原文信息：
- 标题：Vice Chairman’s Thoughts - Past and Future
- 作者：Charles Munger
- 发表时间：2015-02-27
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译：ShawnQinHX
- 整理：Ponge
To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：
I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.
1. Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,
1. 描述是什么样的管理制度和政策，使一家注定要倒闭的小型商品纺织企业蜕变成现如今强大的伯克希尔公司；
2. Explain how the management system and policies came into being,
2. 解释这套管理体系和政策是如何产生的；
3. Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,
3. 一定程度上解释伯克希尔为何表现如此出色；
4. Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and
4. 预测如果巴菲特即将离任，这种异常好的业绩能否延续；
5. Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
5. 思考伯克希尔过去50年取得的巨大成就是否对其他地方有借鉴意义。
The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:
1. Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.
1. 伯克希尔将会是一家分散经营的企业集团（diffuse conglomerate），厌恶那些它无法做出有用预测的活动（averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions）；
2. Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.
2. 它的顶层公司可以通过单独注册的子公司做几乎所有生意，这些子公司 CEO 拥有极大的自主权；
3. There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.
3. 集团总部几乎什么都没有，除了一个小小的办公套间，里面有一名董事长、一名 CFO 和几名助理，助理主要协助 CFO 处理审计、内控等事务；
4. Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.
4. 在伯克希尔子公司中，财产保险业务会一直占据突出地位。那些保险公司作为一个整体，预计会在适当的时候产生可靠的承保收益（underwriting gains），同时也会产生大量“浮存金”（来自尚未支付的保险负债）用于投资；
5. There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.
5. 伯克希尔没有适用于整个系统的人事制度、股票期权制度、其他激励制度、退休或类似制度等，因为子公司有他们自己的系统，而且往往各不相同；
6. Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.
6. 伯克希尔主席只为自己保留了少数职责；
6.1. He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.
6.1. 他将管理几乎所有的证券投资，通常存在于伯克希尔的财险业务中。
6.2. He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.
6.2. 他将挑选所有重要子公司的 CEO，确定他们的薪酬，并从他们的私人建议中获得继任者（人选），以防突然需要一个；
6.3. He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.
6.4. He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.
6.4. 有需要时，他确保子公司 CEO 能迅速联系到他，而平时，他几乎无需任何额外接触；
6.5. He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.
6.5. 他会写一封详实、合乎逻辑、有用的信附在年度报告中。他试想自己若是个被动的小股东想要知道什么，以此设计年报的内容。在年度股东大会上，他还会回答数小时的问题。
6.6. He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.
6.6. 他努力成为一种文化典范，这种文化在他在位期间及离任之后，能长期为客户、股东和其他在任者服务。
6.7. His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and
6.7. 无论他年龄多大，他的首要任务都是留出大量时间安静地阅读和思考，特别是那些可能提高他决策质量的学习。
6.8. He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.
6.8. 他也会花大量时间对他人正在取得的成就推崇备至。
7. New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.
8. Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.
9. In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.
10. In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.
11. As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.
11. 作为一个重要的优先行为事项，伯克希尔几乎从不出售其子公司。
12. Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.
12. 伯克希尔几乎从不把一位 CEO 调到另一家无关的子公司。
13. Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.
13. 伯克希尔绝不会仅以年龄为由强迫子公司的 CEO 退休。
14. Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.
14. 伯克希尔只有极少的未偿债务，因为它努力保持：(i) 在任何情况下几近完美的信用；(ii) 在不寻常的机会出现时，可以轻易获得能被调用的现金和信贷。
15. Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.
Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.
“伯克希尔系统”的元素及其聚集的规模都不太寻常。据我所知，没有任何一家大公司拥有一半这样的元素。
How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?
伯克希尔是如何碰巧获得了如此与众不同的企业个性的呢？
Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.
Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.
几乎对每一个元素的选择，都是因为巴菲特相信在他的领导下，这将有助于最大限度地提高伯克希尔的成就。他并不是想为其他公司创建一个放之四海而皆准的系统。事实上，伯克希尔子公司并不需要在它们的运营中使用伯克希尔系统。一些使用了不同系统的子公司也正蓬勃发展。
What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?
Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:
多年来，我诊断出几个重要原因：
1. He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.
1. 从他自己开始，他特别想要持续地、最大限度地发挥系统中重要人员的理性、技能和奉献精神；
2. He wanted win/win results everywhere—in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.
2. 他想要在任何地方都取得双赢的结果—例如，通过给予忠诚来获得忠诚；
3. He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.
3. 他想要做能使长期结果最大化的决策，所以他总是去找那些在位时间够长并承担决策后果的决策者；
4. He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.
4. 他想把一个庞大机构几乎不可避免的官僚主义的坏处降到最低；
5. He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.
5. 他想像本·格雷厄姆教授一样，为传播智慧做出个人贡献。
When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.
当巴菲特建立伯克希尔系统时，他是否预见到了随之而来的所有好处？没有。巴菲特是在实践过程中偶然发现这些好处的。但是，当他看到有用的结果时，他强化了其成因（when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes）。
Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?
Only four large factors occur to me:
在我看来，只有四大因素：
1. The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,
1. 巴菲特富有建设性的小众特质；
2. The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,
2. 伯克希尔系统富有建设性的小众特质；
3. Good luck, and
3. 好运；
4. The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.
4. 一些股东和其他仰慕者，包括一些媒体人士，对我们奇怪、强烈、又颇具感染力的喜爱、关注和支持。
I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.
我相信这四个因素都存在，而且都有帮助。但最终推动这台“重型机器”前行的还是富有建设性的特质、奇怪的支持，以及它们之间的相互作用。
In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.
Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.
实际上，巴菲特采用的是著名篮球教练约翰·伍登的制胜之道。在伍登学会把几乎所有上场时间分配给七名最优秀的球员后，他时常取得胜利。这样一来，对手总是面对他最好的球员，而不是次好的球员。而且，由于有了额外的上场时间，最好的球员比正常情况下有了更大进步。
And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.
巴菲特的情况比伍登还要好，因为他将所有技能都集中于一个人身上，而不是七个。并且 50 年里，他的技能随着年龄的增长而不断提高，而不是像篮球运动员那样逐步退化。
Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.
此外，巴菲特把如此多的权力和权威集中在重要子公司长期任职的 CEO 身上，也在那里产生了强大的“伍登效应”。这种效应提升了 CEO 的技能，也提高了子公司的成就。
Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.
And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”
而优秀的子公司和 CEO 们则只需要总部较少的关注，这就形成了通常所说的“良性循环”。
How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?
对伯克希尔来说，始终把财险公司作为重要子公司这一做法的效果如何？
Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.
不可思议的好。伯克希尔当初的野心极其不合理，尽管如此，它还是如愿以偿了。
Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.
财险公司通常投资于那些价值与其股东权益大致相当的普通股，伯克希尔的保险子公司也是这么做的。而在过去 50 年中，标普 500 创造了每年约 10% 的税前收益率，形成了一股巨大的顺风。
And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.
而且，在巴菲特时代的最初几十年，伯克希尔保险子公司的普通股表现大幅跑赢指数，这与巴菲特的预期完全一致。后来，当伯克希尔日益庞大的持股规模和对所得税方面的考虑使其跑赢指数的那部分回报逐渐消退、越来越不明显时（也许不会永远如此），另一个更好的情势出现了。阿吉特·詹恩（Ajit Jain）凭空创造了一个庞大的再保险业务，产生了巨大的“浮存金”和丰厚的承保收益。然后整个 GEICO 被并入伯克希尔，GEICO 的市场份额随之翻了两番。伯克希尔的其他保险业务也大有起色，这主要归功于信誉优势（reputational advantage）、承保纪律（underwriting discipline）、寻找并待在良好的利基市场（finding and staying within good niches），以及招募并留住优秀人才。
Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.
后来，伯克希尔因其近乎独一无二且相当可靠的企业个性和庞大规模而被广为人知，它的保险子公司获得并抓住了许多极具吸引力且其他公司无法获得的机会—购买非公开发行的证券。这些证券大多有固定的期限且能产生显著收益。
Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.
伯克希尔在保险业的辉煌业绩并非自然而然的结果。通常情况下，财险生意即便管理得很好，也只能取得一般的结果。这样的结果没啥用处。而伯克希尔更好的结果规模如此之大，让我觉得就算巴菲特保留其聪明才智，恢复青春，再从小规模起步，他也无法重塑这样的业绩。
Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.
Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.
Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?
Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.
伯克希尔在设计时，就有方法论上的优势，更容易获得好机会。伯克希尔从来没有“收购部”这样的部门来承受收购的压力。它也从不依赖“帮手”（咨询顾问）的建议，因为这些人肯定有支持交易的偏见。巴菲特不会自欺欺人，虽然他声称（对某些行业）缺乏专业知识，但他比大多数企业高管更清楚什么在商业中可行，什么不可行。他作为被动投资者的长期经验帮到了他。最后，即使伯克希尔获得了比别人好得多的机会，巴菲特也常常表现出近乎非人的耐心，很少出手。例如，在掌管伯克希尔的头十年里，巴菲特眼看着一个生意（纺织）走向灭亡，两个新生意被引入，净赚一个。
What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.
巴菲特领导下的伯克希尔犯过什么大错吗？嗯，虽然“买错”（mistakes of commision）是常有之事，但几乎所有的大错都在于“错过买”，包括错过买入沃尔玛的股票，而当时我们确信沃尔玛能大获成功。这种错过的错误（errors of omission）（对我们来说）非常重要。如果伯克希尔能够抓住几次确定度其实很高的机会，那它现在的净资产至少会增加 500 亿美元。
The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.
The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.
Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.
此外，它的铁路和公用事业子公司如今提供了大量投资新固定资产的好机会。许多子公司目前正在进行明智的“补强型”并购（”bolt-on” acquisitions）。
Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if (1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.
只要伯克希尔系统大部分保持不变，而现有生意的动能和机会又如此之大，几乎可以肯定，伯克希尔会在很长一段时间内表现得比普通公司更好，即使（1）巴菲特明天就离开；（2）他的继任者能力平平；（3）伯克希尔再也不进行大型收购。
But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.
但是，假如巴菲特即将离开，他的继任者不会是“能力平平”。例如，阿吉特·詹恩（Ajit Jain）和格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel）都是久经考验的佼佼者，用“世界级”来形容可能还不够，我会选择“世界领先”这样的描述。在一些重要方面，他们甚至是比巴菲特还更好的商业管理者。
And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.
Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.
我也不认为令人满意的对新生意的收购会因巴菲特的离开而终止。随着伯克希尔庞大的规模和积极股东主义时代（the age of activism）的到来，我认为一些理想的收购机会还会出现，伯克希尔 600 亿美元的现金也会有益地减少。
My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.
我的最后一个任务是回答伯克希尔过去 50 年取得的巨大成果是否对其他地方有借鉴意义？
The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.
答案显然是肯定的。在巴菲特早年，伯克希尔面临着一项艰巨任务：将一个小笔资金转变为一个庞大而有用的公司。为了解决这个问题，伯克希尔避免了官僚主义，在很长、很长一段时间里，伯克希尔主要依靠一位深谋远虑的领导者，他不断改进，并吸纳了更多像他一样的人才。
Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.
相比之下，一些典型的大公司系统：总部官僚机构林立，很多 CEO 在 59 岁左右上任，很少静下心来思考问题，很快便又在固定的年龄被迫退休。
I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.
我认为，伯克希尔系统应该在其他地方被多加尝试，官僚主义最坏的属性应该像对待癌症一样被整治。应对官僚主义的一个好例子，就是乔治·马歇尔（George Marshall）——他从国会争取到选择将领时不考虑资历的权利，帮助赢得了第二次世界大战。
Sincerely,
Charles T. Munger