原文信息：
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Relative Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 10.0 | 13.8 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (11.7) | 32.0 |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 30.9 | (19.9) |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | (8.4) | 24.6 |
| 1970 | 12.0 | 3.9 | 8.1 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 1.8 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 2.8 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (14.8) | 19.5 |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (26.4) | 31.9 |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 37.2 | (15.3) |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 23.6 | 35.7 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | (7.4) | 39.3 |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 6.4 | 17.6 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 18.2 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.3 | (13.0) |
| 1981 | 31.4 | (5.0) | 36.4 |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 21.4 | 18.6 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 9.9 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 7.5 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 31.6 | 16.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 18.6 | 7.5 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 14.4 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 3.5 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 31.7 | 12.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (3.1) | 10.5 |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 30.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 7.6 | 12.7 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 10.1 | 4.2 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 12.6 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 5.5 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 23.0 | 8.8 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 33.4 | .7 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 28.6 | 19.7 |
| 1999 | .5 | 21.0 | (20.5) |
| 2000 | 6.5 | (9.1) | 15.6 |
| 2001 | (6.2) | (11.9) | 5.7 |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (22.1) | 32.1 |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 28.7 | (7.7) |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 10.9 | (.4) |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 1.5 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 15.8 | 2.6 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (37.0) | 27.4 |
| Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2008 | 20.3% | 8.9% | 11.4 |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2008 | 362,319% | 4,276% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our decrease in net worth during 2008 was 19 to $70,530, a rate of 20.3% compounded annually.1
公司2008年的账面价值减少 115 亿美元，A/B 股每股账面价值下降了 9.6%（标普-31.8%），自现任管理层接手的 44 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 70,530 美元，年复合成长率约为 20.3%。1
The table on the preceding page, recording both the 44-year performance of Berkshire’s book value and the S&P 500 index, shows that 2008 was the worst year for each. The period was devastating as well for corporate and municipal bonds, real estate and commodities. By yearend, investors of all stripes were bloodied and confused, much as if they were small birds that had strayed into a badminton game.
上表记录的伯克希尔股票账面价值和标普指数过去 44 年的表现显示，2008 年对两者都是最坏的年景。这一时期对于企业和市政债券、房地产和大宗商品市场来说也是灾难性的。截至年底，各种类型的投资者晕头转向且伤痕累累，仿佛一群误入羽毛球赛场的小鸟。
As the year progressed, a series of life-threatening problems within many of the world’s great financial institutions was unveiled. This led to a dysfunctional credit market that in important respects soon turned non-functional. The watchword throughout the country became the creed I saw on restaurant walls when I was young: “In God we trust; all others pay cash.”
这一年中，随着时间推移，世界上很多大金融机构内的致命问题暴露出来。这使得机能紊乱的信贷市场在很多重要领域失去功能。我年幼时在一家餐馆墙壁上看到的标语成为现在社会上的口号：“我们只相信上帝，其余人请付现金。”
By the fourth quarter, the credit crisis, coupled with tumbling home and stock prices, had produced a paralyzing fear that engulfed the country. A freefall in business activity ensued, accelerating at a pace that I have never before witnessed. The U.S. — and much of the world — became trapped in a vicious negative-feedback cycle. Fear led to business contraction, and that in turn led to even greater fear.
到了第四季度，信贷危机加上房价和股市的暴跌，导致了人们严重的恐惧情绪，席卷了整个国家。随之而来的是整个商业活动的自由落体运动，而且是我前所未见的加速下落。美国和世界的大部分地区都陷入了一种恶性负反馈循环。恐惧导致商业萎缩，商业萎缩导致了更大的恐惧。
This debilitating spiral has spurred our government to take massive action. In poker terms, the Treasury and the Fed have gone “all in.” Economic medicine that was previously meted out by the cupful has recently been dispensed by the barrel. These once-unthinkable dosages will almost certainly bring on unwelcome aftereffects. Their precise nature is anyone’s guess, though one likely consequence is an onslaught of inflation. Moreover, major industries have become dependent on Federal assistance, and they will be followed by cities and states bearing mind-boggling requests. Weaning these entities from the public teat will be a political challenge. They won’t leave willingly.
不断螺旋上升的悲观气氛促使政府不得不采取大规模行动。用扑克牌局的术语描述，财政部和美联储已经全押 ALL IN。如果说此前为经济开出的药都是论杯装，那最近就是论桶。这些曾经不可想象的用药剂量几乎必然带来不受欢迎的后遗症。尽管一个可能的后果是恶性通货膨胀，但是它们的确切后果谁也说不准。此外，主要行业都变得依赖于政府的援助，紧随其后的是各市和州提出的各种难以置信的请求。让这些机构从公共财政乳头上断奶，将会是一项政治挑战。他们才不会自愿离开。
Whatever the downsides may be, strong and immediate action by government was essential last year if the financial system was to avoid a total breakdown. Had one occurred, the consequences for every area of our economy would have been cataclysmic. Like it or not, the inhabitants of Wall Street, Main Street and the various Side Streets of America were all in the same boat.
即使负面影响非常大，但为了让金融系统避免彻底崩溃，政府去年采取的强有力的紧急措施是必不可少的。一旦金融体系彻底崩溃，所有的经济领域都将造受灾难性的后果。不论你是否喜欢，华尔街、主街和美国街道上的所有人现在都在同一条船上。
Amid this bad news, however, never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past. In the 20th Century alone, we dealt with two great wars (one of which we initially appeared to be losing); a dozen or so panics and recessions; virulent inflation that led to a 21.5 % prime rate in 1980; and the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment ranged between 15% and 25% for many years. America has had no shortage of challenges.
尽管身处坏消息之中，但不要忘记，我们的国家曾经面临过比这更糟糕的局面。仅仅在 20 世纪，我们就经历过两次大战（其中有一次我们似乎都要输掉战争了），十多次的恐慌和衰退。1980 年的恶性通货膨胀，曾导致利率高达 21.5％。还有 1930 年代的大萧条，失业率一直在 15-25％ 间徘徊。美国可从不缺挑战。
Without fail, however, we’ve overcome them. In the face of those obstacles — and many others — the real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven -fold during the 1900s, while the Dow Jones Industrials rose from 66 to 11,497. Compare the record of this period with the dozens of centuries during which humans secured only tiny gains, if any, in how they lived. Though the path has not been smooth, our economic system has worked extraordinarily well over time. It has unleashed human potential as no other system has, and it will continue to do so. America’s best days lie ahead.
然后，我们成功的克服了它们。面对这些障碍，以及其他很多障碍，美国人的实际生活水准在 20 世纪提高了七倍，道琼斯工业指数从 66 点上升到 11,497 点。与之形成对比的是，在之前数十个世纪中，人类在生活上的改善微乎其微（如果有的话）。尽管前进之路并不平坦，但我们的经济体系在过去运转得非常不错。没有其他体系能像它那样激发出人类的潜力，而且这套体系还会继续如此运作。美国最好的日子还在前头。
Take a look again at the 44-year table on page 2. In 75% of those years, the S&P stocks recorded a gain. I would guess that a roughly similar percentage of years will be positive in the next 44. But neither Charlie Munger, my partner in running Berkshire, nor I can predict the winning and losing years in advance. (In our usual opinionated view, we don’t think anyone else can either.) We’re certain, for example, that the economy will be in shambles throughout 2009 — and, for that matter, probably well beyond — but that conclusion does not tell us whether the stock market will rise or fall.
在过去 44 年中，75％ 的时间标普指数实现正收益。我猜，在接下来 44 年中，大概有相同比例的年份也相当不错。但无论是管理伯克希尔的合伙人查理·芒格还是我，都不能提前预知未来年景的好坏。我们固执的认为，其他人也做不到。我们能确定的是，2009 年的经济状况将会惨不忍睹，就这一点而言，和可能会持续很久。但是这个结论也不能告诉我们股市会涨还是会跌。
In good years and bad, Charlie and I simply focus on four goals:
无论年景是好是坏，查理和我都简单地专注以下四个目标：
(1) maintaining Berkshire’s Gibraltar-like financial position, which features huge amounts of excess liquidity, near-term obligations that are modest, and dozens of sources of earnings and cash;
(1) 保持伯克希尔直布罗陀海峡般宽阔的财务状况。这意味着要有大量的流动性、适度的短期债务、以及数十个收益与现金的来源；
(2) widening the “moats” around our operating businesses that give them durable competitive advantages;
(3) acquiring and developing new and varied streams of earnings;
(3) 收购和拓展各种各样新的利润来源；
(4) expanding and nurturing the cadre of outstanding operating managers who, over the years, have delivered Berkshire exceptional results.
(4) 扩大和培养优秀的管理团队，这些人多年来为伯克希尔创造出非凡价值。
Berkshire in 2008 伯克希尔的 2008 年
Most of the Berkshire businesses whose results are significantly affected by the economy earned below their potential last year, and that will be true in 2009 as well. Our retailers were hit particularly hard, as were our operations tied to residential construction. In aggregate, however, our manufacturing, service and retail businesses earned substantial sums and most of them — particularly the larger ones — continue to strengthen their competitive positions. Moreover, we are fortunate that Berkshire’s two most important businesses — our insurance and utility groups — produce earnings that are not correlated to those of the general economy. Both businesses delivered outstanding results in 2008 and have excellent prospects.
去年，伯克希尔生意中的大多数都受到经济下行的显著影响，盈利低于潜在水平，而且 2009 年还会如此。我们的零售业务受到的打击尤其严重，我们和建筑相关的制造业务也是这样。尽管如此，总体而言，我们的制造业、服务业和零售业的收益相当可观，它们中的大多数，尤其是那些规模较大的业务，继续巩固其竞争优势。更值得庆幸的是，伯克希尔的两项最重要的业务：保险和公用事业集团，产生的利润和整体经济相关性不大。这两项业务在 2008 年都取得了出色的业绩，前景也都非常好。
As predicted in last year’s report, the exceptional underwriting profits that our insurance businesses realized in 2007 were not repeated in 2008. Nevertheless, the insurance group delivered an underwriting gain for the sixth consecutive year. This means that our 58.5 billion of insurance “float” -- money that doesn’t belong to us but that we hold and invest for our own benefit -- cost us less than zero. In fact, we were _paid_ 2.8 billion to hold our float during 2008. Charlie and I find this enjoyable.
正如去年年报中提到的，2007 年我们保险业务实现的卓越的承保利润在 2008 年不会再现。不过，保险集团还是连续第六年实现承保盈利。这意味着我们保险业的 585 亿浮存金虽然不属于我们，但是由我们持有，并经由投资产生收益，我们却什么都不用付出。事实上，持有这笔浮存金在 2008 年还给我们带来了 28 亿美元的收益。查理和我发现这买卖还真不错。
Over time, most insurers experience a substantial underwriting loss, which makes their economics far different from ours. Of course, we too will experience underwriting losses in some years. But we have the best group of managers in the insurance business, and in most cases they oversee entrenched and valuable franchises. Considering these strengths, I believe that we will earn an underwriting profit over the years and that our float will therefore cost us nothing. Our insurance operation, the core business of Berkshire, is an economic powerhouse.
大多数保险公司都经历了严重的承保损失，这让它们的经济状况远不同于我们。当然，在某些年份我们也会经历承保损失。但我们拥有保险行业最优秀的经理人团队，多数情况下，他们管理着根深蒂固的有价值的特许经营权。考虑到这些优势，我相信我们会持续实现承保盈利，我们持有的浮存金也不会产生任何成本。保险业是伯克希尔核心业务，是我们经济上的发动机。
Charlie and I are equally enthusiastic about our utility business, which had record earnings last year and is poised for future gains. Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, the managers of this operation, have achieved results unmatched elsewhere in the utility industry. I love it when they come up with new projects because in this capital-intensive business these ventures are often large. Such projects offer Berkshire the opportunity to put out substantial sums at decent returns.
查理和我对我们的公用事业业务同样乐观，该业务去年实现了盈利，而且未来前景也将是平稳的。该业务的经理人 Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel ，取得了在公用事业行业从未有过的成绩。每当他们发现新的项目我都会欢喜雀跃。在这个资本密集的行业，每个项目投资都会很大，这让伯克希尔能够把大量资金投入到有不错回报的行业。
Things also went well on the capital-allocation front last year. Berkshire is always a buyer of both businesses and securities, and the disarray in markets gave us a tailwind in our purchases. When investing, pessimism is your friend, euphoria the enemy.
In our insurance portfolios, we made three large investments on terms that would be unavailable in normal markets. These should add about $1.5 billion pre-tax to Berkshire’s annual earnings and offer possibilities for capital gains as well. We also closed on our Marmon acquisition (we own 64% of the company now and will purchase its remaining stock over the next six years). Additionally, certain of our subsidiaries made “tuck-in” acquisitions that will strengthen their competitive positions and earnings.
在保险领域，我们做了三项在正常市场环境下无法完成的重大投资。这些投资会给伯克希尔带来 15 亿税前收益以及相应的资本利得的可能。我们完成了对 Marmon 的收购（现在拥有 64％ 股份，并将在未来 6 年内购买剩余股份）。此外，我们的子公司也进行了补强收购以增强其竞争优势和盈利能力。
That’s the good news. But there’s another less pleasant reality: During 2008 I did some dumb things in investments. I made at least one major mistake of commission and several lesser ones that also hurt. I will tell you more about these later. Furthermore, I made some errors of omission, sucking my thumb when new facts came in that should have caused me to re-examine my thinking and promptly take action.
好消息到此为之。还有些不太让人高兴的事实：2008 年我做了一些愚蠢的投资。我至少犯了一个重大错误，还有多个小错误，但也造成了不良后果。稍后我会更详细解释。此外，我还犯了一些疏忽大意的错误，当新情况出现时，我本应重新审视自己的想法、然后迅速采取行动，但我却只知道咬着大拇指发愣。
Additionally, the market value of the bonds and stocks that we continue to hold suffered a significant decline along with the general market. This does not bother Charlie and me. Indeed, we enjoy such price declines if we have funds available to increase our positions. Long ago, Ben Graham taught me that “Price is what you pay; value is what you get.” Whether we’re talking about socks or stocks, I like buying quality merchandise when it is marked down.
另外，我们长期持有的债券及股票市值受到市场大跌的影响。这并不让我和查理恼怒。的确，当我们有足够的资金去增加我们仓位的时候，我们反而很享受这样的价格下跌。很久以前，格雷厄姆告诉我“价格是你所支付的，价值是你所得到的”。无论我们所谈论是袜子或者是股票，我总是喜欢在市场下跌时，购买足够多的货物。
Yardsticks 业绩衡量
Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend those totaled 58.5 billion of that total is funded by our insurance float.
伯克希尔的价值主要来自两个领域。首先是我们的投资：股票、债券和类现金。到年底时，这部分资产价值为 1,220 亿美元(其中不包含由我们旗下的金融部门和公用事业子公司持有的投资，这些被列入第二部分价值)。其中有 585 亿美元的投资，来自于我们保险业务浮存金（48% 资金来自零成本杠杆）。
Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 67 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 96. We exclude our insurance earnings from this calculation because the value of our insurance operation comes from the investable funds it generates, and we have already included this factor in our first bucket.
In 2008, our investments fell from 77,793, a decrease that was caused by a decline in market prices, not by net sales of stocks or bonds. Our second segment of value fell from pre-tax earnings of 3,921 (again after minority interest).
2008 年，伯克希尔的投资规模（剔除少数股东权益），从每股 90,343 美元下跌到77,793 美元，这种下降主要由整体市场的暴跌引发，而不是由于市场对股票或债券的抛售。第二部分价值每股税前收益（（也剔除了少数股东权益））从 4,093 美元下降到 3,921 美元。
Both of these performances are unsatisfactory. Over time, we need to make decent gains in each area if we are to increase Berkshire’s intrinsic value at an acceptable rate. Going forward, however, our focus will be on the earnings segment, just as it has been for several decades. We like buying underpriced securities, but we like buying fairly-priced operating businesses even more.
两个部分的表现都不让人满意。如果我们希望以一个可接受的速率增加伯克希尔的固定资产价值，我们需要在每个领域内都取得可观的增长。当然，我们会始终聚焦在能带来持续利润的领域，正如我们数十年来一直做的那样。我们喜欢购买那些被低估的安全资产，但是我们更喜欢购买那些价格公道的公司。
Now, let’s take a look at the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each of these has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together, as is done in standard financial statements, impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.
现在让我们看看伯克希尔的四个主要运营部分。每一领域的资产负债表结构和收入计算方法都迥然不同。因此，把它们合并到一起，如标准的金融报告所做的那样，只会妨碍我们的分析。因此我们把它们分成四个独立部分，查理和我正是如此想的。
Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务
Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million end users make it the U.K.’s third largest distributor of electricity; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 723,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 9% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.
在伯克希尔拥有 87.4% 股权的中美能源控股公司旗下，包含许多不同种类的公用事业的营运。其中最大的分别为：（1）约克郡电力与北方电力公司（Yorkshire Electricity，Northern Electric），拥有 380 万电力用户，为英国第三大的电力分销商；（2）中美能源(MidAmerican Energy)，在爱荷华州拥有 72.3 万电力用户；（3）太平洋电力与洛基山电力公司(Pacific Power，Rocky Mountain Power)，在美西 6 州拥有 170 万电力用户；（4）科恩河与北方天然管道公司（Kern River，Northern Natural pipelines），供应全美 9% 的天然气消耗量。
Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel, and my long-time friend, Walter Scott. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Nine years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have reinforced my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
我们在中美能源控股的合伙人包括两位了不起的管理者 Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel，以及我的老友 Walter Scott。每个合伙人拥有多少投票权并不重要。因为只有我们达成一致时才会做出重大决定。同 Dave、Greg 和 Walter 的 9 年合作让我深信，我们再找不到比他们更好的搭档了。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 21 locally-branded firms that have 16, agents. Last year was a terrible year for home sales, and 2009 looks no better. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.
有些让人不协调的是，中美能源还拥有全美第二大房地产经纪商美国家庭服务公司HomeServices。这家公司有 21 个地方品牌和 16,000 个代理商。去年是房地产销售的恐怖之年，2009 年也好不到哪儿去。不过，我们会在合理价格水平上，继续收购一些优质经纪公司。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
中美能源公司关键运营数据：
| 2008 Earnings (in $ millions) 2008年收益（百万美元） | 2007 Earnings (in $ millions) 2007年收益（百万美元） | |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities 英国电力 | $ 339 | $ 337 |
| Iowa utility 爱荷华电力 | 425 | 412 |
| Western utilities 西部电力 | 703 | 692 |
| Pipelines 管道运输业务 | 595 | 473 |
| HomeServices 家庭服务 | (45) | 42 |
| Other (Net) 其他 | 186 | 130 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes 息税前收益 | 2,203 | 2,086 |
| Constellation Energy* 投资星座[[Energy_Industry | 能源]]* | 1,092 |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire 利息支出-其它企业债务 | (332) | (312) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt 利息支出-[[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]次级[[Bonds | 债券]] |
| Income tax 所得税 | (1,002) | (477) |
| Net Earnings 净收益 | $ 1,850 | $ 1,189 |
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire** 归属于[[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]净收益** | $ 1,704 |
| Debt Owed to Others 应付其它企业债务 | 19,145 | 19,002 |
| Debt Owed to Berkshire 应付[[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]债务 | 1,087 |
* Consists of a breakup fee of 917 million.
* 47 亿并购星座能源失败，获得 1.75 亿美元分手费和 9.17 亿美元优先股转股收益。
** Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of 70 in 2007.2
MidAmerican’s record in operating its regulated electric utilities and natural gas pipelines is truly outstanding. Here’s some backup for that claim.
中美能源在政府管制的电气和天然气管道服务方面的运营非常出色。主要基于以下几点原因。
Our two pipelines, Kern River and Northern Natural, were both acquired in 2002. A firm called Mastio regularly ranks pipelines for customer satisfaction. Among the 44 rated, Kern River came in 9th when we purchased it and Northern Natural ranked 39th. There was work to do.
公司于 2002 年收购科恩河及北方天然管道公司。根据 Mastio 公司的客户满意度排名，当时在总计 44 家公司中，科恩河排名第 9，北方天然排名 39 。我们有许多工作要做。
In Mastio’s 2009 report, Kern River ranked 1stand Northern Natural 3rd. Charlie and I couldn’t be more proud of this performance. It came about because hundreds of people at each operation committed themselves to a new culture and then delivered on their commitment.
在 Mastio 2009 年的报告中，科恩河排名升至第 1 ，而北方天然排名第 3 。对于这样的业绩我们非常的骄傲。这主要得益于每个运营部门所有员工对新文化的认同以及全心全意的付出。
Achievements at our electric utilities have been equally impressive. In 1995, MidAmerican became the major provider of electricity in Iowa. By judicious planning and a zeal for efficiency, the company has kept electric prices unchanged since our purchase and has promised to hold them steady through 2013.
我们在电力事业的成就同样令人瞩目。1995 年，中美能源成为爱荷华州的主要电力供应者。通过精确规划和效率提升，从我们进入以来，公司就一直维系着电价不变，并且会继续保持价格稳定到 2013 年。
MidAmerican has maintained this extraordinary price stability while making Iowa number one among all states in the percentage of its generation capacity that comes from wind. Since our purchase, MidAmerican’s wind-based facilities have grown from zero to almost 20% of total capacity.
Similarly, when we purchased PacifiCorp in 2006, we moved aggressively to expand wind generation. Wind capacity was then 33 megawatts. It’s now 794, with more coming. (Arriving at PacifiCorp, we found “wind” of a different sort: The company had 98 committees that met frequently. Now there are 28. Meanwhile, we generate and deliver considerably more electricity, doing so with 2% fewer employees.)
类似的还有我们在 2006 年购买了太平洋电力公司之后，我们积极的扩张风电设施。风电装机容量从 33 兆瓦上升到 794 兆瓦，未来将进一步上升。（在太平洋电力公司，我们发现另外一股“风”潮：以前该公司经常碰面的有 98 个委员会。现在仅剩下 28 个。同时，我们的发电量和输电量大幅增加，而员工却减少了 2%）。
In 2008 alone, MidAmerican spent 1.8 billion to the $1.1 billion of pre-tax earnings of PacifiCorp (shown in the table as “Western”) and Iowa. In our utility business, we spend all we earn, and then some, in order to fulfill the needs of our service areas. Indeed, MidAmerican has not paid a dividend since Berkshire bought into the company in early 2000. Its earnings have instead been reinvested to develop the utility systems our customers require and deserve. In exchange, we have been allowed to earn a fair return on the huge sums we have invested. It’s a great partnership for all concerned.
在 2008 年，中美能源旗下两家子公司在风力发电领域投入 18 亿美元，现在我们的风电装机容量在全美受监管的公用事业中排名第一。顺便提一下，将这 18 亿美元与太平洋电力（表中的“西部公用事业”）和爱荷华州电力 11 亿美元的税前收益相比。在公共事业领域，我们将经营收益全部再投入，以满足电力服务领域的投资需求。自从伯克希尔 2000 年初购买公司之后，公司从未分红，所有收益被再投资到公用事业领域以满足客户需求上。作为回报，我们的巨额投资被允许获得合理的回报。这对所有相关方来说，均是一次伟大的合作。
Our long-avowed goal is to be the “buyer of choice” for businesses — particularly those built and owned by families. The way to achieve this goal is to deserve it. That means we must keep our promises; avoid leveraging up acquired businesses; grant unusual autonomy to our managers; and hold the purchased companies through thick and thin (though we prefer thick and thicker).
在商业上，我们长期以来的公开目标就是成为“最佳买家”，尤其是对那些由家族创立和拥有的生意。想拥有这个称号，就必须配得上这个称号。这意味着我们必须坚守承诺：避免杠杆收购；给予经理人极大的自主权；和被收购公司同甘共苦，好坏共度（尽管我们更喜欢公司越来越好）。
Our record matches our rhetoric. Most buyers competing against us, however, follow a different path. For them, acquisitions are “merchandise.” Before the ink dries on their purchase contracts, these operators are contemplating “exit strategies.” We have a decided advantage, therefore, when we encounter sellers who truly care about the future of their businesses.
过去的历史表明我们言行一致。同我们竞争的大多数买家都不走我们这条路。对他们而言，收购就像买卖萝卜白菜，合约墨迹未干，收购者已经在考虑“退出策略”，寻找下家。因此，当我们碰到那些真正关心自己生意未来的出售者时，我们拥有压倒性优势。
Some years back our competitors were known as “leveraged-buyout operators.” But LBO became a bad name. So in Orwellian fashion, the buyout firms decided to change their moniker. What they did not change, though, were the essential ingredients of their previous operations, including their cherished fee structures and love of leverage.
几年前，我们的竞争对手被称为“杠杆收购者”（LBO）。但是杠杆收购后来声名狼藉。因此，以 Orwellian 式的方式收购者决定改头换面。但是他们的所作所为全都未变，比如他们深爱的收费结构和对杠杆资金的热爱。
Their new label became “private equity,” a name that turns the facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing. A number of these acquirees, purchased only two to three years ago, are now in mortal danger because of the debt piled on them by their private-equity buyers. Much of the bank debt is selling below 70¢ on the dollar, and the public debt has taken a far greater beating. The private-equity firms, it should be noted, are not rushing in to inject the equity their wards now desperately need. Instead, they’re keeping their remaining funds very private.
它们的新马甲是“私募股权基金”（PE）。这个称号颇具颠倒事实的误导性。这些公司收购一项业务，几乎总是导致被收购方资本结构中的股权资本，相比收购之前大幅减少。一些才被收购了两三年的公司，发现自己被 PE 加给它们的债务推到命悬一线的境地。今天，银行债券大都在以低于票面价值七折的价格出售，政府公债价格更低。尽管如此，应注意的是，PE 公司并没有对它们的监护公司注入它们急需的股权投资，相反，它们把自己还剩下的资金牢牢掌控在自己手里，相当“自私”。
In the regulated utility field there are no large family-owned businesses. Here, Berkshire hopes to be the “buyer of choice” of regulators. It is they, rather than selling shareholders, who judge the fitness of purchasers when transactions are proposed.
There is no hiding your history when you stand before these regulators. They can — and do — call their counterparts in other states where you operate and ask how you have behaved in respect to all aspects of the business, including a willingness to commit adequate equity capital.
当你站在监管者面前时，你的历史是无法掩盖的。他们能——而且也会——打电话给你所在各州的合作机构，调查你之前在业务各方面的表现，包括你是否愿意投入足够的资本。
When MidAmerican proposed its purchase of PacifiCorp in 2005, regulators in the six new states we would be serving immediately checked our record in Iowa. They also carefully evaluated our financing plans and capabilities. We passed this examination, just as we expect to pass future ones.
在 2005 年中美能源提出收购 PacifiCorp 时，六个州的监管机构迅速检查了我们在爱荷华州的纪录。他们还仔细评估了我们的财务计划和融资能力。我们通过了检验。我们希望我们能一如既往地通过未来的各种检验。
There are two reasons for our confidence. First, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel are going to run any businesses with which they are associated in a first-class manner. They don’t know of any other way to operate. Beyond that is the fact that we hope to buy more regulated utilities in the future — and we know that our business behavior in jurisdictions where we are operating today will determine how we are welcomed by new jurisdictions tomorrow.
我们的信心来自两个方面。首先，Dave Sokol 和 Greg Abel 会始终以一流的水准来管理与他们相关的任何业务，他们根本不知道任何其它的方式。其次，我们希望在未来能购买更多受管制的公用事业业务，我们知道，明天是否受监管机构的欢迎，取决于今天我们如何表现。
Insurance 保险业务
Our insurance group has propelled Berkshire’s growth since we first entered the business in 1967. This happy result has not been due to general prosperity in the industry. During the 25 years ending in 2007, return on net worth for insurers averaged 8.5% versus 14.0% for the Fortune 500. Clearly our insurance CEOs have not had the wind at their back. Yet these managers have excelled to a degree Charlie and I never dreamed possible in the early days. Why do I love them? Let me count the ways.
自从 1967 年我们进入这个行业以来，保险业就一直在推动伯克希尔的增长。这个让人欣喜的结果并不是由该行业的普遍繁荣带来的。截至 2007 年年底，过去 25 年时间内，按市值计算，保险业的平均投资回报率是 8.5％，财富 500 强是 14％。很明显，我们在保险业的 CEO 们并不占天时地利。但这些经理的表现却远超出查理和我早先的预计。我爱死他们了。
At GEICO, Tony Nicely — now in his 48th year at the company after joining it when he was 18 — continues to gobble up market share while maintaining disciplined underwriting. When Tony became CEO in 1993, GEICO had 2.0% of the auto insurance market, a level at which the company had long been stuck. Now we have a 7.7% share, up from 7.2% in 2007.
Tony Nicely 在 18 岁时加入 GEICO，如今已在公司工作超过 48 年，他在坚持严格的承销纪律的同时，不断扩大市场份额。当他在 1993 年成为公司 CEO 时，GEICO 在车险领域仅有 2％ 的市场份额，公司很长时间以来一直徘徊在这个市场份额上下。现在我们的市场份额已经从 2007 年的 7.2％ 上升到了 7.7%。
The combination of new business gains and an improvement in the renewal rate on existing business has moved GEICO into the number three position among auto insurers. In 1995, when Berkshire purchased control, GEICO was number seven. Now we trail only State Farm and Allstate.
新业务的收益和现有业务的继续率的提高使得 GEICO 跃居车辆保险领域的第三名。在 1995 年，当伯克希尔取得控制权的时候，GEICO 排名第七。现在我们仅次于州立农业保险 State Farm 和好事达保险 Allstate。
GEICO grows because it saves money for motorists. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But virtually everyone likes to drive. So, sensibly, drivers look for the lowest-cost insurance consistent with first-class service. Efficiency is the key to low cost, and efficiency is Tony’s specialty. Five years ago the number of policies per employee was 299. In 2008, the number was 439, a huge increase in productivity.
GEICO 增长的原因是它能为车险购买人省钱。没人喜欢购买车险，但是基本上人人都喜欢开车。因此，明智的做法是，司机喜欢寻找保险费用最低但服务一流的保险公司。高效率是低成本的关键，而效率正是 Tony 的专长。五年前，每个雇员能获得 299 张保单。2008 年，这个数字是 439 张。生产力极大提高。
As we view GEICO’s current opportunities, Tony and I feel like two hungry mosquitoes in a nudist camp. Juicy targets are everywhere. First, and most important, our new business in auto insurance is now exploding. Americans are focused on saving money as never before, and they are flocking to GEICO. In January 2009, we set a monthly record — by a wide margin — for growth in policyholders. That record will last exactly 28 days: As we go to press, it’s clear February’s gain will be even better.
当我们审视 GEICO 现在当前的市场机会时，Tony 和我就像裸体夏令营中的两只饥饿的蚊子，利润丰厚的猎物无处不在。首先最重要的是我们汽车保险的新业务正在爆发式增长。美国人前所未有的专注于省钱，他们成群结队的走向 GEICO。2009 年 1 月，我们创下保单增长的最高月度记录，这一纪录足足持续了 28 天。当我们印刷本报告的时候，显示 2 月的增幅更加的好。
Beyond this, we are gaining ground in allied lines. Last year, our motorcycle policies increased by 23.4%, which raised our market share from about 6% to more than 7%. Our RV and ATV businesses are also growing rapidly, albeit from a small base. And, finally, we recently began insuring commercial autos, a big market that offers real promise.
除此之外，我们的其它业务也齐头并进。去年，我们摩托车保险增加了 23.4%，使我们的市场份额从 6% 上升到 7% 。我们房车 RV 和全地形车 ATV 同样实现快速增长，尽管其基数很少。最后，我们开始进入商业汽车保险领域，这是一个大有前途的市场。
GEICO is now saving money for millions of Americans. Go to GEICO.com or call 1-800-847-7536 and see if we can save you money as well.
GEICO 现在正在为成百上千的美国人省钱。登录 GEICO.com 或者电话800-847-7536看我们是否也能为你省钱。
General Re, our large international reinsurer, also had an outstanding year in 2008. Some time back, the company had serious problems (which I totally failed to detect when we purchased it in late 1998). By 2001, when Joe Brandon took over as CEO, assisted by his partner, Tad Montross, General Re’s culture had further deteriorated, exhibiting a loss of discipline in underwriting, reserving and expenses. After Joe and Tad took charge, these problems were decisively and successfully addressed. Today General Re has regained its luster. Last spring Joe stepped down, and Tad became CEO. Charlie and I are grateful to Joe for righting the ship and are certain that, with Tad, General Re’s future is in the best of hands.
我们最大的国际再保险公司通用再保险公司 2008 年也表现不凡。不久之前，这家公司还存在非常严重的问题（我们在 1998 年购买它时毫无察觉）。2001 年，Joe Brandon在其搭档Tad Montross协助接任 CEO 时，公司的情形还在进一步恶化。在承保、储备金以及费用方面都失去了纪律。Joe 和 Tad 上任之后，这些问题都得到了果断和成功的解决。今天通用再保险已经重新焕发光彩。去年春天 Joe 退休（因牵涉 AIG 财务造假丑闻被迫辞职，后加入 Alleghany 保险公司，并促成 2021 年 116 亿美元的收购），Tad 接替他成为 CEO。查理和我对 Joe 扶正公司航向的工作感激不尽，同时我们也相信，Tad 正是通用再保险所需的那个正确的领导者。
Reinsurance is a business of long-term promises, sometimes extending for fifty years or more. This past year has retaught clients a crucial principle: A promise is no better than the person or institution making it. That’s where General Re excels: It is the only reinsurer that is backed by an AAA corporation. Ben Franklin once said, “It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.” That’s no worry for General Re clients.
再保险业务是一个带有长期承诺的生意，一个保险合同有时会长达 50 年甚至更久。过去的一年，我们再次向客户传到了一个至关重要的原则：承诺并不重要，重要的是这个承诺是由谁做出。这正是通用再保险优势所在：它是惟一一家有 AAA 级公司作为背后支撑的再保险公司。本·富兰克林说过一句话：“空麻袋立不直”(空头承诺靠不住)。通用再保险的客户无需担心这点。
Our third major insurance operation is Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division, headquartered in Stamford and staffed by only 31 employees. This may be one of the most remarkable businesses in the world, hard to characterize but easy to admire.
我们第三大保险业务是 Ajit Jain 的再保险部门。它的总部位于 Stamford，仅有 31名雇员。它可能是世界上最值得称道的公司之一，难以描述但绝对值得赞扬。
From year to year, Ajit’s business is never the same. It features very large transactions, incredible speed of execution and a willingness to quote on policies that leave others scratching their heads. When there is a huge and unusual risk to be insured, Ajit is almost certain to be called.
每一年阿吉特的生意都各不相同，它的特点是大型交易、难以置信的执行速度，以及愿意承保竞争对手不愿触碰的保单。每当有一项保险存在巨大的非同一般的风险时，人们总会想到去找阿吉特。
Ajit came to Berkshire in 1986. Very quickly, I realized that we had acquired an extraordinary talent. So I did the logical thing: I wrote his parents in New Delhi and asked if they had another one like him at home. Of course, I knew the answer before writing. There isn’t anyone like Ajit.
阿吉特在 1986 年加入伯克希尔。用不了多久，我就意识到自己得到了一个超凡的天才。因此我写了一封信给他在新德里的父母，问他们是否还有另外一个这样的孩子。当然，写信之前我就知道答案会是什么。世界上根本不可能有第二个阿吉特。
Our smaller insurers are just as outstanding in their own way as the “big three,” regularly delivering valuable float to us at a negative cost. We aggregate their results below under “Other Primary.” For space reasons, we don’t discuss these insurers individually. But be assured that Charlie and I appreciate the contribution of each.
我们那些稍小些的保险业务也都以自己的方式表现杰出，像我们提到的三巨头一样。定期的以低于零的成本为我们提供宝贵的浮存金。我们将它们归类于“其他”类。出于篇幅考虑，我们不再详细个别讨论。但请相信，查理和我对他们的贡献都感激不已。
Here is the record for the four legs to our insurance stool. The underwriting profits signify that all four provided funds to Berkshire last year without cost, just as they did in 2007. And in both years our underwriting profitability was considerably better than that achieved by the industry. Of course, we ourselves will periodically have a terrible year in insurance. But, overall, I expect us to average an underwriting profit. If so, we will be using free funds of large size for the indefinite future.
下表是我们保险业务的四大核心数据。跟 2007 年一样，承保损益一栏显示去年这四大业务为伯克希尔提供了大量无成本的浮存金。这 2 年，我们的承保业务盈利能力均远远高于行业水平。当然，我们也会周期性的遭遇保险业务糟糕的年份。但是，总体来说，我们预计公司承保利润将达到平均水平。如此一来，我们将在不确定的未来免费使用大规模的资金。
Insurance Operations
保险业务|Underwriting Profit(Loss) 2008 (in millions)
2007年承保损益（百万美元）|Yearend Float 2008 (in millions)
2007年年末浮存金（百万美元）
---|---:|---:|---:|---:
General Re
通用再保险| 555| 23,009
BH Reinsurance
伯克希尔再保险|1,324|1,427|24,221|23,692
GEICO
盖可保险|916|1,113|8,454|7,768
Other Primary
其他直保|210|279|4,739|4,229
Total
合计| 3,374| 58,698
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
伯克希尔在这个事业群的业务，可谓是包罗万象。不过，我们先看看整体的资产负债表及损益表情况。
Balance Sheet 12/31/08 (in $ millions)
资产负债表（2008年12月31日）单位：百万美元
| Assets 资产 | Amt. 金额 | Liabilities and Equity 负债和权益 | Amt. 金额 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents 现金及等价物 | $ 2,497 | Notes payable 应付票据 | $ 2,212 |
| Accounts and notes receivable 应收账款和应收票据 | 5,047 | ||
| Inventory 存货 | 7,500 | ||
| Other current assets 其他流动资产 | 752 | Other current liabilities 其他流动负债 | 8,087 |
| Total current assets 流动资产合计 | 15,796 | Total current liabilities 流动负债合计 | 10,299 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles [[Goodwill | 商誉]]及无形资产 | 16,515 | Deferred taxes 递延所得税 |
| Fixed assets 固定资产 | 16,338 | Term debt and other liabilities 长期负债及其他负债 | 6,033 |
| Other assets 其他非流动资产 | 1,248 | Equity 所有者权益 | 30,779 |
| $ 49,897 | $ 49,897 |
Earnings Statement (in $ millions)
利润表 单位：百万美元
| Item 科目 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues 收入 | $ 66,099 | $ 59,100 | $ 52,660 |
| Operating expenses (including depreciation of 955 in 2007 and $823 in 2006) 营业费用（其中折旧费用：2008年12.80亿美元，2007年9.55亿美元，2006年8.23亿美元） | 61,937 | 55,026 | 49,002 |
| Interest expense 利息费用 | 139 | 127 | 132 |
| Pre-tax earnings 税前利润 | 4,023* | 3,947* | 3,526* |
| Income taxes and minority interests 所得税和少数股东权益 | 1,740 | 1,594 | 1,395 |
| Net income 净利润 | $ 2,283 | $ 2,353 | $ 2,131 |
* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.
* 税前利润不包含购买法会计调整。
This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned an impressive 17.9% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s also noteworthy that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on our balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 8.1%.
这是个五花八门的组合，出售从棒棒糖到房车的各种商品。它们在去年取得了令人印象深刻的 17.9％ 的平均有形净资产回报率。值得注意的是，这些公司只用了很小的财务杠杆就实现了如此回报。显然我们拥有一些很棒的生意。然而我们是以较高的溢价购买的这些公司，这一点反应在我们资产负债表中的商誉科目上，商誉的影响让我们的平均账面价值回报率下降到 8.1％。
Though the full-year result was satisfactory, earnings of many of the businesses in this group hit the skids in last year’s fourth quarter. Prospects for 2009 look worse. Nevertheless, the group retains strong earning power even under today’s conditions and will continue to deliver significant cash to the parent company. Overall, these companies improved their competitive positions last year, partly because our financial strength let us make advantageous tuck-in acquisitions. In contrast, many competitors were treading water (or sinking).
尽管全年整体业绩表现令人满意，但是该业务集团中很多公司的收益在去年第四季度开始走下坡路。2009 年的前景看上去更糟。尽管如此，在今天这种恶劣环境下，这集团仍然具备强劲的盈利能力，会继续为母公司提供可观的现金流。总之，去年这些公司的市场竞争优势都得到了强化，部分原因是我们的财务实力让我们在收购中占据优势。相比之下，很多竞争对手或者在忙着对付危机的洪水，或者正在沉没其中。
The most noteworthy of these acquisitions was Iscar’s late-November purchase of Tungaloy, a leading Japanese producer of small tools. Charlie and I continue to look with astonishment — and appreciation! — at the accomplishments of Iscar’s management. To secure one manager like Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz or Danny Goldman when we acquire a company is a blessing. Getting three is like winning the Triple Crown. Iscar’s growth since our purchase has exceeded our expectations — which were high — and the addition of Tungaloy will move performance to the next level.
最值得一提的是，去年 11 月，Iscar 收购了一家日本领先的小型工具制造商Tungaloy。查理和我对 Iscar 的管理成果又惊奇又赞叹。收购一家公司时，能够得到一名像 Eitan Wertheimer、Jacob Harpaz 或者 Danny Goldman 这样的管理人员，真的是一件幸事，而一次留住三个，简直像赢了三冠王。自我们收购以来，Iscar 的增长速度一直超出我们曾经很高的预期。现在有了 Tungaloy 的助力，这家公司的表现定会如虎添翼。
MiTek, Benjamin Moore, Acme Brick, Forest River, Marmon and CTB also made one or more acquisitions during the year. CTB, which operates worldwide in the agriculture equipment field, has now picked up six small firms since we purchased it in 2002. At that time, we paid 89 million. Vic Mancinelli, its CEO, followed Berkshire-like operating principles long before our arrival. He focuses on blocking and tackling, day by day doing the little things right and never getting off course. Ten years from now, Vic will be running a much larger operation and, more important, will be earning excellent returns on invested capital.
年内，MiTek、Benjamin Moore、Acme Brick、Forest River、Marmon 和 CTB也进行了一次或多次收购。其中 CTB 在世界范围内经营农业设备，自 2002 年被我们收购以来，它已收购了 6 家小公司。当时收购我们支付了 1.4 亿美元，去年它的税前收益是 0.89 亿美元。该公司的 CEO：Vic Mancinelli 早在我们到来之前就一直遵循伯克希尔的经营原则。Mancinelli 擅长排除障碍和解决困难，日复一日的认真地把每一件小事做好，从不偏离正轨。在未来十年里，Vic 将经营规模更大的业务，更重要的是，将从投入资本中获得优异的回报率。
Finance and Financial Products 金融及金融产品
I will write here at some length about the mortgage operation of Clayton Homes and skip any financial commentary, which is summarized in the table at the end of this section. I do this because Clayton’s recent experience may be useful in the public-policy debate about housing and mortgages. But first a little background.
我会在这里稍显冗长地论述下 Clayton Homes 的抵押贷款业务，并跳过所有财务方面的内容，这些内容列在后文的表格中。这样做是因为，Clayton 最近的经历可能会对关于房地产和抵押贷款的公共政策争论有些帮助。首先我们先看一下背景。
Clayton is the largest company in the manufactured home industry, delivering 27,499 units last year. This came to about 34% of the industry’s 81,889 total. Our share will likely grow in 2009, partly because much of the rest of the industry is in acute distress. Industrywide, units sold have steadily declined since they hit a peak of 372,843 in 1998.
Clayton 是住宅建筑行业最大的公司，去年交付了 27,499套住房，这占了整个行业 81,889 套住房的 34％。2009 年我们的市场份额会进一步增加，部分原因是该行业的其他公司正身陷绝境。站在行业角度，自 1998 年达到售出 372,843 套的高峰之后，整个行业的住房销售数量都在稳步下降。
At that time, much of the industry employed sales practices that were atrocious. Writing about the period somewhat later, I described it as involving “borrowers who shouldn’t have borrowed being financed by lenders who shouldn’t have lent.”
在过去一段时期中，该行业中多数销售行为都很糟糕。我曾描述这段时期为，“不该当债主的人把钱借给了不该欠债的人”。
To begin with, the need for meaningful down payments was frequently ignored. Sometimes fakery was involved. (“That certainly looks like a 3,000 commission if the loan goes through.) Moreover, impossible-to-meet monthly payments were being agreed to by borrowers who signed up because they had nothing to lose. The resulting mortgages were usually packaged (“securitized”) and sold by Wall Street firms to unsuspecting investors. This chain of folly had to end badly, and it did.
首先，人们常常忽略首付款在分期付款的中的重要意义。有时候甚至弄虚作假（“在我看来，他们家的猫价值 2000 美元”，销售人员说。如果贷款被批准，他将得到 3000 美元的佣金）。而贷款人也同意签署那些根本无法偿还按月支付的分期付款协议，因为他们没什么可失去的。由此产生的抵押贷款通常被打包（证券化），然后由华尔街出售给毫无戒心的投资者。这一连串的愚蠢行为必将自食其果，事实上也正如此。
Clayton, it should be emphasized, followed far more sensible practices in its own lending throughout that time. Indeed, no purchaser of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of principal or interest. But Clayton was the exception; industry losses were staggering. And the hangover continues to this day.
必须强调的是，Clayton 在那一时期贷出款项时要理性得多。事实上，没有一个购买了 Clayton 抵押贷款证券化产品的投资者损失过一毛钱的本金和利息。但是 Clayton 只是个例外，整个行业都损失惨重，这种状况一直持续到了今天。
This 1997-2000 fiasco should have served as a canary-in-the-coal-mine warning for the far-larger conventional housing market. But investors, government and rating agencies learned exactly nothing from the manufactured-home debacle. Instead, in an eerie rerun of that disaster, the same mistakes were repeated with conventional homes in the 2004-07 period: Lenders happily made loans that borrowers couldn’t repay out of their incomes, and borrowers just as happily signed up to meet those payments. Both parties counted on “house-price appreciation” to make this otherwise impossible arrangement work. It was Scarlett O’Hara all over again: “I’ll think about it tomorrow.” The consequences of this behavior are now reverberating through every corner of our economy.
1997-2000 年的这段预制房屋市场的惨痛教训应该被视为更大范围内的常规住房市场的危险征兆。但事实上，投资者、政府和评级机构完全没有从预制房屋市场的崩溃中吸取任何教训。相反，令人大惑不解的是，在 2004－2007 年在常规住房中这场可拍的灾难重演中：借款人愉悦地把钱借给根本还不起的人；贷款人也毫不犹豫签署了分期付款协议。双方都希望“房价上涨”让这根本不可能实现的安排发挥作用。《飘》中女主人公郝思嘉说得好：“车到山前自有路，明天再考虑也不迟。”如今我们经济的各方面都品尝到了这种行为的苦果。
Clayton’s 198,888 borrowers, however, have continued to pay normally throughout the housing crash, handing us no unexpected losses. This is not because these borrowers are unusually creditworthy, a point proved by FICO scores (a standard measure of credit risk). Their median FICO score is 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35% are below 620, the segment usually designated “sub-prime.” Many disastrous pools of mortgages on conventional homes are populated by borrowers with far better credit, as measured by FICO scores.
然而在整个房地产市场崩塌期间，Clayton 的198,888名贷款者仍然照常偿还债务，没有给我们带来意外损失。这并不是因为这些贷款者信用良好，一个衡量信用风险的标准 FICO 分数显示，我们的贷款者信用分中位数为 644 分，而全国的中位数为 723 分。我们约有35％的贷款人信用分数低于 620 分，这部分人群通常被称为次级贷款人。而灾难性的常规住房抵押贷款中很多贷款者，根据 FICO 的信用评分，则要好得多。
Yet at yearend, our delinquency rate on loans we have originated was 3.6%, up only modestly from 2.9% in 2006 and 2.9% in 2004. (In addition to our originated loans, we’ve also bought bulk portfolios of various types from other financial institutions.) Clayton’s foreclosures during 2008 were 3.0% of originated loans compared to 3.8% in 2006 and 5.3% in 2004.
直到年底，我们的坏账率仅仅从 2006 年和 2004 年的 2.9%轻微上升到 3.6%。除了我们原始贷款外，我们还从其他金融机构购买了各种不同类别的贷款组合。2008 年，Clayton 丧失抵押品赎回权仅占原始贷款的 3%，2006 年为 3.8%，2004 年为 5.3%。
Why are our borrowers — characteristically people with modest incomes and far-from-great credit scores — performing so well? The answer is elementary, going right back to Lending 101. Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage payments would compare with their actual — not hoped-for — income and then decided whether they could live with that commitment. Simply put, they took out a mortgage with the intention of paying it off, whatever the course of home prices.
为什么我们的贷款人表现得这么好？他们收入平平，信用评分也不高。答案非常简单，回到贷款 101 条款，我们的贷款者仅仅是量力贷款，他们会看看其他们的实际收入（而不是期望收入），是否能够偿还贷款。简单来说，他们贷款时就想好了如何偿还，不管房价怎样变化。
Just as important is what our borrowers did not do. They did not count on making their loan payments by means of refinancing. They did not sign up for “teaser” rates that upon reset were outsized relative to their income. And they did not assume that they could always sell their home at a profit if their mortgage payments became onerous. Jimmy Stewart would have loved these folks.
同样重要的还有我们的贷款人没有做什么。他们没有指望依靠再次借钱来偿还贷款。他们没有收到诱惑性的利率吸引，去签订一旦利率重置，就同自己的收入脱节的苛刻的贷款合同。他们也没有假定，当他们无法偿还贷款时，可以通过出售而获利。Jimmy Stewart（道德楷模詹姆斯·史都华）简直爱死他们了。
Of course, a number of our borrowers will run into trouble. They generally have no more than minor savings to tide them over if adversity hits. The major cause of delinquency or foreclosure is the loss of a job, but death, divorce and medical expenses all cause problems. If unemployment rates rise — as they surely will in 2009 — more of Clayton’s borrowers will have troubles, and we will have larger, though still manageable, losses. But our problems will not be driven to any extent by the trend of home prices.
当然，我们的贷款人中也有不少人未来会陷入困境。如果不幸降临，他们并没有太多储蓄以让自己度过难关。让他们违约或丧失抵押赎回权的主要原因是失业，但是死亡、离婚和重病也都会引发问题。如果失业率上升——在 2009 年这是肯定的，更多的贷款人会陷入麻烦。我们将蒙受更大的损失，尽管仍是可控的。但我们的问题同房价走势关系不大。
Commentary about the current housing crisis often ignores the crucial fact that most foreclosures do not occur because a house is worth less than its mortgage (so-called “upside-down” loans). Rather, foreclosures take place because borrowers can’t pay the monthly payment that they agreed to pay. Homeowners who have made a meaningful down-payment — derived from savings and not from other borrowing — seldom walk away from a primary residence simply because its value today is less than the mortgage. Instead, they walk when they can’t make the monthly payments.
关于目前房地产危机的评论往往忽略掉一个关键事实，那就是大多数丧失抵押品赎回权的情况，并不是因为房屋价值低于抵押贷款价值（所谓的贷款倒挂），而是因为贷款者无力偿还月供。那些通过节衣缩食储蓄来支付首付而不是借款的房主，很少是因为房子价值低于抵押贷款而放弃他们的房子。相反，当他们付不起月供时，他们就会被迫离开。
Home ownership is a wonderful thing. My family and I have enjoyed my present home for 50 years, with more to come. But enjoyment and utility should be the primary motives for purchase, not profit or refi possibilities. And the home purchased ought to fit the income of the purchaser.
拥有自己的房子是件好事。我和我的家人在现在的房子里住 50 年了，而且还会一直住下去。但是购买房屋的首要动机应该是家的喜悦和居住本身，而不是指望它盈利和融资。购买房屋也应该同购房者的收入水平相吻合。
The present housing debacle should teach home buyers, lenders, brokers and government some simple lessons that will ensure stability in the future. Home purchases should involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least 10% and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by the borrower’s income. That income should be carefully verified.
目前的房地产危机应当给购房者、贷款商、经纪商和政府一些简单的教训，而这将确保房市将来的稳定。购房人应当实打实地支付至少 10% 的首付款和与收入相匹配的月供款。而且贷款人的收入证明也要仔细核实。
Putting people into homes, though a desirable goal, shouldn’t be our country’s primary objective. Keeping them in their homes should be the ambition.
居者有其屋是个美好的目标，但不应该是我们国家的首要目标。让他们住在自己的房子而不毁约才是应该追求的目标。
Clayton’s lending operation, though not damaged by the performance of its borrowers, is nevertheless threatened by an element of the credit crisis. Funders that have access to any sort of government guarantee — banks with FDIC-insured deposits, large entities with commercial paper now backed by the Federal Reserve, and others who are using imaginative methods (or lobbying skills) to come under the government’s umbrella — have money costs that are minimal. Conversely, highly-rated companies, such as Berkshire, are experiencing borrowing costs that, in relation to Treasury rates, are at record levels. Moreover, funds are abundant for the government-guaranteed borrower but often scarce for others, no matter how creditworthy they may be.
Clayton 的贷款业务尽管没有因贷款人的表现而受损，却受到整个信贷危机的因素威胁。能够获得任何形式的政府担保的出资人，即拥有 FDIC 保险存款的银行、拥有由美联储支持的商业票据的大型实体，以及其他利用富有想象力的方法（或公关能力）而进入政府保护伞的人，他们的资金成本是极低的。相反的，像伯克希尔这样高评级的公司，其资金成本与美国国债利率相比，达到创纪录的高水平。此外，对于政府信用担保的借款人来说，资金是充裕的，而对于别人而言往往是稀缺的，无论他们的信用等级是多么的高。
This unprecedented “spread” in the cost of money makes it unprofitable for any lender who doesn’t enjoy government-guaranteed funds to go up against those with a favored status. Government is determining the “haves” and “have-nots.” That is why companies are rushing to convert to bank holding companies, not a course feasible for Berkshire.
对于那些无法享受到政府信用担保的资金而言，这样前所未有的利差使得他们根本无法参与竞争。政府最终决定给钱或者不给。这也就是为什么那些公司急于转型成银行控股公司，而这对伯克希尔来说并不可行。
Though Berkshire’s credit is pristine — we are one of only seven AAA corporations in the country — our cost of borrowing is now far higher than competitors with shaky balance sheets but government backing. At the moment, it is much better to be a financial cripple with a government guarantee than a Gibraltar without one.
尽管伯克希尔的信用是极好的，我们是这个国家中仅有的七家 AAA 评级公司之一。但我们现在的借款成本远高于那些负债表较差但有政府支持的竞争者。在这时候，与财务实力强大但没有政府担保的公司相比，一家有政府担保但财务实力严重残废的公司，要好过的多。
Today’s extreme conditions may soon end. At worst, we believe we will find at least a partial solution that will allow us to continue much of Clayton’s lending. Clayton’s earnings, however, will surely suffer if we are forced to compete for long against government-favored lenders.
目前极端的状况将很快结束。在最坏的情况下，我们相信仍然可以找到一些办法继续开展 Clayton 的贷款业务。但是，如果我们不得不与政府支持的竞争者进行长期竞争的话，Clayton 的收益肯定会受到影响。
| (in $ millions) 百万美元 | Pre-Tax Earnings 2008 2008年税前收益 | Pre-Tax Earnings 2007 2007年税前收益 |
|---|---|---|
| Net investment income 交易-经常性收入 | $ 330 | $ 272 |
| Life and annuity operation 人寿年金业务 | 23 | (60) |
| Leasing operations 租赁业务 | 87 | 111 |
| Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton) 克莱顿金融 | 206 | 526 |
| Other* 其他* | 141 | 157 |
| Income before investment and derivatives gains or losses 投资和衍生产品损益前收入 | $ 787 | $ 1,006 |
* Includes 85 million in 2007 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.3
Tax-Exempt Bond Insurance 免税债券保险
Early in 2008, we activated Berkshire Hathaway Assurance Company (“BHAC”) as an insurer of the tax-exempt bonds issued by states, cities and other local entities. BHAC insures these securities for issuers both at the time their bonds are sold to the public (primary transactions) and later, when the bonds are already owned by investors (secondary transactions).
2008 年初，我们成立了伯克希尔哈撒韦保险公司（BHAC），此公司承保由各州、城市和其它地方机构发行的免税政府债券。当债券首次向公众发售（一级交易），以及债券已经是投资者所有（次级交易）时，BHAC 为这些证券的发行人提供保险。
By yearend 2007, the half dozen or so companies that had been the major players in this business had all fallen into big trouble. The cause of their problems was captured long ago by Mae West: “I was Snow White, but I drifted.”
在 2007 年末，这项业务中六家主要公司都陷入困境。他们问题的原因在很久之前就被 Mae West 看到了：“我是白雪公主，但我是漂白的。”
The monolines (as the bond insurers are called) initially insured only tax-exempt bonds that were low-risk. But over the years competition for this business intensified, and rates fell. Faced with the prospect of stagnating or declining earnings, the monoline managers turned to ever-riskier propositions. Some of these involved the insuring of residential mortgage obligations. When housing prices plummeted, the monoline industry quickly became a basket case.
单一险种保险公司（债券保险人的称呼）最初只承保低风险的免税债券。但之后这个行业竞争激烈，价格降低。出于对收益停滞或下滑的担忧，单一保险的经理们把注意力转向风险较高的债券。其中包括住宅抵押债券。当房价骤然下降，单一保险行业迅速陷入难以救药的状态。
Early in the year, Berkshire offered to assume all of the insurance issued on tax-exempts that was on the books of the three largest monolines. These companies were all in life-threatening trouble (though they said otherwise.) We would have charged a 1.5% rate to take over the guarantees on about $822 billion of bonds. If our offer had been accepted, we would have been required to pay any losses suffered by investors who owned these bonds — a guarantee stretching for 40 years in some cases. Ours was not a frivolous proposal: For reasons we will come to later, it involved substantial risk for Berkshire.
年初，伯克希尔提出承保三家最大的单一保险公司账面上所有的免税政府债券。这些公司都处于危及生存的困难中（虽然他们并不承认）。我们将接管价值 8,220 亿美元债券的担保并收取 1.5% 的费用。如果我们的承保被接受，按照要求我们必须支付这些债券投资者的所有损失，有些情况这一保险长达 40 年。我们并不是草率的提议：之后我们将叙述相关原因，这给伯克希尔带来了巨大的风险。
The monolines summarily rejected our offer, in some cases appending an insult or two. In the end, though, the turndowns proved to be very good news for us, because it became apparent that I had severely underpriced our offer.
单一保险公司马上拒绝了我们提出的报价，有的还附以一两句辱骂。然而他们的拒绝对于我们来说是很好的消息，因为最终事实证明，我们严重低估了这个我们的报价。
Thereafter, we wrote about $15.6 billion of insurance in the secondary market. And here’s the punch line: About 77% of this business was on bonds that were already insured, largely by the three aforementioned monolines. In these agreements, we have to pay for defaults only if the original insurer is financially unable to do so.
在那之后，我们在次级市场承保了价值约 156 亿美元的保险。这里的关键在于，77% 的业务是已经投保的债券，并且多数来自前面提到的三家公司。在这些协议中，我们只需要在原始承保人无法支付违约金的时候才必须支付。
We wrote this “second-to-pay” insurance for rates averaging 3.3%. That’s right; we have been paid far more for becoming the second to pay than the 1.5% we would have earlier charged to be the first to pay. In one extreme case, we actually agreed to be fourth to pay, nonetheless receiving about three times the 1% premium charged by the monoline that remains first to pay. In other words, three other monolines have to first go broke before we need to write a check.
我们承保了这些“第二顺位支付”保险的平均费率为 3.3%。没错，因为我们是第二支付者，我们收取的费率远远多于我们是第一支付者的 1.5%。在某些极端情形下，我们其实同意成为第四支付者，然而收取了是第一支付者 3 倍的保险费，他们收的保费是 1%。换句话说，前面三家单一保险公司都破产了我们才需要签写第一张支票。
Two of the three monolines to which we made our initial bulk offer later raised substantial capital. This, of course, directly helps us , since it makes it less likely that we will have to pay, at least in the near term, any claims on our second-to-pay insurance because these two monolines fail. In addition to our book of secondary business, we have also written 96 million. In primary business, of course, we are first to pay if the issuer gets in trouble.
我们最初提出批量承保的三家保险公司中，有两家后来筹集了足够的资本。当然，这对于我们是有帮助的，因为至少在近期，这两家保险公司的倒闭可能性大幅降低，而我们作为第二支付者支付的可能性也大幅减少了。除了次级业务，我们也承保了价值 37 亿美元的一级业务，保费一共是 9,600 万美元。当然，在一级业务下，如果发行者有麻烦，我们是第一支付者。
We have a great many more multiples of capital behind the insurance we write than does any other monoline. Consequently, our guarantee is far more valuable than theirs. This explains why many sophisticated investors have bought second-to-pay insurance from us even though they were already insured by another monoline. BHAC has become not only the insurer of preference, but in many cases the sole insurer acceptable to bondholders.
在我们承保的保险背后，我们拥有的资本倍数，比其他任何一家单一险种保险公司都要多得多，因此我们的担保比其他保险公司更有价值。这解释了为什么尽管许多老练的投资者已经从其他公司的买了保险，还从我们这里买第二支付者的保险。BHAC 不仅成为了优先承保人，在很多时候还成为了债券持有人唯一能接受的承保人。
Nevertheless, we remain very cautious about the business we write and regard it as far from a sure thing that this insurance will ultimately be profitable for us. The reason is simple, though I have never seen even a passing reference to it by any financial analyst, rating agency or monoline CEO.
尽管如此，我们对于承保的业务还是非常谨慎，并且认为这项保险最终能给公司带来利润是非常不确定的。原因很简单，我从未看过一个金融分析师，评级机构或保险公司的 CEO 的提及此事。
The rationale behind very low premium rates for insuring tax-exempts has been that defaults have historically been few. But that record largely reflects the experience of entities that issued uninsured bonds. Insurance of tax-exempt bonds didn’t exist before 1971, and even after that most bonds remained uninsured.
A universe of tax-exempts fully covered by insurance would be certain to have a somewhat different loss experience from a group of uninsured, but otherwise similar bonds, the only question being how different. To understand why, let’s go back to 1975 when New York City was on the edge of bankruptcy. At the time its bonds — virtually all uninsured — were heavily held by the city’s wealthier residents as well as by New York banks and other institutions. These local bondholders deeply desired to solve the city’s fiscal problems. So before long, concessions and cooperation from a host of involved constituencies produced a solution. Without one, it was apparent to all that New York’s citizens and businesses would have experienced widespread and severe financial losses from their bond holdings.
一个完全由保险覆盖的免税债券，与没有投保的相似债券，在某种程度上必然存在不一样的损失经验，唯一的问题是有多大的不同。要明白这个原因，让我们回到 1975 年，那时候纽约市处在破产的边缘。当时纽约市债券基本上都没有投保，多数被纽约的富人，纽约的银行和其他机构持有。这些地方债券持有者非常希望解决城市的财政问题。因此不久，一群相关的选民通过让步和合作，制定了一个解决方案。如果没有这个机制，所有人都很清楚，纽约市民和企业会因为持有这些债券，而遭受大规模的且严重的经济损失。
Now, imagine that all of the city’s bonds had instead been insured by Berkshire. Would similar belt-tightening, tax increases, labor concessions, etc. have been forthcoming? Of course not. At a minimum, Berkshire would have been asked to “share” in the required sacrifices. And, considering our deep pockets, the required contribution would most certainly have been substantial.
现在想象一下，所有城市的债券都由伯克希尔承保。类似的紧缩开支，增加税收，劳工让步等等让步措施会到来吗？当然不会。至少，伯克希尔会被要求一起承担应有的牺牲。考虑到我们财务实力，被要求的贡献一定是非常巨大的。
Local governments are going to face far tougher fiscal problems in the future than they have to date. The pension liabilities I talked about in last year’s report will be a huge contributor to these woes. Many cities and states were surely horrified when they inspected the status of their funding at yearend 2008. The gap between assets and a realistic actuarial valuation of present liabilities is simply staggering.
未来，地方政府将要面对比目前严峻得多的财政问题。在去年报告中我提到的养老金负债将会是这些灾难的主要贡献者。许多城市和州在 2008 年末检查他们的资金情况时，一定会感到震惊。资产和实际债务价值之间的差距简直是令人震惊。
When faced with large revenue shortfalls, communities that have all of their bonds insured will be more prone to develop “solutions” less favorable to bondholders than those communities that have uninsured bonds held by local banks and residents. Losses in the tax-exempt arena, when they come, are also likely to be highly correlated among issuers. If a few communities stiff their creditors and get away with it, the chance that others will follow in their footsteps will grow. What mayor or city council is going to choose pain to local citizens in the form of major tax increases over pain to a far-away bond insurer?
当面对巨大的收入不足问题时，所有债券均以投保的发行人，相比由地方银行和市民持有但没有投保的债券的发行人，更倾向制定对债券持有人不利的解决方案。免税债券带来的损失也很有可能在发行人中互相影响。如果一些发行人对债权人不友善并且一走了之，其他发行人效仿的可能性就会增大。市长和市议会应该如何选择？用增税的方式让当地市民承受痛苦还是让遥远的债券保险公司承受？
Insuring tax-exempts, therefore, has the look today of a dangerous business — one with similarities, in fact, to the insuring of natural catastrophes. In both cases, a string of loss-free years can be followed by a devastating experience that more than wipes out all earlier profits. We will try, therefore, to proceed carefully in this business, eschewing many classes of bonds that other monolines regularly embrace.
因此，承保免税债券，今天看来是一项危险的业务，实际上和承保自然灾害相似。在这两种情况下，一连串无损失的年份过后，可能跟着一次毁灭性的损失，足以让之前的利润一扫而光。因此，我们将对这项业务非常谨慎，许多其他单一保险公司都会承保的债券类别，我们会避开。
The type of fallacy involved in projecting loss experience from a universe of non-insured bonds onto a deceptively-similar universe in which many bonds are insured pops up in other areas of finance. “Back-tested” models of many kinds are susceptible to this sort of error. Nevertheless, they are frequently touted in financial markets as guides to future action. (If merely looking up past financial data would tell you what the future holds, the Forbes 400 would consist of librarians.)
把没有投保的债券的损失经验，投射到一个看似相似却已经投保的债券上，这类错误在金融业的其他领域突然出现，许多不同的回溯测试模型都容易出现这类错误。然而，它们在金融市场上，经常被吹捧为未来行为指南而备受推崇。（如果只凭过去的财务数据就能告诉我们未来的情况，那么福布斯 400 强将由图书管理员组成。）
Indeed, the stupefying losses in mortgage-related securities came in large part because of flawed, history-based models used by salesmen, rating agencies and investors. These parties looked at loss experience over periods when home prices rose only moderately and speculation in houses was negligible. They then made this experience a yardstick for evaluating future losses. They blissfully ignored the fact that house prices had recently skyrocketed, loan practices had deteriorated and many buyers had opted for houses they couldn’t afford. In short, universe “past” and universe “current” had very different characteristics. But lenders, government and media largely failed to recognize this all-important fact.
事实上，抵押贷款相关的证券的惊人损失很大程度上是因为，销售人员、评级机构和投资者运用了有缺陷的基于历史的模型而造成的。这些人只研究了房价温和上升，房产投机行为微不足道时期的损失记录，然后他们把这个经验作为评估未来损失的标尺。他们兴奋地把把这些事实忽略掉：最近房价飙升，贷款纪律恶化，许多购房人选择他们支付不起的房子。总之，过去与现在的情形大相径庭。但是贷方，政府和媒体都没认识到这些重要的事实。
Investors should be skeptical of history-based models. Constructed by a nerdy-sounding priesthood using esoteric terms such as beta, gamma, sigma and the like, these models tend to look impressive. Too often, though, investors forget to examine the assumptions behind the symbols. Our advice: Beware of geeks bearing formulas.
投资者应该对基于历史的模型保持怀疑态度。这些模型由听似书呆子的神职人员构建的，运用神秘的专用术语 β，α，ε 等等，这些模型往往看上去令人印象深刻。然而，投资者常常忘记检查这些模型背后的假设。我们的建议是：小心带有公式的怪人。
A final post-script on BHAC: Who, you may wonder, runs this operation? While I help set policy, all of the heavy lifting is done by Ajit and his crew. Sure, they were already generating $24 billion of float along with hundreds of millions of underwriting profit annually. But how busy can that keep a 31-person group? Charlie and I decided it was high time for them to start doing a full day’s work.
最后关于 BHAC 的附言：你可能想知道，谁在运营这个公司？虽然我负责帮助制定保单，但所有繁重的事情有阿吉特及他的团队完成的。当然，他们已经获得了 240 亿的浮存金，每年还有数千万美元承保利润。但是要多忙才能维持一个 31 人的团队呢？查理和我觉得是时候让他们做全日制工作了。
Investments 投资业务
Because of accounting rules, we divide our large holdings of common stocks this year into two categories. The table below, presenting the first category, itemizes investments that are carried on our balance sheet at market value and that had a yearend value of more than $500 million.
由于会计规则的原因，今年我们把所持有的大量普通股票分为 2 类。下表列出了第一类，详细列出了我们资产负债表中年末市值超过 5 亿美元的投资。
12/31/08
| Shares 股份数量 | Company 公司名称 | Percentage of Company Owned 股份占比 | Cost* (in $ millions) 成本*（百万美元） | Market (in $ millions) 市值（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company [[American_Express | 美国运通]] | 13.1 | $ 1,287 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company [[Coca_Cola | 可口可乐]] | 8.6 | 1,299 |
| 84,896,273 | ConocoPhillips [[ConocoPhillips | 康菲石油]] | 5.7 | 7,008 |
| 30,009,591 | Johnson & Johnson 强生 | 1.1 | 1,847 | 1,795 |
| 130,272,500 | Kraft Foods Inc. 卡夫食品 | 8.9 | 4,330 | 3,498 |
| 3,947,554 | POSCO 浦项钢铁 | 5.2 | 768 | 1,191 |
| 91,941,010 | The Procter & Gamble Company 宝洁 P&G | 3.1 | 643 | 5,684 |
| 22,111,966 | Sanofi-Aventis 赛诺菲 | 1.7 | 1,827 | 1,404 |
| 11,262,000 | Swiss Re 瑞士再保险 | 3.2 | 773 | 530 |
| 227,307,000 | Tesco plc 乐购 | 2.9 | 1,326 | 1,193 |
| 75,145,426 | U.S. Bancorp [[US_Bancorp | 美国合众银行]] | 4.3 | 2,337 |
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 沃尔玛 | 0.5 | 942 | 1,118 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company [[Washington_Post | 华盛顿邮报]] | 18.4 | 11 |
| 304,392,068 | Wells Fargo & Company [[Wells_Fargo | 富国银行]] | 7.2 | 6,702 |
| Others 其他 | 6,035 | 4,870 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market 普通股总市值 | $ 37,135 | $ 49,073 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
* 成本项是我们实际的购买价格，也是计税的依据；这与 GAAP 会计原则所认定的“成本”有一些不同，因为少数情况下账面价值需要增加或减记。
In addition, we have holdings in Moody’s and Burlington Northern Santa Fe that we now carry at “equity value” — our cost plus retained earnings since our purchase, minus the tax that would be paid if those earnings were paid to us as dividends. This accounting treatment is usually required when ownership of an investee company reaches 20%.
另外，我们持有穆迪和圣达菲伯林顿北方铁路公司的股票，这些股份以股权价值计算，即我们的成本加上自我们持有以来的留存收益，减去如果这些收益作为股息支付将要缴纳的相关税款。当持有被投资公司所有权超过 20% 时，通常采用这种会计处理方式。
We purchased 15% of Moody’s some years ago and have not since bought a share. Moody’s, though, has repurchased its own shares and, by late 2008, those repurchases reduced its outstanding shares to the point that our holdings rose above 20%. Burlington Northern has also repurchased shares, but our increase to 20% primarily occurred because we continued to buy this stock.
我们几年前购买了穆迪 15% 的股票，之后再也也没有买过这支股票。期间穆迪不断回购股票，到 2008 年底，回购的股票减少了市场中的流通股，于是我们的股份被动上升到了 20%。伯林顿北方铁路公司也回购了他们的股票，但我们持续购买这支股票，持股份额也已到达 20%。
Unless facts or rules change, you will see these holdings reflected in our balance sheet at “equity accounting” values, whatever their market prices. You will also see our share of their earnings (less applicable taxes) regularly included in our quarterly and annual earnings.
除非事实或者规则改变，你将会看到无论这些股票的市值是多少，这些资产将以权益会计价值反映在我们的资产负债表中。你也将会看到他们收益中被我们应占部分（减去应付税）也定期的纳入我们的季度和年度收益中。
I told you in an earlier part of this report that last year I made a major mistake of commission (and maybe more; this one sticks out). Without urging from Charlie or anyone else, I bought a large amount of ConocoPhillips stock when oil and gas prices were near their peak. I in no way anticipated the dramatic fall in energy prices that occurred in the last half of the year. I still believe the odds are good that oil sells far higher in the future than the current 50 price. But so far I have been dead wrong. Even if prices should rise, moreover, the terrible timing of my purchase has cost Berkshire several billion dollars.
此前我曾经提到过，去年我犯了一个严重的投资错误（可能还有很多，只是这个被发现了而已）。查理或者其他人都跟此事无关。在油价和天然气价格接近最高点时，我购买了大量的康菲石油的股票。我没能预计到 2008 年下半年能源价格的大幅下跌。我仍然认为未来石油价格高于现在的 40-50 美元可能性很大。但是到目前为止我错得离谱。即使石油价格回升，我选择购买的时机也让伯克希尔损失了数十亿美元。
I made some other already-recognizable errors as well. They were smaller, but unfortunately not that small. During 2008, I spent 27 million, for an 89% loss. Since then, the two stocks have declined even further. The tennis crowd would call my mistakes “unforced errors.”
我还犯了一些目前已经可见的错误。这些错误不那么大，但不幸的是，它们也不小。2008 年我花了 2.44 亿美元买了两家在我看来非常便宜的爱尔兰银行的股票。年底，这些股票的市价已经跌到 2,700 万美元，我们亏损了 89％。自那之后，这两只股票的价格还在一路下跌。网球比赛的观众会称这种行为为“非受迫性失误”。
On the plus side last year, we made purchases totaling $14.5 billion in fixed-income securities issued by Wrigley, Goldman Sachs and General Electric. We very much like these commitments, which carry high current yields that, in themselves, make the investments more than satisfactory. But in each of these three purchases, we also acquired a substantial equity participation as a bonus. To fund these large purchases, I had to sell portions of some holdings that I would have preferred to keep (primarily Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble and ConocoPhillips). However, I have pledged — to you, the rating agencies and myself — to always run Berkshire with more than ample cash. We never want to count on the kindness of strangers in order to meet tomorrow’s obligations. When forced to choose, I will not trade even a night’s sleep for the chance of extra profits.
去年的投资也有好的一面。我们购买了 145 亿箭牌、高盛和通用电气发行的固定收益证券。我们非常喜欢这些具有非常高当前收益率的合约，这本身就让这些投资非常令人满意。而且在这三笔投资中，我们每笔投资都获得了可观的股权投资作为额外回报。为了为这三项重大投资提供资金，我不得不出售了我们原本愿意持有的部分资产（主要是强生、宝洁和康菲石油）。然而我曾向你们评级机构和我资金保证，我将始终以充足的现金经营伯克希尔。我们从不指望靠陌生人的善意来履行明天的义务。当被迫选择，我不会为了更多利润牺牲哪怕一晚的睡眠。
The investment world has gone from underpricing risk to overpricing it. This change has not been minor; the pendulum has covered an extraordinary arc. A few years ago, it would have seemed unthinkable that yields like today’s could have been obtained on good-grade municipal or corporate bonds even while risk-free governments offered near-zero returns on short-term bonds and no better than a pittance on long-terms. When the financial history of this decade is written, it will surely speak of the Internet bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble of the early 2000s. But the U.S. Treasury bond bubble of late 2008 may be regarded as almost equally extraordinary.
投资界已经从极高的风险偏好发展到了极低的风险偏好。这种转变可真不小，钟摆已经从一个极端摇摆到了另一个极端。仅仅数年前，即使政府短期债券无风险回报率接近于零，长期债券收益率微乎其微，但高等级的市政债券或者公司债券却能获得今天的收益率，这似乎是不可想象的。当未来人们撰写这十年的金融史时，肯定会提到 1990 年代末的互联网泡沫和 21 世纪初的房地产泡沫。但 2008 年美国国债泡沫可能也会被认为几乎与前几次泡沫一样非同寻常。
Clinging to cash equivalents or long-term government bonds at present yields is almost certainly a terrible policy if continued for long. Holders of these instruments, of course, have felt increasingly comfortable — in fact, almost smug — in following this policy as financial turmoil has mounted. They regard their judgment confirmed when they hear commentators proclaim “cash is king,” even though that wonderful cash is earning close to nothing and will surely find its purchasing power eroded over time.
如果长期持有现金等价物或者长期政府债券，几乎可以肯定这是一种糟糕的投资策略。当然，随着金融动荡的加剧，持有这些资产的投资者会越发自我感觉良好，甚至到自鸣得意的地步。当他们听到所有评论员都在说“现金为王”时，他们越发感觉自己决策英明。尽管这些为王的现金不能带来任何收益，而且随着时间推移，其购买力还在不断下降。
Approval, though, is not the goal of investing. In fact, approval is often counter-productive because it sedates the brain and makes it less receptive to new facts or a re-examination of conclusions formed earlier. Beware the investment activity that produces applause; the great moves are usually greeted by yawns.
然而投资的目的不是为了获得赞许。事实上，赞许往往会适得其反。因为它束缚了你的思维，让你的大脑停止接受新的事实，或重新审视早先形成的结论。谨防那些让人夸赞的投资行为，那些伟大的举动通常都会让人觉得枯燥无聊。
Derivatives 衍生品
Derivatives are dangerous. They have dramatically increased the leverage and risks in our financial system. They have made it almost impossible for investors to understand and analyze our largest commercial banks and investment banks. They allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to engage in massive misstatements of earnings for years. So indecipherable were Freddie and Fannie that their federal regulator, OFHEO, whose more than 100 employees had no job except the oversight of these two institutions, totally missed their cooking of the books.
衍生产品很危险。它们让我们金融系统中的杠杆率和风险都增加不少。它们让投资者们难以理解和分析我们最大的商业银行和投资银行。它们允许房利美和房地美多年来大规模虚报收益。房地美和房利美是如此令人困惑，以至于它们的联邦监管机构联邦住房企业监管办公室 OFHEO 的 100 多名职员除了监督这两家公司之外什么都不用做，即使如此还完全不得要领，彻底迷失在它们复杂的衍生品账目中。
Indeed, recent events demonstrate that certain big-name CEOs (or former CEOs) at major financial institutions were simply incapable of managing a business with a huge, complex book of derivatives. Include Charlie and me in this hapless group: When Berkshire purchased General Re in 1998, we knew we could not get our minds around its book of 23,218 derivatives contracts, made with 884 counterparties (many of which we had never heard of). So we decided to close up shop. Though we were under no pressure and were operating in benign markets as we exited, it took us five years and more than $400 million in losses to largely complete the task. Upon leaving, our feelings about the business mirrored a line in a country song: “I liked you better before I got to know you so well.”
实际上，最近的一些事件表明，那些大型金融机构的 CEO 或者前 CEO 们，根本没有能力去管理一个如此复杂和庞大的衍生品交易。查理和我也在这个倒霉鬼名单中，当伯克希尔在 1998 年收购通用再保险时，我们知道我们搞不定它同 884 个交易对手达成的 23,218 份衍生品合约（其中许多我们从未听说过）。因此我们决定关门大吉。尽管当我们选择退出时没有任何市场压力，但我们花了 5 年时间并损失了 4 亿美元才大致完成这项任务。离别之际，我们对这门生意的感觉正如一句乡村民谣歌词所唱：“在我还不了解你之前，我更喜欢你一些。”
Improved “transparency” — a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for averting future train wrecks — won’t cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and complex portfolio of derivatives. Auditors can’t audit these contracts, and regulators can’t regulate them. When I read the pages of “disclosure” in 10-Ks of companies that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don’t know what is going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).
更高的“透明度”——政治家、评论员和金融监管机构最喜欢用这个良方来避免将来出现严重问题——对衍生产品导致的问题也无能为力。据我所知，没有一种报告机制能够接近于描述和衡量庞大复杂的衍生品组合的风险。审计人员无法审计这些合约，监管机构也无法进行监管。当我读到使用这类衍生工具的公司 10-K 年报中“事项披露”部分时，我最后只知道，我对这些公司的投资组合状况一无所知（然后还得吃几片阿司匹林缓解头痛）。
For a case study on regulatory effectiveness, let’s look harder at the Freddie and Fannie example. These giant institutions were created by Congress, which retained control over them, dictating what they could and could not do. To aid its oversight, Congress created OFHEO in 1992, admonishing it to make sure the two behemoths were behaving themselves. With that move, Fannie and Freddie became the most intensely-regulated companies of which I am aware, as measured by manpower assigned to the task.
对于监管有效性案例的研究是有必要的，让我们再深入看看房地美和房利美的例子。这两个庞大的机构由国会创立，并且由他们控制，指示他们什么可以做，什么不可以做。为了帮助监管，国会在 1992 年成立了 OFHEO，告诫它要保证这两个巨大的机构行为得当。按照分配到这个任务的人力衡量，这个举措使房利美和房地美成为据我所知监管最严密的公司。
On June 15, 2003, OFHEO (whose annual reports are available on the Internet) sent its 2002 report to Congress — specifically to its four bosses in the Senate and House, among them none other than Messrs. Sarbanes and Oxley. The report’s 127 pages included a self-congratulatory cover-line: “Celebrating 10 Years of Excellence.” The transmittal letter and report were delivered nine days after the CEO and CFO of Freddie had resigned in disgrace and the COO had been fired. No mention of their departures was made in the letter, even while the report concluded, as it always did, that “Both Enterprises were financially sound and well managed.”
2003 年 6 月 15 日，OFHEO 递交 2002 年的报告给国会（其年报可在网上获得），尤其给参众两院的四个老板，其中包括萨班斯和奥克斯利先生（Messrs.Sarbanes、Oxley)。长达 127 页的报告包括一个自我庆祝的标题：“庆祝卓越的 10 年”。房地美的 CEO 和 CFO 在丑闻后辞职以及 COO 被解雇后的九天，转送函和报告被递交。报告的总结跟以往一样：“这两家企业的财务状况良好，并且管理得很好”，信中并未提及他们的离开。
In truth, both enterprises had engaged in massive accounting shenanigans for some time. Finally, in 2006, OFHEO issued a 340-page scathing chronicle of the sins of Fannie that, more or less, blamed the fiasco on every party but — you guessed it — Congress and OFHEO.
其实，这两家企业都有一段时间涉及大规模的会计欺骗行为。最后，在 2006 年，OFHEO 发表了长达 340 页的记录，严厉揭露了房利美的罪状，并或多或少地指责了每个团体的失败，当然，你可以猜到，除了国会和 OFHEO。
The Bear Stearns collapse highlights the counterparty problem embedded in derivatives transactions, a time bomb I first discussed in Berkshire’s 2002 report. On April 3, 2008, Tim Geithner, then the able president of the New York Fed, explained the need for a rescue: “The sudden discovery by Bear’s derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear’s counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets.” This is Fedspeak for “We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude.” In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.
贝尔斯登（Bear Stearns）的破产突显了衍生品交易中对手方问题，这正是我在 2002 年伯克希尔的报告中首次提到的定时炸弹。2008 年 4 月 3 日，时任纽约联储主席的 Tim Geithner 解释了救援的必要性：“贝尔斯登衍生品交易对手突然发现，他们为保护自己免受金融风险的重要金融头寸已经不再有效，这将促使贝尔斯登的交易对手急于清算他们之前持有的抵押品，并且试图在本已脆弱的市场中复制那些投资仓位，这将引发市场的进一步混乱。”美联储发言说：“我们介入是未来阻止不可预见的重大金融连锁反应。”我认为，美联储这样做是对的。
A normal stock or bond trade is completed in a few days with one party getting its cash, the other its securities. Counterparty risk therefore quickly disappears, which means credit problems can’t accumulate. This rapid settlement process is key to maintaining the integrity of markets. That, in fact, is a reason for NYSE and NASDAQ shortening the settlement period from five days to three days in 1995.
正常的股票债券交易通常在几天内完成，一方获得现金，一方获得证券。交易对方的违约风险很快消失，这意味着信用问题不会积累。这种快速的结算过程是保持市场完整性的关键。事实上，这就是纽约交易市场和纳斯达克交易市场在 1995 年把结算周期从 5 天缩短到 3 天的原因。
Derivatives contracts, in contrast, often go unsettled for years, or even decades, with counterparties building up huge claims against each other. “Paper” assets and liabilities — often hard to quantify — become important parts of financial statements though these items will not be validated for many years. Additionally, a frightening web of mutual dependence develops among huge financial institutions. Receivables and payables by the billions become concentrated in the hands of a few large dealers who are apt to be highly-leveraged in other ways as well. Participants seeking to dodge troubles face the same problem as someone seeking to avoid venereal disease: It’s not just whom you sleep with, but also whom they are sleeping with.
相比之下，衍生品合同往往数年甚至数十年都不结算，交易对手彼此之间积累的巨额的债权。难以量化的“纸面”资产和负债构成为财务报表的重要组成部分，尽管这些款项在多年内都不会得到验证。另外，大型金融机构之间形成了一个可怕的、互相依赖的金融网络。数十亿美元的应收款和应付款都集中在少数几个大型交易商手中，这些交易商在其它方面也往往高度杠杆化。逃避麻烦的参与者其实和躲避性病的人面临相同的问题：重要的不止是你和谁睡，还有他们和谁睡。
Sleeping around, to continue our metaphor, can actually be useful for large derivatives dealers because it assures them government aid if trouble hits. In other words, only companies having problems that can infect the entire neighborhood — I won’t mention names — are certain to become a concern of the state (an outcome, I’m sad to say, that is proper). From this irritating reality comes The First Law of Corporate Survival for ambitious CEOs who pile on leverage and run large and unfathomable derivatives books: Modest incompetence simply won’t do; it’s mindboggling screw-ups that are required.
继续借用我们的比喻，和周围所有人发生关系，其实这对大型的衍生品交易者来说是有用的，因为它保证了如果他们遇到麻烦时，他们会得到政府帮助。换句话说，只有那些可能感染整个系统的问题公司（当然我不会指名道姓），一定会成为政府的关注对象（我很遗憾地说，这是一个恰当的结果）。这个恼人的事实，缔造了企业生存的第一法例，这一法则适用于那些野心勃勃的 CEO，他们喜欢利用杠杆，经营着大量深不可测的衍生品账簿，一般无能根本不会这样做，他们需要的是令人难以置信无能。
Considering the ruin I’ve pictured, you may wonder why Berkshire is a party to 251 derivatives contracts (other than those used for operational purposes at MidAmerican and the few left over at Gen Re). The answer is simple: I believe each contract we own was mispriced at inception, sometimes dramatically so. I both initiated these positions and monitor them, a set of responsibilities consistent with my belief that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk Officer as well. If we lose money on our derivatives, it will be my fault.
考虑我描述的毁灭性画面，你也许会想知道，为什么伯克希尔也是 251 个衍生品合约的一方（除了那些在中美能源和通用再保险剩下的几份出于运营目的的合同）。答案很简单：我相信每份合约的定价在我们拥有时都是不合理的，有时还是非常不合理。我创立和监督这些合约，这一系列的职责也与我的信念一致，即任何大型金融机构的 CEO 也必须同样是首席风险执行官。如果我们在衍生品中有损失，那就是我的错。
Our derivatives dealings require our counterparties to make payments to us when contracts are initiated. Berkshire therefore always holds the money, which leaves us assuming no meaningful counterparty risk. As of yearend, the payments made to us less losses we have paid — our derivatives “float,” so to speak — totaled $8.1 billion. This float is similar to insurance float: If we break even on an underlying transaction, we will have enjoyed the use of free money for a long time. Our expectation, though it is far from a sure thing, is that we will do better than break even and that the substantial investment income we earn on the funds will be frosting on the cake.
我们的衍生品交易要求我们的交易对手在合约开始时就向我们付款。因此钱一直在伯克希尔手里，这让我们其实没有任何违约风险。年末，我们收取的资金减去我们付出的损失——称之为我们的衍生品“浮存金”，共计 81 亿美元。这些浮存金和保险浮存金类似：如果我们在合约交易中不盈不亏，我们将长期享受免费使用的资金。虽然不确定，但我们的期望会比不盈不亏做得更好，因此，从浮存金中赚得的大量投资收益将是锦上添花。
Only a small percentage of our contracts call for any posting of collateral when the market moves against us. Even under the chaotic conditions existing in last year’s fourth quarter, we had to post less than 1% of our securities portfolio. (When we post collateral, we deposit it with third parties, meanwhile retaining the investment earnings on the deposited securities.) In our 2002 annual report, we warned of the lethal threat that posting requirements create, real-life illustrations of which we witnessed last year at a variety of financial institutions (and, for that matter, at Constellation Energy, which was within hours of bankruptcy when MidAmerican arrived to effect a rescue).
在市场发展对我们不利时，有一小部分合约要求我们放置抵押品。即使在去年第四季度的混乱情况中，我们也只是提供了不到 1% 的证券组合作为抵押品（当我们交出抵押品时，我们把它存放在第三方，同时保留所存证券的投资收益）。在 2002 年年度报告中，我们提到了放置抵押品要求引起的致命威胁，去年我们亲眼目睹各种各样金融机构的剧变就是活生生的实例（因为这个问题，当中美能源公司赶到进行救援时，星座能源公司在短短的几个小时内宣告破产）。
Our contracts fall into four major categories. With apologies to those who are not fascinated by financial instruments, I will explain them in excruciating detail.
我们的合约有四大类。对金融工具不感兴趣的人我很抱歉，因为我将很详细的解释它们。
- We have added modestly to the “equity put” portfolio I described in last year’s report. Some of our contracts come due in 15 years, others in 20. We must make a payment to our counterparty at maturity if the reference index to which the put is tied is then below what it was at the inception of the contract. Neither party can elect to settle early; it’s only the price on the final day that counts.
- 我在去年报告中描述的“股票看跌”投资组合适度增加了。我们的一些合约将在15 年内到期，其他将在 20 年内到期。如果与看跌期权合约挂钩的参考指数，低于合约签订时的价格，我们将要在到期时给交易对方支付款项。任何一方都不能选择提前结算，重要的只是最后那一天的价格。
To illustrate, we might sell a 1 billion 15-year put contract on the S&P 500 when that index is at, say, 1300. If the index is at 1170 -- down 10% -- on the day of maturity, we would pay 100 million. If it is above 1300, we owe nothing. For us to lose 100 million to $150 million — that we would be free to invest as we wish.
举例来说，我们在标普 500 指数在 1,300 点时卖出一个价值 10 亿美元、期限为15 年的指数看跌期权合约。如果指数在到期日下降了 10% 到 1,170 点，我们将要支付 1 亿美元。如果指数高于 1,300 点，我们什么都不欠。如果我们全部损失掉 10 亿美元，指数必须降到 0。与此同时，卖出那份合约将会我们带来一笔收入，大概 1 亿到 1.5 亿美元，如果我们想的话，我们可以自由地投资。
Our put contracts total 37.1 billion (at current exchange rates) and are spread among four major indices: the S&P 500 in the U.S., the FTSE 100 in the U.K., the Euro Stoxx 50 in Europe, and the Nikkei 225 in Japan. Our first contract comes due on September 9, 2019 and our last on January 24, 2028. We have received premiums of 4.9 billion, money we have invested. We, meanwhile, have paid nothing, since all expiration dates are far in the future. Nonetheless, we have used Black-Scholes valuation methods to record a yearend liability of 10 billion minus the 5.1 billion from these contracts.
我们的看跌合约总共价值 371 亿美元（按照当时汇率计算），分布在四大指数中：美国标普 500 指数，英国的富时 100 指数，欧盟 50 指数和日本的日经 225 指数。我们第一份合约在 2019 年 9 月 9 日到期，最后一份在 2028 年 1 月 24 日到期。我们已经获得了 49 亿美元的保险费，这些钱我们已经用来投资了。同时，我们不用支付任何东西，因为所有的到期日都在很遥远的未来。尽管如此，我们采用了Black Scholes计价方法去记录年末的 100 亿美元债务，这个数字在每个报告日都会变动。用预计损失 100 亿美元减去收取的 49 亿保险费，意味着到目前为止，以市值计算，我们的合约带来了 51 亿美元的损失。
We endorse mark-to-market accounting. I will explain later, however, why I believe the Black-Scholes formula, even though it is the standard for establishing the dollar liability for options, produces strange results when the long-term variety are being valued.
我们支持用市值计价的会计方法。稍后我会解释为什么我觉得 Black Scholes 公式在长期品种被估价时会生成奇怪的结果，即使它是期权计价的标准。
One point about our contracts that is sometimes not understood: For us to lose the full 9 billion, payable between 2019 and 2028. Between the inception of the contract and those dates, we would have held the $4.9 billion premium and earned investment income on it.
我们的合约中有一点有时候不被理解：如果我们要损失掉所有的 371 亿美元，所有四个指数中的所有股票都必须在到期日跌到零。比如，如果所有指数都比合约生成时下降 25%，汇率保持今天的水平不变，我们在 2019 到 2028 年将会产生 90 亿元的应付款。在合约生成和到期日间，我们将持有 49 亿元的保费并赚取投资收益。
- The second category we described in last year’s report concerns derivatives requiring us to pay when credit losses occur at companies that are included in various high-yield indices. Our standard contract covers a five-year period and involves 100 companies. We modestly expanded our position last year in this category. But, of course, the contracts on the books at the end of 2007 moved one year closer to their maturity. Overall, our contracts now have an average life of 2 1/3 years, with the first expiration due to occur on September 20, 2009 and the last on December 20, 2013.
By yearend we had received premiums of 542 million. Using mark-to-market principles, we also set up a liability for future losses that at yearend totaled 100 million, derived from our 3.4 billion of premiums we received. In our quarterly reports, however, the amount of gain or loss has swung wildly from a profit of 693 million in the fourth quarter of 2008.4
年末我们从这些合约收到了34亿美元的保费，并且支付了 5.42 亿美元的损失。按以市值计算的原则，我们建立了未来损失的负债，年末一共是 30 亿美元。支付和预计损失一共 35 亿美元，减去收到的 34 亿美元保费，因此我们一共记录的损失是 1 亿美元。然而，在我们的季度报表中，收益和损失变化很大，从 2008 年第二季度的 3.27 亿美元利润到2008年第四季度的 6.93 亿美元损失。4
Surprisingly, we made payments on these contracts of only $97 million last year, far below the estimate I used when I decided to enter into them. This year, however, losses have accelerated sharply with the mushrooming of large bankruptcies. In last year’s letter, I told you I expected these contracts to show a profit at expiration. Now, with the recession deepening at a rapid rate, the possibility of an eventual loss has increased. Whatever the result, I will keep you posted.
令人惊讶是，去年，去年我们为这些合约只支付了 9,700 万美元，远远低于比我们签订合约时的估计数。然而今年随着大规模破产的激增，损失将会大大增加。在去年的信中，我告诉你我期望这些合约在到期时会产生利润。现在，随着经济衰退加速，最终损失的可能性增大。无论结果如何，我都会随时告诉你。
- In 2008 we began to write “credit default swaps” on individual companies. This is simply credit insurance, similar to what we write in BHAC, except that here we bear the credit risk of corporations rather than of tax-exempt issuers.
- 2008 年，我们开始对私人公司出售“信用违约掉期”业务。这只是一种信用保险，和我们在 BHAC 出售的类似，只不过我们在这里承保的是公司的信用风险，而不是免税债券发行人的信用风险。
If, say, the XYZ company goes bankrupt, and we have written a 70 million.) For the typical contract, we receive quarterly payments for five years, after which our insurance expires.
比如，如果 XYZ 公司破产了，而我们签订了一张价值 1 亿美元的合约，我们有义务支付 XYZ 债务的缩水部分（例如，如果公司的债券在违约后价值 3 千万，我们就欠 7 千万美元）。典型的合约是，我们 5 年里每季度收到对方支付的保费，直到我们的保险到期。
At yearend we had written 93 million. This is the only derivatives business we write that has any counterparty risk; the party that buys the contract from us must be good for the quarterly premiums it will owe us over the five years. We are unlikely to expand this business to any extent because most buyers of this protection now insist that the seller post collateral, and we will not enter into such an arrangement.
年末，我们一共出售了 40 亿美元的合约，涉及 42 个公司，每年保费约 9,300 万美元。这是我们承保的唯一具有违约风险的衍生品合约。合约的买方必须在未来 5 年内有能力按季度支付保费。我们将不会扩大这项业务，因为这种保险大多数买方现在坚持要求卖方提供抵押品，而我们不会参与这样的交易。
- At the request of our customers, we write a few tax-exempt bond insurance contracts that are similar to those written at BHAC, but that are structured as derivatives. The only meaningful difference between the two contracts is that mark-to-market accounting is required for derivatives whereas standard accrual accounting is required at BHAC.
But this difference can produce some strange results. The bonds covered — in effect, insured — by these derivatives are largely general obligations of states, and we feel good about them. At yearend, however, mark-to-market accounting required us to record a loss of $631 million on these derivatives contracts. Had we instead insured the same bonds at the same price in BHAC, and used the accrual accounting required at insurance companies, we would have recorded a small profit for the year. The two methods by which we insure the bonds will eventually produce the same accounting result. In the short term, however, the variance in reported profits can be substantial.
但这些差异会产生奇怪的结果。实际上，这些衍生品保险的债券多数是国家的义务，我们对此感觉良好。但是在年末，以市值计价的会计原则要求我们记录 6.31 亿美元的衍生品合约损失。如果我们在 BHAC 以同样的价格为这些债券承保，运用保险公司要求的会计规则，我们今年将会产生少量利润。我们承保债券的这两种方法最终会产生一样的会计结果。但是短期内，报告的利润差异会很大。
We have told you before that our derivative contracts, subject as they are to mark-to-market accounting, will produce wild swings in the earnings we report. The ups and downs neither cheer nor bother Charlie and me. Indeed, the “downs” can be helpful in that they give us an opportunity to expand a position on favorable terms. I hope this explanation of our dealings will lead you to think similarly.
之前我已经告诉你，运用市值计价会计原则的衍生品合约，在报表中利润变化会很大。这种波动都不会使我和查理欢呼或者烦恼。事实上，“下降”可以非常有助于我们以有利的条款扩大我们的机会。希望我们对交易的解释也让你有同样的想法。
The Black-Scholes formula has approached the status of holy writ in finance, and we use it when valuing our equity put options for financial statement purposes. Key inputs to the calculation include a contract’s maturity and strike price, as well as the analyst’s expectations for volatility, interest rates and dividends.
Black-Scholes 期权定价模型在金融界有着接近神圣的地位，我们用它在报表中定价我们的股票卖出期权。计算需要的关键数据包括合约的期限、行权价格、和分析者对波动性、利率和股息的预测。
If the formula is applied to extended time periods, however, it can produce absurd results. In fairness, Black and Scholes almost certainly understood this point well. But their devoted followers may be ignoring whatever caveats the two men attached when they first unveiled the formula.
如果在较长的时间期限内运用这个公式，将会产生荒谬的结果。说实话，Black 和 Scholes 一定对这一点很明白。但他们的忠实的追随者可能忽略了两位先生第一次公布这个公式时附加的任何警告。
It’s often useful in testing a theory to push it to extremes. So let’s postulate that we sell a 100- year 1 billion put option on the S&P 500 at a strike price of 903 (the index’s level on 12/31/08). Using the implied volatility assumption for long-dated contracts that we do, and combining that with appropriate interest and dividend assumptions, we would find the “proper” Black-Scholes premium for this contract to be 2.5 million.
用一个极端的情形测试一个理论通常非常有用。因此，假设我们出售了一张期限为 100 年，价值 10 亿的标普 500 指数看跌期权，执行价格为 903 （2008 年 12 月 31 日的水平）。使用我们长期合约的隐含波动率假设，加上合适的利率和分红假设，我们发现，这份合约正确的 Black-Scholes 价格为 250 万美元。
To judge the rationality of that premium, we need to assess whether the S&P will be valued a century from now at less than today. Certainly the dollar will then be worth a small fraction of its present value (at only 2% inflation it will be worth roughly 14¢). So that will be a factor pushing the stated value of the index higher. Far more important, however, is that one hundred years of retained earnings will hugely increase the value of most of the companies in the index. In the 20thCentury, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average increased by about 175-fold, mainly because of this retained-earnings factor.
要评判这个价格的合理性，我们必须估计标普指数一个世纪后会不会比今天低。当然，美元到时候会贬值（按 2% 通货膨胀率算，到时候 1 美元价值大概 14 美分）。因此，这将是一个推动指数上升的因素。然而更重要的是，100 年的保留收益将会大大的增加指数中大多数公司的价值。在 20 世纪，道琼斯平均工业指数上升了大概 175 倍（年化 5.3%），主要是因为留存收益这一因素。
Considering everything, I believe the probability of a decline in the index over a one-hundred-year period to be far less than 1%. But let’s use that figure and also assume that the most likely decline — should one occur — is 50%. Under these assumptions, the mathematical expectation of loss on our contract would be 1 billion X 1% X 50%).
考虑到所有因素，我相信指数在 100 年后下跌的可能性少于 1%。但让我们就用这个数字，并且假设如果真的发生，最有可能的是下跌 50%。在这个假设下，我们的合约计算出来的预计损失是 500 万美元（10亿*1%*50%）。
But if we had received our theoretical premium of $2.5 million up front, we would have only had to invest it at 0.7% compounded annually to cover this loss expectancy. Everything earned above that would have been profit. Would you like to borrow money for 100 years at a 0.7% rate?
但如果我们提前预收了 250 万美元的理论保费，我们只需要以每年 0.7% 的复合收益率投资，就可以弥补这个预期损失，超出 0.7% 的部分都是利润。那么你愿意以 0.7% 的利率贷款 100 年吗？
Let’s look at my example from a worst-case standpoint. Remember that 99% of the time we would pay nothing if my assumptions are correct. But even in the worst case among the remaining 1% of possibilities — that is, one assuming a total loss of $1 billion — our borrowing cost would come to only 6.2%. Clearly, either my assumptions are crazy or the formula is inappropriate.
让我们用最坏的角度来看我这个例子。记住，如果我们的假设是对的，有 99% 的概率我们不用支付任何东西。但即使在最坏的那 1% 的可能性里，假设损失 10 亿美元，我们的贷款成本也只是 6.2%。显然，要么我这两个假设都是荒唐的，要么这个公式是不正确的。
The ridiculous premium that Black-Scholes dictates in my extreme example is caused by the inclusion of volatility in the formula and by the fact that volatility is determined by how much stocks have moved around in some past period of days, months or years. This metric is simply irrelevant in estimating the probability-weighted range of values of American business 100 years from now. (Imagine, if you will, getting a quote every day on a farm from a manic-depressive neighbor and then using the volatility calculated from these changing quotes as an important ingredient in an equation that predicts a probability-weighted range of values for the farm a century from now.)
在我这个极端的例子中，Black-Scholes 公式计算出来的荒谬的结果，是因为在公式中包括了波动性，而波动性又是由在过去的日，月，年终有多少股票在波动的结果决定的。在预计 100 年后美国商业价值的概率加权范围时，这一指标无关紧要。（想象一下，如果你愿意，每天从一个患有狂郁症的邻居哪里得到一个农场的报价，然后用这些价格计算出来的波动率，作为这个公司里重要因素来预测农场在 100 年后的价值可能范围）。
Though historical volatility is a useful — but far from foolproof — concept in valuing short-term options, its utility diminishes rapidly as the duration of the option lengthens. In my opinion, the valuations that the Black-Scholes formula now place on our long-term put options overstate our liability, though the overstatement will diminish as the contracts approach maturity.
虽然历史的波动率是一个评定短期期权的有用概念，但却不够完善，随着期权期限的延长，它的有效性就会迅速降低。在我看来，Black-Scholes 公式用在我们的长期看跌期权时，其计算高估了我们的负债，尽管这种高估会随着合约到期而逐渐减少。
Even so, we will continue to use Black-Scholes when we are estimating our financial-statement liability for long-term equity puts. The formula represents conventional wisdom and any substitute that I might offer would engender extreme skepticism. That would be perfectly understandable: CEOs who have concocted their own valuations for esoteric financial instruments have seldom erred on the side of conservatism. That club of optimists is one that Charlie and I have no desire to join.
即使这样，在财务报告中，我们会继续使用 Black-Scholes 公式去估算我们的长期股票看跌期权。这个公式代表了传统的智慧，任何我可能提出的替代品都会引起极端的质疑。这个很好理解：方面，那些使用深奥的金融工具编造自己估值的 CEO，很少站到保守主义一边。我和查理都没有欲望加入乐观主义的行列。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 2nd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
今年我们的年会将在 5 月 2 日周六举行。像往常一样，Qwest 中心大门将在早上 7 点中打开，新的伯克希尔大电影将在 8 点半播放。9 点半我们将直接进入问答环节（午餐将稍作休息，在 Qwest 的观众席举行），会议将持续到下午 3 点。短时间的休息过后，查理和我就很喜欢在 3 点 15 分召开的年度大会。如果你决定在当天的问题环节离开，请在查理说话的时候离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 31,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (A friendly warning: If I find sales are lagging, I lock the exits.)
离开的最好理由，当然就是购物。我们会在连接会场的 194,300 平方英尺的大堂摆放伯克希尔子公司的产品。去年，3.1 万到会的人们都在这里购物，几乎每个摊位都创出了新的销售记录。但你可以做得更好。（友情提醒：如果我发现销售情况差，我会把出口的门锁上。）
This year Clayton will showcase its new i-house that includes Shaw flooring, Johns Manville insulation and MiTek fasteners. This innovative “green” home, featuring solar panels and numerous other energy-saving products, is truly a home of the future. Estimated costs for electricity and heating total only about $1 per day when the home is sited in an area like Omaha. After purchasing the i-house , you should next consider the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby. Make your neighbors jealous.
今年，Clayton 会陈列出他新的预制房屋，包括 Shaw 地毯，Johns Manville 隔音墙和 Mitek 紧固件。这个创新的“绿色”住宅以太阳能板和其他众多节能产品为特征，是真正意义上的未来房子。如果这个房子在像奥马哈这样的地区的话，电热费加起来估计总共才 1 美元一天。买了 i-house 之后，你会接下来考虑在旁边陈列的森林之河房车和浮艇。一定会让你的邻居很羡慕。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.
GEICO 将会有一个摊位，员工都是全国最好的顾问，他们都会为你提供汽车保险定价。许多时候，GEICO 会给你们一个股东优惠折扣(通常是 8%).这个特殊的优惠在我们的 50 个管辖区内，有 44 个管辖区得到许可。（补充：如果你满足其他优惠团体的要求，这个优惠将不会附加上去。）带上你现有保险的详细资料，检查一下我们是否可以帮你省钱。我相信，至少有 50% 的人可以。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of NetJets aircraft available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take along — with no fear of a strip search — the Ginsu knives that you’ve purchased at the exhibit of our Quikut subsidiary.
周六，在奥马哈机场，我们会像往常一样有一系列 NetJets 飞机让你检阅。在 Qwest 的 NetJets 的摊位停留一下，学习如何观赏这些飞机.乘坐公车到达奥马哈，进入你的新飞机。不用担心光身检查，带上你在我们 Quikut 子公司展示上买的 Ginsu 小刀。
Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, which will be selling about 30 books and DVDs. A shipping service will be available for those whose thirst for knowledge exceeds their carrying capacity.
接下来，如果你还有钱，可到访一下书虫书店，这里出售大约 30 种书籍和 DVD。现场有运输服务，为那些渴望学习新知识却不够能力搬运的人解决问题。
Finally, we will have three fascinating cars on the exhibition floor, including one from the past and one of the future. Paul Andrews, CEO of our subsidiary, TTI, will bring his 1935 Duesenberg, a car that once belonged to Mrs. Forrest Mars, Sr., parent and grandparent of our new partners in the Wrigley purchase. The future will be represented by a new plug-in electric car developed by BYD, an amazing Chinese company in which we have a 10% interest.
最后，我们的展示厅有三辆迷人的汽车，其中一辆来自过去和一辆来自未来。我们 TTI 子公司的 CEO：Paul Andrews 将会带来他 1935 年版的 Duesenberg，这辆车曾经属于我们在 Wrigley 收购案中新合伙人的母亲和外祖母Mrs Forrest Mars，Sr.。而未来的那一辆由一个令人惊奇的中国汽车公司 BYD 所生产的（插电汽车）作为代表，同时我们也拥有这个公司 10% 的产权。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.
连同这份报告书一起附上的委托书附件里解释了如何取得参加会议以及其它活动所需要的凭证。至于飞机，酒店以及汽车的预订，我们已与美国快递（800-799-6634）签署合约，他们将为您提供详尽的服务。每年负责这些事项的 Carol Pedersen 工作十分出色，在此我对她表示谢意。酒店预订可能会有难度，请和 Carol 联系她会帮你解决这个问题。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72ndStreet between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM twelve years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from 33.3 million in 2008. On Saturday of that weekend, we also set a single day record of $7.2 million. Ask any retailer what he thinks of such volume.
位于 Dodge 和 Pacific 中间的 72 大街，占地 77 英亩的内布拉斯加家具店今年仍会举行“伯克希尔周末”折扣活动。这项特殊的活动于 12 年前在内布拉斯加家具店首次举行，活动期间的销售额由 1997 年的 530 万美元上升到 2008 年的 3,330 万美元。仅周六一天，我们就创造了单日 720 万美元的销售记录。问一问任何一个零售商他对这个数量的看法吧。
To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, April 30th and Monday, May 4thinclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a western cookout to which you are all invited.
为了享受伯克希尔的折扣，请您在 4 月 30 日周四到 5 月 4 日周一这段期间购买，届时请出示你的与会凭证。在此优惠期间，本着此次活动的精神，折扣价格甚至适用于某些享有很高声望但通常有严格规定不许折价出售的商品，我们非常感谢这些生产商的配合。内布拉斯加家具店的营业时间是周一至周六早上 10 点到晚上 9 点，周日早上 10 点到下午 6 点。此外，今年周六下午 5 点 30 分到晚上 8 点钟，内布拉斯加家具店将会举办西式野外烹饮聚会，欢迎各位参加。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 1st. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 3rd, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
在波仙珠宝将有两项专为股东举办的活动。首先是 5 月 1 日周五晚上 6-10 点的鸡尾酒会。其次是 5 月 3 日周日早上 9 点至下午 4 点的大型售卖活动，周六则持续到下午 6 点。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 27ththrough Saturday, May 9th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.
周日在波仙珠宝大卖场的外面，两届美国象棋冠军 Patrick Wolff 将蒙眼挑战所有前来的参赛者，六人为一组，参赛者眼睛无需蒙上。在此附近，来自达拉斯的著名魔术大师 Norman Beck 将使旁观者们不知所措。另外，两位世界顶尖的棋牌专家 Bob Hamman 和 Sharon Osberg 将在周日下午与股东们进行切磋。
Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 3rd, and will be serving from 1 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 975 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,448 including 702 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please don’t embarrass me by ordering foie gras. Remember: To come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st( but not before ).
Gorat’s 将在 5 月 3 日周日下午 1 点至 10 点专为伯克希尔股东们提供服务。去年，足以容纳 240 人的 Gorat’s 在周日提供了 975 道餐点，3 天里一共提供了 2,448 道，其中包括 702 行家们青睐的主菜——T骨牛排。如果你要点鹅肝，请不要觉得让我为难。请记住：如果你选择那天在 Gorat’s 用餐，请在 4 月 1 日订位（无需提前），预订电话为：402-551-3733。
We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 700 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from outside the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
周六下午 4 点钟同样会有一场专为来自非北美地区的股东而设的招待会。每一年我们举办的会议都会吸引来自世界各地的人士前来参加，为了表示热诚的欢迎，我和查理将会亲自迎接来自远方的客人们。去年我们就接见了来自不同国家的 700 多个贵客。来自非北美和加拿大的股东们都会收到特别的入场凭证以及参加本场招待会的指南。
This year we will be making important changes in how we handle the meeting’s question periods. In recent years, we have received only a handful of questions directly related to Berkshire and its operations. Last year there were practically none. So we need to steer the discussion back to Berkshire’s businesses.
In a related problem, there has been a mad rush when the doors open at 7 a.m., led by people who wish to be first in line at the 12 microphones available for questioners. This is not desirable from a safety standpoint, nor do we believe that sprinting ability should be the determinant of who gets to pose questions. (At age 78, I’ve concluded that speed afoot is a ridiculously overrated talent.) Again, a new procedure is desirable.
另一个相关的问题就是：当早上 7 点钟开门的时候曾经出现过混乱的场面，原因就是人们争先排队为了取得用于发问的扩音器。这从安全的角度出发是不可取的，我们也不认为奋力而跑的能力是决定能否发问的因素。（在 78 岁这一年我总结出徒步疾行是荒谬的被高估的才能。）因此，一个新的程序是迫切需要的。
In our first change, several financial journalists from organizations representing newspapers, magazines and television will participate in the question-and-answer period, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be emailed at cloomis@fortunemail.com; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at BerkshireQuestions@cnbc.com, and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at arsorkin@nytimes.com. From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the dozen or so he or she decides are the most interesting and important. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
第一个变化，一些来自报纸杂志以及电视媒体的金融新闻工作者将会参加问答环节，并向我和查理提出股东们通过电子邮件提交的问题。他们的名字和邮箱分别为：财富杂志 Carol Loomis，cllomis@fortunemail.com；CNBC 的 Becky Quick，berkshirequestion@cnbc.com；纽约时报的 Andrew Ross Sorkin，arsorkin@nytimes.com。每个记者都会从所提交的问题中选出他们认为最有趣和重要的一些问题参与讨论。（如果您的问题被选中而您希望记者在提问时提及您的名字，请在电子邮件中注明。）
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists will pick some tough ones and that’s the way we like it.
我和查理都无法从中得到太多关于所要问及问题的线索。我们知道记者们会选一些比较尖锐的问题，而我们喜欢这种方式。
In our second change, we will have a drawing at 8:15 at each microphone for those shareholders hoping to ask questions themselves. At the meeting, I will alternate the questions asked by the journalists with those from the winning shareholders. At least half the questions — those selected by the panel from your submissions — are therefore certain to be Berkshire-related. We will meanwhile continue to get some good — and perhaps entertaining — questions from the audience as well.
我们的第二个变化是，我们会在 8 点 15 分为那些想提问题的股东进行一个麦克风的抽签。在会上，我会轮流回答记者和在场股东的提问。因此，至少一半的问题是从你们的提交中选出的并且是与伯克希尔有关的。同时我们也会继续回答一些来自观众的好的问题，也许涉及娱乐的。
So join us at our Woodstock for Capitalists and let us know how you like the new format. Charlie and I look forward to seeing you.
所以请参加我们为资本家们举办的年度伍德斯托克音乐节，并让我们知道你是否喜欢这一新形式。我和查理非常期待您的光临。
February 27, 2009
2009年2月27日
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
原文：All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for A.
译文（微信翻译）：*本报告中使用的所有每股数字都适用于伯克希尔的A股。B股数据为A股的三十分之一。
原文：Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of 70 in 2007.
肖良版：未译。
参照黄媛 李婧 杨峻 路璐2009年致股东信的译法：包括伯克希尔 2008 年 7200 万美元和 2007 年 7000 万美元利息（扣除相关所得税，括号中为负值）。
原文：Includes 85 million in 2007 of fees that Berkshire charges Clayton for the use of Berkshire’s credit.
肖良版：未译。
原文：In our quarterly reports, however, the amount of gain or loss has swung wildly from a profit of 693 million in the fourth quarter of 2008.
肖良版：然而，在我们的季度报表中，收益和损失变化很大，从 2008 年第二季度的 3.27 亿美元利润到2008年第四季度的 6.98 美元损失。
最后一句翻译错误，已修改为：然而，在我们的季度报表中，收益和损失变化很大，从 2008 年第二季度的 3.27 亿美元利润到2008年第四季度的 6.93 亿美元损失。