原文信息：
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Relative Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 10.0 | 13.8 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (11.7) | 32.0 |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 30.9 | (19.9) |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | (8.4) | 24.6 |
| 1970 | 12.0 | 3.9 | 8.1 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 1.8 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 2.8 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (14.8) | 19.5 |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (26.4) | 31.9 |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 37.2 | (15.3) |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 23.6 | 35.7 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | (7.4) | 39.3 |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 6.4 | 17.6 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 18.2 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.3 | (13.0) |
| 1981 | 31.4 | (5.0) | 36.4 |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 21.4 | 18.6 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 9.9 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 7.5 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 31.6 | 16.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 18.6 | 7.5 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 14.4 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 3.5 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 31.7 | 12.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (3.1) | 10.5 |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 30.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 7.6 | 12.7 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 10.1 | 4.2 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 12.6 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 5.5 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 23.0 | 8.8 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 33.4 | 0.7 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 28.6 | 19.7 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | 21.0 | (20.5) |
| 2000 | 6.5 | (9.1) | 15.6 |
| 2001 | (6.2) | (11.9) | 5.7 |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (22.1) | 32.1 |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 28.7 | (7.7) |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 10.9 | (0.4) |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 1.5 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 15.8 | 2.6 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (37.0) | 27.4 |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 26.5 | (6.7) |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2009 | 20.3% | 9.3% | 11.0 |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2009 | 434,057% | 5,430% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our gain in net worth during 2009 was 19 to $84,487, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.1
公司 2009 年的账面价值增加 218 亿美元，A/B 股每股的账面价值增长了 19.8%（标普2.7%），自现任管理层接手的 45 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 84,487 美元，年复合成长率约为 20.3%。
Berkshire’s recent acquisition of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) has added at least 65,000 shareholders to the 500,000 or so already on our books. It’s important to Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and me that all of our owners understand Berkshire’s operations, goals, limitations and culture. In each annual report, consequently, we restate the economic principles that guide us. This year these principles appear on pages 89-94 and I urge all of you — but particularly our new shareholders — to read them. Berkshire has adhered to these principles for decades and will continue to do so long after I’m gone.
公司最近收购了伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路公司（BNSF），这使我们已有的约 50 万名股东至少增加了 6.5 万名。对于我和我的长期合伙人查理芒格而言，最重要的是所有的股东都能了解公司的业务、目标、局限性和文化。因此，在每次的年报中，我们都重述了指导我们的经济原则。我强烈建议所有人尤其是新股东认真阅读这些原则。伯克希尔数十年来都在坚守这些原则，在我不在之后的长时间内会继续坚持。
In this letter we will also review some of the basics of our business, hoping to provide both a freshman orientation session for our BNSF newcomers and a refresher course for Berkshire veterans.
此外，在这封信中我们将回顾基本业务的运营情况，希望为新加入的 BNSF 股东提供专项辅导，老股东也同时复习。
How We Measure Ourselves 我们如何衡量自己
Our metrics for evaluating our managerial performance are displayed on the facing page. From the start, Charlie and I have believed in having a rational and unbending standard for measuring what we have — or have not — accomplished. That keeps us from the temptation of seeing where the arrow of performance lands and then painting the bull’s eye around it.
我们评估管理层绩效的标准刊登在首页。查理和我一开始就认为，要有一个理性和坚定的标准来衡量我们完成和未完成的工作。这让我们避免看到业绩之箭落在何处然后在其周围画上靶心。
Selecting the S&P 500 as our bogey was an easy choice because our shareholders, at virtually no cost, can match its performance by holding an index fund. Why should they pay us for merely duplicating that result?
将标普 500 指数作为我们的基准是一个很容易的选择，因为我们的股东持有指数基金几乎不费什么代价就能实现这样的业绩。那么，他们有什么理由为我们仅仅创造同样绩效而给我们付钱？
A more difficult decision for us was how to measure the progress of Berkshire versus the S&P. There are good arguments for simply using the change in our stock price. Over an extended period of time, in fact, that is the best test. But year-to-year market prices can be extraordinarily erratic. Even evaluations covering as long as a decade can be greatly distorted by foolishly high or low prices at the beginning or end of the measurement period. Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.2
对于我们而言，难度更大的决定是如何衡量伯克希尔相比标普 500 指数的进步。简单的使用股价变化来衡量也有充分的理由。实际上，在一段较长时间内股价是最好的考验。不过，每一年的市场价格可能会极其不稳定，即使涵盖时间长达 10 年的评估，也可能因衡量期间开始和结束时愚蠢的高价或低价而极大扭曲。微软的史蒂夫点·鲍尔默（Steve Ballmer）和通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特（Jeff Immelt）对此就有体会，他们在接掌这些企业时，就遭遇了高得吓人的股票交易价格下跌的过程。2
The ideal standard for measuring our yearly progress would be the change in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. Alas, that value cannot be calculated with anything close to precision, so we instead use a crude proxy for it: per-share book value. Relying on this yardstick has its shortcomings, which we discuss on pages 92 and 93. Additionally, book value at most companies understates intrinsic value, and that is certainly the case at Berkshire. In aggregate, our businesses are worth considerably more than the values at which they are carried on our books. In our all-important insurance business, moreover, the difference is huge. Even so, Charlie and I believe that our book value — understated though it is — supplies the most useful tracking device for changes in intrinsic value. By this measurement, as the opening paragraph of this letter states, our book value since the start of fiscal 1965 has grown at a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.
衡量我们年度进展的理想标准或许是伯克希尔每股内在价值的变动，奈何这一价值难以用精确的方法计算，所以我们使用了一个粗略的替代标准：每股的账面价值。依靠这一标准有其自身的缺点，我们在后文对此进行了讨论。此外，大多数企业股票的账面价值都低估了内在价值，在伯克希尔当然也是如此。总的说来，我们企业的内在价值远高于其账面价值，而且在我们最重要的保险业务中差额巨大。即使如此，查理和我认为，我们的账面价值（虽然被低估），是追踪内在价值变动的最有力工具。运用这种衡量标准，正如本封信开篇一段所言，自 1965 财年以来，伯克希尔账面价值年复合增长率达 20.3%。
We should note that had we instead chosen market prices as our yardstick, Berkshire’s results would look better, showing a gain since the start of fiscal 1965 of 22% compounded annually. Surprisingly, this modest difference in annual compounding rate leads to an 801,516% market-value gain for the entire 45-year period compared to the book-value gain of 434,057% (shown on page 2). Our market gain is better because in 1965 Berkshire shares sold at an appropriate discount to the book value of its underearning textile assets, whereas today Berkshire shares regularly sell at a premium to the accounting values of its first-class businesses.
我们应该注意到，如果选用股价作为我们的衡量标准，伯克希尔的业绩看起来会更好，自 1965 财年年初以来的年复合增长率达到 22%。令人惊讶的是，年复合增长率的这一温和差额，导致 45 年间，市场价值增长 801,516%，而账面价值的增长 434,057%。市值增长更高是因为，在 1965 年，伯克希尔股票以盈利不佳的纺织资产账面价值的适当折扣出售，而如今，伯克希尔股票一般以其一流业务的账面价值溢价出售。
Summed up, the table on page 2 conveys three messages, two positive and one hugely negative. First, we have never had any five-year period beginning with 1965-69 and ending with 2005-09 — and there have been 41 of these — during which our gain in book value did not exceed the S&P’s gain. Second, though we have lagged the S&P in some years that were positive for the market, we have consistently done better than the S&P in the eleven years during which it delivered negative results. In other words, our defense has been better than our offense, and that’s likely to continue.
总之，业绩表格传达了三个信息，其中两个为正面信息和另一个极为负面。首先，在从 1965-1969 年开始、至 2005-2009 年结束的 41 个五年期内，我们账面价值的增速都超过了标普 500 指数的增速；其次，虽然我们在市场向好的几年中落后于标普 500 指数，但在市场不利的年份，我们一直优于指数。换言之，我们的防守要好于进攻，这种情况很可能会持续下去。
The big minus is that our performance advantage has shrunk dramatically as our size has grown, an unpleasant trend that is certain to continue. To be sure, Berkshire has many outstanding businesses and a cadre of truly great managers, operating within an unusual corporate culture that lets them maximize their talents. Charlie and I believe these factors will continue to produce better-than-average results over time. But huge sums forge their own anchor and our future advantage, if any, will be a small fraction of our historical edge.
最大的负面因素是，随着公司规模增长，我们的业绩优势大幅减少，这一令人不快的趋势肯定会持续下去。可以肯定的是，伯克希尔拥有许多出众的业务和一批真正优秀的经理人，并以一种不同寻常的企业文化运营，使他们能够最大限度发挥自己的才干。查理和我相信，这些因素随着时间的推移将继续创造好于平均水平的业绩。但是，巨大的资金规模已经形成沉重的锚，而我们未来的优势（如果有的话），将只是我们过去优势的一小部分。
What We Don’t Do 我们有所不为
Long ago, Charlie laid out his strongest ambition: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” That bit of wisdom was inspired by Jacobi, the great Prussian mathematician, who counseled “Invert, always invert” as an aid to solving difficult problems. (I can report as well that this inversion approach works on a less lofty level: Sing a country song in reverse, and you will quickly recover your car, house and wife.)
很久以前，查理制订了自己最远大的雄心：“我只想知道我将死在哪里，那么我就绝不会去那个地方”。这些智慧受到了伟大的普鲁士数学家雅各比的启发，他建议“反向一直反向”，以帮助解决难题。（我也可以说，这种反向方法在一个不那么崇高的层面上也会起作用：倒唱一首乡村歌曲，你会很快找回房子、车子和妻子。）
Here are a few examples of how we apply Charlie’s thinking at Berkshire:
以下是我们如何在伯克希尔应用查理的思想的几个例子：
- Charlie and I avoid businesses whose futures we can’t evaluate, no matter how exciting their products may be. In the past, it required no brilliance for people to foresee the fabulous growth that awaited such industries as autos (in 1910), aircraft (in 1930) and television sets (in 1950). But the future then also included competitive dynamics that would decimate almost all of the companies entering those industries. Even the survivors tended to come away bleeding.
- 查理和我避开那些我们不能评估其未来的业务，无论他们的产品有多么令人兴奋。在过去，人们不需要什么智慧就能预见到汽车（1910年）飞机（1930年）和电视机（1950年）等行业的惊人增长。但未来，还包括各方面的动态竞争，几乎所有进军这些行业的公司将被竞争摧毁，即使是幸存者也常常是遍体鳞伤地离开。
Just because Charlie and I can clearly see dramatic growth ahead for an industry does not mean we can judge what its profit margins and returns on capital will be as a host of competitors battle for supremacy. At Berkshire we will stick with businesses whose profit picture for decades to come seems reasonably predictable. Even then, we will make plenty of mistakes.
在众多的竞争对手争夺霸主地位的情况下，即使查理和我能够明确预见某个行业未来会有巨大的增长，那也不代表我们能够判断其利润率和资本回报会是多少。在伯克希尔，我们将坚持从事其未来数十年的利润似乎可以合理预测的行业。即使如此，我们还是会犯下许多错误。
- We will never become dependent on the kindness of strangers. Too-big-to-fail is not a fallback position at Berkshire. Instead, we will always arrange our affairs so that any requirements for cash we may conceivably have will be dwarfed by our own liquidity. Moreover, that liquidity will be constantly refreshed by a gusher of earnings from our many and diverse businesses.
- 我们永远不会依赖陌生人的善举。“大到不能倒”不会是伯克希尔的退路。相反，我们总是安排我们的事务，以使我们自己的流动资金能够满足任何我们可以想象到的现金需求。此外，我们众多且多元化的业务带来的大量收益，将不断注入新的流动性。
When the financial system went into cardiac arrest in September 2008, Berkshire was a supplier of liquidity and capital to the system, not a supplicant. At the very peak of the crisis, we poured 9 billion went to bolster capital at three highly-regarded and previously-secure American businesses that needed — without delay — our tangible vote of confidence. The remaining $6.5 billion satisfied our commitment to help fund the purchase of Wrigley, a deal that was completed without pause while, elsewhere, panic reigned.
2008 年 9 月，当金融体系陷入瘫痪之时，伯克希尔是该体系流动性和资本的提供者，而不是求助者。在危机顶峰时期，我们向企业界投入了 155 亿美元，否则这些企业可能只能向联邦政府求助。其中，90 亿美元投入了三家倍受尊敬、以前均安全的美国企业以提高它们的资本金，这些企业刻不容缓需要我们投出无形的信任票。其余的 65 亿美元满足了我们为收购绿箭提供资金的承诺，这桩交易在其他交易充满恐慌时顺畅完成。
We pay a steep price to maintain our premier financial strength. The $20 billion-plus of cash-equivalent assets that we customarily hold is earning a pittance at present. But we sleep well.
为保持一流的财务实力，我们付出了极高的代价。我们通常持有 200 多亿美元的类现金资产收益微薄，但是，我们睡得安稳。
- We tend to let our many subsidiaries operate on their own, without our supervising and monitoring them to any degree. That means we are sometimes late in spotting management problems and that both operating and capital decisions are occasionally made with which Charlie and I would have disagreed had we been consulted. Most of our managers, however, use the independence we grant them magnificently, rewarding our confidence by maintaining an owner-oriented attitude that is invaluable and too seldom found in huge organizations. We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too slowly — or not at all — because of a stifling bureaucracy.
- 我们倾向于让我们的子公司自主经营，我们不会实行任何程度的监督和监视。这意味着我们有时会很晚才发现管理的问题，有时他们的运营和资本方面的决策，如果咨询我和查理的意见，我们可能会不同意。然而，我们大多数经理人都很好运用了我们授予的自主权，保持着一种在大型机构鲜见的、以股东为导向的珍贵态度，来回报我们的信任。我们宁愿承受一些糟糕决策造成的可见成本，也不愿承担由于僵化的官僚作风而导致的决策迟缓（或者根本没有决策）带来的大量无形代价。
With our acquisition of BNSF, we now have about 257,000 employees and literally hundreds of different operating units. We hope to have many more of each. But we will never allow Berkshire to become some monolith that is overrun with committees, budget presentations and multiple layers of management. Instead, we plan to operate as a collection of separately-managed medium-sized and large businesses, most of whose decision-making occurs at the operating level. Charlie and I will limit ourselves to allocating capital, controlling enterprise risk, choosing managers and setting their compensation.
收购BNSF之后，我们现在拥有 25.7 万名员工和数百家运营单位。我们希望增加这两方的数量，但绝不允许伯克希尔成为一个充满各种委员会、预算报告和多级管理层的庞然大物。相反，我们计划以一批单独管理的中型和大型企业集团的方式运营，这些企业的大多数决策都在运营层做出。查理和我将把自己的角色限于资本配置、控制企业风险、挑选经理人和制定他们的薪酬。
- We make no attempt to woo Wall Street. Investors who buy and sell based upon media or analyst commentary are not for us. Instead we want partners who join us at Berkshire because they wish to make a long-term investment in a business they themselves understand and because it’s one that follows policies with which they concur. If Charlie and I were to go into a small venture with a few partners, we would seek individuals in sync with us, knowing that common goals and a shared destiny make for a happy business “marriage” between owners and managers. Scaling up to giant size doesn’t change that truth.
- 我们没有试图去讨好华尔街。基于媒体或分析师评论进行交易的投资者不是我们的目标，相反，我们希望加入伯克希尔的合作伙伴是因为，他们希望对自身理解的企业进行长期投资、并认同这个企业所遵循的原则。假如查理和我要与一些合作伙伴加入一家小企业，我们会寻找与我们志同道合的人，因为我们知道共同的目标和命运会让股东和经理人之间建立一个幸福的”商业婚姻”。就算扩展到大规模的投资也不会改变这一事实。
To build a compatible shareholder population, we try to communicate with our owners directly and informatively. Our goal is to tell you what we would like to know if our positions were reversed. Additionally, we try to post our quarterly and annual financial information on the Internet early on weekends, thereby giving you and other investors plenty of time during a non-trading period to digest just what has happened at our multi-faceted enterprise. (Occasionally, SEC deadlines force a non-Friday disclosure.) These matters simply can’t be adequately summarized in a few paragraphs, nor do they lend themselves to the kind of catchy headline that journalists sometimes seek.
为了建立一个和谐的股东群体，我们努力与股东进行直接和有效的沟通。我们的目标是告诉你，如果我们的角色互换我们想要知道什么。此外，我们会在周末一早把季度和年度财务信息公布在网上，从而在非交易时段给予你和其他投资者充足的时间，来消化我们多元化企业发生的事情。（有时SEC最后期限会强制在非周五披露。）短短数段不能充分概况这些问题，也不足成为新闻记者寻求的那种夺人眼球的新闻标题。
Last year we saw, in one instance, how sound-bite reporting can go wrong. Among the 12,830 words in the annual letter was this sentence: “We are certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 — and probably well beyond — but that conclusion does not tell us whether the market will rise or fall.” Many news organizations reported — indeed, blared — the first part of the sentence while making no mention whatsoever of its ending. I regard this as terrible journalism: Misinformed readers or viewers may well have thought that Charlie and I were forecasting bad things for the stock market, though we had not only in that sentence, but also elsewhere, made it clear we weren’t predicting the market at all. Any investors who were misled by the sensationalists paid a big price: The Dow closed the day of the letter at 7,063 and finished the year at 10,428.
在去年我们一个例子中看到原文摘要是如何出问题的。在长约 12,830 个字的年度信中有这么一句话：“例如，我们确信整个 2009 年甚至更久以后，经济环境仍将艰难，但是这一结论并不能告诉我们市场是涨是跌”。许多新闻机构报道了（实际上是大肆宣扬）这句话的前半部分，而对后半部分只字不提。我认为这是可怕的新闻报道，受到误导的读者或观众很可能会认为查理和我在预测股市会出现糟糕状况，虽然我们不仅在这句话中还在其它地方清楚的表示，我们根本不是在预测股市。任何被这些耸人听闻的新闻所误导的投资者都付出了巨大代价，道琼斯指数在这封信公布之日以 7,063 点收盘，而在年末收于 10,428 点。
Given a few experiences we’ve had like that, you can understand why I prefer that our communications with you remain as direct and unabridged as possible.
考虑到我们有过类似的经历，你会明白为什么我更希望我们与你之间的沟通尽可能地直接和完整。
Let’s move to the specifics of Berkshire’s operations. We have four major operating sectors, each differing from the others in balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is standard in financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
让我们谈谈伯克希尔公司运营的细节。我们有四大业务部分，每一部门的资产负债表和营收帐目都各具特色。如果按照财务报告标准做法把它们混杂在一起会妨碍分析。因此，我们会把它们分为四个独立业务进行展示，这也是查理和我看待它们的方式。
Insurance 保险业务
Our property-casualty (P/C) insurance business has been the engine behind Berkshire’s growth and will continue to be. It has worked wonders for us. We carry our P/C companies on our books at $15.5 billion more than their net tangible assets, an amount lodged in our “Goodwill” account. These companies, however, are worth far more than their carrying value — and the following look at the economic model of the P/C industry will tell you why.
我们的财产险业务一直是公司的增长引擎，它为我们取得了惊人的成绩，并在未来的时间里继续充当这一角色。当前财产险公司帐面价值超过其有形资产净额 155 亿美元，这是我们商誉科目中的金额。当然，通过我下面对财产险领域经济模式特点的解释可以了解到，这些公司的价值要远远超过其帐面价值。
Insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves us holding large sums — money we call “float” — that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, we get to invest this float for Berkshire’s benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float we hold remains remarkably stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.
保险公司运营模式的突出特点即预先收取保费而滞后支付客户索赔。在一些极端情况下，如一些企业工人的事故赔偿，赔偿期甚至长达几十年之久。这种先收后付的模式使得我们能够得以持有大量资金，我们称之为“浮存金”。尽管这部分资本最终将会流向客户，但同时，我们能够利用这部分资金进行投资并为伯克希尔带来利润。尽管不断有保单及索赔进进出出，但我们所持有的浮存金规模相对于保费收入仍基本保持稳定。因此，随着我们业务的增长，浮存金也会越来越多。
If premiums exceed the total of expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income produced from the float. This combination allows us to enjoy the use of free money — and, better yet, get paid for holding it. Alas, the hope of this happy result attracts intense competition, so vigorous in most years as to cause the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Usually this cost is fairly low, but in some catastrophe-ridden years the cost from underwriting losses more than eats up the income derived from use of float.
如果保费收入超过了最终赔偿及运营费用支出总额，那么我们除浮存金的投资收益外，还获得了承保收益。这种组合为我们提供了使用免费资金的机会，更有利的是，我们甚至还因为持有免费资金而获得了报酬。当然，期望这一理想的结果也产生了激烈的行业竞争，在大多数年份里，这种竞争使得整个财产险行业的承保严重亏损。事实上，承保亏损正是该行业为其获得浮存金所付出的代价。通常这一成本并不高，但在一些灾难频发的年份中，承保损失的成本会超过其浮存金带来的投资收益。
In my perhaps biased view, Berkshire has the best large insurance operation in the world. And I will absolutely state that we have the best managers. Our float has grown from 62 billion at the end of 2009. Moreover, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for seven consecutive years. I believe it likely that we will continue to underwrite profitably in most — though certainly not all — future years. If we do so, our float will be cost-free, much as if someone deposited $62 billion with us that we could invest for our own benefit without the payment of interest.
在我看来，伯克希尔拥有全球最好的大型保险运营机构，这或许有失偏颇，但我绝对会说，我们拥有世界上最好的经理人。自 1967 年进入保险领域至 2009 年底，我们的浮存金从当时的 1600 万美元上升至 620 亿美元。此外，我们的运营已连续 7 年实现了承保盈利。我很有信心，在未来的大部分年份里，我们也将能保持承保盈利的骄人局面（当然不是所有年份）。如果是这样，那么我们的浮存金将是免费的。就像有人向我们存入 620 亿美元的存款，我们可以在不必支付利息的情况下，使用这些资金进行投资为我们带来利润。
Let me emphasize again that cost-free float is not a result to be expected for the P/C industry as a whole: In most years, premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses. Consequently, the industry’s overall return on tangible equity has for many decades fallen far short of that achieved by the S&P 500. Outstanding economics exist at Berkshire only because we have some outstanding managers running some unusual businesses. Our insurance CEOs deserve your thanks, having added many billions of dollars to Berkshire’s value. It’s a pleasure for me to tell you about these all-stars.
让我再次强调，无成本浮存金并不是整个财产险行业的普遍现象，在大多数年份，保费并不足以支付客户索赔及公司运营费用。因此，数十年来该行业的有形资产回报率远远低于标普 500 指数，伯克希尔之所以取得骄人的成绩，仅仅是因为我们拥有众多出色的经理人在经营那些非比寻常的业务。我们保险公司的那些 CEO 们理应得到你们的感谢，是他们使得伯克希尔的价值增加了数十亿美元。在此，我很荣幸向大家介绍这些明星 CEO 们：
Let’s start at GEICO, which is known to all of you because of its $800 million annual advertising budget (close to twice that of the runner-up advertiser in the auto insurance field). GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18. Now 66, Tony still tap-dances to the office every day, just as I do at 79. We both feel lucky to work at a business we love.
让我们从 GEICO 保险公司开始，它因为每年 8 亿美元的广告宣传预算而为大家所熟知，这几乎是汽车险领域第二名广告费用的两倍。GEICO 首席执行官托尼·莱斯利（TonyNicely）18 岁进入公司工作，现年已经 66 岁的托尼仍然每天跳着踢踏舞来上班，正如我在 79 岁时所做的一样。我们都为从事自己热爱的事业而感到幸运。
GEICO’s customers have warm feelings toward the company as well. Here’s proof: Since Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its market share has increased from 2.5% to 8.1%, a gain reflecting the net addition of seven million policyholders. Perhaps they contacted us because they thought our gecko was cute, but they bought from us to save important money. (Maybe you can as well; call 1-800-847-7536 or go to http://www.GEICO.com.) And they’ve stayed with us because they like our service as well as our price.
GEICO 的客户同样对公司也有着温暖的感觉。自伯克希尔 1996 年接手 GEICO 以来，其市场占有率由 2.5% 上升到了 8.1%，投保人净增加 700 万。他们或许是因为我们的壁虎形象可爱而与我们取得联系，但他们最终选择了从我们这里购买保险则是为了省钱。他们对我们服务与价格的肯定而成为了我们稳定的客户。（也许你也可以，请拨打 1-800-847-7536 或访问 www.GEICO.com）
Berkshire acquired GEICO in two stages. In 1976-80 we bought about one-third of the company’s stock for 2.3 billion in cash, about 50 times the cost of our original purchase.
伯克希尔分两个阶段完成了对 GEICO 的收购。1976-1980 年，我们出资 4700 万美元购买了 GEICO 约三分之一的股份，多年了，GEICO 大量回购股票使得我们的份额增长至 50% 左右。1996年 1 月 2 日，我们再次以 23 亿美元现金的形式购买了 GEICO 剩余的 50% 股份，这一价格大概是我们最初购买价格的 50 倍。
An old Wall Street joke gets close to our experience:
华尔街流行的一个老笑话很好地诠释了我们这段经历：
Customer: Thanks for putting me in XYZ stock at 5. I hear it’s up to 18.
客户：“很感谢你帮助我以 5美元的价格买进了 XYZ 股票，我听说现在它已经涨到 18 美元了。”
Broker: Yes, and that’s just the beginning. In fact, the company is doing so well now, that it’s an even better buy at 18 than it was when you made your purchase.
经纪人：“是的，这才刚刚开始呢。事实上，由于该公司表现强劲，相比 5 美元时，现在在 18 美元买进甚至会更好。”
Customer: Damn, I knew I should have waited.
客户：“见鬼。我就知道我应该再等等的。”
GEICO’s growth may slow in 2010. U.S. vehicle registrations are actually down because of slumping auto sales. Moreover, high unemployment is causing a growing number of drivers to go uninsured. (That’s illegal almost everywhere, but if you’ve lost your job and still want to drive.. .) Our “low-cost producer” status, however, is sure to give us significant gains in the future. In 1995, GEICO was the country’s sixth largest auto insurer; now we are number three. The company’s float has grown from 9.6 billion. Equally important, GEICO has operated at an underwriting profit in 13 of the 14 years Berkshire has owned it.
GEICO 的增长在 2010 年可能会有所减缓。由于汽车销售量的下滑，美国车辆登记数目实际上也在下降，此外，高失业率使得越来越多的司机没有买保险（这几乎在任何地方都是违法的，但如果你失业了还想开车‧‧‧‧‧‧），然而我们“低成本生产商”的地位无疑会在未来给我们带来可观的业务。1995 年，GEICO 是全美第六大汽车保险公司，而现在我们排名第三。企业的浮存金也由 27 亿美元上涨至 96 亿美元。同样重要的是，GEICO 在伯克希尔管理的 14 年里，其中的 13 年均实现了承保盈利。
I became excited about GEICO in January 1951, when I first visited the company as a 20-year-old student. Thanks to Tony, I’m even more excited today.
1951 年 1 月，当时我还是一名 20 岁的学生，第一次访问 GEICO 我就对它产生兴趣，多亏了托尼，我今天对 GEICO 更加兴奋了。
A hugely important event in Berkshire’s history occurred on a Saturday in 1985. Ajit Jain came into our office in Omaha — and I immediately knew we had found a superstar. (He had been discovered by Mike Goldberg, now elevated to St. Mike.)
在 1985 年的一个周六，伯克希尔历史上发生了一项重大事件，在阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain）进入我办公室的那一刻，我立即意识到我们找到了一个超级明星（他是被 Mike Goldberg 挖来，现在被提升为 St.Mike ）。
We immediately put Ajit in charge of National Indemnity’s small and struggling reinsurance operation. Over the years, he has built this business into a one-of-a-kind giant in the insurance world.
我们立即让阿吉特负责运营国民保险的小型而艰难的再保险业务。多年来，他把该业务发展成为保险领域第一无二的巨头。
Staffed today by only 30 people, Ajit’s operation has set records for transaction size in several areas of insurance. Ajit writes billion-dollar limits — and then keeps every dime of the risk instead of laying it off with other insurers. Three years ago, he took over huge liabilities from Lloyds, allowing it to clean up its relationship with 27,972 participants (“names”) who had written problem-ridden policies that at one point threatened the survival of this 322-year-old institution. The premium for that single contract was 50 billion of premium for us over the next 50 or so years.
如今，阿吉特仅有 30 名员工，但其业务在许多保险领域都创下了交易额新高。阿吉特签下数十亿美元的风险上限，然后保留了每一分的风险，而不是分保给其它保险公司。三年前，他接手了 Lloyds 保险协会的巨额债务，参与清理与 27,927 名参与者当年签下无数问题重重的保单，这些保单一度威胁到这家拥有 322 年历史的保险机构的生存。仅这一份合同的交易金额就达到了 71 亿美元。2009 年中，他谈成的一项人寿保险再保险合同将在未来 50 年左右的时间里为我们带来 500 亿美元的保险费。
Ajit’s business is just the opposite of GEICO’s. At that company, we have millions of small policies that largely renew year after year. Ajit writes relatively few policies, and the mix changes significantly from year to year. Throughout the world, he is known as the man to call when something both very large and unusual needs to be insured.
阿吉特的业务特点正好与 GEICO 相反。在 GEICO，我们拥有数百万的小额保单年复一年地被更新。然而阿吉特签定的保单数量很少，而且每年的保单都会发生巨大变化。在全球范围内，阿吉特是人们在寻求为巨大而非同寻常的事物购买保险时，就会打电话的人。
If Charlie, I and Ajit are ever in a sinking boat — and you can only save one of us — swim to Ajit.
如果有一天，查理、阿吉特和我共在一条正在下沉的船上，而我们当中只有一人能获救的话，那么就救阿吉特吧。
Our third insurance powerhouse is General Re. Some years back this operation was troubled; now it is a gleaming jewel in our insurance crown.
我们第三家保险公司是通用再保险。几年前，这家企业还处在困境之中，而如今，它却是我们保险领域里一块闪闪发光的宝石。
Under the leadership of Tad Montross, General Re had an outstanding underwriting year in 2009, while also delivering us unusually large amounts of float per dollar of premium volume. Alongside General Re’s P/C business, Tad and his associates have developed a major life reinsurance operation that has grown increasingly valuable.
在泰德·蒙特罗斯（Tad Montross）领导下，通用再保险在 2009 年完成了出色的承保业绩，并且为我们在每美元保费收入中提供了罕有的大笔浮存金。除了财产险业务，泰德和他的伙伴们还开发了人寿再保险险业务，其价值日益增长。
Last year General Re finally attained 100% ownership of Cologne Re, which since 1995 has been a key — though only partially-owned — part of our presence around the world. Tad and I will be visiting Cologne in September to thank its managers for their important contribution to Berkshire.
去年，通用再保险终于拥有科隆再保险全部 100% 的股份。自 1995 年以来，科隆再保险一直是我们在世界各地业务的一部分，尽管只是部分拥有。泰德和我今年 9 月将前往科隆，去向那些经理人为伯克希尔所做出的突出贡献表示感谢。
Finally, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them specializing in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, their results have consistently been profitable and, as the table below shows, the float they provide us is substantial. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
最后，我们还拥有一些规模较小的保险公司，他们中的大部分都专攻保险业中某个不常见的特殊领域。总的说来，他们业绩一直都是盈利的。从下面的数据中可以看出，这些小型保险公司一直为我们提供可观的浮存金。查理和我十分重视和感谢这些企业以及他们优秀的经理人。
Here is the record of all four segments of our property-casualty and life insurance businesses:
下面是我们财产险和人寿险业务四个构成部分的主要业绩：
| Insurance Operations | Underwriting Profit 2009 (in millions) | Underwriting Profit 2008 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2009 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2008 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Re | $ 477 | $ 342 | $ 21,014 | $ 21,074 |
| BH Reinsurance | 349 | 1,324 | 26,223 | 24,221 |
| GEICO | 649 | 916 | 9,613 | 8,454 |
| Other Primary | 84 | 210 | 5,061 | 4,739 |
| $ 1,559 | $ 2,792 | $ 61,911 | $ 58,488 |
And now a painful confession: Last year your chairman closed the book on a very expensive business fiasco entirely of his own making.
最后，是我的一项忏悔。去年，你们的董事长结束了一项完全由他自己造成的成本昂贵的商业惨败。
For many years I had struggled to think of side products that we could offer our millions of loyal GEICO customers. Unfortunately, I finally succeeded, coming up with a brilliant insight that we should market our own credit card. I reasoned that GEICO policyholders were likely to be good credit risks and, assuming we offered an attractive card, would likely favor us with their business. We got business all right — but of the wrong type.
多年来，我一直在思考为数百万忠诚的 GEICO 客户提供一些附加产品，不幸的是，我终于想到了一个绝妙的主意，向客户推销我们自己的信用卡。我推测 GEICO 的投保人极有可能拥有良好的信用风险，假如我们发行了具有吸引力的信用卡，他们可能会更青睐我们的业务。遗憾的是，我们的方向是正确的，但形式却是错误的。
Our pre-tax losses from credit-card operations came to about 98 million portfolio of troubled receivables for 55¢ on the dollar, losing an additional $44 million.
在我觉醒之前，我们在信用卡税前损失约为 630 万美元，然后，我们以 55 折出售了 9,800 万美元的不良应收账款组合，损失了 4,400 万美元。
GEICO’s managers, it should be emphasized, were never enthusiastic about my idea. They warned me that instead of getting the cream of GEICO’s customers we would get the ----- well, let’s call it the non-cream. I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.3
值得强调的是，GEICO 的经理们始终没有对我的想法产生兴趣，他们提醒我说，我们不会从 GEICO 客户身上揩到油水，而是会得到（坏账），我称之为非奶油。我婉转的指出，我更老一些，也更有智慧。3
I was just older.
其实我只是更老一些罢了。
Regulated Utility Business 公用事业业务
Berkshire has an 89.5% interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 725,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
伯克希尔拥有中美能源控股公司 89.5% 的股份，后者在公用事业方面业务广泛，其中主要包括：（1）约克郡电力与北方电力公司（Yorkshire Electricity,Northern Electric），拥有 380 万电力用户，为英国第三大的电力分销商；（2）中美能源（MidAmerican Energy），在爱荷华州拥有 72.5 万电力用户；（3）太平洋电力与洛基山电力公司（Pacific Power,Rocky Mountain Power），在美西 6 州拥有 170 万电力用户；（4）科恩河与北方天然管道公司（Kern River,Northern Natural pipelines），供应全美 8% 的天然气消耗量。
MidAmerican has two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. In addition, my long-time friend, Walter Scott, along with his family, has a major ownership position in the company. Walter brings extraordinary business savvy to any operation. Ten years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners. They are truly a dream team.
中美能源控股有两位了不起的管理者 Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel。另外，我的老友Walter Scott 及其家族也持有该公司部分股权。Walter 为任何业务带来非凡的商业头脑。同 Dave、Greg 和 Walter 的十年合作让我深信，我们再找不到比他们更好的搭档了，他们是真正的梦之队。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16,000 agents. Though last year was again a terrible year for home sales, HomeServices earned a modest sum. It also acquired a firm in Chicago and will add other quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices. A decade from now, HomeServices is likely to be much larger.
有些让人不协调的是，中美能源还拥有全美第二大房地产经纪商美国家庭服务公司HomeServices。这家公司有 21 个地方品牌和 1.6 万个代理商。尽管去年对于房屋销售而言仍是恐怖之年，但该公司取得了还算不错的业绩。另外，公司并购了芝加哥一家经纪公司，并且我们还将在合理价格水平上寻求收购其他高质量的经纪公司。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
中美能源一些主要运营数据：
| Items | Earnings 2009 (in millions) | Earnings 2008 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 248 | $ 339 |
| Iowa utility | 285 | 425 |
| Western utilities | 788 | 703 |
| Pipelines | 457 | 595 |
| HomeServices | 43 | (45) |
| Other(net) | 25 | 186 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 1,846 | 2,203 |
| Constellation Energy * | — | 1,092 |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire | (318) | (332) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt | (58) | (111) |
| Income tax. | (313) | (1,002) |
| Net earnings | $ 1,157 | $ 1,850 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire ** | $ 1,071 | $ 1,704 |
| Debt owed to others | 19,579 | 19,145 |
| Debt owed to Berkshire | 353 | 1,087 |
* Consists of a breakup fee of 917 million.4
* 包括 1.75 亿美元分手费和 9.17 亿美元投资盈利。4
** Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of 72 in 2008.5
Our regulated electric utilities, offering monopoly service in most cases, operate in a symbiotic manner with the customers in their service areas, with those users depending on us to provide first-class service and invest for their future needs. Permitting and construction periods for generation and major transmission facilities stretch way out, so it is incumbent on us to be far-sighted. We, in turn, look to our utilities’ regulators (acting on behalf of our customers) to allow us an appropriate return on the huge amounts of capital we must deploy to meet future needs. We shouldn’t expect our regulators to live up to their end of the bargain unless we live up to ours.
我们受监管的电力公司在多数情况下提供垄断性服务，与客户在多方面形成共生关系，客户依赖我们为其提供一流的服务和未来的投资。发电输电项目的审批和建设周期漫长，所以我们必须长远考虑。反过来，为满足未来的能源需求我们必须向其投入巨额资本，我们希望代表我们客户利益的监管机构，允许我们从中获得适当的回报。我们必须自力更生，而非寄希望于我们的监管机构履行承诺。
Dave and Greg make sure we do just that. National research companies consistently rank our Iowa and Western utilities at or near the top of their industry. Similarly, among the 43 U.S. pipelines ranked by a firm named Mastio, our Kern River and Northern Natural properties tied for second place.
大卫和格雷格确保我们正为此而努力。国家研究机构一致认为我们的爱荷华和西部电力在行业中名列前茅。同样，根据 Mastio 公司对 43 家企业的排名，我们的科恩河与北部天然气位列第二。
Moreover, we continue to pour huge sums of money into our operations so as to not only prepare for the future but also make these operations more environmentally friendly. Since we purchased MidAmerican ten years ago, it has never paid a dividend. We have instead used earnings to improve and expand our properties in each of the territories we serve. As one dramatic example, in the last three years our Iowa and Western utilities have earned 3 billion on wind generation facilities.
此外，我们继续向该业务投入巨资，不但着眼未来，而且使这些业务更加环保。自从我们十年前收购中美能源以来，公司 从未 派发过红利，而是将其再投资以扩大再生产。一个明显的例子是，在过去 3 年中我们的爱荷华和西部电力公司盈利 25 亿美元，但同期在风电设施上的投资是 30 亿美元。
MidAmerican has consistently kept its end of the bargain with society and, to society’s credit, it has reciprocated: With few exceptions, our regulators have promptly allowed us to earn a fair return on the ever-increasing sums of capital we must invest. Going forward, we will do whatever it takes to serve our territories in the manner they expect. We believe that, in turn, we will be allowed the return we deserve on the funds we invest.
中美能源以社会责任为重，注重社会信誉，并因此受益：除个别情况外，监管机构允许我们从不断增加的投资中取得合理的回报，未来我们将尽可能以监管期望的方式满足客户的需求。我们相信，我们能够从这些投资中受益。
In earlier days, Charlie and I shunned capital-intensive businesses such as public utilities. Indeed, the best businesses by far for owners continue to be those that have high returns on capital and that require little incremental investment to grow. We are fortunate to own a number of such businesses, and we would love to buy more. Anticipating, however, that Berkshire will generate ever-increasing amounts of cash, we are today quite willing to enter businesses that regularly require large capital expenditures. We expect only that these businesses have reasonable expectations of earning decent returns on the incremental sums they invest. If our expectations are met — and we believe that they will be — Berkshire’s ever-growing collection of good to great businesses should produce above-average, though certainly not spectacular, returns in the decades ahead.
早期，查理和我曾避开了公用事业等资本密集型企业。截至目前，最好的投资依然是那些资本回报率高，增长所需增量投资少的企业。幸运的是我们拥有许多这样的企业，而且很乐意买入更多。不过，伯克希尔预计将产生越来越多的现金，我们目前非常愿意进入那些经常性需要大量资本支出的业务。我们希望这些企业能够从投资的增量资本中获得合理的回报。如果我们的预期得以实现（我相信会的），伯克希尔不断增加的从良好到伟大的业务，在未来几十年中虽不能取得惊人的回报，但是应该可以超过平均水平。
Our BNSF operation, it should be noted, has certain important economic characteristics that resemble those of our electric utilities. In both cases we provide fundamental services that are, and will remain, essential to the economic well-being of our customers, the communities we serve, and indeed the nation. Both will require heavy investment that greatly exceeds depreciation allowances for decades to come. Both must also plan far ahead to satisfy demand that is expected to outstrip the needs of the past. Finally, both require wise regulators who will provide certainty about allowable returns so that we can confidently make the huge investments required to maintain, replace and expand the plant.
值得注意的是，我们的 BNSF 铁路公司与我们的电力公共事业公司具有相似的经济特征。在这两个业务中，我们提供的基本服务对客户、社区以及整个国家的经济发展都至关重要，两者都需要大量的投资，在未来几十年将远超折旧额。两者都必须进行前瞻性规划，以满足超过过去的需求。最后，两者都需要明智的监管机构提供许可回报率的确定性，以便我们可以满怀信心地进行维护更新和扩建所需的巨额投资。
We see a “social compact” existing between the public and our railroad business, just as is the case with our utilities. If either side shirks its obligations, both sides will inevitably suffer. Therefore, both parties to the compact should — and we believe will — understand the benefit of behaving in a way that encourages good behavior by the other. It is inconceivable that our country will realize anything close to its full economic potential without its possessing first-class electricity and railroad systems. We will do our part to see that they exist.
我们发现公众与我们的铁路企业之间存在某种“社会契约”，就像我们的公用事业一样。如果一方推卸责任，双方都将不可避免的遭受损失。所以，我们认为契约双方应该互相理解并鼓励对方良好行为的方式相处。如果国家没有一流的电力和铁路系统，就无法实现其全部的经济潜力。我们会尽力确保它们的存在。
In the future, BNSF results will be included in this “regulated utility” section. Aside from the two businesses having similar underlying economic characteristics, both are logical users of substantial amounts of debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Both will retain most of their earnings. Both will earn and invest large sums in good times or bad, though the railroad will display the greater cyclicality. Overall, we expect this regulated sector to deliver significantly increased earnings over time, albeit at the cost of our investing many tens — yes, tens — of billions of dollars of incremental equity capital.
未来，BNSF铁路公司的业绩可能并入公用事业部分，除了二者具有类似的经济特征外，它们使用的大量债务都不是伯克希尔担保的。两者都将保留它们的大部分收益。无论经济形势好坏，两者都将赚取和投资巨额资金，尽管铁路将表现出更大的周期性。总之，我们预计随着时间的推移，这个受监管的行业将带来显著的收益增长，尽管代价是我们投入数百亿美元的增量资本。
Manufacturing,Service and Retailing Operations 制造业、服务业和零售业
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔在这些行业中业务众多。首先让我们先看一下整个集团的资产负债表和损益表摘要。
Balance Sheet 12/31/09(in millions)
| Assets | Numbers | Liabilities and Equity | Numbers |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 3,018 | Notes payable | $ 1,842 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 5,066 | Other current liabilities | 7,414 |
| Inventory | 6,147 | Total current liabilities | 9,256 |
| Other current assets | 625 | ||
| Total current assets | 14,856 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 16,499 | Deferred taxes | 2,834 |
| Fixed assets | 15,374 | Term debt and other liabilities | 6,240 |
| Other assets | 2,070 | Equity | 30,469 |
| $48,799 | $48,799 |
Earnings Statement(in millions)
| Items | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 61,665 | $ 66,099 | $ 59,100 |
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of 1,280 in 2008 and $955 in 2007) | 59,509 | 61,937 | 55,026 |
| Interest expense | 98 | 139 | 127 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 2,058 * | 4,023 * | 3,947 * |
| Income taxes and minority interests | 945 | 1,740 | 1,594 |
| Net income | $ 1,113 | $ 2,283 | $ 2,353 |
* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
* 税前利润不包含购买法会计调整。
Almost all of the many and widely-diverse operations in this sector suffered to one degree or another from 2009’s severe recession. The major exception was McLane, our distributor of groceries, confections and non-food items to thousands of retail outlets, the largest by far Wal-Mart.
2009 年全球经济衰退使我们旗下种类繁多的业务都受到某种程度上的影响，但麦克莱恩（McLane）却是个例外，它是杂货、糖果及其它非食品类商品的分销商，为数千家零售店提供供应服务，目前其最大客户是著名零售企业沃尔玛。
Grady Rosier led McLane to record pre-tax earnings of 31.2 billion. McLane employs a vast array of physical assets — practically all of which it owns — including 3,242 trailers, 2,309 tractors and 55 distribution centers with 15.2 million square feet of space. McLane’s prime asset, however, is Grady.
格雷迪·罗齐尔（Grady Rosier）领导下的麦克莱恩 2009 年创下了 3.44 亿美元的税前收益纪录。尽管如此，其 312 亿美元的销售收入中，每 1 美元的利润只有 1 美分。麦克莱恩拥有一系列实物资产，包括 3,242 辆拖车、2,309 辆牵引机及总面积达 1,520 万平方英尺的 55 个分销中心。当然麦克莱恩最重要的资产是 Grady。
We had a number of companies at which profits improved even as sales contracted, always an exceptional managerial achievement. Here are the CEOs who made it happen:
我们许多公司尽管销售下滑但盈利增长，这一直是一项非凡的管理成就，以下是成就这一事实的 CEO 们：
| COMPANY | CEO |
|---|---|
| Benjamin Moore(paint) | Denis Abrams |
| Borsheims (jewelry retailing) | Susan Jacques |
| H.H.Brown(manufacturing and retailing of shoes) | Jim Issler |
| CTB (agricultural equipment) | Vic Mancinelli |
| Dairy Queen | John Gainor |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart (furniture retailing) | Ron and Irv Blumkin |
| Pampered Chef (direct sales of kitchen tools) | Marla Gottschalk |
| See’s (manufacturing and retailing of candy) | Brad Kinstler |
| Star Furniture(furniture retailing) | Bill Kimbrell |
Among the businesses we own that have major exposure to the depressed industrial sector, both Marmon and Iscar turned in relatively strong performances. Frank Ptak’s Marmon delivered a 13.5% pre-tax profit margin, a record high. Though the company’s sales were down 27%, Frank’s cost-conscious management mitigated the decline in earnings.
在我们拥有的受低迷工业部门影响的主要企业中，Marmon和Iscar的表现都相对强劲。尽管弗兰克-普塔克（Frank Ptak）领导的Marmon公司销售额下降了 27%，但税前利润增长 13.5% 创下历史新高，弗兰克的成本管理弥补了收益下滑。
Nothing stops Israel-based Iscar — not wars, recessions or competitors. The world’s two other leading suppliers of small cutting tools both had very difficult years, each operating at a loss throughout much of the year. Though Iscar’s results were down significantly from 2008, the company regularly reported profits, even while it was integrating and rationalizing Tungaloy, the large Japanese acquisition that we told you about last year. When manufacturing rebounds, Iscar will set new records. Its incredible managerial team of Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz and Danny Goldman will see to that.
无论战争、经济衰退还是竞争对手，都无法阻止以色列的 Iscar 公司前进的步伐。世界上另外两家小型切削工具供应商年内大半时间都处在亏损状态。尽管 Iscar 业绩相比 2008 年也明显下滑，但是依然盈利，即使在合并和吸收 Tungaloy 的过程中也是如此（去年我曾向你介绍 Iscar 在日本收购切削工具供应商Tungaloy）。一旦制造业复苏， Iscar 将再创新高。由 Eitan Wertheimer，Jacob Harpaz 和 Danny Goldman组成的管理团队对此翘首以待。
Every business we own that is connected to residential and commercial construction suffered severely in 2009. Combined pre-tax earnings of Shaw, Johns Manville, Acme Brick, and MiTek were 1.295 billion in 2006, when construction activity was booming. These businesses continue to bump along the bottom, though their competitive positions remain undented.
2009 年，我们拥有的与住宅及商业建筑相关的业务都遭到了严重的冲击。Shaw，Johns Manville，MiTek，Acme Brick 的税前总收益是 2.27 亿美元，较 2006 年建筑业高潮期的 12.95 亿美元减少 82.5%。上述企业仍将奋力挣扎，但其竞争力依然完好无损。
The major problem for Berkshire last year was NetJets, an aviation operation that offers fractional ownership of jets. Over the years, it has been enormously successful in establishing itself as the premier company in its industry, with the value of its fleet far exceeding that of its three major competitors combined. Overall, our dominance in the field remains unchallenged.
伯克希尔去年面临的最主要的问题是经营飞机部分所有权的利捷航空 NetJets。多年来，NetJets 成功的确立为该行业的龙头企业，它拥有的机队价值超过其三大竞争对手的总和。总体上说，NetJets 在该行业中的主导地位仍然没有收到挑战。
NetJets’ business operation, however, has been another story. In the eleven years that we have owned the company, it has recorded an aggregate pre-tax loss of 102 million at the time of purchase to $1.9 billion in April of last year. Without Berkshire’s guarantee of this debt, NetJets would have been out of business. It’s clear that I failed you in letting NetJets descend into this condition. But, luckily, I have been bailed out.
然而，NetJets在管理运营上存在问题。在我们拥有 NetJets 的 11 年中，累计税前亏损达到了 1.57 亿美元。此外，截至去年 4 月，公司债务由最初的 1.02 亿美元飞涨至 19 亿美元。如果没有伯克希尔对其债务提供担保，恐怕 NetJets 已经倒闭了。显然对于 NetJets 走到今天这个地步我难辞其咎，但幸运的是我们已经获得救援。
Dave Sokol, the enormously talented builder and operator of MidAmerican Energy, became CEO of NetJets in August. His leadership has been transforming: Debt has already been reduced to 711 million in 2009, the company is now solidly profitable.
中美能源杰出的建立者及管理者大卫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）于去年 8 月成为 NetJets 的新任 CEO。他改革了旧有的领导方式，目前公司债务已下降至 14 亿美元，在 2009 年遭受了 7.11 亿美元惊人的亏损后，公司现在已经实现了稳定的赢利。
Most important, none of the changes wrought by Dave have in any way undercut the top-of-the-line standards for safety and service that Rich Santulli, NetJets’ previous CEO and the father of the fractional-ownership industry, insisted upon. Dave and I have the strongest possible personal interest in maintaining these standards because we and our families use NetJets for almost all of our flying, as do many of our directors and managers. None of us are assigned special planes nor crews. We receive exactly the same treatment as any other owner, meaning we pay the same prices as everyone else does when we are using our personal contracts. In short, we eat our own cooking. In the aviation business, no other testimonial means more.
更为重要的是，大卫采取的措施丝毫没有损害 NetJets 前任 CEO 共享飞机之父Rich Santulli 所坚持的安全和服务的严格标准。大卫和我对于保持上述标准非常赞同，我们及家人的出行几乎都乘 NetJets 的航班，而且公司的许多主管和经理也是如此。我们没有人被指派专机和服务人员。我们与其他乘客一视同仁，支付同样的价格，享受同样的服务。简言之，我们自己做饭自己吃。在航空业，没有其它的（安全）证明文件能比这个更有力。
Finance and Financial Products 金融及金融产品
Our largest operation in this sector is Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer of modular and manufactured homes. Clayton was not always number one: A decade ago the three leading manufacturers were Fleetwood, Champion and Oakwood, which together accounted for 44% of the output of the industry. All have since gone bankrupt. Total industry output, meanwhile, has fallen from 382,000 units in 1999 to 60,000 units in 2009.
我们在这一领域最大的业务是 Clayton Homes，美国最大模块化预制住宅制造商。Clayton 并非一直占据着龙头位置。十年前，该领域三大制造商 Fleetwood、Champion、Oakwood 合计占据行业 44% 的产量，但这些公司现在都已破产。同时，整个行业的产量也从 1999 年的 38.2 万套下降至 2009 年的 6 万套。
The industry is in shambles for two reasons, the first of which must be lived with if the U.S. economy is to recover. This reason concerns U.S. housing starts (including apartment units). In 2009, starts were 554,000, by far the lowest number in the 50 years for which we have data. Paradoxically, this is good news.
该行业陷入困局有两个主要原因。第一个原因跟美国住房开工率有关，美国经济若要实现复苏就必须忍受其影响。2009 年 55.4 万套新屋开工量，是有数据 50 年以来的最低记录。但这似乎是一个好消息。
People thought it was good news a few years back when housing starts — the supply side of the picture — were running about two million annually. But household formations — the demand side — only amounted to about 1.2 million. After a few years of such imbalances, the country unsurprisingly ended up with far too many houses.
几年前人们认为每年新屋开工量（供应方） 200 万套是一个好消息，但新组建家庭（需求方）仅约 120 万。在经历了几年这种失衡后，不出所料，这个国家最终拥有了太多的存量住房。
There were three ways to cure this overhang: (1) blow up a lot of houses, a tactic similar to the destruction of autos that occurred with the “cash-for-clunkers” program; (2) speed up household formations by, say, encouraging teenagers to cohabitate, a program not likely to suffer from a lack of volunteers or; (3) reduce new housing starts to a number far below the rate of household formations.
有三种途径可以解决这个问题：第一，与“旧车换现金”计划相似，拆掉大量住房；第二，鼓励青年人同居加速家庭组建，但这一办法只有在当事人自愿的情况下才能得以推行；第三，将新屋开工数量减少到远低于家庭组建水平。
Our country has wisely selected the third option, which means that within a year or so residential housing problems should largely be behind us, the exceptions being only high-value houses and those in certain localities where overbuilding was particularly egregious. Prices will remain far below “bubble” levels, of course, but for every seller (or lender) hurt by this there will be a buyer who benefits. Indeed, many families that couldn’t afford to buy an appropriate home a few years ago now find it well within their means because the bubble burst.
我们的国家理智地选择了第三种途径。这意味着在一年的时间里，住房的问题的政策将非常支持我们，那些高价豪宅和滥建问题极为严重的地方除外。当然住房价格将会远远低于泡沫时期水平，但对于每一个受此影响的售房者或信贷方造成损失的同时，都会有一个购房者从中受益。事实上，几年前那些无法承担购房压力的家庭现在发现，拥有一套住房成为了他们力所能及的事，因为房地产市场泡沫已经破裂。
The second reason that manufactured housing is troubled is specific to the industry: the punitive differential in mortgage rates between factory-built homes and site-built homes. Before you read further, let me underscore the obvious: Berkshire has a dog in this fight, and you should therefore assess the commentary that follows with special care. That warning made, however, let me explain why the rate differential causes problems for both large numbers of lower-income Americans and Clayton.
住宅建造业陷入困境的第二个原因是该行业特有的：工厂预制房屋和现场建造房屋之间存在惩罚性抵押贷款利率差异。在你继续阅读之前，让我强调一个显而易见的事实，伯克希尔在这场斗争中有利益所在（Clayton），因此你应该特别小心接下来的评论。然而，这个警告让我解释一下，为什么利率的差异会给大量低收入美国人及 Clayton 公司带来问题。
The residential mortgage market is shaped by government rules that are expressed by FHA, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Their lending standards are all-powerful because the mortgages they insure can typically be securitized and turned into what, in effect, is an obligation of the U.S. government. Currently buyers of conventional site-built homes who qualify for these guarantees can obtain a 30-year loan at about 5.25%. In addition, these are mortgages that have recently been purchased in massive amounts by the Federal Reserve, an action that also helped to keep rates at bargain-basement levels.
住房抵押贷款市场是由联邦住房管理局 FHA、房地美、房利美制度出来的条例控制，其信贷标准占有绝对的优势，因为他们担保的抵押贷款能够实现证券化，并且实际上均将其转变成联邦政府义务。目前，符合这些担保条件的传统现场建造住宅买家，可以获得利率仅为 5.25% 的 30 年期贷款。此外，作为维持超低利率水平的举措之一，目前这种贷款已大量被美联储购买。
In contrast, very few factory-built homes qualify for agency-insured mortgages. Therefore, a meritorious buyer of a factory-built home must pay about 9% on his loan. For the all-cash buyer, Clayton’s homes offer terrific value. If the buyer needs mortgage financing, however — and, of course, most buyers do — the difference in financing costs too often negates the attractive price of a factory-built home.
相比之下，很少有工厂预制房屋符合机构抵押贷款的资格，因此一个预制房购房者必须负担的贷款利率达到 9%。对于那些采取现金支付方式的购房者，Clayton 的住房拥有着极高的购买价值，然而，如果购房者需要申请住房抵押贷款(事实上大部分购房者都需要)，那么贷款利率上的差异足以抵消预制房在价格上的吸引力。
Last year I told you why our buyers — generally people with low incomes — performed so well as credit risks. Their attitude was all-important: They signed up to live in the home, not resell or refinance it. Consequently, our buyers usually took out loans with payments geared to their verified incomes (we weren’t making “liar’s loans”) and looked forward to the day they could burn their mortgage. If they lost their jobs, had health problems or got divorced, we could of course expect defaults. But they seldom walked away simply because house values had fallen. Even today, though job-loss troubles have grown, Clayton’s delinquencies and defaults remain reasonable and will not cause us significant problems.
去年，我曾解释了为什么我们信用风险很高的买家（通常是低收入群体）但却表现出了更好的信用，因为他们的态度决定了一切。他们购买房屋是为了居住其中而并非打算从转售中赚上一笔。通常，我们的买家通常会根据核实过的偿付能力选择贷款(我们不发放骗子贷款)，并期待着某天他们能最终还清贷款。当然，如果他们失业、离婚或者遭遇了严重的健康问题，我们也有可能面临违约问题的发生，但他们很少因为房价下跌而放弃偿还贷款。即使当前失业压力剧增，但 Clayton 的拖欠和违约行为仍很适度并且没有给我们制造出重大麻烦。
We have tried to qualify more of our customers’ loans for treatment similar to those available on the site-built product. So far we have had only token success. Many families with modest incomes but responsible habits have therefore had to forego home ownership simply because the financing differential attached to the factory-built product makes monthly payments too expensive. If qualifications aren’t broadened, so as to open low-cost financing to all who meet down-payment and income standards, the manufactured-home industry seems destined to struggle and dwindle.
我们也曾努力使更多客户能够符合政府的资格，以获得现场建造房屋类似的利率优惠。但截至目前，我们只取得了一些象征性成功。因此，许多收入不高但习惯负责任的家庭不得不放弃购房，仅仅因为预制房抵押贷款利率差异导致其每月还款额过高。如果我们的低利率的贷款限定条件不被放宽，以便向所有符合首付和收入标准的购房者提供融资，那么预制房制造业务发展空间注定越来越萎缩。
Even under these conditions, I believe Clayton will operate profitably in coming years, though well below its potential. We couldn’t have a better manager than CEO Kevin Clayton, who treats Berkshire’s interests as if they were his own. Our product is first-class, inexpensive and constantly being improved. Moreover, we will continue to use Berkshire’s credit to support Clayton’s mortgage program, convinced as we are of its soundness. Even so, Berkshire can’t borrow at a rate approaching that available to government agencies. This handicap will limit sales, hurting both Clayton and a multitude of worthy families who long for a low-cost home.
尽管在这样情况下，我相信 Clayton 在未来几年仍将盈利，虽然盈利远远低于其真实潜力。我们没有比 CEO 凯文克莱顿（Kevin Clayton）更优秀的经理人了，他将伯克希尔的利益视为自身利益。我们的产品一流物美价廉，并且不断改进。而且，伯克希尔也将会继续以其信用支持 Clayton 的抵押贷款计划，因为我们相信这些贷款的合理性。即使如此，我们也无法以接近政府贷款的利率去借款，这一障碍将会限制我们的销售，损害到 Clayton 和大量渴望廉价住房的美国家庭的共同利益。
In the following table, Clayton’s earnings are net of the company’s payment to Berkshire for the use of its credit. Offsetting this cost to Clayton is an identical amount of income credited to Berkshire’s finance operation and included in “Other Income.” The cost and income amount was 92 million in 2008.6
在下表中，克莱顿的收益是该公司因使用伯克希尔的信用而向其支付信用成本后的净额。克莱顿的这一成本，以相同的金额，被记入伯克希尔金融业务“其他收入”科目中的收益中。2009 年的收益为 1.16 亿美元，2008年则为 9,200 万美元。6
The table also illustrates how severely our furniture (CORT) and trailer (XTRA) leasing operations have been hit by the recession. Though their competitive positions remain as strong as ever, we have yet to see any bounce in these businesses.
下表还说明了去年的经济危机对我们的家具（CORT）和拖车（XTRA）租赁业务造成了多么严重的影响。尽管他们的竞争地位仍如以往一样牢固，但我们尚未看到这些业务有任何回暖迹象：
| Items | Pre-Tax Earnings 2009 (in millions) | Pre-Tax Earnings 2008 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|
| Net investment income | $ 278 | $ 330 |
| Life and annuity operation | 116 | 23 |
| Leasing operations | 14 | 87 |
| Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton) | 187 | 206 |
| Other income * | 186 | 141 |
| Income before investment and derivatives gains or losses | $ 781 | $ 787 |
* Includes 92 million in 2008 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.7
At the end of 2009, we became a 50% owner of Berkadia Commercial Mortgage (formerly known as Capmark), the country’s third-largest servicer of commercial mortgages. In addition to servicing a $235 billion portfolio, the company is an important originator of mortgages, having 25 offices spread around the country. Though commercial real estate will face major problems in the next few years, long-term opportunities for Berkadia are significant.
2009 年底，我们已拥有全国第三大商业抵押贷款服务商 Berkadia Commercial Mortgage 公司（以前称为Capmark）50% 的股份。除了管理 2,350 亿美元的投资资产外，Berkadia 是最初出现住房抵押贷款时的重要操作者，在全国拥有 25 个办事处。尽管在接下来的几年里商业房地产将面临巨大的挑战，但长远地看，Berkadia 将拥有巨大的发展机会。
Our partner in this operation is Leucadia, run by Joe Steinberg and Ian Cumming, with whom we had a terrific experience some years back when Berkshire joined with them to purchase Finova, a troubled finance business. In resolving that situation, Joe and Ian did far more than their share of the work, an arrangement I always encourage. Naturally, I was delighted when they called me to partner again in the Capmark purchase.
我们在 Berkadia 的合作伙伴是 Leucadia 公司，由乔·斯坦伯格（Joe Steinberg）和伊恩·卡明（Ian Cumming）运营。几年前，当伯克希尔与他们一起收购陷入困境的 Finova 金融公司时，我们就曾有过愉快的合作经历。当时为了解决问题，乔和伊恩所做的努力远远超出了其份内工作，这也是我一直夸赞的。所以当他们与我联系共同购买 Berkadia 时我感到很高兴。
Our first venture was also christened Berkadia. So let’s call this one Son of Berkadia. Someday I’ll be writing you about Grandson of Berkadia.
我们也将第一次的冒险经历命名为 Berkadia，所以让我们将这次称为 Berkadia 的儿子，未来的某天，我将会在写给股东的信中谈论 Berkadia 的孙子。
Investments 投资业务
Below we show our common stock investments that at yearend had a market value of more than $1 billion.
下表是我们年末市场价值超过 10 亿美元的普通股投资：
| Shares | Company | Percentage of Company Owned (12/31/09) | Cost (in millions) * | Market (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 12.7 | $ 1,287 | $ 6,143 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Company,Ltd. | 9.9 | 232 | 1,986 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 8.6 | 1,299 | 11,400 |
| 37,711,330 | ConocoPhillips | 2.5 | 2,741 | 1,926 |
| 28,530,467 | Johnson & Johnson | 1.0 | 1,724 | 1,838 |
| 130,272,500 | Kraft Foods Inc. | 8.8 | 4,330 | 3,541 |
| 3,947,554 | POSCO | 5.2 | 768 | 2,092 |
| 83,128,411 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 2.9 | 533 | 5,040 |
| 25,108,967 | Sanofi-Aventis | 1.9 | 2,027 | 1,979 |
| 234,247,373 | Tesco plc | 3.0 | 1,367 | 1,620 |
| 76,633,426 | U.S.Bancorp | 4.0 | 2,371 | 1,725 |
| 39,037,142 | Wal-Mart Stores,Inc. | 1.0 | 1,893 | 2,087 |
| 334,235,585 | Wells Fargo & Company | 6.5 | 7,394 | 9,021 |
| Others | 6,680 | 8,636 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 34,646 | $ 59,034 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
* 成本项是我们实际的购买价格，也是计税的依据；这与GAAP会计原则所认定的“成本”有一些不同，因为少数情况下账面价值需要增加或减记。
In addition, we own positions in non-traded securities of Dow Chemical, General Electric, Goldman Sachs, Swiss Re and Wrigley with an aggregate cost of 26.0 billion. We purchased these five positions in the last 18 months. Setting aside the significant equity potential they provide us, these holdings deliver us an aggregate of 85.78 per share, but which have subsequently been melded into our purchase of the entire company.
此外，我们持有陶氏化学（30亿）、通用电气（30亿）、高盛（50亿）、瑞士再保险（30亿瑞士法郎约26亿美元）和箭牌（65亿）的不可交易债券，总成本是 211 亿美元，账面现行价值是 260 亿美元。我们在过去 18 个月建立了这 5 个仓位。除了它们给我们提供的巨大的股权资产潜力之外，这些持股还给我们带来了每年总计 21 亿美元的股息和利息。最后，我们在年末拥有 76,777,029 股 BNSF 铁路股份（占比 22.5%），每股平均成本 85.78 美元，但是随后并入了我们对整个公司的收购。
In 2009, our largest sales were in ConocoPhillips, Moody’s, Procter & Gamble and Johnson & Johnson (sales of the latter occurring after we had built our position earlier in the year). Charlie and I believe that all of these stocks will likely trade higher in the future. We made some sales early in 2009 to raise cash for our Dow and Swiss Re purchases and late in the year made other sales in anticipation of our BNSF purchase.
2009 年，我们最大的卖出是康菲石油，穆迪、宝洁，以及强生（后者的卖出在我们今年早期持仓后发生）。我和查理相信所有这些股票在将来都很可能涨得更高。我们在 2009 年初卖出了一些，为陶氏化学和瑞士再保险的收购筹集资金，然后年底卖出一些来准备 BNSF 的收购。
We told you last year that very unusual conditions then existed in the corporate and municipal bond markets and that these securities were ridiculously cheap relative to U.S. Treasuries. We backed this view with some purchases, but I should have done far more. Big opportunities come infrequently. When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.8
我们去年曾告诉你，当时公司和市政债券市场存在非常罕见的情况，这些债券相比于美国国债的价格低得离谱，我们通过几项购买支持了这个观点，但是我应该买的更多。这样大的机会非常罕见，当天上掉金子的时候，应该拿桶去接，而不是管子。8
We entered 2008 with 17 billion. Nevertheless, at yearend 2009, our cash was down to 8 billion earmarked for the BNSF acquisition). We’ve put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It’s been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those who invest only when commentators are upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end, what counts in investing is what you pay for a business — through the purchase of a small piece of it in the stock market — and what that business earns in the succeeding decade or two.
2008 年初，我们拥有 443 亿美元的类现金资产，之后我们保留了 170 美元的经营收益。然而，在 2009 年底，我们的现金减少到了 306 亿美元（其中 80 亿用于收购BNSF），我们在过去两年的混乱中投入了大量资金。那是一个理想的投资时期：恐慌的氛围的投资者的朋友。那些只在股评家乐观时投资的投资者，最终为了毫无意义的保证付出了极高的价格。最后，在投资中最重要的在于，你通过股票市场购买一家企业一小部分股权所支付的价格，以及该企业在随后的十年或二十年所赚取的利润。
Last year I wrote extensively about our derivatives contracts, which were then the subject of both controversy and misunderstanding. For that discussion, please go to http://www.berkshirehathaway.com.
We have since changed only a few of our positions. Some credit contracts have run off. The terms of about 10% of our equity put contracts have also changed: Maturities have been shortened and strike prices materially reduced. In these modifications, no money changed hands.
之后我们改变了一些仓位。一些信用合约已经到期失效。我们约 10% 的股票指数看跌合约的条款发生了改变：到期日缩短，行权价降低。但这些改变并没有金钱易手。
A few points from last year’s discussion are worth repeating:
去年中讨论的几点现在需要重申一下：
(1) Though it’s no sure thing, I expect our contracts in aggregate to deliver us a profit over their lifetime, even when investment income on the huge amount of float they provide us is excluded in the calculation. Our derivatives float — which is not included in the 6.3 billion at yearend.
(2) Only a handful of our contracts require us to post collateral under any circumstances. At last year’s low point in the stock and credit markets, our posting requirement was $1.7 billion, a small fraction of the derivatives-related float we held. When we do post collateral, let me add, the securities we put up continue to earn money for our account.
（2）、只有少数合约要求我们无论如何都要提交抵押品。去年，股市和信贷市场的最低位，我们发行的衍生品合约规模是 17 亿美元，只占我们衍生品相关浮存金的一小部分。让我补充一点，当我们提供抵押品时，我们所提供的证券仍然在给我们赚钱。
(3) Finally, you should expect large swings in the carrying value of these contracts, items that can affect our reported quarterly earnings in a huge way but that do not affect our cash or investment holdings. That thought certainly fit 2009’s circumstances. Here are the pre-tax quarterly gains and losses from derivatives valuations that were part of our reported earnings last year:
（3）、最后，这些合约的帐面价值会出现有大波动，这会很大程度上影响我们的季度报告盈利，但是不会影响我们的现金或投资持有。这个想法很适合 2009 年的环境。以下是衍生品估值的税前季度损益，这是我们去年报告收益的一部分：
| Quarter | $ Gain(Loss) in Billions |
|---|---|
| 1 | (1.517) |
| 2 | 2.357 |
| 3 | 1.732 |
| 4 | 1.052 |
As we’ve explained, these wild swings neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. When we report to you, we will continue to separate out these figures (as we do realized investment gains and losses) so that you can more clearly view the earnings of our operating businesses. We are delighted that we hold the derivatives contracts that we do. To date we have significantly profited from the float they provide. We expect also to earn further investment income over the life of our contracts.
正如我们解释的那样，这些剧烈波动不会使我和查理高兴或者烦恼。当我们报告给你的时候，我们仍将这些数字分开（就像我们确实实现了收益或损失一样），这样你就可以更清楚地看到我们所经营业务的盈利情况。我们很高兴我们持有这些衍生品合约。至今我们已经从它们所提供的浮存金中获利颇丰。我们希望在这些合同有效期内赚取更多的投资收益。
We have long invested in derivatives contracts that Charlie and I think are mispriced, just as we try to invest in mispriced stocks and bonds. Indeed, we first reported to you that we held such contracts in early 1998. The dangers that derivatives pose for both participants and society — dangers of which we’ve long warned, and that can be dynamite — arise when these contracts lead to leverage and/or counterparty risk that is extreme. At Berkshire nothing like that has occurred — nor will it.
我们长期投资于我和查理认为定价错误的衍生品合约，就像我们试图投资定价错误的股票和债券一样。事实上，我们在 1998 年第一次向你报告我们持有此类合约（白银）。我们早就警告过衍生品给社会和相关参与者带来的危险，这可能是毁灭性的，当这些合约导致极端的杠杆或交易对手风险时就会出现。在伯克希尔，这类事情从来没有发生过，将来也不会发生。
It’s my job to keep Berkshire far away from such problems. Charlie and I believe that a CEO must not delegate risk control. It’s simply too important. At Berkshire, I both initiate and monitor every derivatives contract on our books, with the exception of operations-related contracts at a few of our subsidiaries, such as MidAmerican, and the minor runoff contracts at General Re. If Berkshire ever gets in trouble, it will be my fault. It will not be because of misjudgments made by a Risk Committee or Chief Risk Officer.
让伯克希尔远离这些风险是我的职责所在。查理和我都认为 CEO 不能把风险控制权交给别人。这太重要了。在伯克希尔，我发起并监控每一份衍生品合约，除了少数几家的子公司(中美能源)的相关运营合同，以及通用再保险剩余的少数收尾合约。如果伯克希尔遇到麻烦，那就是我的错，决不会是风险委员会或首席风险官的责任。
In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it — with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees — the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.
在我看来，一家大型金融机构的董事会如果不坚持要求 CEO 承担全部风险控制责任，那么他们就是失职。如果 CEO 不能胜任这项任务，那么他应该另谋高就。如果他无法做到，而政府需要投入资金的话， CEO 和董事会应该承担很大责任。
It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term.
搞砸了全国一些最大金融机构运营的不是股东，但却是股东承担了这一负担，在大多数失败案例中，他们持有的股票价值 90% 或更多都被抹去了。在过去的两年中的四次最大的金融破产中，他们总计损失了超过 5000 亿美元。如果说这些股东得到了“救助”，那么简直都是对“救助”这个词的嘲讽。
The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price — one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.
然而这些破产公司的 CEO 和高管们基本都毫发无伤，他们的机遇可能因他们所监管的灾难而有所减少，但他们仍然过着奢华的生活。正是这些 CEO 和高管们的行为需要改变：如果他们的公司和国家因为他们的不负责任而受到伤害，他们应该付出沉重的代价，而不应该由公司或者保险来买单。在很多情况下，主管都从过多的金融胡萝卜中获利，应该在他们的职业生涯中加入一些大棒了。
An Inconvenient Truth (Boardroom Overheating) 一个难以忽视的事实（过热的董事会）
Our subsidiaries made a few small “bolt-on” acquisitions last year for cash, but our blockbuster deal with BNSF required us to issue about 95,000 Berkshire shares that amounted to 6.1% of those previously outstanding. Charlie and I enjoy issuing Berkshire stock about as much as we relish prepping for a colonoscopy.
我们旗下的子公司去年为了现金做了几项小型并购案，但是我们对 BNSF 铁路的大型收购要求我们发行 95,000 股伯克希尔 A 类股份，这接近已公开发行的 6.1% 。我和查理对发行伯克希尔股票的喜爱，正如我们享受结肠镜检查前的准备工作一样。
The reason for our distaste is simple. If we wouldn’t dream of selling Berkshire in its entirety at the current market price, why in the world should we “sell” a significant part of the company at that same inadequate price by issuing our stock in a merger?
我们不喜欢发行股票的原因很简单。如果我们不梦想以现在的市价卖掉全部伯克希尔股票的话，为什么要以几乎同样不合理的发行价卖掉公司如此大的一部分呢？
In evaluating a stock-for-stock offer, shareholders of the target company quite understandably focus on the market price of the acquirer’s shares that are to be given them. But they also expect the transaction to deliver them the intrinsic value of their own shares — the ones they are giving up. If shares of a prospective acquirer are selling below their intrinsic value, it’s impossible for that buyer to make a sensible deal in an all-stock deal. You simply can’t exchange an undervalued stock for a fully-valued one without hurting your shareholders.
评估换股并购时，目标公司的股东不仅注重收购方将要给予他们的股票的市场价，同样也希望这笔交易能够给他们带来所放弃的那些自己股份的内在价值。如果收购方股票价格低于其内在价值，那么收购方就不可能在换股合并交易中做出明智的交易。你不可能在不损害股东利益的情况下，用一只被低估的股票去交换一个被完全反应价值的股票。
Imagine, if you will, Company A and Company B, of equal size and both with businesses intrinsically worth 80 per share. The CEO of A, long on confidence and short on smarts, offers 1.25 shares of A for each share of B, correctly telling his directors that B is worth 125 in intrinsic value. If the directors are mathematically challenged as well, and a deal is therefore completed, the shareholders of B will end up owning 55.6% of A & B’s combined assets and A’s shareholders will own 44.4%. Not everyone at A, it should be noted, is a loser from this nonsensical transaction. Its CEO now runs a company twice as large as his original domain, in a world where size tends to correlate with both prestige and compensation.
想想一下，如果你喜欢的话，公司 A 和公司 B 规模相同，且两者的业务价值每股都是 100 美元。它们的股票每股售价 80 美元。A 公司的 CEO 非常自信但不够精明，他用 1.25 股去换 B 公司的1股，并告诉他的董事 B 公司每股价值 100 美元。然而他没有认识到，他将让他的股东们为 B 公司的每股支付 125 美元的内在价值。如果董事们在数字上也没有异议，那么交易就成交了。B 公司的股东将拥有 A&B 公司合并资产的 55.6%，而 A 公司的股东只拥有 44.4%。并不是 A 公司的每个人都是这次不明智交易的受害者。在一个声望和薪酬往往与规模相关的世界里，它的 CEO 将经营一个两倍大的公司。
If an acquirer’s stock is overvalued, it’s a different story: Using it as a currency works to the acquirer’s advantage. That’s why bubbles in various areas of the stock market have invariably led to serial issuances of stock by sly promoters. Going by the market value of their stock, they can afford to overpay because they are, in effect, using counterfeit money. Periodically, many air-for-assets acquisitions have taken place, the late 1960s having been a particularly obscene period for such chicanery. Indeed, certain large companies were built in this way. (No one involved, of course, ever publicly acknowledges the reality of what is going on, though there is plenty of private snickering.)
如果是收购方的股票被高估，那就另当别论了：这会对收购方有利。这就是为什么股市各个领域的泡沫将不可避免导致狡猾的发行人带来一系列的股票发行。如果按照他们股票的市价，他们可以支付更高的价格，因为事实上他们使用的是伪币。这种空气换资产的收购周期性的发生。1960 年代末是此类欺诈发行的一个特别肮脏的时期。事实上，某些大公司就是这样建立起来的（当然没有人公开承认事实，但是私下有许多窃笑）。
In our BNSF acquisition, the selling shareholders quite properly evaluated our offer at 100 was delivered in our shares, which Charlie and I believed to be worth more than their market value. Fortunately, we had long owned a substantial amount of BNSF stock that we purchased in the market for cash. All told, therefore, only about 30% of our cost overall was paid with Berkshire shares.
在我们收购 BNSF 铁路的过程中，出售方的股东合理的评估了我们所提出的每股 100 美元的报价。然而我们的成本却稍高于此，因为这 100 美元中 40% 是以股票形式支付的。查理和我都相信这些股票的价值超过了市价。幸运的是，我们长期以来在市场上现金购买了大量 BNSF 股票，因此，总的来说，只有 30% 的成本是用伯克希尔股票支付的。
In the end, Charlie and I decided that the disadvantage of paying 30% of the price through stock was offset by the opportunity the acquisition gave us to deploy $22 billion of cash in a business we understood and liked for the long term. It has the additional virtue of being run by Matt Rose, whom we trust and admire. We also like the prospect of investing additional billions over the years at reasonable rates of return. But the final decision was a close one. If we had needed to use more stock to make the acquisition, it would in fact have made no sense. We would have then been giving up more than we were getting.
最后，我和查理认为，通过股票支付 30% 的价格劣势，被给了我们的收购机会所抵消。我们可以在一个我们了解并长期喜欢的业务中配置 220 亿美元资金。这还有一个额外的好处是，公司将由我们信任并敬佩的迈特·罗斯（Matt Rose）来经营。我们同样愿意在几年内以合理的回报率再投资几十亿美元。但最终的决定会很接近。如果我们需要用更多的股票来认购，那就没有意义了。我们会得不偿失。
I have been in dozens of board meetings in which acquisitions have been deliberated, often with the directors being instructed by high-priced investment bankers (are there any other kind?). Invariably, the bankers give the board a detailed assessment of the value of the company being purchased, with emphasis on why it is worth far more than its market price. In more than fifty years of board memberships, however, never have I heard the investment bankers (or management!) discuss the true value of what is being given. When a deal involved the issuance of the acquirer’s stock, they simply used market value to measure the cost. They did this even though they would have argued that the acquirer’s stock price was woefully inadequate — absolutely no indicator of its real value — had a takeover bid for the acquirer instead been the subject up for discussion.
我曾参加过数十次董事会，讨论收购方案，董事们通常会接受昂贵的投资银行提供的咨询（还有其它类型的吗）。银行家总是会向董事会详细评估了被收购公司的价值，重大是为什么其内在价值远高于市场价值。然而在长达 50 年的董事生涯中，我从没听到任何投资银行（或管理层）讨论公司所付出的真正价值。当交易涉及收购方股票的发行时，他们只需使用市价来衡量成本，甚至在知道收购方股票被严重低估时仍然这么做。
When stock is the currency being contemplated in an acquisition and when directors are hearing from an advisor, it appears to me that there is only one way to get a rational and balanced discussion. Directors should hire a second advisor to make the case against the proposed acquisition, with its fee contingent on the deal not going through. Absent this drastic remedy, our recommendation in respect to the use of advisors remains: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
当低估的股票作为支付货币时，当董事从顾问获得理性意见的方法看起来只有一种，董事会应聘请第二位顾问，来反对提议的收购案，若交易失败则获得酬劳。如果没有这种严厉的补救措施，我们关于使用顾问的建议永远都是：“不要问理发师你是不是该理发了。”
I can’t resist telling you a true story from long ago. We owned stock in a large well-run bank that for decades had been statutorily prevented from acquisitions. Eventually, the law was changed and our bank immediately began looking for possible purchases. Its managers — fine people and able bankers — not unexpectedly began to behave like teenage boys who had just discovered girls.
我忍不住要告诉你很久以前的一个真实故事。那时我们持有一家经营良好的大型银行（田纳西州 Nashville 市第三国民银行）的股票，几十年来法律禁止这家银行进行收购。最终法律改变了，我们的银行立即开始寻找可能的并购交易。银行经理人本来都是很有能力的银行家，这时毫不意外的表现得像没见过女孩的十几岁的男孩子。
They soon focused on a much smaller bank, also well-run and having similar financial characteristics in such areas as return on equity, interest margin, loan quality, etc. Our bank sold at a modest price (that’s why we had bought into it), hovering near book value and possessing a very low price/earnings ratio. Alongside, though, the small-bank owner was being wooed by other large banks in the state and was holding out for a price close to three times book value. Moreover, he wanted stock, not cash.
他们很快盯上了一家较小规模的银行，经营也很好，在股本回报率，利差，贷款质量等方面具有相似的财务特征。我们的银行以较低的价格售出，几乎接近账面价值，市盈率很低，这也是我们买入的原因。然而该州其它大型银行也有意并购那家小银行，此时他们的要价已接近账面价值的 3 倍，此外，他们要股票而不要现金。
Naturally, our fellows caved in and agreed to this value-destroying deal. “We need to show that we are in the hunt. Besides, it’s only a small deal,” they said, as if only major harm to shareholders would have been a legitimate reason for holding back. Charlie’s reaction at the time: “Are we supposed to applaud because the dog that fouls our lawn is a Chihuahua rather than a Saint Bernard?”
自然，我们银行的同事屈服了，同意了这桩破坏价值的交易。“我们需要显示我们开始收购了。而且这只是很小的交易。”他们这么说就好像只有对股东造成很大伤害才能成为阻止他们的理由一样。查理当时的反应是，“我们是否应该鼓掌庆幸，弄脏我们草坪的是金毛而不是二哈？”
The seller of the smaller bank — no fool — then delivered one final demand in his negotiations. “After the merger,” he in effect said, perhaps using words that were phrased more diplomatically than these, “I’m going to be a large shareholder of your bank, and it will represent a huge portion of my net worth. You have to promise me, therefore, that you’ll never again do a deal this dumb.”
这家小银行的卖方可不是傻瓜，在随后的谈判中提出了最后一个要求。当时他的措辞可能比较含蓄，“在合并后，我将成为你的银行的大股东，这是我净资产中很大一部分。因此你们必须向我保证，你们再也不做这么蠢的交易了。”
Yes, the merger went through. The owner of the small bank became richer, we became poorer, and the managers of the big bank — newly bigger — lived happily ever after.
是的，这个合并成功了。小银行的老板更富有了，而我们则赔了钱。合并而来规模更大银行的经理们，活得更滋润了。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
Our best guess is that 35,000 people attended the annual meeting last year (up from 12 — no zeros omitted — in 1981). With our shareholder population much expanded, we expect even more this year. Therefore, we will have to make a few changes in the usual routine. There will be no change, however, in our enthusiasm for having you attend. Charlie and I like to meet you, answer your questions and — best of all — have you buy lots of goods from our businesses.
我们最乐观的估计是，去年有大约 3.5 万人参加了年会（1981 年仅 12 名，没有漏零）。随着股东人数的大幅增加，今年可能有更多人参会。因此，我们将不得不对惯例做一些改变。尽管如此，我们对大家的热情欢迎不减。我和查理将与大家见面，回答你的问题，最好还能让你们购买更多的产品。
The meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 1st. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking. (Act fast; he can be terse.)
今年的年会将在 5 月 1 日周六召开。同往常一样，Qwest 中心的大门会在早上 7点准时敞开。8 点半放映一部新的伯克希尔影片。9 点半直接进入问答环节并持续到下午 3 点半（中间在Qwest休息午餐）。短暂休会后，我和查理将在 3:45 分召开会议。如果你决定在问答环节离开，请在查理讲话的时候走（但要快，他讲话很简短）。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I get testy and lock the exits.)
离开会议去做的最佳活动当然是购物。我们将在 19.43 万平尺的相邻大厅里摆满各种伯克希尔商品。去年大家买东西都很努力，销售额破了纪录。今年大家还可以做的更好。（友情提示，如果我发现销量上不去将会很生气，并把出口锁上）。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 保险将设一个展台，有来自全国的优秀顾问为您服务，竭诚为您提供汽车保险建议。GEICO 保险将给您一个股东折扣（通常是 8%）。我们开展业务的 51 个区域中的 44 个都允许了这个特别优惠。（额外提示：这个折扣不可累加在其他优惠上）。带上你详细的保险资料，看看能否再省点钱。我相信你们中至少 50% 可以。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. Among the more than 30 books and DVDs it will offer are two new books by my sons: Howard’s Fragile, a volume filled with photos and commentary about lives of struggle around the globe and Peter’s Life Is What You Make It. Completing the family trilogy will be the debut of my sister Doris’s biography, a story focusing on her remarkable philanthropic activities. Also available will be Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the story of my partner. This book is something of a publishing miracle — never advertised, yet year after year selling many thousands of copies from its Internet site. (Should you need to ship your book purchases, a nearby shipping service will be available.)
一定要光顾书虫书屋，它提供 30 余种书和 DVD，其中有两本我儿子新出的书：《霍华德的脆弱》（Howard’s Fragile），其中有采自全球的照片和评论，另一本是：《彼得的生活由你造就》（Peter’s Life Is What You Make It）。完成家庭三部曲的是我妹妹的处女作《多莉斯自传》（Doris’s biography），这本书讲述了她著名的慈善活动。还有《穷查理宝典》（Charlie’s Almanack），这是我合伙人的故事。它可以说是出版届的奇迹，从不打任何广告，每年都在网上售出上千本。（如果您需要将买的书邮寄回去的话，旁边就有邮递服务。）
If you are a big spender — or, for that matter, merely a gawker — visit Elliott Aviation on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday. There we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft that will get your pulse racing.
如果您是一位骨灰级购物狂或者只是观众，可以在在周六中午到下午 5 点光顾奥马哈机场东侧的Elliott Aviation。NetJet公司的机队将让您心跳加速。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
有一个随信附件告诉您如何获取参会凭证，来参加会议和其它活动。至于航班、酒店和汽车租赁，我们仍将与美国运通（800-799-6634）合作，为您提供专门的服务。卡洛尔·彼得森(Carol Pedersen)将一如既往为我们处理相关事务，我知道这很繁杂，在此对她表示感谢。酒店房间可能很难找，但是通过卡洛尔应该能订到。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 29th and Monday, May 3rd inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Berkyville BBQ to which you are all invited.
内布拉斯加家具商场位于第 72 大街上道奇和太平洋之间，占地 77 英亩，在这里我们将召开“伯克希尔周末”特价促销。要得到伯克希尔折扣，你必须在 4 月 29 日周四到 5 月 3 日周一之间光临并出示参会证。本季特价包括了几个大牌产品，这几个牌子通常是没有任何折扣的，但由于是股东周末，所以有例外。我们感谢他们的支持。内布拉斯加家具店在周一至周六早 10 点到晚 9 点开放，周日是早上 10 点到晚上 6 点。周六下午 5 点半到晚 8 点，内布拉斯加家具店都举行烧烤晚会，邀请所有与会者。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, April 30th. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 2nd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在波仙珠宝，我们将再次召开两场股东专场活动。首先将是一个鸡尾酒招待会，在 4月 30 日周五下午 6 点到晚上 10 点。然后是一个大型售卖活动，在 5 月 2 日周日早上 9 点到下午 4 点。周六，我们将开放到下午 6 点。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 26th through Saturday, May 8th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder. Enter with rhinestones; leave with diamonds. My daughter tells me that the more you buy, the more you save (kids say the darnedest things).
我们将在波仙周末迎来大批顾客。为了您的方便，股东优惠将从 4 月 26 日周一持续到 5 月 8 日周六。在此期间，请出示您的参会卡或者股东证明来享受优惠。带水钻来带钻石走。我的女儿告诉我买的越多省得越多。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers.
周日，在波仙外面的大厅，两届美国国际象棋冠军帕特里克·沃尔夫（Patrick Wolff）将以一敌六，蒙眼应战挑战者。著名的达拉斯魔术师贝克（Norman Beck）将进行精彩表演。
Our special treat for shareholders this year will be the return of my friend, Ariel Hsing, the country’s top-ranked junior table tennis player (and a good bet to win at the Olympics some day). Now 14, Ariel came to the annual meeting four years ago and demolished all comers, including me. (You can witness my humiliating defeat on YouTube; just type in Ariel Hsing Berkshire.)
今年的特别活动能够是我一位朋友的再次光临，她就是邢延华（Ariel Hsing），中国顶级青少年乒乓球运动员（将来很有可能获得奥运会奖牌）。今年 14 岁的邢延华四年前参加过年会，打败了所有挑战者，包括我。(你可以在 YouTube 上参观我被打败的过程，只要输入 Ariel Hsing Berkshire 即可。)
Naturally, I’ve been plotting a comeback and will take her on outside of Borsheims at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday. It will be a three-point match, and after I soften her up, all shareholders are invited to try their luck at similar three-point contests. Winners will be given a box of See’s candy. We will have equipment available, but bring your own paddle if you think it will help. (It won’t.)
当然，我一直在策划她的再次光临，她将在周日下午一点出现。所有的股东都可以试试运气。获奖者将获得一盒喜诗糖果。我们将准备现成的球拍，但你也可以带上自己的球拍，如果你觉得有所帮助的话（其实不会有差别）。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 2nd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year, though, it was overwhelmed by demand. With many more diners expected this year, I’ve asked my friend, Donna Sheehan, at Piccolo’s — another favorite restaurant of mine — to serve shareholders on Sunday as well. (Piccolo’s giant root beer float is mandatory for any fan of fine dining.) I plan to eat at both restaurants: All of the weekend action makes me really hungry, and I have favorite dishes at each spot. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st( but not before ) and at Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038.
Gorat’s 餐馆将在 5 月 2 日周日开放伯克希尔股东专场，从下午 1 点至晚上 10点。去年简直人满为患。今年我已经让我的朋友，Piccolo’s 餐馆的唐纳·希恩(Donna Sheehan)，我的另一家最爱的餐馆，为股东在周日提供用餐服务。我计划两个餐厅都去，周日的活动将让我胃口大开，我在两家都有最爱的菜。要在 Gorat’s 订餐，请在 4 月 1 日拨打电话 402-551-3733 （但不要提前），Piccolo’s 电话是 402-342-9038。
Regrettably, we will not be able to have a reception for international visitors this year. Our count grew to about 800 last year, and my simply signing one item per person took about 2.5 hours. Since we expect even more international visitors this year, Charlie and I decided we must drop this function. But be assured, we welcome every international visitor who comes.
遗憾的是，今年我们将不能为外国客人提供特别接待。我们国际客户去年增加了 800个。既然今年要增加更多的国际客人，我和查理决定取消特殊接待。但是我们仍然一如既往地欢迎与会的国际客人。
Last year we changed our method of determining what questions would be asked at the meeting and received many dozens of letters applauding the new arrangement. We will therefore again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail.
去年我们改变了问答环节挑选问题的方法，会后很多人表示喜欢这样的安排。所以今年我们将同样由这三位财经记者主持问答环节，他们将通过电子邮件收集股东的问题，并对我和查理进行提问。
The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
这三位记者和他们的电子邮件分别是：财富杂志记者卡罗尔·卢米斯（Carol Loomis）：cloomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 记者贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）：BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com；纽约时报记者安德鲁·罗斯·索金（Andrew Ross Sorkin）：arsorkin@nytimes.com。从提交的问题中，每位记者将选择十几个他认为最有趣最重要的问题。希望你们的邮件尽量简洁明了，并且不超过两个问题。（并注明是否介意透露姓名。）
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.
我和查理事先都不知道问题。记者们会挑选一些有挑战性的，这正是我们所喜欢的。
We will again have a drawing at 8:15 on Saturday at each of 13 microphones for those shareholders wishing to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. We’ve added 30 minutes to the question time and will probably have time for about 30 questions from each group.
我们将在周六 8:15 通过 13 台手机抽签选出问题。在会议上，我将轮流回答记者提的问题和抽中的问题。我们已经将提问时间延长了 30 分钟，所以每组大概能有 30 个问题。
At 86 and 79, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Indeed, over the years, our work has become ever more fascinating; no wonder we tap-dance to work. If pushed, we would gladly pay substantial sums to have our jobs (but don’t tell the Comp Committee).
查理今年 86 岁，我 79 岁，我们仍然感到很幸运。我们在美国出生，我们的父母让我们接受了良好的教育，我们有美好的家庭和良好的健康，我们拥有的商业天赋给我们带来了财富，比那些跟我们一样为社会做出贡献的人获得的要多。不仅如此，我们一直以来都热爱我们的工作，我们得到了无数的才华横溢开朗的同事的无数的帮助，事实上这些年来，我们的工作变得越来越迷人，难怪我们跳着踢踏舞去上班。如果需要的话，我们简直愿意花钱来保住我们的工作(但请不要告诉薪酬委员会)。
Nothing, however, is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 1st at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
然而，对我们来说，没有什么比在年会上同我们的股东合伙人相聚更加让人开心的了。所以，加入我们 5 月 1 日在 Qwest 为资本家举办的年度伍德斯托克音乐节吧。我们在那里见。
February 26, 2010
2010 年 2 月 26 日
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
P.S. Come by rail.
P.S. 乘火车前来。
原文：I subtly indicated that I was older and wiser.
肖良版：我巧妙的暗示了我的老辣。
参照 巴菲特给股东的信-贝乐斯-财新网，同时为了衔接下一句话 “I was just older.”，故原文修改为：我婉转的指出，我更老一些，也更有智慧。
原文：*Consists of a breakup fee of 917 million.
肖良版：未译。
采用黄媛 李婧 杨峻 路璐的译法：*包括 1.75 亿美元分手费和 9.17 亿美元投资盈利。
原文：**Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of 72 in 2008.
肖良版：未译。
采用黄媛 李婧 杨峻 路璐的译法：**包括伯克希尔 2009 年 3800 万美元和 2008 年 7200 万美元利息（扣除相关所得税，括号中为负值）。
原文：The cost and income amount was 92 million in 2008.
肖良版：2009 年的成本和收益分别为 1.16 亿美元和 9,200 万美元。
该译文未出现 2008 年，且理解有误。原文的意思是：2009 年的收入为 1.16 亿美元，2008 年为 9,200 万美元。故修改为：2009 年的收益为 1.16 亿美元，2008年则为 9,200 万美元。
原文：Includes 92 million in 2008 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.
肖良版：未译。
采用黄媛 李婧 杨峻 路璐的译法：*包括伯克希尔于 2009 和 2008 两年分别向 Clayton 收取的 1.16 亿美元及 9200 万美元的担保费用。
原文：When it’s raining gold, reach for a bucket, not a thimble.
肖良版：当天上掉金子的时候，应该拿桶去接，而不是管子。
据Wikipedia，A thimble is a small pitted cup worn on the finger that protects it from being pricked or poked by a needle while sewing. 指的是戴在手指头上用于顶针的一种工具，容量很小，作用中国俗称“顶针”相似，但形状不一样，thimble不是中空的。这也跟我们平时看到的翻译一致。故翻译修改为：当天上掉金子的时候，应该拿桶去接，而不是顶针。
原文：Steve Ballmer, of Microsoft, and Jeff Immelt, of GE, can tell you about that problem, suffering as they do from the nosebleed prices at which their stocks traded when they were handed the managerial baton.
肖良版：微软的史蒂夫鲍尔默（Steve Ballmer）和通用电气的杰夫伊梅尔特（Jeff Immelt）对此就有体会，他们在接掌这些企业时，都遭遇股价暴跌到令人流鼻血的地步。
这里面 nosebleed 的含义是「非常高」而不是指跌到流鼻血，属于翻译错误，调整为：微软的史蒂夫点·鲍尔默（Steve Ballmer）和通用电气的杰夫·伊梅尔特（Jeff Immelt）对此就有体会，他们在接掌这些企业时，就遭遇了高得吓人的股票交易价格下跌的过程。
Footnotes
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All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. ↩