原文信息：

标题：2007 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
作者：Warren Buffett
发表时间：2008-02-26
链接：2007
中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
整理：XiaoTao
校译：

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman’s Letter and is referred to in that letter.

注：下表载于印刷版《年度报告》中的主席致函对页，并在该函中提及。

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔公司业绩与标普500指数对比

Year	Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1)	Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2)	Relative Results (1)-(2)
1965	23.8	10.0	13.8
1966	20.3	(11.7)	32.0
1967	11.0	30.9	(19.9)
1968	19.0	11.0	8.0
1969	16.2	(8.4)	24.6
1970	12.0	3.9	8.1
1971	16.4	14.6	1.8
1972	21.7	18.9	2.8
1973	4.7	(14.8)	19.5
1974	5.5	(26.4)	31.9
1975	21.9	37.2	(15.3)
1976	59.3	23.6	35.7
1977	31.9	(7.4)	39.3
1978	24.0	6.4	17.6
1979	35.7	18.2	17.5
1980	19.3	32.3	(13.0)
1981	31.4	(5.0)	36.4
1982	40.0	21.4	18.6
1983	32.3	22.4	9.9
1984	13.6	6.1	7.5
1985	48.2	31.6	16.6
1986	26.1	18.6	7.5
1987	19.5	5.1	14.4
1988	20.1	16.6	3.5
1989	44.4	31.7	12.7
1990	7.4	(3.1)	10.5
1991	39.6	30.5	9.1
1992	20.3	7.6	12.7
1993	14.3	10.1	4.2
1994	13.9	1.3	12.6
1995	43.1	37.6	5.5
1996	31.8	23.0	8.8
1997	34.1	33.4	.7
1998	48.3	28.6	19.7
1999	.5	21.0	(20.5)
2000	6.5	(9.1)	15.6
2001	(6.2)	(11.9)	5.7
2002	10.0	(22.1)	32.1
2003	21.0	28.7	(7.7)
2004	10.5	10.9	(.4)
2005	6.4	4.9	1.5
2006	18.4	15.8	2.6
2007	11.0	5.5	5.5
Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2007	21.1%	10.3%	10.8
Overall Gain — 1964-2007	400,863%	6,840%

Notes:

Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注：数据为日历年的数据，但以下情况除外：1965 年和 1966 年为截至 9/30 的年度；1967 年为截至 12/31 的 15 个月。

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.

从 1979 年开始，会计规则要求保险公司按市价而不是按成本与市价孰低法对其持有的股权证券进行估值。在本表中，伯克希尔公司截至 1978 年的业绩已经重报，以符合变更后的规则。在所有其他方面，结果均按最初报告的数字计算。

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

标普500 指数的数字是税前数字，而伯克希尔公司的数字是税后数字。如果伯克希尔这样的公司只是拥有标普500 指数并缴纳相应的税款，那么在该指数显示正收益的年份，其业绩将落后于标普500 指数，但在该指数显示负收益的年份，其业绩将超过标普 500 指数。长年累月下来，税收成本会导致总的落后幅度很大。

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2007 was $12.3 bi ll i o n, w hi c hin cre a se d t h e p er - s ha re b oo k v a l u eo f b o t h o u r Cl a ss A an d Cl a ss B s t oc kb y 11$ 19 to $78,008, a rate of 21.1% compounded annually.¹

公司2007年的账面价值增加123亿美元，A/B股每股的账面价值增长了11%(标普28.7%)，自现任管理层接手的43年以来，每股账面价值由当初的19美元成长到目前的78008美元，年复合成长率约为21.1%。

Overall, our 76 operating businesses did well last year. The few that had problems were primarily those linked to housing, among them our brick, carpet and real estate brokerage operations. Their setbacks are minor and temporary. Our competitive position in these businesses remains strong, and we have first-class CEOs who run them right, in good times or bad.

总体上，去年我们旗下的76家运营业务表现良好。少数几个出问题的业务主要是与房地产相关，包括我们的砖块、地毯以及房地产经纪业务。他们受的影响是轻微的和暂时性的。我们在这些业务领域中的竞争优势依然强大。我们拥有一流的管理层，无论年景好坏，相信他们总能把公司运营得很好。

Some major financial institutions have, however, experienced staggering problems because they engaged in the “weakened lending practices” I described in last year’s letter. John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, aptly dissected the recent behavior of many lenders: “It is interesting that the industry has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine.”

然而，一些大型的金融机构正面临严重问题，原因是他们卷入了我去年信中提到的”宽松的放贷操作”。富国银行的CEO：JohnStumpf对许多机构最近的放贷行为剖析道：“这个行业真有趣，老的赔钱工具就不少，却又在发明新的赔钱方法。”

You may recall a 2003 Silicon Valley bumper sticker that implored, “Please, God, Just One More Bubble.” Unfortunately, this wish was promptly granted, as just about all Americans came to believe that house prices would forever rise. That conviction made a borrower’s income and cash equity seem unimportant to lenders, who shoveled out money, confident that HPA — house price appreciation — would cure all problems. Today, our country is experiencing widespread pain because of that erroneous belief. As house prices fall, a huge amount of financial folly is being exposed. You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes out — and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.

你可能记得2003年的时候，硅谷很流行一个车贴：“神啊，求求你再来个(互联网)泡沫吧”。很不幸，这个愿望很快就成真了：几乎所有的美国人都认为房价会永远上涨。这种坚信不疑令借款人的收入和现金净值对放贷机构无足轻重，他们大把大把的把钱借给别人，相信房价上涨会解决所有问题。今天，我们国家里不断蔓延的痛苦，正是源于这种错误的自信。随着房价的下跌，大量愚蠢的金融问题被曝光。对此你能学到经验就是：只有在退潮的时候，你才能知道谁在裸泳。我们关注的那些最大的金融机构，其现状简直是”惨不忍睹”。

Turning to happier thoughts, we can report that Berkshire’s newest acquisitions of size, TTI and Iscar, led by their CEOs, Paul Andrews and Jacob Harpaz respectively, performed magnificently in 2007. Iscar is as impressive a manufacturing operation as I’ve seen, a view I reported last year and that was confirmed by a visit I made in the fall to its extraordinary plant in Korea.

来点好消息，可以肯定的是，伯克希尔最新收购的TTI和[ISCAR|伊斯卡]公司，在他们的CEO：PaulAndrews和JacobHarpaz领导下，在2007年表现不俗。去年我曾经说过，ISCAR公司是我见过的制造企业中最令人印象深刻的一家，在秋天造访它在韩国非比寻常的工厂后，印象更加深刻了。

Finally, our insurance business — the cornerstone of Berkshire — had an excellent year. Part of the reason is that we have the best collection of insurance managers in the business — more about them later. But we also were very lucky in 2007, the second year in a row free of major insured catastrophes.

最后，作为伯克希尔基石的保险业务，这一年的业绩非常出色，这部分要归功于我们网罗了保险业中最好的一批经理人。此外我们在2007年非常幸运，这是连续第二年美国没有发生非常重大的灾难。

That party is over. It’s a certainty that insurance-industry profit margins, including ours, will fall significantly in 2008. Prices are down, and exposures inexorably rise. Even if the U.S. has its third consecutive catastrophe-light year, industry profit margins will probably shrink by four percentage points or so. If the winds roar or the earth trembles, results could be far worse. So be prepared for lower insurance earnings during the next few years.

不过盛宴已经结束。确定无疑的是：整个保险业的利润率，包括我们在内，2008年将明显下滑。保费在降低，损失敞口却无情地在扩大，即使美国继续经历第三个小灾之年，保险业的利润率也将下降4％或更多。如果遇上飓风或地震，结果将会更糟糕。所以，在接下来的几年里要对较低的保险收益有所准备。

Yardsticks 评判标准

Berkshire has two major areas of value. The first is our investments: stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. At yearend these totaled $141 billion (not counting those in our finance or utility operations, which we assign to our second bucket of value).

伯克希尔的价值主要源于两个方面。一个是我们的投资：股票、债券及现金等价物。在年底这些投资的价值为1410亿美元(在计算时，我们排除了财务和公用事业部门所持有的部位，将其归入第二部分价值中)。

Insurance float — money we temporarily hold in our insurance operations that does not belong to us — funds $59 billion of our investments. This float is “free” as long as insurance underwriting breaks even, meaning that the premiums we receive equal the losses and expenses we incur. Of course, insurance underwriting is volatile, swinging erratically between profits and losses. Over our entire history, however, we’ve been profitable, and I expect we will average breakeven results or better in the future. If we do that, our investments can be viewed as an unencumbered source of value for Berkshire shareholders.

保险浮存金，就是在保险业务中我们暂时持有的但不属于我们的资金，为我们的投资提供了590亿美元零成本资金(590/1410=41.8%)。只要保险业的承保损益平衡，浮存金就可以看作是”免费”获得的，这意味着，我们获得的保费，要与我们可能承担的损失和产生的费用相当。当然，保险承保是不确定的，总在收益和损失之间波动不定。然而在我们的承保历史中，我们总体是获利的，所以我期望在未来，我们将继续保持不亏损的状况，甚至做得更好。如果我们做到了，股东们将看到我们的投资，将成为伯克希尔股东们，无成本的价值来源。

Berkshire’s second component of value is earnings that come from sources other than investments and insurance. These earnings are delivered by our 66 non-insurance companies, itemized on page 76. In our early years, we focused on the investment side. During the past two decades, however, we have put ever more emphasis on the development of earnings from non-insurance businesses.

伯克希尔价值的第二个组成部分是，来自投资和保险以外的收益。这些收益由我们的66家非保险公司提供。早年，我们专注于投资方面。然而，在过去的20年里，我们越来越重视非保险业务收益的发展。

The following tables illustrate this shift. In the first we tabulate per-share investments at 14-year intervals. We exclude those applicable to minority interests.

下表显示了这种变迁。首先，我们在表格中按14年为周期，列出每股所含的投资金额以及非保险业务每股收益增长记录，均排除了少数股东权益的部分。

Year	Per-Share Investments	Years	Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share Investments
1965	$ 4
1979	577	1965-1979	42.8%
1993	13,961	1979-1993	25.6%
2007	90,343	1993-2007	14.3%

For the entire 42 years, our compounded annual gain in per-share investments was 27.1%. But the trend has been downward as we increasingly used our available funds to buy operating businesses.

在42年里，我们每股投资金额的年复合收益是27.1％。但是这一趋势，随着我们越来越多的使用可用资金购买整个运营企业，这一趋势一直在下降。

Here’s the record on how earnings of our non-insurance businesses have grown, again on a per-share basis and after applicable minority interests.

这是我们非保险业务收益增长的记录，同样按每股计算并扣除少数股东权益后的数据。

Year	Per Share Pre-Tax Earnings	Years	Compounded Annual Gain in Per-Share Pre-Tax Earnings
1965	$ 4
1979	18	1965-1979	11.1%
1993	212	1979-1993	19.1%
2007	4,093	1993-2007	23.5%

For the entire period, the compounded annual gain was 17.8%, with gains accelerating as our focus shifted.

每股税前收益年复合增长率为17.8%，随着我们重点的转移，收益增长速度将加快。

Though these tables may help you gain historical perspective and be useful in valuation, they are completely misleading in predicting future possibilities. Berkshire’s past record can’t be duplicated or even approached. Our base of assets and earnings is now far too large for us to make outsized gains in the future.

尽管通过这些表格，让你们对伯克希尔的收益增长历史有了大致概念，也有助评估伯克希尔的内在价值，但是它们对于预测公司未来发展的可能性时，完全具有误导性。伯克希尔过去的增长纪录，未来不要说复制，即使是接近这个水平都是困难的。我们的资产和收益基数，现在对我们来说，已经大的不可能在未来获得超常的增长。

Charlie Munger, my partner at Berkshire, and I will continue to measure our progress by the two yardsticks I have just described and will regularly update you on the results. Though we can’t come close to duplicating the past, we will do our best to make sure the future is not disappointing.

我在伯克希尔的合伙人查理·芒格和我将继续用前面提到的两个指标来衡量我们的进展，并定期将结果报告给你们。尽管我们不可能接近复制过去的增长，但是我们将尽最大努力确保未来的增长不令人失望。

In our efforts, we will be aided enormously by the managers who have joined Berkshire. This is an unusual group in several ways. First, most of them have no financial need to work. Many sold us their businesses for large sums and run them because they love doing so, not because they need the money. Naturally they wish to be paid fairly, but money alone is not the reason they work hard and productively.

我们的努力，得到了那些加入伯克希尔管理层们的有力支持。在某些方面，这是一个与众不同的团体。首先，他们中的许多人在经济上根本无需工作，在将生意卖给我们时，大都获得了大笔资金。他们之所以继续经营，只是因为他们乐此不疲，而不是因为需要钱。当然他们也希望获得公平合理的薪酬，但金钱本身，绝对不是他们如此辛勤且富有效率工作的原因。

A second, somewhat related, point about these managers is that they have exactly the job they want for the rest of their working years. At almost any other company, key managers below the top aspire to keep climbing the pyramid. For them, the subsidiary or division they manage today is a way station — or so they hope. Indeed, if they are in their present positions five years from now, they may well feel like failures.

其次，有些相关的是，这些经理人想在自己剩余工作年限里，从事自己想要的工作。而在绝大多数其他公司里，那些主要的经理们，只要还不是公司一把手，就热衷于爬上公司权力金字塔的顶端。对于他们来说，他们现在管理的子公司或部门，只是晋升途中的中转站，至少他们希望如此。事实上，让他们在目前的职位上待上五年，会让他们深感失败。

Conversely, our CEOs’ scorecards for success are not whether they obtain my job but instead are the long-term performances of their businesses. Their decisions flow from a here-today, here-forever mindset. I think our rare and hard-to-replicate managerial structure gives Berkshire a real advantage.

相比之下，我们CEO们的”计分牌”上的成功标准，不是坐上我的位置，而是他们企业的长期表现。他们的决策是基于”这份工作干到死”的心态做出的。我想正是这种罕见和难以复制的管理结构，才是我们真正的优势。

Acquisitions 收购

Though our managers may be the best, we will need large and sensible acquisitions to get the growth in operating earnings we wish. Here, we made little progress in 2007 until very late in the year. Then, on Christmas day, Charlie and I finally earned our paychecks by contracting for the largest cash purchase in Berkshire’s history.

尽管我们的管理层是最棒的，我们仍需要进行明智的大型收购，以实现我们期望的经营收益增长。这方面我们直到2007年底才取得了一点进展。那是在圣诞节，查理和我签约了在伯克希尔历史上最大的现金收购，最终为我们自己挣到了当年的薪水。

The seeds of this transaction were planted in 1954. That fall, only three months into a new job, I was sent by my employers, Ben Graham and Jerry Newman, to a shareholders’ meeting of Rockwood Chocolate in Brooklyn. A young fellow had recently taken control of this company, a manufacturer of assorted cocoa-based items. He had then initiated a one-of-a-kind tender, offering 80 pounds of cocoa beans for each share of Rockwood stock. I described this transaction in a section of the 1988 annual report that explained arbitrage. I also told you that Jay Pritzker — the young fellow mentioned above — was the business genius behind this tax-efficient idea, the possibilities for which had escaped all the other experts who had thought about buying Rockwood, including my bosses, Ben and Jerry.

这次交易的种子早在1954年就播下了，那年夏天，刚得到新工作才三个月的我，被我的老板本·格雷厄姆和杰瑞·纽曼派去参加Rockwood巧克力公司在布鲁克林召开的股东大会。一个年轻人刚控制了这家生产可可产品的公司。他当时发明了一种绝无仅有的”代币”，为每股Rockwood公司的股票出价80磅可可豆。我在1988年给股东的信中描述过这次交易，也解释了其中的套利机会。我要告诉你们JayPritzker，就是上面提到的那个小伙子，一个利用避税主意的商业天才。这种可行的办法逃过了其他想买Rockwood股票专家们的眼睛，包括我的老板本杰明和杰瑞。

At the meeting, Jay was friendly and gave me an education on the 1954 tax code. I came away very impressed. Thereafter, I avidly followed Jay’s business dealings, which were many and brilliant. His valued partner was his brother, Bob, who for nearly 50 years ran Marmon Group, the home for most of the Pritzker businesses.

在那次股东大会上，Jay友善地教了我很多关于1954年免税的知识，让我在离开时对他印象深刻。此后，我热切地跟踪着Jay那些繁多但出色的生意。Jay最有价值的合伙人是他的兄弟Bob，他经营玛蒙集团(Marmon)近50年了，这是Pritzker家族许多公司的母公司。

Jay died in 1999, and Bob retired early in 2002. Around then, the Pritzker family decided to gradually sell or reorganize certain of its holdings, including Marmon, a company operating 125 businesses, managed through nine sectors. Marmon’s largest operation is Union Tank Car, which together with a Canadian counterpart owns 94,000 rail cars that are leased to various shippers. The original cost of this fleet is $5.1 bi ll i o n . A llt o l d, M a r m o nha s$ 7 billion in sales and about 20,000 employees.

在Jay1999年去世后，Bob在2002年初也退休了。Pritzker家族决定逐步卖掉或重组他们的公司，其中包括Marmon集团。Marmon通过它的9个部门运营着125项生意，其中最大的一个是联合槽罐车公司(Union Tank Car)，加上它的加拿大分公司，联合槽罐车公司共拥有9.4万辆铁路槽罐车，被分租给不同的托运人。这只车队的原始成本是51亿美元，总而言之，Marmon集团拥有70亿美元销售额和大约2万名员工。

We will soon purchase 60% of Marmon and will acquire virtually all of the balance within six years. Our initial outlay will be $4.5 billion, and the price of our later purchases will be based on a formula tied to earnings. Prior to our entry into the picture, the Pritzker family received substantial consideration from Marmon’s distribution of cash, investments and certain businesses.

我们不久将收购Marmon集团60%的股份，并将在6年内买下其余股份。我们的初始支出是45亿美元，我们以后的购买价格将基于一个与收益挂钩的公式。在我们涉足其中之前，Pritzker家族从Marmon集团的现金分配、投资以及坚实的业务中获得了可观的收益。

This deal was done in the way Jay would have liked. We arrived at a price using only Marmon’s financial statements, employing no advisors and engaging in no nit-picking. I knew that the business would be exactly as the Pritzkers represented, and they knew that we would close on the dot, however chaotic financial markets might be. During the past year, many large deals have been renegotiated or killed entirely. With the Pritzkers, as with Berkshire, a deal is a deal.

这项交易，也是按Jay喜欢的方式进行的。我们仅凭Marmon集团的财务报表就给出报价，没有聘请顾问，也没有进行细致的审计。我知道公司会和Pritzker家族描述的情况一样，同样他们也知道，不论混乱的金融市场情况如何，我们都会说到做到。在过去的一年里，许多大型交易被要求重新谈判或干脆取消，但这个交易，对Pritzker家族来说，像对伯克希尔一样，一言为定。

Marmon’s CEO, Frank Ptak, works closely with a long-time associate, John Nichols. John was formerly the highly successful CEO of Illinois Tool Works (ITW), where he teamed with Frank to run a mix of industrial businesses. Take a look at their ITW record; you’ll be impressed.

Marmon集团的CEO：FrankPtak，他有一个长期搭档JohnNichols。John从前是伊利诺伊机械公司优秀的CEO (Illinois Tool Works Inc. NYSE：ITW，一家全球性的工业产品和设备制造商，业务包括：汽车原始设备，食品设备，测试和测量及电子产品，焊接设备，聚合物和流体，建筑产品等。www.itw.com)，在ITW他和Frank合作管理一个多元化的工业集团。看一眼他们在ITW的记录，你会留下深刻印象。

Byron Trott of Goldman Sachs — whose praises I sang in the 2003 report — facilitated the Marmon transaction. Byron is the rare investment banker who puts himself in his client’s shoes. Charlie and I trust him completely.

高盛公司的ByronTrott(我在2003年股东的信中曾对其大加赞扬)，促成了收购Marmon集团。Byron是那种很罕见的，能设身处地为客户着想的投资银行家，查理和我百分百地信任他。

You’ll like the code name that Goldman Sachs assigned the deal. Marmon entered the auto business in 1902 and exited it in 1933. Along the way it manufactured the Wasp, a car that won the first Indianapolis 500 race, held in 1911. So this deal was labeled “Indy 500.”

你们也会喜欢高盛公司为这个交易起的代号。因Marmon集团在1902年-1933年曾涉足汽车业，他们制造的Wasp汽车，赢得了在1911年首次举办的印地安纳波利斯500汽车赛，所以这笔交易被称为”印地500”。

In May 2006, I spoke at a lunch at Ben Bridge, our Seattle-based jewelry chain. The audience was a number of its vendors, among them Dennis Ulrich, owner of a company that manufactured gold jewelry.

2006年5月，当我在西雅图BenBridge珠宝连锁店举办的午餐会上发言时，下面的听众是它的一些供应商，其中包括DennisUlrich，他是一家金饰品制作公司的老板。

In January 2007, Dennis called me, suggesting that with Berkshire’s support he could build a large jewelry supplier. We soon made a deal for his business, simultaneously purchasing a supplier of about equal size. The new company, Richline Group, has since made two smaller acquisitions. Even with those, Richline is far below the earnings threshold we normally require for purchases. I’m willing to bet, however, that Dennis — with the help of his partner, Dave Meleski — will build a large operation, earning good returns on capital employed.

2007年1月，Dennis打电话给我，建议说如果能得到伯克希尔的支持，他可以缔造出一个珠宝制造业巨人。不久我们与他达成了交易，同时又收购了另一家与他规模相当的公司(Bel-Oro International和Aurafin LLC)，组成Richline集团公司。新公司后来又做了两笔较小的收购。但即便如此，Richline公司的收益水平也远低于我们通常要求的收购门槛。不过我打赌，Dennis在他的搭档DaveMeleski的辅助下，将会建立起一个大型企业，并从投入的资本中赚取可观的回报。

Businesses — The Great, the Good and the Gruesome 企业：出色的、良好的、糟糕的

Let’s take a look at what kind of businesses turn us on. And while we’re at it, let’s also discuss what we wish to avoid.

让我们来看看，什么样的企业能让我们兴奋不已。在关注于此时，我们同样也要探讨，哪些是我们期望极力避开的企业。

Charlie and I look for companies that have a) a business we understand; b) favorable long-term economics; c) able and trustworthy management; and d) a sensible price tag. We like to buy the whole business or, if management is our partner, at least 80%. When control-type purchases of quality aren’t available, though, we are also happy to simply buy small portions of great businesses by way of stock-market purchases. It’s better to have a part interest in the Hope Diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.

查理和我要寻找的公司是：a)我们能理解的业务；b)长期可持续的竞争优势；c)有能力且值得信赖的管理层；d)合理的标价。我们倾向买下整个公司，或者当管理层是我们的合伙人时，至少买下80％的股份。如果控股收购的方式不可行，我们也很乐意简单地通过证券市场上买入那些出色公司的一小部分股权，这就好比拥有”希望之钻”(重45.52克拉的蓝色钻石)的一小部分权益，也远远好过拥有一整颗水钻(人造钻石)。

A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company’s being the low-cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success. Business history is filled with “Roman Candles,” companies whose moats proved illusory and were soon crossed.

一家真正伟大的企业必须要有一道持久的”护城河”来保护投资资本获得高额回报。但资本主义的竞争活力使得，任何正赚取高额回报的商业”城堡”，都会受到竞争对手的反复攻击。因此，一道难以逾越的屏障，比如一家公司成为低成本生产商(GEICO保险或Costco好事多超市)，或者拥有强大的世界性[Brand_Value|品牌]，才是企业获得持续成功的关键。商业史中充斥着”罗马烟火筒”般光彩炫目的公司，这些公司所谓的”护城河”最终被证明是虚幻的，很快就被对手跨越。

Our criterion of “enduring” causes us to rule out companies in industries prone to rapid and continuous change. Though capitalism’s “creative destruction” is highly beneficial for society, it precludes investment certainty. A moat that must be continuously rebuilt will eventually be no moat at all.

我们对”持久性”的评判标准，使我们排除了许多处在发展迅速且不断变化行业里的公司。尽管资本主义的”创造性破坏”对社会发展很有利，但它失去了投资的确定性。一条需要不断重建的护城河，最终将完全没有护城河。

Additionally, this criterion eliminates the business whose success depends on having a great manager. Of course, a terrific CEO is a huge asset for any enterprise, and at Berkshire we have an abundance of these managers. Their abilities have created billions of dollars of value that would never have materialized if typical CEOs had been running their businesses.

另外，这个标准也排除那些成功依靠某个伟大的管理者的企业。当然，一个伟大的CEO对任何企业都是一笔巨大的财富，在伯克希尔，我们拥有相当数量这样的经理人。他们的能力创造了数十亿的财富，如果让一般的CEO们来运营这些业务，这些财富将永远无法实现的。

But if a business requires a superstar to produce great results, the business itself cannot be deemed great. A medical partnership led by your area’s premier brain surgeon may enjoy outsized and growing earnings, but that tells little about its future. The partnership’s moat will go when the surgeon goes. You can count, though, on the moat of the Mayo Clinic to endure, even though you can’t name its CEO.

但是，如果一个企业，需要依赖一个超级经理人才能产生伟大的成果，那这个企业本身就不会被认为是个伟大的企业。由你所在地区首席脑外科医生领导的医疗合伙公司，可能有着令人高兴的巨大且增长的收入，但是这并不能说明它的未来将会如何。随着外科医生的离开，合伙公司的”护城河”也将一起消失。即使你不能叫出梅奥诊所(美国最好的医院之一)CEO的名字，你也能知道它的”护城河”能够持续很久。

Long-term competitive advantage in a stable industry is what we seek in a business. If that comes with rapid organic growth, great. But even without organic growth, such a business is rewarding. We will simply take the lush earnings of the business and use them to buy similar businesses elsewhere. There’s no rule that you have to invest money where you’ve earned it. Indeed, it’s often a mistake to do so: Truly great businesses, earning huge returns on tangible assets, can’t for any extended period reinvest a large portion of their earnings internally at high rates of return.

我们所要寻找的企业，是在稳定行业中，具有长期竞争优势的公司。如果它伴随着快速的有机增长，那就更好了。但是即使没有有机增长，那样的生意也是值得的。我们只需简单地把这些生意中获得的可观收益，去购买其它类似的企业。这里没有什么规定你，必须把钱投资在你赚到的地方。事实上，这样的做法通常是一个错误：真正伟大的企业，从有形资产中获得的巨大回报，在任何一个较长的持续期内，都无法以高回报率在内部将其大部分收益再投资。

Let’s look at the prototype of a dream business, our own See’s Candy. The boxed-chocolates industry in which it operates is unexciting: Per-capita consumption in the U.S. is extremely low and doesn’t grow. Many once-important brands have disappeared, and only three companies have earned more than token profits over the last forty years. Indeed, I believe that See’s, though it obtains the bulk of its revenues from only a few states, accounts for nearly half of the entire industry’s earnings.

让我们来看看这种梦幻般生意的原型——我们拥有的喜诗糖果公司。它经营的盒装巧克力业务并不能令人兴奋，因为美国人均的消费量非常低而且没有增长。许多名噪一时的品牌都已消失，并且在过去40年中只有三家公司赚到了超过象征性的收益。事实上我认为，尽管喜诗糖果的收入大部分来源于少数几个州，但却占到整个行业将近一半的收益。

At See’s, annual sales were 16 million pounds of candy when Blue Chip Stamps purchased the company in 1972. (Charlie and I controlled Blue Chip at the time and later merged it into Berkshire.) Last year See’s sold 31 million pounds, a growth rate of only 2% annually. Yet its durable competitive advantage, built by the See’s family over a 50-year period, and strengthened subsequently by Chuck Huggins and Brad Kinstler, has produced extraordinary results for Berkshire.

1972年当蓝筹印花公司买下喜诗糖果时，它年销售1600万磅的糖果。(那时查理和我控制着蓝筹印花公司，后来将其并入伯克希尔)，喜诗去年的销售额是3100万磅，年增长率只有2％。然而由See’s家族在50多年里，建立起来的持久竞争优势，随后被ChuckHuggins和BradKinstler继续巩固，给伯克希尔创造出非凡的利润。

We bought See’s for $25 mi ll i o n w h e ni t ss a l es w ere$ 30 million and pre-tax earnings were less than $5 mi ll i o n . T h ec a p i t a lt h e n re q u i re d t oco n d u c tt h e b u s in ess w a s$ 8 million. (Modest seasonal debt was also needed for a few months each year.) Consequently, the company was earning 60% pre-tax on invested capital. Two factors helped to minimize the funds required for operations. First, the product was sold for cash, and that eliminated accounts receivable. Second, the production and distribution cycle was short, which minimized inventories.

我们用2500万美元买下它时，它的销售额是3000万美元，税前收益不到500万美元。企业的运营资本是800万美元(每年有几个月，它需要适度的季节性债务)。因此，该公司投入资本赚取了60％的税前收益。有两个因素帮助了运营资本的最小化。首先，该产品是现金销售，消除了应收账款；其次，生产和分销的周期很短，使存货最小化。

Last year See’s sales were $383 mi ll i o n, an d p re - t a x p ro f i t s w ere$ 82 million. The capital now required to run the business is $40 mi ll i o n . T hi s m e an s w e ha v e ha d t ore in v es t o n l y$ 32 million since 1972 to handle the modest physical growth — and somewhat immodest financial growth — of the business. In the meantime pre-tax earnings have totaled $1.35 bi ll i o n . * A ll o f t ha t *, e x ce pt f or t h e$ 32 million, has been sent to Berkshire (or, in the early years, to Blue Chip). After paying corporate taxes on the profits, we have used the rest to buy other attractive businesses. Just as Adam and Eve kick-started an activity that led to six billion humans, See’s has given birth to multiple new streams of cash for us. (The biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply” is one we take seriously at Berkshire.)

去年喜诗糖果的销售额是3.83亿美元，税前收益是8200万美元，运营资本是4000万美元。这意味着从1972年以来，我们只需再投资区区3200万美元，以适应业务的适度实际增长，和稍许过度的财务增长。同时税前收益总计是13.5亿美元，扣除3200万美元后，所有这些收益都流到[Berkshire_Hathaway|伯克希尔]。利润在缴纳公司税后，我们用余下的钱购买了其他有吸引力的公司。就像从亚当和夏娃最初喜好的活动，带来了60亿人一样，喜诗糖果开启了我们后来的许多滚滚而来的新财源。(在伯克希尔，我们非常重视圣经多子多孙的命令)

There aren’t many See’s in Corporate America. Typically, companies that increase their earnings from $5 mi ll i o n t o$ 82 million require, say, $400 million or so of capital investment to finance their growth. That’s because growing businesses have both working capital needs that increase in proportion to sales growth and significant requirements for fixed asset investments.

在美国的企业中，象喜诗糖果这样的企业并不多。通常要将公司的收入从500万美元提升到8200万美元，需要为其增长投入约4亿美元的资金(即1美元税前利润增加，需要5美元资本投入)。这是因为成长中的企业，既有与销售额增长成比例增长的营运资本的需求(营收+存货)，也有对固定资产投资的重大需求。

A company that needs large increases in capital to engender its growth may well prove to be a satisfactory investment. There is, to follow through on our example, nothing shabby about earning $82 mi ll i o n p re - t a x o n$ 400 million of net tangible assets. But that equation for the owner is vastly different from the See’s situation. It’s far better to have an ever-increasing stream of earnings with virtually no major capital requirements. Ask Microsoft or Google.

一家需要大幅增加资本投入来实现增长的公司，也可能被证实是一项令人满意的投资。回到我们的例子中，能从4亿美元有形资产净值中赚到8200万美元税前收益，这也不错。但对于股东来说，这一回报水平与喜诗糖果是完全不能比的。喜诗在几乎没有没有重大资本投入的情况下，就能带来源源不断增长的现金流，这简直是太棒了！不信去问问微软或谷歌吧！

One example of good, but far from sensational, business economics is our own FlightSafety. This company delivers benefits to its customers that are the equal of those delivered by any business that I know of. It also possesses a durable competitive advantage: Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure.

一个良好但远非出色的生意例子是我们拥有的[FlightSafety|飞安公司]。这家公司为它的客户创造的价值，跟其他我知道的类似公司一样。它还拥有一项持久的竞争优势：接受飞行训练，如果选择其他公司，而不是这家最顶尖的公司，就像在一次外科手术前，选择价低的医生一样愚蠢。

Nevertheless, this business requires a significant reinvestment of earnings if it is to grow. When we purchased FlightSafety in 1996, its pre-tax operating earnings were $111 mi ll i o n, an d i t s n e t in v es t m e n t in f i x e d a sse t s w a s$ 570 million. Since our purchase, depreciation charges have totaled $923 mi ll i o n . B u t c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u res ha v e t o t a l e d$ 1.635 billion, most of that for simulators to match the new airplane models that are constantly being introduced. (A simulator can cost us more than $12 mi ll i o n, an d w e ha v e 273 o f t h e m .) O u r f i x e d a sse t s, a f t er d e p rec ia t i o n, n o w am o u n tt o$ 1.079 billion. Pre-tax operating earnings in 2007 were $270 mi ll i o n, a g ain o f$ 159 million since 1996. That gain gave us a good, but far from See’s-like, return on our incremental investment of $509 million.

当然，这项生意如果要增长，就需要将收益中的很大一部分再投入。当我们1996年买下飞安公司时，它的税前经营收益是1.11亿美元，在固定资产上的净投资是5.7亿美元。自从我们购买以来，折旧费用总计9.23亿美元，但资本支出总计为16.35亿美元，其中的大部分用来购买飞行训练模拟器，以适配不断推出的新型飞机，(一个模拟器花费超过1200万美元，我们共有273个)。现在我们的固定资产经折旧后，现为10.79亿美元。2007年的税前经营收益为2.7亿美元，与1996年比，增加了1.59亿美元。这个收益相比于我们投入的5.09亿美元增量投资来说，回报还不错，但和喜诗糖果的回报率根本没法比。(累计折旧9.23亿，累计资本支出16.35亿，净投入7.12亿，固定资产净增加5.09亿，减值2.03亿？)

Consequently, if measured only by economic returns, FlightSafety is an excellent but not extraordinary business. Its put-up-more-to-earn-more experience is that faced by most corporations. For example, our large investment in regulated utilities falls squarely in this category. We will earn considerably more money in this business ten years from now, but we will invest many billions to make it.

因此，如果仅仅以经济回报衡量，飞安公司是一个良好但绝非出色的业务。这种高投入高产出的发展经历，正是许多公司所面临的。例如，我们在受监管的公用事业业务中的投资就属于这一类别，十年后，我们将从这个业务中赚到相当多的钱，但是我们需要投入数十亿美元才能实现这个目标。

Now let’s move to the gruesome. The worst sort of business is one that grows rapidly, requires significant capital to engender the growth, and then earns little or no money. Think airlines. Here a durable competitive advantage has proven elusive ever since the days of the Wright Brothers. Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down.

现在让我们来看看糟糕的生意。最糟糕生意是那种收入虽然增长迅速，但需要巨大的投资才能实现增长，然后赚很少的钱甚至赔钱的生意。想想航空业吧，自从莱特兄弟时代以来，整个行业所谓的持续竞争优势，已被证明纯粹子虚乌有。事实上，假如当时某个富有远见的资本家在KittyHawk (莱特兄弟试飞的地方)，他应该把Orville Wright打下来，给后来者帮上一个大忙。

The airline industry’s demand for capital ever since that first flight has been insatiable. Investors have poured money into a bottomless pit, attracted by growth when they should have been repelled by it. And I, to my shame, participated in this foolishness when I had Berkshire buy U.S. Air preferred stock in 1989. As the ink was drying on our check, the company went into a tailspin, and before long our preferred dividend was no longer being paid. But we then got very lucky. In one of the recurrent, but always misguided, bursts of optimism for airlines, we were actually able to sell our shares in 1998 for a hefty gain. In the decade following our sale, the company went bankrupt. Twice.

自首次飞行以来，航空业对资本的需求就是永无止境的。投资者本该对它避而远之的时候，却被它的成长所吸引，将钱源源不断地投入这个无底洞。令人羞愧的是，1989年当我让伯克希尔买入全美航空公司的优先股时，我犯了这种愚蠢的错误。可我们付款支票上的墨迹未干，全美航空就陷入困境，不久它就不再支付给我们优先股的股息。不过最后我们算是很幸运。在又一轮被误导的，对航空公司的乐观情绪爆发时，我们在1998年卖掉了我们手里的股票，实际上大赚了一笔。在我们出售后的10年里，美国航空申请破产了两次！

To sum up, think of three types of “savings accounts.” The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns.

总结一下，想想如下三类”储蓄账户”。伟大的账户，利率非常高，而且随着时间推移，利率会继续增长；良好的账户，支付的利率也很有吸引力，还可以通过增加存款获得更多利息；最后，糟糕的账户，既支付了非常低的利率，还要求你为那些令人失望的回报继续投入资金。

And now it’s confession time. It should be noted that no consultant, board of directors or investment banker pushed me into the mistakes I will describe. In tennis parlance, they were all unforced errors.

现在又到忏悔时间了。必须明确的是，并没有哪个咨询顾问、董事会或投资银行家，把我推到我将描述的那些错误中去。用网球术语来说，它们都是非受迫性失误(主动失误)。

To begin with, I almost blew the See’s purchase. The seller was asking $30 mi ll i o n, an d I w a s a d aman t ab o u t n o t g o in g ab o v e$ 25 million. Fortunately, he caved. Otherwise I would have balked, and that $1.35 billion would have gone to somebody else.

就从我差点搞砸对喜诗糖果的收购说起。当时卖主开价3000万美元，而我坚持不能超过2500万美元。幸运的是，他退让了。否则我的犹豫不决会让这13.5亿美元落入别人的腰包。

About the time of the See’s purchase, Tom Murphy, then running Capital Cities Broadcasting, called and offered me the Dallas-Fort Worth NBC station for $35 million. The station came with the Fort Worth paper that Capital Cities was buying, and under the “cross-ownership” rules Murph had to divest it. I knew that TV stations were See’s-like businesses that required virtually no capital investment and had excellent prospects for growth. They were simple to run and showered cash on their owners.

大约在收购喜诗糖果的时候，当时管理大都会广播公司的汤姆·墨菲打来电话，提议我出价3500万美元买下位于达拉斯沃尔斯堡(Dallas-FortWorth)的NBC电视台，该电视台附带了大都会广播公司要买下的”沃尔斯堡报”，鉴于”交叉持股”的法律规定，汤姆·墨菲不得不剥离它。我知道电视台也是象喜诗糖果那样的生意，实际上不需要什么资本投人，就会获得可观的增长前景，它们很容易运营并且为股东带来滚滚财富。

Moreover, Murph, then as now, was a close friend, a man I admired as an extraordinary manager and outstanding human being. He knew the television business forward and backward and would not have called me unless he felt a purchase was certain to work. In effect Murph whispered “buy” into my ear. But I didn’t listen.

此外，汤姆·墨菲至今都是我们的亲密朋友，我钦佩他是一位出色的经理人和杰出的人。他了解电视这门生意了如指掌，而且除非他认为这个收购必会成功，否则不会给我打电话。实际上汤姆·墨菲已经近乎在我耳边低声说”买”了，可惜我充耳不闻。

In 2006, the station earned $73 mi ll i o n p re - t a x, b r in g in g i t s t o t a l e a r nin g ss in ce I t u r n e dd o w n t h e d e a lt o a tl e a s t$ 1 billion — almost all available to its owner for other purposes. Moreover, the property now has a capital value of about $800 million. Why did I say “no”? The only explanation is that my brain had gone on vacation and forgot to notify me. (My behavior resembled that of a politician Molly Ivins once described: “If his I.Q. was any lower, you would have to water him twice a day.”)

在2006年，该电视台赚到7300万美元的税前收益。从我放弃那个交易至今，至少赚了10亿美元，这些收益都是可以让股东另作他用的。不仅如此，该公司目前的资本价值大约8亿美元。为什么我要说”NO”？唯一的解释就是，我的大脑度假去了却忘记通报我。(我的行为类似于政治家MolyIvins说过的：“如果他的智商再低一点，你就需要每天拿水泼他两次。”)

Finally, I made an even worse mistake when I said “yes” to Dexter, a shoe business I bought in 1993 for $433 mi ll i o nin B er k s hi res t oc k (25, 203 s ha reso f A) . Wha t I ha d a ssesse d a s d u r ab l eco m p e t i t i v e a d v an t a g e v ani s h e d w i t hina f e w ye a rs . B u tt ha t ’ s j u s tt h e b e g innin g : B y u s in g B er k s hi res t oc k, I co m p o u n d e d t hi serror h ug e l y . T ha t m o v e ma d e t h ecos tt o B er k s hi res ha re h o l d ers n o t$ 400 million, but rather $3.5 bi ll i o n . I n esse n ce, I g a v e a w a y 1.6$ 220 billion — to buy a worthless business.

最后，当我对Dexter鞋业说”YES”的时候，我又犯了一个更严重的错误。Dexter是1993年我用价值4.33亿美元的25203股伯克希尔A股股票收购的一家制鞋公司。我当时所评估的持久的竞争优势在随后几年里消失得无影无踪。但这只是个开始：由于购买用的是伯克希尔的股票，我将这个错误放大很多。这次交易的成本对伯克希尔股东来说不是4亿美元，而是35亿美元。从本质上说，我放弃的是，现在的价值2200亿美元出色的生意的1.6％，购买了一家毫无价值的公司。

To date, Dexter is the worst deal that I’ve made. But I’ll make more mistakes in the future — you can bet on that. A line from Bobby Bare’s country song explains what too often happens with acquisitions: “I’ve never gone to bed with an ugly woman, but I’ve sure woke up with a few.”

到目前为止，Dexter是我做过的最糟糕的交易。但是你可以打赌，我将来还会犯更多的错误。BobbyBare的乡村歌曲中有一段歌词，解释了收购为什么会如此频繁的发生这样的结果：“我决不会和一个丑女人上床，但当我醒来时，肯定身边总有几个。”

Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Each sector has vastly different balance sheet and income account characteristics. Therefore, lumping them together impedes analysis. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them.

现在，让我们检视伯克希尔四个主要的运营部门。每个部门都有截然不同的资产负债表和损益表特征。因此，将他们合并会阻碍分析。所以，我们把它们当作四个独立业务来呈现，这就是查理和我看待它们的方式。

Insurance 保险业务

The best anecdote I’ve heard during the current presidential campaign came from Mitt Romney, who asked his wife, Ann, “When we were young, did you ever in your wildest dreams think I might be president?” To which she replied, “Honey, you weren’t in my wildest dreams.”

在这次总统竞选中，我听到最有趣的故事是关于米特·罗姆尼的，他问妻子安(Ann)，“在我们年轻时，你有没有在你最疯狂的梦想中认为，我可能会成为总统？“她回答说，“亲爱的，在我最疯狂的梦想中，根本没有你！”

When we first entered the property/casualty insurance business in 1967, my wildest dreams did not envision our current operation. Here’s how we did in the first five years after purchasing National Indemnity:

在我们1967年首次进入财产/意外保险业务时，在我最疯狂的梦想里也没有我们设想到现在的业务。在我们买下国民保险公司最初的5年，客气地说，我们只是一个缓慢的起跑者，但随后情况发生了变化。下表是我们最初5年和最近5年的情况记录。

Year	Underwriting Profit (Loss) (in millions)	Float (in millions)
1967	$ 0.4	$ 18.5
1968	0.6	21.3
1969	0.1	25.4
1970	(0.4)	39.4
1971	1.4	65.6

To put it charitably, we were a slow starter. But things changed. Here’s the record of the last five years:

Year	Underwriting Profit (Loss) (in millions)	Float (in millions)
2003	$ 1,718	$ 44,220
2004	1,551	46,094
2005	53	49,287
2006	3,838	50,887
2007	3,374	58,698

This metamorphosis has been accomplished by some extraordinary managers. Let’s look at what each has achieved.

这种质变的完成靠的是一些出色的经理人，让我们看看他们各自取得的成就。

GEICO possesses the widest moat of any of our insurers, one carefully protected and expanded by Tony Nicely, its CEO. Last year — again — GEICO had the best growth record among major auto insurers, increasing its market share to 7.2%. When Berkshire acquired control in 1995, that share was 2.5%. Not coincidentally, annual ad expenditures by GEICO have increased from $31 mi ll i o n t o$ 751 million during the same period.

在我们所有的保险公司里，GEICO保险拥有最宽的”护城河”，在CEO托尼·莱斯利(TonyNicely)的细心维护和拓展下，去年，GEICO在主要车险保险公司中，再次取得了最好的增长记录，市场份额上升到7.2％。当伯克希尔1995年获得控制权时，它的份额是2.5％。并非巧合的是，GEICO的年度广告支出由同期的3100万美元，上升到7.51亿美元。

Tony, now 64, joined GEICO at 18. Every day since, he has been passionate about the company — proud of how it could both save money for its customers and provide growth opportunities for its associates. Even now, with sales at $12 billion, Tony feels GEICO is just getting started. So do I.

Tony今年64岁了，他18岁就加入GEICO。此后的每一天里，他都对公司充满热情，为GEICO如何给客户省钱并为员工提供发展机会而自豪。即使是现在销售额达到120亿美元的情况下，Tony仍觉得GEICO的发展才刚开始，我也这么想。

Here’s some evidence. In the last three years, GEICO has increased its share of the motorcycle market from 2.1% to 6%. We’ve also recently begun writing policies on ATVs and RVs. And in November we wrote our first commercial auto policy. GEICO and National Indemnity are working together in the commercial field, and early results are very encouraging.

这里有些证据。在过去三年里，GEICO在摩托车市场的份额从2.1％上升到6％。我们已经开始推出针对全地形车辆和房车车辆的险种，并11月份承保了第一份商业车辆的保单。GEICO保险和国民保险公司正一起进入商业车辆保险领域，而从最初的成果来看，非常鼓舞人心。

Even in aggregate, these lines will remain a small fraction of our personal auto volume. Nevertheless, they should deliver a growing stream of underwriting profits and float.

即使合并，这些业务线也只占我们私人车辆保险市场的一小部分。尽管如此，它们应该能够提供越来越多的承保利润和浮存金。

General Re, our international reinsurer, is by far our largest source of “home-grown” float — $23 billion at yearend. This operation is now a huge asset for Berkshire. Our ownership, however, had a shaky start.

我们的国际再保险业务是由通用再保险公司运营，但到目前为止是我们”本土”浮存金的最大来源，在年底达到230亿美元。这项业务现在是伯克希尔一项巨大的资产。可是，我们的拥有却是从提心吊胆开始的。

For decades, General Re was the Tiffany of reinsurers, admired by all for its underwriting skills and discipline. This reputation, unfortunately, outlived its factual underpinnings, a flaw that I completely missed when I made the decision in 1998 to merge with General Re. The General Re of 1998 was not operated as the General Re of 1968 or 1978.

数十年里，通用再保险都被认为是再保险业里的”蒂芙妮”(Tiffany，世界上著名的奢侈品公司，以生产昂贵的饰品著称)，因其承保技巧和纪律受到所有人的推崇。不幸的是，这种声誉其实已并不符实。当我1998年做出决定要并购通用再保险时，完全忽略了这一缺陷。通用再保险在1998年的运营方式已经与它在1968年或1978年的不同了。

Now, thanks to Joe Brandon, General Re’s CEO, and his partner, Tad Montross, the luster of the company has been restored. Joe and Tad have been running the business for six years and have been doing first-class business in a first-class way, to use the words of J. P. Morgan. They have restored discipline to underwriting, reserving and the selection of clients.

现在，多亏了通用再保险的CEO，JoeBrandon以及搭档TadMontross，恢复了公司以往的光彩。Joe和Tad执掌公司已经6年，套用J.P.摩根的话：他们一直是用一流的方式来做一流的生意。他们已经恢复了对承保、准备金以及客户的挑选上的纪律。

Their job was made more difficult by costly and time-consuming legacy problems, both in the U.S. and abroad. Despite that diversion, Joe and Tad have delivered excellent underwriting results while skillfully repositioning the company for the future.

公司在国内和国外的遗留问题，耗费巨大且旷日持久，让他们的工作更加困难。尽管有那样的牵制，Joe和Tad通过巧妙的对公司的未来重新定位，取得了极好的承保结果。

Since joining Berkshire in 1986, Ajit Jain has built a truly great specialty reinsurance operation from scratch. For one-of-a-kind mammoth transactions, the world now turns to him.

自从1986年加入伯克希尔以来，阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)从零开始，建立了一个真正伟大的专业再保险业务，现在只要是那种独一无二的巨额交易，全世界都会来找他。

Last year I told you in detail about the Equitas transfer of huge, but capped, liabilities to Berkshire for a single premium of $7.1 billion. At this very early date, our experience has been good. But this doesn’t tell us much because it’s just one straw in a fifty-year-or-more wind. What we know for sure, however, is that the London team who joined us, headed by Scott Moser, is first-rate and has become a valuable asset for our insurance business.

去年，我曾详细的告诉过你，Equitas为一笔71亿美元保费的单一保险，向伯克希尔转让了巨额但有赔付上限的债务。对于此笔生意的初期情况，我们的经验很管用，但这对于要被风吹五十年或更长时间后的稻草情况做出预计，这些经验并不能告诉我们更多。然而，我们可以确定的是，由ScottMoser为首的伦敦团队加入了我们，他们是一流的，并已经成为我们保险业务里一笔有价值的财富。

Finally, we have our smaller operations, which serve specialized segments of the insurance market. In aggregate, these companies have performed extraordinarily well, earning above-average underwriting profits and delivering valuable float for investment.

最后，我们还有很小部分的业务，是服务于特殊细分的保险市场。总体上，这些公司运营情况出奇的好，赚取了高于平均水平的承保利润，并为投资提供了宝贵的浮存金。

Last year BoatU.S., headed by Bill Oakerson, was added to the group. This company manages an association of about 650,000 boat owners, providing them services similar to those offered by AAA auto clubs to drivers. Among the association’s offerings is boat insurance. Learn more about this operation by visiting its display at the annual meeting.

去年，Bill Oakerson领导的美国船东协会(BoatU.S.)加入了我们的保险团队。这个公司管理着一个约有65万船主组成的协会，提供给船主的服务类似于AAA汽车俱乐部提供给他们司机的。在协会提供服务之一是船只保险。想更多了解这方面情况，可以在每年的年会上参观他们的展示。

Below we show the record of our four categories of property/casualty insurance.

下面我们展示了我们的四类财产/意外伤害保险的记录。

Insurance Operations	Underwriting Profit(Loss) 2007 (in $ millions)	Underwriting Profit(Loss) 2006 (in $ millions)	Yearend Float 2007 (in $ millions)	Yearend Float 2006 (in $ millions)
General Re	$ 555	$ 526	$ 23,009	$ 22,827
BH Reinsurance	1,427	1,658	23,692	16,860
GEICO	1,113	1,314	7,768	7,171
Other Primary	279	340*	4,229	4,029*
Total	$ 3,374	$ 3,838	$ 58,698	$ 50,887

* Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.

* 包括 2006 年 5 月 19 日起的 Applied Underwriters。

Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务

Berkshire has an 87.4% (diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.8 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 720,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

在伯克希尔拥有87.4%股权的中美能源控股公司旗下，包含许多不同种类的公用事业类公司。其中最大的分别为：(1)约克郡电力与北方电力公司(Yorkshire Electricity,Northern Electric)，拥有380万电力用户，为英国第三大的电力分销商；(2)中美能源(MidAmerican Energy)，在爱荷华州拥有72万电力用户；(3)太平洋电力与洛基山电力公司(Pacific Power,Rocky Mountain Power)，在美西6州拥有170万电力用户；(4)科恩河与北方天然管道公司(Kern River,Northern Natural pipelines)，供应全美8%的天然气消耗量。

Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Eight years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.

我们在中美能源控股的经营伙伴是WalterScott，和两位非常杰出的经理人，DaveSokol与GregAbel。合作双方各自拥有多少股票投票权并不重要，我们只在理智思考并达成一致意见后，才会采取重大的行动。与Dave,Greg和Walter共事的八年加强了我最初的信念：伯克希尔不可能再找到比他们更好的合伙人了。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican also owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 18,800 agents. Last year was a slow year for residential sales, and 2008 will probably be slower. We will continue, however, to acquire quality brokerage operations when they are available at sensible prices.

稍有不协调的是，中美能源拥有美国第二大房地产经纪商美国家庭服务公司HomeServices，该公司通过20家地区性品牌运营、拥有18,800个房动产经纪人员。去年是房屋销售放缓的一年，而2008年很有可能更缓慢。不过，我们将会继续以划算的价格继续收购优质的经纪公司。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operation:

以下是中美能源运营的一些关键数字：

	2007 Earnings (in $ millions)	2006 Earnings (in $ millions)
U.K. utilities	$ 337	$ 338
Iowa utility	412	348
Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006)	692	356
Pipelines	473	376
HomeServices	42	74
Other (Net)	130	245
Earnings before corporate interest and tax	2,086	1,737
Interest, other than to Berkshire	(312)	(261)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt	(108)	(134)
Income tax	(477)	(426)
Net Earnings	$ 1,189	$ 916
Earnings Applicable to Berkshire *	$ 1,114	$ 885
Debt Owed to Others	19,002	16,946
Debt Owed to Berkshire	821	1,055

* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $70 in 2007 an d$ 87 in 2006.

包括伯克希尔 2007 年赚取的利息（扣除相关所得税）70 美元和 2006 年赚取的利息 87 美元。

We agreed to purchase 35,464,337 shares of MidAmerican at $35.05 p ers ha re in 1999, a ye a r in w hi c hi t s p er - s ha ree a r nin g s w ere$ 2.59. Why the odd figure of $35.05 ? I or i g ina ll y d ec i d e d t h e b u s in ess w a s w or t h$ 35.00 per share to Berkshire. Now, I’m a “one-price” guy (remember See’s?) and for several days the investment bankers representing MidAmerican had no luck in getting me to increase Berkshire’s offer. But, finally, they caught me in a moment of weakness, and I caved, telling them I would go to $35.05. With that, I explained, they could tell their client they had wrung the last nickel out of me. At the time, it hurt.

1999年，我们同意以每股35.05美元买下中美能源35,464,337股股票，其每股收益是2.59美元。为什么会是35.05美元这样一个奇怪的数字呢？对伯克希尔来说，我最初认为它的价值是每股35美元。到现在，我还是一个坚持”一口价”的人(还记得喜诗糖果的故事吗？)，在几天里代表中美能源的投资银行家并未成功打动我，让我提高伯克希尔的出价。但是，最后，他们抓住了我软弱的一刹那，我退让了，告诉他们，我将出价每股35.05美元。我解释说，他们可以告诉他们的客户，他们已经榨出了我身上最后一枚镍币。这的确切中当时的要害。

Later on, in 2002, Berkshire purchased 6,700,000 shares at $60 t o h e lp f inan ce t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f o n eo f o u r p i p e l in es . L a s tl y, in 2006, w h e n M i d A m er i c anb o ug h tP a c i f i C or p, w e p u rc ha se d 23, 268, 793 s ha res a t$ 145 per share.

后来，在2002年，伯克希尔又以每股60美元购买了670万股股份，以提供资金帮助我们收购一个的管道供应公司。最后，在2006年，当中美能源买下太平洋公司时，我们又以每股145美元，买下23,268,793股中美能源的股票。(12.43亿(PE13.5)+4.02亿管道+33.74亿太平洋(PE9.7)，合计50.2亿美元)

In 2007, MidAmerican earned $15.78 p ers ha re . Ho w e v er, 77¢ o f t ha tw a s n o n - rec u rr in g - - a re d u c t i o nin d e f erre d t a x a t o u r B r i t i s h u t i l i t y, res u lt in g f ro ma l o w er in g o f t h e U . K . cor p or a t e t a x r a t e . S oc a ll n or ma l i ze d e a r nin g s$ 15.01 per share. And yes, I’m glad I wilted and offered the extra nickel.

在2007年，中美能源的每股收益是15.78美元。当然，其中有0.77美元是非经常性的——由于英国的公司税率降低，我们的英国公用事业公司递延税额减少了。所以，调整后经常性收益是每股15.01美元。是的，我很高兴，被这样榨干并挤出额外的镍币。

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔在这个事业群的业务可说是包罗万象。不过，让我们先看看整体的资产负债表和利润表的概要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/07 (in $ millions)

资产负债表（百万美元）

Assets	Amt.	Liabilities and Equity	Amt.
Cash and equivalents	$ 2,080	Notes payable	$ 1,278
Accounts and notes receivable	4,488
Inventory	5,793
Other current assets	470	Other current liabilities	7,652
Total current assets	12,831	Total current liabilities	8,930
Goodwill and other intangibles	14,201	Deferred taxes	828
Fixed assets	9,605	Term debt and other liabilities	3,079
Other assets	1,685	Equity	25,485
	$ 38,322		$ 38,322

Earnings Statement (in $ millions)

收益表（百万美元）

Item	2007	2006	2005
Revenues	$ 59,100	$ 52,660	$ 46,896
Operating expenses (including depreciation of $955 in 2007,$ 823 in 2006 and $699 in 2005)	55,026	49,002	44,190
Interest expense (net)	127	132	83
Pre-tax income	3,947*	3,526*	2,623*
Income taxes	1,594	1,395	977
Net income	$ 2,353	$ 2,131	$ 1,646

* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

税前利润不包含购买法会计调整

This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 23% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 9.8%.

这是一个包罗万象的集团，从销售棒棒糖到旅行房车，去年赚到了令人高兴的23％的平均净有形资产收益率。值得关注的是，达到这样的收益回报，仅用了极小的财务杠杆。显而易见的，我们拥有的是一些非常棒的企业。我们在收购它们中的很多家时，支付了高出净资产相当多的溢价，这反映在资产负债表的商誉科目。事实上也缩小了平均账面价值的收益率，到9.8%。

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:

以下是有关这个组合中公司的值得报告的情况：

Shaw, Acme Brick, Johns Manville and MiTek were all hurt in 2007 by the sharp housing downturn, with their pre-tax earnings declining 27%, 41%, 38%, and 9% respectively. Overall, these companies earned $941 mi ll i o n p re - t a x co m p a re d t o$ 1.296 billion in 2006.

Shaw地毯，AcmeBrick砖料，Johns Manville隔热材料，MiTek连接件全部受挫于2007年低迷的房地产市场，他们的税前收益分别下降27％，41％，38％和9％。总共这些公司赚到了9.41亿美元的税前收益，而2006年这个数字是12.96亿美元。

Last year, Shaw, MiTek and Acme contracted for tuck-in acquisitions that will help future earnings. You can be sure they will be looking for more of these.

去年，Shaw，AcmeBrick以及MiTek签下多个收购合约，这些并购将有助于未来的收益。你可以确信他们还会寻找更多这样的收购。

In a tough year for retailing, our standouts were See’s, Borsheims and Nebraska Furniture Mart.

在一个零售业的困难年份里，我们的杰出代表是喜诗糖果，波仙珠宝以及内布拉斯加家具卖场。

Two years ago Brad Kinstler was made CEO of See’s. We very seldom move managers from one industry to another at Berkshire. But we made an exception with Brad, who had previously run our uniform company, Fechheimer, and Cypress Insurance. The move could not have worked out better. In his two years, profits at See’s have increased more than 50%.

两年前Brad Kinstler成为喜诗糖果的CEO。在伯克希尔，我们很少将经理们从一个行业调到另一个。但是Brad是一个例外，他以前负责管理费区海默制服公司和Cypress工伤赔偿保险公司。这项调动的效果好得不要再好，在他负责的两年，喜诗糖果的利润增长了超过50％。

At Borsheims, sales increased 15.1%, helped by a 27% gain during Shareholder Weekend. Two years ago, Susan Jacques suggested that we remodel and expand the store. I was skeptical, but Susan was right.

波仙珠宝的销售额增加了15.1％，27％的收益得益于在股东周期间。两年前SusanJacques建议我们重新装修并扩大经营面积。我曾表示怀疑，但事实证明Susan是对的。

Susan came to Borsheims 25 years ago as a $4-an-hour saleswoman. Though she lacked a managerial background, I did not hesitate to make her CEO in 1994. She’s smart, she loves the business, and she loves her associates. That beats having an MBA degree any time.

Susan在25年前加入波仙珠宝，担任时薪4美元的女售货员。尽管她缺乏管理背景，但我在1994年毫不犹豫的让她担任CEO。她聪明、热爱这项事业，也热爱她的员工。这些在任何时候，都足可以超过拥有一个MBA学位。

(An aside: Charlie and I are not big fans of resumes. Instead, we focus on brains, passion and integrity. Another of our great managers is Cathy Baron Tamraz, who has significantly increased Business Wire’s earnings since we purchased it early in 2006. She is an owner’s dream. It is positively dangerous to stand between Cathy and a business prospect. Cathy, it should be noted, began her career as a cab driver.)

题外话：查理和我都不是”简历迷”。相反，我们寻找的是拥有聪明、勤奋和诚实正直的品质的人。我们另一个超级经理人是Cathy Baron Tamraz。自2006年初收购的美国商业资讯公司(BusinessWire)以来，Cathy显著提高了公司的利润。她是所有企业梦寐以求的那种经理人。鉴于Cathy会不顾一切地冲向目标，因此站在Cathy和她的生意目标之间绝对是危险的。值得注意的是，她职业生涯始于出租车司机。

Finally, at Nebraska Furniture Mart, earnings hit a record as our Omaha and Kansas City stores each had sales of about $400 million. These, by some margin, are the two top home furnishings stores in the country. In a disastrous year for many furniture retailers, sales at Kansas City increased 8%, while in Omaha the gain was 6%.

最后，内布拉斯加家具卖场的收益创了记录，它在奥马哈和堪萨斯城卖场的销售额双双达到大约4亿美元。需要注明的是，这是国内最顶尖的两家家具店。在一个对家具零售商来说，在一个灾难性的年度里，堪萨斯卖场的销售额增长了8％，而奥马哈卖场增长了6％。

Credit the remarkable Blumkin brothers, Ron and Irv, for this performance. Both are close personal friends of mine and great businessmen.

多亏有非凡的Blumkin兄弟Ron和Irv才会有这样的表现。他们都是我亲密的私人朋友和出色的生意人。

Iscar continues its wondrous ways. Its products are small carbide cutting tools that make large and very expensive machine tools more productive. The raw material for carbide is tungsten, mined in China. For many decades, Iscar moved tungsten to Israel, where brains turned it into something far more valuable. Late in 2007, Iscar opened a large plant in Dalian, China. In effect, we’ve now moved the brains to the tungsten. Major opportunities for growth await Iscar. Its management team, led by Eitan Wertheimer, Jacob Harpaz, and Danny Goldman, is certain to make the most of them.

伊斯卡公司(Iscar)继续着它的辉煌。它的产品是小型硬质合金切削刀具，可以让巨大而昂贵的机床有更高的生产效率。它的碳化物原料钨是在中国开采的。数十年来，ISCAR公司将钨运到以色列，在那里靠聪明的大脑把它们变成非常有价值的东西。2007年末，ISCAR在中国大连建立了一家大型工厂。实际上，我们现在把聪明的大脑搬到有钨的地方。众多成长的机会正等着ISCAR公司。在Eitan Wertheimer，Jacob Harpaz和Danny Goldman领导的管理团队一定会抓住其中的很多。

Flight services set a record in 2007 with pre-tax earnings increasing 49% to $547 million. Corporate aviation had an extraordinary year worldwide, and both of our companies — as runaway leaders in their fields — fully participated.

航空服务业在2007年创下记录，税前收益增长49％，达到5.47亿美元。公务飞行业务的发展在全球范围内都是异乎寻常的一年。我们的两家公司作为各自领域里领先的龙头企业，充分分享到增长。

FlightSafety, our pilot training business, gained 14% in revenues and 20% in pre-tax earnings. We estimate that we train about 58% of U.S. corporate pilots. Bruce Whitman, the company’s CEO, inherited this leadership position in 2003 from Al Ueltschi, the father of advanced flight training, and has proved to be a worthy successor.

我们的飞行员培训业务飞安公司，收入增长14％，税前收益增长20％。我们培训了大约58％的美国企业的飞行员。2003年BruceWhitman从”高级飞行训练之父”AlUeltschi手中接过公司的CEO一职，事实证明，他是一个称职的继任者。

At NetJets, the inventor of fractional-ownership of jets, we also remain the unchallenged leader. We now operate 487 planes in the U.S. and 135 in Europe, a fleet more than twice the size of that operated by our three major competitors combined. Because our share of the large-cabin market is near 90%, our lead in value terms is far greater.

共享飞机所有权发明者[NetJets|利捷航空]，仍然是业内无可挑战的领导者，我们目前在美国运营着487架飞机，在欧洲运营着135架飞机，其规模是我们三大竞争对手运营的飞机总和的两倍多。由于我们在大型机市场的份额接近90% ，我们在价值方面的领先优势要大得多。

The NetJets brand — with its promise of safety, service and security — grows stronger every year. Behind this is the passion of one man, Richard Santulli. If you were to pick someone to join you in a foxhole, you couldn’t do better than Rich. No matter what the obstacles, he just doesn’t stop.

NetJets品牌凭借其对飞行安全、机上服务和安保方面的承诺，业务每年都有很强劲的增长。它的背后是一个充满激情的人Richard Santulli。如果你需要挑选一个人，和你待在一个散兵坑里，没有比Rich更好的了。不管前面有什么障碍，都不能让他停止。

Europe is the best example of how Rich’s tenacity leads to success. For the first ten years we made little financial progress there, actually running up cumulative losses of $212 million. After Rich brought Mark Booth on board to run Europe, however, we began to gain traction. Now we have real momentum, and last year earnings tripled.

欧洲业务的成功就是证明Rich坚持不懈的一个很好的例子。最初十年里，在欧洲我们在财务方面几乎没有取得任何进展，实际上累计亏损了2.12亿美元。自从Rich让MarkBooth负责欧洲的业务以后，我们才有了真正的增长动力，现在我们的发展真是势不可挡，去年的收益增长3倍。

In November, our directors met at NetJets headquarters in Columbus and got a look at the sophisticated operation there. It is responsible for 1,000 or so flights a day in all kinds of weather, with customers expecting top-notch service. Our directors came away impressed by the facility and its capabilities — but even more impressed by Rich and his associates.

11月，在NetJet位于哥伦布市的总部，我们的董事在会面后顺便参观了他们那里复杂的运营部门。它担负着每天大约1000架次全天候的飞行任务，客户总是期待着一流的服务。我们的董事们离开时，对他们的设施和运营能力印象深刻，不过Rich和他的员工给大家留下更为深刻的印象。

Finance and Finance Products 金融和金融产品业务

Our major operation in this category is Clayton Homes, the largest U.S. manufacturer and marketer of manufactured homes. Clayton’s market share hit a record 31% last year. But industry volume continues to shrink: Last year, manufactured home sales were 96,000, down from 131,000 in 2003, the year we bought Clayton. (At the time, it should be remembered, some commentators criticized its directors for selling at a cyclical bottom.)

我们这部分主要业务是克莱顿公司(Clayton Homes)，全美最大的预制房屋建造商和销售商。去年Clayton的市场份额达到创记录的31％。但是行业规模在继续萎缩：去年预制房屋的销售数量是9.6万套，低于2003年我们买下Clayton时的13.1万套。(需要记得的是，当时还有一些评论员批评Clayton高管，在行业周期的底部出售了公司)。

Though Clayton earns money from both manufacturing and retailing its homes, most of its earnings come from an $11 billion loan portfolio, covering 300,000 borrowers. That’s why we include Clayton’s operation in this finance section. Despite the many problems that surfaced during 2007 in real estate finance, the Clayton portfolio is performing well. Delinquencies, foreclosures and losses during the year were at rates similar to those we experienced in our previous years of ownership.

虽然Clayton从制造和销售预制房屋中获利，但是它的主要收益来自其110亿美元的贷款组合，覆盖了超过30万个借款人。这就是为什么我们将Clayton归到金融业务部分。尽管在2007年房地产金融领域遭遇了很多问题，但克莱顿公司的贷款组合却运作良好。这一年里，行业中逾期还款、丧失抵押品赎回权以及贷款损失的比例与我们前几年经历的情况相仿。(移动房屋贷款类似汽车贷款，不属于不动产，利率非常高甚至有13%)

Clayton’s loan portfolio is financed by Berkshire. For this funding, we charge Clayton one percentage point over Berkshire’s borrowing cost — a fee that amounted to $85 mi ll i o n l a s t ye a r . Cl a y t o n ’ s 2007 p re - t a x e a r nin g so f$ 526 million are after its paying this fee. The flip side of this transaction is that Berkshire recorded $85 million as income, which is included in “other” in the following table.

Clayton贷款组合的资金一直由伯克希尔提供。对于这笔资金，我们在伯克希尔借款成本上，加收1％信用成本后借给Clayton。去年该费用是8500万美元。扣除该项费用后，Clayton在2007年的税前收益是5.26亿美元。这项交易的另一面是伯克希尔记入8500万美元的收入，记录在下表中”其他”项下。

(in $ millions)	Pre-Tax Earnings 2007	Pre-Tax Earnings 2006
Trading - Ordinary Income	$ 272	$ 274
Life and annuity operation	(60)	29
Leasing operations	111	182
Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton)	526	513
Other	157	159
Income before capital gains	1,006	1,157
Trading - Capital Gains	105	938
Total	$ 1,111	$ 2,095

The leasing operations tabulated are XTRA, which rents trailers, and CORT, which rents furniture. Utilization of trailers was down considerably in 2007 and that led to a drop in earnings at XTRA. That company also borrowed $400 million last year and distributed the proceeds to Berkshire. The resulting higher interest it is now paying further reduced XTRA’s earnings.

上表中，租赁业务包括经营拖车租赁业务的XTRA公司，以及经营家具租赁的CORT家具。2007年，由于拖车利用率的明显下降，导致XTRA公司的收益下降。公司去年还通过伯克希尔借款4亿美元，利息支出的增加也降低了XTRA公司的收益。

Clayton, XTRA and CORT are all good businesses, very ably run by Kevin Clayton, Bill Franz and Paul Arnold. Each has made tuck-in acquisitions during Berkshire’s ownership. More will come.

在KevinClayton，BillFranz和PaulArnold的良好经营下，Clayton公司、XTRA公司和CORT家具都是很好的公司。在归入伯克希尔旗下后，每家公司都进行了一系列的收购，以后会更多。

Investments 投资业务

We show below our common stock investments at yearend, itemizing those with a market value of at least $600 million.

下面列出到年底我们持有的股票，它们的市值至少是6亿美元。

12/31/07

Shares	Company	Percentage of Company Owned	Cost* (in $ millions)	Market (in $ millions)
151,610,700	American Express Company	13.1	$ 1,287	$ 7,887
35,563,200	Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.	4.8	1,718	1,861
60,828,818	Burlington Northern Santa Fe	17.5	4,731	5,063
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company	8.6	1,299	12,274
17,508,700	Conoco Phillips	1.1	1,039	1,546
64,271,948	Johnson & Johnson	2.2	3,943	4,287
124,393,800	Kraft Foods Inc.	8.1	4,152	4,059
48,000,000	Moody’s Corporation	19.1	499	1,714
3,486,006	POSCO	4.5	572	2,136
101,472,000	The Procter & Gamble Company	3.3	1,030	7,450
17,170,953	Sanofi-Aventis	1.3	1,466	1,575
227,307,000	Tesco plc	2.9	1,326	2,156
75,176,026	U.S. Bancorp	4.4	2,417	2,386
17,072,192	USG Corp	17.2	536	611
19,944,300	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.	0.5	942	948
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company	18.2	11	1,367
303,407,068	Wells Fargo & Company	9.2	6,677	9,160
1,724,200	White Mountains Insurance Group Ltd.	16.3	369	886
	Others	5,238	7,633
Total Common Stocks	$ 39,252	$ 74,999

* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

*成本项是我们实际的购买价格，也是计税的依据；这与GAAP会计原则所认定的”成本”有一些不同，因为少数情况下账面价值需要增记或减记。

Overall, we are delighted by the business performance of our investees. In 2007, American Express, Coca-Cola and Procter & Gamble, three of our four largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 12%, 14% and 14%. The fourth, Wells Fargo, had a small decline in earnings because of the popping of the real estate bubble. Nevertheless, I believe its intrinsic value increased, even if only by a minor amount.

总的来说，我们所投资公司的经营表现让我们欣慰。在2007年，我们持有市值最大的四家公司中的三家：美国运通、可口可乐以及宝洁公司，每股收益分别增长了12％、14％和14％。第四家富国银行由于房地产泡沫的破裂其收益稍有下降。不过，我相信它的内在价值还是在增加，即使只增加了一点点。

In the strange world department, note that American Express and Wells Fargo were both organized by Henry Wells and William Fargo, Amex in 1850 and Wells in 1852. P&G and Coke began business in 1837 and 1886 respectively. Start-ups are not our game.

在陌生世界的各行各业里，请注意，美国运通和富国银行都是HenryWells和WilliamFargo创建的，分别创建于1850年和1852年。宝洁和可口可乐分别创建于1837年和1886年。创业不是我们的游戏。

I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their “moats” — a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors — have widened during the year. All of the “big four” scored positively on that test.

我必须强调的是：我们不是通过任何一年投资标的的市场价格来衡量我们投资的进展。相反，我们通过适用于我们自己所拥有企业的两个标准来评估它们的表现。第一条标准，扣除行业整体状况后的实际收益增长。第二条更主观的标准是，它们的”护城河”是否在这一年里变得更宽，“护城河”是一种隐喻，指的是公司拥有的，会让它的竞争对手日子难过的竞争优势。这四大公司在这项测试中毫无疑问，都能得分。

We made one large sale last year. In 2002 and 2003 Berkshire bought 1.3% of PetroChina for $488 mi ll i o n, a p r i ce t ha t v a l u e d t h ee n t i re b u s in ess a t ab o u t$ 37 billion. Charlie and I then felt that the company was worth about $100 bi ll i o n . B y 2007, tw o f a c t ors ha d ma t er ia ll y in cre a se d i t s v a l u e : t h e p r i ceo f o i l ha d c l imb e d s i g ni f i c an tl y, an d P e t ro C hina ’ s mana g e m e n t ha dd o n e a g re a t j o binb u i l d in g o i l an d g a sreser v es . I n t h eseco n d ha l f o f l a s t ye a r, t h e ma r k e t v a l u eo f t h eco m p an yrose t o$ 275 billion, about what we thought it was worth compared to other giant oil companies. So we sold our holdings for $4 billion.

去年我们有一笔很大的卖出。在2002-2003年，伯克希尔投资4.88亿美元买入中国石油1.3％的股权。按这个价格整个公司的价值大约为370亿美元。那时查理和我认为该公司的内在价值约为1000亿美元。到2007年，有两个因素显著提高了它的内在价值：油价大幅攀升；以及公司的管理层在石油和天然气资源储备方面做到很好。去年下半年，公司的市值上升到2750亿美元，与其他类似的大型石油公司相比，价值大致相当。所以，我们以40亿美元卖出了中国石油的股票。

A footnote: We paid the IRS tax of $1.2 billion on our PetroChina gain. This sum paid all costs of the U.S. government — defense, social security, you name it — for about four hours.

我们为中国石油交易上的收益向美国国税局缴纳了12亿美元的利得税。此笔税款大约是美国政府运作4小时的所有费用，这包括了国防、社会保障等，我能叫得出的所有费用。

Last year I told you that Berkshire had 62 derivative contracts that I manage. (We also have a few left in the General Re runoff book.) Today, we have 94 of these, and they fall into two categories.

去年我告诉你们，我管理着伯克希尔62个衍生品合约。(我们还有一些合约，遗留在了通用再保险流失的账簿里)。今天，我们有94个这样的合约，它们主要分为两类。

First, we have written 54 contracts that require us to make payments if certain bonds that are included in various high-yield indices default. These contracts expire at various times from 2009 to 2013. At yearend we had received $3.2 bi ll i o nin p re mi u m so n t h eseco n t r a c t s; ha d p ai d$ 472 million in losses; and in the worst case (though it is extremely unlikely to occur) could be required to pay an additional $4.7 billion.

第一类合约，我们签了54个，要求我们为各种高收益指数中包含的某些债券承担违约风险。这些合约的到期日各不相同，从2009年到2013年。到年底，我们从这些合约中收到32亿美元的保费，已支付了4.72亿美元的损失；并且在最坏的情况下(尽管这种极端的情况不太可能发生)，还需要再支付47亿美元。

We are certain to make many more payments. But I believe that on premium revenues alone, these contracts will prove profitable, leaving aside what we can earn on the large sums we hold. Our yearend liability for this exposure was recorded at $1.8 billion and is included in “Derivative Contract Liabilities” on our balance sheet.

我们确定还会支付更多，但我相信，撇开我们持有的大笔资金能够带来的投资收益不说，仅就保费收入而言，这些合约也被证明是有利可图的。在年底我们的资产负债表中，为这些合约的”风险敞口”，记录了18亿美元的”衍生合约负债”。

The second category of contracts involves various put options we have sold on four stock indices (the S&P 500 plus three foreign indices). These puts had original terms of either 15 or 20 years and were struck at the market. We have received premiums of $4.5 bi ll i o n, an d w erecor d e d a l iabi l i t y a t ye a re n d o f$ 4.6 billion. The puts in these contracts are exercisable only at their expiration dates, which occur between 2019 and 2027, and Berkshire will then need to make a payment only if the index in question is quoted at a level below that existing on the day that the put was written. Again, I believe these contracts, in aggregate, will be profitable and that we will, in addition, receive substantial income from our investment of the premiums we hold during the 15- or 20-year period.

第二类合约，涉及到我们针对四种股票指数(标普500指数和三种国外的指数)卖出的各种看跌期权。这些看跌期权的原始期限为15年或20年，它们会受到市场的影响。我们为此收到45亿美元的保费，年底我们记录的衍生合约负债是46亿美元。这些合约中的看跌期权只能在到期日行权，它们的到期时间在2019年到2027年之间。届时，只有当相关的股票指数水平，低于看跌期权合约当日报价时的，我们才需要付钱出去。同样的，我相信这些合约，总体上将是盈利的。我们也将在持有这些保费的15或20年里，通过投资获得可观的收益。

对于我们的衍生品合约有两点是很重要的。

Two aspects of our derivative contracts are particularly important. First, in all cases we hold the money, which means that we have no counterparty risk.

第一，在所有交易里，我们都是通过卖出合约收钱的一方，这意味着我们并没有交易对手风险。

Second, accounting rules for our derivative contracts differ from those applying to our investment portfolio. In that portfolio, changes in value are applied to the net worth shown on Berkshire’s balance sheet, but do not affect earnings unless we sell (or write down) a holding. Changes in the value of a derivative contract, however, must be applied each quarter to earnings.

第二，这些衍生品合约适用的会计准则，不同于我们的投资组合。投资组合资产价值的变化将以净资产的形式，显示在伯克希尔的资产负债表上，但它不会影响当期的收益，除非我们出售(或是减记)持有的股份。而衍生品合约的价值变化，必须每个季度的计入收益中。因此，我们持有的衍生品头寸，有时会造成公司报告收益的大幅波动，可查理和我相信这些头寸的内在价值变化很小。

Thus, our derivative positions will sometimes cause large swings in reported earnings, even though Charlie and I might believe the intrinsic value of these positions has changed little. He and I will not be bothered by these swings — even though they could easily amount to $1 billion or more in a quarter — and we hope you won’t be either. You will recall that in our catastrophe insurance business, we are always ready to trade increased volatility in reported earnings in the short run for greater gains in net worth in the long run. That is our philosophy in derivatives as well.

即便这些波动很容易在单个季度达到10亿美元或更多，他和我也不会对此有所困扰，我们希望你也不会。大家会记得，在巨灾保险业务中，我们总是愿意，用短期收益报告的大幅波动，换取长期账面价值的巨大增长。这也是我们在衍生品交易中的投资哲学。

The U.S. dollar weakened further in 2007 against major currencies, and it’s no mystery why: Americans like buying products made elsewhere more than the rest of the world likes buying products made in the U.S. Inevitably, that causes America to ship about $2 billion of IOUs and assets daily to the rest of the world. And over time, that puts pressure on the dollar.

在2007年，美元对其它主要货币进一步贬值，原因显而易见：美国人喜爱购买世界其它地区生产的产品，超过世界其他地区的人们对美国产商品的喜爱。这就不可避免地造成，美国每天将大约价值20亿美元的借据和资产输送给世界其他地区。随着时间推移，这会对美元造成压力。

When the dollar falls, it both makes our products cheaper for foreigners to buy and their products more expensive for U.S. citizens. That’s why a falling currency is supposed to cure a trade deficit. Indeed, the U.S. deficit has undoubtedly been tempered by the large drop in the dollar. But ponder this: In 2002 when the Euro averaged 94.6¢, our trade deficit with Germany (the fifth largest of our trading partners) was $36 bi ll i o n, w h ere a s in 2007, w i t h t h e E u ro a v er a g in g$ 1.37, our deficit with Germany was up to $45 bi ll i o n . S imi l a r l y, t h e C ana d ian d o ll a r a v er a g e d 64¢ in 2002 an d 93¢ in 2007. Y e t o u r t r a d e d e f i c i tw i t h C ana d a rose a s w e ll, f ro m$ 50 billion in 2002 to $64 billion in 2007. So far, at least, a plunging dollar has not done much to bring our trade activity into balance.

当美元贬值时，它既让外国人能更便宜地购买我们的产品，又使它们的产品对美国人来说变得更昂贵。这就是为什么货币贬值常被认为可以用来解决贸易赤字。的确，美元大幅贬值后，美国的贸易赤字，毫无疑问会有所缓解。但是想想看：在2002年，欧元平均值为0.946美元，我们对德国(我们第五大贸易伙伴)的贸易赤字是360亿美元。到2007年，欧元平均值为1.37美元，而我们对德国的贸易赤字却上升到450亿美元。相似的情况是，加元2002年平均值为0.64美元，2007年为0.93美元。我们对加拿大的贸易赤字同样也从2002年的500亿美元上升到2007年的640美元。到目前为止，美元的贬值并不能对平衡我们的贸易起很大的作用。

There’s been much talk recently of sovereign wealth funds and how they are buying large pieces of American businesses. This is our doing, not some nefarious plot by foreign governments. Our trade equation guarantees massive foreign investment in the U.S. When we force-feed $2 billion daily to the rest of the world, they must invest in something here. Why should we complain when they choose stocks over bonds?

最近有很多主权财富基金以及它们如何在购买大量美国公司的讨论。这是我们自己造成的，并不是外国政府有什么邪恶的阴谋。实际上，我们的贸易方式导致了在美国的巨额外国投资。当我们每天将20亿美元强加给世界其他地区时，他们必定会在这里投资点什么。当他们选择股票，而不是债券时，为什么我们要抱怨呢？

Our country’s weakening currency is not the fault of OPEC, China, etc. Other developed countries rely on imported oil and compete against Chinese imports just as we do. In developing a sensible trade policy, the U.S. should not single out countries to punish or industries to protect. Nor should we take actions likely to evoke retaliatory behavior that will reduce America’s exports, true trade that benefits both our country and the rest of the world.

美元的贬值，错不在欧佩克，中国及其他。其他发达国家和美国一样依赖石油进口，也和中国进口石油展开竞争。在制定明智的贸易政策时，美国不应单独挑选出一些国家来惩罚或一些行业来保护。我们也不应该采取那些很容易引发报复的行动，那样只会减少美国的出口，对我们和世界其他地区来说，真正的贸易应该是互惠的。

Our legislators should recognize, however, that the current imbalances are unsustainable and should therefore adopt policies that will materially reduce them sooner rather than later. Otherwise our $2 billion daily of force-fed dollars to the rest of the world may produce global indigestion of an unpleasant sort. (For other comments about the unsustainability of our trade deficits, see Alan Greenspan’s comments on November 19, 2004, the Federal Open Market Committee’s minutes of June 29, 2004, and Ben Bernanke’s statement on September 11, 2007.)

然而，我们的立法者应该认识到，这种贸易不平衡是不可持续的，所以现在需要调整政策，以求从实质上尽早而不推迟减少这种不平衡。否则，我们每天强加给世界各地的20亿美元，已经造成全球令人不快的消化不良。有关贸易赤字不可持续的其它评述，请看艾伦·格林斯潘Alan Greenspan2004年11月19日的论述，联邦公开市场委员会2004年6月29日的备忘录，和本·伯南克Ben Bernanke2007年9月11日的讲话)

At Berkshire we held only one direct currency position during 2007. That was in — hold your breath — the Brazilian real. Not long ago, swapping dollars for reals would have been unthinkable. After all, during the past century five versions of Brazilian currency have, in effect, turned into confetti. As has been true in many countries whose currencies have periodically withered and died, wealthy Brazilians sometimes stashed large sums in the U.S. to preserve their wealth.

伯克希尔在2007年只持有一种直接外汇的头寸。它就是——请屏住你的呼吸——巴西的货币雷亚尔。就在不久以前，将美元兑换成雷亚尔被认为是不可想象的。毕竟，在过去一个世纪里，多达5个版本的巴西货币已经变成了狂欢节彩纸片了。正如许多货币周期性贬值和消亡的国家一样，富裕的巴西人为保护他们的财富，有时将大笔的资金转移到美国。

But any Brazilian who followed this apparently prudent course would have lost half his net worth over the past five years. Here’s the year-by-year record (indexed) of the real versus the dollar from the end of 2002 to yearend 2007: 100; 122; 133; 152; 166; 199. Every year the real went up and the dollar fell. Moreover, during much of this period the Brazilian government was actually holding down the value of the real and supporting our currency by buying dollars in the market.

但是任何采用这种看上去谨慎方式的巴西人，已经在过去5年中，都损失了一半的净资产。这是从2002年到2007年底，雷亚尔对美元的指数记录：100，122，133，152，166，199。每年雷亚尔都在走高，美元却在下跌。此外，在这段时期大部分时间里，巴西政府还在市场中买入美元，以此来压低雷亚尔的升值速度，并支撑美元的下跌。

Our direct currency positions have yielded $2.3 billion of pre-tax profits over the past five years, and in addition we have profited by holding bonds of U.S. companies that are denominated in other currencies. For example, in 2001 and 2002 we purchased €310 million Amazon.com, Inc. 6 7/8 of 2010 at 57% of par. At the time, Amazon bonds were priced as “junk” credits, though they were anything but. (Yes, Virginia, you can occasionally find markets that are ridiculously inefficient — or at least you can find them anywhere except at the finance departments of some leading business schools.)

我们直接外汇头寸在过去5年中已经带来23美元的税前收益。另外，我们还通过持有以外币计价的美国公司债券获利。例如，在2001年和2002年，我们以57％面值的价格，购买了3.1亿欧元的亚马逊公司的债券：票面利率6.875％，2010年6月到期。当时，亚马逊公司的债券被定价为”垃圾”级信用，尽管它们根本就不是。(是的，在Virginia，你偶尔能够发现市场效率会低的离谱，或者你也可以在任何地方发现它们，除了某些主流商学院的金融系。)

The Euro denomination of the Amazon bonds was a further, and important, attraction for us. The Euro was at 95¢ when we bought in 2002. Therefore, our cost in dollars came to only $169 mi ll i o n . N o wt h e b o n d sse ll a t 102$ 1.47. In 2005 and 2006 some of our bonds were called and we received $253 mi ll i o n f or t h e m . O u rre mainin g b o n d s w ere v a l u e d a t$ 162 million at yearend. Of our $246 mi ll i o n o f re a l i ze d an d u n re a l i ze d g ain, ab o u t$ 118 million is attributable to the fall in the dollar. Currencies do matter.

对我们来说，亚马逊债券的以欧元计价是一个更深层更重要的吸引力。在2002年我们购买的时候，欧元的平均值是0.95美元。因此，我们的成本以美元计仅仅是1.69亿美元。现在债券以102％面值的价格被出售，欧元平均值是1.47美元。在2005年和2006年我们的一些债券被赎回，我们收到2.53亿美元。我们剩余的债券在年底价值为1.62亿美元。在我们已实现和未实现的2.46亿美元收益里，约有1.18亿美元是由于美元的贬值。货币确实很重要。

At Berkshire, we will attempt to further increase our stream of direct and indirect foreign earnings. Even if we are successful, however, our assets and earnings will always be concentrated in the U.S. Despite our country’s many imperfections and unrelenting problems of one sort or another, America’s rule of law, market-responsive economic system, and belief in meritocracy are almost certain to produce ever-growing prosperity for its citizens.

在伯克希尔，我们将努力提高直接和间接的海外收益来源。即使我们能成功，我们的资产和收益仍将主要集中在美国。尽管我们国家存在许多不完善之处和各种各样的问题，但是美国法制，市场经济体系，以及社会精英的信仰都将为国民创造持久的繁荣。

As I have told you before, we have for some time been well-prepared for CEO succession because we have three outstanding internal candidates. The board knows exactly whom it would pick if I were to become unavailable, either because of death or diminishing abilities. And that would still leave the board with two backups.

正如我之前告诉过你们的，一段时间以来，我们已经对CEO的接班人做好了充分的准备，因为我们拥有三个很出色的内部候选人。董事会很清楚的知道，一旦我死亡或能力衰退而无法胜任工作，他们将选谁来接替我的工作。并且董事会还有两个后备人选。

Last year I told you that we would also promptly complete a succession plan for the investment job at Berkshire, and we have indeed now identified four candidates who could succeed me in managing investments. All manage substantial sums currently, and all have indicated a strong interest in coming to Berkshire if called. The board knows the strengths of the four and would expect to hire one or more if the need arises. The candidates are young to middle-aged, well-to-do to rich, and all wish to work for Berkshire for reasons that go beyond compensation.

去年，我告诉你们，我们将尽快完成伯克希尔在投资业务上的接班人计划。我们的确现在确定了4个候选人，他们都能接替我的投资工作。目前，所有人都管理着大量资金，并且他们都表示，如果接到电话，非常有兴趣应邀到伯克希尔来工作。董事会了解这四位的能力，如果需要，董事去期望雇佣一个或多个人。这些候选人都正当壮年，经济上非常富有，所有人希望能为伯克希尔效力，并不是为了薪酬。

(I’ve reluctantly discarded the notion of my continuing to manage the portfolio after my death — abandoning my hope to give new meaning to the term “thinking outside the box.”)

(我很不情愿地打消了，要在我死后继续管理投资组合的念头。也放弃我希望给”拓展视野”一词赋予的新含义。)

Fanciful Figures — How Public Companies Juice Earnings 充满想象力的数字——上市公司们是如何给收益”注水”的

Former Senator Alan Simpson famously said: “Those who travel the high road in Washington need not fear heavy traffic.” If he had sought truly deserted streets, however, the Senator should have looked to Corporate America’s accounting.

前参议员Alan Simpson有句名言：“那些在华盛顿高速公路上开车的人，需要不怕大堵车”。假如参议员要寻找的是真正不堵车的道路，他应该去看看美国公司的会计们走那边。

An important referendum on which road businesses prefer occurred in 1994. America’s CEOs had just strong-armed the U.S. Senate into ordering the Financial Accounting Standards Board to shut up, by a vote that was 88-9. Before that rebuke the FASB had shown the audacity — by unanimous agreement, no less — to tell corporate chieftains that the stock options they were being awarded represented a form of compensation and that their value should be recorded as an expense.

1994年在企业”首选路线的问题”上举行了一次最重要的投票。迫于美国CEO们的压力，美国参议院投票以88比9通过提案，让美国财务会计准则委员会(FASB)闭上了嘴。此前，一项毫无异义的规定让FASB饱受指责，规定要求公司的管理层们，他们获得的股票期权是一种经济补偿，其价值将被作为一项费用计入公司报表。

After the senators voted, the FASB — now educated on accounting principles by the Senate’s 88 closet CPAs — decreed that companies could choose between two methods of reporting on options. The preferred treatment would be to expense their value, but it would also be allowable for companies to ignore the expense as long as their options were issued at market value.

在参议员们投票表决后，FASB(现在由参议院88名秘密注册会计师进行会计原则教育)颁布法令：公司可以在两种期权报告方式之间选择。“首选的”处理方式是：将期权的价值视为费用。不过法令也允许，当公司是按市场价值发行期权时，可以忽略这些费用。

A moment of truth had now arrived for America’s CEOs, and their reaction was not a pretty sight. During the next six years, exactly two of the 500 companies in the S&P chose the preferred route. CEOs of the rest opted for the low road, thereby ignoring a large and obvious expense in order to report higher “earnings.” I’m sure some of them also felt that if they opted for expensing, their directors might in future years think twice before approving the mega-grants the managers longed for.

轮到美国的CEO们说真话的时候，他们的回应一点不光彩。在接下去的6年里，入选标准普尔指数的500家公司中只有两家，选择了”费用化”路线。余下公司的CEO们全都选择了另一条备选路线，从而忽略了一大笔巨大而明显的支出，只为在报表上报告更高的”收益”。我确信他们中的一些人也觉得，如果他们选择把期权作为费用计入，他们的董事们会在将来的某些时候，在批准经理们渴望的巨额奖金之前而三思。

It turned out that for many CEOs even the low road wasn’t good enough. Under the weakened rule, there remained earnings consequences if options were issued with a strike price below market value. No problem. To avoid that bothersome rule, a number of companies surreptitiously backdated options to falsely indicate that they were granted at current market prices, when in fact they were dished out at prices well below market.

事实证明，对很多CEO来说，那条备选路线也不够好。在日趋削弱的规定下，如果期权发行价格低于公司市场价值，仍然存在收益。不过没问题。为了规避这条恼人的规定，许多公司秘密地回溯授予期权的日期，以虚假的表明他们是按当时的市场价格获得期权的，而事实上，他们是以远低于市场价格发行的。

Decades of option-accounting nonsense have now been put to rest, but other accounting choices remain — important among these the investment-return assumption a company uses in calculating pension expense. It will come as no surprise that many companies continue to choose an assumption that allows them to report less-than-solid “earnings.” For the 363 companies in the S&P that have pension plans, this assumption in 2006 averaged 8%. Let’s look at the chances of that being achieved.

十多年里，针对股票期权的荒谬会计规则正在淡出，但是其他这样的会计手段依然存在，其中比较重要的是，公司在计算养老金费用时，使用的投资回报假设。毫不奇怪，许多公司将会继续选定一种假设，使其报告的”收益”低于实际水平。对于标准普尔指数363家制定养老金计划的公司中，2006年平均投资回报假设是8％。让我们看看这个假设实现的可能性。

The average holdings of bonds and cash for all pension funds is about 28%, and on these assets returns can be expected to be no more than 5%. Higher yields, of course, are obtainable but they carry with them a risk of commensurate (or greater) loss.

在所有的养老基金中，平均持有债券和现金的比例大约是28％，这部分资产的回报率不会超过5％。当然更高的收益是有可能达到的，但同时也会带来相应(或更大)损失的风险。

This means that the remaining 72% of assets — which are mostly in equities, either held directly or through vehicles such as hedge funds or private-equity investments — must earn 9.2% in order for the fund overall to achieve the postulated 8%. And that return must be delivered after all fees, which are now far higher than they have ever been.

这意味着剩余72％的养老金资产大部分是公司股权，或直接持有，或通过对冲基金或私人股权投资等工具间接持有。如果要使整个基金整体收益率达到假设的8％，这部分资产的收益率必须达到9.2％，并且这种回报，必须是扣除所有费用之后的，但是现在的费用水平远高于以往。

How realistic is this expectation? Let’s revisit some data I mentioned two years ago: During the 20th Century, the Dow advanced from 66 to 11,497. This gain, though it appears huge, shrinks to 5.3% when compounded annually. An investor who owned the Dow throughout the century would also have received generous dividends for much of the period, but only about 2% or so in the final years. It was a wonderful century.

这种期望的真实性有多少呢？让我们回顾一下两年前我提到的一些数据：在整个20世纪，道琼斯指数从66点涨到11497点。这个增长看上去很大，但年复合增长率仅有5.3％。如果一个投资者，持有道琼斯指数整整一个世纪，在期间的很多时候，他会收到很慷慨的分红，但在最后的几年里，分红大约也只有2％左右。20世纪是一个多么美好的世纪。

Think now about this century. For investors to merely match that 5.3% market-value gain, the Dow — recently below 13,000 — would need to close at about 2,000,000 on December 31, 2099. We are now eight years into this century, and we have racked up less than 2,000 of the 1,988,000 Dow points the market needed to travel in this hundred years to equal the 5.3% of the last.

想想现在这个世纪。投资者如果仅仅想达到5.3％的市值增长，那道琼斯指数(最近低于13000点)需要在2099年12月31日收报于200万点左右！就是在100年里，为达到上世纪年化5.3％的收益水平，需要道琼斯指数上涨198.8万点，在这个世纪的头八年里，我们只取得不到2000点的上涨。

It’s amusing that commentators regularly hyperventilate at the prospect of the Dow crossing an even number of thousands, such as 14,000 or 15,000. If they keep reacting that way, a 5.3% annual gain for the century will mean they experience at least 1,986 seizures during the next 92 years. While anything is possible, does anyone really believe this is the most likely outcome?

有趣的是，市场评论人士经常在道琼斯指，突破诸如14000点或15000点这样千点整数位时，感到异常兴奋。如果他们保持这种反应，按本世纪按年化增长5.3％计，他们将在余下的92年里，至少要经历1986次这样的兴奋。虽然说一切皆有可能，但真的有人相信这是最有可能的结果吗？

Dividends continue to run about 2%. Even if stocks were to average the 5.3% annual appreciation of the 1900s, the equity portion of plan assets — allowing for expenses of .5% — would produce no more than 7% or so. And .5% may well understate costs, given the presence of layers of consultants and high-priced managers (“helpers”).

股息收益率继续徘徊在2％左右。即使股票年化增长率能达到上世纪5.3％的水平，养老金计划中的股票部分，在考虑0.5％的费用支出后，收益率也不会超过7％左右。考虑到投资顾问和高身价基金经理的存在，0.5%的费用支出已经是相当保守的了。

Naturally, everyone expects to be above average. And those helpers — bless their hearts — will certainly encourage their clients in this belief. But, as a class, the helper-aided group must be below average. The reason is simple: 1) Investors, overall, will necessarily earn an average return, minus costs they incur; 2) Passive and index investors, through their very inactivity, will earn that average minus costs that are very low; 3) With that group earning average returns, so must the remaining group — the active investors. But this group will incur high transaction, management, and advisory costs. Therefore, the active investors will have their returns diminished by a far greater percentage than will their inactive brethren. That means that the passive group — the “know-nothings” — must win.

当然，每个人都期望自己收益率超过市场的平均水平。那些”投资顾问”由衷的鼓励和灌输他们的客户这种观念。但是作为一个雇佣这些投资顾问的群体，他们的收益率一定是低于平均水平。原因很简单：1)整体而言，投资者必然获得一个平均回报，减去他们承担的交易费用；2)被动型投资者和指数投资者，由于他们交易不活跃，他们获得的回报，是平均回报减去一个非常低的交易费用。3)在赚取市场平均收益的群体中，剩下的一部分就是交易活跃的投资者。但是这个群体将产生高额的交易、管理和顾问咨询费用。所以交易活跃的投资者回报率将比不活跃的投资者的回报率要低得多。这意味着，“懵懂无知”的被动型投资者一定会胜出。

I should mention that people who expect to earn 10% annually from equities during this century — envisioning that 2% of that will come from dividends and 8% from price appreciation — are implicitly forecasting a level of about 24,000,000 on the Dow by 2100. If your adviser talks to you about double-digit returns from equities, explain this math to him — not that it will faze him. Many helpers are apparently direct descendants of the queen in Alice in Wonderland, who said: “Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.” Beware the glib helper who fills your head with fantasies while he fills his pockets with fees.

我必须指出的是，在本世纪里，那些预计从股票中赚到10％年化收益的人，他们设想的是2％的年收益来自分红，8％来自股价上涨。他们相当于含蓄的预计，2100年道琼斯指数会在2400万点的水平！如果你的理财顾问说会从股票上赚到两位数的投资回报，那就把上面的数学问题解释给他听，一定会让他感到狼狈。许多”投资顾问”显然是童话”绿野仙踪”里女王后裔，她说：“为什么我在早饭前就已经相信了超过六件不可能发生的事情呢？“要当心那些油嘴滑舌的投资顾问，他们在往你头脑里塞进幻想的同时，也在往自己的口袋里揣满酬金。

Some companies have pension plans in Europe as well as in the U.S. and, in their accounting, almost all assume that the U.S. plans will earn more than the non-U.S. plans. This discrepancy is puzzling: Why should these companies not put their U.S. managers in charge of the non-U.S. pension assets and let them work their magic on these assets as well? I’ve never seen this puzzle explained. But the auditors and actuaries who are charged with vetting the return assumptions seem to have no problem with it.

一些公司在欧洲和美国都有养老金计划，在他们的会计中，几乎所有公司都认为，美国养老金计划将会比海外的养老金赚的更多。这种差异令人费解：为什么这些公司不派他们的美国养老金经理们，去管理公司海外养老金资产，好让他们在这些资产上施展自己魔力？我从来没有见过有人解释这个谜题，但是负责审查这些回报假设的审计人员和核算师似乎对此没有异议。

What is no puzzle, however, is why CEOs opt for a high investment assumption: It lets them report higher earnings. And if they are wrong, as I believe they are, the chickens won’t come home to roost until long after they retire.

然而毫无疑问的是，为什么CEO们要选择一个如此高的投资回报假设：这样他们就可以报告更高的收益。而且即便他们错了，正如我认为的那样，那恶果也只是在他们退休后的很长时间里才会发生。

After decades of pushing the envelope — or worse — in its attempt to report the highest number possible for current earnings, Corporate America should ease up. It should listen to my partner, Charlie: “If you’ve hit three balls out of bounds to the left, aim a little to the right on the next swing.”

数十年来，美国公司一直在尽可能高的虚报当前收益，或是更糟的企图，这些行为应该收敛了。他们应该听听我搭档查理·芒格的话：“如果你三次把球击出左边界，那下次击球时，瞄得稍微靠向右些。”

Whatever pension-cost surprises are in store for shareholders down the road, these jolts will be surpassed many times over by those experienced by taxpayers. Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is woefully inadequate. Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from inflicting tax pain, given that problems will only become apparent long after these officials have departed. Promises involving very early retirement — sometimes to those in their low 40s — and generous cost-of-living adjustments are easy for these officials to make. In a world where people are living longer and inflation is certain, those promises will be anything but easy to keep.

无论未来公司的股东面临什么样的养老金成本意外，纳税人要经历的打击，要远胜公司股东们许多倍。公共养老金虽然承诺巨大，但在很多方面，养老基金资金却严重不足。只是因为引爆这颗定时炸弹的导火索还很长，政治家们畏缩于加税后造成的痛苦。反正只有在这些官员去世后很久，这些问题才会出现。这些官员们很容易作出这些养老的承诺，包括提前退休(有时是40岁以下的人)和慷慨的生活成本调整等计划。在这个人们寿命越来越长而且通货膨胀确定无疑的世界里，那些承诺将决不容易兑现。

Having laid out the failures of an “honor system” in American accounting, I need to point out that this is exactly the system existing at Berkshire for a truly huge balance-sheet item. In every report we make to you, we must guesstimate the loss reserves for our insurance units. If our estimate is wrong, it means that both our balance sheet and our earnings statement will be wrong. So naturally we do our best to make these guesses accurate. Nevertheless, in every report our estimate is sure to be wrong.

在阐述了美国公司会计中”荣誉制度”的失败之后，我需要指出的是，在伯克希尔庞大的资产负债表项目中，它是确实存在的。在每个我们提供给你们的报表中，我们必须为我们保险的业务估算损失储备金。如果我们的估算有误，将意味着我们的资产负债表和损益表都是错的。所以，我们自然会尽自己所能让这部分估算精确。然而，在每一份报告中，我们的估算肯定会有差错。

At yearend 2007, we show an insurance liability of $56 bi ll i o n t ha t re p rese n t so u r gu ess a s t o w ha tw e w i ll e v e n t u a ll y p a y f or a lll osse v e n t s t ha t occ u rre d b e f oreye a re n d (e x ce pt f or ab o u t$ 3 billion of the reserve that has been discounted to present value). We know of many thousands of events and have put a dollar value on each that reflects what we believe we will pay, including the associated costs (such as attorney’s fees) that we will incur in the payment process. In some cases, among them claims for certain serious injuries covered by worker’s compensation, payments will be made for 50 years or more.

在2007年底，我们列示了560亿美元的保险负债。这表示我们推测，在年底前发生的所有损失事件，最终将进行赔付的金额，(除了约30亿美元准备金已按现值贴现)。我们为知道的数以千计的事件进行了估算，以反映我们需要支付的美元价值，包括在支付过程中需要支付的相关费用(如律师费)。在某些案子里，由工伤赔偿保障引发的，对某些严重伤害的索赔，将支付50年或更长时间。

We also include a large reserve for losses that occurred before yearend but that we have yet to hear about. Sometimes, the insured itself does not know that a loss has occurred. (Think of an embezzlement that remains undiscovered for years.) We sometimes hear about losses from policies that covered our insured many decades ago.

我们还为年底前已发生但尚未报告的损失储备了大笔的准备金。有时，被保险人本身也不知道是否有损失发生(想想哪些多年未被发现的职务侵占案件)。我们有时候接到索赔，损失来自我们几十年前承保的保单。

A story I told you some years back illustrates our problem in accurately estimating our loss liability: A fellow was on an important business trip in Europe when his sister called to tell him that their dad had died. Her brother explained that he couldn’t get back but said to spare nothing on the funeral,

几年前我曾告诉过你们一个故事，形象说明我们在精确估算损失责任方面的问题：一个小伙子正在欧洲进行一次重要的商务旅行，这时他妹妹来电话告诉他：父亲过世了。

whose cost he would cover. When he returned, his sister told him that the service had been beautiful and presented him with bills totaling $8, 000. He p ai d u p b u t am o n t h l a t errece i v e d abi ll f ro m t h e m or t u a ry f or$ 10. He paid that, too — and still another $10 c ha r g e h erece i v e d am o n t h l a t er . Wh e na t hi r d$ 10 invoice was sent to him the following month, the perplexed man called his sister to ask what was going on. “Oh,”she replied, “I forgot to tell you. We buried Dad in a rented suit.”

但小伙子解释说，他没法回去，但鉴于自己没有在葬礼上出什么力，他愿意承担葬礼的费用。在他回来后，他的妹妹告诉他，葬礼办得顺利，并寄给了他一张8000美元的账单，他付了。但一个月后，他又收到从殡仪馆开出的一张10美元账单。他又付了。又一个月后，他又收到另一张同样的10美元账单。当第三张10美元账单寄给他时，这个困惑的男人打电话给他妹妹询问发生了什么事。她回答说，“哦，我忘了告诉你，爸爸下葬的时候，穿的是租来的西装。”

At our insurance companies we have an unknown, but most certainly large, number of “rented suits” buried around the world. We try to estimate the bill for them accurately. In ten or twenty years, we will even be able to make a good guess as to how inaccurate our present guess is. But even that guess will be subject to surprises. I personally believe our stated reserves are adequate, but I’ve been wrong several times in the past.

在我们的保险公司，我们有一个未知的，但肯定数量巨大的”租来的西装”被埋在世界各地。我们试图精确估算他们的账单。在十年或二十年后，我们甚至能够很好的猜测，我们现在的估算有多不准确。但即便是这样保守的估算也会让人意料之外，我个人认为，我们的准备金是充足的，但在过去，我也犯过好几次错误。

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 3rd. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

我们今年的股东大会将在5月3日周六举行。与往常一样，Qwest中心在上午7点开门，一部伯克希尔的新影片将在8点半放映。9点半开始我们直接进入问答环节，(中间休息一下，在Qwest中心的展位上吃午饭)，直到下午3点。接着，在稍作休息后，查理和我将在3:15召开年度股东大会。如果在当天的问答阶段你打算离开的话，拜托请在查理讲话时那样做。

The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 27,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But you can do better. (If necessary, I’ll lock the doors.)

离开最好的理由，当然是购物。在毗邻会议区，我们辟出194,300平方英尺的场地，摆满伯克希尔旗下公司的产品，希望能满足你们的购物欲望。去年，由于2.7万名与会人士各尽其力，几乎所有的摊位的销售额记录都创下新高。但是今年你们能做的更好。(如果需要，我会锁上所有的门。)

This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that this 1,550-square-foot home, priced at $69,500, delivers exceptional value. And after you purchase the house, consider also acquiring the Forest River RV and pontoon boat on display nearby.

今年我们将再次展示克莱顿公司的预制房屋，(包括Acme砖块；Shaw地毯；JohnManville隔热材料；MiTek连接件；Carefree遮阳蓬；NFM家具)。你会发现这间1,550平方英尺的房屋，售价在69,500美元，非常超值。在你买下房屋后，考虑一下摊位附近森林之河公司的房车和浮船。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can.

GEICO保险将有一个摊位，来自全国的顶尖保险顾问齐聚于此，他们全部准备给你提供车辆保险的报价。在大多情况里，GEICO保险能给你一个特殊的股东折扣(通常是8％)。这个特殊的报价在我们全美50个州中的45个营业网点都适用。(补充一点：如果你有资格享受另一个折扣，比如给特定团体的折扣，这些折扣不能累加。)带上你已有保险的详细资料，让我们看看是否能帮你省钱。至少50％的人，我相信我们能做到。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel and scissors that you wish on board with you.

周六，在奥马哈机场，NetJet公司象以往一样陈列他们的飞机供你们参观。NetJet公司在Qwest中心的摊位上，你也可以看到这些飞机的资料。坐大巴来奥马哈的，乘你的新飞机离开吧。你可以带上所有你想带的定型发胶和剪刀，和你一起上飞机。

Next, if you have any money left, visit the Bookworm, where you will find about 25 books and DVDs — all discounted — led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Without any advertising or bookstore placement, Charlie’s book has now remarkably sold nearly 50,000 copies. For those of you who can’t make the meeting, go to poorcharliesalmanack.com to order a copy.

接下来，如果你还有钱剩下，去看看书虫的摊位，你会找到大约25种图书和DVD碟片，以《穷查理宝典》为首，全部打折。在没有做任何广告或在书店做陈列，查理的书现在引入注目，卖出近5万本。你们中谁没有参会的话，上网站poorcharliesalmanack.com预订一本。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

随本报告一起寄送的股东委托资料里，会解释你如何获得参加股东大会和其他活动的凭据。我们也再次委托美国运通公司(800-799-6634)为你们提供飞机、宾馆和汽车预订方面的帮助。负责此事的Carol Pedersen，每年都为我们做了出色的工作，我为此特别感谢她。宾馆的房间会很紧张，但与卡洛尔联系，你将会得到一间。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM eleven years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 mi ll i o nin 1997 t o$ 30.9 million in 2007. This is more volume than most furniture stores register in a year.

坐落于道奇街和太平洋街之间的第72街，占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具中心。在那里，我们会再次举办”伯克希尔周末”大减价。我们开始举办这一特殊活动是在11年前。“周末大减价”的销售额也从1997年的530万美元，增加到2007年的3090万美元。这个数目比许多家具店一年登记的销售额要大的多。

To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 1st and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a Baja Beach Bash featuring beef and chicken tacos.

你只有在5月1日到5月5日的这段时间内购买，并出示你的年会入场券，才能享受折扣价。在此期间的折扣价，也适用于部分几乎从不打折销售的知名厂商，为祝贺我们的股东周末，特别破例。我们非常感谢这些厂商的支持。内布拉斯加家具中心周一到周六的营业时间为，早上10点到晚上9点，周日则为早上10点到晚上6点。今年，在周六从下午5点半到8点，卖场会举办一场巴加海滩盛会，供应墨西哥特色的牛肉和鸡肉卷饼。

At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

在波仙珠宝，我们将再次举办两场特别针对伯克希尔股东的活动。第一场是鸡尾酒招待会，时间是5月2日，周五下午6点到晚上10点。第二场是大型售卖活动，将在5月4日，周日的上午9点到下午4点举行，周六我们将开放到下午6点。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

在整个周末，波仙珠宝店里将会人山人海。为了方便你们，股东特惠价格将从4月28日，周一开始，一直到5月10日，周六，一直有效。在此期间，请出示你的年会入场券，以证明你的股东身份，或出示交易说明，证明你是一个伯克希尔股票持有人。

On Sunday, in a tent outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

周日，在波仙珠宝店外的帐篷里，两届美国国际象棋冠军Patrick Wolff将带着眼罩，和来宾下盲棋，当然六人一组的来宾可以睁大双眼。从达拉斯来的著名魔术师Patrick Wolff会在附近迷惑观众。另外，我们还请到两位世界顶级的桥牌高手BobHamman和SharonOsberg，在周日下午，会和我们的股东们玩桥牌。

Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Last year Gorat’s, which seats 240, served 915 dinners on Shareholder Sunday. The three-day total was 2,487 including 656 T-bone steaks, the entrée preferred by the cognoscenti. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).

Gorat’s餐厅照例再次在5月4日周日对伯克希尔股东独家开放。服务时间是下午4点到晚上10点。去年，240个座位的Gorat’s餐厅，在周日接待了915位来晚餐的股东，三天里共卖出2,487份牛排，其中656份是丁骨牛排。这是美食鉴赏家的首选主菜，请记住那天去Gorat’s餐厅，你必须提前预约，需要的人在4月1日(不要提前)打402-551-3733进行预订。

We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.

周六下午4点，我们将再次为从北美以外来的股东，举办一个招待会。每年我们的股东大会吸引来自全球的许多人，查理和我想对这些来自远方的客人，表示一下我们个人的问候。去年，我们很高兴与来自许多国家的400位股东会面。任何非美国和加拿大的股东，将收到特别的入场券，上面有参加这个招待会的说明。

At 84 and 77, Charlie and I remain lucky beyond our dreams. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to that experienced by many people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. Every day is exciting to us; no wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 3rd at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.

84岁的查理和77岁的我，拥有的幸运超过了我们的梦想。我们都出生在美国；都有非常了不起的父母，让我们能获得良好的教育；都有美满的家庭和健康的身体；都有一些”商业”基因，让我们取得了某种其他人未经历过的巨大成功，这些人对我们社会的福祉做出了相同甚至更多的贡献。而且，我们长期以来一直拥有自己热爱的工作，并得到了无数才华横溢和令人愉快同事的无数协助。对于我们，每天都是那样令人兴奋；所以不要惊讶，看到我们跳着踢踏舞去上班。不过对我们来说，没有什么比在伯克希尔每年的股东大会上，与我们的股东合伙人欢聚一堂，更让人兴奋的了。因此，5月3日在Qwest中心，来参加我们”为资本家举办的年度伍德斯托克音乐节”。我们将在那里恭候各位。

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事会主席

February 2008

2008年2月

All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A. ↩

B
Coopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

2007 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders2007 年致股东的信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

Yardsticks 评判标准

Acquisitions 收购

Businesses — The Great, the Good and the Gruesome 企业：出色的、良好的、糟糕的

Insurance 保险业务

Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务

Finance and Finance Products 金融和金融产品业务

Investments 投资业务

Fanciful Figures — How Public Companies Juice Earnings 充满想象力的数字——上市公司们是如何给收益”注水”的

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

Graph View

Table of Contents

BCoopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

2007 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders2007 年致股东的信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

Yardsticks 评判标准

Acquisitions 收购

Businesses — The Great, the Good and the Gruesome 企业：出色的、良好的、糟糕的

Insurance 保险业务

Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务

Finance and Finance Products 金融和金融产品业务

Investments 投资业务

Fanciful Figures — How Public Companies Juice Earnings 充满想象力的数字——上市公司们是如何给收益”注水”的

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

Footnotes

Graph View

Table of Contents

B
Coopinio投资智慧库