原文信息：
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Relative Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 10.0 | 13.8 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (11.7) | 32.0 |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 30.9 | (19.9) |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | (8.4) | 24.6 |
| 1970 | 12.0 | 3.9 | 8.1 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 1.8 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 2.8 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (14.8) | 19.5 |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (26.4) | 31.9 |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 37.2 | (15.3) |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 23.6 | 35.7 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | (7.4) | 39.3 |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 6.4 | 17.6 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 18.2 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.3 | (13.0) |
| 1981 | 31.4 | (5.0) | 36.4 |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 21.4 | 18.6 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 9.9 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 7.5 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 31.6 | 16.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 18.6 | 7.5 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 14.4 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 3.5 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 31.7 | 12.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (3.1) | 10.5 |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 30.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 7.6 | 12.7 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 10.1 | 4.2 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 12.6 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 5.5 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 23.0 | 8.8 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 33.4 | .7 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 28.6 | 19.7 |
| 1999 | .5 | 21.0 | (20.5) |
| 2000 | 6.5 | (9.1) | 15.6 |
| 2001 | (6.2) | (11.9) | 5.7 |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (22.1) | 32.1 |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 28.7 | (7.7) |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 10.9 | (.4) |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 1.5 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 15.8 | 2.6 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (37.0) | 27.4 |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 26.5 | (6.7) |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 15.1 | (2.1) |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2010 | 20.2% | 9.4% | 10.8 |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2010 | 490,409% | 6,262% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
注： 数据为日历年数据，但以下情况除外： 1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9/30 的年度；1967 年为截至 12/31 的 15 个月。
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
从 1979 年开始，会计规则要求保险公司按市价而不是按成本与市价孰低法对其持有的股权证券进行估值。在本表中，伯克希尔公司截至 1978 年的业绩已经重报，以符合变更后的规则。在所有其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
标准普尔500指数的数字是税前，而伯克希尔公司的数字是税后。如果伯克希尔这样的公司只是拥有标准普尔 500 指数，并缴纳相应的税款，那么在该指数出现正收益的年份，其业绩将落后于标准普尔 500 指数，但在该指数出现负收益的年份，其业绩将超过标准普尔 500 指数。长年累月下来，税收成本会导致总的落后幅度很大。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
The per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 13% in 2010. Over the last 46 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from 95,453, a rate of 20.2% compounded annually.1
公司 2010 年的账面价值增加 49 亿美元， A/B 股每股的账面价值增长了 13%(标普 21.4%)，自现任管理层接手的 46 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 95453 美元，年复合成长率约为 20.2%。
The highlight of 2010 was our acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe, a purchase that’s working out even better than I expected. It now appears that owning this railroad will increase Berkshire’s “normal” earning power by nearly 40% pre-tax and by well over 30% after-tax. Making this purchase increased our share count by 6% and used $22 billion of cash. Since we’ve quickly replenished the cash, the economics of this transaction have turned out very well.
2010 年的亮点是公司收购了 BNSF 铁路公司(BurlingtonNorthernSantaFe)，该项收购比我预期的要顺利。现在看来，收购这条铁路将使伯克希尔”常规”盈利能力税前增长 40%，税后增长超过 30%。这起收购让我们的股 票数量增加 6%，花费了 220 亿美元的现金。由于我们迅速补充了现金，该项交易的经济效益最终表现非常好。
A “normal year,” of course, is not something that either Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and my partner, or I can define with anything like precision. But for the purpose of estimating our current earning power, we are envisioning a year free of a mega-catastrophe in insurance and possessing a general business climate somewhat better than that of 2010 but weaker than that of 2005 or 2006. Using these assumptions, and several others that I will explain in the “Investment” section, I can estimate that the normal earning power of the assets we currently own is about 12 billion after-tax, excluding any capital gains or losses. Every day Charlie and I think about how we can build on this base.
当然，我的合伙人、伯克希尔的副董事长查理·芒格也是我的合伙人，或者我本人，都很难精确定义到底什么 才是”一个正常年份”。但是，为了估算我们现有的盈利能力，我们对于正常年份的设想是，在保险生意方面不存 在巨大灾难， 总体经济环境好于 2010 年，但却弱于 2005 年或 2006 年。按照这样的假设和其他我在”投资”部分阐述的其他几个假设，我估计公司目前所拥有资产的正常盈利能力为，税前 170 亿美元或税后 120 亿美元，不包括任何资本损益。 查理和我每天都在思考如何增强公司的盈利能力。
Both of us are enthusiastic about BNSF’s future because railroads have major cost and environmental advantages over trucking, their main competitor. Last year BNSF moved each ton of freight it carried a record 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. That’s three times more fuel-efficient than trucking is, which means our railroad owns an important advantage in operating costs. Concurrently, our country gains because of reduced greenhouse emissions and a much smaller need for imported oil. When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.
我们两人都对 BNSF 的前景持乐观的态度，因为与其主要的竞争对手卡车运输相比， 铁路存在巨大的成本和 环境优势。在 2010 年，BNSF 每吨货物运输的成本为 1 加仑柴油/500 英里，比卡车运输省油三倍，这意味着公 司的铁路运输拥有巨大的运营成本优势。同时，降低温室气体排放量，减少对进口石油的需求量，将使得我们的 国家受益。铁路运输使整个社会受益。
Over time, the movement of goods in the United States will increase, and BNSF should get its full share of the gain. The railroad will need to invest massively to bring about this growth, but no one is better situated than Berkshire to supply the funds required. However slow the economy, or chaotic the markets, our checks will clear.
随着时间的推移，美国境内的货物运输将会增加， BNSF 将会实现其全部收益。为了实现这种收益，需要对铁路进行巨额投资， 伯克希尔是最佳的资金供给者。不管经济增长多么缓慢，市场如何动荡，我们的支票都将兑付。
Last year — in the face of widespread pessimism about our economy — we demonstrated our enthusiasm for capital investment at Berkshire by spending 5.4 billion — or 90% of the total — was spent in the United States. Certainly our businesses will expand abroad in the future, but an overwhelming part of their future investments will be at home. In 2011, we will set a new record for capital spending — 2 billion increase in the United States.
2010 年，在大家都不看好美国经济的情况下， 伯克希尔显示了对资本投资的热情，花费了 60 亿美元进行不动产和设备投资，其中 90%约 54 亿美元投资在美国境内。当然，公司的业务在将来将会扩张，但是绝大多数投资还将位于美国境内。在 2011 年，我们将创造 80 亿美元资本支出的新记录，所增加的 20 亿美元将全部投资于美国境内。
Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of “great uncertainty.” But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain.
资本总是在追逐机会，而美国存在大量的机会。 现在的评论员总会说美国有”巨大的不确定性”。但是回想一下 1941 年 12 月 6 日， 1987 年 10 月 18 日， 2001 年 9 月 10 日。无论今天如何平静，未来总是存在不确定性。
Don’t let that reality spook you. Throughout my lifetime, politicians and pundits have constantly moaned about terrifying problems facing America. Yet our citizens now live an astonishing six times better than when I was born. The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential — a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War — remains alive and effective.
不要让那样的现实吓坏了你。在我的整个一生中，政客和学者们一直都抱怨和夸大美国面临的可怕问题。然而，与我出生之时相比，美国民众的生活水平惊人的提高了 6 倍。那些悲观论者忽视了一个至关重要的因素：人类的潜能是取之不尽用之不竭的，尽管时不时受到经济衰退甚至内战的干扰，但用来释放这种潜能的美国制度依然充满活力和效率。
We are not natively smarter than we were when our country was founded nor do we work harder. But look around you and see a world beyond the dreams of any colonial citizen. Now, as in 1776, 1861, 1932 and 1941, America’s best days lie ahead.
我们并没有比建国时更加聪慧，工作更加努力。但是，环顾四周你会看到， 世界已经超越了殖民时代民众的梦想。现在，正如 1776、 1861、 1932 和 1941 年一样，美国人的好日子还在前头。
Performance 业绩
Charlie and I believe that those entrusted with handling the funds of others should establish performance goals at the onset of their stewardship. Lacking such standards, managements are tempted to shoot the arrow of performance and then paint the bull’s-eye around wherever it lands.
查理和我认为， 那些受托管理别人资金的人， 应该在其工作伊始就确定绩效目标。如果缺乏业绩标准，管理层将会倾向先射出业绩之箭，然后在周围画上靶心。
In Berkshire’s case, we long ago told you that our job is to increase per-share intrinsic value at a rate greater than the increase (including dividends) of the S&P 500. In some years we succeed; in others we fail. But, if we are unable over time to reach that goal, we have done nothing for our investors, who by themselves could have realized an equal or better result by owning an index fund.
就伯克希尔而言，我们很早就告诉过大家，我们的目标是， 使每股内在价值增长超过标准普尔 500 指数(含股息)。在有些年份我们超过了，但也有一些年份我们没有超过。 但是，如果随着时间推移， 我们无法达到这一目标，我们就没有为我们的投资者带来任何东西，他们完全可以通过购买一只指数基金来实现同等的或者更好的回报。
The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t possible.
当然，如何计算内在价值也是一项挑战。将这个问题交给查理和我，你将得到两个不同的答案。想要精确是不可能的。
To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value — book value — when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying value on our books. (Later in this report, we’ll present a case study.) But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing.
为了消除主观性，我们在衡量业绩时， 采用账面价值作为内在价值的一个低估的替代指标。可以肯定的是， 我们的一些业务价值远远超过他们的账面价值。 (在这份报告的后半部分，将介绍一个案例研究)。 因为内在价值相比账面价值的溢价， 每年很少巨幅波动， 所以，账面价值可以作为衡量我们表现的一个合理工具。
The table on page 2 shows our 46-year record against the S&P, a performance quite good in the earlier years and now only satisfactory. The bountiful years, we want to emphasize, will never return. The huge sums of capital we currently manage eliminate any chance of exceptional performance. We will strive, however, for better-than-average results and feel it fair for you to hold us to that standard.
首页的业绩对比表说明了 46 年以来， 伯克希尔相对于标准普尔 500 指数的业绩变化。在早期年份， 伯克希尔的业绩非常好，而现在的业绩只能说是令人满意。我们在此想强调的是，那些富饶的年份已经一去不复返。我们目前管理的巨额资本已经不存在任何实现非凡的业绩的可能性。然而，我们将竭尽所能，使得业绩超过平均水平。达到这个标准对你们来说是公平的。
Yearly figures, it should be noted, are neither to be ignored nor viewed as all-important. The pace of the earth’s movement around the sun is not synchronized with the time required for either investment ideas or operating decisions to bear fruit. At GEICO, for example, we enthusiastically spent $900 million last year on advertising to obtain policyholders who deliver us no immediate profits. If we could spend twice that amount productively, we would happily do so though short-term results would be further penalized. Many large investments at our railroad and utility operations are also made with an eye to payoffs well down the road.
需要注意的是，我们不应该忽略年度数据，也不应该过于看重。地球绕太阳公转的速度， 与投资理念和运营决策产生业绩所需的时间并不同步。例如，在 GEICO，我们 2010 年的广告支出高达 9000 万美元，而所吸引的保险客户并没有立即为我们带来利润。如果我们的广告支出能够有效的翻番，我们将很高兴这么做， 即使短期业绩将进一步承压。在对铁路和公用事业进行大额投资的时候，我们也着眼于未来的回报。
To provide you a longer-term perspective on performance, we present on the facing page the yearly figures from page 2 recast into a series of five-year periods. Overall, there are 42 of these periods, and they tell an interesting story. On a comparative basis, our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even as our relative advantage narrowed.
为了让你们对业绩有一个更长远的看法，我们重新编制了首页的年度业绩对比数据， 以 5 年为期总共 42 期， 它们讲述了一个有趣的故事。比较来看，我们最好的年份结束于 1980 年代。然而，接下来的 17 年是市场的黄金时期。 尽管我们的相对优势缩小，但伯克希尔仍然取得了惊人的绝对回报。
After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has delivered only moderate absolute results.
1999 年之后市场停滞(不知道你们是否注意到这一点？ )，因此，从那时起， 伯克希尔所实现的相对于标普 500 指数的令人满意的回报率， 只带来了温和的绝对收益。
Looking forward, we hope to average several points better than the S&P — though that result is, of course, far from a sure thing. If we succeed in that aim, we will almost certainly produce better relative results in bad years for the stock market and suffer poorer results in strong markets.
展望未来，我们希望伯克希尔所实现的收益率能够比标普 500 指数平均高几个点，尽管这远非确
定。如果我们达到了这个目标，几乎可以肯定， 在股市低迷的年份， 我们将实现较好的相对业绩，而在股市狂热的年份则会相对较差。
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500 by Five-Year Periods
| Five-Year Period | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965-1969 | 17.2 | 5.0 | 12.2 |
| 1966-1970 | 14.7 | 3.9 | 10.8 |
| 1967-1971 | 13.9 | 9.2 | 4.7 |
| 1968-1972 | 16.8 | 7.5 | 9.3 |
| 1969-1973 | 17.7 | 2.0 | 15.7 |
| 1970-1974 | 15.0 | (2.4) | 17.4 |
| 1971-1975 | 13.9 | 3.2 | 10.7 |
| 1972-1976 | 20.8 | 4.9 | 15.9 |
| 1973-1977 | 23.4 | (0.2) | 23.6 |
| 1974-1978 | 24.4 | 4.3 | 20.1 |
| 1975-1979 | 30.1 | 14.7 | 15.4 |
| 1976-1980 | 33.4 | 13.9 | 19.5 |
| 1977-1981 | 29.0 | 8.1 | 20.9 |
| 1978-1982 | 29.9 | 14.1 | 15.8 |
| 1979-1983 | 31.6 | 17.3 | 14.3 |
| 1980-1984 | 27.0 | 14.8 | 12.2 |
| 1981-1985 | 32.6 | 14.6 | 18.0 |
| 1982-1986 | 31.5 | 19.8 | 11.7 |
| 1983-1987 | 27.4 | 16.4 | 11.0 |
| 1984-1988 | 25.0 | 15.2 | 9.8 |
| 1985-1989 | 31.1 | 20.3 | 10.8 |
| 1986-1990 | 22.9 | 13.1 | 9.8 |
| 1987-1991 | 25.4 | 15.3 | 10.1 |
| 1988-1992 | 25.6 | 15.8 | 9.8 |
| 1989-1993 | 24.4 | 14.5 | 9.9 |
| 1990-1994 | 18.6 | 8.7 | 9.9 |
| 1991-1995 | 25.6 | 16.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992-1996 | 24.2 | 15.2 | 9.0 |
| 1993-1997 | 26.9 | 20.2 | 6.7 |
| 1994-1998 | 33.7 | 24.0 | 9.7 |
| 1995-1999 | 30.4 | 28.5 | 1.9 |
| 1996-2000 | 22.9 | 18.3 | 4.6 |
| 1997-2001 | 14.8 | 10.7 | 4.1 |
| 1998-2002 | 10.4 | (0.6) | 11.0 |
| 1999-2003 | 6 | .0 | (0.6) |
| 2000-2004 | 8.0 | (2.3) | 10.3 |
| 2001-2005 | 8.0 | 0.6 | 7.4 |
| 2002-2006 | 13.1 | 6.2 | 6.9 |
| 2003-2007 | 13.3 | 12.8 | 0.5 |
| 2004-2008 | 6.9 | (2.2) | 9.1 |
| 2005-2009 | 8.6 | 0.4 | 8.2 |
| 2006-2010 | 10.0 | 2.3 | 7.7 |
Notes: The first two periods cover the five years beginning September 30 of the previous year. The third period covers 63 months beginning September 30, 1966 to December 31, 1971. All other periods involve calendar years.
注： 前两期涵盖始于前一年 9 月 30 日的五年，第三期涵盖从 1966 年 9 月 30 日到 1971 年 12 月 31 日的 63 个月。
The other notes on page 2 also apply to this table.
其他所有年份均为公历年份。
Intrinsic Value — Today and Tomorrow 内在价值的今天和明天
Though Berkshire’s intrinsic value cannot be precisely calculated, two of its three key pillars can be measured. Charlie and I rely heavily on these measurements when we make our own estimates of Berkshire’s value.
The first component of value is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $158 billion at market value.
Insurance float — money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us — funds $66 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, underwriting results are volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, though, we’ve been significantly profitable, and I also expect us to average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, all of our investments — those funded both by float and by retained earnings — can be viewed as an element of value for Berkshire shareholders.
保险浮存金是在保险业务中我们所临时持有的不属于我们的货币。保险浮存金为我们的投资提供了 660 亿美元的资金。只要保险承保能盈亏平衡，这些钱就是免费的，也就是说，我们收取的保费能覆盖我们所产生赔付损失和运营成本。当然，保险承保损益波动不定。然而，纵观伯克希尔的整个历史，我们一直保持盈利。在将来，我也希望我们能够实现盈亏平衡或更好的结果。如果达到了这一点， 那些由保险浮存金和留存收益提供资金的投资， 都可以视为伯克希尔股东价值的重要组成部分。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance underwriting. These earnings are delivered by our 68 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 106. In Berkshire’s early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we’ve increasingly emphasized the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses, a practice that will continue.
公司内在价值的第二个组成部分是来自于投资和保险承保之外的其他收益。 它们来自于 68 家非保险公司，在之后有详细说明。在伯克希尔的早期，我们专注于投资。然而，在过去 20 年间，我们越来越强调拓展来自于非保险业务的收益。 这个战略我们将继续下去。
The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first table, we present per-share investments at decade intervals beginning in 1970, three years after we entered the insurance business. We exclude those investments applicable to minority interests.
下表表明了这种改变。在表中，我们从 1970 年开始(即我们进入保险业 3 年后)， 以 10 年为期列出了每股投资和每股经营收益(不包括少数股东权益)。
| Yearend | Per-Share Investments | Period | Compounded Annual Increase in Per-Share Investments |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 66 | ||
| 1980 | 754 | 1970-1980 | 27.5% |
| 1990 | 7,798 | 1980-1990 | 26.3% |
| 2000 | 50,229 | 1990-2000 | 20.5% |
| 2010 | 94,730 | 2000-2010 | 6.6% |
Though our compounded annual increase in per-share investments was a healthy 19.9% over the 40-year period, our rate of increase has slowed sharply as we have focused on using funds to buy operating businesses.
尽管在这 40 年， 我们每股投资年复合增长率达到惊人的 19.9%， 然而，由于近年来我们集中资金专注于购买经营业务，每股投资年增长率急速下降。
The payoff from this shift is shown in the following table, which illustrates how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have increased, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.
表中每股税前经营收益， 印证了我们非保险业务的收益是如何增长的。
| Year | Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings | Period | Compounded Annual Increase in Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 2.87 | ||
| 1980 | 19.01 | 1970-1980 | 20.8% |
| 1990 | 102.58 | 1980-1990 | 18.4% |
| 2000 | 918.66 | 1990-2000 | 24.5% |
| 2010 | 5,926.04 | 2000-2010 | 20.5% |
For the forty years, our compounded annual gain in pre-tax, non-insurance earnings per share is 21.0%. During the same period, Berkshire’s stock price increased at a rate of 22.1% annually. Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths — sometimes for extended periods — but eventually they meet.
40 年来， 伯克希尔非保险业务每股税前收益年复合增长率为 21.0%，公司股价同期年复合增长率为 22.1%。随着时间的推移，你就会发现公司的股价变动与伯克希尔的投资和收益变动大致同步。市场价格和内在价值遵循的路径经常不同， 尽管有时交汇时间很漫长，但它们终将交汇。
There is a third, more subjective, element to an intrinsic value calculation that can be either positive or negative: the efficacy with which retained earnings will be deployed in the future. We, as well as many other businesses, are likely to retain earnings over the next decade that will equal, or even exceed, the capital we presently employ. Some companies will turn these retained dollars into fifty-cent pieces, others into two-dollar bills.
内在价值计算还涉及第三个因素： 未来留存收益的使用效率。 这个要素主观性比较强，可以是积极的，也可以是消极的。 我们以及其他众多企业一样， 很可能在未来十年内，保留的收益将等于甚至超过， 我们目前所使用的资本。 其中有些公司从每 1 美元的留存收益中收回 50 美分，而有些公司则收回 2 美元。
This “what-will-they-do-with-the-money” factor must always be evaluated along with the “what-do-we-have-now” calculation in order for us, or anybody, to arrive at a sensible estimate of a company’s intrinsic value. That’s because an outside investor stands by helplessly as management reinvests his share of the company’s earnings. If a CEO can be expected to do this job well, the reinvestment prospects add to the company’s current value; if the CEO’s talents or motives are suspect, today’s value must be discounted. The difference in outcome can be huge. A dollar of then-value in the hands of Sears Roebuck’s or Montgomery Ward’s CEOs in the late 1960s had a far different destiny than did a dollar entrusted to Sam Walton.
为了让我们或任何人能够合理地估计一家企业的内在价值， “他们将用留存收益做些什么”这个因素，必须与前面两个”我们现在拥有什么”的计算，一起进行评估。 这是因为当管理层使用其在公司部分收益进行再投资时，外部投资者只能旁观。如果一名 CEO 能够胜任这项工作，再投资前景将增加企业的当前价值，如果 CEO 的能力和动机受到怀疑，那么当前的价值将大打折扣。 其结果的差异可能是巨大的。 1960 年代， 交给 Sears 公司或Montgomery 公司的 CEO 的每一美元， 与交给沃尔玛公司 Sam Walton 的相比， 其结局真是大相径庭。
Charlie and I hope that the per-share earnings of our non-insurance businesses continue to increase at a decent rate. But the job gets tougher as the numbers get larger. We will need both good performance from our current businesses and more major acquisitions. We’re prepared. Our elephant gun has been reloaded, and my trigger finger is itchy.
查理和我希望我们非保险业务的每股收益能够以令人满意的适度增长。但是， 随着数字越来越大， 工作变得越来越困难。我们不仅希望当前业务经营良好，还希望出现更多大宗收购。我们整装待发，猎象之枪已经上膛，扣住扳机的手指正发痒痒。
Partially offsetting our anchor of size are several important advantages we have. First, we possess a cadre of truly skilled managers who have an unusual commitment to their own operations and to Berkshire. Many of our CEOs are independently wealthy and work only because they love what they do. They are volunteers, not mercenaries. Because no one can offer them a job they would enjoy more, they can’t be lured away.
我们所具备的一些重要优势部分抵消了我们的庞大规模。首先，我们拥有一批能力出众的管理人才，他们对自身的业务运营以及伯克希尔忠诚无比。 我们的许多 CEO 都很富有，他们工作的唯一原因是出于对本职工作的热爱。他们是自愿的，而非为钱而来。 因为没有人能够给他们提供一份更他们喜欢的工作，所以他们不会因为受到利诱而离开公司。
At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years (it’s reproduced on pages 104-105) and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.
在伯克希尔，经理人能够专注于经营各自的业务：他们无需参加总部召开的会议，也无需担忧融资问题，更不会受到华尔街的骚扰。他们只是每两年会收到本人的一封信， 如果他们愿意就会给我打电话。他们工作的方式各不相同： 在过去一年之中， 有些经理从未与我交谈，而有些经理几乎每天都要和我交谈。我们信任的是人， 而并非流程。 “雇佣优秀员工，少管理他们”的箴言不仅适用于这些经理人，而且也适用于我本人。
Berkshire’s CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.
伯克希尔的 CEO 们各式各样。有些人拥有 MBA， 有些没上过大学。有些 CEO 按部就班进行预算； 有些则是按自己意愿行事。我们的团队犹如一支由击球风格迥异的全明星组成的棒球队，我们很少要求他们做出改变。
Our second advantage relates to the allocation of the money our businesses earn. After meeting the needs of those businesses, we have very substantial sums left over. Most companies limit themselves to reinvesting funds within the industry in which they have been operating. That often restricts them, however, to a “universe” for capital allocation that is both tiny and quite inferior to what is available in the wider world. Competition for the few opportunities that are available tends to become fierce. The seller has the upper hand, as a girl might if she were the only female at a party attended by many boys. That lopsided situation would be great for the girl, but terrible for the boys.
我们的第二个优势与我们分配利润的方式有关。在满足业务需要之后， 我们还有大量的剩余现金。 绝大多数公司资本再投资， 局限于自己一直经营的业务领域。 这往往将它们限制在一个很小的范围内，对于为数不多的机会的竞争趋于激烈。 卖方占据有力地位，如同在唯一一个女孩出现在一个男孩众多的舞会上一样。这种不均衡的的局面将对女孩有利，但对男孩来说就太糟糕了。
At Berkshire we face no institutional restraints when we deploy capital. Charlie and I are limited only by our ability to understand the likely future of a possible acquisition. If we clear that hurdle — and frequently we can’t — we are then able to compare any one opportunity against a host of others.
When I took control of Berkshire in 1965, I didn’t exploit this advantage. Berkshire was then only in textiles, where it had in the previous decade lost significant money. The dumbest thing I could have done was to pursue “opportunities” to improve and expand the existing textile operation — so for years that’s exactly what I did. And then, in a final burst of brilliance, I went out and bought another textile company. Aaaaaaargh! Eventually I came to my senses, heading first into insurance and then into other industries.
当我于 1965 年接管伯克希尔的时候，并没有利用该项优势。当时，伯克希尔只从事纺织业务。在我接管之前的 10 年间， 公司亏损严重。我做过的最蠢的事情莫过于决定， 继续在现存的纺织业务里继续寻找机会并扩大经营， 所以在之后几年中我就一直致力于此，就在那时，在最后的灵光一闪中，我出去收购了另外一家纺织企业。啊啊啊(真是糟糕透了)！！最终，我醒悟过来， 首先跨入保险业， 之后又进入了其他行业。
There is even a supplement to this world-is-our-oyster advantage: In addition to evaluating the attractions of one business against a host of others, we also measure businesses against opportunities available in marketable securities, a comparison most managements don’t make. Often, businesses are priced ridiculously high against what can likely be earned from investments in stocks or bonds. At such moments, we buy securities and bide our time.
除了这种”世界尽在我手”的优势之外，还有一个补充：除了评估一个企业相对于其他企业的优点之外，我们还衡量这项业务相对于有价证券的机会。而这种衡量方式却被大多是管理层忽略了。在大多数情况下， 企业定价过高，而股票或债券投资可能赚取更高的收益。在这种情况下，我们买进证券， 等待时机。
Our flexibility in respect to capital allocation has accounted for much of our progress to date. We have been able to take money we earn from, say, See’s Candies or Business Wire (two of our best-run businesses, but also two offering limited reinvestment opportunities) and use it as part of the stake we needed to buy BNSF.
我们在资本配置上的灵活性，是我们迄今所取得的大多数成就的主要原因。 例如，我们的喜诗糖果或者美国商业资讯公司(Business Wire)是我们经营的最好的两项业务， 也是再投资机会非常有限的两项业务，我们从中两家公司获得收益，并将其收益投入到购买 BNSF 铁路公司中去。
Our final advantage is the hard-to-duplicate culture that permeates Berkshire. And in businesses, culture counts.
To start with, the directors who represent you think and act like owners. They receive token compensation: no options, no restricted stock and, for that matter, virtually no cash. We do not provide them directors and officers liability insurance, a given at almost every other large public company. If they mess up with your money, they will lose their money as well. Leaving my holdings aside, directors and their families own Berkshire shares worth more than $3 billion. Our directors, therefore, monitor Berkshire’s actions and results with keen interest and an owner’s eye. You and I are lucky to have them as stewards.
首先， 代表你们的董事们像股东一样思考和行动，他们只得到了象征性地补偿：没有期权、没有受限股票，而且因此，实质上也几乎没有现金。我们没有向董事和高管提供责任保险，而其他大型上市公司都提供责任保险。如果他们搞糟了你们的钱，他们也同样失去金钱。 除我个人股份以外，这些董事及其家庭所持有的伯克希尔股份价值超过 30 亿美元。因此，我们的董事，以极大的热情和股东视角监督伯克希尔的行动和结果。选择他们作为财产管理员，对你们和我来讲，何其幸运！
This same owner-orientation prevails among our managers. In many cases, these are people who have sought out Berkshire as an acquirer for a business that they and their families have long owned. They came to us with an owner’s mindset, and we provide an environment that encourages them to retain it. Having managers who love their businesses is no small advantage.
这种所有者导向的文化同样在我们子公司的管理层中盛行。 在很多中情况下，这些人们将伯克希尔视为一个收购他们及其家族所长期拥有的一项业务的收购方。他们带着所有者的心态加入我们，我们向他们提供一个能够保持这种所有者心态的环境。 拥有一批热爱自己业务的经理人，是我们一项很大的优势。
Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is 301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.
文化是自我传播的。温斯顿·丘吉尔曾经说道， “你塑造了建筑，然后建筑塑造了你”(You shape your houses and then they shape you.)。这一智慧同样适用于企业。官僚主义的程序导致更多的官僚主义， 专制将诱发专横的行为。 正如一句俚语所言： 当你坐在汽车后座，而车一动不动时，你就知道自己已经不再是一名 CEO 了。在伯克希尔的”全球总部”，我们每年的租金仅为 270212 美元。 此外，办公室家具、艺术品、自动可乐售货机、午餐室、高科技设备等方面的投资为 301363 美元。只要查理和我视你们的钱为我们自己的钱，伯克希尔的经理人也将小心经营。
Our compensation programs, our annual meeting and even our annual reports are all designed with an eye to reinforcing the Berkshire culture, and making it one that will repel and expel managers of a different bent. This culture grows stronger every year, and it will remain intact long after Charlie and I have left the scene.
我们的薪酬方案、年度股东大会、甚至我们的年度报告的设计，都是为了增强伯克希尔的企业文化，使得这种文化能够排斥和驱逐带有不同倾向的经理人。 这种文化氛围逐年增强，即使在查理和我离职之后很久一段时间内，这种文化将完好无缺地保留下来。
We will need all of the strengths I’ve just described to do reasonably well. Our managers will deliver; you can count on that. But whether Charlie and I can hold up our end in capital allocation depends in part on the competitive environment for acquisitions. You will get our best efforts.
GEICO 盖可保险
Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories.
Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school.
60 年前的一个月， GEICO 保险步入我的生活，从此改变了我的一生。当时，我是哥伦比亚大学一名 20 岁的研究生，之所以到那儿上学，因为我心目中的偶像本杰明.格雷厄姆，每周都会在学校教一次课。
One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington.
一天在图书馆，我在美国名人录中发现他是 GEICO 保险的主席。我对保险一无所知，并且从来没有听过该公司。然而，图书管理员指引我阅读一个大型的保险公司目录。在阅读到 GEICO 保险的时候，我决定拜访该公司。
Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson.
在接下来的周六，我登上了前往华盛顿的早班车。在我抵达公司总部的时候， 大楼已经关门了。我当时不断敲门，直到最后一名看门人出来了。我问他公司是否还有人可以进行交谈，他就领我去找当时唯一一个还在办公室里的人，洛里默·戴维森(LorimerDavidson)。
That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.)
我的幸运时刻到了。在接下来的四个小时里， “Davy”给我上了一节关于保险和 GEICO 的课程。我们之间伟大的友谊由此开始。不久以后，我从哥伦比亚大学毕业，成了奥马哈的一名股票销售员。当然， GEICO 保险就是我得首要推荐， 这让我与数十名客户建立了一个绝好的开端。就在与Davy 会面后不久，在我 9800 美元的投资组合中， GEICO 保险占了 75%，即便如此，我现在还是认为这个比例少了点。
Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened — with the stock falling by more than 95% — Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.)
后来， Davy 担任 GEICO 保险的 CEO，把公司发展到了梦想不到的高度。但是，就在 Davy 退休后的1970 年代， GEICO 保险陷入困境，股票价格下跌 95%。 伯克希尔在市场上购买了该公司大约 1/3 的股票。数年之后，由于 GEICO 保险的回购， 伯克希尔的持股比例增加到 50%， 伯克希尔的持有成本为 4600 万美元(尽管我们的持股比例比较高，但是没有行使控制权)。
We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)
在 1996 年初，我们又收购了 GEICO 保险剩余 50%的股票，这促使 Davy 在其 95 岁高龄之际，通过录像带向我表明他是多么高兴，他所热爱的 GEICO 保险将永久性地成为伯克希尔的一部分。 (他还十分风趣地总结道， “下次沃伦，请任命我哦。 ”)
A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal — saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance — remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or http://www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%.
在过去的 60 年间， GEICO 保险发生了很多变故，但是，它的核心目标，大幅节省美国人的汽车保险购买成本，却始终未变(可以拨打电话 1-800-847-7596，或者登陆 www.GEICO.com 了解详情)。换而言之，通过获得保险客户的认可来获得业务。通过专注于该目标，公司发展成为美国第三大汽车保险商，市场占有率为 8.8%。
When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low.
当 GEICO 保险的 CEO 托尼·莱斯利(TonyNicely)上任的时候， GEICO 保险的市场占有率为 2.0%。 GEICO 保险的市场占有率曾经在 10 年中徘徊在该水平。在 Tony 的领导下， GEICO 保险成长为一家不同的公司，因为Tony 发现了一条持续增长的道路， 既能保持承保纪律， 又能保持低成本。
Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about 4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion.
让我来量化一下 Tony 的成绩。当我们在 1996 年购买 GEICO 保险剩余的 50%的股权时，成本为 23 亿美元，对应的隐含价值为 46 亿美元， GEICO 保险当时有形资产账面价值为 19 亿美元。
The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value — 2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal.
隐含价值比有形资产价值高27 亿美元，这 27 亿美元就是我们估算的 GEICO 保险的”商誉’在当时的价值。这种商誉代表当时与 GEICO 保险发生业务联系的保险客户的经济价值。在 1995 年，这些客户向 GEICO 保险支付了 28 亿美元的保费， 因此我们对 GEICO 客户的估值为他们每年支付给公司保费的 97%(27/28)。按照行业标准，这是一个非常高的价格。但是， GEICO 保险不是普通的保险公司。由于运营成本比较低， 承保一直是保持盈利的，并且客户忠诚度非常高。
Today, premium volume is 1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO — off to a strong start in 2011 — is the gift that keeps giving.
现在公司保费为 143 亿美元，并且持续上升。然而，在我们的账上， GEICO 商誉的账面价值仅为 14 亿美元。无论 GEICO 保险的价值增加多少，商誉的账面价值都保持不变(按照会计准则，如果商誉的经济价值降低，则需要减值，但如果经济价值增加， 则保持不变)。按照我们 1996 年购买 GEICO 保险的估值标准，现在 GEICO商誉的实际价值大约为 140 亿美元。 在 10-20 年之后，这个金额也更高。 在 2011 年 GEICO 保险迎来了一个强劲的开端，这是一份不断奉献给你们的礼物。
One not-so-small footnote: Under Tony, GEICO has developed one of the country’s largest personal-lines insurance agencies , which primarily sells homeowners policies to our GEICO auto insurance customers. In this business, we represent a number of insurers that are not affiliated with us. They take the risk; we simply sign up the customers. Last year we sold 769,898 new policies at this agency operation, up 34% from the year before. The obvious way this activity aids us is that it produces commission revenue; equally important is the fact that it further strengthens our relationship with our policyholders, helping us retain them.
一个不可忽略的备注：在 Tony 的领导下， GEICO 保险已经发展成为美国境内最大的个人保险 机构，主要向GEICO 保险汽车保险客户销售房主保单。在该项业务中，我们代表了众多与我们无关的保险公司。他们承担风险，我们只是负责销售。在 2010 年，我们出售了 769898 份新保单，比 2009 年增加了 34%。该项业务对我们最明显的帮助是能够带来佣金收入。同等重要的是，它进一步增强了我们的保险客户与我们的关系，有助于我们留住客户。
I owe an enormous debt to Tony and Davy (and, come to think of it, to that janitor as well).
我欠 Tony 和 Davy 很多(也同样欠那个看门人很多)。
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of Berkshire. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. Lumping them together therefore impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在，让我们来检查一下伯克希尔的四大部门。每个部门的资产负债表和收入特征各有不同，将它们搅合在一块则无法分析。因此，我们将其作为四项独立业务展示， 这是查理和我对它们的看法。
We will look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has propelled our expansion over the years.
Insurance 保险业务
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown: Just take a look at the following table:
财产意外险保险公司预先收取保费， 事后支付索赔。在极端情况下，例如对于工人事故赔偿问题所引发的索赔，索赔支付可能会持续数十年。这种”先收钱后付款”的模式使我们持有大量的现金，我们称其为”浮存金”，这些”浮存金”最终将流向投保人。同时，我们可以用”浮存金”为伯克希尔投资并获利。尽管个人保单和索赔来去不停，但我们持有的浮存金相比保单数量却特别稳定。因此，随着公司业务的增长，浮存金也会增长。我们是如何增长的，请看下表：
| Yearend | Float (in $ millions) |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income that our float produces. When such a profit occurs, we enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company, has incurred an underwriting loss in seven of the last ten years. During that period, its aggregate underwriting loss was more than $20 billion.
如果我们收到的的保费超过运营费用和最终赔付损失的总和，则记为承保利润， 这将加计入到保险浮存金产生的投资收益之中。如果承保产生了利润，我们就能享受到免费使用这些资金， 更棒的是，还因为持有这种免费资金而获得回报。哎， 所有保险公司都希望实现这一令人满意的结果， 这导致了激烈的竞争。在绝大多数年份，竞争是如此激烈，以至于财产意外险行业整体遭遇严重的承保亏损。实际上这一损失是财产意外险行业持有保险浮存金所付出的代价。例如，州立农业保险到目前为止是美国最大的保险公司，尽管其经营管理良好，但在过去10 年之中，有 7 年都发生了承保损失。在此期间，总承保损失超过 200 亿美元。
At Berkshire, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eight consecutive years, our total underwriting gain for the period having been 66 billion with us, paid us a fee for holding its money and then let us invest its funds for our own benefit.
伯克希尔我们连续八年获得承保盈利，在此期间的盈利总计达到 170 亿美元。我相信我们在将来的绝大多数年份(尽管不是全部)都将继续保持盈利。如果我们达到了这个目标，我们持有的浮存金将比零成本更棒。就像有人向我们存入 660 亿美元，每年还因为这些钱而向我们支付费用， 然后允许我们拿去投资获利，我们必将受益。
Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not an outcome to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, industry premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of the average return realized by American industry, a sorry performance almost certain to continue. Berkshire’s outstanding economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running some unusual businesses. We’ve already told you about GEICO, but we have two other very large operations, and a bevy of smaller ones as well, each a star in its own way.
我要再次强调一下， “无成本”的浮存金并不是整个财产意外险行业的一个预期结果。在大多数年份，行业的保险费不足以支付理赔和运营费用。因此，几十年来，保险业有形资本的回报率远远低于美国全行业实现的平均收益率， 这种令人失望的表现肯定会持续下去。 伯克希尔之所以拥有雄厚的经济效益，是因为我们有一些卓越的经理人，他们经营着一些非同寻常的业务。除了 GEICO 保险外，我们还拥有另外两家大型保险公司和数家小公司。每个公司都因为自己的特色而熠熠生辉。
First off is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, run by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most importantly, brains in a manner that is unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative than most large insurers in that respect. In the past year, Ajit has significantly increased his life reinsurance operation, developing annual premium volume of about $2 billion that will repeat for decades.
首先是伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾恩负责。阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)敢于承保他人不愿意，或者其他资本不愿意接手的风险，其经营融合了能力、速度和果断，更重要的是，在保险业，他拥有独具一格的思维方式。他从未让伯克希尔遭受与自身实力不成比例的风险。实际上，我们在这一点上比业内的其他大型保险公司更为保守。在 2010 年，阿吉特·贾恩大幅提高了人寿再保险业务，保险费高达 20 亿美元，这将在今后持续数十年(来自瑞士再保险)。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $30 billion and significant underwriting profits, a feat that no CEO of any other insurer has come close to matching. By his accomplishments, he has added a great many billions of dollars to the value of Berkshire. Even kryptonite bounces off Ajit.
自 1985 年以来，阿吉特·创建了一家拥有 300 亿美元浮存金和巨额承保利润的保险公司， 这一成就 是其他任何保险公司的 CEO 都无法企及的壮举。阿吉特所取得的成就为伯克希尔增添了数十亿美元的资产。 即使氪石都无法击败他。 (氪石是科幻故事里无敌的氪星人终极弱点)
We have another insurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们还拥有通用再保险公司，由泰德·蒙特罗斯(TadMontross)负责管理。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation requires four disciplines: (1) An understanding of all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) A conservative evaluation of the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) The setting of a premium that will deliver a profit, on average, after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) The willingness to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
实际上，保险业务的健康运营需要遵循四条准则： 1、 了解可能导致承保损失的所有风险； 2、 保守地估计造成实际损失的任何风险的可能性以及一旦发生损失情况下的可能成本； 3、 一般来讲，在扣除预期索赔损失和运营费用之后， 设定的保费能够获得平均的承保收益； 4、 如果不能获得合理的保费就放弃这项业务。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. The urgings of Wall Street, pressures from the agency force and brokers, or simply a refusal by a testosterone-driven CEO to accept shrinking volumes has led too many insurers to write business at inadequate prices. “The other guy is doing it so we must as well” spells trouble in any business, but none more so than insurance.
许多保险公司通过了前三条准则的考验，却在第四条碰了壁。华尔街的急功近利、机构和经纪人带来的压力，或者是雄性激素驱动的 CEO 不肯接受业务下滑，导致许多保险公司以低价承保。 “别人在做，我们也必须要做”，这种想法让许多企业身陷困境， 而保险行业尤其如此。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, it will continue to be.
Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
最后，我们拥有许多小型保险公司，其中，它们中的绝大多数都有专属经营领域。总体而言，这些保险公司一直以来都是盈利的，向我们提供了大量的浮存金(见下表)。我和查理非常珍视这些企业和他们的经理人。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
下表为我们财产意外险业务所有四个部门的业绩记录：
| Insurance Operations | Underwriting Profit 2010 (in millions) | Underwriting Profit 2009 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2010 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2009 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Re | $ 452 | $ 477 | $ 20,049 | $ 21,014 |
| BH Reinsurance | 176 | 250 | 30,370 | 27,753 |
| GEICO | 1,117 | 649 | 10,272 | 9,613 |
| Other Primary | 268 | 84 | 5,141 | 5,061 |
| $ 2,013 | $ 1,460 | $ 65,832 | $ 63,441 |
Among large insurance operations, Berkshire’s impresses me as the best in the world.
在大型的保险公司中，我认为伯克希尔是世界上最好的保险公司。
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造业、服务业和零售业
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔在该部分的业务涵盖广泛， 让我看一看整个部门的资产负债表和利润表摘要：
Balance Sheet 12/31/10 (in $ millions)
| Assets | Amt. | Liabilities and Equity | Amt. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 2,673 | Notes payable | $ 1,805 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 5,396 | ||
| Inventory | 7,101 | ||
| Other current assets | 550 | Other current liabilities | 8,169 |
| Total current assets | 15,720 | Total current liabilities | 9,974 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 16,976 | Deferred taxes | 3,001 |
| Fixed assets | 15,421 | Term debt and other liabilities | 6,621 |
| Other assets | 3,029 | Equity | 31,550 |
| $ 51,146 | $ 51,146 |
Earnings Statement (in $ millions)
| Items | 2010 | 2009 | 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 66,610 | $ 61,665 | $ 66,099 |
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of 1,422 in 2009 and $1,280 in 2008) | 62,225 | 59,509 | 61,937 |
| Interest expense | 111 | 98 | 139 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 4,274* | 2,058* | 4,023* |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 1,812 | 945 | 1,740 |
| Net earnings | $ 2,462 | $ 1,113 | $ 2,283 |
* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
This group of companies sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of the businesses enjoy terrific economics, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets that run from 25% after-tax to more than 100%. Others produce good returns in the area of 12-20%. Unfortunately, a few have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I have made in my job of capital allocation. These errors came about because I misjudged either the competitive strength of the business I was purchasing or the future economics of the industry in which it operated. I try to look out ten or twenty years when making an acquisition, but sometimes my eyesight has been poor.
这群企业销售的产品范围很广，从棒棒糖到喷气飞机。有些企业的经济效益特别好。用非*杠杆*净有形资产收益率来衡量，其税后收益率最低为 25%， 高的甚至超过 100%。其他企业的收益率在 12-20%之间。不幸的是，少数企业的收益率特别低，这是我在资本配置的工作中所犯下的严重错误的结果。 之所以发生这些错误，是因为我错误判断了我所收购的企业的竞争力，或者它在该行业的未来经济效益。我试图本着十年二十年的长期持有来进行收购，但有时候也难免老眼昏花。
Most of the companies in this section improved their earnings last year and four set records. Let’s look first at the record-breakers.
该组中的绝多大数企业在 2010 年收益有所提高， 让我们先看看收益创造了新的记录的四家企业。
- TTI, our electronic components distributor, had sales 21% above its previous high (recorded in 2008) and pre-tax earnings that topped its earlier record by 58%. Its sales gains spanned three continents, with North America at 16%, Europe at 26%, and Asia at 50%. The thousands of items TTI distributes are pedestrian, many selling for less than a dollar. The magic of TTI’s exceptional performance is created by Paul Andrews, its CEO, and his associates.
- TTI 是一家电器元器件分销商。 2010 年销售收入同比增长了 21%，超过了 2008 年创下的最高记录，税前利润也比之前的最高记录提高了 58%。销售收入增长按区域分，北美 16%、欧洲 26%、 亚洲 50%。 TTI 分销的数千件产品为普通消费品，许多售价不足一美元。 TTI 卓越的业绩是由公司的 CEO 保罗·安德鲁(PaulAndrews)及其同事创造的。
- Forest River, our RV and boat manufacturer, had record sales of nearly $2 billion and record earnings as well. Forest River has 82 plants, and I have yet to visit one (or the home office, for that matter). There’s no need; Pete Liegl, the company’s CEO, runs a terrific operation. Come view his products at the annual meeting. Better yet, buy one.
- 森林之河(Forest River)是一家房车及游艇制造商。 2010 年的销售收入和利润再创新高，其销售收入接近20 亿美元。森林之河拥有 82 个工厂，我还没去拜访过其中一家(或总部)，根本没有必要。公司的 CEO 比特·利格尔(PiteLiegl)经营的非常好。 来年会看看他们的产品， 最好能买一个。
- CTB, our farm-equipment company, again set an earnings record. I told you in the 2008 Annual Report about Vic Mancinelli, the company’s CEO. He just keeps getting better. Berkshire paid 160 million and eliminated 106 million pre-tax. Productivity gains have produced much of this increase. When we bought CTB, sales per employee were 405,878.
- Would you believe shoes? H. H. Brown, run by Jim Issler and best known for its Born brand, set a new record for sales and earnings (helped by its selling 1,110 pairs of shoes at our annual meeting). Jim has brilliantly adapted to major industry changes. His work, I should mention, is overseen by Frank Rooney, 89, a superb businessman and still a dangerous fellow with whom to have a bet on the golf course.
- 你敢相信还有制鞋业务吗？ 吉姆·艾斯拉(JimIssler)经营的布朗鞋业(以”Born”品牌闻名)，在 2010 年创下收入和利润新的记录。吉姆出色的适应了重大的行业变化。我要提醒一下，吉姆的工作由 89 岁的弗兰克·鲁尼(Frank Rooney)负责。 他是一名卓越的企业家，也是高尔夫球场的一个危险人物。
A huge story in this sector’s year-to-year improvement occurred at NetJets. I can’t overstate the breadth and importance of Dave Sokol’s achievements at this company, the leading provider of fractional ownership of jet airplanes. NetJets has long been an operational success, owning a 2010 market share five times that of its nearest competitor. Our overwhelming leadership stems from a wonderful team of pilots, mechanics and service personnel. This crew again did its job in 2010, with customer satisfaction, as delineated in our regular surveys, hitting new highs.
年度同比进步最快的企业是 NetJets 公司。在此，大卫·索科尔(DaveSokol)对于 NetJets 取得的成就发挥的重要性和广泛性怎么强调都不为过。 NetJets 是喷气式飞机部分所有权的主要供应商。 NetJets 长期以来在运营上取得成功， 2010 年的市场占有率是第二名的五倍。我们卓越的领导能力源自于一个由飞行员、机械师以及乘务人员组成的团队。该团队 2010 年出色完成工作，客户满意度创下新高。
Even though NetJets was consistently a runaway winner with customers, our financial results, since its acquisition in 1998, were a failure. In the 11 years through 2009, the company reported an aggregate pre-tax loss of $157 million, a figure that was far understated since borrowing costs at NetJets were heavily subsidized by its free use of Berkshire’s credit. Had NetJets been operating on a stand-alone basis, its loss over the years would have been several hundreds of millions greater.
尽管 NetJets 一直在客户中大获全胜， 但自从 1998 年收购以来， 我们的财务结果一直处于亏损状态。 2009年前的 11 年里，该公司报告的税前亏损累计 1.57 亿美元。 这一数字远低于实际，因为 NetJets 的借款成本得到伯克希尔免费信用的大量补贴。如果 NetJets 独立经营的话，多年来的亏损将会再多出数亿美元。
We are now charging NetJets an appropriate fee for Berkshire’s guarantee. Despite this fee (which came to 207 million pre-tax in 2010, a swing of $918 million from 2009. Dave’s quick restructuring of management and the company’s rationalization of its purchasing and spending policies has ended the hemorrhaging of cash and turned what was Berkshire’s only major business problem into a solidly profitable operation.
现在，对于伯克希尔的担保，我们向 NetJets 收取适当的费用。扣除这种费用之后(2010 年为 3800 万美元)，税前收益为 2.07亿美元， 比 2009 年增加了 9.18 亿美元。大卫迅速对其管理层进行了重组，并对公司的采购和支出政策作了合理规划， 结束了现金大量流失的状况。并将伯克希尔唯一的问题业务，转变为一个稳定盈利的业务。
Dave has meanwhile maintained NetJets’ industry-leading reputation for safety and service. In many important ways, our training and operational standards are considerably stronger than those required by the FAA. Maintaining top-of-the-line standards is the right thing to do, but I also have a selfish reason for championing this policy. My family and I have flown more than 5,000 hours on NetJets (that’s equal to being airborne 24 hours a day for seven months) and will fly thousands of hours more in the future. We receive no special treatment and have used a random mix of at least 100 planes and 300 crews. Whichever the plane or crew, we always know we are flying with the best-trained pilots in private aviation.
同时， 大卫还保持了 NetJets 在安全性和服务方面的业内领先地位。在很多重要方面，我们的培训和操作标准都高出 FAA 的要求。 保持最高标准是正确之举，但是，我还有一个私人原因希望 NetJets 公司能够一直保持这项原则。我和家人已经乘坐该公司的飞机飞行了 5000 小时(相当于 7 个月内每天飞行 24 小时)，将来还要再飞上数千小时。我们从来没要求什么特殊待遇， 而是随机选择了至少 100 架飞机和 300 名机组人员。无论那一架飞机或机组人员，我们都是与私人航空领域中最优秀的机师们共同飞行。
The largest earner in our manufacturing, service and retailing sector is Marmon, a collection of 130 businesses. We will soon increase our ownership in this company to 80% by carrying out our scheduled purchase of 17% of its stock from the Pritzker family. The cost will be about $1.5 billion. We will then purchase the remaining Pritzker holdings in 2013 or 2014, whichever date is selected by the family. Frank Ptak runs Marmon wonderfully, and we look forward to 100% ownership.
马蒙控股集团(Marmon)是我们在制造业、服务业和零售业中最赚钱的公司，该公司共有 130 项业务。我们将按照计划从 Pritzker 家族收购该公司 17%的股份，那么我们在该公司的所有权将提高到 80%，收购成本约为15 亿美元。我们然后将在 2013 年或者 2014 年收购 Pritzker 家族所持有的该公司剩余的股权，具体日期由Pritzker 决定。弗兰克·普特克(FrankPtak)把马蒙控股集团经营的特别好，我们期望能够 100%收购该公司。
Next to Marmon, the two largest earners in this sector are Iscar and McLane. Both had excellent years. In 2010, Grady Rosier’s McLane entered the wine and spirits distribution business to supplement its $32 billion operation as a distributor of food products, cigarettes, candy and sundries. In purchasing Empire Distributors, an operator in Georgia and North Carolina, we teamed up with David Kahn, the company’s dynamic CEO. David is leading our efforts to expand geographically. By yearend he had already made his first acquisition, Horizon Wine and Spirits in Tennessee.
[ISCAR|伊斯卡]和[McLane_Company|麦克莱恩]是另外两家最赚钱的公司。麦克莱恩是一家食品、 香烟、糖果和杂物分销商， 2010 年营业收入为 320 亿美元，在 GradyRosier 的领导下，于 2010 年进入葡萄酒和烈酒分销业务。在收购位于乔治亚州和北加州 Empire 分销商时，我们和公司 CEO 大卫卡恩(DavidKahn)合作。 David 正领导我们扩大业务地域范围。 年底 David 已经完成了首项收购，即收购位于田纳西州的 HorizonWine&Spirits 公司。
At Iscar, profits were up 159% in 2010, and we may well surpass pre-recession levels in 2011. Sales are improving throughout the world, particularly in Asia. Credit Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman for an exceptional performance, one far superior to that of Iscar’s main competitors.
ISCAR 公司 2010 年的利润增加了 159%， 2011 年公司的利润将极有可能超过经济衰退前的水平。全球的销售收入正在改善，尤其是亚洲。这些都是好消息。 Credit Eitan Wertheimer， Jacob Harpaz， Danny Goldman 的出色表现，远远超过了伊斯卡的主要竞争对手。
All that is good news. Our businesses related to home construction, however, continue to struggle. Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and Acme Brick have maintained their competitive positions, but their profits are far below the levels of a few years ago. Combined, these operations earned 1.3 billion in 2006, and their employment has fallen by about 9,400.
所有这些都是好消息。 然而，家具建材业务继续面临困境， JohnsManville、 MiTek、 Shaw 和 AcmeBrick 继续保持其竞争地位，但是， 利润远低于几年前水平。 2010 年这些公司的税前利润为 3.62 亿美元， 而 2006 年则为 13 亿美元，员工人数也削减了 9400 名。
A housing recovery will probably begin within a year or so. In any event, it is certain to occur at some point. Consequently: (1) At MiTek, we have made, or committed to, five bolt-on acquisitions during the past eleven months; (2) At Acme, we just recently acquired the leading manufacturer of brick in Alabama for 55 million roofing membrane plant in Ohio, to be completed next year; and (4) Shaw will spend $200 million in 2011 on plant and equipment, all of it situated in America. These businesses entered the recession strong and will exit it stronger. At Berkshire, our time horizon is forever.
房地产市场可能会在一年左右开始复苏， 无论如何，它肯定会在某个时刻发生。因此： (1)在过去 11 个月内， MiTek 进行了 5 次补强性收购； (2)最近 Acme 花费 5000 万美元收购了阿拉巴马州一家主要的造砖厂；(3)JohnsManville 在俄亥俄州花费 5500 万美元建造了一家屋顶薄膜厂，在明年竣工； (4) 2011 年 Shaw 将在工厂和设备上投资 2000 万美元，所有投资都位于美国境内。这些企业在进入衰退时表现强劲， 在衰退结束时表现更为强劲。伯克希尔的经营期限是永久。
Regulated, Capital-Intensive Businesses 受管制的资本密集型业务
We have two very large businesses, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, with important common characteristics that distinguish them from our many others. Consequently, we give them their own sector in this letter and split out their financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
BNSF 铁路公司和中美能源是我们旗下两家最大的企业，这两家企业都有区别于我们其他企业的共性。因此，我们在股东信函中把它们单独列为一个部门，并且，其财务数据单独列示在 GAAP 资产负债表和收入表中。
A key characteristic of both companies is the huge investment they have in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is not needed: Both businesses have earning power that, even under very adverse business conditions, amply covers their interest requirements. For example, in recessionary 2010 with BNSF’s car loadings far off peak levels, the company’s interest coverage was 6:1.
这两家企业的一个主要特征是对使用寿命长、受管制资产进行了巨额投资， 这些资产的资金来自伯克希尔不提供担保的大量长期债务。这两家企业不需要我们的信用：它们都拥有盈利能力，即使面临不利的经营环境， 也可以充分满足所需支付利息的要求。例如，在经济衰退的 2010 年， BNSF 的车载运输量远低于峰值水平， 该企业的盈利对利息的覆盖倍数为 6:1。
Both companies are heavily regulated, and both will have a never-ending need to make major investments in plant and equipment. Both also need to provide efficient, customer-satisfying service to earn the respect of their communities and regulators. In return, both need to be assured that they will be allowed to earn reasonable earnings on future capital investments.
这两家企业都受到严格的监管， 需要长期在工厂和设备方面进行巨额投资， 同时还需要提供高效的，客户满意的服务来获得业界的及其监管的尊重。作为回报， 两家企业能够在未来的资本投资中获得合理的回报。
Earlier I explained just how important railroads are to our country’s future. Rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, measured by ton-miles, and BNSF moves more than any other railroad — about 28% of the industry total. A little math will tell you that more than 11% of all inter-city ton-miles of freight in the U.S. is transported by BNSF. Given the shift of population to the West, our share may well inch higher.
先前我就解释过铁路对于国家未来的重要性。如果按照吨英里来衡量的话，美国境内 42%的城际货物是通过铁路运输的，其中约 28%的货物是 BNSF 来运输的， 超过了其他任何铁路公司。简单计算一下你就会发现， 美国超过 11%的城际货物是通过 BNSF 运输的。 鉴于美国人口的西进趋势，我们的市场份额还会进一步扩大。
All of this adds up to a huge responsibility. We are a major and essential part of the American economy’s circulatory system, obliged to constantly maintain and improve our 23,000 miles of track along with its ancillary bridges, tunnels, engines and cars. In carrying out this job, we must anticipate society’s needs, not merely react to them. Fulfilling our societal obligation, we will regularly spend far more than our depreciation, with this excess amounting to $2 billion in 2011. I’m confident we will earn appropriate returns on our huge incremental investments. Wise regulation and wise investment are two sides of the same coin.
重任在肩，我们是美国经济循环系统中重要的组成部分， 必须不断维护和改善我们 2.3 万英里的铁路线， 以及附属的桥梁、隧道、 牵引车和车厢。为了履行这份职责，我们不只是被动作出反应，还要预见社会的需求。为了履行我们的社会责任， 我们的经常性资本支出将远远超过折旧， 2011 年这一金额为 20 亿美元。我相信我们将从巨大的增量投资中获得适当的回报。明智的监管和明智的投资是同一枚硬币的正反面。
At MidAmerican, we participate in a similar “social compact.” We are expected to put up ever-increasing sums to satisfy the future needs of our customers. If we meanwhile operate reliably and efficiently, we know that we will obtain a fair return on these investments.
至于中美能源，我们也享有类似的”社会契约”。为了满足客户的未来需要，我们期望投入更多资本。如果能够同时可靠和高效的运营，我们将从这些投资中获得公正的回报。
MidAmerican supplies 2.4 million customers in the U.S. with electricity, operating as the largest supplier in Iowa, Wyoming and Utah and as an important provider in other states as well. Our pipelines transport 8% of the country’s natural gas. Obviously, many millions of Americans depend on us every day.
中美能源向美国 240 万客户提供能源，是爱荷华州、怀俄明州和犹他州最大的电力供应商，同时也是其他州重要的电力供应商。美国 8%的天然气是通过我们的管道运输的。显然， 每天有数以百万计的美国人依赖我们。
MidAmerican has delivered outstanding results for both its owners (Berkshire’s interest is 89.8%) and its customers. Shortly after MidAmerican purchased Northern Natural Gas pipeline in 2002, that company’s performance as a pipeline was rated dead last, 43 out of 43, by the leading authority in the field. In the most recent report published, Northern Natural was ranked second. The top spot was held by our other pipeline, Kern River.
中美能源为其所有者(伯克希尔拥有 89.8%的股份)和客户带来了卓越的业绩。就在 2002 年中美能源收购了北方天然气管线后不久，按照业界一家权威的评级，该公司天然气管道的业绩在 43 家公司之中排名最后。 而在最近发布的报告中，北方天然气排名第二。第一名是我们的另一条管道科恩河管道公司。
In its electric business, MidAmerican has a comparable record. Iowa rates have not increased since we purchased our operation there in 1999. During the same period, the other major electric utility in the state has raised prices more than 70% and now has rates far above ours. In certain metropolitan areas in which the two utilities operate side by side, electric bills of our customers run far below those of their neighbors. I am told that comparable houses sell at higher prices in these cities if they are located in our service area.
在其电力业务中，中美能源也有一个不错的记录。自 1999 年收购爱荷华州的电力业务以来，其电费一直没涨过。而在同期，该州其他主要电力公司已经将电价提高了 70%以上，目前电价远远超过我们的电价。在某些两家公司共同经营的大型城市，我们客户的电费远低于他们的邻居。有人曾经告诉我， 城市中位于我们服务区域的房产相比其它地区的售价会更高。
MidAmerican will have 2,909 megawatts of wind generation in operation by the end of 2011, more than any other regulated electric utility in the country. The total amount that MidAmerican has invested or committed to wind is a staggering $5.4 billion. We can make this sort of investment because MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, unlike other utilities that generally pay out most of what they earn.
截止到 2011 年底，中美能源的风力发电量将超过 2909 兆瓦，超过美国任何受监管的电力公司。中美能源在风能领域的投资总额高达 54 亿美元。 我们之所以能够进行这么大的投资是因为， 中美能源保留了所有的收益， 而不同于其他电力公司几乎花光其所有的收益。
As you can tell by now, I am proud of what has been accomplished for our society by Matt Rose at BNSF and by David Sokol and Greg Abel at MidAmerican. I am also both proud and grateful for what they have accomplished for Berkshire shareholders. Below are the relevant figures:
正如你现在所看到的， 我为 BNSF 的马特罗斯(MattRose)和中美能源的大卫索科尔(DavidSokol)及格雷格阿贝尔(GregAbel)所取得的成就感到骄傲， 我也对他们为伯克希尔股东们所作出的贡献感到骄傲，并心生感激。
| MidAmerican | Earnings 2010 (in millions) | Earnings 2009 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 333 | $ 248 |
| Iowa utility | 279 | 285 |
| Western utilities | 783 | 788 |
| Pipelines | 378 | 457 |
| HomeServices | 42 | 43 |
| Other (net) | 47 | 25 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 1,862 | 1,846 |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (323) | (318) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt | (30) | (58) |
| Income tax | (271) | (313) |
| Net earnings | $ 1,238 | $ 1,157 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire* | $ 1,131 | $ 1,071 |
* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of 38 in 2009.
| BNSF (Historical accounting through 2/12/10; purchase accounting subsequently) | 2010 (in millions) | 2009 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 16,850 | $ 14,016 |
| Operating earnings | 4,495 | 3,254 |
| Interest (Net) | 507 | 613 |
| Pre-Tax earnings | 3,988 | 2,641 |
| Net earnings | 2,459 | 1,721 |
Finance and Financial Products 金融和金融产品业务
This, our smallest sector, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), and Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes.
这是我们规模最小的部门，包括两家租赁公司，分别是经营拖车租赁业务的 XTRA 公司和经营家具租赁的科特家具(CORT)，以及全美最大的预制房屋建造商和融资公司克莱顿(Clayton Homes)。
Both of our leasing businesses improved their performances last year, albeit from a very low base. XTRA increased the utilization of its equipment from 63% in 2009 to 75% in 2010, thereby raising pre-tax earnings to 17 million in 2009. CORT experienced a pickup in business as the year progressed and also significantly tightened its operations. The combination increased its pre-tax results from a loss of 18 million of profit in 2010.
去年两家租赁公司的业绩都有所改善，尽管基数很低。 XTRA 公司的设备利用率从 2009 年的 63%提高至2010 年的 75%，税前利润也随之从 1700 万美元增加到 3500 万美元； 科特家具的业务也逐步复苏，同时严控运营费用， 合并后的税前收益从 300 万美元提高到 1800 万美元。
At Clayton, we produced 23,343 homes, 47% of the industry’s total of 50,046. Contrast this to the peak year of 1998, when 372,843 homes were manufactured. (We then had an industry share of 8%.) Sales would have been terrible last year under any circumstances, but the financing problems I commented upon in the 2009 report continue to exacerbate the distress. To explain: Home-financing policies of our government, expressed through the loans found acceptable by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, favor site-built homes and work to negate the price advantage that manufactured homes offer.
克莱顿去年建造了 23343 套预制房，占整个行业 50046 套产量的 47%。 与之形成鲜明对比的是 1998 年的行业高峰，当年我们建造了 372843 套(只占 8%行业份额)。去年的销售业绩在任何情况下看都很糟糕，而我在2009 年的报告中提及的融资问题加剧了我们的困境。具体来说：美国政府的住房贷款政策偏好现场建造的住宅(从适用于联邦住房管理局 FHA，房地美和房利美可接受的贷款中可以看出)，使预制房的价格优势遭到削弱。
We finance more manufactured-home buyers than any other company. Our experience, therefore, should be instructive to those parties preparing to overhaul our country’s home-loan practices. Let’s take a look.
克莱顿向预制房买家提供的贷款比任何其他公司都多。我们的经验对致力于改革美国住房贷款政策的各方都具有借鉴意义。 让我们来看看。
Clayton owns 200,804 mortgages that it originated. (It also has some mortgage portfolios that it purchased.) At the origination of these contracts, the average FICO score of our borrowers was 648, and 47% were 640 or below. Your banker will tell you that people with such scores are generally regarded as questionable credits.
克莱顿提供了 200804 笔住房抵押贷款(它还购买了一些抵押贷款组合)。在克莱顿发放贷款时，客户的平均 FICO 信用分为 648，其中 47%的客户信用分为 640 或者更低。通常银行认为这些客户的信用有问题。
Nevertheless, our portfolio has performed well during conditions of stress. Here’s our loss experience during the last five years for originated loans:
尽管如此，即使在金融危机期间，我们的贷款投资组合业绩仍然表现不错。 下面是过去 5 年我们的原始贷款的损失经验：
| Year | Net Losses as a Percentage of Average Loans |
|---|---|
| 2006 | 1.53% |
| 2007 | 1.27% |
| 2008 | 1.17% |
| 2009 | 1.86% |
| 2010 | 1.72% |
Our borrowers get in trouble when they lose their jobs, have health problems, get divorced, etc. The recession has hit them hard. But they want to stay in their homes, and generally they borrowed sensible amounts in relation to their income. In addition, we were keeping the originated mortgages for our own account, which means we were not securitizing or otherwise reselling them. If we were stupid in our lending, we were going to pay the price. That concentrates the mind.
我们的贷款客户在失业、 健康问题、离婚等情况下而陷入困境， 经济衰退对他们打击很大， 但他们希望能保住住房。通常来说，他们贷款的额度与收入相称。另外，我们将原始的抵押贷款保留在自己报表中，这意味着我们没有将其证券化或者再次转售。如果我们在放贷方面愚蠢行事，我们必会付出代价。 必须牢记这一点。
If home buyers throughout the country had behaved like our buyers, America would not have had the crisis that it did. Our approach was simply to get a meaningful down-payment and gear fixed monthly payments to a sensible percentage of income. This policy kept Clayton solvent and also kept buyers in their homes.
如果全国的购房者都像我们的客户那样行事，美国就不会面临信贷危机了。我们的成功法则是： 收取合理的首付，且将固定月还款额度与收入挂钩。 该政策使克莱顿保持偿付能力，也帮助客户保住了房子。
Home ownership makes sense for most Americans, particularly at today’s lower prices and bargain interest rates. All things considered, the third best investment I ever made was the purchase of my home, though I would have made far more money had I instead rented and used the purchase money to buy stocks. (The two best investments were wedding rings.) For the $31,500 I paid for our house, my family and I gained 52 years of terrific memories with more to come.
考虑到现今美国的房价和利率都很低，购买住房对大多数美国人来说都是明智的选择。 总的来说， 我自己就把购买住宅看成我第三成功的投资(前两大成功投资是购买一对婚戒)，仅仅花了 3.15 万美元，我和家人获得了 52年的美好回忆，而且今后还将继续受益。
But a house can be a nightmare if the buyer’s eyes are bigger than his wallet and if a lender — often protected by a government guarantee — facilitates his fantasy. Our country’s social goal should not be to put families into the house of their dreams, but rather to put them into a house they can afford.
但是，如果购房者的眼光高于其经济承受能力，而银行(受政府担保)助长了他的幻想，那房子就可能成为灾难。我们国家的社会目标不应该是让家庭享受梦幻住宅，而是住进能够负担得起的住房。
Investments 投资业务
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
以下表格反映了 2010 年年底伯克希尔公司持有的市值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned (12/31/10) | Cost (in millions) * | Market (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 12.6 | $ 1,287 | $ 6,507 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Company, Ltd. | 9.9 | 232 | 1,182 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.6 | 1,299 | 13,154 |
| 29,109,637 | ConocoPhillips | 2.0 | 2,028 | 1,982 |
| 45,022,563 | Johnson & Johnson | 1.6 | 2,749 | 2,785 |
| 97,214,584 | Kraft Foods Inc. | 5.6 | 3,207 | 3,063 |
| 19,259,600 | Munich Re | 10.5 | 2,896 | 2,924 |
| 3,947,555 | POSCO | 4.6 | 768 | 1,706 |
| 72,391,036 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 2.6 | 464 | 4,657 |
| 25,848,838 | Sanofi-Aventis | 2.0 | 2,060 | 1,656 |
| 242,163,773 | Tesco plc | 3.0 | 1,414 | 1,608 |
| 78,060,769 | U.S. Bancorp | 4.1 | 2,401 | 2,105 |
| 39,037,142 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 1.1 | 1,893 | 2,105 |
| 358,936,125 | Wells Fargo & Company | 6.8 | 8,015 | 11,123 |
| Others | 3,020 | 4,956 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 33,733 | $ 61,513 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
In our reported earnings we reflect only the dividends our portfolio companies pay us. Our share of the undistributed earnings of these investees, however, was more than $2 billion last year. These retained earnings are important. In our experience — and, for that matter, in the experience of investors over the past century — undistributed earnings have been either matched or exceeded by market gains, albeit in a highly irregular manner. (Indeed, sometimes the correlation goes in reverse. As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth — and I still have my wife.”) In the future, we expect our market gains to eventually at least equal the earnings our investees retain.
我们在报表中反映的收益只是投资组合公司支付给我们的股息。然而， 2010 年我们在这些被投资公司的未分配收益中所占的份额超过 20 亿美元。这些留存收益特别重要。根据过去一个世纪的投资经验，这些未分配收益将创造相当甚至超过的市值收益，尽管是以不规则的方式。 (事实上，有时这种相关性是相反的，正如一位投资者在2009 年所说，这比离婚还糟糕！我已经损失了一半的净资产，但我妻子还在。 )我们预计， 我们持股公司未来的市场收益最终将至少等于这些公司的留存收益。
In our earlier estimate of Berkshire’s normal earning power, we made three adjustments that relate to future investment income (but did not include anything for the undistributed earnings factor I have just described).
此前对伯克希尔常规盈利能力的估计中， 我们对未来的投资收益进行了三次调整(但没有考虑刚才提到的未分配收益因素)。
The first adjustment was decidedly negative. Last year, we discussed five large fixed-income investments that have been contributing substantial sums to our reported earnings. One of these — our Swiss Re note — was redeemed in the early days of 2011, and two others — our Goldman Sachs and General Electric preferred stocks — are likely to be gone by yearend. General Electric is entitled to call our preferred in October and has stated its intention to do so. Goldman Sachs has the right to call our preferred on 30 days notice, but has been held back by the Federal Reserve (bless it!), which unfortunately will likely give Goldman the green light before long.
第一次调整是负面的， 去年我们讨论了五笔大型固定收益投资，这些投资为我们的报告收益贡献了大量收益。 其中， 瑞士再保险债券于 2011 年初被赎回。高盛和通用电气的优先股可能在年底前被赎回。通用电气有权在 10 月份回购我们所持有的优先股，并且表明了该意向。 高盛有权赎回，只需要提前 30 天通知，但美联储目前还没有批准(上天保佑)。不过美联储可能要不了多久就会批准。
All three of the companies redeeming must pay us a premium to do so — in aggregate about $1.4 billion — but all of the redemptions are nevertheless unwelcome. After they occur, our earning power will be significantly reduced. That’s the bad news.
There are two probable offsets. At yearend we held 500 million — and perhaps much more — to our investment income. That sort of increase in money-market yields is unlikely to come soon. It is appropriate, nevertheless, for us to include improved rates in an estimate of “normal” earning power. Even before higher rates come about, furthermore, we could get lucky and find an opportunity to use some of our cash hoard at decent returns. That day can’t come too soon for me: To update Aesop, a girl in a convertible is worth five in the phone book.
还有两个好消息来抵消不利影响。截止去年年底，我们持有的现金等价物是 380 亿美元， 它们在 2010 年一直收益微薄。 但是， 在某个时候利率将有所提高。我们的投资收益因此将至少增加 5 亿美元，可能会更高。类似这种货币市场收益率上升的情况不会马上到来。但我们在评估”常规”盈利能力时， 将提高的利率纳入估算是合适的。即便在更高的利率到来之前，我们也能能幸运地找到机会，让手中的现金得到不错的回报。 那一天对我来说不会来得太早，更新伊索，坐在敞篷车的一个女孩抵得上电话簿里的 5 个(一鸟在手胜过两鸟在林)。
In addition, dividends on our current common stock holdings will almost certainly increase. The largest gain is likely to come at Wells Fargo. The Federal Reserve, our friend in respect to Goldman Sachs, has frozen dividend levels at major banks, whether strong or weak, during the last two years. Wells Fargo, though consistently prospering throughout the worst of the recession and currently enjoying enormous financial strength and earning power, has therefore been forced to maintain an artificially low payout. (We don’t fault the Fed: For various reasons, an across-the-board freeze made sense during the crisis and its immediate aftermath.)
此外，我们持有普通股的股息肯定会增加。最大的收益可能来自富国银行。美联储在过去两年中不考虑银行业绩好坏，限制各大银行的股息水平。富国银行在经济衰退时期持续发展，目前拥有雄厚的财务实力和盈利能力，却被迫维持低支出水平(我们无意指责美联储的决定，出于多方原因，全面限制银行红利在危机期间合情合理)。
At some point, probably soon, the Fed’s restrictions will cease. Wells Fargo can then reinstate the rational dividend policy that its owners deserve. At that time, we would expect our annual dividends from just this one security to increase by several hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
Other companies we hold are likely to increase their dividends as well. Coca-Cola paid us 376 million from Coke, up 376 million to double. By the end of that period, I wouldn’t be surprised to see our share of Coke’s annual earnings exceed 100% of what we paid for the investment. Time is the friend of the wonderful business.
我们持股的其他企业也可能提高股息。 1995 年可口可乐公司向我们支付了 8800 万元红利，当时我们刚完成可口可乐股票的建仓。此后，可口可乐每年都在提高股息。 2011 年，可口可乐股息将高达 3.76 亿美元，比去年增加 2400 万美元。我预计十年内其股息将比 3.76 亿美元翻一番。十年后，如果我们在可口可乐收入中所占的份额超过当初的投资成本(13 亿)，我也不会感到惊讶。 时间是好生意的朋友。
Overall, I believe our “normal” investment income will at least equal what we realized in 2010, though the redemptions I described will cut our take in 2011 and perhaps 2012 as well.
总体看来，我们的常规投资收益将和2010 年的收入持平，尽管前面所说的赎回将减少我们在 2011 年和 2012 年的收益。
Last summer, Lou Simpson told me he wished to retire. Since Lou was a mere 74 — an age Charlie and I regard as appropriate only for trainees at Berkshire — his call was a surprise.
去年夏天， 路易·辛普森(LouSimpson)向我表示他有意退休， 由于他才 74 岁， 查理和我认为这个年纪对伯克希尔来说还很年轻，他的来电要求让我们感到吃惊。
Lou joined GEICO as its investment manager in 1979, and his service to that company has been invaluable. In the 2004 Annual Report, I detailed his record with equities, and I have omitted updates only because his performance made mine look bad. Who needs that?
1979 年， 路易担任 GEICO 保险公司的投资经理， 他为该公司的服务非常宝贵。 在 2004 年的年报中我详细介绍了他的投资业绩， 我之所以停止了更新，是因为他的突出业绩让我感到自愧不如。
Lou has never been one to advertise his talents. But I will: Simply put, Lou is one of the investment greats. We will miss him.
路易从未自己炫耀他的才能， 但我会，路易是一个伟大的投资大师，我们都会想念他。
Four years ago, I told you that we needed to add one or more younger investment managers to carry on when Charlie, Lou and I weren’t around. At that time we had multiple outstanding candidates immediately available for my CEO job (as we do now), but we did not have backup in the investment area.
四年以前，我曾经说过，等到查理、 路易和我都不在后，公司需要增加一名或多名年轻的投资经理。 当时我们有多位杰出的候选人可以立刻接任我 CEO 的工作，就像现在一样，但我们在投资领域还没有合适的后备人选。
It’s easy to identify many investment managers with great recent records. But past results, though important, do not suffice when prospective performance is being judged. How the record has been achieved is crucial, as is the manager’s understanding of — and sensitivity to — risk (which in no way should be measured by beta, the choice of too many academics). In respect to the risk criterion, we were looking for someone with a hard-to-evaluate skill: the ability to anticipate the effects of economic scenarios not previously observed. Finally, we wanted someone who would regard working for Berkshire as far more than a job.
很容易找到许多近期业绩卓越的投资经理人。但过去出色的表现虽然重要，却不能以此判断未来的业绩。至关重要的是如何取得业绩， 投资经理如何理解和感知风险也至关重要(这绝不能用太多学者所选择的贝塔系数来衡量)。 在风险评价标准方面，我们希望找到能力罕见超群的候选人，他能够预计到以前从未出现过的经济情景的影响。 最后，我们需要全身心为伯克希尔效力的候选人，而不仅仅把这当做一份工作。
When Charlie and I met Todd Combs, we knew he fit our requirements. Todd, as was the case with Lou, will be paid a salary plus a contingent payment based on his performance relative to the S&P. We have arrangements in place for deferrals and carryforwards that will prevent see-saw performance being met by undeserved payments. The hedge-fund world has witnessed some terrible behavior by general partners who have received huge payouts on the upside and who then, when bad results occurred, have walked away rich, with their limited partners losing back their earlier gains. Sometimes these same general partners thereafter quickly started another fund so that they could immediately participate in future profits without having to overcome their past losses. Investors who put money with such managers should be labeled patsies, not partners.
查理和我遇到[Todd_Combs|托德·库姆斯]的时候，我们就知道他符合我们的各项要求。托德和路易·辛普森的待遇相同， 将根据他相对于标普指数的表现，获得一份薪水外加相关奖金。我们已制定收入延期和结转的安排，防止波动剧烈的投资受到不当支付的影响。对冲基金行业见证了普通合伙人 GP 的一些可怕行径，他们在股价上涨时获得了巨额回报， 而当糟糕业绩出现时， 有限合伙人 LP 则失去了此前的收益。 有时，这些普通合伙人 GP 迅速启动另一个基金， 以便他们套取未来的预期利润，而不必承担过去的损失。把资金托付给这类基金经理的投资者实际上成了替罪羊，而不是合伙人。
As long as I am CEO, I will continue to manage the great majority of Berkshire’s holdings, both bonds and equities. Todd initially will manage funds in the range of one to three billion dollars, an amount he can reset annually. His focus will be equities but he is not restricted to that form of investment. (Fund consultants like to require style boxes such as “long-short,” “macro,” “international equities.” At Berkshire our only style box is “smart.”)
只要我还担任 CEO，我就会继续管理伯克希尔的大部分资产，包括债券和股票。托德将初步管理 10-30 亿美元的基金， 他可以每年重新调整这一规模。他投资的重点将是股票，但并不局限于股票。 (基金顾问喜欢将投资类型描述成”对冲”、 “宏观”和”国际”等模式，而在伯克希尔我们只有一种模式，即”精明”的投资。 )
Over time, we may add one or two investment managers if we find the right individuals. Should we do that, we will probably have 80% of each manager’s performance compensation be dependent on his or her own portfolio and 20% on that of the other manager(s). We want a compensation system that pays off big for individual success but that also fosters cooperation, not competition.
随着时间推移，如果能找到合适的人选，我们将增加 1-2 名投资经理。 如果我们这么做，我们可能会让每位投资经理的绩效薪酬， 80%来自于他管理的投资组合， 20%来自于其他经理人的投资组合。我们希望建立一个能为个人的成功带来巨大回报的薪酬体系， 同时也能促进他们之间相互合作而不是竞争。
When Charlie and I are no longer around, our investment manager(s) will have responsibility for the entire portfolio in a manner then set by the CEO and Board of Directors. Because good investors bring a useful perspective to the purchase of businesses, we would expect them to be consulted — but not to have a vote — on the wisdom of possible acquisitions. In the end, of course, the Board will make the call on any major acquisition.
等到查理和我不在后，我们的投资经理将按照 CEO 和董事会规定的方式对整个投资组合负责。 因为出色的投资者为企业收购带来了良好的视角，我们希望他们能够就可能的企业并购是否明智方面进行咨询，但不是表决。当然，董事会将会对任何重大并购作出决策。
One footnote: When we issued a press release about Todd’s joining us, a number of commentators pointed out that he was “little-known” and expressed puzzlement that we didn’t seek a “big-name.” I wonder how many of them would have known of Lou in 1979, Ajit in 1985, or, for that matter, Charlie in 1959. Our goal was to find a 2-year-old Secretariat, not a 10-year-old Seabiscuit. (Whoops — that may not be the smartest metaphor for an 80-year-old CEO to use.)
一个补充： 当我们宣布托德将加盟我们的时候，有些评论员指出，托德是无名之辈，对于我们没有找到声名显赫的经理人表示困惑。我想知道， 他们究竟有多少人在 1979 年听说过路易·辛普森，在 1985 年认识阿吉特·贾恩，在 1959 年听说过查理。我们的目标是找到一位资历尚浅的经理人，而不是久经沙场的老将。 对于一个 80 岁的 CEO 来说，这可能不是最明智的比喻。
Derivatives 金融衍生品
Two years ago, in the 2008 Annual Report, I told you that Berkshire was a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operations at our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the few left over at Gen Re). Today, the comparable number is 203, a figure reflecting both a few additions to our portfolio and the unwinding or expiration of some contracts.
两年前， 在 2008 年年告中，我向你们披露伯克希尔持有 251 个金融衍生品合约(不包括用于子公司经营的合约，比如中美能源， 以及通用再保险留下的少数合约)。 今天可比的数字是 203 个，数字变化是由于我们组合中增加了一些新的合约， 以及一些旧的合约已经到期或被解除。
Our continuing positions, all of which I am personally responsible for, fall largely into two categories. We view both categories as engaging us in insurance-like activities in which we receive premiums for assuming risks that others wish to shed. Indeed, the thought processes we employ in these derivatives transactions are identical to those we use in our insurance business. You should also understand that we get paid up-front when we enter into the contracts and therefore run no counterparty risk. That’s important.
我们继续持有的这些金融衍生品均由我本人负责，它们主要包括两种类型。这两种都属于和保险相似的投资活动， 即我们承担他人极力避免的风险而收取保费。实际上， 在这些衍生品交易中我们采用的决策机制也与保险业务相似。 此外，我们在缔结这些合同时预先收费，因此不会面临交易对手风险。这点相当重要。
Our first category of derivatives consists of a number of contracts, written in 2004-2008, that required payments by us if there were bond defaults by companies included in certain high-yield indices. With minor exceptions, we were exposed to these risks for five years, with each contract covering 100 companies.
第一类衍生品主要是在 2004-2008 年间签订的合约，它们要求：如果某些高收益率指数的成份股企业发生了债券违约，伯克希尔将给予赔付。在极少例外的情况下，我们所面临的风险期为 5 年，每份合约涵盖 100 家公司。
In aggregate, we received premiums of $3.4 billion for these contracts. When I originally told you in our 2007 Annual Report about them, I said that I expected the contracts would deliver us an “underwriting profit,” meaning that our losses would be less than the premiums we received. In addition, I said we would benefit from the use of float.
总的来说，我们从这些合约中收取了 34 亿美元保费。 在 2007 年的年报中，我说预计这些合约将带来”承保利润”， 这意味着我们的赔付将低于收取的保费。另外，我说，我们将从”浮存金”的使用中获利。
Subsequently, as you know too well, we encountered both a financial panic and a severe recession. A number of the companies in the high-yield indices failed, which required us to pay losses of 2 billion over the life of the contracts. In short, we charged the right premium, and that protected us when business conditions turned terrible three years ago.
后来如你所知， 我们遭遇了金融恐慌和严重的经济衰退。许多高收益率指数的成份股企业破产了，我们为此赔付了 25 亿美元。尽管如此，现在风险较高的合约基本已经到期，我们面临的风险敞口已经大大减少。因此，我们几乎肯定会获得当初预期的承保利润。 此外， 在这些合约有效期内，我们还使用了平均高达 20 亿美元的无息”浮存金”。简而言之，我们收取的保费金额适当， 这在三年前经济环境恶化时保护了我们。
Our other large derivatives position — whose contracts go by the name of “equity puts” — involves insurance we wrote for parties wishing to protect themselves against a possible decline in equity prices in the U.S., U.K., Europe and Japan. These contracts are tied to various equity indices, such as the S&P 500 in the U.S. and the FTSE 100 in the U.K. In the 2004-2008 period, we received $4.8 billion of premiums for 47 of these contracts, most of which ran for 15 years. On these contracts, only the price of the indices on the termination date counts: No payments can be required before then.
其它的大型衍生品则是”股票看跌期权”，我们为美国、英国、欧洲和日本的希望避免股价暴跌风险的投资者提供保险。这些合约与各种股票指数挂钩，比如美国的标普 500 指数、英国的富时 100 指数等。 2004-2008 年间，我们签订了 47 个此类合约，收取了 48 亿美元保费， 大多数合约有效期是 15 年。 在这些合约中，只有到期日的指数价格才重要，此前的任何价格都不需要赔付。
As a first step in updating you about these contracts, I can report that late in 2010, at the instigation of our counterparty, we unwound eight contracts, all of them due between 2021 and 2028. We had originally received 425 million. Consequently, we realized a gain of 647 million for about three years.
关于这些合约的情况，我向大家披露如下：在交易对手的要求下，我们在 2010 年下半年解除了 8 份原定于2021-2028 年到期的合约， 这些合约我们最初收到 6.47 亿美元保费， 因解约我们需退回 4.25 亿美元， 因此我们实现了 2.22 亿美元的收益，并在在三年内无息、无限制的使用了 6.47 亿美元资金。
Those 2010 transactions left us with 39 equity put contracts remaining on our books at yearend. On these, at their initiation, we received premiums of $4.2 billion.
截至 2010 年底，我们还剩下 39 份股票看跌期权，这些合约成立之初我们总共收到 42 亿美元保费。
The future of these contracts is, of course, uncertain. But here is one perspective on them. If the prices of the relevant indices are the same at the contract expiration dates as these prices were on December 31, 2010 — and foreign exchange rates are unchanged — we would owe $3.8 billion on expirations occurring from 2018 to 2026. You can call this amount “settlement value.”
当然， 这些合约的未来收益是不确定的，但我可以从下列角度说明：如果相关合约指数在上述合约到期时的价格，与 2010 年 12 月 31 日相同，而外汇汇率保持不变的话， 那么在 2018-2026 年到期时，我们将赔付 38 亿美元，你们可以视其为”结算价值”。
On our yearend balance sheet, however, we carry the liability for those remaining equity puts at 2.9 billion gain in the years to come, that being the difference between the liability figure of 3.8 billion. I believe that equity prices will very likely increase and that our liability will fall significantly between now and settlement date. If so, our gain from this point will be even greater. But that, of course, is far from a sure thing.
然而在我们的资产负债表上，我们将这些剩余看跌期权的负债记为 67 亿美元。换言之，如果相关指数的价格自该日起保持不变，我们将在未来这些合约到期的年份录得 29 亿美元收益，也就是 67 亿美元负债与 38 亿美元结算价值之间的差额。我相信，从现在到结算日， 股票价格很可能会上涨， 我们的负债将会大幅下降。 如果这一预言成真，我们获得的收益将更大，当然这并非确定的事情。
What is sure is that we will have the use of our remaining “float” of 66 billion.) Since money is fungible, think of a portion of these funds as contributing to the purchase of BNSF.
可以确定的是， 在未来十年间我们可以无息使用平均 42 亿美元浮存金。 我们保险业务 660 亿美元的浮存金中不包含该部分，也不包括前一类高收益合约产生的浮存金。由于资金是可替代的，想象一下这些资金被部分用于收购 BNSF 铁路。
As I have told you before, almost all of our derivatives contracts are free of any obligation to post collateral — a fact that cut the premiums we could otherwise have charged. But that fact also left us feeling comfortable during the financial crisis, allowing us in those days to commit to some advantageous purchases. Foregoing some additional derivatives premiums proved to be well worth it.
正如我们之前告诉你们的那样，我们几乎所有的衍生品合约都没提供担保品的义务，这种情况降低了我们可以收取的保费。但是在金融危机期间， 也让我们倍感舒适，使得我们能够在那些日子进行一些有利的收购。 事实证明，放弃一些额外的衍生品保费被证明是非常值得的。
On Reporting and Misreporting: The Numbers That Count and Those That Don’t 报告与误报： 财报中重要的数字和不重要的数字
Earlier in this letter, I pointed out some numbers that Charlie and I find useful in valuing Berkshire and measuring its progress.
在这封信的前面部分我列示了一些数字， 查理和我认为这些数字有助于评估伯克希尔的价值并衡量其进展。
Let’s focus here on a number we omitted, but which many in the media feature above all others: net income. Important though that number may be at most companies, it is almost always meaningless at Berkshire. Regardless of how our businesses might be doing, Charlie and I could — quite legally — cause net income in any given period to be almost any number we would like.
下面我们重点谈谈一个被忽略的数字：净利润。这个数字在媒体中是非常重要的。 尽管这个数字对大多数公司来说很重要，但对伯克希尔来说几乎毫无意义。不管业务如何运营， 查理和我可以合法的在任何特定时期内创造任何我们想要的净利润数字。
We have that flexibility because realized gains or losses on investments go into the net income figure, whereas unrealized gains (and, in most cases, losses) are excluded. For example, imagine that Berkshire had a 1 billion of realized losses. Our net income — which would count only the loss — would be reported as less than our operating income. If we had meanwhile realized gains in the previous year, headlines might proclaim that our earnings were down X% when in reality our business might be much improved.
我们具有这种灵活性是因为， 已实现的投资损益被纳入净利润中， 而未实现的损益(大部分情况下为亏损)则被排除在外。例如，如果伯克希尔某年未实现的投资收益为 100 亿美元，同时实现了投资损失为 10 亿美元，那么我们报告的仅计入亏损的净利润，将会低于经营收益。同时，如果我们上一年有已实现收益，新闻头条中就可能会宣称我们的收益下降了 X%，而实际上我们的业务可能已大大改善。
If we really thought net income important, we could regularly feed realized gains into it simply because we have a huge amount of unrealized gains upon which to draw. Rest assured, though, that Charlie and I have never sold a security because of the effect a sale would have on the net income we were soon to report. We both have a deep disgust for “game playing” with numbers, a practice that was rampant throughout corporate America in the 1990s and still persists, though it occurs less frequently and less blatantly than it used to.
由于我们有大量的未实现收益可以利用，因此， 如果我们真的认为净利润数字很重要，我们可以定期将已实现的收益注入其中。不过，请放心，查理和我绝不会抛售，因为抛售会影响我们即将报告的净利润数字，而且我们都对”玩数字游戏”深恶痛绝。
Operating earnings, despite having some shortcomings, are in general a reasonable guide as to how our businesses are doing. Ignore our net income figure, however. Regulations require that we report it to you. But if you find reporters focusing on it, that will speak more to their performance than ours.
尽管存在某些缺点，但经营收益总体上是我们企业经营状况的一个合理的指标。 我们忽略的净利润数字，然而法规要求我们向你们报告。 但是，如果你发现报告方注意力在此， 这将比我们所能告诉你的更多。
Both realized and unrealized gains and losses are fully reflected in the calculation of our book value. Pay attention to the changes in that metric and to the course of our operating earnings, and you will be on the right track.
我们的帐面价值的计算已经全面反映了已实现和未实现的损益。 关注账面价值以及经营收益的变化过程，你将步入正轨。
As a p.s., I can’t resist pointing out just how capricious reported net income can be. Had our equity puts had a termination date of June 30, 2010, we would have been required to pay 5.8 billion on September 30th. Yet the Black-Scholes formula that we use in valuing these contracts required us to increase our balance-sheet liability during this period from 9.6 billion, a change that, after the effect of tax accruals, reduced our net income for the quarter by $455 million.
顺便说一句，我忍不住要指出， 报告的净利润多么变幻莫测。假如我们看跌期权到期日定在 2010 年 6 月 30日， 我们必须向交易对手支付 64 亿美元。证券价格在接下来的一个季度普遍上涨，使得相应数字在 9 月 30 日下降至 58 亿美元。然而，我们用于评估这些合约的 Black-Scholes 期权定价模型要求我们，在此期间将资产负债表上的负债从 89 亿美元增加到 96 亿美元，这一更改在应计税的影响下，我们本季度净利润降低了 4.55 亿美元。
Both Charlie and I believe that Black-Scholes produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options. We set out one absurd example in these pages two years ago. More tangibly, we put our money where our mouth was by entering into our equity put contracts. By doing so, we implicitly asserted that the Black-Scholes calculations used by our counterparties or their customers were faulty.
查理和我都认为，在评估长期期权时， Black-Scholes 期权定价模型产生了非常不准确的数值。两年前，我们在这部分列举了一个荒唐的例子。更具体的说，我们通过卖出股票看跌期权含蓄的表示， 我们的交易对手或其客户采用的 Black-Scholes 期权定价模型的运算是错误的。
We continue, nevertheless, to use that formula in presenting our financial statements. Black-Scholes is the accepted standard for option valuation — almost all leading business schools teach it — and we would be accused of shoddy accounting if we deviated from it. Moreover, we would present our auditors with an insurmountable problem were we to do that: They have clients who are our counterparties and who use Black-Scholes values for the same contracts we hold. It would be impossible for our auditors to attest to the accuracy of both their values and ours were the two far apart.
但是，我们继续采用这个公式编制财务报表，因为 Black-Scholes 是公认的期权估价标准，几乎所有顶级商学院都开设这个课程。我们不得不按它计算， 就会被指责会计造假。此外， 还会给审计师带来难以解决的问题，因为他们的客户是我们的交易对手，他们在相同的合同中也采用此公式，如果双方的评估方法相差太大，审计就无法证明他们与我们评估的精确度。
Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can’t supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can’t come up with an exact figure — anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn’t bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.
Black-Scholes 对于审计和监管者的部分吸引力在于， 它能提供精确的数字，而查理和我不能提供这些。我们认为，我们合同的真实负债远低于按该公式计算出的数值，但是我们无法拿出准确的数字，也无法提供 GEICO 保险、 BNSF 铁路或伯克希尔准确的价值。对此我们并不困扰， 因为模糊的正确远好过精确的错误。
John Kenneth Galbraith once slyly observed that economists were most economical with ideas: They made the ones learned in graduate school last a lifetime. University finance departments often behave similarly. Witness the tenacity with which almost all clung to the theory of efficient markets throughout the 1970s and 1980s, dismissively calling powerful facts that refuted it “anomalies.” (I always love explanations of that kind: The Flat Earth Society probably views a ship’s circling of the globe as an annoying, but inconsequential, anomaly.)
John Kenneth Galbraith 曾经俏皮地评论，经济学家在思想最节省：他们让在研究生院学到的东西可以用一辈子。 大学金融院系的行为往往类似。 上世纪七、八十年代，几乎所有人都固执地坚持有效市场理论，轻蔑地将驳倒这一理论的有力事实称之为”异常现象”。 (我一直很喜欢这种解释： “地平说学会”可能认为轮船环游地球令人讨厌、不合逻辑且不正常。 )
Academics’ current practice of teaching Black-Scholes as revealed truth needs re-examination. For that matter, so does the academic’s inclination to dwell on the valuation of options. You can be highly successful as an investor without having the slightest ability to value an option. What students should be learning is how to value a business. That’s what investing is all about.
学术界目前教授 Black-Scholes 模型作为揭示真理的做法需要重新审视， 就此而言，学术界对期权估值的过度重视也是如此。即使你没有丝毫评估期权的能力，你一样可以成为非常成功的投资者。学生们应该学习的是如何评估企业的价值，那才是投资的意义所在。
Life and Debt 生活和债务
The fundamental principle of auto racing is that to finish first, you must first finish. That dictum is equally applicable to business and guides our every action at Berkshire.
汽车比赛的基本法则是， 比赛第一的前提是你必须先能完成比赛。 该准则同样适合经营企业，指导我们在伯克希尔的每一项活动。
Unquestionably, some people have become very rich through the use of borrowed money. However, that’s also been a way to get very poor. When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you’re clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive. Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices. And as we all learned in third grade — and some relearned in 2008 — any series of positive numbers, however impressive the numbers may be, evaporates when multiplied by a single zero. History tells us that leverage all too often produces zeroes, even when it is employed by very smart people.
毫无疑问，有些人通过借钱投资成为巨富， 然而这也同样能使你一贫如洗。 当杠杆效应发挥作用的时候，收益会成倍放大，配偶觉得你很聪明，邻居也艳羡不已。但杠杆会使人上瘾， 一旦你从奇迹中获利， 很少有人回到保守的做法上去。 正如我们在三年级学到的(有些人在 2008 年金融危机中重新学到)，不管多大的数字一旦乘以 0都会化为乌有。历史表明，无论操作者多么聪明，杠杆效应的结果往往是”0”。
Leverage, of course, can be lethal to businesses as well. Companies with large debts often assume that these obligations can be refinanced as they mature. That assumption is usually valid. Occasionally, though, either because of company-specific problems or a worldwide shortage of credit, maturities must actually be met by payment. For that, only cash will do the job.
当然对企业来说，金融杠杆也是致命的。许多负债累累的公司认为债务到期时可以靠继续融资解决，这种假定通常是正常的。可一旦企业本身或者全球信用出现危机，到期债务就必须如约清偿，届时只有现金才靠得住。
Borrowers then learn that credit is like oxygen. When either is abundant, its presence goes unnoticed. When either is missing, that’s all that is noticed. Even a short absence of credit can bring a company to its knees. In September 2008, in fact, its overnight disappearance in many sectors of the economy came dangerously close to bringing our entire country to its knees.
然后，借款人就会明白， 现金就像氧气，供应充沛时，人们甚至不会加以注意。而一旦发生紧缺， 你就会注意到它的重要性。 即使短暂的信贷危机也可能使企业崩溃，事实上， 2008 年 9 月一夜之间席卷多个经济部门的信贷危机使整个美国都濒临崩溃。
Charlie and I have no interest in any activity that could pose the slightest threat to Berkshire’s well-being. (With our having a combined age of 167, starting over is not on our bucket list.) We are forever conscious of the fact that you, our partners, have entrusted us with what in many cases is a major portion of your savings. In addition, important philanthropy is dependent on our prudence. Finally, many disabled victims of accidents caused by our insureds are counting on us to deliver sums payable decades from now. It would be irresponsible for us to risk what all these constituencies need just to pursue a few points of extra return.
查理和我对任何可能给伯克希尔的健康带来丝毫威胁的活动都不感兴趣。 (我们俩加起来已经 167 岁，可不想”从头再来”。 )我们永远铭记在心：你们，也就是我们的合伙人， 将毕生大部分积蓄托付给我们。此外，一些重要的慈善活动也依赖于我们的审慎决定。最后，许多因我们的投保人造成的事故导致致残的受害人，也指望我们未来几十年的提供保险金。如果为了追求额外的一点利润而使这么多人面临风险，那将是不负责任的。
A little personal history may partially explain our extreme aversion to financial adventurism. I didn’t meet Charlie until he was 35, though he grew up within 100 yards of where I have lived for 52 years and also attended the same inner-city public high school in Omaha from which my father, wife, children and two grandchildren graduated. Charlie and I did, however, both work as young boys at my grandfather’s grocery store, though our periods of employment were separated by about five years. My grandfather’s name was Ernest, and perhaps no man was more aptly named. No one worked for Ernest, even as a stock boy, without being shaped by the experience.
我个人的一点历史经历或许可以解释， 为什么我们对任何财务上的冒险主义极度厌恶。我直到查理 35 岁才见到他，尽管他在距离我已经居住了 52 年的房子只有 100 码远，而且我们在奥马哈市区同一所公立高中上学，我的爸爸、妻子、三个孩子和两个孙子也是上了这所高中。 但查理和我都是小男孩的时候， 都在我爷爷的杂货店里打过工。尽管我俩打工的时间相隔 5 年之久。我爷爷的名字是欧内斯特(Ernest)，可能再也没有任何人比他更适合这个名字了。所有为他工作过的人，即使是一个股票男孩，都会受到这段工作经历的重大影响。
On the facing page you can read a letter sent in 1939 by Ernest to his youngest son, my Uncle Fred. Similar letters went to his other four children. I still have the letter sent to my Aunt Alice, which I found — along with $1,000 of cash — when, as executor of her estate, I opened her safe deposit box in 1970.
后面你会看到Ernest 在 1939 年写给他的最小的儿子也就是我的叔叔弗雷德(Fred)的一封信。他另外四个孩子也收到过同样的信。我还保存着爷爷写给我姑姑爱丽丝(Alice)的同样内容的一封信。 1970 年，作为姑姑的遗嘱执行人，我打开了她放在银行的保险箱，发现了爷爷给她的信，信里还有 1000 美元现金。
Ernest never went to business school — he never in fact finished high school — but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival. At Berkshire, we have taken his 10 billion of cash, excluding that held at our regulated utility and railroad businesses. Because of that commitment, we customarily keep at least 3 billion from Katrina, the insurance industry’s most expensive catastrophe) and quickly seize acquisition or investment opportunities, even during times of financial turmoil.
Ernest 从来没有读什么商业院校，事实上他连高中也没有读完，但是他非常明白， 现金作为确保生存前提至关重要。在伯克希尔，我们严格遵循他保留足够现金的原则， 并对他 1000 美元的解决方案进一步推进了一步， 我们承诺，将始终维持最少 100 亿美元的现金储备，为此我们通常会保留最少 200 亿美元现金。 这样我们就可以承受前所未有的保险损失(迄今为止最大的一笔是卡特里娜飓风造成的高达 30 亿美元的保险赔付， 这是保险业最昂贵的一次灾害)， 并能迅速抓住收购或投资机会，即使是金融危机也影响不到我们。
We keep our cash largely in U.S. Treasury bills and avoid other short-term securities yielding a few more basis points, a policy we adhered to long before the frailties of commercial paper and money market funds became apparent in September 2008. We agree with investment writer Ray DeVoe’s observation, “More money has been lost reaching for yield than at the point of a gun.” At Berkshire, we don’t rely on bank lines, and we don’t enter into contracts that could require postings of collateral except for amounts that are tiny in relation to our liquid assets.
我们的现金主要是以美国国债的形式存在，而避免持有利率略高几个基点的其他短期证券。商业债券和货币市场基金的脆弱性在 2008 年 9 月暴露无疑，而我们在此之前就长期坚持上述原则。 我们非常认同投资作家RayDeVoe 的观点： “更多的钱损失在追求盈利上而不是损失在枪口下。 “在伯克希尔公司，我们既不依赖于银行的信用额度，也不会签订需要提供担保的借款合同，除非这些抵押品的规模相对于我们庞大的流动性资产而言微不足道。
Furthermore, not a dime of cash has left Berkshire for dividends or share repurchases during the past 40 years. Instead, we have retained all of our earnings to strengthen our business, a reinforcement now running about 48 million to $157 billion during those four decades and our intrinsic value has grown far more. No other American corporation has come close to building up its financial strength in this unrelenting way.
此外，过去 40 年来伯克希尔从未将现金用于分红或回购股票，我们保留了所有的收益来强化我们的业务，现在月度盈利已超过 10 亿美元。在这 40 年中，我们的股东权益从 4800 万美元增长至 1570 亿美元。我们的内在价值增长的更快。 没有任何一家美国公司能够以这种坚持不懈的方式建立起自己的财务实力。
By being so cautious in respect to leverage, we penalize our returns by a minor amount. Having loads of liquidity, though, lets us sleep well. Moreover, during the episodes of financial chaos that occasionally erupt in our economy, we will be equipped both financially and emotionally to play offense while others scramble for survival. That’s what allowed us to invest $15.6 billion in 25 days of panic following the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008.
由于我们对利用财务杠杆如此谨慎，我们的回报略受影响，但拥有大量现金使我们得以安枕无忧。 此外， 在偶尔爆发的经济危机中， 在其他公司都为生存而挣扎时，我们将拥有充沛资金和精神准备去发动攻势。 2008 年雷曼兄弟破产后市场一片恐慌，而我们得以在 25 天内投资了 156 亿美元。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, April 30th. Carrie Kizer from our home office will be the ringmaster, and her theme this year is Planes, Trains and Automobiles. This gives NetJets, BNSF and BYD a chance to show off.
年会将于 4 月 30 日周六召开。来自总部的 CarrieKizer 将成为主持人，她今年的主题是飞机、火车和汽车，NetJets、 BNSF 和比亚迪将有一个上场的机会。
As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)
同往常一样， Qwest 中心的大门会在早上 7 点准时开放。 8 点半放映一部新的伯克希尔影片。 9 点半直接进入问答环节并持续到下午 3 点半(中午在 Qwest 午餐)。在一个短暂的休息后，我和查理将在 3:45 做会议总结。如果你决定在问答环节离开，请在查理讲话的时候走(但要快，他讲话很简短)。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,053 pairs of Justin boots, 12,416 pounds of See’s candy, 8,000 Dairy Queen Blizzards®and 8,800 Quikut knives (that’s 16 knives per minute). But you can do better. Remember: Anyone who says money can’t buy happiness simply hasn’t learned where to shop.
离开会议的最佳原因当然是购物。我们将在 194300 万平米的相邻大厅里摆满各种伯克希尔子公司的商品。去年大家踊跃购物，销售额破了纪录。在 9 个小时之内，我们出售了 1053 双 Justin 长靴， 12416 磅糖果， 8000个 DQ 暴风雪冰激凌， 8800 把 Quikut 餐刀(相当于每分钟销售 16 把餐刀)。今年大家还可以做的更好。 记住: 那些说金钱买不到幸福的人只是还没有学会在哪里购物。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 保险将设一个展台，有来自全国的优秀顾问为您服务，竭诚为您提供汽车保险建议。 GEICO 保险将给您一个股东折扣(通常是 8%)。我们开展业务的 51 个司法管辖区内的 44 个都允许了这个特别优惠。 (额外提示：这个折扣不可以累积在其他优惠上)把你现在的保险拿来，看看能否再省点钱。我相信你们中至少 50%可以。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry more than 60 books and DVDs, including the Chinese language edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the ever-popular book about my partner. So what if you can’t read Chinese? Just buy a copy and carry it around; it will make you look urbane and erudite. Should you need to ship your book purchases, a shipping service will be available nearby.
一定要光顾书虫书吧。它提供 60 余种书和 DVD，其中包括《穷查理宝典》，这是本我合伙人的畅销书。 不识中文又怎样？只要买一本带在身边，它会让你看起来彬彬有礼、 博学多才。 如果您需要将买的书邮寄回去的话，旁边就有邮递服务。
If you are a big spender — or merely a gawker — visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet.
如果您是一位骨灰级购物狂， 或者只是喜欢到处看看，可以在在周六中午到下午 5 点光顾奥马哈机场东侧的伊里亚特飞机(ElliottAviation)。 NetJet 公司的机队将让您心跳加速。坐车来，乘私人飞机离开。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
本报告随附的代理材料告诉您如何获取参加会议和其它活动的参会凭证。至于航班、酒店和汽车租赁，我们仍将与[American_Express|美国运通]合作，为您提供专门的服务。将一如既往为我们处理相关事务，我知道这很繁杂，在此对她表示感谢。酒店房间可能很难找， 但是通过 Carol 应该能订到。
Airlines have often jacked up prices — sometimes dramatically so — for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive is about 2.5 hours and it may be that you can save significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha.
航空公司经常在伯克希尔周末期间抬高价格，有时会大幅上涨。如果你来自遥远的地方，比较一下飞往堪萨斯城和奥马哈的费用。开车大约需要 2.5小时，这可能会让你节省很多钱，特别是如果你计划在奥马哈租车的话。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year the store did $33.3 million of business during its annual meeting sale, a volume that — as far as I know — exceeds the one-week total of any retail store anyplace. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 26th and Monday, May 2nd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
内布拉斯加家具商场位于 72 街上道奇和太平洋之间，占地 77 英亩，在这里我们将召开”伯克希尔周末”特价促销。去年，该商场在年后期间的销售收入为 3330 万美元，超过一个零售商店一周的销售收入总额。要得到伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 26 日周二到 5 月 2 日周一之间光临并出示参会证。本季特价包括了几个大牌产品，这几个牌子通常是没有任何折扣的，但由于是股东周末，所以有例外。我们感谢他们的支持。内布拉斯加家具店在周一至周六早 10 点到晚 9 点开放，周日是早上 10 点到晚上 6 点。周六下午 5 点半到晚 8 点，内布拉斯加家具店都举行烧烤晚会，邀请所有与会者。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from6p.m.to9p.m.onFriday,April29th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 1st, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. On Sunday, around 1 p.m., I will be at Borsheims with a smile and a shoeshine, selling jewelry just as I sold men’s shirts at J.C. Penney’s 63 years ago. I’ve told Susan Jacques, Borsheims’ CEO, that I’m still a hotshot salesman. But I see doubt in her eyes. So cut loose and buy something from me for your wife or sweetheart (presumably the same person). Make me look good.
在波仙珠宝，我们将再次举办两场股东专场活动。首先将是一个鸡尾酒招待会，在 4 月 29 日周五下午 6 点到晚上 9 点。然后是一个大型售卖活动，在 5 月 1 日周日早上 9 点到下午 4点。周六，我们将开放到下午 6 点。 周日下午 1 点左右，我将面带微笑和擦鞋的态度，在博尔斯海姆卖珠宝，就像 63 年前我在 J.C.Penney’s 卖男式衬衫一样。 波仙将在周末迎来大批顾客。 我已经告诉 Borsheims 的 CEOSusan Jacques，我仍然是一个炙手可热的推销员， 但我从她的眼神中看到了怀疑。所以放开手脚，从我这里买些东西给你的妻子或爱人(大概是同一个人)， 让我看起来宝刀不老。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 25ththrough Saturday, May 7th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire shareholder.
为了您的方便，股东优惠将从 4 月 25 日周一持续到 5 月 7 日周六。在此期间，请出示您的参会卡或者股东证明来享受优惠。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
周日，在波仙外面的大厅，两届美国国际象棋冠军 PatrickWolff 将以一敌六，盲棋应战挑战者。著名的达拉斯魔术师 NormanBeck 将进行精彩表演。 此外，周日下午，我们将邀请 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg 两位世界顶尖的桥牌专家与我们的股东一起玩桥牌。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 1st. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites and — still being a growing boy — I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st( but not before ) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.
Gorat’s 和 Piccolo’s 餐馆将在 5 月 1 日周日开放伯克希尔股东专场，从下午 1 点至晚上 10 点。 Gorat’s 餐馆下午 1 点钟开始营业， Piccolo’s 餐馆下午 4 点开始营业。我在两家都有最爱的菜，作为一个还在长身体的男孩，周日晚上将在这两家餐厅用餐。要在 Gorat’s 订餐，请在 4 月 1 日拨打电话 402-551-3733(但不要提前)， Piccolo’s 电话是 402-342-9038。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com.
今年我们将同样由这三位财经记者主持问答环节，他们将通过电子邮件收集股东的问题，并对我和查理进行提问。这三位记者和他们的电子邮件分别是：财富杂志记者卡 Carol Loomis： cloomis@fortunemail.com； CNBC 记者 Becky Quick： BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；纽约时报记者 Andrew Ross Sorkin：arsorkin@nytimes.com。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any email you send them. (In your email, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
从提交的问题中，每位记者将选择十几个他认为最有趣最重要的问题。 他们表示，如果你的邮件保持简洁明了， 与伯克希尔有关并不超过两个问题，那么你的问题最有可能被选中(请注明是否介意透露姓名)。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it.
查理和我都不会提前得到要问问题的线索。记者们会挑选一些有挑战性的，这正是我们所喜欢的。
We will again have a drawing at 8:15 a.m. on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We hope to answer at least 60 questions. From our standpoint, the more the better. Our goal, which we pursue both through these annual letters and by our meeting discussions, is to give you a better understanding of the business that you own.
我们将在周六 8 点 15 分我们将再次在 13 个麦克中为希望现场提问的股东通过抽签选出问题。在会议上，我将轮流回答记者提的问题和抽中的问题。我们希望能够至少回答 60 个问题。从我们的立场来看，越多越好。每年公布致股东信函和召开年后讨论的目的是让你们更好地理解你所拥有的业务。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. Equally important, however, are the 20 men and women who work with me at our corporate office (all on one floor, which is the way we intend to keep it!).
出于充分的理由，我定期赞美我们运营经理人所取得的成就。但是，同等重要的是那些和我在企业办公室一块工作的 20 名男女同事(我们有意安排所有人在同一个楼层工作)。
This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 14,097-page Federal income tax return along with state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities — and the list goes on and on.
我们的小组高效处理众多的 SEC 和其他监管要求，整理多达 14097 页的联邦所得税申报单、州所得税和外国所得税申报单，回答股东和媒体的无数个询问，编制年度报表，准备召开全美最大的年会，协调董事会活动，等等。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and joyful. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: They deal with 48 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who will send students to Omaha this school year for a day with me and also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers for lunch. No CEO has it better.
他们以令人难以置信的效率开心地处理各种业务任务，让我倍感轻松和愉悦。他们的努力不仅局限于公司，他们还需要同 48 所大学(从 200 所大学中选出)打交道。 这些大学在该学年将选送学生到位于奥马哈，与我共处一天。同时还处理我收到的各种询问，安排我的旅行，甚至给我买汉堡包当午餐。 没有那位 CEO 比这更好。
This home office crew has my deepest thanks and deserves yours as well. Come to our Woodstock for Capitalism on April 30thand tell them so.
我衷心感谢总部办公室全体成员，他们也值得你们的感谢。请在 4 月 30 日来参加为资本家举办的年度伍德斯托克音乐节，并告诉他们这一点。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 26, 2011
Memo
To: Berkshire Hathaway Managers (“The All-Stars”)
cc: Berkshire Directors
From: Warren E. Buffett
Date: July 26, 2010
This is my biennial letter to reemphasize Berkshire’s top priority and to get your help on succession planning (yours, not mine!).
这是我每两年写的一封信，再次强调伯克希尔的首要任务，并希望你们在继任规划方面给予帮助（是你们给我，不是我给你们！）。
The priority is that all of us continue to zealously guard Berkshire’s reputation. We can’t be perfect but we can try to be. As I’ve said in these memos for more than 25 years: “We can afford to lose money — even a lot of money. But we can’t afford to lose reputation — even a shred of reputation.” We must continue to measure every act against not only what is legal but also what we would be happy to have written about on the front page of a national newspaper in an article written by an unfriendly but intelligent reporter.
当务之急是，我们所有人都要继续积极维护伯克希尔的声誉。我们不可能做到完美，但我们可以努力做到。正如我 25 年来一直在备忘录中所说的： “我们可以承受亏损，甚至是巨额亏损。但我们不能失去声誉，哪怕是一丝一毫的声誉”。“我们必须继续衡量每一项行为，不仅要看哪些行为是合法的，还要看哪些行为是我们乐于让一个不友好但聪明的记者在全国性报纸的头版撰文报道的。
Sometimes your associates will say “Everybody else is doing it.” This rationale is almost always a bad one if it is the main justification for a business action. It is totally unacceptable when evaluating a moral decision. Whenever somebody offers that phrase as a rationale, in effect they are saying that they can’t come up with a good reason. If anyone gives this explanation, tell them to try using it with a reporter or a judge and see how far it gets them.
有时，你的同事会说 “别人都在这么做”。如果这是商业行为的主要理由，那么这个理由几乎总是不好的。在评估一项道德决策时，它是完全不可接受的。每当有人用这句话作为理由时，他们实际上是在说，他们想不出一个好的理由。如果有人给出这样的解释，请告诉他们，试着在记者或法官面前使用这种解释，看看能让他们走多远.
If you see anything whose propriety or legality causes you to hesitate, be sure to give me a call. However, it’s very likely that if a given course of action evokes such hesitation, it’s too close to the line and should be abandoned. There’s plenty of money to be made in the center of the court. If it’s questionable whether some action is close to the line, just assume it is outside and forget it.
如果你看到任何事情的适当性或合法性让你犹豫不决，请务必给我打电话。不过，如果某项行动引起了您的犹豫，那很可能是它太接近底线，应该放弃。球场中央有很多钱可以赚。如果对某个动作是否接近底线存在疑问，那就假设它在底线外，然后忘掉它。
As a corollary, let me know promptly if there’s any significant bad news. I can handle bad news but I don’t like to deal with it after it has festered for awhile. A reluctance to face up immediately to bad news is what turned a problem at Salomon from one that could have easily been disposed of into one that almost caused the demise of a firm with 8,000 employees.
因此，如果有任何重大坏消息，请及时告诉我。我可以处理坏消息，但我不喜欢在它发酵一段时间后再处理。正是因为不愿意立即面对坏消息，所罗门公司的问题才从一个可以轻松解决的问题变成了一个几乎导致拥有 8000 名员工的公司倒闭的问题。
Somebody is doing something today at Berkshire that you and I would be unhappy about if we knew of it. That’s inevitable: We now employ more than 250,000 people and the chances of that number getting through the day without any bad behavior occurring is nil. But we can have a huge effect in minimizing such activities by jumping on anything immediately when there is the slightest odor of impropriety. Your attitude on such matters, expressed by behavior as well as words, will be the most important factor in how the culture of your business develops. Culture, more than rule books, determines how an organization behaves.
有人z在伯克希尔公司做的一些事，如果你我知道，一定会很不高兴。这是不可避免的： 我们现在有超过 25 万名员工，这些人每天不发生任何不良行为的可能性微乎其微。但是，如果我们能在发现任何不妥之处时立即采取行动，就能极大地减少此类行为的发生。你在这些问题上的言行态度，将是企业文化发展的最重要因素。文化比规章制度更能决定一个组织的行为方式。
In other respects, talk to me about what is going on as little or as much as you wish. Each of you does a first-class job of running your operation with your own individual style and you don’t need me to help. The only items you need to clear with me are any changes in post-retirement benefits and any unusually large capital expenditures or acquisitions.
在其他方面，你们想跟我谈什么就谈什么。你们每个人都以自己的风格在经营方面做出了一流的成绩，不需要我的帮助。你们唯一需要向我说明的事项是退休后福利的任何变化以及任何异常庞大的资本支出或收购。
I need your help in respect to the question of succession. I’m not looking for any of you to retire and I hope you all live to 100. (In Charlie’s case, 110.) But just in case you don’t, please send me a letter (at home if you wish) giving your recommendation as who should take over tomorrow if you should become incapacitated overnight. These letters will be seen by no one but me unless I’m no longer CEO, in which case my successor will need the information. Please summarize the strengths and weaknesses of your primary candidate as well as any possible alternates you may wish to include. Most of you have participated in this exercise in the past and others have offered your ideas verbally. However, it’s important to me to get a periodic update, and now that we have added so many businesses, I need to have your thoughts in writing rather than trying to carry them around in my memory. Of course, there are a few operations that are run by two or more of you — such as the Blumkins, the Merschmans, the pair at Applied Underwriters, etc. — and in these cases, just forget about this item. Your note can be short, informal, handwritten, etc. Just mark it “Personal for Warren.”
在继承问题上，我需要你们的帮助。我不希望你们中的任何人退休，我希望你们都能活到 100 岁（查理的情况是 110 岁）。但以防万一，请给我寄一封信（如果你们愿意，可以寄到家里），如果你们一夜之间丧失了工作能力，请推荐明天的接班人。这些信除了我之外谁也不会看到，除非我不再担任首席执行官，在这种情况下，我的继任者会需要这些信息。请总结你的主要候选人以及任何可能的候补候选人的优缺点。你们中的大多数人过去都参加过这项工作，其他人也口头提出了自己的想法。不过，定期更新对我来说很重要，现在我们增加了这么多业务，我需要把你们的想法写下来，而不是试图把它们记在我的记忆中。当然，也有一些业务是由你们两个或两个以上的人经营的，比如布卢姆金斯、默施曼夫妇、应用承保人公司的一对夫妇等。— 在这种情况下，就忘掉这一项吧。你的便条可以简短、非正式、手写等。只需注明 “沃伦私人信件 “即可。
Thanks for your help on all of this. And thanks for the way you run your businesses. You make my job easy.
感谢你们在这方面提供的帮助。也感谢你们经营企业的方式。你们让我的工作变得轻松。
WEB/db
P.S. Another minor request: Please turn down all proposals for me to speak, make contributions, intercede with the Gates Foundation, etc. Sometimes these requests for you to act as intermediary will be accompanied by “It can’t hurt to ask.” It will be easier for both of us if you just say “no.” As an added favor, don’t suggest that they instead write or call me. Multiply 76 businesses by the periodic “I think he’ll be interested in this one” and you can understand why it is better to say no firmly and immediately.
附：另一个小小的请求： 请拒绝所有让我发言、捐款、与盖茨基金会交涉等的提议。有时，这些让你充当中间人的请求会伴随着 “问问也无妨”。如果你直接说 “不”，我们双方都会好受些。作为额外的帮助，不要建议他们写信或打电话给我。将 76 项业务乘以 “我想他会对这个感兴趣 “的周期性，你就会明白为什么最好立即坚决地说不。
A letter sent in 1939 by Ernest
Dear Fred & Catherine:
Over a period of a good many years I have known a great many people who at some time or another have suffered in various ways simply because they did not have ready cash. I have known people who have had to sacrifice some of their holdings in order to have money that was necessary at that time.
多年来，我认识了许多人，他们或多或少都曾因为没有现成的现金而遭受过各种苦难。我认识一些人，他们不得不牺牲部分财产，以换取当时所需的资金。
For a good many years your grandfather kept a certain amount of money where he could put his hands on it in very short notice.
多年来，你祖父一直把一定数量的钱放在他可以在很短时间内拿到手的地方。
For a number of years I have made it a point to keep a reserve, should some occasion come up where I would need money quickly, without disturbing the money that I have in my business. There have been a couple occasions when I found it very convenient to go to this fund.
多年来，我一直坚持保留一笔备用金，以备不时之需。有几次，我发现动用这笔资金非常方便。
Thus, I feel that everyone should have a reserve. I hope it never happens to you, but the chances are that some day you will need money, and need it badly, and with this thought in view, I started a fund by placing 1000,00 in the fund.
因此，我觉得每个人都应该有一笔储备金。我希望这种情况永远不会发生在你身上，但很有可能有一天你会需要钱，而且会非常需要。有鉴于此，我在你结婚的时候，在一个信封里放了 200 美元，写上了你的名字，成立了一个基金。每年我都会往里面添加一些东西，直到现在基金里已经有了 1000 美元。
Ten years have elapsed since you were married, and this fund is now completed.
自你们结婚以来，十年已经过去，这笔基金现在已经完成。
It is my wish that you place this envelope in your safety deposit box, and keep it for the purpose that it was created, for. Should the time come when you need part, I would suggest that you use as little as possible, and replace it as soon as possible.
我希望你把这个信封放在你的保险箱里，保留它的用途。如果有一天你需要用到它的一部分，我建议你尽量少用，并尽快更换。
You might feel that this should be invested and bring you an income. Forget it — the mental satisfaction of having $1000.00 laid away where you can put your hands on it, is worth more than what interest it might bring, especially if you have the investment in something that you could not realize on quickly.
你可能觉得这笔钱应该用来投资，给你带来收入。算了吧—把 1000 美元存放在你可以动用的地方，这种精神上的满足感比它可能带来的利息更有价值，尤其是如果你投资的东西不能很快变现的话。
If in after years you feel this has been a good idea, you might repeat it with your own children.
如果多年后您觉得这是个好主意，您可以对自己的孩子重复这样做。
For your information, I might mention that there has never been a Buffett who ever left a very large estate, but there has never been one that did not loave something. They never spent all they made, but always saved part of what they made, and it has all worked out pretty well.
This letter is being written at the expiration of ten years after you were married.
这封信是在你们结婚十年后写的。
Ernest Buffett
Dad
Footnotes
-
All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. ↩