原文信息：
Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | 12.0 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.4 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 6.5 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | (6.2) | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | 4.6 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 8.3 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2014 | 19.4% | 21.6% | 9.9% |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2014 | 751,113% | 1,826,163% | 11,196% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
A note to readers: Fifty years ago, today’s management took charge at Berkshire. For this Golden Anniversary, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger each wrote his views of what has happened at Berkshire during the past 50 years and what each expects during the next 50. Neither changed a word of his commentary after reading what the other had written. Warren’s thoughts begin on page 24 and Charlie’s on page 39. Shareholders, particularly new ones, may find it useful to read those letters before reading the report on 2014, which begins below.
读者须知：50 年前，今天的管理层掌管伯克希尔公司。在这个金色周年纪念之际，Warren Buffett 和 Charlie Munger 分别撰写了自己对伯克希尔过去 50 年的看法以及对未来 50 年的展望。在读完对方的文章后，两人都没有改动自己的评论。沃伦的观点从第 24 页开始，查理的观点从第 39 页开始。股东们，尤其是新股东们，在阅读下面开始的 2014 年报告之前，阅读这些信件可能会有所帮助。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2014 was 19 to $146,186, a rate of 19.4% compounded annually.1
2014年伯克希尔的账面价值增长了183亿美元，A/B股每股账面价值增长8.3%(标普13.7%)。自现任管理层接手的50年来，每股账面价值已从19美元增至146,186美元，年均复合增长率约为19.4%。
During our tenure, we have consistently compared the yearly performance of the S&P 500 to the change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. We’ve done that because book value has been a crude, but useful, tracking device for the number that really counts: intrinsic business value.
In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire’s assets were then largely securities whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of the assets involved in the calculation of book value were “marked to market.”
在我们最初的几十年里，公司账面价值与内在价值之间的关系比现在要密切得多。这是事实，因为当年伯克希尔的资产主要是可随时反应其当前市值的有价证券。按华尔街的话说，计算账面价值的大多数资产都是”按市值计价的”。
Today, our emphasis has shifted in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened.
With that in mind, we have added a new set of data — the historical record of Berkshire’s stock price — to the performance table on the facing page. Market prices, let me stress, have their limitations in the short term. Monthly or yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and not indicative of changes in intrinsic value. Over time, however, stock prices and intrinsic value almost invariably converge. Charlie Munger, Berkshire Vice Chairman and my partner, and I believe that has been true at Berkshire: In our view, the increase in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value over the past 50 years is roughly equal to the 1,826,163% gain in market price of the company’s shares.
鉴于此，我们在首页中的业绩表现表中增列了一组新的数据，即伯克希尔股价的历史变动记录。让我强调一下，市场价格在短期内有其缺陷。股价的月度或年度变动往往是非理性的，因此无法衡量企业内在价值的变化。然而长期来看，股价和内在价值总是趋于吻合。伯克希尔的副主席兼我的合伙人查理·芒格以及我本人均对此深信不疑：在我们看来，伯克希尔每股内在价值在过去50年的增长大致相当于公司股价 1,826,163% 涨幅。
The Year at Berkshire 伯克希尔过去一年表现
It was a good year for Berkshire on all major fronts, except one. Here are the important developments:
在过去一年，伯克希尔在几乎所有方面都取得了不俗成绩，仅有一处例外。重要进展如下：
- Our “Powerhouse Five” — a collection of Berkshire’s largest non-insurance businesses — had a record 1.6 billion from 2013.2 The companies in this sainted group are Berkshire Hathaway Energy (formerly MidAmerican Energy), BNSF, IMC (I’ve called it Iscar in the past), Lubrizol and Marmon.
伯克希尔旗下非保险业务最大的”五驾马车”，2014年的税前收益达到创记录的124亿美元，较2013年增加16亿美元。这一备受赞誉的集团具体包括伯克希尔能源公司(前中美能源)、BNSF铁路、IMC集团(过去称其为ISCAR)、[Lubrizol|路博润]和Marmon集团。
Of the five, only Berkshire Hathaway Energy, then earning 12 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the ten-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply increasing earnings, but making sure we also increase per-share results.
在这五家公司之中，只有伯克希尔能源公司是十年之前就为我们所有，当时的税前收益只有3.93亿美元。我们以全现金的方式收购了其他三家，在收购第五家BNSF时，我们用现金支付了70%，其余30%通过发行伯克希尔股票支付，为此公司股本增加了6.1%。换言之，这五家公司在过去十年为伯克希尔带来120亿美元的年税前收益回报，但公司的股本仅伴随轻微的稀释。这样的结果才符合我们的目标：不仅仅增加收益，而是要确保提高每股收益。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2015, we expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve as well. The gain could reach $1 billion, in part because of bolt-on acquisitions by the group that have already closed or are under contract.
如果美国经济在2015年继续复苏，我们预计来自”五驾马车”的收益也将继续增长，这一收益有望达到10亿美元，部分原因来自该集团已完成和正在进行的”补强收购”。
- Our bad news from 2014 comes from our group of five as well and is unrelated to earnings. During the year, BNSF disappointed many of its customers. These shippers depend on us, and service failures can badly hurt their businesses.
2014年的坏消息也来自这”五驾马车”，但与收益无关。在过去一年，BNSF的服务令许多客户失望。这些托运人都有赖于我们的铁路线，运营不畅将严重损害他们的业务。
BNSF is, by far, Berkshire’s most important non-insurance subsidiary and, to improve its performance, we will spend $6 billion on plant and equipment in 2015. That sum is nearly 50% more than any other railroad has spent in a single year and is a truly extraordinary amount, whether compared to revenues, earnings or depreciation charges.
到目前为止，BNSF依然是伯克希尔最重要的非保险类子公司，为改善其业绩，我们将在2015年在工厂和设备上投入60亿美元。这个数字比其他任何铁路公司一年的支出都高出近50%，无论从收入、盈利还是折旧费用相比，这样的投入都堪称空前。
Though weather, which was particularly severe last year, will always cause railroads a variety of operating problems, our responsibility is to do whatever it takes to restore our service to industry-leading levels. That can’t be done overnight: The extensive work required to increase system capacity sometimes disrupts operations while it is underway. Recently, however, our outsized expenditures are beginning to show results. During the last three months, BNSF’s performance metrics have materially improved from last year’s figures.
尽管去年恶劣的天气状况尤客观上会给铁路运营带来各种问题，但我们的责任是竭尽所能将我们的服务恢复到行业领先水平。这当然不是一朝一夕之功：铁路扩建升级工程难免会影响到现有的运营。但可喜的是，我们对铁路的大力投入在近期已初显成效。在过去的一个季度里，BNSF的业绩指标比去年的数据有了明显的改善。
- Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned 4.7 billion in 2013. Here, as with our Powerhouse Five, we expect further gains in 2015. Within this group, we have two companies that last year earned between 600 million, six that earned between 400 million, and seven that earned between 250 million. This collection of businesses will increase in both number and earnings. Our ambitions have no finish line.
我们数十家规模较小的非保险业务在去年的税前收益总额为51亿美元，较2013年的47亿美元有了较大增长。与我们的”五驾马车”类似，我们预计2015年有望进一步增长。在这些企业中，有2家企业税前收益在4-6亿美元之间；有6家企业收益在2.5-4亿美元之间；另有7家收益在1-2.5亿美元之间。这一系列企业的数量和收益都将增长。我们的雄心没有终点。
- Berkshire’s huge and growing insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2014 — that makes 12 years in a row — and increased its float. During that 12-year stretch, our float — money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit — has grown from 84 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold. Meanwhile, our underwriting profit totaled 2.7 billion earned in 2014. And all of this began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
伯克希尔庞大且不断增长的保险产业在2014年再次实现了承保盈利，这也是连续12年保持承保盈利，此外保险浮存金规模也大幅增加。在过去12年时间里，我们的保险浮存金规模从410亿增长至840亿美元，尽管这些浮存金的所有权并不属于我们，但我们却可以使用其投资来为伯克希尔创造收益。尽管这一收益和浮存金规模并没有反映在伯克希尔的收益中，但由于允许我们持有的浮存金资产能够产生可观投资收益。同时，我们在12年间实现了240亿美元的承保收益，其中2014年实现27亿美元。而这一切都始于1967年我们以860万美元收购了国民保险公司。
- While Charlie and I search for new businesses to buy, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year was particularly fruitful: We contracted for 31 bolt-ons, scheduled to cost 400,000 to $2.9 billion. However, the largest acquisition, Duracell, will not close until the second half of this year. It will then be placed under Marmon’s jurisdiction.
在查理和我寻找新的收购机会时，我们的许多子公司也在不定期的进行”补强收购”。去年这方面的成果尤为丰硕：我们签订了31项补强收购协议，预计耗资78亿美元。这些交易的规模从40万美元至29亿美元不等。其中最大的一项收购金霸王(Duracell)，预计要到今年下半年才能完成。收购完成后将归Marmon集团管理。
Charlie and I encourage bolt-ons, if they are sensibly-priced. (Most deals offered us aren’t.) They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. This means no more work for us, yet more earnings, a combination we find particularly appealing. We will make many more of these bolt-on deals in future years.
如果价格合理，查理和我都鼓励补强式[Acquisitions|收购]。他们将资本配置到与我们现有业务相符合的业务中，收购的业务将交由我们的专业管理团队接管。这意味着我们无需更多工作去整合就能获得更多的收益回报，对于这样的天然搭配对我们来说特别有吸引力。在未来，我们将开展更多的补强收购。
- Two years ago my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann, asked Berkshire to join his 3G Capital group in the acquisition of Heinz. My affirmative response was a no-brainer: I knew immediately that this partnership would work well from both a personal and financial standpoint. And it most definitely has.
两年之前，我的好友Jorge Paulo Lemann邀请伯克希尔参与他的3G资本对亨氏(Heinz)的收购。对此我毫无犹豫地表示同意：当时我就知道，无论从个人关系角度还是财务投资角度看，本次合伙必然顺利。最后事情发展也大致如此。
I’m not embarrassed to admit that Heinz is run far better under Alex Behring, Chairman, and Bernardo Hees, CEO, than would be the case if I were in charge. They hold themselves to extraordinarily high performance standards and are never satisfied, even when their results far exceed those of competitors.
在此我必须承认，亨氏集团在董事长AlexBehring和CEO-BernardoHees的管理下，要远远好于我负责的情况。即便当他们的业绩远远超越同行，他们还是坚持极高的绩效标准且从不满意。
We expect to partner with 3G in more activities. Sometimes our participation will only involve a financing role, as was the case in the recent acquisition of Tim Hortons by Burger King. Our favored arrangement, however, will usually be to link up as a permanent equity partner (who, in some cases, contributes to the financing of the deal as well). Whatever the structure, we feel good when working with Jorge Paulo.
我们希望在更多的活动中与3G资本合作。有时我们的参与只是扮演财务投资人的角色，就像最近汉堡王(Burger King)收购TimHortons咖啡连锁店的案例一样。然而我们最青睐的方式还是成为永久股权合伙人(在某些案例中，他们也为交易提供融资)。但不管具体结构如何，我们对与Jorge Paulo和合作感觉很好。
Berkshire also has fine partnerships with Mars and Leucadia, and we may form new ones with them or with other partners. Our participation in any joint activities, whether as a financing or equity partner, will be limited to friendly transactions.
伯克希尔还与玛氏(Mars)和Leucadia建立了良好的合作关系，我们可能与这些伙伴或其他伙伴结成新的合作关系。但不管是作为纯粹的财务投资者还是股权合作伙伴，我们都将仅限于友好交易(不参与恶意收购)。
- In October, we contracted to buy Van Tuyl Automotive, a group of 78 automobile dealerships that is exceptionally well-run. Larry Van Tuyl, the company’s owner, and I met some years ago. He then decided that if he were ever to sell his company, its home should be Berkshire. Our purchase was recently completed, and we are now “car guys.”
去年10月，我们签约收购了VanTuyl汽车销售公司，该集团由78家汽车经销商组成，运营异常好。许多年前，我曾与该公司的所有者Larry Van Tuyl有过一面之缘。当时他决定说，如果他要卖掉公司，那么他希望卖给伯克希尔。我们最近完成了收购，现在我们也算是”汽车人”了。
Larry and his dad, Cecil, spent 62 years building the group, following a strategy that made owner-partners of all local managers. Creating this mutuality of interests proved over and over to be a winner. Van Tuyl is now the fifth-largest automotive group in the country, with per-dealership sales figures that are outstanding.
Larry和他的父亲Cecil Tuyl花了62年的时间建立了这个集团，遵循的策略就是让所有的本地管理人员都成为股东的合伙人。事实一次又一次的证明，创造这种相互的利益关系使公司成为最后的赢家。Van Tuyl目前是全美第五大汽车经销集团，每个经销商的销售数字都非常出色。
In recent years, Jeff Rachor has worked alongside Larry, a successful arrangement that will continue. There are about 17,000 dealerships in the country, and ownership transfers always require approval by the relevant auto manufacturer. Berkshire’s job is to perform in a manner that will cause manufacturers to welcome further purchases by us. If we do this — and if we can buy dealerships at sensible prices — we will build a business that before long will be multiples the size of Van Tuyl’s $9 billion of sales.
近年来，Jeff Rachor与Larry搭档，这一成功的安排还将持续。目前全美有17000家汽车经销商，而经销商所有权的变更总是要获得汽车制造商的同意。伯克希尔所要做的，就要是要让汽车制造商支持伯克希尔去收购更多的汽车经销商。如果我们能以合理的价格去收购更多的汽车经销商，如果我们做到这一点，那么不久我们将建立一个将是VanTuyl每年90亿美元销售额数倍的汽车经销业务。
With the acquisition of Van Tuyl, Berkshire now owns 9.5 companies that would be listed on the Fortune 500 were they independent (Heinz is the 0.5). That leaves 490.5 fish in the sea. Our lines are out.
- Our subsidiaries spent a record $15 billion on plant and equipment during 2014, well over twice their depreciation charges. About 90% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we will always invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunities runs through America. The treasures that have been uncovered up to now are dwarfed by those still untapped. Through dumb luck, Charlie and I were born in the United States, and we are forever grateful for the staggering advantages this accident of birth has given us.
2014年，我们的子公司总计在厂房和设备上投入了创纪录的150亿美元，远远超过折旧费用两倍。其中大约有90%的资金花在美国国内。尽管我们也会一直在海外投资，但发展机遇的源泉还是在美国。迄今为止，已经发现的宝藏与尚未发现的宝藏相比相形见绌。幸运的是，查理和我出生在美国，我们对如天赐之福般的”美国人优势”永怀感念。
- Berkshire’s yearend employees — including those at Heinz — totaled a record 340,499, up 9,754 from last year. The increase, I am proud to say, included no gain at headquarters (where 25 people work). No sense going crazy.
伯克希尔的年终员工总数(包括亨氏在内)达到创纪录的340499人，比去年增加了9754人。我可以自豪的指出，这一增长不包括公司总部的工作人员(那里依然是25人)。诸位不必惊慌。
- Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments — American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of IBM (increasing our ownership to 7.8% versus 6.3% at yearend 2013). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola, American Express and Wells Fargo raised our percentage ownership of each. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 9.1% to 9.2%, our interest in American Express increased from 14.2% to 14.8% and our ownership of Wells Fargo grew from 9.2% to 9.4%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our ownership raises Berkshire’s portion of their annual earnings by $50 million.
去年伯克希尔对”四大巨头”的持仓均有增持，即美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行。我们增持了IBM的股票(持股比例从2013年底的6.3%增加到7.8%)，与此同时，可口可乐、美国运通和富国银行的股票回购也提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐公司的持股比例从9.1%增加到了9.2%，美国运通从14.2%增加到了14.8%，富国银行从9.2%增加到了9.4%。如果你认为0.1%并不重要，那么请仔细看看这个数字：对于四家企业来说，我们持股比例每上升0.1%，伯克希尔每年的收益就会增加5000万美元。
These four investees possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business. It’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
这四家企业拥有优秀的业务，他们的管理层能力出众且以股东利益为导向。在伯克希尔，我们宁可拥有一家优秀业务非控股但相当大一部分的股份，也不愿拥有一家普通企业的100%。与其拥有整个水钻不如拥有部分希望之钻。(宁要鲜桃一口，不要烂杏一筐)
If Berkshire’s yearend holdings are used as the marker, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2014 earnings before discontinued operations amounted to 3.3 billion only three years ago). In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive — about 862 million.) But make no mistake: The $3.1 billion of these companies’ earnings we don’t report are every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
如果按照伯克希尔年末持股比例来看，我们在四大巨头在2014年经常性经营收益中应占47亿美元(3年前是33亿美元)。但在我们报告的收益中，仅仅包括收到的约16亿美元[Dividends|股息]。但不要搞错了：对伯克希尔来说没有报告的31亿美元收益与报告的部分一样有价值。
The earnings these investees retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock — a move that enhances Berkshire’s share of future earnings without requiring us to lay out a dime. Their retained earnings also fund business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees, in aggregate, will grow substantially over time (though 2015 will be a tough year for the group, in part because of the strong dollar). If the expected gains materialize, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains. (For the package of four, our unrealized gains already totaled $42 billion at yearend.)
这些被投资企业保留的收益通常会用于回购股票，这意味着我们不花一分钱就增加了伯克希尔在未来收益中所占的份额。他们留存收益也为那些通常被证明是有利可图的商业机会提供资金。所有的这些都让我们预计，随着时间的推移，这四家被投资公司的每股收益将大幅增长(尽管2015年对该集团而言将是艰难的一年，部分原因是美元走强)。如果预期的增长实现，那么伯克希尔的股息也将增加，更为重要的是，我们在这些企业未实现的资本收益也将增加(截至去年底，我们在这四家企业中的未实现的资本收益已经达到420亿美元)。
Our flexibility in capital allocation — our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses — gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for Berkshire’s endless gusher of cash.
我们在资本配置方面的灵活性，即我们愿意被动地将大笔资金投入到非控制企业中，与那些将投资限定于自己能够经营范围内的企业相比，这使得我们拥有显著的优势。我们对直接经营业务和被动投资的灵活姿态，使得我们能够合理利用伯克希尔源源不断的现金的机会增加了一倍。
- I’ve mentioned in the past that my experience in business helps me as an investor and that my investment experience has made me a better businessman. Each pursuit teaches lessons that are applicable to the other. And some truths can only be fully learned through experience. (In Fred Schwed’s wonderful book, Where Are the Customers’ Yachts? , a Peter Arno cartoon depicts a puzzled Adam looking at an eager Eve, while a caption says, “There are certain things that cannot be adequately explained to a virgin either by words or pictures.” If you haven’t read Schwed’s book, buy a copy at our annual meeting. Its wisdom and humor are truly priceless.)
我过去曾说过，我的商业经验有助于我成为一名投资者，而我的投资经验使我成为一名更好的商人。二者的经验教训是互相促进的。有一些真理只能通过实践才能彻底领悟。(Fred Schwed的佳作《客户的游艇在哪儿》中有一副PeterArno的漫画，画中一个困惑的亚当看着一个渴望的夏娃，而配文写道，“有些事情无论是用文字还是图片都无法让一位处女彻底明白”。如果你没有读过Schwed的书，那就在我们年会上买一本。它的智慧和幽默真是无价之宝。)
Among Arno’s “certain things,” I would include two separate skills, the evaluation of investments and the management of businesses. I therefore think it’s worthwhile for Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our two investment managers, to each have oversight of at least one of our businesses. A sensible opportunity for them to do so opened up a few months ago when we agreed to purchase two companies that, though smaller than we would normally acquire, have excellent economic characteristics. Combined, the two earn 125 million of net tangible assets.
除了Arno说的”确定的事情”，我认为还需要两个独立的技能：对投资的评估能力和对企业的管理能力。因此我认为我们两位投资经理Todd Combs和TedWeschler有能力至少管理我们的一项业务。几个月前我们同意收购的两家公司，让我们有机会做到这一点。这两家公司虽然规模小于我们通常会收购的公司，但具有优秀的经济特征。两家公司净有形资产约1.25亿美元，年税前收益约1亿美元。
I’ve asked Todd and Ted to each take on one as Chairman, in which role they will function in the very limited way that I do with our larger subsidiaries. This arrangement will save me a minor amount of work and, more important, make the two of them even better investors than they already are (which is to say among the best).
我已经要求Todd和Ted各担任一家公司的董事长。他们将以非常有限的方式发挥作用，就像我对我们较大的子公司所做的那样。这种安排为我分担了一点工作，更重要的是，它将使他们两人成为比现在更好的投资者(也就是最好的投资者之一)。
Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us. We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too: Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
这种押注对我们来说并不新鲜。早在1965年，巴菲特合伙人公司BPL收购伯克希尔控股权以来，我们一直进行类似的押注。同样，根据充分的理由，查理和我一直认为，“押注”美国继续繁荣下去几乎是板上钉钉的事情。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 238 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. In my lifetime alone, real per-capita U.S. output has sextupled. My parents could not have dreamed in 1930 of the world their son would see. Though the preachers of pessimism prattle endlessly about America’s problems, I’ve never seen one who wishes to emigrate (though I can think of a few for whom I would happily buy a one-way ticket).
事实上，在过去238年中，谁曾因为押注美国衰落而受益了？如果你将美国的现状与1776年进行对比，你简直不敢相信自己的眼睛。仅在我有生之年，美国的实际人均产出就翻了6倍。我的父母在1930年做梦都不会想到，他们的儿子今天所看到的世界。虽然那些悲观主义传教士没完没了地说美国存在这样那样的问题，但我从未见过有人真的希望移民国外(虽然我能够想到一些人，而且我很乐意为他们购买单程票)。
The dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. Gains won’t come in a smooth or uninterrupted manner; they never have. And we will regularly grumble about our government. But, most assuredly, America’s best days lie ahead.
我们市场经济蕴含的活力仍将继续发挥它的魔力。要收获总要经历挫折，不可能一帆风顺。人们会经常的抱怨我们的政府。但确定无疑的是，美国最好的日子还在前头。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
在这种有利形势下，查理和我希望通过以下方式提升伯克希尔的每股内在价值：(1)不断提高我们众多子公司的基本盈利能力；(2)通过补强型收购进一步增加它们的收益；(3)受益于我们投资对象的增长；(4)当伯克希尔股价大幅低于内在价值时进行回购股份；(5)偶尔进行大规模收购。我们还将努力通过发行很少(如果有可能的话)的伯克希尔股份让你的成果最大化。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy will still be playing vital roles in our economy. Homes and autos will remain central to the lives of most families. Insurance will continue to be essential for both businesses and individuals. Looking ahead, Charlie and I see a world made to order for Berkshire. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
这些方式都依赖其坚实的基础。一个世纪内，BNSF铁路和伯克希尔能源公司仍将继续在美国经济中扮演重要角色。住房和汽车仍将是大部分家庭生活的中心。保险将继续对企业和个人至关重要。展望未来，查理和我看到伯克希尔仍将大有用武之地。我们对受托管理伯克希尔深感荣幸。
Intrinsic Business Value 企业内在价值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements — one of them qualitative — that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 123-124.
虽然查理和我经常提到内在商业价值，我们却无法准确地告诉你伯克希尔股票的内在价值是多少(事实上任何其他股票都是如此)。不过，在2010年的年度报告中，我们提出了内在价值的三大要素，其中之一是定性的，另两个是定量的。我们认为这三大要素是合理估算伯克希尔内在价值的关键。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2014 our per-share investments increased 8.4% to 10,847 per share.
两个定量要素的最新数据：2014年我们的每股投资增长8.4%至140123美元，除保险和投资之外的业务税前收益增长19%至每股10847美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the ensuing 44 years has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but our main focus is to build operating earnings. That’s why we were pleased to exchange our Phillips 66 and Graham Holdings stock for operating businesses last year and to contract with Procter and Gamble to acquire Duracell by means of a similar exchange set to close in 2015.
自1970年以来，我们的每股投资年复合率增长为19%，我们的税前收益年复合增长率为20.6%。在随后的44年中，伯克希尔股价以与两个价值衡量标准类似的速度增长绝非巧合。查理和我都希望看到这两部分都能够增长，但我们主要的精力放在提升经营收益上面。这就是为什么去年我们选择用Phillips66和GrahamHoldings的股票来换取经营业务，并通过类似的交易从宝洁手中收购金霸王(Duracell)，交易将在2015年完成交易。
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
现在，让我们来看看我们运营的四个主要板块。它们彼此之间的资产负债表和收入特征都存在巨大差异。因此我们将它们作为四个独立业务分别呈现，这也是查理和我看待它们的方式。(虽然它们共处伯克希尔一个屋檐下拥有极其重要和持久不衰的优势。) 我们的目标是假设我们角色互换，你是作报告的管理层而我们是股东，提供给我们想要知道的信息。
Insurance 保险业务
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation. That industry has been the engine that has propelled our expansion since 1967, when we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for $8.6 million. Though that purchase had monumental consequences for Berkshire, its execution was simplicity itself.
让我们先来看看伯克希尔的核心业务保险业，自1967年以来，保险业务一直是不断驱动我们扩张的引擎。当时我们以860万美元的价格收购国民保险公司及其姊妹公司国民火灾海事保险公司。虽然这笔收购对于伯克希尔的意义深远，但过程十分简单。
Jack Ringwalt, a friend of mine who was the controlling shareholder of the two companies, came to my office saying he would like to sell. Fifteen minutes later, we had a deal. Neither of Jack’s companies had ever had an audit by a public accounting firm, and I didn’t ask for one. My reasoning: (1) Jack was honest and (2) He was also a bit quirky and likely to walk away if the deal became at all complicated.
我的朋友JackRingwalt是这两家公司的控股股东，他来到我的办公室表示希望出售公司，15分钟后我们就达成协议。杰克的两家公司都没有接受过公共会计师事务所的审计，我也没有对此做出任何要求。我的理由是：1)杰克是个诚实的人；2)他有点古怪，如果收购过程过于繁琐，他可能就会放弃交易。
On pages 128-129, we reproduce the 1.5-page purchase agreement we used to finalize the transaction. That contract was homemade: Neither side used a lawyer. Per page, this has to be Berkshire’s best deal: National Indemnity today has GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) net worth of $111 billion, which exceeds that of any other insurer in the world.
One reason we were attracted to the property-casualty business was its financial characteristics: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over many decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
我们被财产意外险吸引的一个重要原因是其独特的财务特性。保险公司提前收取保费，然后支付赔偿金。在极端情况下，比如工伤赔偿，支付时间可能长达数十年。这种先收钱后赔钱的模式可让保险公司拥有大量现金，我们称之为浮存金，这些资金最终会支付到保户手中。同时，保险公司可以使用这些浮存金为自己投资。虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模和保费收入维持一个相对稳定的关系。所以，随着我们业务扩张，我们的浮存金规模也在增长。浮存金是如何增长的如下表所示：
| Year | Float (in $ millions) |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
| 2014 | 83,921 |
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO and our new commercial insurance operation are almost certain to grow at a good clip. National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, is party to a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do in time experience a decline in float, it will be very gradual — at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. This strength is a key pillar in Berkshire’s economic fortress.
浮存金进一步的增长将难以实现。从好的方面来看，GEICO和我们新的商业险业务几乎肯定都会保持良好的增长速度。国民保险再保险业务的保单减少导致浮存金下降。但即便我们的浮存金下滑，其速率也会十分平缓，每年下滑不会超3%。保险业务的特性决定了我们拥有的现金资源肯定可以满足短期的偿付需求。这个优势是伯克希尔长盛不衰的关键。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过了运营费用和最终偿付总额，我们将获得承保收益。这增加了我们的保险浮存金产生的投资收入。当获得这种利润时，我们就可以享受免费资金的使用，更棒的是，我们持有还获得了额外收益。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it frequently causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses. The prolonged period of low interest rates our country is now dealing with causes earnings on float to decrease, thereby exacerbating the profit problems of the industry.
不幸的是，所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果。这导致了激烈竞争。竞争常常让整个财产保险行业遭受巨额承保损失。这个损失实际上就是保险行业为持有浮存金而支付的成本。尽管保险公司享受着浮存金带来的好处，但和美国其他行业的公司相比，动态竞争几乎会确保保险公司将保持净有形资产回报率低于正常水平的惨淡记录。美国长期的低利率让浮存金获得的投资收益减少，因此加剧了行业的利润下滑问题。
As noted in the first section of this report, Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for twelve consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $24 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers, who know that while float is valuable, its benefits can be drowned by poor underwriting results. That message is given at least lip service by all insurers; at Berkshire it is a religion.
正如在报告第一部分所述，伯克希尔现在已连续12年实现承保盈利。这一期间我们税前收益合计240亿美元。展望未来，我相信我们将在大多数年份继续实现承保盈利。这是我们保险经理人每天关注的焦点。他们知道浮存金是有价值的，但其好处可能被糟糕承销结果淹没。虽然所有的保险公司都会在口头上传达这点观点，但在伯克希尔这是一种信仰。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability , just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims and related expenses — a huge $22.7 billion to more than six million claimants in 2014 — and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float.
那么浮存金将如何影响我们的内在价值？当我们计算伯克希尔账面价值时，浮存金的总额被作为负债减掉，就好像我们明天就要将其全部支付而无法补充一样。但将浮存金严格视作负债是错误的。它应该被视为一个循环基金。我们每天都要支付过去的索赔和相关费用，去年就向600万索赔人支付了227亿美元的巨额费用，这减少了我们的浮存金。但同样肯定的是，我们每天都在承保新的业务，收取的保费又增加了浮存金。
If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability. Owing 1 that will go out the door tomorrow and not be replaced. The two types of liabilities are treated as equals, however, under GAAP.
如果我们的循环浮存金没有成本且可以长期持久(我相信会是这样)，那么这种负债的真正价值会显著低于会计上的账面负债。因为新的业务会替代旧的索赔，因此欠下的每1美元永远都不会从公司消失，这跟持有明天就将付出而无法收回的1美元截然不同。然而根据GAAP准则这两种类型的负债被认为是完全相同的。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is a $15.5 billion “goodwill” asset that we incurred in buying our insurance companies and that increases book value. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance company sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
我们在收购保险公司时产生了155亿美元的”商誉”资产，这增加了账面价值，并部分抵消了这一被夸大的浮存金负债。这种商誉体现了我们为保险公司获得浮存金能力所支付的价格。然而，商誉的收购成本与实际价值无关。举例来说，如果一家保险公司蒙受了长期大额的承保损失，那么无论其原始取得成本如何，账面上的任何商誉资产都应被视作是毫无价值的。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill — what we would happily pay for float of similar quality were we to purchase an insurance operation possessing it — to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. Under present accounting rules (with which we agree) this excess value will never be entered on our books. But I can assure you that it’s real. That’s one reason — a huge reason — why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔并不是这样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司商誉真正的经济价值远超其历史账面价值。如果我们收购拥有类似商誉的保险公司，我们很乐意为类似质量的浮存金支付费用。根据目前会计准则，这种超额价值永远不会记入报表。但我可以向你保证这是真正存在的。这就是我们认为伯克希尔内在商业价值远高于其账面价值的一个巨大的原因。
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources.
首先，浮存金规模最高的是由阿吉特·贾因管理的伯克希尔再保险集团。阿吉特对别人不敢兴趣或没有资本承受的风险提供保险。他的运营结合了能力、速度和果断。更重要的是，他的思维方式在保险界独一无二。然而，他从来没有将伯克希尔暴露在与我们资源不相称的风险之中。
Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe — a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced — Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. We would also remain awash in cash and be looking for large opportunities in a market that might well have gone into shock. Meanwhile, other major insurers and reinsurers would be far in the red, if not facing insolvency.
事实上，我们在避免风险上远比其他大多数大型保险公司要保守。举例来说，如果保险业因某种特大灾难而遭受2500亿美元的损失，这一损失大约为保险业经历过最大损失的3倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，由于其众多的收益来源，依然将实现可观的利润。我们也将保持现金充沛，并将在一个已经陷入动荡的市场中寻找大量的机会。而其他的主要保险或再保险公司即使不面临破产，也会出现严重亏损。
Ajit’s underwriting skills are unmatched. His mind, moreover, is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment. Last year I told you about his formation of Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly welcomed by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. Previously, we had written only a few specialized lines of commercial insurance.
阿吉特的承销能力无人能及。他的大脑是一个创意工厂。他一直在寻找新的业务线加入目前的产品组合中。去年，我向你们介绍了他建立的伯克希尔特种保险公司(简称”BHSI”)。这将我们带入了商业保险领域。我们在该领域立刻获得了美国主要保险经纪和企业风险经理的欢迎。以前，我们只承保了几种特种商业保险业务线。
BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. During 2014, Peter expanded his talented group, moving into both international business and new lines of insurance. We repeat last year’s prediction that BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years.
BHSI现在由PeterEastwood领导。他是一位富有经验的保险商，在保险行业广受尊重。在2014年，Peter扩大了他的人才团队，进军国际业务和新的保险业务线。我们重复去年的预测，BHSI将会成为伯克希尔的重要资产，将在未来数年承保数十亿的业务量。
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们还有另一个强大的再保险公司通用再保险，该公司由Tad Montross管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
本质上，一个稳健的保险公司需要遵守四大承保纪律，它必须：(1)理解所有可能保单发生损失的风险；(2)谨慎的评估风险发生的可能性及其可能造成的损失；(3)设定合理的保费。平均而言，保费需要高于可能发生的损失及运营费用的总和；(4)如果在无法获得合适保费的情况下愿意放手。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司都遵守前三条规则，却忽视了第四条。他们无法放弃竞争对手正在积极争取的业务。老话说：“别人都这么做，我们也必须这么做”，这个问题在许多行业都会招致麻烦，但保险行业尤为突出。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been considerably better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad遵守了这四条戒律，而这体现在了他的业绩表现上。在他管理下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金表现一直好于零成本，我们预计这种情况仍将保持。我们对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务尤其满意。自我们1998年收购该公司以来，该业务就一直稳定增长且保持盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, it was beset by problems that caused commentators — and me as well, briefly — to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 64 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 53 years of service in 2014. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying. There is no better manager than Tony.
最后还有GEICO保险，由Tony Nicely运营管理，他18岁就加入公司，到2014年已为公司服务53年。Tony在1993年成为公司CEO，之后公司一直表现亮眼。没有比Tony更好的经理了。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. It was clear to me that GEICO would succeed because it deserved to succeed. No one likes to buy auto insurance. Almost everyone, though, likes to drive. The insurance consequently needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them — and only a low-cost operation can deliver these. Indeed, at least 40% of the people reading this letter can save money by insuring with GEICO. So stop reading and go to geico.com or call 800-368-2734.
当我1951年第一次听说GEICO的时候，我被该公司相对于其他保险巨头巨大的成本优势震惊了。当时我就明白，GEICO将获得成功，因为它理应成功。没人喜欢买车险，但几乎所有人都爱开车。因为对大多数家庭来说购买车险是一笔重大支出，而节约对家庭来说很重要，所以只有低成本的保险公司才能提供这些。事实上，至少40%阅读这封信的人可通过在GEICO投保省钱。所以暂停阅读，登录GEICO.Com或拨打800-368-2734。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. (We ended 2014 at 10.8% compared to 2.5% in 1995, when Berkshire acquired control of GEICO.) The company’s low costs create a moat — an enduring one — that competitors are unable to cross. Our gecko never tires of telling Americans how GEICO can save them important money. The gecko, I should add, has one particularly endearing quality — he works without pay. Unlike a human spokesperson, he never gets a swelled head from his fame nor does he have an agent to constantly remind us how valuable he is. I love the little guy.
GEICO的成本优势是该公司能够年复一年持续扩大市场份额的主要原因(1995年伯克希尔刚收购GEICO的时候，它的市场份额是2.5%，而2014年我们的市场份额达到10.8%)。GEICO的低成本创造了一条竞争对手无法逾越的护城河。我们的吉祥物”Gecko”不知疲倦地告诉美国人GEICO如何为他们省钱。我不得不说，Gecko有一个特别讨喜的品质，即它无薪工作。不像其他任何人类代言人，他从不被自己的名誉冲昏头脑，也从不提醒我们它干得多么出色。我喜欢这个小家伙。
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Indeed, over the past decade, they have earned 1.7 billion to $8.6 billion. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
我们除了拥有的三大保险公司，我们还有其他一些规模较小的公司，它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域。总体而言，这些公司成长非常好，稳定地创造着承保盈利。过去十年中，他们从承保业务赚得了29.5亿美元收益，同时浮存金从17亿美元增长到86亿美元。查理和我都非常珍视这些公司和他们的经理人。
| Insurance Operations | 2014 Underwriting Profit (in millions) | 2013 Underwriting Profit (in millions) | 2014 Yearend Float (in millions) | 2013 Yearend Float (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance | $ 606 | $ 1,294 | $ 42,454 | $ 37,231 |
| General Re | 277 | 283 | 19,280 | 20,013 |
| GEICO | 1,159 | 1,127 | 13,569 | 12,566 |
| Other Primary | 626 | 385 | 8,618 | 7,430 |
| $ 2,668 | $ 3,089 | $ 83,921 | $ 77,240 |
Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future should certain unwanted events occur.
简单来说，保险业是销售承诺。“客户”现在付钱，保险公司承诺，如果未来某件不希望发生的事情发生了，就向客户付钱。
Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by people in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay, even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives, is all-important.
有时候这些承诺可能几十年都不会兑现(想象20多岁的人买的人寿保险)。因此，保险公司履行承诺的意愿和能力都很重要，即便是在付款期遇上了经济危机。
Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by certain of the world’s largest and most sophisticated P/C insurers, who wished to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” these liabilities — most of them potential losses from asbestos claims — to a reinsurer. They needed the right one, though: If a reinsurer fails to pay a loss, the original insurer is still on the hook for it. Choosing a reinsurer, therefore, that down the road proves to be financially strapped or a bad actor threatens the original insurer with getting huge liabilities right back in its lap.
伯克希尔在履行承诺方面无人可比，这一点在近几年已被世界上各个最大最资深的财产保险公司认可。他们都希望从规模巨大、时间超长的负债中摆脱出来。也就是说，这些保险公司希望将这些负债”割让”给再保险公司，其中大多数都是石棉索赔造成的潜在损失。不过，他们需要一个好的再保险公司：如果一个再保险公司不能履约，原保险公司就要为此承担责任。因此，如果一个再保险公司自己陷入财务困境，或者其不良行为导致到原保险公司重新承担巨额债务。
Last year, our premier position in reinsurance was reaffirmed by our writing a policy carrying a 7.1 billion.
去年，我们承保一个保费高达30亿美元的保单，这奠定了我们在再保险领域的龙头地位。我相信这个保单只逊于我们自己在2007年拿下的Lloyd’s的保单，其保费高达71亿美元。
In fact, I know of only eight P/C policies in history that had a single premium exceeding $1 billion. And, yes, all eight were written by Berkshire. Certain of these contracts will require us to make substantial payments 50 years or more from now. When major insurers have needed an unquestionable promise that payments of this type will be made, Berkshire has been the party — the only party — to call.
事实上，据我所知历史上只有8笔财产意外险保单的单笔保费超过10亿美元。没错，全都是伯克希尔承保的。其中有些合约要求我们50年甚至更久之后赔付大额款项。当大型保险公司需要这种类型的赔付承诺时，伯克希尔是唯一能兑现的公司。
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models protected by wide moats amount to something unique in the insurance world. This assemblage of strengths is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses 受监管的资本密集型业务
We have two major operations, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”), that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
我们主要有两块业务，BNSF铁路和伯克希尔[Energy_Industry|能源]，拥有与我们其他业务不同特征的共同的特点。所以，我们把他们的各项财务数据从我们GAAP的负债表和收益表中分离出来，在这封信中单独来谈。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was more than 8:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
这两家公司的一个关键特征是，对非常长期的、受监管资产进行了巨额投资。这些资产部分资金来自伯克希尔不提供担保的大额长期债务。事实上这些资产并不需要我们的信贷支持，因为即使在经济状况恶化时，它们的盈利能力也远超其利息要求。比如，去年BNSF的利息覆盖倍数是8:1(我们对利息覆盖倍数的定义是税前收益/利息，而不是息税折旧摊销前利润/利息，尽管后者被普遍使用，但我们觉得存在严重缺陷)。
At BHE, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies offering an essential service on an exclusive basis. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Recently, we have further broadened that base through our $3 billion (Canadian) acquisition of AltaLink, an electric transmission system serving 85% of Alberta’s population. This multitude of profit streams, supplemented by the inherent advantage of being owned by a strong parent, has enabled BHE and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This economic fact benefits both us and our customers.
同时，对BHE而言，有两个因素保证公司能在任何情况下都有能力偿付债务。第一个是所有公用事业的共同点：抗衰退收益，这来自于这些公司提供独家服务的结果。第二个只有少数几个公用事业公司享有，即多元化的收益来源，使我们免受任何单一监管机构的伤害。最近，我们进一步扩大了这一基础，我们用30亿美元收购了AltaLink，这是一个为加拿大Alberta州85%的人口提供服务的输电系统。通过多元化收益来源，加上母公司的固有优势，让BHE及其公用事业子公司能够大幅度降低债务成本。这种模式对我们和我们的客户都有利。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，我们的两家子公司都在以重要方式为美国经济提供动力。
- BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.
BNSF承担了15%的城际货物运输量(按吨英里计)，无论是公路、铁路、水运、空运或是管道。事实上，我们的货运量超过任何人。这让BNSF成为美国经济循环系统中最为重要的大动脉。
BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
像所有铁路公司一样，BNSF以节能环保的方式运输货物，1加仑柴油能将一吨货物运输500英里。完成同样的任务卡车要消耗4倍的燃料。
- BHE’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are a leader in renewables: From a standing start ten years ago, BHE now accounts for 6% of the country’s wind generation capacity and 7% of its solar generation capacity. Beyond these businesses, BHE owns two large pipelines that deliver 8% of our country’s natural gas consumption; the recently-purchased electric transmission operation in Canada; and major electric businesses in the U.K. and Philippines. And the beat goes on: We will continue to buy and build utility operations throughout the world for decades to come.
BHE的公用事业项目为11个州的零售客户提供服务。没有一家公用事业的服务范围能超过它。而且，我们是在可再生能源方面的领导者：从十年前开始，BHE提供了美国6%的风能发电量和7%的太阳能发电量。除此之外，BHE还有两条大型管道，运输全美8%的天然气消费量。还有最近收购的加拿大输电公司，及在英国和菲律宾的大型电力公司。我们还将在未来数十年收购和建造更多的公用事业项目。
BHE can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. In fact, last year the company retained more dollars of earnings — by far — than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this 100% retention policy as an important advantage — one almost certain to distinguish BHE from other utilities for many years to come.
BHE之所以能做出这些投资，是因为它保留了所有收益。事实上去年BHE留存的收益比美国任何一家电力公司都要多。我们和我们的监管机构认为这种100%保留收益的政策视为一个巨大优势。这也将让BHE在未来数年内在行业中独领风骚。
When BHE completes certain renewables projects that are underway, the company’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. In addition, we have conventional projects in the works that will also cost many billions. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns — and, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
当BHE完成这些目前在建的可再生能源项目时，公司整个再生能源资产组合将耗资150亿美元。此外，我们正在进行的其他传统项目也要花费数十亿美元。只要它们在未来能获得合理的回报，我们乐于做出这些投入。而且，我对未来的监管抱有极大的信心。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is concomitantly in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心来自于既有我们过去的经验，还有我们对社会永远需要在交通和能源方面进行大规模投资的认识。以确保资金持续流向重大项目的方式对待资本提供者，符合各地政府的自身利益。同时，以获得监管机构及其所代表的民众信任的方式开展业务，也符合我们自身带来利益。
Last year we fully met this objective at BHE, just as we have in every year of our ownership. Our rates remain low, our customer satisfaction is high and our record for employee safety is among the best in the industry.
The story at BNSF, however — as I noted earlier — was not good in 2014, a year in which the railroad disappointed many of its customers. This problem occurred despite the record capital expenditures that BNSF has made in recent years, with those having far exceeded the outlays made by Union Pacific, our principal competitor.
就像我之前指出的一样，去年BNSF铁路的表现并不好，这一年的铁路行业令很多客户失望，尽管BNSF近几年的资本支出创下新高，远超其主要竞争对手联合太平洋铁路公司(Union Pacific)，但这个问题还是出现了。
The two railroads are of roughly equal size measured by revenues, though we carry considerably more freight (measured either by carloads or ton-miles). But our service problems exceeded Union Pacific’s last year, and we lost market share as a result. Moreover, U.P.’s earnings beat ours by a record amount. Clearly, we have a lot of work to do.
两家铁路公司的收入规模大致相当，尽管我们的货运量更多(以车载或吨英里计)。但我们的服务还是出现了比联合太平洋更多的问题，因此我们失去了部分市场份额。此外，联合太平洋去年比我们盈利高出的规模创下记录。显然，我们还有很多工作要做。
We are wasting no time: As I also mentioned earlier, we will spend $6 billion in 2015 on improving our railroad’s operation. That will amount to about 26% of estimated revenues (a calculation that serves as the industry’s yardstick). Outlays of this magnitude are largely unheard of among railroads. For us, this percentage compares to our average of 18% in 2009-2013 and to U.P.’s projection for the near future of 16-17%. Our huge investments will soon lead to a system with greater capacity and much better service. Improved profits should follow.
但我们也没有浪费时间：正如我之前提到的，我们将在2015年花费60亿美元以改善我们的铁路运营。这笔钱预计将占到今年收入的26% (这是该行业的衡量标准)。这种规模的支出在整个铁路行业都是闻所未闻的。对我们来说，这一比例与2009-2013年18%的平均水平，以及联合太平洋16-17%的未来计划相比，形成了鲜明对比。我们大规模的投资将很快带来运力更大和服务更好的系统，盈利也会很快改善。
Here are the key figures for Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF:
下面是伯克希尔[Energy_Industry|能源]和伯灵顿北方圣达菲铁路公司(BNSF)的一些主要财务数据：
| Berkshire Hathaway Energy (89.9% owned) | 2014 Earnings (in millions) | 2013 Earnings (in millions) | 2012 Earnings (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 527 | $ 362 | $ 429 |
| Iowa utility | 298 | 230 | 236 |
| Nevada utilities | 549 | — | — |
| PacifiCorp (primarily Oregon and Utah) | 1,010 | 982 | 737 |
| Gas Pipelines (Northern Natural and Kern River) | 379 | 385 | 383 |
| HomeServices | 139 | 139 | 82 |
| Other (net) | 236 | 4 | 91 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 3,138 | 2,102 | 1,958 |
| Interest | 427 | 296 | 314 |
| Income taxes | 616 | 170 | 172 |
| Net earnings | $ 2,095 | $ 1,636 | $ 1,472 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire | $ 1,882 | $ 1,470 | $ 1,323 |
| BNSF | 2014 Earnings (in millions) | 2013 Earnings (in millions) | 2012 Earnings (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 23,239 | $ 22,014 | $ 20,835 |
| Operating expenses | 16,237 | 15,357 | 14,835 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 7,002 | 6,657 | 6,000 |
| Interest (net) | 833 | 729 | 623 |
| Income taxes | 2,300 | 2,135 | 2,005 |
| Net earnings | $ 3,869 | $ 3,793 | $ 3,372 |
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造，服务和零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这一板块的业务包括了方方面面。不过让我先看看整个板块的合并资产负债表和利润表摘要。
Balance Sheet 12/31/14 (in millions)
| Assets | Amount | Liabilities and Equity | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 5,765 | Notes payable | $ 965 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 8,264 | Other current liabilities | 9,734 |
| Inventory | 10,236 | Total current liabilities | 10,699 |
| Other current assets | 1,117 | ||
| Total current assets | 25,382 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 28,107 | Deferred taxes | 3,801 |
| Fixed assets | 13,806 | Term debt and other liabilities | 4,269 |
| Other assets | 3,793 | Non-controlling interests | 492 |
| Berkshire equity | 51,827 | ||
| $ 71,088 | $ 71,088 |
Earnings Statement
| (in millions) | 2014 | 2013* | 2012* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 97,689 | $ 93,472 | $ 81,432 |
| Operating expenses | 90,788 | 87,208 | 75,734 |
| Interest expense | 109 | 104 | 112 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 6,792 | 6,160 | 5,586 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2,324 | 2,283 | 2,229 |
| Net earnings | $ 4,468 | $ 3,877 | $ 3,357 |
*Earnings for 2012 and 2013 have been restated to exclude Marmon’s leasing operations, which are now included in the Finance and Financial Products section.
* 2012 年和 2013 年的收益已重新列报，不包括 Marmon 的租赁业务，这些业务现已纳入金融和金融产品部分。
Our income and expense data conforming to GAAP is on page 49. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
我们符合GAAP会计准则的收入和支出数据在完整报告中。这里的运营费用是非GAAP准则的，不包含一些购买法会计调整项目(主要是一些无形资产摊销)。我们用此方法呈现数字是因为，查理和我都认为这些数据能更准确反映企业真实的支出和收益情况。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments — some are tiny and arcane — but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets. Some truly deplete over time, while others in no way lose value. For software, as a big example, amortization charges are very real expenses. The concept of making charges against other intangibles, such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arises through purchase-accounting rules and clearly does not reflect reality. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated — even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不会解释所有的调整，其中一些调整微小且不易解释，但认真的投资者应理解无形资产的不同性质。有些无形资产的价值会随着时间推移而损耗殆尽，而有些完全不会受损。例如软件的摊销费用就是非常真实的费用。而其它无形资产是不应被”摊销”的，比如客户关系。如果通过购买法会计计算显然不能反映真实情况。GAAP会计准则认为这两种费用没有区别，也就是说，在计算收益的时候，两者都被列为费用，尽管从投资者的角度来看，它们的差异再大不过了。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 49, amortization charges of $1.15 billion have been deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. The “non-real” charges, once non-existent at Berkshire, have become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. Non-real amortization charges will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在符合GAAP的完整报告中，有11.5亿美元的摊销费用已作为费用扣除。我们认为其中只有20%是”真实”的，其余的则不是。由于我们进行了多次收购，伯克希尔曾经不存在的”非真实”费用变得非常重要，随着我们继续收购更多的公司，“非真实”摊销费用几乎肯定会进一步上升。
The GAAP-compliant table on page 67 gives you the current status of our intangible assets. We now have 4.1 billion will be charged over the next five years. Eventually, of course, every dollar of non-real costs becomes entirely charged off. When that happens, reported earnings increase even if true earnings are flat.
在完整报告中列示了无形资产的现状。我们目前还有74亿美元无形资产有待摊销，其中41亿美元将在未来五年摊销完毕。当然，最终每一美元非真实成本将全部被扣除。到那时，即使真实的收益持平，财报列示的收益也将增长。
Depreciation charges, we want to emphasize, are different: Every dime of depreciation expense we report is a real cost. That’s true, moreover, at most other companies. When CEOs tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, wire them up for a polygraph test.
但我们想强调的是，折旧费用是不同的：我们报告的每一美元的折旧都是真实成本。此外，在大多数其他公司也是如此。当CEO吹嘘息税折旧摊销前利润是估值标准时，请把他们绑起来测谎。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, you should remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
当然，我们公开的报告将继续符合GAAP会计准则。然而，为了认清现实，你应该记得把我们报告的大部分摊销费用加回来。
To get back to our many manufacturing, service and retailing operations, they sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of this sector’s businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, the result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operates.
回到我们许多制造、服务和零售业务上，他们销售涵盖从棒棒糖到喷气飞机等各种产品。以未加杠杆的净有形资产计算，其中一些业务经济效益极佳，实现的税后回报率高达25%甚至超过100%。其他业务的回报率在12-20%之间。不过，有几家公司的回报率非常低，这是我在资本配置时犯了一些严重错误。我并没有被误导，只是在评估公司和产业经济动态时，我的判断是错误的。
Fortunately, my blunders normally involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, nonetheless, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $24 billion of net tangible assets during 2014 and, despite their holding large quantities of excess cash and using little leverage, earned 18.7% after-tax on that capital.
若作为整个实体来看，这一集团是一家优秀企业。尽管它们持有大量超额现金，几乎没有使用债务杠杆，它们2014年平均使用了240亿美元净有形资产，但其税后回报率高达18.7%。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought for too high a price. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin, and that premium is likely to widen. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in both the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.
当然，如果是以过高的价格买入经济效益极佳的企业，它也可能是笔糟糕投资。我们为大多数业务的净有形资产支付了大量溢价，这一成本反映再我们报告的巨大商誉数字中。不过总体来说，我们在该业务板块投入的资本获得了可观回报。而且，这些业务的内在价值远超账面价值，这种溢价可能还会扩大。即便如此，保险业和受监管行业的内在价值和账面价值的差距更大。真正的大赢家在哪里。
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, their competitors — both current and potential — read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if others knew our numbers. In some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, therefore, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 97-100.
这个业务集团有太多的公司，我们无法一一评论，而且它们(现有和潜在)的竞争对手都会阅读这份报告。在我们一些业务上，如果其他人知道某些数字，我们可能处于不利地位。因此那些对伯克希尔的价值没有实质性影响的业务，我们只披露需要披露的内容。你可以在完整报告中找到我们业务运营的大量细节。
Finance and Financial Products 金融和金融产品
This year we include in this section Marmon’s very sizable leasing operations, whose wares are railcars, containers and cranes. We have also restated the previous two years to reflect that change. Why have we made it? At one time there was a large minority ownership at Marmon, and I felt it was more understandable to include all of the company’s operations in one place. Today we own virtually 100% of Marmon, which makes me think you will gain more insight into our various businesses if we include Marmon’s leasing operations under this heading. (The figures for the many dozens of Marmon’s other businesses remain in the previous section.)
今年我们将Marmon集团中规模很大的租赁业务纳入该板块之中，其业务包括有轨货车、集装箱和起重机租赁。我们还重述了过去两年的状况以反映该调整。我们为何这么做？我们一度拥有Marmon大量少数股权，因此我认为把公司所有运营都放在一起更易理解。但如今我们几乎拥有Marmon全部的股权，因此我认为，如果把Marmon租赁业务包含在一板块，能让你对我们各种业务有更多了解。
Our other leasing and rental operations are conducted by CORT (furniture) and XTRA (semi-trailers). These companies are industry leaders and have substantially increased their earnings as the American economy has gained strength. Both companies have invested more money in new equipment than have many of their competitors, and that’s paying off.
我们的其他租赁业务是由CORT(家具)和XTRA(半挂车)进行的。这些公司都是行业领导者，随着美国经济的复苏，它们的收入已大幅增加。这两家公司在新设备上投资超过了许多竞争者对手，而这正带来回报。
Kevin Clayton has again delivered an industry-leading performance at Clayton Homes, the largest home builder in America. Last year, Clayton sold 30,871 homes, about 45% of the manufactured homes bought by Americans. When we purchased Clayton in 2003 for $1.7 billion, its share was 14%.
KevinClayton再次带领全美最大的预制房建筑商ClaytonHomes取得了行业领先的业绩。去年，Clayton售出了30871套住宅，约占美国人购买预制房总数的45%。当我们在2003年以17亿美元价格收购Clayton时，其市场份额仅为14%。
Key to Clayton’s earnings is the company’s $13 billion mortgage portfolio. During the financial panic of 2008 and 2009, when funding for the industry dried up, Clayton was able to keep lending because of Berkshire’s backing. In fact, we continued during that period to finance our competitors’ retail sales as well as our own.
Clayton盈利的关键在于该公司拥有的130亿美元按揭贷款投资组合。在2008-2009年金融危机时期，当房地产融资枯竭时，由于有伯克希尔的支持，Clayton得以继续放贷。事实上，在金融危机时期，我们继续为自己的零售业务和竞争对手的零售业务提供资金。
Many of Clayton’s borrowers have low incomes and mediocre FICO scores. But thanks to the company’s sensible lending practices, its portfolio performed well during the recession, meaning a very high percentage of our borrowers kept their homes. Our blue-collar borrowers, in many cases, proved much better credit risks than their higher-income brethren.
Clayton的许多借款人都是低收入者，FICO信用分数一般。但因公司明智的放贷做法，其投资组合在经济衰退时期也表现良好，这也意味着我们有很高比例的借款人保住了自己的房子。事实证明在许多情况下，我们蓝领借款人比其高收入同胞拥有更好的信用风险。
At Marmon’s railroad-car operation, lease rates have improved substantially over the past few years. The nature of this business, however, is that only 20% or so of our leases expire annually. Consequently, improved pricing only gradually works its way into our revenue stream. The trend, though, is strong. Our 105,000-car fleet consists largely of tank cars, but only 8% of those transport crude oil.
在Marmon的铁路车辆租赁业务中，租赁率在过去几年里显著改善。但该业务的性质是，我们每年仅有20%左右的租赁合同到期。因此，定价上涨只会逐步在我们的收益中反映出来。不过这个趋势非常强劲。我们拥有的10.5万辆的”舰队”中主要由大量的油罐车组成，但只有8%是用于原油运输。
One further fact about our rail operation is important for you to know: Unlike many other lessors, we manufacture our own tank cars, about 6,000 of them in a good year. We do not book any profit when we transfer cars from our manufacturing division to our leasing division. Our fleet is consequently placed on our books at a “bargain” price. The difference between that figure and a “retail” price is only slowly reflected in our earnings through smaller annual depreciation charges that we enjoy over the 30-year life of the car. Because of that fact as well as others, Marmon’s rail fleet is worth considerably more than the $5 billion figure at which it is carried on our books.
关于我们的铁路运营，还有一件重要的事情需要你们知道：与许多其他租赁商不同，我们自己生产油罐车，每年约生产6000辆。我们把油罐车从制造部门转移至租赁部门，不会记录任何利润。因此，我们的”舰队”以非常低的价格计入报表。该个数字与”零售”价格的差额，只是通过我们罐车在30年寿命周期内，享受较少的折旧费用慢慢反映在我们的收益中。因为上述及其他原因，Marmon车队的价值远远超过财报上的50亿美元。
Here’s the earnings recap for this sector:
以下是该板块的税前收益数据：
| (in millions) | 2014 | 2013 | 2012 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkadia (our 50% share) | $ 122 | $ 80 | $ 35 |
| Clayton | 558 | 416 | 255 |
| CORT | 36 | 40 | 42 |
| Marmon — Containers and Cranes | 238 | 226 | 246 |
| Marmon — Railcars | 442 | 353 | 299 |
| XTRA | 147 | 125 | 106 |
| Net financial income* | 296 | 324 | 410 |
| $ 1,839 | $ 1,564 | $ 1,393 |
* Excludes capital gains or losses
Investments 投资业务
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
以下是截至去年年末，伯克希尔持有的市值最大的15只普通股投资。
| Shares** | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost* at 12/31/14 (in millions) | Market at 12/31/14 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 14.8 | $ 1,287 | $ 14,106 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.2 | 1,299 | 16,888 |
| 18,513,482 | DaVita HealthCare Partners Inc. | 8.6 | 843 | 1,402 |
| 15,430,586 | Deere & Company | 4.5 | 1,253 | 1,365 |
| 24,617,939 | DIRECTV | 4.9 | 1,454 | 2,134 |
| 13,062,594 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. | 3.0 | 750 | 2,532 |
| 76,971,817 | International Business Machines Corp. | 7.8 | 13,157 | 12,349 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 12.1 | 248 | 2,364 |
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.8 | 2,990 | 4,023 |
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 4,683*** |
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,721 | 2,032 |
| 96,890,665 | U.S. Bancorp | 5.4 | 3,033 | 4,355 |
| 43,387,980 | USG Corporation | 30.0 | 836 | 1,214 |
| 67,707,544 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 2.1 | 3,798 | 5,815 |
| 483,470,853 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.4 | 11,871 | 26,504 |
| Others | 10,180 | 15,704 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 55,056 | $ 117,470 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under GAAP rules.
* 这是我们的实际购买价格，也是我们的计税基础；公认会计原则的”成本“在少数情况下有所不同，因为根据公认会计原则的规定，我们必须进行注销或减记。
** Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老金投资的持股。
*** Held under contract of sale for this amount.
*** 根据销售合同持有，金额为这一数额。
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for 12.5 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fourth largest equity investment — and one we value highly.
伯克希尔还有一个主要的股权投资并未计入上表：我们在2021年9月以前任何时间都有权以50亿美元买入7亿股美国银行股票。在去年末这部分价值是125亿美元。我们可能会在我们的期权到期前行权。同时，你必须意识到，美国银行实质上是我们的第四大股权投资，并且是我们极重视的一个投资。
Attentive readers will notice that Tesco, which last year appeared in the list of our largest common stock investments, is now absent. An attentive investor , I’m embarrassed to report, would have sold Tesco shares earlier. I made a big mistake with this investment by dawdling.
细心的读者可能会注意到，去年出现在我们投资清单上的乐购(Tesco)如今已不复存在。我不得不尴尬地向大家报告，专注的投资者应该早就卖掉了乐购的股票，而我在这项投资上犯了一个巨大的错误，那就是磨蹭。
At the end of 2012 we owned 415 million shares of Tesco, then and now the leading food retailer in the U.K. and an important grocer in other countries as well. Our cost for this investment was $2.3 billion, and the market value was a similar amount.
2012年底，我们拥有4.15亿股乐购股票，当时和现在乐购都是英国领先的食品零售商，在其他国家也是一个重要的食杂商。我们这一投资的成本是23亿美元，与这些股票的市值差不多。
In 2013, I soured somewhat on the company’s then-management and sold 114 million shares, realizing a profit of $43 million. My leisurely pace in making sales would prove expensive. Charlie calls this sort of behavior “thumb-sucking.” (Considering what my delay cost us, he is being kind.)
2013年，我对乐购当时的管理层略感失望，因此卖出了1.14亿股，实现4300万美元的收益。事后证明，我懒散卖出方式代价高昂。查理把这类行为称为”吮拇指”。(考虑到我的拖延给我们造成的损失，他这样说真是宽宏大量)。
During 2014, Tesco’s problems worsened by the month. The company’s market share fell, its margins contracted and accounting problems surfaced. In the world of business, bad news often surfaces serially: You see a cockroach in your kitchen; as the days go by, you meet his relatives.
2014年，乐购的问题逐月恶化。公司市场份额大幅下降，利润率萎缩，会计问题浮出水面。在商界坏消息经常是接踵而至：一旦你在厨房里看到一只蟑螂，几天后你就会遇到它的”亲戚”。
We sold Tesco shares throughout the year and are now out of the position. (The company, we should mention, has hired new management, and we wish them well.) Our after-tax loss from this investment was $444 million, about 1/5 of 1% of Berkshire’s net worth. In the past 50 years, we have only once realized an investment loss that at the time of sale cost us 2% of our net worth. Twice, we experienced 1% losses. All three of these losses occurred in the 1974-1975 period, when we sold stocks that were very cheap in order to buy others we believed to be even cheaper.
我们在去年全年都在卖出乐购股票，现在已经卖光了。(我们要指出的是，这家公司已聘用了新的管理层，我们希望他们一切顺利)。我们这笔投资的税后亏损是4.44亿美元，相当于伯克希尔账面价值的0.2%。过去50年中，我们仅有一次投资在卖出时亏损超过账面价值的2%。另外有两次亏损超过账面价值1%。这三次亏损都发生在1974-1975年间，当时我们以非常便宜的价格出售股票，以购买其他我们认为更为便宜的股票。
Our investment results have been helped by a terrific tailwind. During the 1964-2014 period, the S&P 500 rose from 84 to 2,059, which, with reinvested dividends, generated the overall return of 11,196% shown on page 2. Concurrently, the purchasing power of the dollar declined a staggering 87%. That decrease means that it now takes $1 to buy what could be bought for 13¢ in 1965 (as measured by the Consumer Price Index).
我们的投资业绩得益于一股强劲的顺风。1964-2014年期间，标普500指数从84点涨至2059点，加上股息再投资，整体回报达到11196%。与此同时，美元的购买力下降了令人吃惊的87%。这样的下跌意味着现在需要1美元才能买到的东西，在1965年花13美分就可以买到(根据消费者价格指数衡量)。
There is an important message for investors in that disparate performance between stocks and dollars. Think back to our 2011 annual report, in which we defined investing as “the transfer to others of purchasing power now with the reasoned expectation of receiving more purchasing power — after taxes have been paid on nominal gains — in the future.”
股票和美元表现的巨大差异向投资者发出了一个重要信号。回顾我们2011年的年度报告，我们在报告中将投资定义为：现在将购买力让渡给他人，同时合理预期在未来将获得更多的购买力(在名义收益税后)。
The unconventional, but inescapable, conclusion to be drawn from the past fifty years is that it has been far safer to invest in a diversified collection of American businesses than to invest in securities — Treasuries, for example — whose values have been tied to American currency. That was also true in the preceding half-century, a period including the Great Depression and two world wars. Investors should heed this history. To one degree or another it is almost certain to be repeated during the next century.
从过去50年得出一个非常规但不容辩驳的结论是，投资于一个多元化的美国企业组合，比投资于价值与美元挂钩的证券(如美国国债)要安全得多。之前的半个世纪也是如此，即使包括了大萧条和两次世界大战在内。投资者应该关注这段历史。在某种程度上，这种情况肯定会在未来一个世纪重演。
Stock prices will always be far more volatile than cash-equivalent holdings. Over the long term , however, currency-denominated instruments are riskier investments — far riskier investments — than widely-diversified stock portfolios that are bought over time and that are owned in a manner invoking only token fees and commissions. That lesson has not customarily been taught in business schools, where volatility is almost universally used as a proxy for risk. Though this pedagogic assumption makes for easy teaching, it is dead wrong: Volatility is far from synonymous with risk. Popular formulas that equate the two terms lead students, investors and CEOs astray.
股票价格的波动性总是会比持有现金等价物高得多。但是，从长期来看，货币计价的投资品风险更高，相比以象征性手续费和佣金的方式购买的广泛多元化的股票组合，其风险甚至要高出很多。商学院通常不教授这样的知识，在那里波动性普遍被用作衡量风险的指标。尽管这样的学术假设使教学变得容易，但它错得离谱：波动性远不是风险的同义词。流行观念将二者等同起来，导致学生、投资者和CEO们误入歧途。
It is true, of course, that owning equities for a day or a week or a year is far riskier (in both nominal and purchasing-power terms) than leaving funds in cash-equivalents. That is relevant to certain investors — say, investment banks — whose viability can be threatened by declines in asset prices and which might be forced to sell securities during depressed markets. Additionally, any party that might have meaningful near-term needs for funds should keep appropriate sums in Treasuries or insured bank deposits.
当然，毫无疑问的是，拥有股票一天一周或一年的风险(无论从名义值还是购买力衡量)，都远高于将资金投入现金等价物中。这对于某些投资者(比如说投行)有意义，因为它们的生存可能受到资产价格大幅下跌的威胁，并可能在市场低迷时被迫出售证券。此外，任何可能有重大的近期内资金需求的人，他们都应该在美国国债或有保险的银行存款中保留适当的金额。
For the great majority of investors, however, who can — and should — invest with a multi-decade horizon, quotational declines are unimportant. Their focus should remain fixed on attaining significant gains in purchasing power over their investing lifetime. For them, a diversified equity portfolio, bought over time , will prove far less risky than dollar-based securities.
但是，对绝大多数投资者来说，股价的下跌并不重要，因为他们能够(也应该)以几十年的眼光进行投资。他们的关注重点仍然是，在投资生命周期内获得购买力的大幅增长。对他们来说，随着时间推移买入而建立的多元化的股票组合将被证明风险远低于基于美元的证券。
If the investor, instead, fears price volatility, erroneously viewing it as a measure of risk, he may, ironically, end up doing some very risky things. Recall, if you will, the pundits who six years ago bemoaned falling stock prices and advised investing in “safe” Treasury bills or bank certificates of deposit. People who heeded this sermon are now earning a pittance on sums they had previously expected would finance a pleasant retirement. (The S&P 500 was then below 700; now it is about 2,100.) If not for their fear of meaningless price volatility, these investors could have assured themselves of a good income for life by simply buying a very low-cost index fund whose dividends would trend upward over the years and whose principal would grow as well (with many ups and downs, to be sure).
相反，如果投资者害怕价格波动，错误地把它视为某种风险衡量标准，具有讽刺意味的是，他反而可能会做一些非常冒险的事情。如果你愿意回忆一下6年前，那些哀叹股价不断下跌，建议投资于”安全”的国债或银行存单的权威人士。听了这些建议的人们现在的回报少得可怜，而他们之前预计这些钱可以为愉快的退休生活提供资金。(标普500指数当时低于700点，现在约为2100点)。如果他们不担心毫无意义的价格波动，这些投资者当时本可以买一只低成本的指数基金来确保自己终生将获得丰厚的收入。因为这些基金的股息将在未来几年增加，本金也将上涨(当然这其中会有很多涨跌起伏)。
Investors, of course, can, by their own behavior , make stock ownership highly risky. And many do. Active trading, attempts to “time” market movements, inadequate diversification, the payment of high and unnecessary fees to managers and advisors, and the use of borrowed money can destroy the decent returns that a life-long owner of equities would otherwise enjoy. Indeed, borrowed money has no place in the investor’s tool kit: Anything can happen anytime in markets. And no advisor, economist, or TV commentator — and definitely not Charlie nor I — can tell you when chaos will occur. Market forecasters will fill your ear but will never fill your wallet.
当然，投资者本身的行为可能会让持有股票变成某种高风险的行为。许多人确实如此。频繁的交易，试图”抓准”市场走势，不充分的多元投资，向基金经理和顾问支付高昂而不必要的费用，使用借来的钱投资，这些行为都可能破坏终生股票持有者原本应该享有的可观回报。事实上，投资者根本不应该用借来的钱投资，因为市场中任何时候都有可能发生意想不到的事情。没有任何经济学家、投资顾问、电视评论员，当然包括查理和我，能够告诉你混乱什么时候会发生。市场预测砖家只能让你的耳朵满满，但永远不能让你的钱包满满。
The commission of the investment sins listed above is not limited to “the little guy.” Huge institutional investors, viewed as a group, have long underperformed the unsophisticated index-fund investor who simply sits tight for decades. A major reason has been fees: Many institutions pay substantial sums to consultants who, in turn, recommend high-fee managers. And that is a fool’s game.
以上列出”投资佣金罪”并不仅限于”散户”。作为一个群体，长期以来大型机构投资者的表现一直跑不赢单纯的指数基金投资者。其中一个重要的原因就是费用：许多机构向咨询机构支付巨额费用，而这些咨询机构又推荐费用高昂的经理。这是一个愚蠢的游戏。
There are a few investment managers, of course, who are very good — though in the short run, it’s difficult to determine whether a great record is due to luck or talent. Most advisors, however, are far better at generating high fees than they are at generating high returns. In truth, their core competence is salesmanship. Rather than listen to their siren songs, investors — large and small — should instead read Jack Bogle’s The Little Book of Common Sense Investing.
当然，也有一些投资经理非常优秀，尽管从短期看难以辨别一个好的记录是运气还是天赋。但大多数投资顾问索取高额费用的本领远高于提供高额回报，事实上他们的核心竞争力是销售能力。不管是大投资者还是散户，不要听他们的花言巧语，而应该读一读JackBogle写的《投资稳赚》(The Little Book of CommonSense Investing)。
Decades ago, Ben Graham pinpointed the blame for investment failure, using a quote from Shakespeare: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”
几十年前，BenGraham就准确指出了投资失败的根源，他引用了一句莎士比亚名剧中的台词：“亲爱的Brutus，错误不在我们明星身上，而在我们自己身上。”
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 2nd at the CenturyLink Center. Last year’s attendance of 39,000 set a record, and we expect a further increase this year as we celebrate our Golden Anniversary. Be there when the doors open at 7 a.m.
本次股东大会将在今年5月2日(周六)Century Link中心召开。去年有3.9万人出席会议创下历史记录，我们预计今年庆祝金色50周年之际，出席人数会再创纪录。会议中心将在当天早晨7点开门。
Berkshire’s talented Carrie Sova will again be in charge. Carrie joined us six years ago at the age of 24 as a secretary. Then, four years ago, I asked her to take charge of the meeting — a huge undertaking, requiring a multitude of skills — and she jumped at the chance. Carrie is unflappable, ingenious and expert at bringing out the best in the hundreds who work with her. She is aided by our entire home office crew who enjoy pitching in to make the weekend fun and informative for our owners.
伯克希尔的才女Carrie Sova将再次负责安排会议。六年前24岁的Carrie作为秘书加入我们。四年前我请她负责年会，这是一个艰巨的任务，需要高超的技能，她欣然接受了挑战。Carrie镇定专注，顺利地与数百名工作人员协同工作。她得到了我们整个总部办公室工作人员的帮助，他们喜欢参与进来，让我们所有的股东享受一个丰富和有趣的周末。
And, yes, we also try to sell our visiting shareholders our products while they’re here. In fact, this year we will substantially increase the hours available for purchases, opening for business at the CenturyLink on Friday, May 1st, from noon to 5 p.m. as well as the usual 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on meeting day. So bring a smile to Charlie’s face and do some serious shopping.
没错，我们还会向出席会议的观摩股东出售我们的产品。事实上今年我们还会延长购物时间。CenturyLink中心从5月1日周五中午到下午5点以及周六上午7点到下午4点开放。所以你们多买一点，查理会很高兴。
Get up early on Saturday morning. At 6:20 a.m., Norman and Jake, two Texas longhorns each weighing about a ton, will proceed down 10th Street to the CenturyLink. Aboard them will be a couple of our Justin Boot executives, who do double duty as cowboys. Following the steers will be four horses pulling a Wells Fargo stagecoach. Berkshire already markets planes, trains and automobiles. Adding steers and stagecoaches to our portfolio should seal our reputation as America’s all-purpose transportation company.
周六早上6:20，Norman和Jake这两头体重为一吨的得克萨斯长角牛，将穿越CenturyLink中心门前的第十大街，牛上坐着的是JustinBoot公司的两位高管，他们都是兼职牛仔。后面是一辆由四匹马拉着的富国银行马车。伯克希尔已经有了飞机、火车和汽车。马车牛车加入我们的组合，我们就是一家大而全的交通公司了。
At about 7:30 a.m. on Saturday, we will have our fourth International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target again will be a Clayton Home porch, located precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. When I was a teenager — in my one brief flirtation with honest labor — I tossed about 500,000 papers. So I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me! Humiliate me! Knock me down a peg! I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will run 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed). I’ll present a special prize to the 12-or-under contestant who makes the best toss. Deb Bosanek will be the judge.
周六上午7:30，我们将举办第四届国际扔报纸挑战赛，在距35英尺的地方把报纸投入克莱顿之家的门廊。我记得我还是个少年的时候，曾投递过50万份报纸。所以我认为这方面我非常厉害。挑战我！羞辱我！打败我吧！我会为打败我的人买一份DillyBar冰淇淋。报纸有36到42页，你必须先把它们折好(不准用橡皮筋)。我还会为那些12岁或小于12岁的优胜参赛者设特别奖。Deb Bosanek将担任裁判。
At 8:30 a.m., a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30 p.m. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45 p.m. This business session typically lasts only a half hour or so.
上午8:30会放映一部关于伯克希尔的新电影。1小时后，我们将直接开始问答环节，一直持续到下午3:30结束。中午将在CenturyLink中心午餐。下午在短暂休息后，查理和我将在3:45召开年会，通常只持续半小时。
Your venue for shopping will be the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting and in which products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries will be for sale. If you don’t get your shopping done on Friday, slip out while Charlie’s talking on Saturday and binge on our bargains. Check the terrific BNSF railroad layout also. Even though I’m 84, it still excites me.
购物采购区设在毗邻会议19.43万平方英尺的大厅，伯克希尔数十家子公司的产品可供购买。如果你们周五没有买够，可以趁查理说话的时候溜出去，尽情享受我们的便宜货。别忘了看看BNSF的铁路布局图，尽管我已84岁了，但这些东西仍让我兴奋。
Last year you did your part as a shopper, and most of our businesses racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period on Saturday, we sold 1,385 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 23 seconds), 13,440 pounds of See’s candy, 7,276 pairs of Wells Lamont work gloves and 10,000 bottles of Heinz ketchup. Heinz has a new mustard product, so both mustard and ketchup will be available this year. (Buy both!) Now that we are open for business on Friday as well, we expect new records in every precinct.
去年，作为一名购物者，你尽了自己的一份力量，我们的大多数摊位的销售都创下了记录。在周六9小时内，我们售出了1385双Justin皮靴(23秒一双)，13440磅喜诗糖果，7267双Well Lamont工作手套和1万瓶亨氏番茄酱。亨氏有一个新的芥末产品，我推荐你今年芥末和番茄酱都买。由于今年周五就开卖，我预计销售将再创纪录。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our third annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that will be sent to you with your credentials for the meeting. Entrants in the race will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates. (Charlie and I, however, will sleep in.)
我们的跑鞋公司Brooks，将提供一款纪念版跑鞋。购买一双后，你能穿着它参加第二天早上8:00在CenturyLink举行的第三届”伯克希尔5公里”比赛。参会的全部细节在会议指南中都有，你将有机会与伯克希尔的经理，董事和合作伙伴一起参加跑步比赛。(不过查理和我会睡懒觉)。
A GEICO booth in the shopping area will be staffed by a number of the company’s top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another discount, such as that available to certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out our price. We can save many of you real money.
全美最顶级的保险顾问将出现在位于购物区的GEICO展台。顺便来看看你的报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO将会给您一个股东特别折扣(通常是8%)。我们开展业务的51个行政区域中有44个都批准了这个特别优惠。(额外提示：这个折扣不可以与其他优惠叠加使用，比如给予特定群体的优惠)。带上你现有的保单详细信息过来看看我们的报价。我们至少可以帮助你们很多人省下更多的保险费。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. Last year, many shareholders purchased Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965, and he has produced an updated edition for the meeting. We also expect to be selling an inexpensive book commemorating our fifty years. It’s currently a work in process, but I expect it to contain a wide variety of historical material, including documents from the 19th Century.
一定要去书虫书店的展台看看，这里会有35种书籍和DVD，其中包括几本新书。去年许多股东买了Max Olson整理的自1965年伯克希尔的股东信合集。今年他为会议制作了更新版。另外，我们还会推出一本便宜一点的纪念我们50周年的书。目前这项工作正在进行中，但我预计它将包含各种各样的历史材料，包括一些19世纪的文件资料。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to both the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City vs. Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. The savings for a couple could run to $1,000 or more. Spend that money with us.
本报告随附的材料包括了帮助你获得参加本次会议和其他活动所需的凭证。届时飞机票可能会因为伯克希尔周末而涨价。如果你从很远的地方来，你可以比较飞到堪萨斯城和到奥马哈的机票。两个城市之间的车程约为2.5小时，如果你打算租车的话，一对夫妇节省的机票钱可能高达1000美元。把钱省下来到我们这里花。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did a record 9 million.)
在72大街Dodge和Pacific之间的内布拉斯加家具商城，届时会有一场”伯克希尔周末”打折大会。去年在会议的那一周，该店创下了40481817美元的销售记录。(该店平均周销售额约为900万美元。)
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 28th and Monday, May 4th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Saturday and 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. on Sunday. From 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m. on Saturday, NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
为了获得伯克希尔在内布拉斯加州家具商城的折扣，你需要在4月28日周二至5月4日周一期间购物(含这两天)，同时必须出示你出席股东大会的证件。这段时间的特殊折扣甚至适用于多家知名制造商的产品。他们通常有严格的折扣规定，但本着股东周末的精神，为您破例。我们感激他们的合作。内布拉斯加家具商城的营业时间是周一至周五上午10点至晚9点，周六上午10点到晚9:30，周日上午10点至晚8点。周六下午5:30至晚8点，内布拉斯加家具商城会举办一场野餐会，会邀请各位股东参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will remain open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded our sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
我们会在波仙珠宝店再次举行两场股东专属的活动。第一场是5月1日周五晚6点至9点的鸡尾酒招待会。第二场是5月3日周日早9点至下午4点的大型售卖活动。周六我们还会开到晚6点。近几年，我们这种活动的三天销量超过了每年12月全月销量，而12月往往是珠宝商销售业绩最好的月份。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27th through Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
届时整个周末，波仙会人潮汹涌。因此，为便于你安排，我们将股东优惠价的时段设定为4月27日周一至5月9日周六。在此期间，请出示出席会议的证件或代理委托书证明你是伯克希尔的股东。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
周日，在波仙外面的购物中心，来自达拉斯的优秀魔术师NormanBeck会为观众表演。此外，我们会邀请两位世界顶级桥牌大师Bob Hamman与Sharon Osberg当天下午与股东们桥牌比赛。千万别和他们玩牌赌钱。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a sophomore at Princeton, having already represented the United States in the 2012 Olympics. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我的朋友邢延华(Ariel Xing)周日也会去购物中心与乒乓球挑战者比赛。我认识她时她只有9岁，那时我连一个球都赢不了她。现在她已经在普林斯顿大学念大二，代表美国参加过2012年的奥运会。如果你不介意让自己难堪，想和她切磋下球技，那天下午1点就可以开始了。比尔·盖茨和我都会上场试图削削她的锐气。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st( but not before ); for Piccolo’s, call 402-346-2865. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
Gorat’s与Piccolo’s两家餐馆将于周日(5月3日)再次向伯克希尔的股东开放。他们都会开到当晚10点，Gorat’s当天下午1点开门，Piccolo’s当天下午4点开门。这两家餐馆都是我的最爱，周日晚上两家我都会光顾。请记住，4月1日起预订Gorat’s请拨打402-551-3733(4月1日以前不行)，Piccolo’s的订餐电话是402-346-2865。在Piccolo’s可以点特大号的根汁汽水加冰淇淋球作为饭后甜点。娘娘腔才点小份呢。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, who retired last year after sixty years at Fortune, but remains the expert on business and financial matters, and who may be e-mailed at loomisbrk@gmail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我们会再次邀请同样三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，向查理和我提问的股东可以用电邮向他们提交问题。这三位记者及其电邮地址分别是：为《财富》杂志效力60年于去年离休的CarolLoomis，但仍然是商业和财务问题专家，她邮箱是： loomisbrk@gmail.com；美国CNBC记者BeckyQuick的邮箱是： BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；《纽约时报》记者Andrew Ross Sorkin： arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is asked.)
每位记者将在那些提交的问题中选择6个他/她认为最有趣又最重要的提问。记者们告诉我，如果你不是在最后一刻才提交问题，每封邮件提问未超过两个，而且问题既简洁又和伯克希尔相关，就最有可能被选中。(你可以在邮件中告诉三位记者，如果问题被选中，你是否希望他们公开自己的名字。)
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Gary Ransom of Dowling & Partners. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb and Gregg Warren of Morningstar. Our hope is that the analysts and journalists will ask questions that add to our owners’ understanding and knowledge of their investment.
我们还会邀请由三名跟踪伯克希尔的分析师组成的分析师团队。今年保险专家将是Dowling&Partners的Gary Ransom。保险业以外的问题将来自Ruane,Cunniff&Goldfarb的Jonathan Brandt、晨星公司的Gregg Warren。我们希望分析师与记者提的问题能让我们的股东更了解他们的投资。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions headed our way. Some will be tough, for sure, and that’s the way we like it. All told we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and for 18 from the audience. (Last year we had 62 in total.) The questioners from the audience will be chosen by means of 11 drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. on the morning of the annual meeting. Each of the 11 microphones installed in the arena and main overflow room will host, so to speak, a drawing.
对那些将被问到的问题，查理和我都不会得到任何线索。当然，有些问题会很难回答，可那正是我们喜欢的方式。我们希望他们能问至少54个问题，每位分析师和记者都将提6个问题，剩余的18个将由观众来提。去年我们总共回答了62个问题。提问的观众会由11次抽签选出。抽签在年会当天上午8点15分开始。主分会场将布置11个麦克风，每个麦克风区域将有一次抽签机会。
While I’m on the subject of our owners’ gaining knowledge, let me remind you that Charlie and I believe all shareholders should simultaneously have access to new information that Berkshire releases and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial data late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is always held on a Saturday. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, treating them instead as we do all other shareholders.
既然谈及了股东想要知道的问题答案，那么我来提醒一下，查理和我相信，所有的股东都应当在同一时间接收到伯克希尔发布的新消息，也应当拥有足够的时间来对其进行分析。这就是为什么我们试图在周五晚间或周六早间发布公司相关财报的原因，也正因此，我们的年度股东大会也选择在周六召开。我们不与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一的谈话，我们对待他们与对待所有股东都是一样的。
We get terrific help at meeting time from literally thousands of Omaha residents and businesses who want you to enjoy yourselves. This year, because we expect record attendance, we have worried about a shortage of hotel rooms. To deal with that possible problem, Airbnb is making a special effort to obtain listings for the period around meeting time and is likely to have a wide array of accommodations to offer. Airbnb’s services may be especially helpful to shareholders who expect to spend only a single night in Omaha and are aware that last year a few hotels required guests to pay for a minimum of three nights. That gets expensive. Those people on a tight budget should check the Airbnb website.
年会期间，我们将得到成千上万奥马哈居民和企业的大力帮助，他们希望各位在这里度过一段开心的时光。今年，由于预计出席会议的人数将创历史新高，我们担心会出现酒店房间不足的情况。为了解决这个问题，Airbnb为此付出了特别努力，向我们提供了会议期间与会者所能选择的酒店房间清单。Airbnb的服务给予了希望在奥马哈镇短暂停留一晚的股东极大帮助。去年股东大会期间，有一些酒店就要求住宿的客人最少支付三晚的房间费用，那相当昂贵。对于预算紧张的参会股东来说，应当提前在Airbnb网站上查看住宿信息。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers also to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most of our managers have no financial need to work. The joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
出于充分的理由，我经常赞扬我们运营经理人的成就。他们是真正的全明星，他们经营各自的企业就像是他家族唯一拥有的资产一样。我相信，我们的经理人的心态是以股东利益为导向，和那些大型上市公司管理层完全相同。大多数经理人根本没有任何工作的经济需求；对他们来说，在企业经营上打出本垒打得到的快乐，完全不亚于收到一大笔薪酬支票。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 24,100-page Federal income tax return and oversees the filing of 3,400 state tax returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities — and the list goes on and on.
然而，同样重要的还有那些与我并肩作战的24位总部办公室员工。这个团队有效地处理了SEC与其他监管机构提出的大量监管要求，提交了多达24100页的联邦所得税申报表，并监督了3400项州纳税申报表的提交，回答了无数股东和媒体的问询，发布公司年度报表，准备全美最大规模的上市公司年度股东大会，协调董事会活动，这样的例子数不胜数。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and french fries (smothered in Heinz ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他们异常高效地愉快地处理了所有这些问题，我的生活因此轻松愉快。他们的努力已经不局限于跟伯克希尔严格相关的活动：去年他们组织来自40所高校(从200所候选学校中筛选出)的学生代表来奥马哈，跟我进行了一天问答。他们还处理我收到的各种邀请，安排我的行程，甚至帮我买汉堡和(当然是裹着亨氏番茄酱)薯条作午餐。没有哪个CEO像我做得这么舒服了；我真的感觉像是天天跳着踢踏舞去上班。
Last year, for the annual report, we dropped our 48-year-old “no pictures” policy — who says I’m not flexible? — and ran a photo of our remarkable home-office crew that was taken at our Christmas lunch. I didn’t warn the gang of the public exposure they were to receive, so they didn’t have on their Sunday best. This year was a different story: On the facing page you will see what our group looks like when they think someone will be noticing. However they dress, their performance is mind-boggling.
去年年度报告中，我们放弃了延续48年的”没有照片”政策(谁说我们死板的？)，刊登了一张我们出色的总部办公室工作人员圣诞节共进午餐的照片。当时我没有提醒他们这张照片会对外公开，所以他们未着盛装。今年就不同了：你将在看到我们总部团队正式对外的样子。不管他们穿着如何，他们的工作表现都令人惊叹。
Come meet them on May 2nd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
5月2日来跟他们会面，并享受我们为资本家准备的Woodstock狂欢派对吧。
February 27, 2015
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Footnotes
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All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. 本报告中使用的所有每股数字均适用于伯克希尔公司的 A 股。B 股的数字是 A 股的 1/1500。 ↩
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Throughout this letter, as well as in the “Golden Anniversary” letters included later in this report, all earnings are stated on a pre-tax basis unless otherwise designated. 在本信以及本报告后面的 “黄金周年纪念 “信中，除非另有说明，否则所有收益均以税前为基础。 ↩