原文信息：
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Relative Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 10.0 | 13.8 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (11.7) | 32.0 |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 30.9 | (19.9) |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | (8.4) | 24.6 |
| 1970 | 12.0 | 3.9 | 8.1 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 1.8 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 2.8 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (14.8) | 19.5 |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (26.4) | 31.9 |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 37.2 | (15.3) |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 23.6 | 35.7 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | (7.4) | 39.3 |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 6.4 | 17.6 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 18.2 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.3 | (13.0) |
| 1981 | 31.4 | (5.0) | 36.4 |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 21.4 | 18.6 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 9.9 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 7.5 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 31.6 | 16.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 18.6 | 7.5 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 14.4 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 3.5 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 31.7 | 12.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (3.1) | 10.5 |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 30.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 7.6 | 12.7 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 10.1 | 4.2 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 12.6 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 5.5 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 23.0 | 8.8 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 33.4 | 0.7 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 28.6 | 19.7 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | 21.0 | (20.5) |
| 2000 | 6.5 | (9.1) | 15.6 |
| 2001 | (6.2) | (11.9) | 5.7 |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (22.1) | 32.1 |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 28.7 | (7.7) |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 10.9 | (0.4) |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 1.5 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 15.8 | 2.6 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (37.0) | 27.4 |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 26.5 | (6.7) |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 15.1 | (2.1) |
| 2011 | 4.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.0 | (1.6) |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2012 | 19.7% | 9.4% | 10.3 |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2012 | 586,817% | 7,433% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of 1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of 19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.1
2012年，伯克希尔为股东实现了241亿美元的回报。我们用其中的13亿美元回购了部分股份，因此公司今年账面价值增长了228亿。A/B股的每股账面价值增长了14.4%(标普16%)。过去的48年(即从现任的管理层接受以来)，每股账面价值从19美元增长到了114214美元，复合增长19.7%。(A股=1500*B股)
A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but let’s first get the bad news out of the way.
去年伯克希尔有一些好消息，但我们还是先从坏消息说起吧。
- When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms of the comparison we present on the facing page.
1965年我掌管的合伙公司接手伯克希尔以来，我做梦都没想到，我们能在一年赚241亿美元，但与标普500指数相比较，我们的业绩是低于平均水平的。
But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshire’s percentage increase in book value was less than the S&P’s percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be noted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.
To date, we’ve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years, outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.
迄今为止，在5年期的业绩衡量上，我们从来没有落后于标普，已经实现了43连胜。但是标普指数过去4年连续上涨，超过了我们的预期。如果2013年市场继续上涨，我们的5年期连胜记录就要终结了。
One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshire’s results, my partner Charlie Munger, the company’s Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. It’s our job to increase intrinsic business value — for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy — at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshire’s share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring no value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.
有一件事情你可以确信：无论伯克希尔最终业绩如何，我和我的合伙人查理·芒格，公司的副董事长，都不会改变衡量标准。我们的工作就是以比标普指数更快的速度增加公司的内在价值——我们使用账面价值作为其一个明显的低估指标。如果我们成功了，虽然伯克希尔每年股价的波动难以预测，但长期来看它将超越标普指数。如果我们失败了，我们没有给投资者带来任何价值，他们可以直接购买一只低费率的指数基金来获得标普的回报。
Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshire’s intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. We’re confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of terrific operating managers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short.
查理和我相信，长期来看，伯克希尔的内在价值的增长水平可能以略高于标普指数，我们对此充满信心。因为我们拥有一批优秀的企业，一批能干的经理人团队，以及以股东利益为导向的公司文化。然而，当市场下跌时，我们的相对业绩表现肯定会更好一些。在市场特别强劲的年份，我们预期将会暂时落后。
- The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a major acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.
2012年第二件令人失望的事情是我没有能进行一笔重大收购。我瞄准了一些大象，但最终一无所获。
Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renowned Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.
不过今年年初我们的运气发生了变化。2月，我们达成协议收购一家全资拥有亨氏公司的控股公司50%股份。另外一半将会由以Jorge Paulo Lemann为首的一小群投资者所持有，他是巴西著名的商人和慈善家。
We couldn’t be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about 8 billion in preferred shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding company’s common stock for a nominal sum.
没有比这更好的投资伙伴了。JorgePaulo长期以来都是我的好朋友，并且是一位卓越的经理人。他的投资人团队和伯克希尔将会各自出资约40亿美元购买控股公司的普通股。伯克希尔还会另外投资80亿美元购买股息率9%的优先股。优先股还有两个优势大大增加了它的价值：首先它将会在特定时刻以显著的溢价被回购，其次这些优先股还附带认股权证，允许我们以名义价格购买持股公司5%的普通股。
Our total investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So it’s back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.
120亿美元的总投资吸收了伯克希尔去年一大部分利润。但我们依然拥有大量的现金，并在不断地累积。所以，我们得继续工作；查理和我再次穿上狩猎服，继续寻找大象。
Now to some good news from 2012:
接下来是2012年的一些好消息：
- Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy — our five most profitable non-insurance companies — were likely to earn more than 10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.
去年我告诉大家，BNSF、Iscar、Lubrizol、MarmonGroup和中美能源这5家最赚钱的非保险公司，在2012年税前收益将会达到100亿美元。它们确实做到了。尽管美国经济增长缓慢，全球多数经济体都很疲软，我们的”五驾马车”总收益为101亿美元，比2011年增加了约6亿。
Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning 9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
这个集团里，只有税前收益3.93亿美元的中美能源是伯克希尔8年前就拥有的。后来，我们以现金购买了五驾马车中的三辆。在收购第5家BNSF铁路的时候，我们支付了70%的现金，剩下的部分增发股票，使得发行在外的股份增加了6.1%。因此，这5家公司为伯克希尔贡献了97亿美元收益增长，只产生了轻微的稀释。这与我们的目标一致，即不仅仅是实现增长，而是要实现每股收益的增长。
Unless the U.S. economy tanks — which we don’t expect — our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that.
除非美国经济出现衰退(我们预期这不太可能)，我们的”五驾马车”2013年将会实现更高的利润。5位负责的优秀的CEO们将确保这一点实现。
- Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.
尽管我去年一笔大额收购都没做成，但是我们子公司的经理人做得要好的多。去年是我们”补强型”收购创纪录的一年，我们花了23亿美元收购了26家公司，这些公司被并入我们现有的业务中。这些交易没有让伯克希尔增发任何股票。
Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are low-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers.
查理和我喜欢这样的收购：通常它们是低风险的，不让总部承受任何负担，并且扩展了我们久经考验的经理人施展拳脚的空间。
- Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire 1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable underwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.
GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICO’s share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increased from 16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.
GEICO是保险业务里的领头羊，在不牺牲承保纪律的情况下继续扩大其市场份额。自1995年我们收购以来，GEICO在个人车险的市场份额从2.5%增长到了9.7%。保费收入从28亿增长到了167亿。未来还有巨大的增长空间等着它。
The credit for GEICO’s extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, telling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.
GEICO的卓越表现应归功于托尼·莱斯利和他手下的2.7万名员工。另外，我们还要感谢我们的吉祥物Gecko。它都一直坚守在岗位上，风雨无阻的告诉大家如何到GEICO.com买更便宜的保险。
When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice.
当我为大家祈福的时候，我为GEICO祈祷两次。
- Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.
事实证明，我们的新投资经理ToddCombs和TedWeschler是聪明正直诚信的典范，在投资组合管理之外，在许多方面都在为伯克希尔提供帮助，并且他们与我们的企业文化相融。我们找到这两位简直是捡到宝。2012年，他们两人都以两位数的优势跑赢了标普500指数。这让我有点抬不起头(用了非常小号的字体)。
Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsidiaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshire’s massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over.
因此，我们已经将他们各自管理的资金规模增加到了约50亿美元(部分来自我们子公司的养老金)。Todd和Ted都非常年轻，在查理和我离开后将长期掌管伯克希尔巨额的投资组合。他们接手以后大家可以高枕无忧。
- Berkshire’s yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy.
伯克希尔年末的雇员总数创记录地达到了288,462名，比上年增加17,604名。我们总部的员工人数依然维持在24名。暂时还没有任何疯狂的迹象。
- Berkshire’s “Big Four” investments — American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo — all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our ownership now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.
伯克希尔的四大投资美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行，都经历了一个好年景。我们在4家公司的持股比例都有所增加。我们增持了[Wells_Fargo|富国银行]，和[IBM|IBM]。同时，可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购增加了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的持股比例从8.8%增加到8.9%，在美国运通的持股比例从13.0%增加到13.7%。
Berkshire’s ownership interest in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”
伯克希尔在这四家公司的持股比例未来还会增加。MaeWest说的对：“好东西越多越精彩。”
The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.
这四家公司运营着非凡的业务，并且由有才华的、以股东利益为导向的经理人管理。在伯克希尔，我们更愿意拥有一家优秀公司非控制性但足够大的一部分，也不愿意拥有一家平庸公司的全部权益。相对于那些只能收购他们自己能够经营的类似业务的公司，我们在资本配置上的灵活性，使我们具有一个巨大优势。
Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2012 earnings amounted to 1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.
以我们年末的份额计算，2012年我们在”四巨头”中所占的收益份额是39亿。但在我们报告给你的收益中，我们只包括了我们获得的11亿股息。但请不用担心：没有报告的28亿收益和报告的具有同样价值。
The earnings that the four companies retain are often used for repurchases — which enhance our share of future earnings — and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend).
四家公司保留的收益通常用于[Share_Buybacks|回购]，以及对具有良好前景的投资机会的再投资。随着时间推移，我们预计四巨头的收益将大幅提升。如果我们是正确的，伯克希尔的股息将增加，更重要的是，我们未实现的投资收益也将增加(去年底四巨头的未实现的资本利得合计未267亿美元)。
- There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capital-allocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both earnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didn’t share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. That’s 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever the pundits are saying. We instead heed the words from Gary Allan’s new country song, “Every Storm Runs Out of Rain.”
去年许多企业的CEO们在做资本配置的决策时，都被”不确定性”的经济给吓倒了(虽然他们中的许多公司盈利和现金都创达到纪录的水平)。在伯克希尔，我们完全没有他们的担心，相反2012年我们在工厂和设备上投资了创纪录的98亿美元，其中约88%投资在美国。这比2011年又增加了19%，虽然2011年是我们之前投资的历史记录。不管砖家们怎么说，查理和我喜欢在值得的项目上大笔投资。我们注意到GaryAllan新歌词：“暴雨过后必是晴天”。
We will keep our foot to the floor and will almost certainly set still another record for capital expenditures in 2013. Opportunities abound in America.
我们依然脚踏实地，而且基本确定2013年又会是资本支出创纪录的一年。美国遍地都是机会。
A thought for my fellow CEOs: Of course, the immediate future is uncertain; America has faced the unknown since 1776. It’s just that sometimes people focus on the myriad of uncertainties that always exist while at other times they ignore them (usually because the recent past has been uneventful).
给我的CEO们的一点想法：毫无疑问，未来永远是充满不确定性的，美国从1776年开始就一直面对各种不确定性。只不过有时候人们非常关注那些永远存在的无数不确定性，而有时，他们却又无视它们(通常是因为那段时间太平无事)。
American business will do fine over time. And stocks will do well just as certainly, since their fate is tied to business performance. Periodic setbacks will occur, yes, but investors and managers are in a game that is heavily stacked in their favor. (The Dow Jones Industrials advanced from 66 to 11,497 in the 20th Century, a staggering 17,320% increase that materialized despite four costly wars, a Great Depression and many recessions. And don’t forget that shareholders received substantial dividends throughout the century as well.)
长期来看，美国公司前景光明。当然股票也会表现良好，因为它们的命运是和公司的业绩联系在一起的。周期性的困难在所难免，但是投资者和经理人正处在一个对他们极为有利的游戏中。(道琼斯工业指数在20世纪里从66点涨到了11497点，期间经历了四次损失惨重的战争，一次大萧条和多次经济衰退，最终依然蹒跚上升了17320%。而且不要忘了，投资者在整个20世纪也收获了可观的股息。
Since the basic game is so favorable, Charlie and I believe it’s a terrible mistake to try to dance in and out of it based upon the turn of tarot cards, the predictions of “experts,” or the ebb and flow of business activity. The risks of being out of the game are huge compared to the risks of being in it.
因为游戏本身就是如此的有利，查理和我认为，依据塔罗牌的排列，砖家的预测，或者商业周期的起伏，试图在游戏中跳进跳出是一个巨大的错误。错过这个游戏的风险比呆坐里面要大得多。
My own history provides a dramatic example: I made my first stock purchase in the spring of 1942 when the U.S. was suffering major losses throughout the Pacific war zone. Each day’s headlines told of more setbacks. Even so, there was no talk about uncertainty; every American I knew believed we would prevail.
我自己的故事就是一个戏剧性的例子：1942年春天我第一个购买股票，美国当时在太平洋战场正遭受重大损失。每天的新闻头条都在讲诉更多的困难。尽管如此，也没有人在谈论不确定性；我认识的每个美国人都坚信我们会获胜。
The country’s success since that perilous time boggles the mind: On an inflation-adjusted basis, GDP per capita more than quadrupled between 1941 and 2012. Throughout that period, every tomorrow has been uncertain. America’s destiny, however, has always been clear: ever-increasing abundance.
自那段危险时期以来，我们的国家取得的成功让人难以置信：经过通胀调整后，从1941年到2012年，人均GDP翻了4倍。在这期间，每个明天都充满不确定性。然而，美国的命运一直都非常清晰：长盛不衰。
If you are a CEO who has some large, profitable project you are shelving because of short-term worries, call Berkshire. Let us unburden you.
如果你是一个CEO，因为短期因素的担忧，搁置了一个巨大但利润丰厚的投资项目，请打电话给伯克希尔，让我们来减轻你的痛苦。
In summary, Charlie and I hope to build per-share intrinsic value by (1) improving the earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) participating in the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
总之，查理和我希望通过以下方式来增加我们的每股内在价值，(1)增强我们子公司的盈利能力；(2)通过”补强型”的收购进一步增加他们的收益；(3)参与到我们投资对象的增长中去；(4)当伯克希尔的股价明显低于内在价值时，回购股票；(5)偶尔进行大额收购。极少情况下，我们也会增发伯克希尔的股票来最大化最终的业绩。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will continue to play major roles in the American economy. Insurance, moreover, will always be essential for both businesses and individuals — and no company brings greater resources to that arena than Berkshire. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects.
这些业务都具有坚实的基础。一个世纪以后，BNSF和中美能源依然会在美国经济中扮演重要角色。保险业务对个人和企业都是必不可少的——没有哪家公司比伯克希尔给这个领域投资带来更多资本。当我们看到这些以及其他优势时，查理和我就非常喜欢你们公司的前景。
Intrinsic Business Value 企业内在价值
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (or, for that matter, any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements — one of which was qualitative — that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 104-105.
虽然查理和我不停谈论内在价值，但我们无法告诉你伯克希尔的股票精确的内在价值数字是多少(或任何其他股票)。在2010年的年报里，我们提出了三个要素(其中一个是定性的)，我们认为这是衡量伯克希尔内在价值的关键。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2012 our per-share investments increased 15.7% to 8,085.
这两个关键量化因素的最新数据：2012年，我们的每股投资增长了15.7%，达到113786美元，我们除保险和投资外业务的每股税前收益增长15.7%，达到8085美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.4% compounded annually, and our per-share earnings figure has grown at a 20.8% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 42-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both areas, but our strong emphasis will always be on building operating earnings.
自1970年以来，我们的每股投资以每年19.4%的复合速度增长，我们的每股收益增速则是20.8%。伯克希尔的估计过去42年的增速和我们两个主要价值衡量指标的增速非常接近，这并非巧合。查理和我乐于看到这两个方面都增长，但是我们的重点将始终放在提高经营收益上。
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在，让我们来看看四个主要业务板块的运营情况。它们具有差别巨大的资产负债和收入结构。因此把它们合并到一起将会阻碍分析。因此我们将它作为四个独立业务分别讨论，这也是查理和我看待它们的方式。
Insurance 保险业务
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains quite stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
财产意外险公司提前收取保费，事后支付索赔。在一些极端情况下，比如某些工伤保险，赔付可能延续几十年。这种现在收钱，将来赔付的模式让我们持有大量的资金，我们把它称作”浮存金”，但它们最终会支付到别人手中。同时，我们可以使用这些浮存金为伯克希尔投资。虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出，但是我们持有的浮存金规模相对于保费收入能维持一个稳定比率。所以，随着我们的业务扩张，我们的浮存金规模也在增长。我们增长的速度，如下表格所示：
| Year | Float (in $ millions) |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
| 2012 | 73,125 |
Last year I told you that our float was likely to level off or even decline a bit in the future. Our insurance CEOs set out to prove me wrong and did , increasing float last year by $2.5 billion. I now expect a further increase in 2013. But further gains will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual — at the outside no more than 2% in any year.
去年我告诉大家，我们的浮存金规模在未来可能趋于平稳，甚至有可能会有所下降。但我们的保险公司CEO们最终证明我是错的，他们去年让我们增加了25亿浮存金。我现在预期2013年还会进一步增长。但是更多的增长会越发困难。好消息是，GEICO的浮存金基本上会保持增长。但是在国民保险公司的再保险部门，我们有一些流失的保单，它们的浮存金会下降。如果我们未来确实出现了浮存金的下降，那它会是非常温和的，每年流失出去的不会超过2%。
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it. That’s like your taking out a loan and having the bank pay you interest.
如果我们的保费收入超过了经营成本和赔付支出，我们会在利用浮存金投资获得的投资收益之外录得一个承保盈利。赚到这种利润的时候，我们将享受使用这些免费资金的好处，更好的是，我们还因为持有这些资金而赚到钱。这就好像你去银行贷款，银行还倒贴给你利息。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in eight of the eleven years ending in 2011. (Their financials for 2012 are not yet available.) There are a lot of ways to lose money in insurance, and the industry never ceases searching for new ones.
不幸的是，保险公司实现这个美好结果的强烈愿望导致了激烈的竞争，大多数年份竞争都是如此激烈，以至于整个财险行业都在严重承保亏损中运营。这些亏损，实质上就是整个行业为了获得浮存金所支付的代价。举个例子，州立农业保险公司(State Farm)，当前美国最大且管理良好的保险公司，截止到2011年前的11年里有8年都录得承保亏损(2012年尚未公布)。保险行业有很多种亏钱的方式，而且该行业从未停止寻找新的亏钱方式。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for ten consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $18.6 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. If we do, our float will be better than free money.
正如报告前一部分所述，我们已经连续10年录得承保盈利，在此期间我们的税前收益累计186亿美元。预计未来大部分年份中，我们依然会保持承保盈利。如果确实如此，那我们的浮存金就比免费的资金更诱人。
So how does our attractive float affect the calculations of intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and were unable to replenish it. But that’s an incorrect way to look at float, which should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. If float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe Berkshire’s will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
那我们诱人的浮存金将会如何影响内在价值的计算？当伯克希尔在计算账面价值的时候，所有的浮存金都作为负债被扣除了，就好像我们明天就必须赔付，并且再也无法补充回来一样。但这是一种错误看待浮存金的方式，它实际上应该被看做一笔循环基金。如果浮存金是无成本并且是长期存在的，我相信伯克希尔的浮存金确实如此，那这种债务的真实价值将远低于会计账面上的负债。
A partial offset to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In effect, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
我们账面价值中包括的155亿”商誉”，部分地抵消了这笔被夸大的负债。实际上，这些商誉代表着我们为保险公司产生浮存金的能力所支付的价格。然而商誉的账面成本，和它的真实价值毫无对应关系。比如说一家产生持续大额承保亏损的保险公司，其商誉应该为零，无论其历史成本是多少。
Fortunately, that’s not the case at Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill — what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation producing float of similar quality — to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason — a huge reason — why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔的情况并非如此。查理和我相信，我们保险公司的商誉的真正经济价值，也就是我们愿意为购买一家能产生类似质量的浮存金的保险公司所支付的价格，远远超过账面上记录的历史成本。浮存金的价值是我们认为伯克希尔的内在价值明显超过账面价值的一个原因，一个重要原因。
Let me emphasize once again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: There is very little “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In 37 of the 45 years ending in 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue.
必须再强调一下，无成本的浮存金不应该成为对整个产险行业平均预期的结果：在保险行业里，像伯克希尔这样能获得的优质浮存金的公司非常之少。截至2011年的45年中，有37年整个行业的保费收入不能覆盖赔付支出和成本费用。因此，几十年来整个行业的有形资产回报率，一直远远低于美国其他行业的平均水平，这种糟糕的表现几乎肯定将会持续下去。
A further unpleasant reality adds to the industry’s dim prospects: Insurance earnings are now benefitting from “legacy” bond portfolios that deliver much higher yields than will be available when funds are reinvested during the next few years — and perhaps for many years beyond that. Today’s bond portfolios are, in effect, wasting assets. Earnings of insurers will be hurt in a significant way as bonds mature and are rolled over.
另外一个更加不利的事实让行业的前景更加暗淡：保险公司的收益现在受益于之前”遗留”的高息债券组合，这些投资组合的收益率，远高于未来几年(或许持续很多年)资金再投资的回报率。今天的债券投资组合实际上是在浪费资金。随着债券到期并再投资(收益率下行)，保险收益将会遭受重创。
Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some extraordinary insurance operations. Let me tell you about the major units.
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe — a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced — Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because it has so many streams of earnings. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.
首先，浮存金规模排在第一的是伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)运营。阿吉特对其他人都不愿意或者没有财力承保的风险进行承保。他的业务结合了能力、速度、果断，以及最重要的他的头脑智慧。他从未让伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险之下。实际上，我们比多数大保险公司在规避风险方面都更加保守。举例来说，如果保险行业因某项巨灾遭遇了2500亿美元的亏损(这是历史上所发生过最大规模亏损的3倍)，伯克希尔整体上当年依然能够实现盈利，因为它有如此多的收益来源。其他的直保保险公司和再保险公司则会出现大额的亏损，有些甚至将面临破产。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $35 billion and a significant cumulative underwriting profit, a feat that no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. He has thus added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. If you meet Ajit at the annual meeting, bow deeply.
从1985年开始，阿吉特已经创建了一家拥有350亿美元浮存金和可观承保盈利的再保险公司，这是一项任何其他保险公司的CEO都难以望其项背的成就。他也为伯克希尔贡献了数十亿美元的价值。如果你在年会上遇到阿吉特，请深深鞠躬表示敬意。
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们另一家再保险公司是通用再保险，由泰德·蒙特罗斯(Tad Montross)管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
归根结底，一家优秀的保险公司必须遵守四个承保原则。它必须：(1)理解所有可能导致保单形成损失的风险敞口；(2)保守地衡量风险敞口实际形成损失的概率以及可能的损失规模；(3)设定合理的保费，平均来看，在覆盖潜在的赔付损失和运营成本后，能够实现承保盈利；(4)如果无法获得适当的保费，愿意放弃保单。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.
很多保险公司顺利通过前三条测试，但在第四条上不及格。他们无法放弃竞争对手正在争抢的业务。老话讲，“别人这么干，我也得这么干”，这在很多行业都带来了麻烦，但保险行业尤甚。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has achieved consistent and profitable growth since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad遵守了所有四条保险戒律，他的业绩证明了这一点。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金比无成本的资金还要诱人，并且我们预计这种情况依然会继续。我们尤其对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务充满热情，从1998年我们收购公司以来，这项业务持续增长并不断盈利。
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 62 years ago. GEICO is run by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 51 years of service in 2012.
最后还有GEICO，62年前我就是从这家保险公司成长起来的。GEICO由托尼·莱斯利运营，他18岁就加入了公司，到2012年已经服役51年。
I rub my eyes when I look at what Tony has accomplished. Last year, it should be noted, his record was considerably better than is indicated by GEICO’s GAAP underwriting profit of 410 million. This item had nothing to do with 2012’s operating results, changing neither cash, revenues, expenses nor taxes. In effect, the writedown simply widened the already huge difference between GEICO’s intrinsic value and the value at which we carry it on our books.
看到托尼的成就让我无法相信自己的眼睛。必须说明的是，他的业绩远不是去年GEICO按GAAP报告的6.8亿美元承保盈利所能说明的。因为年初的会计准则调整，我们在GEICO的承保盈利中计入了4.1亿的费用。这和GEICO 2012年的运营没有任何关系，不改变现金、收入、成本和税收科目。实际上，这项减记只是进一步加大了GEICO的内在价值和账面价值之间的差距。
GEICO earned its underwriting profit, moreover, despite the company suffering its largest single loss in history. The cause was Hurricane Sandy, which cost GEICO more than three times the loss it sustained from Katrina, the previous record-holder. We insured 46,906 vehicles that were destroyed or damaged in the storm, a staggering number reflecting GEICO’s leading market share in the New York metropolitan area.
尽管公司遭遇了历史上最大的单笔损失，GEICO依然实现了承保盈利。亏损的原因是飓风Sandy，它给GEICO造成了三倍于此前的记录保持者飓风Katrina的损失。风暴中损毁的车辆中46906辆是由GEICO承保的，这个巨大的数字，这也反映了GEICO在纽约地区市场份额的领先地位。
Last year GEICO enjoyed a meaningful increase in both the renewal rate for existing policyholders (“persistency”) and in the percentage of rate quotations that resulted in sales (“closures”). Big dollars ride on those two factors: A sustained gain in persistency of a bare one percentage point increases intrinsic value by more than $1 billion. GEICO’s gains in 2012 offer dramatic proof that when people check the company’s prices, they usually find they can save important sums. (Give us a try at 1-800-847-7536 or GEICO.com. Be sure to mention that you are a shareholder; that fact will usually result in a discount.)
去年，GEICO在现有投保客户的续保率(“客户粘度”)和询单转化率(“转化率”)上都有显著的提升。这两项数据意味着一大笔利润：仅一个百分点的持续增长，就意味着内在价值增加超过10亿美元。2012年GEICO的收益提供了戏剧性的证明，只要来询问GEICO保单价格，通常会发现可以省下不少钱。(打个电话到1-800-847-7536或者到网站GEICO.com试一下。记得申明你是伯克希尔的股东，这通常能让给你享受优惠价。)
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies have consistently delivered an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除了我们的三大保险公司外，我们还有一些规模较小的保险公司，它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域。整体上，这些公司一直为我们贡献承保收益。另外，正如表格数据显示的那样，它们也提供了大量浮存金。查理和我非常珍视这些公司和它们的经理人。
Late in 2012, we enlarged this group by acquiring Guard Insurance, a Wilkes-Barre company that writes workers compensation insurance, primarily for smaller businesses. Guard’s annual premiums total about $300 million. The company has excellent prospects for growth in both its traditional business and new lines it has begun to offer.
2012下半年，我们通过收购Guard Insurance扩大了这个大家庭。它是一家位于Wilkes-Barre的工伤保险公司，主要做一些小额的保单。Guard的年保费规模大约3亿美元。这家公司在它的传统业务和它即将提供的新业务上都有很好的增长潜力。
| Insurance Operations | Underwriting Profit 2012 (in millions) | Underwriting Profit 2011 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2012 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2011 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance | $ 304 | $ (714) | $ 34,821 | $ 33,728 |
| General Re | 355 | 144 | 20,128 | 19,714 |
| GEICO | 680* | 576 | 11,578 | 11,169 |
| Other Primary | 286 | 242 | 6,598 | 5,960 |
| $ 1,625 | $ 248 | $ 73,125 | $ 70,571 |
* After a $410 million charge against earnings arising from an industry-wide accounting change.
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world. It was our lucky day when, in March 1967, Jack Ringwalt sold us his two property-casualty insurers for $8.6 million.
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses 受管制的资本密集型业务
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that have important common characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each business has earning power that even under terrible conditions amply covers its interest requirements. In last year’s tepid economy, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9.6x. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as deeply flawed.) At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two key factors ensure its ability to service debt under all circumstances: the company’s recession-resistant earnings, which result from our exclusively offering an essential service, and its great diversity of earnings streams, which shield it from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body.
两家公司的一个重要特征是，它们都对受监管的长期资产进行了巨额投资，这些资产部分资金来自伯克希尔不提供担保的大额长期债务。它们实际上并不需要我们的信用支持，因为它们具备良好的盈利能力，即使在恶劣的经济环境下也能覆盖它们的债务利息。比如在去年疲软的经济中，BNSF的利息覆盖倍数是9.6倍。(利息覆盖倍数=税前收益/利息，而不是EBITDA/利息，我们认为EBITDA是一个被普遍使用的错误指标)。与此同时，中美能源有两个因素确保其在各种情形下偿还本息的能力：抵抗周期的盈利能力(这是我们垄断性提供基本服务的结果)，以及多元化的收益来源(这保护它免受某一监管机构的严重伤害)。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，我们的这两家公司都在主要领域为美国经济提供动力：
- BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact making BNSF the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system.
BNSF承担了全美15%(以吨英里衡量)的城际间货运量，包括公路、铁路、水路、航空以及管道运输。事实上，我们的运输量超过其他任何公司，这个事实使得BNSF成为美国经济循环系统最重要的大动脉。
BNSF also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
BNSF还以一种非常节能和环保的方式运输货物，一加仑柴油可以运送一吨货物至500英里。卡车实现同样的运力大约要使用4倍的能源。
- MidAmerican’s electric utilities serve regulated retail customers in ten states. Only one utility holding company serves more states. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: first, from a standing start nine years ago, we now account for 6% of the country’s wind generation capacity. Second, when we complete three projects now under construction, we will own about 14% of U.S. solar-generation capacity.
中美能源的电力设施为10个州的零售客户提供服务。只有一家公用事业控股公司为多个州服务。另外，我们是可再生能源方面的领导者：第一，9年前开始稳定起步，目前已占全国风力装机容量的6%。第二，在建的三个项目完成后，我们将占有全美太阳能装机容量的14%。
Projects like these require huge capital investments. Upon completion, indeed, our renewables portfolio will have cost $13 billion. We relish making such commitments if they promise reasonable returns — and on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
类似的项目需要巨额的资本投资。实际上完工后，我们的可再生能源项目将耗资130亿美元。我们进行这样的投资是因为监管承诺提供合理的回报——在这方面，我们给予了未来的监管极大的信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investment in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. And it is in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a manner that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心来源于过往的经验，以及社会在交通和能源方面会一直需要大量投资的认识。政府为了自己的利益将会合理对待资本提供者，以确保资金持续流向重要的基础项目。从我们自身的利益出发，我们愿意去争取监管机构和它们所代表的人民的认可和批准。
Our managers must think today of what the country will need far down the road. Energy and transportation projects can take many years to come to fruition; a growing country simply can’t afford to get behind the curve.
我们的经理人今天必须思考这个国家未来需要什么。能源和交通项目需要很多年才能见到效益；但一个不断增长的经济体无法承受基础设施落后的代价。
We have been doing our part to make sure that doesn’t happen. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting on our laurels: BNSF will spend about $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, roughly double its depreciation charge and more than any railroad has spent in a single year.
我们一直在尽自己一份力量来确保这种情况不会发生。大家可能听到过我们国家破败的基础设施之类的言论，但对BNSF和多数的铁路来说都不是这样。美国的铁路系统正处于一个不能更好的状态，这是行业巨大投资的结果，但我们没有满足于现状：BNSF将会在2013年投入40亿美元，大约是其折旧费用的2倍，比任何铁路在一年内投入的都要多。
In Matt Rose, at BNSF, and Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, we have two outstanding CEOs. They are extraordinary managers who have developed businesses that serve both their customers and owners well. Each has my gratitude and each deserves yours. Here are the key figures for their businesses:
BNSF铁路的MattRose和中美能源的Greg Abel，是我们两位杰出的CEO。他们是杰出的管理者，他们运营的业务为客户提供了良好服务，为股东创造良好的回报。我非常感谢他们，他们都值得你的感激。下面是他们业务的关键数据：
| MidAmerican (89.8% owned) | Earnings 2012 (in millions) | Earnings 2011 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 429 | $ 469 |
| Iowa utility | 236 | 279 |
| Western utilities | 737 | 771 |
| Pipelines | 383 | 388 |
| HomeServices | 82 | 39 |
| Other (net) | 91 | 36 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 1,958 | 1,982 |
| Interest | 314 | 336 |
| Income taxes | 172 | 315 |
| Net earnings | $ 1,472 | $ 1,331 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire | $ 1,323 | $ 1,204 |
| BNSF | Earnings 2012 (in millions) | Earnings 2011 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 20,835 | $ 19,548 |
| Operating expenses | 14,835 | 14,247 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 6,000 | 5,301 |
| Interest (net) | 623 | 560 |
| Income taxes | 2,005 | 1,769 |
| Net earnings | $ 3,372 | $ 2,972 |
Sharp-eyed readers will notice an incongruity in the MidAmerican earnings tabulation. What in the world is HomeServices, a real estate brokerage operation, doing in a section entitled “Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses?”
眼尖的读者可能已经注意到中美能源的利润表格中不协调之处。家庭服务公司(HomeServices)怎么会被划分到”受管制的资本密集的业务”中？
Well, its ownership came with MidAmerican when we bought control of that company in 2000. At that time, I focused on MidAmerican’s utility operations and barely noticed HomeServices, which then owned only a few real estate brokerage companies.
Since then, however, the company has regularly added residential brokers — three in 2012 — and now has about 16,000 agents in a string of major U.S. cities. (Our real estate brokerage companies are listed on page 107.) In 2012, our agents participated in $42 billion of home sales, up 33% from 2011.
然而从那以后，住宅服务公司就不断地增加经纪公司，2012年又增加了3家，现在在美国主要的大城市拥有大约1.6万名经纪人。2012年，我们的经纪人参与的房屋销售交易达420亿美元，比2011年增长33%。
Additionally, HomeServices last year purchased 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which together license 544 brokerage companies throughout the country and receive a small royalty on their sales. We have an arrangement to purchase the balance of those operations within five years. In the coming years, we will gradually rebrand both our franchisees and the franchise firms we own as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices.
另外，家庭服务公司去年购买了Prudential和Real Living 67%的特许权业务，它们在全国一共向544家经纪公司发放了许可证，并从销售中获得了一小部分特许费。我们计划5年内收购剩余的股份。今年，我们将逐步把特许加盟商和特许权经营公司合并为伯克希尔家庭服务公司(BHHS)。
Ron Peltier has done an outstanding job in managing HomeServices during a depressed period. Now, as the housing market continues to strengthen, we expect earnings to rise significantly.
即便在经济萧条时期，RonPeltier在管理住房经纪公司上依然工作出色。现在，房地产市场持续走强，我们预计收益将会有显著的提升。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这部分的业务种类繁多。让我们看看整个集团的合并的资产负债表和利润表的摘要。
Balance Sheet 12/31/12 (in millions)
| Assets | Amt. | Liabilities and Equity | Amt. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 5,338 | Notes payable | $ 1,454 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 7,382 | Other current liabilities | 8,527 |
| Inventory | 9,675 | Total current liabilities | 9,981 |
| Other current assets | 734 | ||
| Total current assets | 23,129 | ||
| Deferred taxes | 4,907 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 26,017 | Term debt and other liabilities | 5,826 |
| Fixed assets | 18,871 | Non-controlling interests | 2,062 |
| Other assets | 3,416 | Berkshire equity | 48,657 |
| $ 71,433 | $ 71,433 |
Earnings Statement (in millions)
| 2012 | 2011* | 2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 83,255 | $ 72,406 | $ 66,610 |
| Operating expenses | 76,978 | 67,239 | 62,225 |
| Interest expense | 146 | 130 | 111 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 6,131 | 5,037 | 4,274 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2,432 | 1,998 | 1,812 |
| Net earnings | $ 3,699 | $ 3,039 | $ 2,462 |
* Includes earnings of Lubrizol from September 16.
Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP. In particular, they exclude some purchase-accounting items, primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets. We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the real expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table.
符合GAAP的收入和支出数据列示在后文。上表中的运营成本是不符合GAAP准则的。尤其是它剔除了一些购买法会计项目，主要是某些无形资产的摊销。我们列示这些数据是因为，查理和我认为这样的调整更准确地反映了整个业务真实的成本和利润。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments — some are small and arcane — but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others never lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real expenses. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when calculating earnings — even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不打算逐一解释所有的调整(有些是细微并且晦涩的)，但是认真的投资者必须要理解不同无形资产之间的本质区别：一些无形资产的价值随时间消耗殆尽，但是另外一些的价值永不贬值。比如软件，摊销费用是真实的成本。然而一些无形资产，比如客户关系，按购买法会计准则必须摊销，但是它并非真实的成本。GAAP并不区分这两种摊销。两种费用都在计算收益时计入成本，尽管从投资者的角度看，它们是如此不同。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $600 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real” — and indeed that is the portion we have included in the table above — and the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made.
在后文列示的GAAP准则的数字中，该部门6亿美元的摊销费用被计入了成本。我们大致认为其中的20%是”真实”的，这也是我们上面的表格包括的部分，其他部分则不是。因为我们做了非常多的收购，这种差别变得影响巨大。
“Non-real” amortization expense also looms large at some of our major investees. IBM has made many small acquisitions in recent years and now regularly reports “adjusted operating earnings,” a non-GAAP figure that excludes certain purchase-accounting adjustments. Analysts focus on this number, as they should.
“非真实”的摊销费用还对我们一些主要的投资对象产生影响。IBM近几年进行了许多小型并购，并且定期地报告”调整后的营业利润”，一个剔除了某些购买法会计调整的非GAAP数据。分析师关注的是这个数字，他们理应如此。
A “non-real” amortization charge at Wells Fargo, however, is not highlighted by the company and never, to my knowledge, has been noted in analyst reports. The earnings that Wells Fargo reports are heavily burdened by an “amortization of core deposits” charge, the implication being that these deposits are disappearing at a fairly rapid clip. Yet core deposits regularly increase. The charge last year was about $1.5 billion. In no sense, except GAAP accounting, is this whopping charge an expense.
然而，富国银行没有强调它的”非真实”摊销费用，据我所知，分析师也未提及。富国银行报告收益深受”核心存款摊销”费用所累，这似乎意味着这些存款在迅速的消失。但是实际情形却是存款在不断增长。去年这项摊销是15亿美元。除了GAAP准则，这项异常巨大的摊销在哪里都不具有实际意思。
And that ends today’s accounting lecture. Why is no one shouting “More, more?”
今天的会计课到此结束。为什么没有人大声要求”再多讲一点，再讲一点？”
The crowd of companies in this section sell products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation.
这个板块公司销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机的各种产品。有些公司有非常好的竞争优势，它们无杠杆净有形资产回报率从税后25%到100%多。其他公司的回报率介于12-20%之间。但也有少数公司的回报率非常低，这是我们在资产配置上所犯下的严重错误。
More than 50 years ago, Charlie told me that it was far better to buy a wonderful business at a fair price than to buy a fair business at a wonderful price. Despite the compelling logic of his position, I have sometimes reverted to my old habit of bargain-hunting, with results ranging from tolerable to terrible. Fortunately, my mistakes have usually occurred when I made smaller purchases. Our large acquisitions have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well.
50多年前，查理就告诉我，以合理的价格买入一家优秀的公司，比以一个便宜的价格买入一家平庸的公司更好。尽管这个道理有着令人信服的逻辑，我还是时不时地犯捡便宜的的老毛病，其结果有些难以接受，有些则极其糟糕。幸运的是，我的错误通常发生在小额收购。大笔收购的企业通常进展顺利，少数甚至极好。
Viewed as a single entity, therefore, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employ $22.6 billion of net tangible assets and, on that base, earned 16.3% after-tax.
把这个板块看做一个整体的话，这个企业集团的业绩非常不错。226亿美元的净有形资产获得了16.3%的税后收益。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the price paid is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for intangible assets. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of the businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the huge winners reside.
当然，如果出价过高，买入一些具有良好经济特性的公司也可能成为一笔糟糕的投资。我们大多数的收购里都支付了远超净有形资产的溢价，这些成本反映在财报巨额的无形资产数据中。不过总体来说，我们在该板块部署的资本收获了可观的回报。而且，这些公司的内在价值远超账面价值。需要说明的是，在保险业和受管制行业之间，内在价值和账面价值之间的差异更为巨大。那里才是真正的大赢家所在之处。
Marmon provides an example of a clear and substantial gap existing between book value and intrinsic value. Let me explain the odd origin of this differential.
Last year I told you that we had purchased additional shares in Marmon, raising our ownership to 80% (up from the 64% we acquired in 2008). I also told you that GAAP accounting required us to immediately record the 2011 purchase on our books at far less than what we paid. I’ve now had a year to think about this weird accounting rule, but I’ve yet to find an explanation that makes any sense — nor can Charlie or Marc Hamburg, our CFO, come up with one. My confusion increases when I am told that if we hadn’t already owned 64%, the 16% we purchased in 2011 would have been entered on our books at our cost.
去年，我告诉大家，我们15亿增持了Marmon额外的16%股份，持股比例升至了80%(2008年收购了64%)。我还告诉大家，GAAP准则要求，我们必须以远低于我们实际支付价格的成本记录这笔交易(减记6.14亿)。我花了一整年的时间来思考这条怪异的会计准则，但是没有找到任何合理解释。查理和CFO-MarcHamburg也想不出来。当我得知，如果我们之前没有拥有64%的权益，那我们2011年新购买的16%就可以以实际购买成本入账，我更加糊涂了。
In 2012 (and in early 2013, retroactive to yearend 2012) we acquired an additional 10% of Marmon and the same bizarre accounting treatment was required. The $700 million write-off we immediately incurred had no effect on earnings but did reduce book value and, therefore, 2012’s gain in net worth.
2012年(实际发生在2013年初，但追溯调整至2012年底)，我们又14亿增持了Marmon额外的10%股份，同样奇怪的会计要求又出现了。立即减记的7亿美元没有影响我们的利润，但是降低了我们的账面价值，因此也降低了2012年公司的净资产值。
The cost of our recent 10% purchase implies a 8 billion. Charlie and I believe our current purchase represents excellent value. If we are correct, our Marmon holding is worth at least $4.6 billion more than its carrying value.
最近10%的收购价格意味着我们现在持有Marmon的90%股份价值126亿美元。但我们账面记录的价值仅有80亿。查理和我认为最近的收购价格代表了真实的价值。如果我们是对的，那我们持有Marmon的实际价值至少比账面价值高46亿美元。
Marmon is a diverse enterprise, comprised of about 150 companies operating in a wide variety of industries. Its largest business involves the ownership of tank cars that are leased to a variety of shippers, such as oil and chemical companies. Marmon conducts this business through two subsidiaries, Union Tank Car in the U.S. and Procor in Canada.
Marmon是一家多元化公司，有150多家各个行业的子公司。它最大的业务是持有并租赁油罐车给各种货运公司，比如石油和化学品公司。Marmon通过美国联合油罐(UnionTankCar)和加拿大Procor两家子公司运营这项业务。
Union Tank Car has been around a long time, having been owned by the Standard Oil Trust until that empire was broken up in 1911. Look for its UTLX logo on tank cars when you watch trains roll by. As a Berkshire shareholder, you own the cars with that insignia. When you spot a UTLX car, puff out your chest a bit and enjoy the same satisfaction that John D. Rockefeller undoubtedly experienced as he viewed his fleet a century ago.
Union TankCar历史悠久，一直归Standard Oil Trust拥有，直到1911年帝国解体。有火车经过的时候留意看油罐上的UTLX标志。作为伯克希尔的股东，大家拥有带有这个商标的油罐车。当大家看到一辆UTLX油罐车时，请挺起胸膛，并享受一个世纪前约翰·洛克菲勒看到自己的车队所享受到那种满足感。
Tank cars are owned by either shippers or lessors, not by railroads. At yearend Union Tank Car and Procor together owned 97,000 cars having a net book value of 100,000. Union Tank Car is also a major manufacturer of tank cars — some of them to be sold but most to be owned by it and leased out. Today, its order book extends well into 2014.
油罐车归货运商或者出租人所有，铁路公司并不拥有。至去年年底，UnionTankCar和Procor一共拥有9.7万辆油罐车，账面价值40亿美元(4.1万美元/辆)。值得注意的是一辆新车成本约10万美元。UnionTankCar还是一家主要的油罐车制造商，少部分出售但大部分自己持有并出租。现在它的订单已经排到2014年了。
At both BNSF and Marmon, we are benefitting from the resurgence of U.S. oil production. In fact, our railroad is now transporting about 500,000 barrels of oil daily, roughly 10% of the total produced in the “lower 48” (i.e. not counting Alaska and offshore). All indications are that BNSF’s oil shipments will grow substantially in coming years.
BNSF和Marmon都受益于与美国原油生产的复苏。我们的铁路现在每天运输50万桶原油，大约是”下48州”(不包括阿拉斯加和离岸州)总产量的10%。种种迹象表明，BNSF今年的原油运输量将会大幅增长。
Space precludes us from going into detail about the many other businesses in this segment. Company-specific information about the 2012 operations of some of the larger units appears on pages 76 to 79.
篇幅所限，我们不能在这里一一讨论许多其他公司的细节。其它具体业务请参见年报。
Finance and Financial Products 金融和金融产品
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
这是我们最小的业务板块，包括两家租赁公司，XTRA(拖车租赁)和CORT(家具租赁)，以及ClaytonHome，国内领先的预制房生产商和融资商。除了这些100%拥有的子公司外，我们还有其他一些金融资产以及Berkadia商业抵押贷款公司50%的权益。
We include Clayton in this sector because it owns and services 332,000 mortgages, totaling $13.7 billion. In large part, these loans have been made to lower and middle-income families. Nevertheless, the loans have performed well throughout the housing collapse, thereby validating our conviction that a reasonable down payment and a sensible payments-to-income ratio will ward off outsized foreclosure losses, even during stressful times.
我们把Clayton归入到这个板块，是因为它拥有33.2万笔抵押贷款，合计137亿美元。这些贷款中的大部分贷给了中低收入家庭。然而这些贷款在房地产市场崩盘中表现良好，这进一步增强了我们的放贷理念，即合理的首付比例和合理的月供收入比，可以有效防范止赎损失，即便在市场萧条时也有效。
Clayton also produced 25,872 manufactured homes last year, up 13.5% from 2011. That output accounted for about 4.8% of all single-family residences built in the country, a share that makes Clayton America’s number one homebuilder.
Clayton去年还生产了25,872套预制房，比2011年上升13.5%。占全国全国独栋住宅建设量的4.8%，其份额为全美第一。
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. Our expenditures for new rental equipment at XTRA totaled $256 million in 2012, more than double its depreciation expense. While competitors fret about today’s uncertainties, XTRA is preparing for tomorrow.
CORT和XTRA也是各自领域中的佼佼者。2012年XTRA在新租赁设备上的投资是2.56亿美元，是其折旧费用的两倍多。当竞争对手们在担忧今天的不确定性时，XTRA已经在为明天做准备。
Berkadia continues to do well. Our partners at Leucadia do most of the work in this venture, an arrangement that Charlie and I happily embrace.
Berkadia继续表现出色。我们在Leucadia的合伙人承担了大部分工作，这是查理和我喜闻乐见的情形。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
下面是这个版块的税前收益概述(不包括资本损益)：
| 2012 (in millions) | 2011 (in millions) | |
|---|---|---|
| Berkadia | $ 35 | $ 25 |
| Clayton | 255 | 154 |
| CORT | 42 | 29 |
| XTRA | 106 | 126 |
| Net financial income* | 410 | 440 |
| $ 848 | $ 774 |
* Excludes capital gains or losses
Investments 投资业务
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下面是我们年末持有的，市值超过10亿美元的股票投资：
12/31/12
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned | Cost* (in millions) | Market (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 13.7 | $ 1,287 | $ 8,715 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.9 | 1,299 | 14,500 |
| 24,123,911 | ConocoPhillips | 2.0 | 1,219 | 1,399 |
| 22,999,600 | DIRECTV | 3.8 | 1,057 | 1,154 |
| 68,115,484 | International Business Machines Corp | 6.0 | 11,680 | 13,048 |
| 28,415,250 | Moody’s Corporation | 12.7 | 287 | 1,430 |
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.3 | 2,990 | 3,599 |
| 20,668,118 | Phillips 66 | 3.3 | 660 | 1,097 |
| 3,947,555 | POSCO | 5.1 | 768 | 1,295 |
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 3,563 |
| 25,848,838 | Sanofi | 2.0 | 2,073 | 2,438 |
| 415,510,889 | Tesco plc | 5.2 | 2,350 | 2,268 |
| 78,060,769 | U.S. Bancorp | 4.2 | 2,401 | 2,493 |
| 54,823,433 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc | 1.6 | 2,837 | 3,741 |
| 456,170,061 | Wells Fargo & Company | 8.7 | 10,906 | 15,592 |
| Others | 7,646 | 11,330 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 49,796 | $ 87,662 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
One point about the composition of this list deserves mention. In Berkshire’s past annual reports, every stock itemized in this space has been bought by me, in the sense that I made the decision to buy it for Berkshire. But starting with this list, any investment made by Todd Combs or Ted Weschler — or a combined purchase by them — that meets the dollar threshold for the list (1.15 billion shown.
关于上面的投资组合，有一点需要说明。在伯克希尔以前的年报中，该领域的每只股票都是我购买的，也就是说，我为伯克希尔做出了投资决策。但从这个组合开始，由ToddCombs或Ted Weschlerg做出的投资，或两人联合投资的，只要满足列示的门槛(今年是10亿美元)都会被包括在内。DIRECTV就是第一支这样的股票，Todd和Ted在他们的投资组合中都持有它，2012年末市值合计11.5美元。
Todd and Ted also manage the pension funds of certain Berkshire subsidiaries, while others, for regulatory reasons, are managed by outside advisers. We do not include holdings of the pension funds in our annual report tabulations, though their portfolios often overlap Berkshire’s.
We continue to wind down the part of our derivatives portfolio that involved the assumption by Berkshire of insurance-like risks. (Our electric and gas utility businesses, however, will continue to use derivatives for operational purposes.) New commitments would require us to post collateral and, with minor exceptions, we are unwilling to do that. Markets can behave in extraordinary ways, and we have no interest in exposing Berkshire to some out-of-the-blue event in the financial world that might require our posting mountains of cash on a moment’s notice.
我们将继续削减涉及伯克希尔承担类似保险风险的衍生品投资组合。不过我们的电力和天然气公用事业业务还会继续进行运营所需的衍生品投资。除了少数的例外，新的合约将会要求我们提供抵押，我们不愿做抵押。市场有可能会走极端，但我们无意于将伯克希尔暴露在任何金融市场的突发事件中，这可能片刻之间就吞噬掉伯克希尔堆积如山的现金。
Charlie and I believe in operating with many redundant layers of liquidity, and we avoid any sort of obligation that could drain our cash in a material way. That reduces our returns in 99 years out of 100. But we will survive in the 100th while many others fail. And we will sleep well in all 100.
查理和我都认为，在运营中要维持多余的流动性，避免任何形式可能会耗光我们现金的债务。这种策略在100年中的99年里将降低我们的回报率。但是这可以在别人都倒下的时候，保护我们在第100年活下来。那么我们将在100年里高枕无忧。
The derivatives we have sold that provide credit protection for corporate bonds will all expire in the next year. It’s now almost certain that our profit from these contracts will approximate 2 billion over their five-year lives. All told, these derivatives have provided a more-than-satisfactory result, especially considering the fact that we were guaranteeing corporate credits — mostly of the high-yield variety — throughout the financial panic and subsequent recession.
我们出售的为企业债提供信用保障的衍生品明年将会到期。基本可以确定我们将会在这些合约上实现10亿美元的税前收益。我们还收到了在5年存续期里这些合约的大笔预收款，贡献的”浮存金”平均大于20亿美元。总的来说，这些衍生品提供了一个非常令人满意的回报，尤其考虑到在整个金融危机合随后的恐慌中，我们承保的是高风险的企业[Bonds|债券]。
In our other major derivatives commitment, we sold long-term puts on four leading stock indices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts were initiated between 2004 and 2008 and even under the worst of circumstances have only minor collateral requirements. In 2010 we unwound about 10% of our exposure at a profit of $222 million. The remaining contracts expire between 2018 and 2026. Only the index value at expiration date counts; our counterparties have no right to early termination.
在其他主要的衍生品合约里，我们曾卖出了四个主要股票指数(美国、英国、欧洲和日本)的长期看跌期权。这些合约是2004年至2008年期间签订的，即使在市场最糟糕的时候，也仅有少量的抵押品要求。2010年，我们解除了10%的风险敞口，赚得2.22亿美元。剩余的合约将会在2018年至2026年之间到期。只有到期日的指数才能用于结算，我们的交易对手不能提前行权。
Berkshire received premiums of 6.2 billion; the corresponding figure at yearend 2012 was 7.5 billion from 4.2 billion of float derived from these contracts as we see fit.
伯克希尔签订以上还未到期的合约时，收到了42亿美元的保费。如果所有合约都在2011年到期，我们必须要支付62亿美元，2012年这个数字是39亿美元。由于结算负债的大幅下降，我们的GAAP负债从2011年的85亿下降到2012年的75亿。虽然最终结果还不确定，但是查理和我相信，最终的负债将会比我们现有的账面负债还低。另外，我们可以自由运用这些合约收到的42亿美元，投资于我们喜欢的标的。
We Buy Some Newspapers… Newspapers? 我们买了一些报业公司……报业？
During the past fifteen months, we acquired 28 daily newspapers at a cost of $344 million. This may puzzle you for two reasons. First, I have long told you in these letters and at our annual meetings that the circulation, advertising and profits of the newspaper industry overall are certain to decline. That prediction still holds. Second, the properties we purchased fell far short of meeting our oft-stated size requirements for acquisitions.
过去的15个月里，我们以3.44亿美元收购了28家日报。有两个原因可能让你非常疑惑。第一，我一直在致股东信和年会里向大家说，整个报业的发行量、广告和利润毫无疑问会下降。这个预测依然有效。第二，我们买下的资产完全达不到我们要求的收购规模标准。
We can address the second point easily. Charlie and I love newspapers and, if their economics make sense, will buy them even when they fall far short of the size threshold we would require for the purchase of, say, a widget company. Addressing the first point requires me to provide a more elaborate explanation, including some history.
第二点可能比较容易解释。查理和我喜欢报纸，如果它们的经济情况合意，我们会买下它们，哪怕它们的规模根本达不到我们的收购标准，比如一些袖珍型公司。解释第一点需要多费一些功夫，还需要一些历史。
News, to put it simply, is what people don’t know that they want to know. And people will seek their news — what’s important to them — from whatever sources provide the best combination of immediacy, ease of access, reliability, comprehensiveness and low cost. The relative importance of these factors varies with the nature of the news and the person wanting it.
简单的说，新闻就是人们不知道但却又想知道的事情。考虑即时性、方便性、可靠性、全面性和低成本，人们会从任何最佳组合的来源寻找对他们来说重要的新闻。这些因素的重要程度随新闻的特性和受众的需求而不同。
Before television and the Internet, newspapers were the primary source for an incredible variety of news, a fact that made them indispensable to a very high percentage of the population. Whether your interests were international, national, local, sports or financial quotations, your newspaper usually was first to tell you the latest information. Indeed, your paper contained so much you wanted to learn that you received your money’s worth, even if only a small number of its pages spoke to your specific interests. Better yet, advertisers typically paid almost all of the product’s cost, and readers rode their coattails.
在电视和互联网出现以前，报纸是各种新闻的最主要信息渠道，这一事实让其成为大部分人不可或缺的产品。无论你关注国际、国内、地方，体育还是财经，大家订阅的报纸通常是最快的信息来源。哪怕整份报纸里只有几页满足大家的兴趣爱好，报纸里所包含的信息还是让你的订阅物超所值。更好的是，广告商通常支付了几乎全部的刊印成本，读者只需搭个顺风车。
Additionally, the ads themselves delivered information of vital interest to hordes of readers, in effect providing even more “news.” Editors would cringe at the thought, but for many readers learning what jobs or apartments were available, what supermarkets were carrying which weekend specials, or what movies were showing where and when was far more important than the views expressed on the editorial page.
此外，广告本身也提供了很多信息给有兴趣的读者，实际上相当于提供了更多”新闻”。编辑们在这方面绞尽脑汁，但是对很多读者来说，招聘信息，哪里有房屋出租，哪个超市周末打折，或者哪部电影何时在哪里上映，比主要文章里的社论要有意义的多。
In turn, the local paper was indispensable to advertisers. If Sears or Safeway built stores in Omaha, they required a “megaphone” to tell the city’s residents why their stores should be visited today. Indeed, big department stores and grocers vied to outshout their competition with multi-page spreads, knowing that the goods they advertised would fly off the shelves. With no other megaphone remotely comparable to that of the newspaper, ads sold themselves.
反过来说，报纸对于打广告的公司来说也是不可或缺的。如果Sears和Safeway在奥马哈开了新店，它们需要一个”大喇叭”来告诉城里的居民为何今天应该去光顾它们的商店。实际上，大型百货商店、杂货店争相在报纸上打出多页广告来压倒竞争对手，因为他们知道广告促销的产品立马就会被抢购一空。再没其他宣传方式比得上报纸了，广告会一传百应。
As long as a newspaper was the only one in its community, its profits were certain to be extraordinary; whether it was managed well or poorly made little difference. (As one Southern publisher famously confessed, “I owe my exalted position in life to two great American institutions — nepotism and monopoly.”)
只要是当地社区的唯一报纸，它的利润肯定非常可观，经营水平的好坏没有太大影响。正如一家南部的出版商坦言，“我一生优越的地位全部归功于美国的两项制度——裙带关系和垄断。”
Over the years, almost all cities became one-newspaper towns (or harbored two competing papers that joined forces to operate as a single economic unit). This contraction was inevitable because most people wished to read and pay for only one paper. When competition existed, the paper that gained a significant lead in circulation almost automatically received the most ads. That left ads drawing readers and readers drawing ads. This symbiotic process spelled doom for the weaker paper and became known as “survival of the fattest.”
近年来，绝大部分城市都只剩下了一份报纸(或者两家竞争的报纸合并如同一个经济利益体)。这种减缩是不可避免的，大部分人只愿意订阅和阅读一份报纸。当竞争存在的时候，发行量显著领先的报纸几乎会自动获得大部分的广告。于是广告吸引读者，读者吸引广告。共生的过程淘汰了弱势的报纸，即所谓的”胖者生存”。
Now the world has changed. Stock market quotes and the details of national sports events are old news long before the presses begin to roll. The Internet offers extensive information about both available jobs and homes. Television bombards viewers with political, national and international news. In one area of interest after another, newspapers have therefore lost their “primacy.” And, as their audiences have fallen, so has advertising. (Revenues from “help wanted” classified ads — long a huge source of income for newspapers — have plunged more than 90% in the past 12 years.)
现在世界已经改变了，早在报纸开始印刷的时候，股价信息和全国体育赛事的细节就已经成了旧闻。互联网提供了大量招聘和租房信息。电视机随时播放政治、国内和国际新闻。在一个接一个领域报纸失去了首要地位。随着受众减少，广告也随之下降。(招聘类广告收入曾经是报纸的重要收入，过去的12年里下降超过90%。)
Newspapers continue to reign supreme, however, in the delivery of local news. If you want to know what’s going on in your town — whether the news is about the mayor or taxes or high school football — there is no substitute for a local newspaper that is doing its job. A reader’s eyes may glaze over after they take in a couple of paragraphs about Canadian tariffs or political developments in Pakistan; a story about the reader himself or his neighbors will be read to the end. Wherever there is a pervasive sense of community, a paper that serves the special informational needs of that community will remain indispensable to a significant portion of its residents.
然而，报纸在传递地方新闻方面，依然维持着霸主地位。如果大家想知道自己的社区发生了什么——无论是关于市长，税收，还是高中橄榄球队的新闻，没有任何东西能取代地方报纸。读者读到加拿大关税局或者巴基斯坦政局发展的文章可能会犯困，但是一条与读者或者他的邻居有关的新闻，将会被一读到底。只要社区观念普遍存在，满足社区特定新闻需求的报纸就会对社区内的大部分居民不可或缺。
Even a valuable product, however, can self-destruct from a faulty business strategy. And that process has been underway during the past decade at almost all papers of size. Publishers — including Berkshire in Buffalo — have offered their paper free on the Internet while charging meaningful sums for the physical specimen. How could this lead to anything other than a sharp and steady drop in sales of the printed product? Falling circulation, moreover, makes a paper less essential to advertisers. Under these conditions, the “virtuous circle” of the past reverses.
即便一个有价值的产品，也会因错误的商业策略而自毁。过去几十年，几乎所有的大型报纸都在进行这一个过程。出版商(包括伯克希尔旗下的布法罗新闻报)都曾在互联网上免费提供它们的报纸，同时却对纸质报纸收费。这怎么能不导致纸质报纸发行量的大幅下降呢？此外，下跌的发行量，进一步降低了它对广告商的重要意义。于是过去的”良性循环”彻底逆转。
The Wall Street Journal went to a pay model early. But the main exemplar for local newspapers is the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, published by Walter Hussman, Jr. Walter also adopted a pay format early, and over the past decade his paper has retained its circulation far better than any other large paper in the country. Despite Walter’s powerful example, it’s only been in the last year or so that other papers, including Berkshire’s, have explored pay arrangements. Whatever works best — and the answer is not yet clear — will be copied widely.
《华尔街日报》很早就开始尝试收费模式。地方性报纸的范例则是Walter Hussman Jr.出版的《阿肯色民主党公报》，Walter也很早开始尝试收费模式，过去的几十年里，它的发行量维持的比国内其他报纸都要好。除了Walter外，其他报纸包括伯克希尔的报纸，直到最近几年才尝试收费模式。只要模式的效果最好(现在还不确定)，就会被广泛复制。
Charlie and I believe that papers delivering comprehensive and reliable information to tightly-bound communities and having a sensible Internet strategy will remain viable for a long time. We do not believe that success will come from cutting either the news content or frequency of publication. Indeed, skimpy news coverage will almost certainly lead to skimpy readership. And the less-than-daily publication that is now being tried in some large towns or cities — while it may improve profits in the short term — seems certain to diminish the papers’ relevance over time. Our goal is to keep our papers loaded with content of interest to our readers and to be paid appropriately by those who find us useful, whether the product they view is in their hands or on the Internet.
查理和我认为，向一个联系紧密的社区提供全面可靠的信息，并制定合理的互联网策略，社区报纸将会在很长时间内保持活力。我们不认为削减内容和发行频率会带来成功。实际上，狭窄的覆盖范围会导致狭窄的客户群。而在一些较大的城镇也尝试过了降低发行频率，虽然短期内可能提高利润，但是长期来看会减少报纸的曝光频率。我们的目标是让报纸充满读者感兴趣的内容，并且让那些觉得它有用的人支付合理的费用，无论是纸质的还是网络版。
Our confidence is buttressed by the availability of Terry Kroeger’s outstanding management group at the Omaha World-Herald, a team that has the ability to oversee a large group of papers. The individual papers, however, will be independent in their news coverage and editorial opinions. (I voted for Obama; of our 12 dailies that endorsed a presidential candidate, 10 opted for Romney.)
我们的信心来源于TerryKroeger在《奥马哈先驱报》的卓越管理，他的团队有能力管理更多的报纸。各份报纸则会在新闻采编上保持独立。(我投票给了奥巴马；但我们支持总统候选人的12份日报中，有10份选择了罗姆尼。)
Our newspapers are certainly not insulated from the forces that have been driving revenues downward. Still, the six small dailies we owned throughout 2012 had unchanged revenues for the year, a result far superior to that experienced by big-city dailies. Moreover, the two large papers we operated throughout the year — The Buffalo News and the Omaha World-Herald — held their revenue loss to 3%, which was also an above-average outcome. Among newspapers in America’s 50 largest metropolitan areas, our Buffalo and Omaha papers rank near the top in circulation penetration of their home territories.
我们的报纸当然也摆脱不了导致收入下滑的压力。尽管如此，我们拥有的6份小型日报2012年的收入没有下降，这是比其他大城市日报要好的成绩。另外，我们全年运营的两份大型报纸《布法罗新闻报》和《奥马哈世界先驱报》的收入下滑维持在3%，也优于平均水平。在全美50个大城市圈，我们在布法罗和奥马哈的报纸在当地的渗透率名列前茅。
This popularity is no accident: Credit the editors of those papers — Margaret Sullivan at the News and Mike Reilly at the World-Herald — for delivering information that has made their publications indispensable to community-interested readers. (Margaret, I regret to say, recently left us to join The New York Times, whose job offers are tough to turn down. That paper made a great hire, and we wish her the best.)
这种受欢迎程度并非意外：这要归功于报纸的编辑们，布法罗的Margaret Sullivan和奥马哈的Mike Reilly，他们传递的信息使他们的报纸对关注社区的读者来说不可或缺。(非常遗憾，Margaret最近离开我们加入了《纽约时报》，这个机会很难拒绝。纽约时报挖到了一个宝，我们祝她一切顺利。)
Berkshire’s cash earnings from its papers will almost certainly trend downward over time. Even a sensible Internet strategy will not be able to prevent modest erosion. At our cost, however, I believe these papers will meet or exceed our economic test for acquisitions. Results to date support that belief.
几乎可以肯定的是，长期来看伯克希尔在报纸上获得的现金收入将会不断下降。即便是明智的互联网策略也不能阻止温和的侵蚀。至于我们的投资，我们相信这些报纸将会达到或者超过我们的收购回报标准。迄今为止的结果都证明了我们的想法。
Charlie and I, however, still operate under economic principle 11 (detailed on page 99) and will not continue the operation of any business doomed to unending losses. One daily paper that we acquired in a bulk purchase from Media General was significantly unprofitable under that company’s ownership. After analyzing the paper’s results, we saw no remedy for the losses and reluctantly shut it down. All of our remaining dailies, however, should be profitable for a long time to come. (They are listed on page 108.) At appropriate prices — and that means at a very low multiple of current earnings — we will purchase more papers of the type we like.
查理和我始终坚持股东手册第11条经济原则，我们不会持续运营扭亏无望的业务。我们打包收购Media General时，其旗下包括一家无利可图的日报，我们对其分析后，找不出解决办法，于是不情愿的将其关闭。而我们其他的日报，则在未来很长一段时间内都会保持盈利。如果价格合理(意味着非常低的市盈率)，我们将购买更多我们喜欢类型的报纸。
A milestone in Berkshire’s newspaper operations occurred at yearend when Stan Lipsey retired as publisher of The Buffalo News. It’s no exaggeration for me to say that the News might now be extinct were it not for Stan.
Charlie and I acquired the News in April 1977. It was an evening paper, dominant on weekdays but lacking a Sunday edition. Throughout the country, the circulation trend was toward morning papers. Moreover, Sunday was becoming ever more critical to the profitability of metropolitan dailies. Without a Sunday paper, the News was destined to lose out to its morning competitor, which had a fat and entrenched Sunday product.
查理和我1977年4月收购了新闻报。当时它是一份晚报，主打工作日而没有周日版。全国报纸的发行趋势是晨报。而且对于城市的日报的盈利来说，周日版越来越重要。没有周日版，布法罗几乎注定要输给它的晨报竞争对手，它们拥有庞大且死忠用户的周日版。
We therefore began to print a Sunday edition late in 1977. And then all hell broke loose. Our competitor sued us, and District Judge Charles Brieant, Jr. authored a harsh ruling that crippled the introduction of our paper. His ruling was later reversed — after 17 long months — in a 3-0 sharp rebuke by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, we lost circulation, hemorrhaged money and stood in constant danger of going out of business.
于是我们在1977年底开始刊印周日版。但是噩梦开始了。竞争对手起诉我们，地区法官CharleBrieant Jr.宣布了一项严厉的判决阻碍我们周日版的发行。在漫长的17个月以后，他的判决在第二巡回法院以3-0被驳回。在上诉期间，我们损失了发行量，现金大失血，并且随时面临着倒闭的危险。
Enter Stan Lipsey, a friend of mine from the 1960s, who, with his wife, had sold Berkshire a small Omaha weekly. I found Stan to be an extraordinary newspaperman, knowledgeable about every aspect of circulation, production, sales and editorial. (He was a key person in gaining that small weekly a Pulitzer Prize in 1973.) So when I was in big trouble at the News, I asked Stan to leave his comfortable way of life in Omaha to take over in Buffalo.
那时StanLipse是我1960年代的一位好朋友，他和妻子卖给了伯克希尔一家小型奥马哈周报。我发现Stan是一位一流的报业人士，对发行、产品、销售和编辑各个方面了如指掌。(他是让那份小周报荣获1973年普利策奖的关键人物)。所以当我在布法罗焦头烂额的时候，我邀请Stan离开他奥马哈舒适的生活，去布法罗接手。
He never hesitated. Along with Murray Light, our editor, Stan persevered through four years of very dark days until the News won the competitive struggle in 1982. Ever since, despite a difficult Buffalo economy, the performance of the News has been exceptional. As both a friend and as a manager, Stan is simply the best.
他从不犹豫。Stan和我们的主编Murray Light一起，在艰难的时光中坚持奋斗了4年，直到新闻报在1982年从竞争中胜出。从那时起，即便在布法罗经济糟糕的时候，我们的报纸业绩都表现出色。无论作为朋友还是经理人，Stan都是最棒的。
Dividends 分红
A number of Berkshire shareholders — including some of my good friends — would like Berkshire to pay a cash dividend. It puzzles them that we relish the dividends we receive from most of the stocks that Berkshire owns, but pay out nothing ourselves. So let’s examine when dividends do and don’t make sense for shareholders.
伯克希尔的一些股东(包括我一些最好的朋友)，可能都希望伯克希尔进行现金分红。让他们疑惑的是，我们从伯克希尔拥有的大多数子公司那里收到很多分红，却从来不向大家分红。我们有必要来了解一下，什么时候分红对股东有意义，什么时候没有意义。
A profitable company can allocate its earnings in various ways (which are not mutually exclusive). A company’s management should first examine reinvestment possibilities offered by its current business — projects to become more efficient, expand territorially, extend and improve product lines or to otherwise widen the economic moat separating the company from its competitors.
一家盈利的公司，可以通过各种方式分配收益(这些方法不是互相排斥的)。公司的管理层应该首先检查，当前业务再投资的可能性：提高效率，扩张地域，扩大或改进生产线，或者其他方式能加深拓宽公司与竞争对手之间的经济护城河。
I ask the managers of our subsidiaries to unendingly focus on moat-widening opportunities, and they find many that make economic sense. But sometimes our managers misfire. The usual cause of failure is that they start with the answer they want and then work backwards to find a supporting rationale. Of course, the process is subconscious; that’s what makes it so dangerous.
我要求子公司的经理人永无止境地专注于加深护城河的机会，他们也的确发现很多行之有效的办法。但有时候我们的经理人也犯错。通常错误的原因是，他们先找到了他们想要的答案，然后再反过来寻找支持它们的理由。当然这个过程是潜意识的；这也是让错误无比危险的原因。
Your chairman has not been free of this sin. In Berkshire’s 1986 annual report, I described how twenty years of management effort and capital improvements in our original textile business were an exercise in futility. I wanted the business to succeed and wished my way into a series of bad decisions. (I even bought another New England textile company.) But wishing makes dreams come true only in Disney movies; it’s poison in business.
你们的董事长也犯过同样的错误。在伯克希尔1986年的年报里，我详述了20年来我们在原有的纺织业务上的管理努力和投资，最终如何竹篮打水一场空。我希望公司最后能成功，导致了一系列糟糕的决定。(我甚至买下了另一家新英格兰的纺织厂)。但是梦想成真只在迪士尼的童话故事里存在。愿望是商业决策上的毒药。
Despite such past miscues, our first priority with available funds will always be to examine whether they can be intelligently deployed in our various businesses. Our record $12.1 billion of fixed-asset investments and bolt-on acquisitions in 2012 demonstrate that this is a fertile field for capital allocation at Berkshire. And here we have an advantage: Because we operate in so many areas of the economy, we enjoy a range of choices far wider than that open to most corporations. In deciding what to do, we can water the flowers and skip over the weeds.
虽然过去犯过如此错误，但我们可用资金的首要配置选择始终是，研究它是否能够明智的配置到我们现有的业务中。2012年我们创纪录的121亿美元固定资产投资和补强型收购证明，伯克希尔内部有一大片沃土可以投资。而且我们具备显著优势：我们再经济的许多领域运营着众多的业务，我们享有比大多数公司更广泛的投资选择。在决定投资什么的时候，我们可以直接跳过杂草去浇灌鲜花。
Even after we deploy hefty amounts of capital in our current operations, Berkshire will regularly generate a lot of additional cash. Our next step, therefore, is to search for acquisitions unrelated to our current businesses. Here our test is simple: Do Charlie and I think we can effect a transaction that is likely to leave our shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis than they were prior to the acquisition?
即使在我们在伯克希尔现有业务中部署了大量资本后，伯克希尔依然源源不断产出富余的现金。因此，我们的下一步则是，寻找与当前业务无关的收购机会。我们的标准也很简单：查理和我认为，我们是否能够达成一项交易，让我们的股东在每股基础上，比收购之前更加富有？
I have made plenty of mistakes in acquisitions and will make more. Overall, however, our record is satisfactory, which means that our shareholders are far wealthier today than they would be if the funds we used for acquisitions had instead been devoted to share repurchases or dividends.
But, to use the standard disclaimer, past performance is no guarantee of future results. That’s particularly true at Berkshire: Because of our present size, making acquisitions that are both meaningful and sensible is now more difficult than it has been during most of our years.
Nevertheless, a large deal still offers us possibilities to add materially to per-share intrinsic value. BNSF is a case in point: It is now worth considerably more than our carrying value. Had we instead allocated the funds required for this purchase to dividends or repurchases, you and I would have been worse off. Though large transactions of the BNSF kind will be rare, there are still some whales in the ocean.
尽管如此，一笔大额的收购还是可以大幅提高我们的每股内在价值。BNSF铁路就是一个不错的例子：它现在的价值远高于账面价值。如果我们这次收购的钱用来分红或者回购，我们的情况要比现在更糟糕。虽然像BNSF这样的大家伙不多，但是海里还是有鲸鱼的。
The third use of funds — repurchases — is sensible for a company when its shares sell at a meaningful discount to conservatively calculated intrinsic value. Indeed, disciplined repurchases are the surest way to use funds intelligently: It’s hard to go wrong when you’re buying dollar bills for 80¢ or less. We explained our criteria for repurchases in last year’s report and, if the opportunity presents itself, we will buy large quantities of our stock. We originally said we would not pay more than 110% of book value, but that proved unrealistic. Therefore, we increased the limit to 120% in December when a large block became available at about 116% of book value.
资金的第三种利用方式是回购。当公司股票以明显低于保守估计的内在价值的折扣出售时，回购就有意义。实际上，有纪律的股票回购是合理利用资金的最可靠方式：以80美分或者更低的价格购买1美元很难出错。在去年年报里，我们解释了回购的标准，如果机会来了，我们会大笔回购股票。我们之前说我们回购不会支付超过110%的账面价值，但是事实证明那不切实际。因此，我们在12月将上限提高到120%，当时一大笔股票以账面价值的116%在出售。
But never forget: In repurchase decisions, price is all-important. Value is destroyed when purchases are made above intrinsic value. The directors and I believe that continuing shareholders are benefitted in a meaningful way by purchases up to our 120% limit.
And that brings us to dividends. Here we have to make a few assumptions and use some math. The numbers will require careful reading, but they are essential to understanding the case for and against dividends. So bear with me.
最后我们来谈谈分红。这里我们需要一些假设并且要做些计算。这些数字需要仔细阅读才能理解，但是这对于理解应该和不应该分红的理由至关重要。所以请耐心听我讲。
We’ll start by assuming that you and I are the equal owners of a business with 240,000 — and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into our business at 125% of net worth. Therefore, the value of what we each own is now $1.25 million.
我们假设你和我各自拥有一家价值200万美元的公司的一半。公司每年的净有形资产收益率是12%，即24万美元，并且可以合理预期再投资收益率也是12%。此外，外部投资者愿意以净资产125%的价格收购我们的公司。于是，我们各自拥有的资产价格是125万美元。
You would like to have the two of us shareholders receive one-third of our company’s annual earnings and have two-thirds be reinvested. That plan, you feel, will nicely balance your needs for both current income and capital growth. So you suggest that we pay out 160,000 to increase the future earnings of the business. In the first year, your dividend would be $40,000, and as earnings grew and the one-third payout was maintained, so too would your dividend. In total, dividends and stock value would increase 8% each year (12% earned on net worth less 4% of net worth paid out).
你可能希望公司每年把利润的三分之一用来分配，剩余三分之二继续投资。你觉得这个方案即满足了当前收入的要求，又能实现资本增值。所以你建议我们分配8万美元现金，剩余16万用于增加公司未来的利润。第一年，你会收到4万美元的分红，随着利润的增长和三分之一的分红比例保持不变，你收到的分红也会增长。总的来说，分红和股票价值会以每年8%的速度增长(12%收益率-4%分红)。
After ten years our company would have a net worth of 2 million compounded at 8%) and your dividend in the upcoming year would be 2,698, (125% of our half of the company’s net worth). And we would live happily ever after — with dividends and the value of our stock continuing to grow at 8% annually.
十年后，我们公司的净资产会达到4,317,850美元(期初的200万按8%的复利计算)，同时你下一年收到的分红也会增长到86,357美元。我们两人各自的股票价值2,698,656(我们各自一半净资产的125%)。我们之后会生活的非常快乐，因为分红和股价依然每年增长8%。
There is an alternative approach, however, that would leave us even happier. Under this scenario, we would leave all earnings in the company and each sell 3.2% of our shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce the same $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this option the “sell-off” approach.
但还有另一种方式会让我们更加快乐。那就是我们留存所有的利润，同时每人每年卖出手中3.2%的股票。因为股票可以以净资产125%的价格卖出，所以这种方法第一年也能获得4万美元的现金，卖出获得的资金也会不断增长。我们暂且把这种方法叫做”卖出法”。
Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of our company increases to 2 million compounded at 12%). Because we would be selling shares each year, our percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, we would each own 36.12% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be 1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $2,804,425, about 4% greater than the value of your shares if we had followed the dividend approach.
在”卖出法”的情形下，十年后公司的净资产值会增长到6,211,686美元(期初的200万按12%的复利计算)。但是因为我们每年都会卖出股票，持股比例会下降，十年后，我们每人拥有公司36.12%的股票。即便如此，你所持的股票对应的净资产为2,243,540美元。另外别忘了，每1美元的净资产值可以以1.25美元卖出。因此，剩余的股票市值2,804,425美元，大约比”分红法”高出4%。同时，你从”卖出法”获得的现金要比”分红法”获得的现金高4%。瞧！你不但每年有更有钱花，最后还有更多的财产。
Moreover, your annual cash receipts from the sell-off policy would now be running 4% more than you would have received under the dividend scenario. Voila! — you would have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value.
This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth. Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured.
当然，上述的计算假设平均每年12%的净资产回报率，而且股东能以账面价值的125%卖出股票。到目前为止，标普500指数的净资产回报率明显超过12%，并且售价远超净资产的125%。这两条假设对于伯克希尔来说似乎都是适当的，当然这无法保证。
Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. If they are, the argument for the sell-off policy becomes even stronger. Over Berkshire’s history — admittedly one that won’t come close to being repeated — the sell-off policy would have produced results for shareholders dramatically superior to the dividend policy.
考虑到乐观的情形，上面的假设被超过的可能性也是存在的。如果事实如此，那么”卖出法”就更具优势。根据伯克希尔的历史(当然这一历史无法重演)，“卖出法”比”分红法”给股东带来了多得多的财富。
Aside from the favorable math, there are two further — and important — arguments for a sell-off policy. First, dividends impose a specific cash-out policy upon all shareholders. If, say, 40% of earnings is the policy, those who wish 30% or 50% will be thwarted. Our 600,000 shareholders cover the waterfront in their desires for cash. It is safe to say, however, that a great many of them — perhaps even most of them — are in a net-savings mode and logically should prefer no payment at all.
除了计算上的优势以外，还有两个支持”卖出法”的原因也非常重要。第一，分红策略强制对所有股东进行同样比例的分红。比如说，分红比例是40%，那些希望分红比例是30%或50%的股东就受到伤害。我们60万股东的分红偏好各不相同。或许可以肯定地说，他们中的许多人(或许是绝大多数)偏好净储蓄模式，他们宁愿不分红。
The sell-off alternative, on the other hand, lets each shareholder make his own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all. Of course, a shareholder in our dividend-paying scenario could turn around and use his dividends to purchase more shares. But he would take a beating in doing so: He would both incur taxes and also pay a 25% premium to get his dividend reinvested. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)
第二，“卖出法”让股东可以自己决定现金和资本增值之间的比例。一位股东可以选择兑现60%的利润，另一位可以选择兑现20%或者不兑现。当然，“分红法”股东可以用分红把股票买回来，但是他这样做会受到伤害：既要交税，又要支付25%的溢价才能把股票买回来。(记住，公开市场以账面价值的125%交易股票。)
The second disadvantage of the dividend approach is of equal importance: The tax consequences for all taxpaying shareholders are inferior — usually far inferior — to those under the sell-off program. Under the dividend program, all of the cash received by shareholders each year is taxed whereas the sell-off program results in tax on only the gain portion of the cash receipts.
分红的第二个坏处同样严重：“分红法”的税收负担不如(通常远不如) “卖出法”。根据股息计划，每年股东收到所有的现金分红都要交税，而”卖出法”只需为现金收入中的利得部分交税。
Let me end this math exercise — and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill — by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 4.25% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased.
让我们以我自己的例子来结束这场数学练习(我可以听到你们好像牙医的钻头被拿开了一样的开心的欢呼)，并解释股东如何逐步减持股票，同时实现投资的增值。在过去的7年里，我每年都会捐出自己持有的4.25%伯克希尔股票。经过这个过程，我原持有的712,497,000股B股股票(经过拆股)已经减少到了528,525,623股。很显然我的持股比例显著的减少了。
Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are 40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue — albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion — even as I now annually give away more than 4.5% of my shares (the increase having occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).
但我在公司的投资实际上增加了：我现在持有的股票的账面价值明显高于7年之前。(具体数字是2005年的282亿，2012年为402亿)。换句话说，虽然我现在伯克希尔的持股比例降低了，但是投在伯克希尔的钱更多了。同样的，我在伯克希尔的内在价值和公司的盈利能力也比2005年大大增强。随着时间推移，我预计这种价值增长还会继续(尽管是以一种不规则的方式)，即使我现在每年都会捐赠超过4.25%的股票(增加的份额是由于我增加了对某些基金会的终身承诺)。
Above all, dividend policy should always be clear, consistent and rational. A capricious policy will confuse owners and drive away would-be investors. Phil Fisher put it wonderfully 54 years ago in Chapter 7 of his Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits , a book that ranks behind only The Intelligent Investor and the 1940 edition of Security Analysis in the all-time-best list for the serious investor. Phil explained that you can successfully run a restaurant that serves hamburgers or, alternatively, one that features Chinese food. But you can’t switch capriciously between the two and retain the fans of either.
最重要的是，分红政策必须始终保持清晰、一致和合理。反复无常的政策会把股东弄糊涂，也会排斥潜在的投资者。54年前菲利普·费雪(Phil Fisher)在他的《普通股和不普通的利润》一书的第7章非常精彩地阐述了这一点，对认真的投资者而言，这本书在经典书目上仅次于《聪明的投资者》以及1940年版的《证券分析》。费雪说你可以成功地运营一家卖汉堡的餐馆或一家中餐为特色的餐馆，但是你不能不停地转换还同时留住两类顾客。
Most companies pay consistent dividends, generally trying to increase them annually and cutting them very reluctantly. Our “Big Four” portfolio companies follow this sensible and understandable approach and, in certain cases, also repurchase shares quite aggressively.
大多数公司奉行稳定的分红策略，通常试图逐年提高分红，但非常不愿意削减分红。我们的”四大”投资组合就遵循类似的、可理解的模式。有时候，还会非常积极地回购股票。
We applaud their actions and hope they continue on their present paths. We like increased dividends, and we love repurchases at appropriate prices.
我们拍手称赞它们现行的策略，并希望它们继续保持。我们喜欢增加分红，我们也喜欢以合理的价格回购股票。
At Berkshire, however, we have consistently followed a different approach that we know has been sensible and that we hope has been made understandable by the paragraphs you have just read. We will stick with this policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions.
当然在伯克希尔，我们一直遵循一种不同的分红策略，我们深知这样做的合理性，我们也希望上述的段落能帮助大家理解这一策略。只要我们相信，我们关于账面价值增长和市场价格溢价的假设依然合理，我们就会一直坚持上述策略。如果将来某项因素变化导致了实质性的改变，我们将会重新审视我们的策略。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 4th at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova will be in charge. (Though that’s a new name, it’s the same wonderful Carrie as last year; she got married in June to a very lucky guy.) All of our headquarters group pitches in to help her; the whole affair is a homemade production, and I couldn’t be more proud of those who put it together.
年会将在5月4号周六在CenturyLink中心举行。Carrie sova总负责。(虽然看起来是个新名字，其实仍是去年那个优秀的carrie。她刚刚嫁给一个幸运的男士)所有我们总部的团队都会协助她，整个活动都是我们公司自己操办，我为所有参与其中的员工由衷的感到骄傲。
The doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our second International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. The target will be the porch of a Clayton Home, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. Last year I successfully fought off all challengers. But now Berkshire has acquired a large number of newspapers and with them came much tossing talent (or so the throwers claim). Come see whether their talent matches their talk. Better yet, join in. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands).
我们将在早上7点开门，7点半我们将开展我们的第二届国际报纸投递挑战赛。目标将在克莱顿之家的门廊,精确来说从投掷线算起有35英尺。去年我成功的打败了所有的挑战者。但是如今伯克希尔已经收购了一大批报业公司，与之同来的有很多的报纸投递高手(当然投递者都这么说)。来看看他们的才能是否有他们说的那么好。最好你也加入进来。这些报纸有36-42页，你必须自己把他们折起来。(不准用橡皮筋)
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
早上8点半，一部新的伯克希尔电影会上映。一个小时以后我们将开始股东问答，这将会持续到下午3点半(其间会在CenturyLink的看台休息吃午饭)。在短暂的休息之后，查理与我将会在3点45分召开年度会议。如果你决定在白天的提问时间离开,请在查理说话的时候溜走。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do so by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,090 pairs of Justin boots, (that’s a pair every 30 seconds), 10,010 pounds of See’s candy, 12,879 Quikut knives (24 knives per minute) and 5,784 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t shopped at our meeting.
最好的退出理由当然是购物。毗邻会议区，一个占地达19.43万平方英尺的大堂里会放满伯克希尔旗下数十家企业的产品，我们将为你提供帮助。去年你们尽了全力，大多数地点都创下了销售新纪录。在9小时内我们卖出了1090双Justin靴子(每30秒一双)，10010磅的喜诗糖果，12879把Quikut小刀(每分钟24把)与5784双Wells Lamont手套，这些都是热门商品。但你可以做的更好。记住，那些说金钱不能买到幸福的人根本还没有在我们的年会上买过东西。
Last year, Brooks, our running shoe company, exhibited for the first time and ran up sales of $150,000. Brooks is on fire: Its volume in 2012 grew 34%, and that was on top of a similar 34% gain in 2011. The company’s management expects another jump of 23% in 2013. We will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting.
去年，我们的跑鞋公司Brooks，在第一次展览时就获得了15万美元的销售。Brooks现在火了，其销售额在2012年增长了34%，紧跟在其2011年约34%的增长之后。公司的管理层预计2013年销售额还能再提升23%。我们将再次有一款特殊的纪念性跑鞋在年会上供应。
On Sunday at 8 a.m., we will initiate the “Berkshire 5K,” a race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your credentials for the meeting. We will have plenty of categories for competition, including one for the media. (It will be fun to report on their performance.) Regretfully, I will forego running; someone has to man the starting gun.
周日早上8点，我们开启了”伯克希尔5公里”活动，一场从Century Link开始的跑步比赛，参赛的所有细节可参见来宾手册。你在收到你的会议邀请函同时会收到这本手册。我们将会有各类比赛，包括一个对于媒体的比赛。(当他们报道自己的表现时一定会很有趣)。遗憾的是，我会错过这项跑步比赛，必须有人去打响发令枪。
I should warn you that we have a lot of home-grown talent. Ted Weschler has run the marathon in 3:01. Jim Weber, Brooks’ dynamic CEO, is another speedster with a 3:31 best. Todd Combs specializes in the triathlon,but has been clocked at 22 minutes in the 5K.
我得给你们提个醒，我们有很多本土人才。Ted Weschler的马拉松纪录为3小时1分钟。Brooks跑鞋公司的CEO-Jim Weber是另一位体力充沛的跑步健将，有着3小时31分的记录。Todd Combs的专长是铁人三项全能，但他在5公里项目上有着22分钟的记录。
That, however, is just the beginning: Our directors are also fleet of foot (that is, some of our directors are). Steve Burke has run an amazing 2:39 Boston marathon. (It’s a family thing; his wife, Gretchen, finished the New York marathon in 3:25.) Charlotte Guyman’s best is 3:37, and Sue Decker crossed the tape in New York in 3:36. Charlie did not return his questionnaire.
然而，这仅仅是开始：我们的管理者也是跑步健将(或者说，我们一些董事也是)。Steve Burke在波士顿马拉松赛的成绩是2小时39分。(这是他家特色：他的妻子Gretchen在3小时25分内完成了纽约马拉松赛)。Charlotte Guyman的最好成绩是3小时37分，Sue Decker在纽约跑了3小时36分。至于查理，他没有回复我给他的问卷。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO将会在购物区设个展位，由其在全国各地的顶级顾问们负责。插一句，在多数情况下，GEICO会给你一个股东优惠(通常为8%)。在我们运营的51个地区中有44个区可以享受这个特别的优惠。(加一点：这个优惠不可以与其他优惠同时享有，假如你已经享受到另一个优惠，比如给予某些特殊群体的)。带上你现存保险的细节，我们来看看是否能帮你省钱。你们当中有至少一半以上的人，我相信我们能够帮到。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, including a couple of new ones. Carol Loomis, who has been invaluable to me in editing this letter since 1977, has recently authored Tap Dancing to Work: Warren Buffett on Practically Everything. She and I have cosigned 500 copies, available exclusively at the meeting.
你一定要去书虫书店看看。它会带来35种书籍及DVD产品，包括一些新书。Carol Loomis，自1977年来就在帮我修改这封信，对我来说是无价之宝，她最近写了《跳着踢踏舞去上班：沃伦巴菲特和他的一切》。她和我已经一起签了500本书，只有在会场专卖。
The Outsiders, by William Thorndike, Jr., is an outstanding book about CEOs who excelled at capital allocation. It has an insightful chapter on our director, Tom Murphy, overall the best business manager I’ve ever met. I also recommend The Clash of the Cultures by Jack Bogle and Laura Rittenhouse’s Investing Between the Lines. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
《商界局外人》(The Outsiders)由William Thorndike,Jr.撰写，是一本杰出的好书，是关于CEO如何在资本配置方面达到出色业绩。Tom Murphy是我所见到过的最好的商业管理者，在这本书中写了有洞察力的一章。我也推荐Jack Bogle的《文化冲突：投资与投机》(The Clash of the Cultures)与Laura Rittenhouse的《从字里行间间挖掘投资机会》(Investing Between Lines)。如果你需要运输你买的书，附近就有一家能提供物流服务。
The Omaha World-Herald will again have a booth, offering a few books it has recently published. Red-blooded Husker fans — is there any Nebraskan who isn’t one? — will surely want to purchase Unbeatable. It tells the story of Nebraska football during 1993-97, a golden era in which Tom Osborne’s teams went 60-3.
《奥马哈世界先驱报》将会再设一个展位，提供其最近出版的几本书。活跃的Huskers粉丝(有没有内布拉斯加州人不是的？)将会想买一本《不可战胜》(Unbeatable)。它讲述了内布拉斯加州橄榄球在1993-97的故事，那个黄金时代里Tom Osborne的队伍赢得了60胜3负的战绩。
If you are a big spender — or aspire to become one — visit Signature Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果你很能烧钱，或有打算这样做，周六中午至下午5点来奥马哈机场东面的Signature Aviation。在那里我们会有一队NetJets飞机供你来爽一把。你可以坐巴士来，开私人飞机走，活着不就要享受一下嘛。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
代理投票材料的附件中有报告，可以告诉你如何获得进入会场与其他活动的邀请函。这周到伯克希尔航线价格已经大大上涨。如果你从远方来，可以比较飞去堪萨斯城与直飞奥马哈的成本。这两个城市之间的车程在2个半小时，你也许可以省不少钱，尤其如果你打算在奥马哈租车的话。请把省下的钱花在我们这里。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $35.9 million of business during its annual meeting sale, an all-time record that makes other retailers turn green. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 30th and Monday, May 6th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
在Dodge路与Pacific路之间的72号大街，有着77英亩的土地，上面坐落着内布拉斯加州家具市场，我们在那儿会再次举办”伯克希尔周末”的打折活动。去年这家店在会议期间的销售额达3590万美元，是一项划时代的记录，这让其它零售商脸都绿了。为了获得伯克希尔的折扣，你必须在4月30日周二至5月6日周一之间(包含这两天)的这段时间购物，同时也必须出示你的邀请函。这段时间的特殊折扣甚至适用于好几家知名生产商的产品，通常是不给打折销售的，但出于股东周末的考虑，给予你一个例外。我们感激他们的合作。内布拉斯加州家具市场的营业时间是周一至周六早上10点至晚上9点，周日是早10点至晚6点。今年的周六，从晚上5点半到8点，家具市场会举办一个野餐会，你们都会被邀请的。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6p.m.to9p.m.onFriday,May 3rd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 5th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在波仙珠宝我们会再次开展两个股东独有的活动。第一个是鸡尾酒招待会，从5月3日周五晚上6点至9点。第二个是大型售卖活动，5月5日周日早上9点至下午4点。在周六，我们会开到晚上6点。最近几年，我们三天的销售额已经超过了12月的所有销售额，12月通常是珠宝商的最好月份。
Around 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Last year my sales totaled 2 million. Because I need to leave well before sundown, I will be desperate to do business. Come take advantage of me. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” price.
周日下午1点，我会在波仙珠宝店开始我的销售工作。去年我的销售额累计到150万美元。今年我会坚持到200万美元。因为我需要在日落前离开，所以我会拼命努力。来占我便宜好了。为”疯狂的沃伦”开个价吧。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 29th through Saturday, May 11th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整个周末我们在波仙有巨大的人群。为你的方便考虑，股东优惠价从4月29日周一至5月11日周六都可以。在此期间，请出示你的参会邀请函或证券单据来证明你是伯克希尔的股东。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
在周日，波仙外面的大厅，两次美国国际象棋冠军Patrick Wolff蒙住眼睛，将以六人一组的方式迎战所有的挑战者，他们将大开眼界。来自达拉斯的魔术师Norman Beck，会震撼观众。此外，我们会邀请两位世界顶级桥牌大师Bob Hamman与Sharon Osberg，在周日下午与我们的股东玩桥牌。不过别和他们玩牌赌钱。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 5th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st( but not before ) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s, order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one. (I once saw Bill Gates polish off two of the giant variety after a full-course dinner; that’s when I knew he would make a great director.)
5月5日周日Gorat’s与Piccolo’s两家餐馆会再次向伯克希尔的股东开放。他们会服务到晚上10点，Gorat’s下午1点开门，Piccolo’s4点开门。这两家餐馆都是我的最爱，周日晚上两家我都会去光顾。记住，要在Gorat’s预定，4月1日起拨打402-551-3733，Piccolo’s电话是402-342-9038。在Piccolo’s可以点一个”大屋顶啤酒冰淇淋”作为饭后甜点。只有娘娘腔才会点小的。我曾经看到比尔盖茨在一顿晚饭后干掉大屋顶，那时我认识到他会成为一个伟大的管理者的。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
我们再次会有三位财经记者主持会议的问答环节，他们会向查理和我提出股东通过电子邮件发来的问题。他们及他们的电子邮箱地址是：财富杂志Carol Loomis： cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC的Becky Quick： BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com，纽约时报Andrew Ross Sorkin: arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
那些被提交的问题中，每一个记者将会选择六个他(她)认为最有趣和重要的进行提问。他们过去的选择已经告诉我那些简洁，提交时间较早，和伯克希尔相关的问题(请记住，每封电子邮件最好不要提出超过两个问题)最有可能被选中(在您的邮件中，请告诉记者如果问题被选中，您希不希望自己的名字被公开)。
Last year we had a second panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. All were insurance specialists, and shareholders subsequently indicated they wanted a little more variety. Therefore, this year we will have one insurance analyst, Cliff Gallant of Nomura Securities. Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb will join the analyst panel to ask questions that deal with our non-insurance operations.
去年我们邀请了一个由三名研究伯克希尔的分析师组成的分析师团队，但是由于他们三人都是保险业的专家，所以很多股东在会后表示希望今年的分析师团队能够更加多元化一些。因此，今年我们将只邀请一名保险行业的专家：来自野村证券(Nomura)的Cliff Gallant。除了他以外，来自红杉基金(Ruane,Cunniff&Goldfarb)的Jonathan Brandt将会被邀请到今年的分析师团队对非保险业务进行提问。
Finally — to spice things up — we would like to add to the panel a credentialed bear on Berkshire, preferably one who is short the stock. Not yet having a bear identified, we would like to hear from applicants. The only requirement is that you be an investment professional and negative on Berkshire. The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
最后，为了让整个提问过程变得更为给力，我们希望能够有一位看空伯克希尔的分析师加入到分析师团队中，如果是已经开始在做空伯克希尔的那就更理想了。尽管此前从来没有过对伯克希尔的前景看空的论调，我们仍然希望能找到这样的分析师。对这位分析师唯一的要求是你是一位投资专家并且看空伯克希尔。三位分析师将会提出他们自身对于伯克希尔的疑问，同时，记者和其他参会者也将会交替对他们发问。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it, which is why we try to issue financial information after the market close on a Friday and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that will further educate shareholders about their investment.
查理和我认为所有的股东都应该在同一时间获得伯克希尔的信息，并且拥有充足的时间去分析它们，而这也是为什么我们在周五收盘之后公布去年的年度报告，并在周六举行年度股东大会的原因。我们不会与大型的机构投资者或者分析师一对一交谈。我们希望记者和分析师所提出的问题能够帮助伯克希尔的股东进一步理解他们对伯克希尔的投资。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 11 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
我和查理将不会获知那些即将被问及的问题的细节。我们也知道记者和分析师将会提出很有水准的问题(有些甚至会让我们难堪)，可是那正是我们所希望看到的。总的来说，我们希望能被问到至少54个问题，其中每个分析师和记者将提出6个，剩余的18个将由其他股东大会参与者提出。如果有多余的时间，我们将从股东哪里获得更多的问题。那些有权提出问题的其他与会者将会被选择并在早上8:15通过11个布置在主会场和分会场的麦克风进行抽签决定。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe their mindset to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
出于充分的理由，我时常对旗下运营经理所取得的成就进行褒奖。他们都是真正的全明星，并且把他们所经营的生意当成他们家族唯一的资产一样来对待。我确信他们拥有和大多数大型公众公司相同的”以股东为导向”的信念。他们中的大多数人已经实现了财务自由，对他们而言，打出商业上”本垒打”的乐趣和薪水一样重要。
Equally important, however, are the 23 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
当然，另外23名与我在公司办公室共事的员工(我们都在一层楼层办公，这是一个我们一直在维持的工作传统)也是同样出色和重要的。
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 21,500-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities — and the list goes on and on.
这个团队高效率地去应对SEC和其他监管机构繁杂的监管要求，提交了21,500页的联邦，州立以及海外联邦所得税申报表，回复数不清的股东及媒体要求，制作公司的年度报告，准备公司一年一度最大规模的股东年会，协调董事会的活动并且年复一年日复一日地重复着上述繁杂的工作任务。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他们以一种欢欣的态度和令人难以置信的效率去处理上述一切事宜，从而让我的生活变得轻松和快乐。他们还将精力花在与伯克希尔的业务非直接相关的事务中：去年他们接待了48个学校的代表(他们是从200多个申请学校中选拔出来的)，他们来到奥马哈参加和我的问答日活动。除此之外，他们还着手处理一切我所收到的请求，安排我的行程，甚至给我订购午餐吃的汉堡。作为一个CEO，没有比这更轻松的了。我感觉每一天自己都是开心到跳着踢踏舞去上班的。
This home office crew, along with our operating managers, has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to Omaha — the cradle of capitalism — on May 4th and chime in.
这个家庭办公室的职员和我们的运营经理，请接受我最真挚的感谢，他们也值得你们的感谢。5月4号，请来资本家的摇篮奥马哈为我助阵。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
March 1, 2013
Footnotes
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All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. ↩