 billion. That’s no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.
正如报告此前提及的一样，伯克希尔现在已连续13年实现承保盈利。这一期间我们税前收益合计262亿美元。并非偶然，严格的风险评估是我们所有保险经理们的日常关注焦点，他们知道虽然浮存金是有价值的，但其好处可能被糟糕承保结果淹没。虽然所有的保险公司都会在口头上传达这点观点，但在伯克希尔这是一种信仰。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability , just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect. It should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses — a huge $24.5 billion to more than six million claimants in 2015 — and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business that will soon generate its own claims, adding to float.
那么浮存金将如何影响我们的内在价值？当我们计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金的总额被作为负债减掉，就好像我们明天就要将其全部支付而无法补充一样。但将浮存金严格视作负债是错误的。它应该被视为一个循环基金。我们每天都要支付过去的索赔和相关费用，2015年就向600万索赔人支付了245亿美元的巨额费用，这减少了我们的浮存金。但同样肯定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，收取的保费又增加了浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing 1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities, however, are treated as equals under GAAP.
如果我们的循环浮存金没有成本且可以长期保持规模(我相信会是这样)，那么这种负债的真正价值会显著低于会计上的账面负债。因为新的业务会替代旧的索赔，因此欠下的每1美元永远都不会从公司消失，这跟持有明天就将付出而无法收回的1美元截然不同。然而根据GAAP准则这两种类型的负债被认为是完全相同的。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
我们在收购保险公司时产生了155亿美元的”商誉”资产，这增加了账面价值，并部分抵消了这一被夸大的浮存金负债。很大程度上这种商誉体现了我们为保险业务获得浮存金能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的收购成本与真实价值无关。举例来说，如果一家保险公司蒙受了长期大额的承保损失，那么无论其原始取得成本如何，账面上的任何商誉资产都应被视作是毫无价值的。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill — what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it — to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Indeed, almost the entire $15.5 billion we carry for goodwill in our insurance business was already on our books in 2000. Yet we subsequently tripled our float. Its value today is one reason — a huge reason — why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔并不是这样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司商誉真正的经济价值远超其历史账面价值。如果我们收购拥有类似商誉的保险公司，我们很乐意为类似质量的浮存金支付费用。事实上，2000年我们在保险业务中为商誉支付的155亿美元几乎全部计入账面价值，然而，我们之后保险业务的浮存金规模扩大了三倍，它的价值就是我们认为伯克希尔内在商业价值远高于其账面价值的一个巨大的原因。
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
首先，浮存金规模最高的是由阿吉特·贾因管理的伯克希尔再保险集团。阿吉特对别人不敢兴趣或没有资本承保的风险提供保险。他的运营结合了能力、速度和果断。更重要的是，他的思维方式在保险界独一无二。然而，他从来没有将伯克希尔暴露在与我们资源不相称的风险之中。
Indeed, Berkshire is far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe — a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced — Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities to write business in an insurance market that might well be in disarray. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be swimming in red ink, if not facing insolvency.
事实上，伯克希尔在规避风险方面远比其他大多数大型保险公司要保守。举例来说，如果保险业因某种特大灾难而遭受2500亿美元的损失，这一损失大约为保险行业经历过最大损失的3倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，由于其众多的收益来源，依然将实现可观的利润。我们也将保持现金充沛，并将在一个已经陷入动荡的保险市场中寻找大量的承保机会。而其他的主要保险或再保险公司即使不面临破产，也会出现严重亏损。
When Ajit entered Berkshire’s office on a Saturday in 1986, he did not have a day’s experience in the insurance business. Nevertheless, Mike Goldberg, then our manager of insurance, handed him the keys to our reinsurance business. With that move, Mike achieved sainthood: Since then, Ajit has created tens of billions of value for Berkshire shareholders.
1986年的那个周六，阿吉特走进了伯克希尔的办公室，那时的他甚至没有一点保险业方面的经验。尽管如此，时任我们保险公司的经理人MikeGoldberg还是让他管理再保险业务。在这种鼓励和推动下，阿吉特在保险界崭露头角，并且很快大放异彩，为伯克希尔的股东创造了数百亿美元的价值。
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
本质上，一个稳健的保险公司需要遵守四大承保纪律，它必须：(1)理解所有可能导致保单发生损失的风险；(2)谨慎的评估风险发生的可能性及其可能造成的损失；(3)设定合理的保费。平均而言，保费在满足可能发生的损失及运营费用的总和后，将带来利润；(4)如果在无法获得合适保费的情况下愿意放手。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司都能遵守前三条规则，却忽视了第四条。他们根本无法放弃竞争对手正在积极争取的业务。老话说：“别人都这么做，我们也必须这么做”，这在许多行业都会招致麻烦，但保险行业尤为突出。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad遵守了这四条戒律，而这体现在了他的业绩表现上。在他管理下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金表现一直好于零成本，我们预计这种情况仍将保持。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其满意。自我们1998年收购该公司以来，该业务就一直稳定增长且保持盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators — and me as well, briefly — to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 65 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 54 years of service in 2015. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony. In the 40 years that I’ve known him, his every action has made great sense.
最后还有GEICO保险，65年前，我就是在这家保险公司学到了保险业务的第一课。GEICO由Tony Nicely运营管理，他18岁就加入公司，到2015年已为公司服务54年。Tony在1993年成为公司CEO，之后公司一直表现亮眼。没有比Tony更好的经理了。在我认识他的40年里，他的每一项管理措施都很到位。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed.
1951年1月，我第一次听说GEICO的时候，我被该公司相对于其他保险巨头巨大的成本优势震惊了。当时我就明白，GEICO将获得成功，因为它理应成功。
No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them — and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading — right now! — and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
没人喜欢买车险，但几乎所有人都爱开车。因为对大多数家庭来说购买车险是一笔重大支出，而节约对家庭来说很重要，所以只有低成本的保险公司才能提供这些。事实上，至少40%阅读这封信的人可通过在GEICO投保省钱。所以暂停阅读，登录GEICO.Com或拨打800-368-2734咨询一下看看。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2015 with 11.4% of the market compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat — an enduring one — that competitors are unable to cross.
GEICO的成本优势是该公司能够年复一年持续扩大市场份额的主要原因，(1995年伯克希尔刚收购GEICO的时候，它的市场份额是2.5%，而2015年我们的市场份额达到11.4%)。GEICO的低成本创造了一条竞争对手无法逾越的护城河。
All the while, our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. I love hearing the little guy deliver his message: “15 minutes could save you 15% or more on car insurance.” (Of course, there’s always a grouch in the crowd. One of my friends says he is glad that only a few animals can talk, since the ones that do speak seem unable to discuss any subject but insurance.)
一直以来，我们的吉祥物”Gecko”不知疲倦地告诉美国人GEICO如何为他们省钱。我喜欢听这个小家伙所传达的信息：15分钟可以为你节省15%或更多的汽车保费。当然，人群中总会有一些抱怨，我的一个朋友说，他很高兴只有少数动物会说话，因为这些会说话的动物，似乎除了保险之外不能讨论任何话题。
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies that primarily write commercial coverages. In aggregate, these companies are a large, growing and valuable operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit, usually much better than that reported by their competitors. Indeed, over the past 13 years, this group has earned 943 million to $9.9 billion.
我们除了拥有的三大保险公司，我们还有其他一些规模较小的公司，它们主要承保商业保险。整体而言，这些公司是一个规模庞大、不断增长且价值不菲的业务。它们始终保持承保盈利，并且通常比同行报告的利润好得多。在过去13年中，该集团从承保业务赚得了40亿美元收益(约占其保费收入的13%)，同时浮存金从9.43亿美元增长到99亿美元。
Less than three years ago, we formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”), which we include in this group. Our first decision was to put Peter Eastwood in charge. That move was a home run: BHSI has already developed $1 billion of annual premium volume and, under Peter’s direction, is destined to become one of the world’s leading P/C insurers.
不到三年前，我们成立了伯克希尔特种保险公司(BHSI)，我们也将其纳入该集团。我们第一个决定就是让Peter Eastwood去管理这个公司。这是一个全垒打的举措：伯克希尔特种保险公司的年度保费数量已经达到10亿美元，而且在Peter的领导下，它有望成为世界领先的产险保险公司之一。
Here’s a recap of underwriting earnings and float by division:
以下按业务部门划分的承保业绩和浮存金规模摘要：
| Insurance Operations | 2015 Underwriting Profit (in millions) | 2014 Underwriting Profit (in millions) | 2015 Yearend Float (in millions) | 2014 Yearend Float (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance | $ 421 | $ 606 | $ 44,108 | $ 42,454 |
| General Re | 132 | 277 | 18,560 | 19,280 |
| GEICO | 460 | 1,159 | 15,148 | 13,569 |
| Other Primary | 824 | 626 | 9,906 | 8,618 |
| $ 1,837 | $ 2,668 | $ 87,722 | $ 83,921 |
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses 受监管的资本密集型业务
We have two major operations, BNSF and BHE, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement. Together, they last year accounted for 37% of Berkshire’s after-tax operating earnings.
我们这一板块主要有两个业务，BNSF铁路和BHE能源，拥有与我们其他业务不同的重要特征。所以，我们把他们的各项财务数据从我们GAAP的负债表和收益表中分离出来，在这封信中为它们分配了独立板块单独来谈。去年，它们合计占伯克希尔税后收益的37%。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions would far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, in a disappointing year for railroads, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是，对非常长期的、受监管的资产进行了巨额投资。这些资产部分资金来自伯克希尔不提供担保的大额长期债务。事实上这些资产并不需要我们的信贷支持，因为每家公司都有盈利能力，即使在经济状况恶化时，也远超其利息支付需求。比如，去年在铁路行业令人失望的一年里，BNSF的利息覆盖倍数超过了8:1(我们对利息覆盖倍数的定义是息税前利润/利息，而不是息税折旧摊销前利润/利息，尽管后者被普遍使用，但我们觉得存在严重缺陷)。
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great and ever-widening diversity of earnings streams, which shield BHE from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. These many sources of profit, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, have allowed BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
与此同时，有两个因素保证BHE能源能在任何情况下都有能力偿付债务。第一个是所有公用事业的共同点：抗衰退收益，这来自于这些公司提供独家服务的结果。第二个只有少数几个公用事业公司享有，即多元化的收益来源，使BHE免受任何单一监管机构的伤害。这些多元化的收益来源，加上强大母公司的固有优势，让BHE及其公用事业子公司能够大幅度降低债务成本。这种模式对我们和我们的客户都有利。
All told, BHE and BNSF invested $11.6 billion in plant and equipment last year, a massive commitment to key components of America’s infrastructure. We relish making such investments as long as they promise reasonable returns — and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
整体来说，BHE能源和BNSF铁路去年在工厂和设备方面投资了116亿美元，这是对美国的基础设施关键组成部分做出的重大贡献。只要它们能够承诺合理的回报，我们很愿意进行此类投资。不过前提就是，我们对未来的监管有绝对的信心。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need huge investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的这种自信心，不仅来自于我们过去的经验，还有我们对社会清晰的认识，即社会永远需要在交通和能源方面进行大规模投资。以确保资金持续流向重大项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合各地政府的自身利益。同时以获得监管机构及其所代表的民众信任的方式开展业务，也符合我们自身利益。
Low prices are a powerful way to keep these constituencies happy. In Iowa, BHE’s average retail rate is 6.8¢ per KWH. Alliant, the other major electric utility in the state, averages 9.5¢. Here are the comparable industry figures for adjacent states: Nebraska 9.0¢, Missouri 9.3¢, Illinois 9.3¢, Minnesota 9.7¢. The national average is 10.4¢. Our rock-bottom prices add up to real money for paycheck-strapped customers.
低廉的价格是让这些支持者们满意的有力方式。在爱荷华州，BHE能源的平均零售价是6.8美分/千瓦时，该州的另一家主要电力公司Alliant的均价是9.3美分。这里有一些来自附近州的行业可比数据：内布拉斯加州9美分、密苏尔州9.3美分、伊利诺斯州9.7美分、明尼苏达州9.7美分。全美的平均价格大概是10.4美分。我们最低的价格为那些工薪阶层的客户节省了真金白银。
At BNSF, price comparisons between major railroads are far more difficult to make because of significant differences in both their mix of cargo and the average distance it is carried. To supply a very crude measure, however, our revenue per ton-mile was just under 3¢ last year, while shipping costs for customers of the other four major U.S.-based railroads were at least 40% higher, ranging from 4.2¢ to 5.3¢.
对于BNSF铁路而言，主要的铁路公司之间价格比较则要困难得多，因为他们在货物组合和平均运输里程上都存在着巨大的差异。然而，为了提供一个粗略的衡量标准，去年我们收费略低于3美分/吨英里，然而其他四大铁路公司的客户平均运输成本至少高出40%，从4.2美分到5.3美分不等。
Both BHE and BNSF have been leaders in pursuing planet-friendly technology. In wind generation, no state comes close to Iowa, where last year megawatt-hours we generated from wind equaled 47% of all megawatt-hours sold to our retail customers. (Additional wind projects to which we are committed will take that figure to 58% in 2017.)
BHE能源和BNSF铁路已经成为美国能源友好型产业的领头羊。在风力发电方面，没有一个州能够超过爱荷华州，去年我们在那里生产的风电兆瓦数相当销售给零售客户所有兆瓦数的47%。(我们新增的风电项目将会让这个比例在2017年达到58%)。
BNSF, like other Class I railroads, uses only a single gallon of diesel fuel to move a ton of freight almost 500 miles. That makes the railroads four times as fuel-efficient as trucks! Furthermore, railroads alleviate highway congestion — and the taxpayer-funded maintenance expenditures that come with heavier traffic — in a major way.
Here are the key figures for BHE and BNSF:
| Berkshire Hathaway Energy (89.9% owned) | 2015 Earnings (in millions) | 2014 Earnings (in millions) | 2013 Earnings (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 460 | $ 527 | $ 362 |
| Iowa utility | 314 | 298 | 230 |
| Nevada utilities | 586 | 549 | (58) |
| PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah) | 1,026 | 1,010 | 982 |
| Gas pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River) | 401 | 379 | 385 |
| Canadian transmission utility | 170 | 16 | — |
| Renewable projects | 175 | 194 | 50 |
| HomeServices | 191 | 139 | 139 |
| Other (net) | 27 | 26 | 12 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 3,350 | 3,138 | 2,102 |
| Interest | 499 | 427 | 296 |
| Income taxes | 481 | 616 | 170 |
| Net earnings | $ 2,370 | $ 2,095 | $ 1,636 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire | $ 2,132 | $ 1,882 | $ 1,470 |
| BNSF | 2015 Earnings (in millions) | 2014 Earnings (in millions) | 2013 Earnings (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 21,967 | $ 23,239 | $ 22,014 |
| Operating expenses | 14,264 | 16,237 | 15,357 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 7,703 | 7,002 | 6,657 |
| Interest (net) | 928 | 833 | 729 |
| Income taxes | 2,527 | 2,300 | 2,135 |
| Net earnings | $ 4,248 | $ 3,869 | $ 3,793 |
I currently expect increased after-tax earnings at BHE in 2016, but lower earnings at BNSF.
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这一板块的业务包罗万象。不过让我们先来看一看整个业务板块的资产负债表和利润表。
Balance Sheet 12/31/15 (in millions)
| Assets | Amount | Liabilities and Equity | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 6,807 | Notes payable | $ 2,135 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 8,886 | Other current liabilities | 10,565 |
| Inventory | 11,916 | Total current liabilities | 12,700 |
| Other current assets | 970 | ||
| Total current assets | 28,579 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 30,289 | Deferred taxes | 3,649 |
| Fixed assets | 15,161 | Term debt and other liabilities | 4,767 |
| Other assets | 4,445 | Non-controlling interests | 521 |
| Berkshire equity | 56,837 | ||
| $ 78,474 | $ 78,474 |
Earnings Statement (in millions)
| (in millions) | 2015 | 2014 | 2013* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 107,825 | $ 97,689 | $ 93,472 |
| Operating expenses | 100,607 | 90,788 | 87,208 |
| Interest expense | 103 | 109 | 104 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 7,115 | 6,792 | 6,160 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2,432 | 2,324 | 2,283 |
| Net earnings | $ 4,683 | $ 4,468 | $ 3,877 |
* Earnings for 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in the Finance and Financial Products results.
* 2013 年的盈利已重报，不包括 Marmon 的租赁业务，该业务现已纳入金融和金融产品的业绩中。
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 38. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP because they exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我们符合GAAP会计原则的收支数据参见完整报告。相比之下，上表中的运营费用是非GAAP会计原则计算的，因为它们不包括一些购买法会计调整项目(主要是一些无形资产的摊销)。我们这样做是因为查理和我认为，经过调整后的数字比GAAP数字更能精确反映表中业务的实际收支情况。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments — some are tiny and arcane — but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete in value over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Conversely, the concept of recording charges against other intangibles, such as customer relationships, arises from purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect economic reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated — even though, from an investor’s viewpoint, they could not differ more.
我不会解释所有的调整，其中一些调整微小且不易解释，但认真的投资者应理解无形资产的不同性质。有些无形资产的价值会随着时间推移而损耗殆尽，而有些完全不会受损。例如软件的摊销费用就是非常真实的费用。相反，其它无形资产(如客户关系)是不应被”摊销”的。如果通过购买法会计计算显然不能反映真实情况。GAAP会计准则认为这两种费用没有区别，也就是说，在计算收益的时候，两者都被列为费用，尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们的差异再大不过了。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 38, amortization charges of $1.1 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once non-existent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges are likely to climb further as we acquire more companies.
在符合GAAP的完整报告中，有11亿美元的摊销费用已作为费用扣除。我们认为其中只有20%是”真实”的，其余的则不是。由于我们进行了多次收购，伯克希尔曾经不存在的”非真实”费用变得非常重要，随着我们继续收购更多的公司，“非真实”摊销费用几乎肯定会进一步上升。
The table on page 55 gives you the current status of our intangible assets as calculated by GAAP. We now have 4.1 billion will be expensed over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of these “assets” will be charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat. (My gift to my successor.)
在完整报告中列示了根据GAAP计算的无形资产的现状。我们目前还有68亿美元无形资产有待摊销，其中41亿美元将在未来五年摊销完毕。当然，最终每一美元非真实成本将全部被扣除。到那时，即使真实的收益持平，报告收益也会增加。(这是我给继任者的一份礼物。)
I suggest that you ignore a portion of GAAP amortization costs. But it is with some trepidation that I do that, knowing that it has become common for managers to tell their owners to ignore certain expense items that are all too real. “Stock-based compensation” is the most egregious example. The very name says it all: “compensation.” If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? And, if real and recurring expenses don’t belong in the calculation of earnings, where in the world do they belong?
我建议你最好忽略一部分GAAP会计原则计算的摊销费用。但这么做会让我有些担心，因为我知道管理层告诉股东忽略一些真实费用几乎已成常态。其中”股票补偿”是最令人震惊的例子。这个费用项目名称中有”补偿”两个字，如果补偿不算费用的话，那是什么？如果收入计算不包括真实费用和经常性费用，那它们应该包含在哪里？
Wall Street analysts often play their part in this charade, too, parroting the phony, compensation-ignoring “earnings” figures fed them by managements. Maybe the offending analysts don’t know any better. Or maybe they fear losing “access” to management. Or maybe they are cynical, telling themselves that since everyone else is playing the game, why shouldn’t they go along with it. Whatever their reasoning, these analysts are guilty of propagating misleading numbers that can deceive investors.
华尔街分析师也经常在这场闹剧中扮演重要角色，用这些管理层提供的虚假的、忽视”补偿”的收益数据做分析。也许是这些分析师不专业，或者他们怕与管理层关系搞坏，或者他们就是玩世不恭，认为其他人都这么做，为什么自己不顺应潮流呢。不管他们理由是什么，这些分析师传递误导性信息欺骗投资者是有罪的。
Depreciation charges are a more complicated subject but are almost always true costs. Certainly they are at Berkshire. I wish we could keep our businesses competitive while spending less than our depreciation charge, but in 51 years I’ve yet to figure out how to do so. Indeed, the depreciation charge we record in our railroad business falls far short of the capital outlays needed to merely keep the railroad running properly, a mismatch that leads to GAAP earnings that are higher than true economic earnings. (This overstatement of earnings exists at all railroads.) When CEOs or investment bankers tout pre-depreciation figures such as EBITDA as a valuation guide, watch their noses lengthen while they speak.
折旧费用是一个更复杂的问题，但几乎总是真实的费用。毫无疑问伯克希尔也有折旧费用。我希望我们能在保持业务竞争力的同时尽可能减少折旧支出，但51年来我还没弄清如何做到这一点。事实上，我们铁路业务的折旧支出远远低于维持铁路业务正常运转所需资本支出，这也导致了GAAP的收益高于真实收益。整个铁路行业都存在这种夸大收益的情况。当CEO和投资银行家吹捧息税折旧摊销前的收益(EBITDA)，作为估值基础时，那么他十有八九就在故意忽悠你。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report. You should also subtract something to reflect BNSF’s inadequate depreciation charge.
当然了，我们公布的报告收益将继续遵循GAAP会计准则。然而为了解真实信息，你一定要记得把我们报告中的大部分摊销费用加回来，然后还要再减去一些，以反映BNSF铁路少计的折旧费用。
Let’s get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, which sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%.
让我们回到我们的制造、服务和零售业务，这些业务销售从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机等各种产品。以未加杠杆的净有形资产计算，其中一些业务经济效益极佳，实现的税后回报率高达25%甚至超过100%。其他业务的回报率在12-20%之间。
A few, however — these are serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation — have very poor returns. In most of these cases, I was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates, and we are now paying the price for my misjudgments. At other times, I stumbled in evaluating either the fidelity or the ability of incumbent managers or ones I later appointed. I will commit more errors; you can count on that. If we luck out, they will occur at our smaller operations.
不过，有少数几家公司的回报率非常低，这是我在资本配置时犯的严重错误。在多数情况下，我对公司或其所在行业的经济动态的评估是错误的。我们正在为我的误判付出代价。有时候，我在评估现任或继任经理人的忠诚度和能力方面犯了错误。可以肯定的是，我将来还会犯更多错误，如果我们幸运的话，这种情况将发生在我们较小的业务中。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25.6 billion of net tangible assets during 2015 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using only token amounts of leverage, earned 18.4% after-tax on that capital.
整体来看，这一集团的公司是一家优秀企业。尽管它们持有大量超额现金，只使用了象征性的债务杠杆，它们2015年平均使用了256亿美元净有形资产，但其税后回报率高达18.4%。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought at too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill and other intangibles. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Earnings from the group should grow substantially in 2016 as Duracell and Precision Castparts enter the fold.
当然，如果是以过高的价格买入经济效益极佳的企业，它也可能是笔糟糕投资。我们已经为大多数业务所拥有的净有形资产支付了大量的溢价，其成本反映在我们报告的庞大的商誉和其它无形资产数字上。但总的来说，我们这样部署资本的方式为我们带来了可观的资本回报。等到随着金霸王(Duracell)和Precision Castparts的加入，该业务板块的收益将在2016年大幅增长。
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors — both current and potential — read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can nevertheless find a good bit of detail about many of our operations on pages 88-91.
这个业务集团有太多的公司，我们无法一一单独评论，而且它们(现有和潜在)的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们一些业务上，如果其他人知道某些数字，我们可能处于不利地位。因此那些对伯克希尔的价值没有实质性影响的业务，我们只披露需要披露的内容。你可以在完整报告中找到我们业务运营的大量细节。
Finance and Financial Products 金融和金融产品业务
Our three leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture), XTRA (semi-trailers), and Marmon (primarily tank cars but also freight cars, intermodal tank containers and cranes). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. At each of the three, we have invested more money in new equipment than have many of our competitors, and that’s paid off. Dealing from strength is one of Berkshire’s enduring advantages.
我们的三项租赁业务是由CORT(家具)、XTRA(半挂拖车)和Marmon(主要是油罐车租赁、还包括冷藏货车、联运式油罐集装箱车和起重机)三家公司构成。这三家公司都是行业领导者，随着美国经济的走强，它们的收益都取得了大幅增长。我们在这三家公司设备上的投资超过了任何一个竞争对手，而这正带来回报。发挥自身长处是伯克希尔经久不衰的优势之一。
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the second-largest home builder in America. Last year, the company sold 34,397 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. In contrast, the company was number three in the field, with a 14% share, when Berkshire purchased it in 2003.
Kevin Clayton再次带领全美第二大建筑商Clayton Homes取得了行业领先的业绩。去年，Clayton售出了34397套住宅，约占美国预制房销售总数的45%。当我们在2003年收购Clayton时，它在该领域排名第三，其市场份额仅为14%。
Manufactured homes allow the American dream of home ownership to be achieved by lower-income citizens: Around 70% of new homes costing $150,000 or less come from our industry. About 46% of Clayton’s homes are sold through the 331 stores we ourselves own and operate. Most of Clayton’s remaining sales are made to 1,395 independent retailers.
预制房屋让美国低收入群体实现了拥有住房的美国梦，造价在15万美元或以下的住房大约70%来自预制房行业。Clayton大约46%的房屋是通过我们331家自营门店销售出去的，其它大部分销量是通过1395家独立零售商卖掉的。
Key to Clayton’s operation is its $12.8 billion mortgage portfolio. We originate about 35% of all mortgages on manufactured homes. About 37% of our mortgage portfolio emanates from our retail operation, with the balance primarily originated by independent retailers, some of which sell our homes while others market only the homes of our competitors.
Clayton运营的关键是其拥有的128亿美元的抵押贷款组合。我们在预制房屋抵押贷款中约占35%份额，我们约37%的抵押贷款组合来自于我们的零售业务，其余主要来自于独立零售商，其中有些零售商售卖我们的房屋，而有一些只卖我们竞争对手的房屋。
Lenders other than Clayton have come and gone. With Berkshire’s backing, however, Clayton steadfastly financed home buyers throughout the panic days of 2008-2009. Indeed, during that period, Clayton used precious capital to finance dealers who did not sell our homes. The funds we supplied to Goldman Sachs and General Electric at that time produced headlines; the funds Berkshire quietly delivered to Clayton both made home ownership possible for thousands of families and kept many non-Clayton dealers alive.
来来去去的出借人中，只有Clayton是最持久的。在伯克希尔的支持下，Clayton在2008-2009年金融危机恐慌期间坚定不移的为房屋购买者提供抵押贷款。在那段期间，Clayton还用其宝贵的资金为那些不销售Clayton房屋的经销商提供资金支持。当时我们向高盛和通用电气提供资金支持成为头条新闻；伯克希尔默默向Clayton提供资金既让成千上万个家庭拥有自己的房子，也让许多非Clayton经销商活了下来。
Our retail outlets, employing simple language and large type, consistently inform home buyers of alternative sources for financing — most of it coming from local banks — and always secure acknowledgments from customers that this information has been received and read. (The form we use is reproduced in its actual size on page 119.)
我们在Clayton房屋零售门店都采用了较大字体和简单明了的宣传语，不断提醒消费者可以选择多种融资渠道，其中大部分来自当地银行，并始终确保客户确认已经收到和阅读了这些资料。
Mortgage-origination practices are of great importance to both the borrower and to society. There is no question that reckless practices in home lending played a major role in bringing on the financial panic of 2008, which in turn led to the Great Recession. In the years preceding the meltdown, a destructive and often corrupt pattern of mortgage creation flourished whereby (1) an originator in, say, California would make loans and (2) promptly sell them to an investment or commercial bank in, say, New York, which would package many mortgages to serve as collateral for a dizzyingly complicated array of mortgage-backed securities to be (3) sold to unwitting institutions around the world.
抵押贷款发放实践对于借方和整个社会都有极大好处。毫无疑问，导致2008年金融危机进而引发经济衰退的元凶之一，就是不顾后果的住房贷款滥放行为。金融危机之前几年里，一种破坏性的腐败的抵押贷款模式蓬勃发展：(1)在加州的一家金融机构发放了许多抵押贷款；(2)然后这家机构迅速将这些贷款卖给在纽约的投资银行或商业银行，这些银行将许多抵押贷款打包，作为抵押贷款证券的抵押物；(3)随后又把这些抵押贷款支持证券卖给世界各地不知情的机构或个人。
As if these sins weren’t sufficient to create an unholy mess, imaginative investment bankers sometimes concocted a second layer of sliced-up financing whose value depended on the junkier portions of primary offerings. (When Wall Street gets “innovative,” watch out!) While that was going on, I described this “doubling-up” practice as requiring an investor to read tens of thousands of pages of mind-numbing prose to evaluate a single security being offered.
就好像这些恶行还不足以引发邪恶的混乱一样，一些富有想象力的投资银行，有时还在此基础上炮制出第二层融资产品，而这些金融产品的价值主要依赖于那些初次发行债券的劣后级。(当华尔街变得富有创新精神时，你一定要当心)。在这种情况下，我将这种双层结构的做法描述为，就像要求投资者读几万页令人麻木无聊的散文，然后来评估要买的这支证券。
Both the originator and the packager of these financings had no skin in the game and were driven by volume and mark-ups. Many housing borrowers joined the party as well, blatantly lying on their loan applications while mortgage originators looked the other way. Naturally, the gamiest credits generated the most profits. Smooth Wall Street salesmen garnered millions annually by manufacturing products that their customers were unable to understand. (It’s also questionable as to whether the major rating agencies were capable of evaluating the more complex structures. But rate them they did.)
在这场游戏中毫无底线的抵押贷款发放人和打包抵押贷款支持证券的银行家，眼里只有钱，被不断增加的规模和上涨的价格所驱动。许多住房贷款人也加入这一行列，公然在贷款申请中撒谎。而抵押贷款发起人却视而不见。当然，风险最大的信贷产品会产生最大的回报。狡猾的华尔街销售人员，依靠向顾客推销他们完全无法理解的金融产品，每年赚取了数百万美元的收入。(同样地，主要的评级机构是否有能力评估更为复杂结构的金融产品也值得怀疑？然而他们依然给出了评级)。
Barney Frank, perhaps the most financially-savvy member of Congress during the panic, recently assessed the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, saying, “The one major weakness that I’ve seen in the implementation was this decision by the regulators not to impose risk retention on all residential mortgages.” Today, some legislators and commentators continue to advocate a 1%-to-5% retention by the originator as a way to align its interests with that of the ultimate lender or mortgage guarantor.
Barney Frank可能是2008金融危机期间最懂金融的国会议员了。最近他在评价2010年的Dodd-Frank法案时说：我在法案实施过程中发现一个巨大缺点，那就是监管机构决定不要求所有住房抵押贷款机构实施风险自留。今天，一些立法者和评论家还在建议要让贷款发放方保留1-5%的风险，以使贷款发起方、最终贷款人和抵押贷款担保人的利益保持一致。
At Clayton, our risk retention was, and is, 100%. When we originate a mortgage we keep it (leaving aside the few that qualify for a government guarantee). When we make mistakes in granting credit, we therefore pay a price — a hefty price that dwarfs any profit we realized upon the original sale of the home. Last year we had to foreclose on 8,444 manufactured-housing mortgages at a cost to us of $157 million.
在Clayton，不管是过去还是现在，我们风险自留率都是100%。我们每发放一笔贷款，就会一直持有它(除了少数政府担保的贷款)。因此，如果我们放贷时犯了错误，那么我们就会付出代价。这个高昂的代价远远超过房屋销售利润。去年我们取消了8444笔预制房屋抵押贷款的抵押品赎回权，为此我们共计损失了1.57亿美元。
The average loan we made in 2015 was only 522.
在2015年我们每笔贷款平均金额是59942美元，对于传统抵押贷款机构来说微不足道，但对于许多低收入贷款人来说却是一个艰巨的承诺，我们的买家依靠这笔贷款获得一栋体面的房子，平均每月只需支付552美元的本息。来看看我们在年会上展出的房子吧。
Some borrowers, of course, will lose their jobs, and there will be divorces and deaths. Others will get over-extended on credit cards and mishandle their finances. We will lose money then, and our borrower will lose his down payment (though his mortgage payments during his time of occupancy may have been well under rental rates for comparable quarters). Nevertheless, despite the low FICO scores and income of our borrowers, their payment behavior during the Great Recession was far better than that prevailing in many mortgage pools populated by people earning multiples of our typical borrower’s income.
当然了，有些贷款人可能会失业、离婚或去世。也有人会过度使用信用卡，财务状况崩溃。遇到这种情况我们将会亏钱，而我们的贷款人也会失去他们的首付款，尽管他在居住期间，按揭远低于可比租金。即便如此，尽管我们的借款人的FICO分数和收入均较低，但他们在经济危机期间的贷款偿还情况，远远好于其它同类抵押贷款的普遍状况，而这些抵押贷款人的收入水平往往是我们的贷款人的数倍。
The strong desire of our borrowers to have a home of their own is one reason we’ve done well with our mortgage portfolio. Equally important, we have financed much of the portfolio with floating-rate debt or with short-term fixed-rate debt. Consequently, the incredibly low short-term rates of recent years have provided us a constantly-widening spread between our interest costs and the income we derive from our mortgage portfolio, which bears fixed rates. (Incidentally, we would have enjoyed similar margins had we simply bought long-term bonds and financed the position in some short-term manner.)
我们的贷款人强烈渴望拥有自己的房子，这是我们抵押贷款组合方面还款很好的原因之一。同时重要的是，我们用浮动利率债券或短期固定利率债券为大部分抵押贷款组合融资。因此，近年来令人难以置信的短期低利率，与我们抵押贷款组合的固定利率，为我们的利息成本和利息收入之间提供了一个不断扩大的利差。顺便说一句，如果我们仅仅购买长期债券，并以某种短期低利率的方式融资，那么我们也能得到类似的结果。(这也是导致2023年硅谷银行破产的根源。)
Normally, it is risky business to lend long at fixed rates and borrow short as we have been doing at Clayton. Over the years, some important financial institutions have gone broke doing that. At Berkshire, however, we possess a natural offset in that our businesses always maintain at least 40 billion to 60 billion invested at 0.25% or less, a sharp move to higher short-term rates would bring benefits to us far exceeding the higher financing costs we would incur in funding Clayton’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. In banking terms, Berkshire is — and always will be — heavily asset-sensitive and will consequently benefit from rising interest rates.
通常情况下，借入短期资金并以固定利率长期借出，是风险较高的行为，就像我们在Clayton所做的那样。多年来，一些以此模式运作的重要金融巨头纷纷破产。然而，在伯克希尔，我们拥有一个自然抵消策略，因为我们的业务总是保持至少200亿美元的现金等价物，这些资金仅仅赚取短期利率回报。更多情况下，我们的短期投资规模介于400-600亿美元之间。假如我们600亿美元投资在0.25%或更低的利率的短期投资上，那么一个更高的短期利率带来的回报，将远远超过我们在克莱顿的130亿美元抵押贷款组合所产生的融资成本。从银行业的角度看，伯克希尔对资产高度敏感，因此将受益于上升的利率。
Let me talk about one subject of which I am particularly proud, that having to do with regulation. The Great Recession caused mortgage originators, servicers and packagers to come under intense scrutiny and to be assessed many billions of dollars in fines and penalties.
现在让我谈谈一个与监管有关的令我引以为傲的话题。金融危机导致抵押贷款发起人、服务商、抵押贷款支持证券包装商受到极为严苛的审查，并被处以数十亿美元的巨额处罚。
The scrutiny has certainly extended to Clayton, whose mortgage practices have been continuously reviewed and examined in respect to such items as originations, servicing, collections, advertising, compliance, and internal controls. At the federal level, we answer to the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Dozens of states regulate us as well. During the past two years, indeed, various federal and state authorities (from 25 states) examined and reviewed Clayton and its mortgages on 65 occasions. The result? Our total fines during this period were 704,678. Furthermore, though we had to foreclose on 2.64% of our manufactured-home mortgages last year, 95.4% of our borrowers were current on their payments at yearend, as they moved toward owning a debt-free home.
这些审查当然扩大到了Clayton，其抵押贷款业务频频遭到检查，比如贷款发放、服务、收款、宣传推广、合规、内部控制等环节。在联邦政府层面，我们要接受联邦贸易委员会、住房与城市发展部、消费者金融保护局等政府部门的监管。数十个州立法律也制约着我们。事实上在过去2年里，联邦政府及25个州当局对Clayton机器抵押贷款进行了65次审查，结果如何？在此期间，我们的罚款总额为3.82万美元，退还客户704678美元。此外，在过去的一年里，尽管我们不得不取消了2.64%的预制房屋抵押品赎回权，但95.4%的借款者在年终仍在还款，因为还清贷款后，他们将拥有一套无债务的房子。
Marmon’s rail fleet expanded to 133,220 units by yearend, a number significantly increased by the company’s purchase of 25,085 cars from General Electric on September 30. If our fleet was connected to form a single train, the engine would be in Omaha and the caboose in Portland, Maine.
截至年底，Marmon集团的铁路车队增加到133220辆，去年9月30日，该公司从通用电气购入25085辆油罐车后其规模大幅增加。如果将我们车队链接成一列火车，车头在奥马哈，节尾将在缅因州波特兰。
At yearend, 97% of our railcars were leased, with about 15-17% of the fleet coming up for renewal each year. Though “tank cars” sound like vessels carrying crude oil, only about 7% of our fleet carries that product; chemicals and refined petroleum products are the lead items we transport. When trains roll by, look for the UTLX or Procor markings that identify our tank cars. When you spot the brand, puff out your chest; you own a portion of that car.
截至年底，我们97%的油罐车被租赁，每年约有15-17%的车辆需要重新续租。尽管这些铁路油罐车听上去像是满载原油的舰队，但实际上只有7%的车辆用于运输原油，我们承运的主要是化工产品以及精炼石油。当列车从你驶过时，请仔细寻找油罐车上的UTLX或者Procor标志。当你看到那个标志时，请挺起你的胸膛，作为股东，你拥有那辆车的一部分。
Here’s the earnings recap for this sector:
下图为该板块的收益概况：
| (in millions) | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkadia (our 50% share) | $ 74 | $ 122 | $ 80 |
| Clayton | 706 | 558 | 416 |
| CORT | 55 | 49 | 42 |
| Marmon — Containers and Cranes | 192 | 238 | 226 |
| Marmon — Railcars | 546 | 442 | 353 |
| XTRA | 172 | 147 | 125 |
| Net financial income* | 341 | 283 | 322 |
| $ 2,086 | $ 1,839 | $ 1,564 |
* Excludes capital gains or losses
Investments 投资业务
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding because we are part of a control group and account for it on the “equity” method.
下面我们列出了截至年末普通股投资中市值最大的15家公司。由于我们是[Kraft_Heinz|卡夫亨氏]控股股东，所以采用”权益法”进行核算并未列入。
| Shares** | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost* at 12/31/15 (in millions) | Market at 12/31/15 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 15.6 | $ 1,287 | $ 10,545 |
| 46,577,138 | AT&T | 0.8 | 1,283 | 1,603 |
| 7,463,157 | Charter Communications, Inc. | 6.6 | 1,202 | 1,367 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.3 | 1,299 | 17,184 |
| 18,513,482 | DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc. | 8.8 | 843 | 1,291 |
| 22,164,450 | Deere & Company | 7.0 | 1,773 | 1,690 |
| 11,390,582 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | 2.7 | 654 | 2,053 |
| 81,033,450 | International Business Machines Corp. | 8.4 | 13,791 | 11,152 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 12.6 | 248 | 2,475 |
| 55,384,926 | Phillips | 66 | 10.5 | 4,357 |
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 4,683*** |
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,701 | 1,896 |
| 101,859,335 | U.S. Bancorp | 5.8 | 3,239 | 4,346 |
| 63,507,544 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 2.0 | 3,593 | 3,893 |
| 500,000,000 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.8 | 12,730 | 27,180 |
| Others | 10,276 | 16,450 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 58,612 | $ 112,338 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
* 这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的计税基础；公认会计原则的 “成本 “在少数情况下有所不同，因为根据公认会计原则的规定，我们必须进行注销或减记。
** Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。
*** Held under contract of sale for this amount.
*** 根据销售合同持有，金额为此数。
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for 11.8 billion. We are likely to purchase them just before expiration of our option and, if we wish, we can use our $5 billion of Bank of America 6% preferred to fund the purchase. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment — and one we value highly.
伯克希尔一个重要持仓并未列入上表：2021年9月之前任意时刻，我们有权以50亿美元的价格买下美国银行7亿股股票。截至去年年底，这些股票价值118亿美元。我们打算在期权到期日前再购入，如果我们愿意，还可以将美国银行50亿美元利率为6%的优先股投资作为购买资金。与此同时，各位必须认识到，实际上美国银行是我们第四大的普通股投资，也是我们十分看重的一项投资。
Productivity and Prosperity 生产力提升与社会繁荣
Earlier, I told you how our partners at Kraft Heinz root out inefficiencies, thereby increasing output per hour of employment. That kind of improvement has been the secret sauce of America’s remarkable gains in living standards since the nation’s founding in 1776. Unfortunately, the label of “secret” is appropriate: Too few Americans fully grasp the linkage between productivity and prosperity. To see that connection, let’s look first at the country’s most dramatic example — farming — and later examine three Berkshire-specific areas.
前文我曾告诉过你，我们在卡夫亨氏的合作伙伴3G资本是如何根除低效，从而提升每小时的单位产出。美国自1776年建国以来，生产效率的提高一直是生活水平大幅改善的秘诀。不幸的是，这”秘诀”知道的人还真不多：美国很少有人能完全理解生产力与繁荣之间的关联性。要了解这种关联，我们先来看看美国最引入注目的实例：农业，然后再来看看伯克希尔的3个特殊投资领域。
In 1900, America’s civilian work force numbered 28 million. Of these, 11 million, a staggering 40% of the total, worked in farming. The leading crop then, as now, was corn. About 90 million acres were devoted to its production and the yield per acre was 30 bushels, for a total output of 2.7 billion bushels annually.
1900年，美国有2800万劳动力。其中1100万人口从事农业，惊人的占40%。与现在一样，当时的主要农作物是玉米。约9千万英亩种植玉米，每英亩产量为30蒲式耳，年总产量为27亿蒲式耳(1蒲式耳=35.238升)。
Then came the tractor and one innovation after another that revolutionized such keys to farm productivity as planting, harvesting, irrigation, fertilization and seed quality. Today, we devote about 85 million acres to corn. Productivity, however, has improved yields to more than 150 bushels per acre, for an annual output of 13-14 billion bushels. Farmers have made similar gains with other products.
后来，人们发明了拖拉机以及其他各式各样的农具，使农业生产力有了革命性的进步，种植、收割、灌溉、施肥、选种等流程的效率皆大大提升。如今，美国约8500万英亩种植玉米。虽然面积并未增加，然而生产力的提高将产量提高到每英亩150蒲式耳以上，年产量为130-140亿蒲式耳。其他农作物的产量提升也不相上下。
Increased yields, though, are only half the story: The huge increases in physical output have been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in the number of farm laborers (“human input”). Today about three million people work on farms, a tiny 2% of our 158-million-person work force. Thus, improved farming methods have allowed tens of millions of present-day workers to utilize their time and talents in other endeavors, a reallocation of human resources that enables Americans of today to enjoy huge quantities of non-farm goods and services they would otherwise lack.
然而，产量的提升只是故事的一部分：农作物产量的大幅增加，伴随着劳动力数量的急剧减少。如今仅有300万人口在农场劳作，仅占1.58亿劳动力总量的2%。由此可见，农业技术的进步解放了成千上万的工人，让他们得以将时间和才智投入到其他工作，人力资源的再分配使如今的美国人得以享受琳琅满目的非农商品和服务，如果不是生产力的提高，人们的生活只能停留在男耕女织时代。
It’s easy to look back over the 115-year span and realize how extraordinarily beneficial agricultural innovations have been — not just for farmers but, more broadly, for our entire society. We would not have anything close to the America we now know had we stifled those improvements in productivity. (It was fortunate that horses couldn’t vote.) On a day-to-day basis, however, talk of the “greater good” must have rung hollow to farm hands who lost their jobs to machines that performed routine tasks far more efficiently than humans ever could. We will examine this flip-side to productivity gains later in this section.
回顾过去的115年历史，我们意识到，农业创新是多么有益，不仅仅对农民，更广泛的说，对我们整个社会都有益。如果我们扼杀了生产力的提高，就不会有现在的美国。(幸好被淘汰的马儿们不会投票)。然而，在日常生活中，对于那些失业的农场工人们大谈科技的美好无异于对牛弹琴，因为机器运行的效率远超人类。下面我们进一步讨论生产力提高导致的失业问题。
For the moment, however, let’s move on to three stories of efficiencies that have had major consequences for Berkshire subsidiaries. Similar transformations have been commonplace throughout American business.
不过，现在让我们先来看看对伯克希尔子公司效率提升产生重大影响的三个实例。这类改变在整个美国商界已经是司空见惯了。
- In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the American workforce totaled 44 million. About 1.35 million workers were employed in the railroad industry. The revenue ton-miles of freight moved by Class I railroads that year totaled 655 billion.
1947年二战刚结束不久，美国劳动力总数为4400万，约135万工人供职于铁路行业。当年一级铁路货运量总计6550亿吨英里。
By 2014, Class I railroads carried 1.85 trillion ton-miles, an increase of 182%, while employing only 187,000 workers, a reduction of 86% since 1947. (Some of this change involved passenger-related employees, but most of the workforce reduction came on the freight side.) As a result of this staggering improvement in productivity, the inflation-adjusted price for moving a ton-mile of freight has fallen by 55% since 1947, a drop saving shippers about $90 billion annually in current dollars.
到了2014年，一级铁路运输量为1.85万亿吨英里，增长了182%，而雇员人数仅为18.7万，相比1947年减少了86%。(其中部分变化涉及客运人员，但大部分减少的劳动力是货运人员)。鉴于生产力的惊人提高，净通胀调整后，每吨英里的货运成本自1947年来降低了55%，这一降幅每年为托运人节省约900亿美元。
Another startling statistic: If it took as many people now to move freight as it did in 1947, we would need well over three million railroad workers to handle present volumes. (Of course, that level of employment would raise freight charges by a lot; consequently, nothing close to today’s volume would actually move.)
再来看另一组令人震惊的数据：如果现在货运雇员规模停留在1947年的水平，我们将需要300多万的铁路工人来处理现在的货运量。(当然，如此多的人工成本将大大提高运费，货运量也很难发展到今天这般规模)。
Our own BNSF was formed in 1995 by a merger between Burlington Northern and Santa Fe. In 1996, the merged company’s first full year of operation, 411 million ton-miles of freight were transported by 45,000 employees. Last year the comparable figures were 702 million ton-miles (plus 71%) and 47,000 employees (plus only 4%). That dramatic gain in productivity benefits both owners and shippers. Safety at BNSF has improved as well: Reportable injuries were 2.04 per 200,000 man-hours in 1996 and have since fallen more than 50% to 0.95.
1995年，当时Burlington Northern铁路与Santa Fe铁路合并，成立了我们的BNSF铁路公司。1996年是这家新合并公司第一个完整营运的年份，4.5万名员工完成了4.11亿吨英里的货运量。2015年货运量增长71%达到7.02亿吨英里，雇员人数仅增长2%达到4.7万人。生产力的提升不但惠及铁路公司，也惠及托运人。同时，BNSF铁路的生产安全性也得到了提升：1996年上报的因工受伤人数为2.04人/20万人工时数，而今下降了超过50%，仅为0.95人/20万人工时数。
- A bit more than a century ago, the auto was invented, and around it formed an industry that insures cars and their drivers. Initially, this business was written through traditional insurance agencies — the kind dealing in fire insurance. This agency-centric approach included high commissions and other underwriting expenses that consumed about 40¢ of the premium dollar. Strong local agencies were then in the driver’s seat because they represented multiple insurers and could play one company off against another when commissions were being negotiated. Cartel-like pricing prevailed, and all involved were doing fine — except for the consumer.
一个多世纪前，人们发明了汽车，围绕着它形成了一个为汽车及其驾驶者提供保险的行业。最初，这项业务是通过经营火灾保险的传统保险代理机构进行的。这种以代理机构为中心的运营模式，包含高额佣金和其他承销费用，这些费用约占保费的40%。当时，实力雄厚的地方代理机构处于主导地位，因为它们代理着多家保险公司，而且在佣金谈判时，它们可以让保险公司之间进行价格竞争。因此卡特尔式的定价开始盛行，除了消费者以外，所有相关企业都表现良好。(Cartel定价是指，多个具有竞争关系的经营者为牟取超额利润，以合同、协议或其他方式，共同商定商品或服务价格，从而限制市场竞争的一种垄断联合。)
And then some American ingenuity came into play: G. J. Mecherle, a farmer from Merna, Illinois, came up with the idea of a captive sales force that would sell the insurance products of only a single company. His baby was christened State Farm Mutual. The company cut commissions and expenses — moves that permitted lower prices — and soon became a powerhouse. For many decades, State Farm has been the runaway volume leader in both auto and homeowner’s insurance. Allstate, which also operated with a direct distribution model, was long the runner-up. Both State Farm and Allstate have had underwriting expenses of about 25%.
随后，一些美国人的聪明才智开始发挥作用: 来自伊利诺伊州Merna市的农民G. J. Mecherle提出建立一支专属销售队伍只销售自家保险产品的想法。他的公司命名为州立农业互助保险公司(State Farm Mutual)。该公司降低了佣金和运营费用，这些措施使得保险价格得以降低，并很快成为一家强大的保险公司。几十年来，州立农业保险一直是汽车保险和房屋保险领域承保规模的领头羊。同样采用直销模式运营的好事达保险公司(Allstate)长期位居亚军。州立农业保险和好事达保险的承保费用都在25%左右。
In the early 1930s, another contender, United Services Auto Association (“USAA”), a mutual-like company, was writing auto insurance for military officers on a direct-to-the-customer basis. This marketing innovation rose from a need that military personnel had to buy insurance that would stay with them as they moved from base to base. That was business of little interest to local insurance agencies, which wanted the steady renewals that came from permanent residents.
在1930年代早期，另一个类似的竞争者联合服务汽车协会(USAA)开始直接面向客户为军官提供汽车保险。这种营销创新源于军事人员在从一个基地转移到另一个基地时必须购买保险。这是本地保险机构不感兴趣的业务，因为它们希望常居民能够稳定的续保。
The direct distribution method of USAA, as it happened, incurred lower costs than those enjoyed by State Farm and Allstate and therefore delivered an even greater bargain to customers. That made Leo and Lillian Goodwin, employees of USAA, dream of broadening the target market for its direct distribution model beyond military officers. In 1936, starting with $100,000 of capital, they incorporated Government Employees Insurance Co. (later compressing this mouthful to GEICO).
事实上，USAA的直销方式比State Farm和Allstate的承保成本更低，因此可以为客户提供更大的折扣。这使得USAA的雇员Leo和Lillian Goodwin，梦想扩大将其直销模式的目标市场扩大到军官之外。1936年他们以10万美元的资本成立了政府雇员保险公司(Government Employes Insurance Co.，后来简化成GEICO)。
Their fledgling did 22.6 billion , more than double the volume of USAA. (Though the early bird gets the worm, the second mouse gets the cheese.) GEICO’s underwriting expenses in 2015 were 14.7% of premiums, with USAA being the only large company to achieve a lower percentage. (GEICO is fully as efficient as USAA but spends considerably more on advertising aimed at promoting growth.)
1937年，他们刚刚起步的公司完成了23.8万美元汽车保险收入，这是第一个完整的年份。去年GEICO完成了226亿美元，是 USAA 的两倍多。(尽管早起的鸟儿有虫吃，但第二只老鼠有奶酪吃)。2015年GEICO和USAA的承保费用占保费都为14.7%，USAA是唯一一家承保费用比率较低的大公司。(GEICO与USAA效率完全一样，但GEICO在促进增长的广告上花费更多) 。
With the price advantage GEICO’s low costs allow, it’s not surprising that several years ago the company seized the number two spot in auto insurance from Allstate. GEICO is also gaining ground on State Farm, though it is still far ahead of us in volume. On August 30, 2030 — my 100th birthday — I plan to announce that GEICO has taken over the top spot. Mark your calendar.
GEICO凭借低成本优势，几年前成功取代Allstate成为汽车保险第二名也就不足为奇了。尽管State Farm在保费数量上仍远远领先于GEICO，但差距已经大大缩小。在我的100岁生日也就是2030年8月30日，我计划宣布GEICO已经占据了榜首位置。记得在你的日历上做记号。
GEICO employs about 34,000 people to serve its 14 million policyholders. I can only guess at the workforce it would require to serve a similar number of policyholders under the agency system. I believe, however, that the number would be at least 60,000, a combination of what the insurer would need in direct employment and the personnel required at supporting agencies.
GEICO雇佣了大约3.4万名员工为其1400万名投保人提供服务。我猜测，在代理制度下，为相似数量的保单持有人提供服务所需要的劳动力数量，我相信这个数字至少会达到6万人，这是保险公司在直接雇佣所需要人员和支持机构所需要的人员的总和。
- In its electric utility business, our Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) operates within a changing economic model. Historically, the survival of a local electric company did not depend on its efficiency. In fact, a “sloppy” operation could do just fine financially.
That’s because utilities were usually the sole supplier of a needed product and were allowed to price at a level that gave them a prescribed return upon the capital they employed. The joke in the industry was that a utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office. And some CEOs ran things accordingly.
这是因为公用事业公司往往是某种刚需产品的唯一供应商，并被允许在一定水平上定价，以使其投入的资本获得规定的回报。业内有这样一个笑话：公用事业是唯一一个通过装修老板办公室就自动赚更多钱的行业。许多公用事业公司的CEO确实是按着这个套路操作的。
That’s all changing. Today, society has decided that federally-subsidized wind and solar generation is in our country’s long-term interest. Federal tax credits are used to implement this policy, support that makes renewables price-competitive in certain geographies. Those tax credits, or other government-mandated help for renewables, may eventually erode the economics of the incumbent utility, particularly if it is a high-cost operator. BHE’s long-established emphasis on efficiency — even when the company didn’t need it to attain authorized earnings — leaves us particularly competitive in today’s market (and, more important, in tomorrow’s as well).
但现在这一切都变了。今天，社会已经达成共识，联邦政府补贴的风力发电和太阳能发电符合我们的长远利益。联邦政府通过税款抵免来落实这一政策，以使可再生能源的价格在特定地区具有竞争力。这些可再生能源的税收抵免(或其他政策支持)，最终可能会侵蚀现有的公用事业的经济效益，尤其是那些运行成本较高的公司。尽管公司并不需要通过提高效益来获得允许的收益，但BHE一直以来都非常注重提升效率，这也使得BHE在当今市场(特别重要的是明天的市场)变得特别有竞争力。
BHE acquired its Iowa utility in 1999. In the year before, that utility employed 3,700 people and produced 19 million megawatt-hours of electricity. Now we employ 3,500 people and produce 29 million megawatt-hours. That major increase in efficiency allowed us to operate without a rate increase for 16 years, a period during which industry rates increased 44%.
1999年，BHE收购了爱荷华公用事业公司。而前一年该公司雇佣了3700人，发电量为1900万兆瓦时。现在我们雇佣了3500名员工，发电量达到了2900兆瓦时。效率的大幅提高让我们能够在16年不提价，而同期行业平均提价了44%。
The safety record of our Iowa utility is also outstanding. It had .79 injuries per 100 employees in 2015 compared to the rate of 7.0 experienced by the previous owner in the year before we bought the operation.
我们爱荷华公用事业公司的安全记录也非常出色。2015年，员工的事故率只有0.79%，而我们接手前公司的事故率为7%。
In 2006 BHE purchased PacifiCorp, which operated primarily in Oregon and Utah. The year before our purchase PacifiCorp employed 6,750 people and produced 52.6 million megawatt-hours. Last year the numbers were 5,700 employees and 56.3 million megawatt-hours. Here, too, safety improved dramatically, with the accident-rate-per-100-employees falling from 3.4 in 2005 to .85 in 2015. In safety, BHE now ranks in the industry’s top decile.
2006年，BHE收购了在俄勒冈州和犹他州运营的电力公司PacifiCorp。我们收购的前一年，该公司员工数为6750人，发电量为5260万兆瓦时。而去年，员工数为5700人，发电量为5630万兆瓦时。公司的安全性也得到显著提升，事故率从2005年的3.4%下降到2015年的0.85%。安全方面BHE可以排在行业前十。
Those outstanding performances explain why BHE is welcomed by regulators when it proposes to buy a utility in their jurisdiction. The regulators know the company will run an efficient, safe and reliable operation and also arrive with unlimited capital to fund whatever projects make sense. (BHE has never paid a dividend to Berkshire since we assumed ownership. No investor-owned utility in America comes close to matching BHE’s enthusiasm for reinvestment.)
这些杰出的表现解释了为什么BHE在提议收购某个地区的公用事业公司时，当地的监管机构会表现出如此大的欢迎。监管机构知道，我们的公司会带来高效、安全可靠的运营，同时为任何有意义的项目提供无限的资本。(自我们获得所有权以来，BHE从未向伯克希尔支付过股息。在美国，没有一家投资者拥有的公用事业公司能与BHE的再投资热情相媲美。)
The productivity gains that I’ve just spelled out — and countless others that have been achieved in America - have delivered awesome benefits to society. That’s the reason our citizens, as a whole, have enjoyed — and will continue to enjoy — major gains in the goods and services they receive.
我刚刚详细解释的生产力的提升(以及无数其他方面的进步)为社会带来了惊人的效益。这就是为什么我们的全体公民已经享受并将继续享受他们所获得的商品和服务所带来的巨大好处。
To this thought there are offsets. First, the productivity gains achieved in recent years have largely benefitted the wealthy. Second, productivity gains frequently cause upheaval: Both capital and labor can pay a terrible price when innovation or new efficiencies upend their worlds.
对于这一点，有一些抵消成份。首先近年来生产效率的提升，在很大程度上使富人更受益。其次，生产效率的提升也常常引发动荡：当创新或更高的效率颠覆了原有世界，不管是资本家还是劳动者都可能付出巨大的代价。
We need shed no tears for the capitalists (whether they be private owners or an army of public shareholders). It’s their job to take care of themselves. When large rewards can flow to investors from good decisions, these parties should not be spared the losses produced by wrong choices. Moreover, investors who diversify widely and simply sit tight with their holdings are certain to prosper: In America, gains from winning investments have always far more than offset the losses from clunkers. (During the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrial Average — an index fund of sorts — soared from 66 to 11,497, with its component companies all the while paying ever-increasing dividends.)
我们不需要同情资本(不论是私人企业还是上市公司)，他们的本职工作就是照顾好自己。当正确的决策为投资者带来巨额的回报，那错误的决策带来巨大的损失也就无可避免。此外，那些广泛进行多元化投资并简单呆坐不动的投资者们一定会获得成功：在美国，成功投资带来的回报远远超过失败带来的损失。(20世纪，道琼斯工业平均指数从66点飙升至11497点，其成分股企业一直在支付越来越多的股息。)
A long-employed worker faces a different equation. When innovation and the market system interact to produce efficiencies, many workers may be rendered unnecessary, their talents obsolete. Some can find decent employment elsewhere; for others, that is not an option.
但长期工作的工人却面临着一个截然不同的等式。当创新与市场体系相互作用以提升生产效率时，许多工人会因此失去价值，他们的能力会被淘汰。或许有些人能在别的地方找到体面的工作，但多数人却别无选择。
When low-cost competition drove shoe production to Asia, our once-prosperous Dexter operation folded, putting 1,600 employees in a small Maine town out of work. Many were past the point in life at which they could learn another trade. We lost our entire investment, which we could afford, but many workers lost a livelihood they could not replace. The same scenario unfolded in slow-motion at our original New England textile operation, which struggled for 20 years before expiring. Many older workers at our New Bedford plant, as a poignant example, spoke Portuguese and knew little, if any, English. They had no Plan B.
当低成本竞争将鞋业生产的中心转向亚洲，我们曾经繁荣的德克斯特(Dexter)鞋业倒闭了，导致缅因州一个小镇1600名员工失业。许多人已经过了可以再学习另一门手艺的年纪。我们失去了我们能够负担的所有投资，但许多员工失去的却是他们赖以生存的工作。同样的场景也出现在我们原来的新英格兰纺织厂”慢性死亡”的过程中。这家纺织厂垂死挣扎了整整20年，作为一个令人心酸的例子，许多New Bedford工厂的老员工只会说葡萄牙语，几乎不会说英语但他们没有第二个工作选择。
The answer in such disruptions is not the restraining or outlawing of actions that increase productivity. Americans would not be living nearly as well as we do if we had mandated that 11 million people should forever be employed in farming.
上述这些糟糕案例的解决方案并不是限制或禁止提高生产力。如果我们强制要求1100万人从事农业工作，那么美国人的生活将永远不会像我们现在这样好。
The solution, rather, is a variety of safety nets aimed at providing a decent life for those who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. (I personally favor a reformed and expanded Earned Income Tax Credit that would try to make sure America works for those willing to work.) The price of achieving ever-increasing prosperity for the great majority of Americans should not be penury for the unfortunate.
问题的解决方案在于建立各种保护措施，为那些愿意继续工作、但其才能却因为市场力量而贬值的人提供体面的生活。(我个人非常赞成改革和扩大劳动所得税减免，为那些愿意工作的人们提供最大的保障。)对大多数美国人来说，实现不断增长的繁荣的代价不应该是不幸者的贫穷。
Important Risks 重要的风险
We, like all public companies, are required by the SEC to annually catalog “risk factors” in our 10-K. I can’t remember, however, an instance when reading a 10-K’s “risk” section has helped me in evaluating a business. That’s not because the identified risks aren’t real. The truly important risks, however, are usually well known. Beyond that, a 10-K’s catalog of risks is seldom of aid in assessing: (1) the probability of the threatening event actually occurring; (2) the range of costs if it does occur; and (3) the timing of the possible loss. A threat that will only surface 50 years from now may be a problem for society, but it is not a financial problem for today’s investor.
和所有的上市公司一样，美国SEC要求我们每年都要在10-K中列出”风险因素”。然而，我并不记得哪一个例子是我在阅读10-K文件中的”风险”部分时帮我评估了一项业务。这并不是因为这些已确认的风险是不真实的，而是真正重要的风险通常是众所周知的。除此之外，10-K文件中的风险因素也很少有助于评估：(1)威胁事件真正发生的概率；(2)如果发生，将付出的成本区间；(3)可能发生损失的时间。50年后才可能浮现出来的问题可能会成为社会问题，但对于今天的投资者来说，这并不是一个在财务上需要考虑的问题。
Berkshire operates in more industries than any company I know of. Each of our pursuits has its own array of possible problems and opportunities. Those are easy to list but hard to evaluate: Charlie, I and our various CEOs often differ in a very major way in our calculation of the likelihood, the timing and the cost (or benefit) that may result from these possibilities.
伯克希尔涉足的行业比我知道的其他任何公司都要多。我们的每一个兴趣都有自己的一系列可能的问题和机会。列举出来容易但是评估很难：查理、我以及我们的CEO计算这些可能的投资机会可能发生的概率、发生的时机和带来的损益时，往往有很大的区别。
Let me mention just a few examples. To begin with an obvious threat, BNSF, along with other railroads, is certain to lose significant coal volume over the next decade. At some point in the future — though not, in my view, for a long time — GEICO’s premium volume may shrink because of driverless cars. This development could hurt our auto dealerships as well. Circulation of our print newspapers will continue to fall, a certainty we allowed for when purchasing them. To date, renewables have helped our utility operation but that could change, particularly if storage capabilities for electricity materially improve. Online retailing threatens the business model of our retailers and certain of our consumer brands. These potentialities are just a few of the negative possibilities facing us — but even the most casual follower of business news has long been aware of them.
我可以举几个例子。我们从一个最显而易见的威胁开始吧：BNSF和其他铁路公司，未来十年很可能将失去大量的煤炭运输业务。而未来的某个时刻(虽然在我看来在很长一段时间内都不会)，无人驾驶可能会让GEICO保险的保单数量大规模萎缩。这种趋势也会影响到我们的汽车经销商业务。我们纸质报纸的发行量还将继续下降，这是我们在收购时就非常清楚的。目前，可再生能源对我们的公用事业业务起到了助力，但如果电力存储技术得到实质提升，那么情况将有可能改变。在线零售已经威胁到了我们的零售商和某些消费品牌的商业模式。这些都还只是我们面临的负面可能性的一小部分，但即便是对商业新闻再漫不经心的人，也早已意识到了这些负面因素。
None of these problems, however, is crucial to Berkshire’s long-term well-being. When we took over the company in 1965, its risks could have been encapsulated in a single sentence: “The northern textile business in which all of our capital resides is destined for recurring losses and will eventually disappear.” That development, however, was no death knell. We simply adapted. And we will continue to do so.
然而，这些问题都对伯克希尔的长远发展都起不到什么关键性的影响。1965年我们刚接手这家公司时，一句话就能概括当时的风险：“我们所有的资本所在的北方纺织业务注定将持续亏损，直至消亡。“然而，这种发展趋势，并没有敲响丧钟。我们只是适应了它，未来也将如此。
Every day Berkshire managers are thinking about how they can better compete in an always-changing world. Just as vigorously, Charlie and I focus on where a steady stream of funds should be deployed. In that respect, we possess a major advantage over one-industry companies, whose options are far more limited. I firmly believe that Berkshire has the money, talent and culture to plow through the sort of adversities I’ve itemized above — and many more — and to emerge with ever-greater earning power.
伯克希尔的经理人每天都在思考，他们该如何在一个不断变化的世界中更好的竞争。查理和我每天也同样都在积极关注着，哪些领域值得我们投入资本以获得源源不断地现金流。在这一方面，我们比那些只涉足一个行业的公司更有优势，毕竟他们的选择更为有限。我一直坚信，伯克希尔拥有足够的资本、人才和文化，能够克服上面我列举的种种逆境(甚至更多)，并以越来越强大的盈利能力脱颖而出。
There is, however, one clear, present and enduring danger to Berkshire against which Charlie and I are powerless. That threat to Berkshire is also the major threat our citizenry faces: a “successful” (as defined by the aggressor) cyber, biological, nuclear or chemical attack on the United States. That is a risk Berkshire shares with all of American business.
然而，伯克希尔面临着一个明确存在且非常持久的危险，查理和我也感到束手无策。对伯克希尔的威胁也是我们的国民所面临的主要威胁：针对美国”成功”的网络、生物、核和化学袭击。这是伯克希尔与全美所有企业共同面临的风险。
The probability of such mass destruction in any given year is likely very small. It’s been more than 70 years since I delivered a Washington Post newspaper headlining the fact that the United States had dropped the first atomic bomb. Subsequently, we’ve had a few close calls but avoided catastrophic destruction. We can thank our government — and luck! — for this result.
在任何给定的年份，这种大规模毁灭的概率都非常小。70多年前我在《华盛顿邮报》发表了一篇文章，标题是在美国投下第一颗原子弹。随后，我们与一些灾难性的破坏擦肩而过。对于这个结果，我们得感谢于我们的政府，当然还有运气。
Nevertheless, what’s a small probability in a short period approaches certainty in the longer run. (If there is only one chance in thirty of an event occurring in a given year, the likelihood of it occurring at least once in a century is 96.6%.) The added bad news is that there will forever be people and organizations and perhaps even nations that would like to inflict maximum damage on our country. Their means of doing so have increased exponentially during my lifetime. “Innovation” has its dark side.
尽管如此，短期内的小概率事件长期来看就接近必然。(如果某一事件在某一年发生的概率为1/30，那么它在一个世纪内至少发生一次的概率是96.6%)。此外，更坏的消息是，总有个人或组织、甚至可能是国家，希望对我们的国家制造最大的伤害。在我有生之年，他们达成这一目的的能力呈指数级增长。“创新”也有其阴暗面。
There is no way for American corporations or their investors to shed this risk. If an event occurs in the U.S. that leads to mass devastation, the value of all equity investments will almost certainly be decimated.
美国公司和投资者无法摆脱这种风险。如果美国发生大规模破坏事件，所有股权投资几乎肯定会大幅缩水。
No one knows what “the day after” will look like. I think, however, that Einstein’s 1949 appraisal remains apt: “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”
没有人知道”后天”会是什么样子。然而，我认为，1949年爱因斯坦的这句评价依然恰当：“我不知道第三次世界大战将使用什么武器，但第四次世界大战，人们的武器将是木棒和石块！”
I am writing this section because we have a proxy proposal regarding climate change to consider at this year’s annual meeting. The sponsor would like us to provide a report on the dangers that this change might present to our insurance operation and explain how we are responding to these threats.
我写这一章节是因为，今年的年会上，我们有一个关于气候变化的代理提案需要考虑。发起人希望我们能提交一份报告，说明气候变化可能会对我们的保险业务带来怎样的威胁，以及我们将如何应对这些挑战。
It seems highly likely to me that climate change poses a major problem for the planet. I say “highly likely” rather than “certain” because I have no scientific aptitude and remember well the dire predictions of most “experts” about Y2K. It would be foolish, however, for me or anyone to demand 100% proof of huge forthcoming damage to the world if that outcome seemed at all possible and if prompt action had even a small chance of thwarting the danger.
在我看来，气候变化很可能给地球带来一个严峻的问题。我之所以说”极有可能”，而不说”肯定”，是因为我没有相应的科学能力做出这个判断，并且我清楚地记得大多数”专家”对千年虫问题的可怕预言。不过，如果这一结果极有可能，如果迅速采取行动消除威胁的可能性又非常小的话，那么我或者任何人要求100%确凿的证据来证明伤害即将到来，那也是非常愚蠢的。
This issue bears a similarity to Pascal’s Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy. Call this Noah’s Law: If an ark may be essential for survival , begin building it today, no matter how cloudless the skies appear.
这个问题与关于”上帝是否存在”的Pascal赌注有相似之处。人们可能还记得，Pascal认为，如果上帝真的存在的可能性很小，那么按”上帝确实存在”行事就是有意义的，因为这么做的回报可能是无限的，但不这么做却可能带来永恒的痛苦。同样，哪怕只有1%的可能这个星球真的面临一场巨大灾难，而拖延就意味放弃任何回旋余地，那现在不作为就是愚蠢的。这就是诺亚定律：如果方舟对于生存至关重要，那么不论现在的天空有多么晴朗，都应当立即开始建造方舟。(如果上帝存在：我信上帝，那么会受到奖赏；我不信上帝，那么会受到惩罚；如果上帝不存在，不管信不信上帝什么事情都不会发生。)
It’s understandable that the sponsor of the proxy proposal believes Berkshire is especially threatened by climate change because we are a huge insurer, covering all sorts of risks. The sponsor may worry that property losses will skyrocket because of weather changes. And such worries might, in fact, be warranted if we wrote ten- or twenty-year policies at fixed prices. But insurance policies are customarily written for one year and repriced annually to reflect changing exposures. Increased possibilities of loss translate promptly into increased premiums.
代理提案的发起人认为气候变化将对伯克希尔带来巨大威胁是可以理解的，因为我们是一家庞大的保险公司，覆盖了各种类型的风险。他们或许会担心，气候变化会使财产损失概率大幅上升。事实上，如果我们以固定价格制定未来10-20年的保单，那么这种担忧是非常有必要的。但是，产险保单通常以一年为期，每年都会重新定价以反映不断变化的风险敞口。损失概率的增加，能够迅速转化为保费的增加。
Think back to 1951 when I first became enthused about GEICO. The company’s average loss-per-policy was then about 1,000 per policy. Wouldn’t such skyrocketing losses prove disastrous, you might ask? Well, no.
回想1951年，我第一次对GEICO保险产生热情。当时该公司每份保单年均损失约为30美元。想象一下，如果我当时预测2015年每份保单的损失成本将达到1000美元左右，你会作何反应？你可能会问，如此飙升的损失难道不是灾难性的吗？好吧，答案是否定的。
Over the years, inflation has caused a huge increase in the cost of repairing both the cars and the humans involved in accidents. But these increased costs have been promptly matched by increased premiums. So, paradoxically, the upward march in loss costs has made insurance companies far more valuable. If costs had remained unchanged, Berkshire would now own an auto insurer doing 23 billion.
多年来，通货膨胀导致了汽车维修和人身事故赔偿费用激增。但这些增加的成本都及时反映到了增加的保费中。因此，矛盾的是，损失成本的上升，保险公司的价值反而增加了。如果损失成本一直维持不变，伯克希尔将拥有一家每年6亿保费规模的汽车保险公司，而不是一家230亿美元庞大保费规模的保险公司。
Up to now, climate change has not produced more frequent nor more costly hurricanes nor other weather-related events covered by insurance. As a consequence, U.S. super-cat rates have fallen steadily in recent years, which is why we have backed away from that business. If super-cats become costlier and more frequent, the likely — though far from certain — effect on Berkshire’s insurance business would be to make it larger and more profitable.
到目前为止，气候变化并没有带来更加频繁或损失更大的飓风，或其他保险覆盖范围的其他恶劣气候事件。因此，近年来美国的巨灾保险费率在持续下降，这也是我们放弃这一块业务的原因。如果巨灾变得更加频繁或损失更加惨重(尽管还远不能确定)，对伯克希尔保险业务的影响将是，规模更大，利润更高。
As a citizen, you may understandably find climate change keeping you up nights. As a homeowner in a low-lying area, you may wish to consider moving. But when you are thinking only as a shareholder of a major insurer, climate change should not be on your list of worries.
作为公民，气候变化让你彻夜难眠也在情理之中，如果你的房子地势较低，想要搬家也是人之常情。但单单作为一个大型保险公司的股东，气候变化不应该是你担心的事情。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
Charlie and I have finally decided to enter the 21st Century. Our annual meeting this year will be webcast worldwide in its entirety. To view the meeting, simply go to https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream at 9 a.m. Central Daylight Time on Saturday, April 30th. The Yahoo! webcast will begin with a half hour of interviews with managers, directors and shareholders. Then, at 9:30, Charlie and I will commence answering questions.
我和查理终于决定进入21世纪了。我们今年的年会将在全世界进行网络直播。如果想观看我们这次年会，只需在美国中部时间4月30日周六上午9:00登录以下网址：https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream 。前半小时，网络直播将播放对经理人、董事和股东的采访，查理和我将在9:30开始回答大家的问题。
This new arrangement will serve two purposes. First, it may level off or modestly decrease attendance at the meeting. Last year’s record of more than 40,000 attendees strained our capacity. In addition to quickly filling the CenturyLink Center’s main arena, we packed its overflow rooms and then spilled into two large meeting rooms at the adjoining Omaha Hilton. All major hotels were sold out notwithstanding Airbnb’s stepped-up presence. Airbnb was especially helpful for those visitors on limited budgets.
这项新的安排主要有两个目的。首先，它可能会适当分流一些参会人流。去年的记录是有超过40000人参与我们的年会，这已经超过了我们的承接能力。不仅是Century Link Center的主会场人满为患，毗邻的奥马哈希尔顿酒店两个大型的会议室也很快挤满了人。尽管Airbnb业务量大幅增加，但所有的大酒店都被抢订一空。预算有限的人们可以通过Airbnb订房。
Our second reason for initiating a webcast is more important. Charlie is 92, and I am 85. If we were partners with you in a small business, and were charged with running the place, you would want to look in occasionally to make sure we hadn’t drifted off into la-la land. Shareholders, in contrast, should not need to come to Omaha to monitor how we look and sound. (In making your evaluation, be kind: Allow for the fact that we didn’t look that impressive when we were at our best.)
第二个让我们开始尝试网络直播的原因更为重要。查理92岁了，我也85岁了。如果我们是你在一家小企业的合伙人，负责管理这家企业，你大概会偶尔过来看看，确保我们没有梦游到虚幻之地。相比之下，股东们也不用跑到奥马哈来监督我们的表现。(还请你们在评论的时候宽容一些：请接受我们哪怕在最好的状态下也没有太大吸引力的事实。)
Viewers can also observe our life-prolonging diet. During the meeting, Charlie and I will each consume enough Coke, See’s fudge and See’s peanut brittle to satisfy the weekly caloric needs of an NFL lineman. Long ago we discovered a fundamental truth: There’s nothing like eating carrots and broccoli when you’re really hungry — and want to stay that way.
观众还可以借此观察到我们如此长寿的饮食习惯。会议期间，查理和我每人都要喝足可乐、吃掉好多喜诗软糖和花生糖，足够一个NFL前锋一周的热量需求。很久以前，我们就发现了一个基本的事实：你要真的饿了，没什么比得上胡萝卜和花椰菜的，而且你还想一直这么保持下去。
Shareholders planning to attend the meeting should come at 7 a.m. when the doors open at CenturyLink Center and start shopping. Carrie Sova will again be in charge of the festivities. She had her second child late last month, but that did not slow her down. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in those who work with her. She is aided by hundreds of Berkshire employees from around the country and by our entire home office crew as well, all of them pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
当天Century Link中心早上7点开门，计划参加会议的股东们就可以开始购物。Carrie Sova将再次主持今年的年会。上个月底她刚刚生了第二个孩子，但这并没有让她停下。她沉着镇定、机智又非常专业，可以为大家呈现出最好的内容。她得到了来自全国各地数百名伯克希尔员工们，以及我们办公室所有的工作人员的帮助，他们将共同为各位老板带来一个有趣充实的周末。
Last year we increased the number of hours available for shopping at the CenturyLink. Sales skyrocketed — so, naturally, we will stay with the new schedule. On Friday, April 29th you can shop between noon and 5 p.m., and on Saturday exhibits and stores will be open from 7 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.
去年我们延长了Century Link的购物时间，让我们的销量直线上涨，所以我们今年还会延续新的时间表。4月29日(周五)，您可以从中午一直逛到下午5点，周六您可以从早晨7点一直逛到下午4点半。
On Saturday morning, we will have our fifth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will again be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager — in my one brief flirtation with honest labor — I delivered about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good at this game. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
周六早晨，我们将进行第五届国际报纸投递挑战赛。目标仍是克莱顿之家的门廊，投掷线据目标大概35英尺左右。当我十几岁时，我曾经短暂做过送报纸的工作，投递了大概50万份报纸，所以我觉得自己很擅长这个游戏。向我挑战吧！让我难堪吧！打倒我吧！报纸大概有36-42页，你必须自己折叠它们(不许用橡皮筋)。
The competition begins at 7:15, when contestants will make preliminary tosses. The eight throws judged most accurate — four made by contestants 12 or under, and four made by the older set — will compete against me at 7:45. The young challengers will each receive a prize. But the older ones will have to beat me to take anything home.
比赛将在早晨7:15开始，参赛者将进行初赛，最准确的8名投掷手在7:45与我展开最终对决。有4名从12岁以下选手参赛者中选出，4名是往届选手。年轻的新选手只要晋级就会获得奖励，而老选手必须要打败我才能赢到奖品。
And be sure to check out the Clayton home itself. It can be purchased for $78,900, fully installed on land you provide. In past years, we’ve made many sales on the meeting day. Kevin Clayton will be on hand with his order book.
不要忘了顺便去看看克莱顿之家，您可以花7.8万买下它，我们可以将它安装到您指定的地点。在过去的几年中，我们在年会上做成了很多买卖，Kevin Clayton的手上会随时拿着订货单的。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (including a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so and can safely be skipped by those craving a little last-minute shopping.
早晨8点半将会上映一部新的伯克希尔电影。一个小时后会有问答环节(中午在Century Link摊位上会提供午餐)，问答环节将持续到下午3点半。在短暂的休息后，查理与我将会在3:45召开年度会议。业务环节大概会持续半小时，为了安全起见那些想要来个”最后一分钟购物”的人可以跳过这个环节。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. Say hello to the many Berkshire managers who will be captaining their exhibits. And be sure to view the terrific BNSF railroad layout that salutes all of our subsidiaries. Your children (and you!) will be enchanted with it.
您的购物场地将是一个19.43万平方英尺的大厅，毗邻会场，伯克希尔旗下的数十家子公司的产品将在这里出售。向那些为自己产品站台的伯克希尔经理们问好吧，他们将担任导购。记得看看BNSF铁路布局图，它为了向伯克希尔所有子公司致敬而设计，您和您的孩子一定会为它着迷。
We will have a new and very special exhibit in the hall this year: a full-size model of the world’s largest aircraft engine, for which Precision Castparts makes many key components. The real engines weigh about 20,000 pounds and are ten feet in diameter and 22 feet in length. The bisected model at the meeting will give you a good look at many PCC components that help power your flights.
今年我们还有一个非常特别的新展览：世界上最大飞机发动机的全尺寸模型。模型的绝大多数零件都是由Precision Castparts公司制造的。真正的发动机有2万磅重，直径10英尺，长22英尺。我们展览的这个被从中间切开的模型可以让您更好的了解为您的飞机提供动力的PCC发动机零件。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them on Sunday at our fourth annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your meeting credentials. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in; the fudge and peanut brittle take their toll.) Participation in the 5K grows every year. Help us set another record.
我们经营的Brooks跑鞋今年也会出售会议纪念款。买一双之后参加我们周日早晨8点的第四届”伯克希尔5公里”活动吧。起跑点设在Century Link，您可以在和参会入场券一起寄过去的参会指南中看到更多相关的详细信息。参加这个比赛您就会发现自己在和一堆伯克希尔的经理、管理人员、董事和合作伙伴共同前行。(不过查理和我要多睡会儿，我们吃了太多的软糖和花生脆)。这项活动的参赛者正在逐年增多，也帮我们创下了另一个记录。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money. Spend the savings on our other products.
购物区的GEICO展位是由来自我们公司分布在全国各地的顶尖顾问组成的。别忘了在展位下停下看一下报价，多数情况下GEICO会为你提供股东折扣(通常8%左右)。在我们经营的51个司法区有44个允许这个特别折扣。(补充一点：折扣不能和其他折扣同时使用，比如某个享受特别折扣的团体。)带上您现有的保单信息来看看我们的报价，您就会发现真的可以省好多钱。用省下的钱买我们的其他产品吧！
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Andy Kilpatrick will introduce (and be glad to sign) the latest edition of his all-encompassing coverage of Berkshire. It’s 1,304 pages and weighs 9.8 pounds. (My blurb for the book: “Ridiculously skimpy.”) Check out Peter Bevelin’s new book as well. Peter has long been a keen observer of Berkshire.
记得去书虫书吧看看。我们将会在那里展出35本书和一些DVD，其中包括几本新书。Andy Kilpatrick将介绍他关于伯克希尔全方位报道《Of Permanent Value》的最新版本，并且很愿意签名售书。本书有1304页，重9.8磅。(我对于这本书的简介是：“薄得离谱”)。同时看看Peter Bevelin的新书《A Few Lessons from Sherlock Holmes》。长期以来Peter一直都是伯克希尔非常敏锐的观察员。
We will also have a new, 20-page-longer edition of Berkshire’s 50-year commemorative book that at last year’s meeting sold 12,000 copies. Since then, Carrie and I have uncovered additional material that we find fascinating, such as some very personal letters sent by Grover Cleveland to Edward Butler, his friend and the then — publisher of The Buffalo News. Nothing from the original edition has been changed or eliminated, and the price remains $20. Charlie and I will jointly sign 100 copies that will be randomly placed among the 5,000 available for sale at the meeting.
我们也将推出一本20页的全版伯克希尔50周年纪念册。我们曾在去年的会展上卖出了12000本。那之后，Carrie和我发现了一些新的资料，我们认为它们非常吸引人的，例如一些非常私人的信件，比如Grover Cleveland寄给Edward Butler的信，EdwardButler是他的朋友，当时还是《布法罗新闻》的发行人。原版中已有的内容没有任何删除或改动，价格仍是20美元。查理和我将共同签售100本，它们将随机地放置在准备好地5000本当中，在展会上售卖。
My friend, Phil Beuth, has written Limping on Water , an autobiography that chronicles his life at Capital Cities Communications and tells you a lot about its leaders, Tom Murphy and Dan Burke. These two were the best managerial duo — both in what they accomplished and how they did it — that Charlie and I ever witnessed. Much of what you become in life depends on whom you choose to admire and copy. Start with Tom Murphy, and you’ll never need a second exemplar.
我的朋友Phil Beuth写了一本自传《Limping on Water》，讲述他在大都会的工作生活，讲述了很多关于他的领导Tom Murphy和Dan Burke的事。不论是从取得的成就还是如何取得的过程来看，这两位都是查理和我见过的最顶尖的管理二人组。你的人生能取得怎样的成就，很大程度上取决于你所选择的崇拜和学习对象。Tom Murphy就是一个不二人选。
Finally, Jeremy Miller has written Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules , a book that will debut at the annual meeting. Mr. Miller has done a superb job of researching and dissecting the operation of Buffett Partnership Ltd. and of explaining how Berkshire’s culture has evolved from its BPL origin. If you are fascinated by investment theory and practice, you will enjoy this book.
最后，由Jeremy Miller写的《巴菲特致股东的信-基本原则篇》(Warren Buffett’s Ground Rules)也将在这次年会上闪亮登场。Miller先生已经对巴菲特合伙公司做了出色的研究和剖析，并且详细的解释了伯克希尔是如何从最初的BPL发展至今的。如果你着迷于投资理论与实践，你会喜欢这本书的。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
这份报告的附件材料可以告诉您如何获得年会及其他活动的所需凭证。机票有时会在伯克希尔周末前提价。如果您从很远的地方来，您可以比较飞到堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用，两个城市之间车程为2.5小时。如果你计划在奥马哈租车的话飞到堪萨斯可能为你节省大笔资金，一对夫妇大概可以节省1000多美元。把省下的钱花在我们的产品上吧！
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72ndStreet between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week encompassing the meeting, the store did a record 9 million.)
在位于道奇和太平洋之间的72街，占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具商城，我们将再次举行”伯克希尔周末”折扣价活动。在去年的年会周里，这个家具店创下了约4424万美元营业额。如果你和任何的零售商说这个数字，他们都不会相信。(内布拉斯加家具商城在奥马哈的店铺每周平均的销售额大概900万美元，奥马哈的销售情况还是除了我们在达拉斯的新店之外最好的)。
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. During “Berkshire Weekend” NFM will be open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is hosting a picnic to which you are all invited.
要获得NFM的折扣优惠，您必须在4月26日(周二)至5月2日(周一)之间进行购买，别忘带着您的参会凭证。几家平常没有折扣活动的著名制造品牌也会参加特价活动，本着股东周末的特别精神为您破例。我们非常感谢他们的配合。在”伯克希尔周末”NFM将在工作日从上午10点营业至晚上9点，周六将从上午10点营业至晚上9点半，周日从上午10点营业至晚上8点。周六晚5点半至8点半，内布拉斯加家具商城将举办野餐活动，我们邀请您也一同参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, April 29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. During last year’s Friday-Sunday stretch, the store wrote a sales ticket every 15 seconds that it was open.
在波仙珠宝店，我们还将举行两场只有股东可以参加的活动。第一场将于4月29日(周五)下午6点到9点举行鸡尾酒会。第二场大型售卖活动将在5月1日(周日)举行早上9点至下午4点举行。周六波仙将营业至下午6点。去年的这个周五到周日，我们的商店在营业时间每15秒就会开出一张销售单。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25th through Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder either by presenting your meeting credential or a brokerage statement showing you own our stock.
周末期间波仙珠宝将迎来大量客流。因此，为了您的方便，股东价格优惠期间定于4月25日周一到5月7日周六。在此期间，请您出示自己的参会凭据，或出示能显示您持有我们股票的经纪声明(brokerage statement)，以便确定您的股东身份。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. On the upper level, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. I will join them and hope to have Ajit and Charlie there also.
周日在波仙珠宝外面的商场，来自达拉斯的杰出魔术师NormanBeck将会进行令人眼花缭乱的魔术表演。在商场上层，我们邀请到了世界顶级桥牌专家BobHamman和SharonOsberg，股东可在周日下午和他们切磋牌艺。我会加入牌局，并希望能把Ajit和查理也请过来。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a junior at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我的朋友Ariel Hsing周日也会来到商场，接受乒乓球的挑战。我第一次见到她时才9岁，即便那会儿我也一分都赢不了她。她在2012年就已经代表美国出征过奥运会，现在是普林斯顿大学的大三学生。如果您不介意输球的尴尬的话，可以和她切磋一下球技，活动下午1点开始。比尔·盖茨和我会率先登场，试着削减她的锐气。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st, serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st( but not before ). As for my other favorite restaurant, Piccolo’s, I’m sad to report it closed.
5月1日周日这一天，Gorat’s餐馆将再次为伯克希尔股东独家开放，营业时间为下午1点到晚上10点。请于4月1日(请勿提前)拨打402-551-3733预定Gorat’s餐厅座位。而另一家我最喜欢的餐厅Piccolo’s，我很遗憾地宣布它关门了。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, the preeminent business journalist of her time, who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我们将再次邀请同样的三位财经记者主持大会期间的问答环节，他们会向我和查理提出股东通过电子邮件发送的问题。三名记者和他们的邮件分别是：杰出的商业记者CarolLoomis： loomisbrk@gmail.com；来自CNBC的BeckyQuick： BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；来自《纽约时报》的AndrewRossSorkin： arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位记者会从收到的问题中，选出他们认为最有意思最重要的6个问题。几位记者告诉我，为了增加您的问题被选中的几率，您的问题要简洁，避免在最后一刻才发送出去，要和伯克希尔相关，并且一封邮件里问题数量不要超过两个。(在邮件里说明，如果您的问题被选中您是否希望透露自己的名字)。
An accompanying set of questions will be asked by three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
三名关注伯克希尔的分析师会提出另外一组问题。今年的保险业专家是来自野村证券的CliffGallant。与我们非保险业务相关的问题，将会由来自Ruane,Cunniff&Goldfarb公司的JonathanBrandt和晨星公司(Morningstar)的GreggWarren提出。我们希望分析师和记者提出的问题有助于增进股东们对自己投资的了解。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. Multi-part questions aren’t allowed; we want to give as many questioners as possible a shot at us.
查理和我对于将要回答的问题并没有什么线索。当然有些问题会很刁钻，这是我们喜欢的方式。一个问句里包含多个问题是不允许的，我们想要让尽可能多的人有机会向我们提问。
All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 64 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
我们预计总共会收到至少54个问题，其中分析师和记者每人可以问6个问题，听众可以提出18个问题。(去年我们总共回答了64个问题)。听众的问题将通过11次抽签的方式选出来，抽签时间为年度会议当天早上的8:15。在大会场馆和主要分会场一共安置有11个麦克风，每个麦克风将会进行一次抽签。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and, if possible, should also have adequate time to digest and analyze it before any trading takes place. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not follow the common practice of talking one-on-one with large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders. There is no one more important to us than the shareholder of limited means who trusts us with a substantial portion of his savings.
在我谈论让股东增加知识的同时，我也要提请大家注意，查理和我相信所有的股东都应该能够同时接收到伯克希尔发布的新信息；而且如果条件允许的话，股东应该在进行交易前用充足的时间消化和分析这些信息。正是出于这个原因，我们尽量在周五晚间或周六早间发布财报数据，年度大会也总是在周六举办。我们并不采用和大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一的交谈的惯常做法，而是像对待所有其他股东一样对待他们。对我们来说，没有人比收入有限的股东更重要的了，因为他们基于信任把大部分积蓄托付于于我们打理。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I also believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
处于充分的理由，我常常夸赞公司的运营经理所取得的成就，他们都是全明星级别的经理人，经营自己的业务就好像这些资产是他们家族拥有的唯一财产一样谨慎。我也相信我们的管理者心态是以股东利益为导向，就像在大型上市公司中管理一样。我们大多数经理人并不需要为钱而工作。对他们来说，打出商业”全垒打”所带来的愉悦跟收到薪水支票同样重要。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 30,400-page Federal income tax return — that’s up 6,000 pages from the prior year! — oversees the filing of 3,530 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities, fact-checks this letter — and the list goes on and on.
在我们公司总部办公室工作的24名男女雇员也同样重要。他们高效地处理SEC和其它监管要求，提交了30400页联邦所得税申报表，比前一年多了6000多页！还要监管3530份州税申报表，回应无数的股东和媒体问询，发布年度报告，准备美国最大规模的企业年会，协调董事会的活动，对这封信进行事实审核……这份任务列表还可以写很长。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year, for example, they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day. In fact, my job becomes more fun every year.
他们愉快高效处理了所有这些业务任务，让我的生活倍感轻松愉悦。他们还努力处理一些并非和伯克希尔严格相关的活动：比如，去年他们接待了40所大学(从200所申请大学挑选出来的)派出的学生到奥马哈和我进行一天的问答活动。他们还处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅程，甚至午餐时还帮我买汉堡和炸薯条(当然裹满了亨氏番茄酱)。没有哪个CEO比我更舒服了；我真的感觉每天像跳着踢踏舞去上班。事实上，我的工作一年比一年更有趣。
In 2015, Berkshire’s revenues increased by $16 billion. Look carefully, however, at the two pictures on the facing page. The top one is from last year’s report and shows the entire Berkshire home-office crew at our Christmas lunch. Below that photo is this year’s Christmas photo portraying the same 25 people identically positioned. In 2015, no one joined us, no one left. And the odds are good that you will see a photo of the same 25 next year.
2015年，伯克希尔的收入增长了160亿美元。然而总部没有人加入也没有人离开。明年你可能还会看到这25人的照片。
Can you imagine another very large company — we employ 361,270 people worldwide — enjoying that kind of employment stability at headquarters? At Berkshire we have hired some wonderful people — and they have stayed with us. Moreover, no one is hired unless he or she is truly needed. That’s why you’ve never read about “restructuring” charges at Berkshire.
你能想象还有哪家超大型公司的总部(我们在全球有361270名雇员)能有这样的雇员稳定性吗？伯克希尔雇佣了许多优秀的员工，他们一直在陪伴着我们。此外，除非真正需要，否则没有人会被雇佣。这就是你从来没听说过伯克希尔要进行”重组”的原因。
On April 30th, come to Omaha — the cradle of capitalism — and meet my gang. They are the best
4月30日，来资本家的摇篮奥马哈和我的这些小伙伴碰面吧。他们是最棒的。
February 27, 2016
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Footnotes
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All per—share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. ↩