原文信息：

标题：2006 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
作者：Warren Buffett
发表时间：2007-02-28
链接：PDF
中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
整理：Ponge
校译：

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman’s Letter and is referred to in that letter.

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

Year	AnnualPercentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1)	Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2)	Relative Results (1)-(2)
1965	23.8	10.0	13.8
1966	20.3	(11.7)	32.0
1967	11.0	30.9	(19.9)
1968	19.0	11.0	8.0
1969	16.2	(8.4)	24.6
1970	12.0	3.9	8.1
1971	16.4	14.6	1.8
1972	21.7	18.9	2.8
1973	4.7	(14.8)	19.5
1974	5.5	(26.4)	31.9
1975	21.9	37.2	(15.3)
1976	59.3	23.6	35.7
1977	31.9	(7.4)	39.3
1978	24.0	6.4	17.6
1979	35.7	18.2	17.5
1980	19.3	32.3	(13.0)
1981	31.4	(5.0)	36.4
1982	40.0	21.4	18.6
1983	32.3	22.4	9.9
1984	13.6	6.1	7.5
1985	48.2	31.6	16.6
1986	26.1	18.6	7.5
1987	19.5	5.1	14.4
1988	20.1	16.6	3.5
1989	44.4	31.7	12.7
1990	7.4	(3.1)	10.5
1991	39.6	30.5	9.1
1992	20.3	7.6	12.7
1993	14.3	10.1	4.2
1994	13.9	1.3	12.6
1995	43.1	37.6	5.5
1996	31.8	23.0	8.8
1997	34.1	33.4	.7
1998	48.3	28.6	19.7
1999	.5	21.0	(20.5)
2000	6.5	(9.1)	15.6
2001	(6.2)	(11.9)	5.7
2002	10.0	(22.1)	32.1
2003	21.0	28.7	(7.7)
2004	10.5	10.9	(.4)
2005	6.4	4.9	1.5
2006	18.4	15.8	2.6
Compounded Annual Gain — 1965-2006	21.4%	10.4%	11.0
Overall Gain — 1964-2006	361,156%	6,479%

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions:1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2006 was $16.9 bi ll i o n, w hi c hin cre a se d t h e p er - s ha re b oo k v a l u eo f b o t h o u r Cl a ss A an d Cl a ss B s t oc kb y 18.4$ 19 to $70,281, a rate of 21.4% compounded annually.¹

公司 2006 年的账面价值增加 169 亿美元，A/B 股每股的账面价值增加 18.4％（标普24.1％），自现任管理层接手的 42 年以来，每股账面价值由当初的 19 美元成长到目前的 70,281 美元，年复合成长率约为 21.4％。

We believe that $16.9 billion is a record for a one-year gain in net worth — more than has ever been booked by any American business, leaving aside boosts that have occurred because of mergers (e.g. AOL’s purchase of Time Warner). Of course, Exxon Mobil and other companies earn far more than Berkshire, but their earnings largely go to dividends and/or repurchases, rather than to building net worth.

不考虑企业合并带来的增长（例如美国在线并购时代华纳），我们相信，单年169亿美元的账面价值增长额，超过了任何美国企业的历史纪录。当然，埃克森美孚石油公司及其它的企业的收益规模远超伯克希尔，但其收益主要用于股利发放或股票回购，而不是用来累积账面价值。

All that said, a confession about our 2006 gain is in order. Our most important business, insurance, benefited from a large dose of luck: Mother Nature, bless her heart, went on vacation. After hammering us with hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 — storms that caused us to lose a bundle on super-cat insurance — she just vanished. Last year, the red ink from this activity turned black — very black.

尽管如此，我们 2006 年的业绩，应该要坦承一个事实：我们最重要的保险业务的亮丽表现，主要是相当的幸运使然：由于上天有好生之德，使得一切平安。在历经 2004、2005 年飓风的重创（巨灾保险的高额理赔金，使我们损失惨重）后，终于让我们松了一口气。去年，我们的巨灾保险事业已由亏转盈，并且大有斩获。

In addition, the great majority of our 73 businesses did outstandingly well in 2006. Let me focus for a moment on one of our largest operations, GEICO. What management accomplished there was simply extraordinary.

除此之外，伯克希尔旗下的73个业务单位，在2006年绝大多数也都有突出的表现。让我们重点谈谈伯克希尔旗下最大的业务之一 GEICO，其管理层的成就，可以说是非凡的。

As I’ve told you before, Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, went to work at the company 45 years ago, two months after turning 18. He became CEO in 1992, and from then on the company’s growth exploded. In addition, Tony has delivered staggering productivity gains in recent years. Between yearend 2003 and yearend 2006, the number of GEICO policies increased from 5.7 million to 8.1 million, a jump of 42%. Yet during that same period, the company’s employees (measured on a fulltime-equivalent basis) fell 3.5%. So productivity grew 47%. And GEICO didn’t start fat.

正如过去所述，GEICO 保险的 CEO 托尼·莱斯利 45 年前加入公司，当时他只有 18 岁零二个月，自 1992 年走马上任以来，公司的成长突飞猛进。而近年来，托尼更在运营效率的提升上精益求精，由 2003 年底至 2006 年底，GEICO 的保单数量从 570 万份增长至 810 万份，成长了 42％。但此同时，公司的全职员工却减少了 3.5％。因此，运营效率不但提升了 47％，而 GEICO 并没有组织臃肿的问题。

That remarkable gain has allowed GEICO to maintain its all-important position as a low-cost producer, even though it has dramatically increased advertising expenditures. Last year GEICO spent $631 mi ll i o n o na d s, u p f ro m$ 238 million in 2003 (and up from $31 million in 1995, when Berkshire took control). Today, GEICO spends far more on ads than any of its competitors, even those much larger. We will continue to raise the bar.

GEICO 创造出的惊人成长，即便在广告支出激增的情况下，仍保持其作为低成本保险公司绝对领先的地位。去年，GEICO 的广告支出为 6.31 亿美元，高于 2003 年的 2.38 亿美元，也高于 1995 年收购时的 3100 万。目前，GEICO 的广告支出远远超过任何竞争对手，即使规模远大于 GEICO 者，而我们将持续提高竞争的门槛。

Last year I told you that if you had a new son or grandson to be sure to name him Tony. But Don Keough, a Berkshire director, recently had a better idea. After reviewing GEICO’s performance in 2006, he wrote me, “Forget births. Tell the shareholders to immediately change the names of their present children to Tony or Antoinette.” Don signed his letter “Tony.”

各位还记得去年我说过，如果你有儿子或孙子出生，一定要帮他取名“托尼”。但伯克希尔的董事唐·基奥（Don Keough）最近有更好的想法：在回顾了 2006 年 GEICO 的表现后，他写信给我说：“甭提出生了，告诉股东们赶快把小孩的名字，都改成托尼或安东尼吧！”而他在信后面已经署名为“托尼”了。

Charlie Munger — my partner and Berkshire’s vice chairman — and I run what has turned out to be a big business, one with 217,000 employees and annual revenues approaching $100 billion. We certainly didn’t plan it that way. Charlie began as a lawyer, and I thought of myself as a security analyst. Sitting in those seats, we both grew skeptical about the ability of big entities of any type to function well. Size seems to make many organizations slow-thinking, resistant to change and smug. In Churchill’s words: “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us.” Here’s a telling fact: Of the ten non-oil companies having the largest market capitalization in 1965 — titans such as General Motors, Sears, DuPont and Eastman Kodak — only one made the 2006 list.

我的搭档也是伯克希尔的副董事长查理芒格，和我共同管理着一个庞大的事业体，它拥有 21.7 万名员工，年营收直逼 1000 亿美元。当然这并非我们原先的规划，芒格一开始是以律师身份起家，而我则将自己视为证券分析师。在那个年代，我们对于任何形态的大型机构能否有效运营，一直表示怀疑。规模似乎使许多组织思维迟缓，抵制变革，甚至自以为是。丘吉尔曾说过：“我们改变了世界，而世界也改变了我们”。一个明显的事实是：1965 年市值排名前十的非石油公司，如通用汽车、西尔斯、杜邦、与柯达等巨头，在 2006 年只有一家上榜。

In fairness, we’ve seen plenty of successes as well, some truly outstanding. There are many giant-company managers whom I greatly admire; Ken Chenault of American Express, Jeff Immelt of G.E. and Dick Kovacevich of Wells Fargo come quickly to mind. But I don’t think I could do the management job they do. And I know I wouldn’t enjoy many of the duties that come with their positions — meetings, speeches, foreign travel, the charity circuit and governmental relations. For me, Ronald Reagan had it right: “It’s probably true that hard work never killed anyone — but why take the chance?”

公平而言，还是有许多大企业的经理人表现非凡，像我马上就能想到一些让人推崇备至的 CEO，如美国运通的 Ken Chenault、通用电气的 Jeff Immelt、富国银行的 Dick Kovacevich，但我认为我无法胜任他们的管理工作，我也不认为自己能欣然接受这些随着地位而来的许多职责，诸如会议、演说、出差、慈善巡回、政府公关等。我很认同美国前总统里根曾说的话：“努力工作也许累不死人，但何苦冒这个险呢？”

So I’ve taken the easy route, just sitting back and working through great managers who run their own shows. My only tasks are to cheer them on, sculpt and harden our corporate culture, and make major capital-allocation decisions. Our managers have returned this trust by working hard and effectively.

因此，我决定让人生过得轻松点，完全放手让集团中的优秀经理人来表现，而我的任务就是为他们加油、塑造及加强企业文化、并做出重大的资本配置决策。而伯克希尔的所有经理人，也以努力和有效的工作，来回报我对他们的信任。

For their performance over the last 42 years — and particularly for 2006 — Charlie and I thank them.

对于过去 42 年来的绩效，尤其是 2006 年的优异成果，芒格和我感谢他们的努力。

Yardsticks 评判标准

Charlie and I measure Berkshire’s progress and evaluate its intrinsic value in a number of ways. No single criterion is effective in doing these jobs, and even an avalanche of statistics will not capture some factors that are important. For example, it’s essential that we have managers much younger than I available to succeed me. Berkshire has never been in better shape in this regard — but I can’t prove it to you with numbers.

芒格与我用来衡量伯克希尔的表现与评估其内在价值的方法有很多种，其中并没有任何一个绝对标准能用以评估伯克希尔，而且很多重要事实也是无法用大量统计数据表示出来的。举例来说，对伯克希尔而言，拥有很多未来大有可为的年轻经理人是很重要的优势，但我可没办法单纯用数字来证明这点。

There are two statistics, however, that are of real importance. The first is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) that we own on a per-share basis. Arriving at this figure, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings. Here’s the record since present management acquired control of Berkshire:

然而，还是有两个非常重要的衡量基准，第一个是每股拥有的投资金额（包括现金与类现金），在计算时，我们排除了金融部门所持有的投资部位，因为其价值被大量的融资负债所抵消。以下是自从现任管理层接手伯克希尔到现今的数据记录：

Year	Per-Share Investments *
1965	$ 4
1975	159
1985	2,407
1995	21,817
2006	$ 80,636
Compound Growth Rate 1965-2006	27.5%
Compound Growth Rate 1995-2006	12.6%

* Net of minority interests

In our early years we put most of our retained earnings and insurance float into investments in marketable securities. Because of this emphasis, and because the securities we purchased generally did well, our growth rate in investments was for a long time quite high.

伯克希尔早期的作法，是将大部分的留存收益及保险浮存金用于有价证券投资，由于如此专注投资，再加上购买的公司都有不错的表现，我们的投资增长率在很长的一段时间都相当高。

Over the years, however, we have focused more and more on the acquisition of operating businesses. Using our funds for these purchases has both slowed our growth in investments and accelerated our gains in pre-tax earnings from non-insurance businesses, the second yardstick we use. Here’s how those earnings have looked:

然而近年来，我们越来越专注于收购运营业务，我们的资金用于并购，使得我们投资规模的增长放缓，但加快了我们非保险业务的税前收益加速成长，这是我们的第二个衡量基准。

Year	Pre-Tax Earnings Per Share *
1965	$ 4
1975	4
1985	52
1995	175
2006	$ 3,625
Compound Growth Rate 1965-2006	17.9%
Compound Growth Rate 1995-2006	31.7%

* Excluding purchase-accounting adjustments and net of minority interests

不包括购买法会计调整数和少数股权净额

Last year we had a good increase in non-insurance earnings — 38%. Large gains from here on in, though, will come only if we are able to make major, and sensible, acquisitions. That will not be easy. We do, however, have one advantage: More and more, Berkshire has become “the buyer of choice” for business owners and managers. Initially, we were viewed that way only in the U.S. (and more often than not by private companies). We’ve long wanted, nonetheless, to extend Berkshire’s appeal beyond U.S. borders. And last year, our globe-trotting finally got underway.

去年我们非保险业务的税前收益增长了 38％。但只有当我们能够进行一些重大且明智的收购时，日后的收益增长才有保障，而这并非易事。所幸我们确实有一个优势，因为对许多企业主及经理人来说，伯克希尔越来越成为＂首选买家”。最初，我们通常只在美国私营公司中被如此看待，但我们一直希望将伯克希尔的吸引力拓展到海外去，去年我们的国际化终于开花结果了。

Acquisitions 收购

We began 2006 by completing the three acquisitions pending at yearend 2005, spending about $6 billion for PacifiCorp, Business Wire and Applied Underwriters. All are performing very well.

我们在 2006 年初完成了 2005 年的三项收购，总金额达 60 亿美元，所有企业进展都相当顺利。此三家企业分别为太平洋电力（PacifiCorp）、商业资讯公司（BusinessWire）、工伤赔偿保险公司（Applied Underwriters）。

The highlight of the year, however, was our July 5th acquisition of most of ISCAR, an Israeli company, and our new association with its chairman, Eitan Wertheimer, and CEO, Jacob Harpaz. The story here began on October 25, 2005, when I received a 1.25-page letter from Eitan, of whom I then knew nothing. The letter began, “I am writing to introduce you to ISCAR,” and proceeded to describe a cutting-tool business carried on in 61 countries. Then Eitan wrote, “We have for some time considered the issues of generational transfer and ownership that are typical for large family enterprises, and have given much thought to ISCAR’s future. Our conclusion is that Berkshire Hathaway would be the ideal home for ISCAR. We believe that ISCAR would continue to thrive as a part of your portfolio of businesses.”

不过，去年的收购亮点是在 7 月 5 日取得以色列伊斯卡公司（ISCAR）的多数股权，并与该公司董事长艾登威萨姆（Eitan Wertheimer），及CEO雅各布·哈帕斯（Jacob Harpaz）建立新的关系。故事开始于 2005 年 10 月 25 日，我收到 Eitan 一封一页多点的信，当时我对他一无所知。信开头写道：＂这封信的目的，是向你介绍 ISCAR 公司”，接着描述了它在 61 个国家经营的切削工具业务。Eitan 继续写道：＂一段时间以来，我们一直在思考大型家族企业典型的代际传承和所有权方面的问题，并慎重地思考了 ISCAR 的未来。我们的结论是，伯克希尔将是 ISCAR 理想的归宿，我们相信，ISCAR 将作为其业务组合一员而继续蓬勃发展”。

Overall, Eitan’s letter made the quality of the company and the character of its management leap off the page. It also made me want to learn more, and in November, Eitan, Jacob and ISCAR’s CFO, Danny Goldman, came to Omaha. A few hours with them convinced me that if we were to make a deal, we would be teaming up with extraordinarily talented managers who could be trusted to run the business after a sale with all of the energy and dedication that they had exhibited previously. However, having never bought a business based outside of the U.S. (though I had bought a number of foreign stocks), I needed to get educated on some tax and jurisdictional matters. With that task completed, Berkshire purchased 80% of ISCAR for $4 billion. The remaining 20% stays in the hands of the Wertheimer family, making it our valued partner.

总体来看，Eitan 的来信成功地突显了该公司的质量以及管理层的特质，同时也让我有了更深入了解的念头。到了 11 月份，Eitan、Jacob 和 ISCAR 的 CFO 丹尼·高曼（Danny Goldman）来到奥马哈。几小时的会面时间，使我坚信此一收购案若能成功，这个值得信任、能力超凡的管理层，将能顺利地加入伯克希尔。因为他们将能秉持收购前的精力十足和奉献态度，继续经营该事业。然而，由于伯克希尔从未收购总部设于美国以外的企业（尽管我买过许多外国企业的股票），故需要研究相关税制和司法方面知识。了解过后，伯克希尔以 40 亿美元，收购了 80％的 ISCAR 股权，而其余 20％仍由 Wertheimer 家族继续持有，并成为我们宝贵的合作伙伴。

ISCAR’s products are small, consumable cutting tools that are used in conjunction with large and expensive machine tools. It’s a business without magic except for that imparted by the people who run it. But Eitan, Jacob and their associates are true managerial magicians who constantly develop tools that make their customers’ machines more productive. The result: ISCAR makes money because it enables its customers to make more money. There is no better recipe for continued success.

ISCAR 生产小型、易耗性的切削工具，其主要是高价大型机床设备的零组件。这个业务没有任何神奇之处，主要是管理者赋予的价值。而 Eitan、Jacob 与团队成员，都是真正的管理魔术师，不断研发出新型工具，使顾客的机器更具生产效率。所以结论是：ISCAR 的获利之道，是帮助顾客赚更多的钱。应该没有比这更能创造持续成功的秘诀了吧！

In September, Charlie and I, along with five Berkshire associates, visited ISCAR in Israel. We — and I mean every one of us — have never been more impressed with any operation. At ISCAR, as throughout Israel, brains and energy are ubiquitous. Berkshire shareholders are lucky to have joined with Eitan, Jacob, Danny and their talented associates.

在 9 月份，查理和我以及伯克希尔 5 位同事，前往以色列参观了 ISCAR 公司。我们每个人都对其营运方面的表现赞叹不已。在 ISCAR 就像整个以色列一样，到处充满了具备聪明才智和充沛活力的人才。对伯克希尔的股东们来说，能有 Eitan、Jacob、Danny 及其人才辈出的团队一同加入，实在是三生有幸。

A few months later, Berkshire again became “the buyer of choice” in a deal brought to us by my friend, John Roach, of Fort Worth. John, many of you will remember, was Chairman of Justin Industries, which we bought in 2000. At that time John was helping John Justin, who was terminally ill, find a permanent home for his company. John Justin died soon after we bought Justin Industries, but it has since been run exactly as we promised him it would be.

数月后，我在沃斯堡的朋友约翰·罗奇（John Roach），拜他的牵线所赐，伯克希尔又再度成为“首选买家”。大家应该还记得，John Roach 是伯克希尔集团 2000 年所收购 Justin 工业的董事长。当时 John 正帮助身患绝症的约翰贾斯丁（John Justin）为他的公司寻找永久的归宿。就在伯克希尔收购后，John Justin 旋即去世，但公司一直按我们当时承诺的那样运营。

Visiting me in November, John Roach brought along Paul Andrews, Jr., owner of about 80% of TTI, a Fort Worth distributor of electronic components. Over a 35-year period, Paul built TTI from $112, 000 o f s a l es t o$ 1.3 billion. He is a remarkable entrepreneur and operator.

在 11 月，John Roach 带着保罗·安德鲁（Paul Andrews, Jr.）来拜访我。Paul 拥有沃斯堡一家电子零件分销商 TTI 的 80％股权。历经 35 年的努力，Paul 使 TTI 的销售额从 11.2 万美元提高到 13 亿美元，他是一位不可多得的创业家与经营者。

Paul, 64, loves running his business. But not long ago he happened to witness how disruptive the death of a founder can be both to a private company’s employees and the owner’s family. What starts out as disruptive, furthermore, often evolves into destructive. About a year ago, therefore, Paul began to think about selling TTI. His goal was to put his business in the hands of an owner he had carefully chosen, rather than allowing a trust officer or lawyer to conduct an auction after his death.

Paul 今年 64 岁，非常热衷于经营这份事业。但就在不久前，他亲眼目睹私有企业创始人过世，对公司员工及其家人所造成的冲击。尤其是此一突如其来的变化，常常会进而演变成最终的毁灭。因此在一年前，Paul 就开始考虑出售 TTI，目标是将公司亲自交到细心挑选的买主手中，而不愿一手创立的企业，任由信托人员或律师，在他过世后予以拍卖。

Paul rejected the idea of a “strategic” buyer, knowing that in the pursuit of “synergies,” an owner of that type would be apt to dismantle what he had so carefully built, a move that would uproot hundreds of his associates (and perhaps wound TTI’s business in the process). He also ruled out a private equity firm, which would very likely load the company with debt and then flip it as soon as possible.

Paul 直接拒绝了某些“战略性”买主。因为他知道，这类企业的所有人，通常为追求所谓的“协同效应”，倾向将他精心建立的事业予以肢解，使得数以百计的员工失去依靠（此一过程也可能让 TTI 的事业受到重创）。他也排除掉私募股权机构的买主，因为此类公司未来势必将因此背负过多债务，而只要一有机会就尽快转手卖出。

That left Berkshire. Paul and I met on the morning of November 15th and made a deal before lunch. Later he wrote me: “After our meeting, I am confident that Berkshire is the right owner for TTI. I am proud of our past and excited about our future.” And so are Charlie and I.

最后，只有伯克希尔符合他的心意。Paul 与我在 11 月 15 日早晨会面，并在午餐前达成协议。不久后他写信给我：“双方会晤之后，我坚信伯克希尔就是 TTI 的最佳拥有者。我对我们的过去感到自豪，而对未来则感到兴奋不已”。查理与我也深有同感。

We also made some “tuck-in” acquisitions during 2006 at Fruit of the Loom (“Fruit”), MiTek, CTB, Shaw and Clayton. Fruit made the largest purchases. First, it bought Russell Corp., a leading producer of athletic apparel and uniforms for about $1.2 bi ll i o n (in c l u d in g a ss u m e dd e b t) an d in Dece mb er i t a g ree d t o b u y t h e in t ima t e a pp a re l b u s in esso f V FC or p . T o g e t h er, t h ese a c q u i s i t i o n s a dd ab o u t$ 2.2 billion to Fruit’s sales and bring with them about 23,000 employees.

在 2006 年，我们还进行了一些“补强性”收购，比如鲜果布衣（Fruit of the Loom）、MiTek、CTB、Shaw 地毯、以及克莱顿（Clayton）。其中鲜果布衣的收购规模最大。首先，以 12 亿美元（包含负债）收购运动服饰、及制服的生产商罗素公司（Russell Corp.）。接着在 12 月，同意收购威富公司（VF Corp.）内衣制造业务。这些收购，共计为鲜果布衣增加了 22 亿美元的营收，也带来约 2.3 万名员工。

Charlie and I love it when we can acquire businesses that can be placed under managers, such as John Holland at Fruit, who have already shown their stuff at Berkshire. MiTek, for example, has made 14 acquisitions since we purchased it in 2001, and Gene Toombs has delivered results from these deals far in excess of what he had predicted. In effect, we leverage the managerial talent already with us by these tuck-in deals. We will make many more.

查理和我非常乐意收购一些可以置于伯克希尔现有经理人旗下管理的业务，比如鲜果布衣的经理人约翰·霍兰德（John Holland），他们已经在伯克希尔集团中发光发热。以 Mitek 公司为例，自 2001 年被我们收购后，该公司给已进行了 14 次收购，Gene Toombs 通过这些收购所获得的成果，远远超过他先前的预期。事实上，我们也通过这些补强性收购，充分利用了已有的管理人才，达到事半功倍的效果，这是值得我们继续努力的方向。

We continue, however, to need “elephants” in order for us to use Berkshire’s flood of incoming cash. Charlie and I must therefore ignore the pursuit of mice and focus our acquisition efforts on much bigger game.

然而，为运用伯克希尔涌入的大量现金，我们仍然需要“大象级”的企业作为收购的目标。因此，查理和我必须放弃对老鼠的追求，将心力投注于更大的收购案上面。

Our exemplar is the older man who crashed his grocery cart into that of a much younger fellow while both were shopping. The elderly man explained apologetically that he had lost track of his wife and was preoccupied searching for her. His new acquaintance said that by coincidence his wife had also wandered off and suggested that it might be more efficient if they jointly looked for the two women. Agreeing, the older man asked his new companion what his wife looked like. “She’s a gorgeous blonde,” the fellow answered, “with a body that would cause a bishop to go through a stained glass window, and she’s wearing tight white shorts. How about yours?” The senior citizen wasted no words: “Forget her, we’ll look for yours.”

我们所效法的精神以下面的故事做比喻：一个老男人推着购物车，与商场里的一个年轻小伙子相撞。老男人满怀歉意地解释，因老伴走丢专心寻找她，所以一时不慎。巧合的是，这位初识者竟然也表示与妻子走散，建议两人一起寻找，可能将更有效率。老男人点点头，询问这个小伙子的太太长相如何。小伙子回答：“她是个金发美女！而且身材好到能让主教冲破教堂彩绘玻璃窗，而且她今天穿的是件白色紧身热裤。那你的太太呢？”这位老男人立刻脱口而出：“别管她了，我们找你的太太就好”。

What we are looking for is described on page 25. If you have an acquisition candidate that fits, call me — day or night. And then watch me shatter a stained glass window.

我们正在寻找的对象，在股东信中有详细说明，如果阁下有符合要求的收购标的，不管什么时候都欢迎打电话给我。然后，就看着我撞碎彩绘玻璃窗吧！

Now, let’s examine the four major operating sectors of Berkshire. Lumping their financial figures together impedes analysis. So we’ll look at them as four separate businesses, starting with the all-important insurance group.

现在，就让我们来看看伯克希尔的四大运营业务。若将它们的财务数字合并一起，将会妨碍我们的分析。所以，我们将他们视为四大独立业务分别加以探讨，就从对伯克希尔而言最重要的保险事业开始。

Insurance 保险业务

Next month marks the 40th anniversary of our entrance into the insurance business. It was on March 9, 1967, that Berkshire purchased National Indemnity and its companion company, National Fire & Marine, from Jack Ringwalt for $8.6 million.

下个月是我们进入保险业务的 40 周年。1967 年 3 月 9 日，伯克希尔从杰克·林沃尔特（Jack Ringwalt）手中以 860 万美元，买下国民保险公司（National Indemnity）、及其伙伴企业国民火险及海运险公司。

Jack was a long-time friend of mine and an excellent, but somewhat eccentric, businessman. For about ten minutes every year he would get the urge to sell his company. But those moods — perhaps brought on by a tiff with regulators or an unfavorable jury verdict — quickly vanished.

Jack 是我的老朋友，他是一位杰出、但脾气有些古怪的生意人。每年有大约 10 分钟的时间，他会产生想要出售公司的冲动。而这样的情绪，也许是因为与监管机关意见相左、或是法院判决不利，但却稍纵即逝。

In the mid-1960s, I asked investment banker Charlie Heider, a mutual friend of mine and Jack’s, to alert me the next time Jack was “in heat.” When Charlie’s call came, I sped to meet Jack. We made a deal in a few minutes, with me waiving an audit, “due diligence” or anything else that would give Jack an opportunity to reconsider. We just shook hands, and that was that.

在 1960 年代中期，我告诉一位投资银行家朋友查理·海德（Charlie Heider），当下次 Jack “上火”时，赶快联络我。Charlie 是 Jack 和我的共同朋友，之后 Charlie 来电，我便火速安排与 Jack 会面。我们在几分钟内就达成协议，而且我刻意放弃审计、尽职调查、以及其它任何会使他重新考虑的机会。我们只是握手达成了初步协议。

When we were due to close the purchase at Charlie’s office, Jack was late. Finally arriving, he explained that he had been driving around looking for a parking meter with some unexpired time. That was a magic moment for me. I knew then that Jack was going to be my kind of manager.

而我们在 Charlie 办公室等待签约以完成收购那天，Jack迟到了，他到达时解释说，他一直开车在附近寻找定时器还未用完的免费车位。此刻对我来说，实在是妙不可言，因为我知道 Jack 就是我想找的那一种经理人。

When Berkshire purchased Jack’s two insurers, they had “float” of $17 million. We’ve regularly offered a long explanation of float in earlier reports, which you can read on our website. Simply put, float is money we hold that is not ours but which we get to invest.

伯克希尔买下他的两家保险公司，共有 1700 万的浮存金。在过去年报中，我们对浮存金作了详尽的解释，你也可以在我们的网站上查阅。简单来说，浮存金是我们持有，虽然不属于我们，但却可以用来投资的钱。

At the end of 2006, our float had grown to $50.9 bi ll i o n, an d w e ha v es in ce w r i tt e nah ug ere t ro a c t i v ere in s u r an ceco n t r a c tw i t h Eq u i t a s - - w hi c h I w i ll d escr ib e in t h e n e x t sec t i o n - - t ha t b oos t s f l o a t b y an o t h er$ 7 billion. Much of the gain we’ve made has come through our acquisition of other insurers. but we’ve also had outstanding internal growth, particularly at Ajit Jain’s amazing reinsurance operation. Naturally, I had no notion in 1967 that our float would develop as it has. There’s much to be said for just putting one foot in front of the other every day.

到2006年底，我们的浮存金已成长至509亿美元，我们已经跟Equitas 签订了巨额的追溯再保险合约（我会在下个部分加以说明），浮存金规模又增加了70亿美元。浮存金的增长，大多是来自于我们收购其他保险公司，但我们自身经营的保险业务，也有显著的内生性成长，尤其是阿吉特贾恩所管理的再保险业务。我在1967年，自然无法想象浮存金可以发展至此一规模，但这都归功于每天的一步一个脚印，所创造出积少成多的效果。

The float from retroactive reinsurance contracts, of which we have many, automatically drifts down over time. Therefore, it will be difficult for us to increase float in the future unless we make new acquisitions in the insurance field. Whatever its size, however, the all-important cost of Berkshire’s float over time is likely to be significantly below that of the industry, perhaps even falling to less than zero. Note the words “over time.” There will be bad years periodically. You can be sure of that.

我们目前持有许多追溯再保险合约，其所产生的浮存金，将随着时间而日益减少。所以，除非我们在此方面不断有新收购案的完成，否则浮存金在未来的增加上，或有相当的困难。然而，无论浮存金的规额大小，对伯克希尔来说最重要的，是浮存金的成本，随着时间推移，可能远低于业界的标准，甚至可能低于零。请注意“随着时间的推移”这个词，会周期性的出现不好的年份，这一点是可以确定的。

In 2006, though, everything went right in insurance — really right. Our managers — Tony Nicely (GEICO), Ajit Jain (B-H Reinsurance), Joe Brandon and Tad Montross (General Re), Don Wurster (National Indemnity Primary), Tom Nerney (U.S. Liability), Tim Kenesey (Medical Protective), Rod Eldred (Homestate Companies and Cypress), Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies (Applied Underwriters), John Kizer (Central States)and Don Towle (Kansas Bankers Surety) — simply shot the lights out. When I recite their names, I feel as if I’m at Cooperstown, reading from the Hall of Fame roster. Of course, the overall insurance industry also had a terrific year in 2006. But our managers delivered results generally superior to those of their competitors.

不过，保险业务 2006 年的状况相当不错，可以说非常棒。我们的经理人，包括 Tony Nicely（GEICO 保险），Ajit Jain（B-H 再保险），Joe Brandon 和 Tad Montross（General Re），Don Wurster（国民保险直保业务），Tom Nerney（U.S. 责任险），Tim Kenesey（Medical Protective 医疗事故保险），Rod Eldred（HomeState 和 Cypress 保险），Sid Ferenc 和 Steve Menzies（Applied Underwriter 工伤保险），John Kizer（Central States 中部州保险）和 Don Towle（Kansas 银行家担保），表现发光发热。在朗诵他们的名字时，我觉得好像在棒球发源地库伯斯敦 Cooperstown，照着名人堂上的名单—念出。当然，整个保险业在2006年都有亮丽的演出，但伯克希尔经理人的表现，却普遍优于竞争对手。

Below is the tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance. Enjoy the view, because you won’t soon see another like it.

以下是我们每个主要保险业务的承保业绩，及其浮存金的数字。请仔细的回味，因为近期内，你将很难再看到如此精彩的报告了。

Insurance Operations	Underwriting Profit(Loss) 2006 (in $ millions)	Underwriting Profit(Loss) 2005 (in $ millions)	Yearend Float 2006 (in $ millions)	Yearend Float 2005 (in $ millions)
General Re	$ 526	$ (334)	$ 22,827	$22,920
B-H Reinsurance	1,658	(1,069)	16,860	16,233
GEICO	1,314	1,221	7,171	6,692
Other Primary	340**	235*	4,029	3,442
Total	$ 3,838	$ 53	$ 50,887	$ 49,287

* Includes MedPro from June 30, 2005.

* 包括 MedPro 自 2005 年 6 月 30 日起；

** Includes Applied Underwriters from May 19, 2006.

** 包括 Applied Underwriters 自 2006 年 5 月 19 日起；

In 2007, our results from the bread-and-butter lines of insurance will deteriorate, though I think they will remain satisfactory. The big unknown is super-cat insurance. Were the terrible hurricane seasons of 2004-05 aberrations? Or were they our planet’s first warning that the climate of the 21st Century will differ materially from what we’ve seen in the past? If the answer to the second question is yes, 2006 will soon be perceived as a misleading period of calm preceding a series of devastating storms. These could rock the insurance industry. It’s naive to think of Katrina as anything close to a worst-case event.

2007 年，在伯克希尔赖以为生的保险事业方面，将很难再创造出更好的结果，但我认为，应该可以维持不错的表现，但超级巨灾保险，却是最大的未知数。2004-2005 年飓风的接踵而来，是脱离常轨的吗？或者这些天灾只是警讯，告诉我们 21 世纪的地球气候，已经变得跟过去截然不同？如果第二个问题的答案是肯定的，2006 年将可能是未来一连串暴风雨前的宁静。如此一来，整个保险业势必将天翻地覆，故若将前年的 Katrina 飓风视为最坏的情况，可能是过于天真的想法。

Neither Ajit Jain, who manages our super-cat operation, nor I know what lies ahead. We do know that it would be a huge mistake to bet that evolving atmospheric changes are benign in their implications for insurers.

无论是负责巨灾保险业务的阿吉特，还是我本人，都不知道未来将如何演变。我们只知道，若保险业者押注在地球气候变化对保险业的影响是正面良性的话，那将是一个巨大的错误。

Don’t think, however, that we have lost our taste for risk. We remain prepared to lose $6 billion in a single event, if we have been paid appropriately for assuming that risk. We are not willing, though, to take on even very small exposures at prices that don’t reflect our evaluation of loss probabilities. Appropriate prices don’t guarantee profits in any given year, but inappropriate prices most certainly guarantee eventual losses. Rates have recently fallen because a flood of capital has entered the super-cat field. We have therefore sharply reduced our wind exposures. Our behavior here parallels that which we employ in financial markets: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.

然而，不要认为伯克希尔已经失去了承担风险的兴趣。假若为承保特定风险，我们获得了适当的保费收入，我们仍准备为单一事件承担 60 亿美元的理赔金。但是，对于一些经过评估，在保费上无法反映可能的损失的风险，就算理赔的金额不大，我们也不愿承保。合理的保费，并不确保特定年度的获利，但只要保费不合理，肯定会保证最后以亏损收场。由于大量资金涌入巨灾保险业，使得近来的保费价格降低，因此伯克希尔将大幅减少飓风保险的承保额。伯克希尔在保险事业上的经营，和我们在金融市场上的作法，可说是如出一辙：当别人贪婪时要提高警觉，当别人恐惧时要贪婪。

Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance Lloyd’s、Equitas 以及追溯再保险

Last year — we are getting now to Equitas — Berkshire agreed to enter into a huge retroactive reinsurance contract, a policy that protects an insurer against losses that have already happened, but whose cost is not yet known. I’ll give you details of the agreement shortly. But let’s first take a journey through insurance history, following the route that led to our deal.

接下来，就要谈到 Equitas 了。去年，伯克希尔签订了金额庞大的追溯再保险合约，该合同是为了保护保险业者，免受已经发生的损失，但尚不清楚确切的理赔金额所带来的可能风险。稍待片刻，我将会讲解一下这合约的相关细节。但先来回顾一下保险的历史，然后大家自然就会了解这笔交易的来龙去脉。

Our tale begins around 1688, when Edward Lloyd opened a small coffee house in London. Though no Starbucks, his shop was destined to achieve worldwide fame because of the commercial activities of its clientele — shipowners, merchants and venturesome British capitalists. As these parties sipped Edward’s brew, they began to write contracts transferring the risk of a disaster at sea from the owners of ships and their cargo to the capitalists, who wagered that a given voyage would be completed without incident. These capitalists eventually became known as “underwriters at Lloyd’s.”

故事发生在 1668 年左右，当时 Edward Lloyd 在伦敦经营一家小咖啡店，因为顾客（包括船主、商人、以及爱冒险的英国资本家）都在店里从事商业交易，所以在那个没有星巴克的年代里，他的店就注定远近驰名。这些顾客品尝着咖啡，并与资本家签下能转移他们货船、货物海上风险的合约。这些签下合约的资本家，是押注在此次出海，可以顺利平安的想法上，最后就变成所谓的“位于 Lloyd’s 的保险业者”。

Though many people believe Lloyd’s to be an insurance company, that is not the case. It is instead a place where many member-insurers transact business, just as they did centuries ago.

虽然有很多人认为 Lloyd 是家保险公司，但实情并非如此。就跟一个世纪前一样，Lloyd’s 仅是许多保险业者处理交易的场所而已。

Over time, the underwriters solicited passive investors to join in syndicates. Additionally, the business broadened beyond marine risks into every imaginable form of insurance, including exotic coverages that spread the fame of Lloyd’s far and wide. The underwriters left the coffee house, found grander quarters and formalized some rules of association. And those persons who passively backed the underwriters became known as “names.”

经过时间的演变，保险业者吸引了一些被动投资人，加入共同承保的行列。除此之外，业务范围也扩展至海运险以外的领域，几乎任何可能的保险形式，其中包括一些无奇不有的保单。因此，Lloyd’s 声名远播。保险业者们后来走出 Lloyd’s 咖啡厅，各自找更雄伟的总部，并订立合作规范。而那些提供资金给保险业者的被动投资人，就变成所谓的“财团”。

Eventually, the names came to include many thousands of people from around the world, who joined expecting to pick up some extra change without effort or serious risk. True, prospective names were always solemnly told that they would have unlimited and everlasting liability for the consequences of their syndicate’s underwriting — “down to the last cufflink,” as the quaint description went. But that warning came to be viewed as perfunctory. Three hundred years of retained cufflinks acted as a powerful sedative to the names poised to sign up.

最后，来自世界各地成千上万的财团都加入了这个行列，期望不费吹灰之力或不冒风险就能获得赚钱之道。当然，这些潜在的财团们，在加入保险业者的共同承保前，都被理性地告知，他们将对其承保的后果，承担无限和永久的责任，简单点就是“赔到脱裤子”。但是这样的警告根本只是敷衍，根本没人理会。由于过去三百年来，并没有人真的“赔到脱裤子”，对于财团来说，这是极具说服力的证明，因此许多安心地加入共同承保。

Then came asbestos. When its prospective costs were added to the tidal wave of environmental and product claims that surfaced in the 1980s, Lloyd’s began to implode. Policies written decades earlier — and largely forgotten about — were developing huge losses. No one could intelligently estimate their total, but it was certain to be many tens of billions of dollars. The specter of unending and unlimited losses terrified existing names and scared away prospects. Many names opted for bankruptcy; some even chose suicide.

随后就出现了石棉问题。在 1980 年代，因为环保及产品索赔的声浪风起云涌而来，使保险业者的理赔成本，如滚雪球般膨胀，Lloyd’s开始瓦解。数十年前所签下的保单（许多早就被人遗忘的合约），亏损金额大幅攀升，再精明的人恐都难以估计总数，但必定是数百亿美元之巨。无穷无尽的巨大损失吓坏许多财团，以及潜在进入者。许多财团最后只能选择破产，有些人甚至选择自杀了结。

From these shambles, there came a desperate effort to resuscitate Lloyd’s. In 1996, the powers that be at the institution allotted £11.1 billion to a new company, Equitas, and made it responsible for paying all claims on policies written before 1993. In effect, this plan pooled the misery of the many syndicates in trouble. Of course, the money allotted could prove to be insufficient — and if that happened, the names remained liable for the shortfall.

动荡中，有些人不顾一切的想要重振 Lloyd’s 的雄风。1996 年，该机构的高层，决定以 111 亿英镑的资金，成立一家新公司 Equitas，来承担 1993 年以前的所有未了结保险合约。其实，这个计划是将许多悲惨财团们的问题集中处理，当然，拨出的资金是绝对是入不敷出，但若如此，财团们仍要为资金缺口负责。

But the new plan, by concentrating all of the liabilities in one place, had the advantage of eliminating much of the costly intramural squabbling that went on among syndicates. Moreover, the pooling allowed claims evaluation, negotiation and litigation to be handled more intelligently than had been the case previously. Equitas embraced Ben Franklin’s thinking: “We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall hang separately.”

但是，集中所有债务一起处理的新计划，至少可以让财团间的内斗告一段落。此外，将这些保险合约集合起来，也可以在评估、谈判以及诉讼上，较先前的决策更为明智。Equitas计划，怀抱的是富兰克林的思想：“我们必须团结一致，否则一定会被各个击破。”

From the start, many people predicted Equitas would eventually fail. But as Ajit and I reviewed the facts in the spring of 2006 — 13 years after the last exposed policy had been written and after the payment of £11.3 billion in claims — we concluded that the patient was likely to survive. And so we decided to offer a huge reinsurance policy to Equitas.

起初，许多人预期，Equitas 终将走上失败一途。但在 2006 年春天（在距离最后一张保单被承保 13 年后，（1993-2006年）累计支付 113 亿英磅理赔金），我和阿吉特审视所有的数据后，得出的结论是它还是有存活下去的可能。于是我们决定，愿提供 Equitas 巨额的再保险合约。

Because plenty of imponderables continue to exist, Berkshire could not provide Equitas, and its 27,972 names, unlimited protection. But we said — and I’m simplifying — that if Equitas would give us $7.12 bi ll i o nin c a s han d sec u r i t i es (t hi s i s t h e f l o a t I s p o k e ab o u t), w e w o u l d p a y a ll o f i t s f u t u rec l aim s an d e x p e n ses u pt o$ 13.9 billion. That amount was $5.7 billion above what Equitas had recently guessed its ultimate liabilities to be. Thus the names received a huge — and almost certainly sufficient — amount of future protection against unpleasant surprises. Indeed the protection is so large that Equitas plans a cash payment to its thousands of names, an event few of them had ever dreamed possible.

由于仍存在许多不可知的变量，故伯克希尔并不能提供 Equitas、及其 27,972 名财团无上限的保障。但我们提出（用尽量简单的说法），只要 Equitas 支付伯克希尔 71.2 亿美元的现金及证券（这就是先前提到的浮存金），我们就愿意负担其未来的理赔金，上限为 139 亿美元。此一金额，较 Equitas 最近评估的所有债务，还多出 57 亿美元。如此一来，财团得到了巨大（几乎保证是足够）的未来保障，能够杜绝不幸意外的打击。而伯克希尔提供的保障之大，甚至让 Equitas 计划支付现金红利给数千名财团，这是他们做梦都想不到的。

And how will Berkshire fare? That depends on how much “known” claims will end up costing us. how many yet-to-be-presented claims will surface and what they will cost, how soon claim payments will be made and how much we earn on the cash we receive before it must be paid out. Ajit and I think the odds are in our favor. And should we be wrong. Berkshire can handle it.

这对伯克希尔的影响为何？这取决于“已知”的理赔最终有多少成本，以及将有多少尚未提交理赔的保单会付出水面要求我们负责，这些理赔金何时正式支付，以及伯克希尔能在这笔钱支付前、创造出多少现金。我跟阿吉特认为情况将对伯克希尔有利，而且即使判断出了差错，伯克希尔也能应付自如。

Scott Moser, the CEO of Equitas, summarized the transaction neatly: “Names wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”

Equitas 的 CEO 斯科特·莫泽（Scott Moser），对此项交易的评语十分简洁。他说：“财团们希望晚上能安然入睡，而我们刚为他们买了世界上最好的床垫。”

Warning: It’s time to eat your broccoli — I am now going to talk about accounting matters. I owe this to those Berkshire shareholders who love reading about debits and credits. I hope both of you find this discussion helpful. All others can skip this section; there will be no quiz.

注意：吃西兰花的时间到了（意思是对健康有益），现在开始来讨论会计上的处理。对于喜欢阅读会计报表、研究借贷关系的伯克希尔股东，希望后面的讨论可以满足各位，并有所收获。其它人可以跳过此一部分，不必担心有随堂测验。

Berkshire has done many retroactive transactions — in both number and amount a multiple of such policies entered into by any other insurer. We are the reinsurer of choice for these coverages because the obligations that are transferred to us — for example, lifetime indemnity and medical payments to be made to injured workers — may not be fully satisfied for 50 years or more. No other company can offer the certainty that Berkshire can, in terms of guaranteeing the full and fair settlement of these obligations. This fact is important to the original insurer, policyholders and regulators.

伯克希尔已进行许多追溯再保险的交易，不管是在数量或是金额上，都比其它的保险业者的承保上，多出许多倍。由于我们是这类保险的首选再保险业者，因为这些将移转给我们的义务（例如对于受伤员工的终身伤害医疗给付）可能在 50 年或更长时间内无法完全履行。在保障这些债务得到全面公平的清算方面，没有别的公司，可以像伯克希尔一样做到这一点。这一事实对于原保险公司、保户、及监管机关来说，都是非常重要的。

The accounting procedure for retroactive transactions is neither well known nor intuitive. The best way for shareholders to understand it, therefore, is for us to simply lay out the debits and credits. Charlie and I would like to see this done more often. We sometimes encounter accounting footnotes about important transactions that leave us baffled, and we go away suspicious that the reporting company wished it that way. (For example, try comprehending transactions “described” in the old 10-Ks of Enron, even after you know how the movie ended.)

追溯交易的会计程序既不是众所皆知，也不直观。为了让伯克希尔股东了解，最好的方法，就是简单列出会计的借方及贷方。查理和我希望看到更多人这么做。许多公司的重要交易放在会计附注里，这往往令人摸不着头绪。对这种故意将财务报告作如此呈现的公司，我们一向抱着怀疑态度、而不想理会。（例如，即使是知晓了最后的结局，也不妨试着解读安然公司过去年报中，对于“描述＂交易上的呈现方式。）

So let us summarize our accounting for the Equitas transaction. The major debits will be to Cash and Investments, Reinsurance Recoverable, and Deferred Charges for Reinsurance Assumed(“DCRA”). The major credit will be to Reserve for Losses and Loss Adjustment Expense. No profit or loss will be recorded at the inception of the transaction, but underwriting losses will thereafter be incurred annually as the DCRA asset is amortized downward. The amount of the annual amortization charge will be primarily determined by how our end-of-the-year estimates as to the timing and amount of future loss payments compare to the estimates made at the beginning of the year. Eventually, when the last claim has been paid, the DCRA account will be reduced to zero. That day is 50 years or more away.

因此，让我们总结一下 Equitas 的会计处理。主要的借方项目是现金与投资、再保摊回，以及再保险的递延费用资产 DCRA。主要的贷方项目为赔偿准备金以及赔偿调整费用准备金。在交易之初，并没有损益入帐，但是每年摊销再保险的递延费用资产 DCRA 时，保险损失就会跟着出现。而每年摊销的费用最主要取决于，我们对未来赔偿支付的时点、及赔偿金额的年终估计值，与年初的估计值相比。最后，当赔偿最后一张保单之后，再保险的递延收费资产账户就会降低为零，而这一天会是 50 年或是更久之后。

What’s important to remember is that retroactive insurance contracts always produce underwriting losses for us. Whether these losses are worth experiencing depends on whether the cash we have received produces investment income that exceeds the losses. Recently our DCRA charges have annually delivered $300 mi ll i o n orsoo f u n d er w r i t in g l osses, w hi c hha v e b ee nm ore t han o ff se t b y t h e in co m e w e ha v ere a l i ze d t h ro ug h u seo f t h ec a s h w erece i v e d a s a p re mi u m . A b se n t n e w re t ro a c t i v eco n t r a c t s, t h e am o u n t o f t h e ann u a l c ha r g e w o u l d n or ma ll y d ec l in eo v er t im e . A f t er t h e Eq u i t a s t r an s a c t i o n, h o w e v er, t h e ann u a l D CR A cos tw i ll ini t ia ll y in cre a se t o ab o u t$ 450 million a year. This means that our other insurance operations must generate at least that much underwriting gain for our overall float to be cost-free. That amount is quite a hurdle but one that I believe we will clear in many, if not most, years.

但重点是要记住，追溯再保险合约，总是会给我们带来损失。而这样的损失是否值得承受，就取决于我们是否能创造出超越损失的投资收益。最近，我们的 DCRA 摊销费用每年带来约 3 亿美元左右的承保损失，大约和我们将所收保费、用于投资所产生的收益相互抵消。如果没有新的追溯合约，每年费用将随着时间持续下降。然而，在与 Equitas 签订合约之后，每年的 DCRA 费用将增加到 4.5 亿美元左右。这意味着我们其它的保险事业，必须创造出相同金额的承保收益，伯克希尔才能让浮存金成本降为零。此一目标具有相当的挑战性，但我相信，我们将在许多年份实现浮存金零成本（可能不是大多数年份）。

Aren’t you glad that I promised you there would be no quiz?

我答应过不会有随堂测验，各位是不是很高兴？

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务及零售业务

Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.

伯克希尔在这个事业群的活动，可说是包罗万象。不过，让我们先看看整体的资产负债表和利润表的概要。

Balance Sheet 12/31/06 (in $ millions)

Assets	Amt.	Liabilities and Equity	Amt.
Cash and equivalents	$ 1,543	Notes payable	$ 1,468
Accounts and notes receivable	3,793
Inventory	5,257
Other current assets	363	Other current liabilities	6,635
Total current assets	10,956	Total current liabilities	8,103
Goodwill and other intangibles	13,314	Deferred taxes	540
Fixed assets	8,934	Term debt and other liabilities	3,014
Other assets	1,168	Equity	22,715
	$ 34,372		$ 34,372

Earnings Statement (in $ millions)

Item	2006	2005	2004
Revenues	$ 52,660	$ 46,896	$ 44,142
Operating expenses (including depreciation of $823 in 2006,$ 699 in 2005 and $676 in 2004)	49,002	44,190	41,604
Interest expense (net)	132	83	57
Pre-tax income	3,526 *	2,623 *	2,481 *
Income taxes	1,395	977	941
Net income	$ 2,131	$ 1,646	$ 1,540

* Does not include purchase-accounting adjustments.

* 税前利润不包含购买法会计调整

This motley group, which sells products ranging from lollipops to motor homes, earned a pleasing 25% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at large premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.8%.

这家五花八门的业务集团，销售从棒棒糖到房车的各种产品，去年的平均有形净资产的回报率为 25％，令人欣喜。值得注意的是，此一营运结果仅用了极小的财务杠杆。显而易见的，我们持有的这些企业，实在是表现非凡。不过，我们在收购这些事业时大多支付了高出净资产相当多的溢价，这反映在上面的商誉科目。而这一事实，也让相对于平均账面价值回报率，掉到 10.8％。

Here are a few newsworthy items about companies in this sector:

以下是这个事业群中几家表现显著的公司：

Bob Shaw, a remarkable entrepreneur who from a standing start built Shaw Industries into the country’s largest carpet producer, elected last year, at age 75, to retire. To succeed him, Bob recommended Vance Bell, a 31-year veteran at Shaw, and Bob, as usual, made the right call. Weakness in housing has caused the carpet business to slow. Shaw, however, remains a powerhouse and a major contributor to Berkshire’s earnings.

鲍勃·萧（Bob Shaw）是一位非凡的创业家。身为萧氏工业创办人的他，把公司发展为全美最大的地毯制造商。去年，75 岁的 Bob 决定退休。为了接替他，Bob 推荐了在萧氏地毯工作了 31 年的老兵 Vance Bell。就像以往一样，Bob 做了正确决定。虽然房市走疲，使得地毯事业的发展也跟着迟缓，然而萧氏地毯公司依旧是伯克希尔的主力事业，贡献了可观的收益。

MiTek, a manufacturer of connectors for roof trusses at the time we purchased it in 2001, is developing into a mini-conglomerate. At the rate it is growing, in fact, “mini” may soon be inappropriate. In purchasing MiTek for $420 mi ll i o n, w e l e n tt h eco m p an y$ 200 million at 9% and bought $198 mi ll i o n o f s t oc k, p r i ce d a t$ 10,000 per share. Additionally, 55 employees bought 2,200 shares for $22 million. Each employee paid exactly the same price that we did, in most cases borrowing money to do so.

MiTek 是屋顶桁架连接件的制造商，伯克希尔在 2001 年收购该公司，目前公司也拓展成迷你集团。不过事实上，以目前的发展速度来看，“迷你”一词很快将变得不恰当。当初以 4.2 亿美元收购 MiTek 时，我们以 9％的利率借给它 2 亿美元，并且买下价值 1.98 亿美元的股票（以每股 1 万美元的价格购入）。另外，55 名员工以 2200 万的美元购入 2200 股。每名员工和我们付出的价格一样，并且大部分的人是用借钱的方式完成。

And are they ever glad they did! Five years later, MiTek’s sales have tripled and the stock is valued at $71, 699 p ers ha re . Des p i t e i t s makin g 14 a c q u i s i t i o n s, a t a cos t o f$ 291 million, MiTek has paid off its debt to Berkshire and holds $35 million of cash. We celebrated the fifth anniversary of our purchase with a party in July. I told the group that it would be embarrassing if MiTek’s stock price soared beyond that of Berkshire “A” shares. Don’t be surprised, however, if that happens (though Charlie and I will try to make our shares a moving target).

这些员工都十分庆幸自己做了这个决定。五年后 MiTek 的销售额成长 3 倍，股价为 71,699 美元。尽管它收购了 14 家公司，斥资 2.91 亿，MiTek 不但还清了伯克希尔的债务，还余有 3500 万现金。我们在7月时欢庆收购 5 周年纪念，我告诉经营团队如果 MiTek 的股价超越了伯克希尔的 A 股，那对伯克希尔来说，还真的很尴尬。各位，如果此事成真，千万别感到惊讶（虽然芒格跟我试着把伯克希尔的股票推向目标）。

Not all of our businesses are destined to increase profits. When an industry’s underlying economics are crumbling, talented management may slow the rate of decline. Eventually, though, eroding fundamentals will overwhelm managerial brilliance. (As a wise friend told me long ago. “If you want to get a reputation as a good businessman, be sure to get into a good business.“) And fundamentals are definitely eroding in the newspaper industry, a trend that has caused the profits of our Buffalo News to decline. The skid will almost certainly continue.

不过并不是所有业务的获利都提升了。当行业的基本面崩坏时，即使有才能的管理层，也仅能试着减缓其衰退速率。最后，逐渐崩坏的基本面会战胜管理层的才能。（就像一个有智慧的朋友曾经告诉我：「要想成为一个好的企业家，就一定要进入一个好行业」）。报业的基本面绝对是每况愈下，如此的情势使得伯克希尔布法罗新闻报的获利下降，而且还会持续下去。

When Charlie and I were young, the newspaper business was as easy a way to make huge returns as existed in America. As one not-too-bright publisher famously said, “I owe my fortune to two great American institutions: monopoly and nepotism.” No paper in a one-paper city, however bad the product or however inept the management, could avoid gushing profits.

我跟芒格还年轻时，在美国经营报业可以很轻易获得可观的获利。就像某位不太聪明的发行人名言：“我的财富，来自于美国社会的两大支柱：垄断和裙带关系”。在某家报社垄断的城市中，无论报纸内容多么差强人意，无论管理多么无能，都能创造暴利。

The industry’s staggering returns could be simply explained. For most of the 20th Century, newspapers were the primary source of information for the American public. Whether the subject was sports, finance, or politics, newspapers reigned supreme. Just as important, their ads were the easiest way to find job opportunities or to learn the price of groceries at your town’s supermarkets.

产业的迟缓可能仅有一个理由可以解释。在 20 世纪大部分的时间中，报纸是美国大众主要的信息来源。不管主题为体育、财经，或政治，报纸都有至高的地位。另外很重要的是，报纸广告提供最简单的招聘信息，以及了解镇上超市商品价格的渠道。

The great majority of families therefore felt the need for a paper every day, but understandably most didn’t wish to pay for two. Advertisers preferred the paper with the most circulation, and readers tended to want the paper with the most ads and news pages. This circularity led to a law of the newspaper jungle: Survival of the Fattest.

绝大部分的家庭感知到报纸对日常生活的重要。但是可理解的，大多数的人并不想为第二份报纸买单。广告客户喜欢找发行量最多的报社，而读者往往希望购买拥有最多广告和新闻版面的报纸。如此的循环，导致报业的丛林生存法则：“强者恒强”。

Thus, when two or more papers existed in a major city (which was almost universally the case a century ago), the one that pulled ahead usually emerged as the stand-alone winner. After competition disappeared, the paper’s pricing power in both advertising and circulation was unleashed. Typically, rates for both advertisers and readers would be raised annually — and the profits rolled in. For owners this was economic heaven. (Interestingly, though papers regularly — and often in a disapproving way — reported on the profitability of, say, the auto or steel industries, they never enlightened readers about their own Midas-like situation. Hmmm..)

如此一来，当一个大城市存在两家或更多报纸时（一个世纪以前，这个现象相当普遍），通常领先的报社将会成为最后的赢家。而当竞争结束，报社在广告及报纸的定价能力方面将得到释放。一般而言，广告客户及读者的费率每年都会上调，利润滚滚而来。对股东来说，这曾是获利的天堂。（有趣的是，虽然报纸定期或通常让人不以为然的方式报道汽车或钢铁业的盈利能力，但却从未让读者了解自己的点石成金的状况。嗯…）

As long ago as my 1991 letter to shareholders, I nonetheless asserted that this insulated world was changing, writing that “the media businesses…will prove considerably less marvelous than I, the industry, or lenders thought would be the case only a few years ago.” Some publishers took umbrage at both this remark and other warnings from me that followed. Newspaper properties, moreover, continued to sell as if they were indestructible slot machines. In fact, many intelligent newspaper executives who regularly chronicled and analyzed important worldwide events were either blind or indifferent to what was going on under their noses.

但早在 1991 年的股东信，我就断言这种不受经济景气影响的状况，正在改变。我写道：“媒体事业，最后将发现其营运结果，将比我、整个产业、或是债权人几年前所预期的好景，逊色不少。”有些报社对我这番评论、或后来陆续出现的警告感到不悦。而且，愿意接手报业资产的人仍络绎不绝，以为其仍是坚不可摧的老虎机一样。事实上，许多在报业定期记录、及分析重要国际事件的聪明经理人，对发生在自己身上的事，要么视而不见，要么漠不关心。

Now, however, almost all newspaper owners realize that they are constantly losing ground in the battle for eyeballs. Simply put, if cable and satellite broadcasting, as well as the internet, had come along first, newspapers as we know them probably would never have existed.

然而，现今所有的报社老板都了解到他们渐渐地在这场“眼球争霸战”中败阵下来。简单来说，如果有线电视和卫星广播以及互联网比报纸早诞生，那么也许根本就不会有报纸了。

In Berkshire’s world, Stan Lipsey does a terrific job running the Buffalo News, and I am enormously proud of its editor, Margaret Sullivan. The News’ penetration of its market is the highest among that of this country’s large newspapers. We also do better financially than most metropolitan newspapers, even though Buffalo’s population and business trends are not good. Nevertheless, this operation faces unrelenting pressures that will cause profit margins to slide.

Stan Lipsey 把布法罗新闻报经营得有声有色，并且我也对编辑 Margaret Sullivan 感到无比骄傲。布法罗新闻报在报纸市场的渗透率，比起全国其它报纸都来得高。在财务营运方面，即使布法罗的人口及商业趋势并不是很好，但我们的财务状况也仍旧比其它大都会的报纸来得优异。不过，营运还是面临无情的压力，这将导致利润率持续下滑。

True, we have the leading online news operation in Buffalo, and it will continue to attract more viewers and ads. However, the economic potential of a newspaper internet site — given the many alternative sources of information and entertainment that are free and only a click away — is at best a small fraction of that existing in the past for a print newspaper facing no competition.

当然，我们在布法罗拥有领先的网络新闻业务，并且这将会持续吸引更多浏览者及广告客户。但是，报纸网站的经济潜力，充其量仅是过去报纸垄断荣景的一小部分。考虑到许多网站提供了许多免费的信息及娱乐选择，并且只要用鼠标一点，就把浏览者送走了。

For a local resident, ownership of a city’s paper, like ownership of a sports team, still produces instant prominence. With it typically comes power and influence. These are ruboffs that appeal to many people with money. Beyond that, civic-minded, wealthy individuals may feel that local ownership will serve their community well. That’s why Peter Kiewit bought the Omaha paper more than 40 years ago.

但对当地居民来说，发行当地专属的报纸，就像是当地拥有运动球队一样，可以马上吸引目光。随之而来的通常是权力及影响力，这些都是吸引有钱人的好处。更甚之，有公民意识的富人，可能会觉得地方报纸将为他们的社区服务。这就是为什么 Peter Kiewit 经营奥马哈报纸超过 40 年的原因。

We are likely therefore to see non-economic individual buyers of newspapers emerge, just as we have seen such buyers acquire major sports franchises. Aspiring press lords should be careful, however: There’s no rule that says a newspaper’s revenues can’t fall below its expenses and that losses can’t mushroom. Fixed costs are high in the newspaper business, and that’s bad news when unit volume heads south. As the importance of newspapers diminishes, moreover, the “psychic” value of possessing one will wane, whereas owning a sports franchise will likely retain its cachet.

我们常常看到非经济个人报社买主出现，就好像许多收购体育特许权的买主一样。但是向往进入新闻界的大亨们可要当心，因为没有原则显示报社的收益不能低于支出，也没规则显示亏损不会愈演愈烈。经营报社的固定成本很高，并且当发行量减少时，那还真是坏消息呢。在报纸重要性降低的同时，心理上对拥有报社的精神价值也会减损，而拥有体育特许权的价值却还保有一样的地位。

Unless we face an irreversible cash drain, we will stick with the News, just as we’ve said that we would. (Read economic principle 11, on page 76.) Charlie and I love newspapers — we each read five a day — and believe that a free and energetic press is a key ingredient for maintaining a great democracy. We hope that some combination of print and online will ward off economic doomsday for newspapers, and we will work hard in Buffalo to develop a sustainable business model. I think we will be successful. But the days of lush profits from our newspaper are over.

就像先前说的，除非面临不能改善之现金流出困难，否则我们还是会坚持经营新闻媒体事业。芒格和我热爱报纸，我们一天都要读 5 份，再加上我们相信：自由且充满活力的新闻媒体，是维持民主的关键要素。我们希望印刷发行及网络的结合，可以规避报纸的末日。伯克希尔也会与布法罗一起努力，发展成一套可持续经营的商业模型。相信最后的成功将会是我们的，只是报业获利丰厚的岁月已经逝去。

A much improved situation is emerging at NetJets, which sells and manages fractionally-owned aircraft. This company has never had a problem growing: Revenues from flight operations have increased 596% since our purchase in 1998. But profits had been erratic.

出售及管理共享飞机的利捷航空（NetJets）的情况大为改善。该公司的成长从来不是问题，其营收自 1998 年自伯克希尔收购以来，已经成长 596％，但在获利方面却十分不稳定。

Our move to Europe, which began in 1996, was particularly expensive. After five years of operation there, we had acquired only 80 customers. And by mid-year 2006 our cumulative pre-tax loss had risen to $212 million. But European demand has now exploded, with a net of 589 customers having been added in 2005-2006. Under Mark Booth’s brilliant leadership, NetJets is now operating profitably in Europe, and we expect the positive trend to continue.

1996 年我们进军欧洲导致成本暴增。在欧洲运营 5 年只获得 80 个客户，至 2006 年年中，累积的税前损失已达到 2.12 亿美元。不过目前欧洲的需求暴增，2005-2006 年新增了 589 名客户。在 Mark Booth 精明的领导之下，NetJets 在欧洲终于转亏为盈，我们期待如此的经营态势可以延续。

Our U.S. operation also had a good year in 2006, which led to worldwide pre-tax earnings of $143 mi ll i o na tN e t J e t s l a s t ye a r . W e ma d e t hi s p ro f i t e v e n t h o ug h w es u ff ere d a l osso f$ 19 million in the first quarter.

2006 年美国业务也经营得不错，使得全球的税前收益达到 1.43 亿。即使在 2006 年的第一季亏损 0.19 亿，但以整年度来看，还是实现盈利。

Credit Rich Santulli, along with Mark, for this turnaround. Rich, like many of our managers, has no financial need to work. But you’d never know it. He’s absolutely tireless — monitoring operations, making sales, and traveling the globe to constantly widen the already-enormous lead that NetJets enjoys over its competitors. Today, the value of the fleet we manage is far greater than that managed by our three largest competitors combined.

如此由亏转盈的营运成绩，当然和 Mark 一起努力的 Rich Santulli 也有功劳。就像是其它伯克希尔的经理人，Rich 并不为了钱而工作，但你永远不会知道这一点。他绝对是个精力旺盛的人，负责监督营运、促进成交，并穿梭世界各地，以持续拓展本来就相当庞大的市场，让NetJets公司可以超越对手。今日，我们管理的机队价值，已经远远超越前三大 3 家竞争对手的总和。

There’s a reason NetJets is the runaway leader: It offers the ultimate in safety and service. At Berkshire, and at a number of our subsidiaries, NetJets aircraft are an indispensable business tool. I also have a contract for personal use with NetJets and so do members of my family and most Berkshire directors. (None of us, I should add, gets a discount.) Once you’ve flown NetJets, returning to commercial flights is like going back to holding hands.

NetJets 之所以能鹤立鸡群，是因为它提供了极致的安全及服务。在伯克希尔，及许多我们的子公司里，NetJets 的飞机是不可或缺的商业工具。而我、我的家人，以及伯克希尔董事会成员，也有和 NetJets 签下私人用途的合约（我必须要说，我们并未享有折扣）。一旦你接受过 NetJets 的服务，再回去坐一般的商用客机，好像又回到过去一样，凡事只有自求多福。

Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务

Berkshire has an 86.6% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1) Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.; (2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; (3) Pacific Power and Rocky Mountain Power, serving about 1.7 million electric customers in six western states; and (4) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry about 8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S.

在伯克希尔拥有 86.6％股权的中美能源控股公司旗下，包含许多不同种类的公用事业的营运。其中最大的分别为：（1）约克郡电力与北方电力公司（Yorkshire Electricity & Northern Electric），拥有370万电力用户，为英国第三大的电力分销商；（2）中美能源（MidAmerican Energy），在爱荷华州拥有 70.6 万电力用户；（3）太平洋电力与洛基山电力公司（Pacific Power & Rocky Mountain Power），在美西 6 州拥有 170 万电力用户；（4）科恩河与北方天然管道公司（Kern River & Northern Natural pipelines），供应全美 8％的天然气消耗量。

Our partners in ownership of MidAmerican are Walter Scott, and its two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we will make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Six years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored my original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.

我们在中美能源控股的经营伙伴是 Walter Scott 与其它两位非常杰出的经理人 Dave Sokol 与 Greg Abel。在合伙的双方，握有多少股权并不重要。只有在经过理智地思考并取得意见的一致后，我们才会做出重要的决定。在与他们三位共事六年后我超越原先的认知：他们真是伯克希尔万中选一的好合伙人。

Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S., HomeServices of America. This company operates through 20 locally-branded firms with 20,300 agents. Despite HomeServices’ purchase of two operations last year, the company’s overall volume fell 9% to $58 billion, and profits fell 50%.

有点不协调的是，中美能源旗下拥有美国第二大的不动产经纪商美国家庭服务公司（HomeServices），这家公司旗下经营 20 个地区性品牌、拥有 20,300 位经纪人。但尽管其去年进行两个收购案，该公司的总成交金额却下降了 9％，达到 580 亿美元，利润也缩水 50％。

The slowdown in residential real estate activity stems in part from the weakened lending practices of recent years. The “optional” contracts and “teaser” rates that have been popular have allowed borrowers to make payments in the early years of their mortgages that fall far short of covering normal interest costs. Naturally, there are few defaults when virtually nothing is required of a borrower. As a cynic has said, “A rolling loan gathers no loss.” But payments not made add to principal, and borrowers who can’t afford normal monthly payments early on are hit later with above-normal monthly obligations. This is the Scarlett O’Hara scenario: “I’ll think about that tomorrow.” For many home owners, “tomorrow” has now arrived. Consequently there is a huge overhang of offerings in several of HomeServices’ markets.

近年来放款质量的低落，是造成住宅不动产交易减缓的因素之一。而「可任意选择」的合约、以及「诱惑」的利率，使得借款人可以在贷款的头几年，以远低于正常利率的利息还贷。在对借款人几乎没有要求的状况下，自然不会有什么违约，如一些尖酸刻薄的说法：「不断循环的贷款，因为收不到钱，所以没有损失可言。」但是未支付的利息，却会滚入本金，那些先前不能不正常付息的房贷户，在后来超过正常月还款额的利息负担中不支倒地。如同 Scarlett O’Hlara 的「明天的事明天再担心」现象，对许多房主来说，所谓的「明天」已经到来了。所以，此一后续效应，势必在 HomeServices 公司的几个市场中浮现。

Nevertheless, we will be seeking to purchase additional brokerage operations. A decade from now, HomeServices will almost certainly be much larger.

话虽如此，但我们还是会继续收购其它的不动产经纪业务，因为相信十年后，HomeServices 公司必然将远超过目前的规模。

Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:

以下是中美能源在运营上的关键数据：

	2006 Earnings (in $ millions)	2005 Earnings (in $ millions)
U.K. utilities	$ 338	￥ 308
Iowa utility	348	288
Western utilities (acquired March 21, 2006)	356	N/A
Pipelines	376	309
HomeServices	74	148
Other (Net)	226	115
Earnings before corporate interest and tax	1,718	1,168
Interest, other than to Berkshire	(261)	(200)
Interest on Berkshire junior debt	(134)	(157)
Income tax	(407)	(248)
Net Earnings	$ 916	$ 563
Earnings Applicable to Berkshire *	$ 885	$ 523
Debt Owed to Others	16,946	10,296
Debt Owed to Berkshire	1,055	1,289

* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of $87 in 2006 an d$ 102 in 2005.

* 包括了伯克希尔所得的利息（扣除所有相关所得税后的净额）

Finance and Financial Products 金融及金融产品

You will be happy to hear — and I’m even happier — that this will be my last discussion of the losses at Gen Re’s derivative operation. When we started to wind this business down early in 2002, we had 23,218 contracts outstanding. Now we have 197. Our cumulative pre-tax loss from this operation totals $409 mi ll i o n, b u t o n l y$ 5 million occurred in 2006. Charlie says that if we had properly classified the $409 million on our 2001 balance sheet, it would have been labeled “Good Until Reached For. ”In any event, a Shakespearean thought — slightly modified — seems appropriate for the tombstone of this derivative business: “All’s well that ends.”

各位一定很高兴听到这个消息（当然我本人更高兴）：这将是我最后一次，在股东信中提及通用再保险公司在衍生性金融商品业务的亏损了。伯克希尔从 2002 年初开始关闭这项业务时，我们有 23,218 个在外流通合约，现在已处置到只剩 197 个，而这部分业务的税前亏损累计达 4.09 亿美元（但 2006 年只有 500 万亏损）。查理表示，如果我们在 2001 年的资产负债表中要对这 4.09 亿美元下个批注，那会是「直到最后，才知有没有」。总而言之，这句改编过的莎士比亚的台词，会是此衍生性金融商品业务的最佳墓志铭：“结束了就万事大吉”。

We’ve also wound up our investment in Value Capital. So earnings or losses from these two lines of business are making their final appearance in the table that annually appears in this section.

同时，我们也结束了对价值资本公司的投资。因此在此部分的报表中，这两个业务的损益，都不会再出现在未来的报表中。

Clayton Homes remains an anomaly in the manufactured-housing industry, which last year recorded its lowest unit sales since 1962. Indeed, the industry’s volume last year was only about one-third that of 1999.Outside of Clayton, I doubt if the industry, overall, made any money in 2006.

克莱顿预制房（Clayton Homes）仍然是制造业中异类，在去年创下自 1962 年来最低的销售量。事实上该业务去年的销售额只有 1999 年的 1/3 左右，除了Clayton，我对这个产业在 2006 年是否有赚到任何钱感到怀疑。

Yet Clayton earned $513 mi ll i o n p re - t a x an d p ai d B er k s hi re ana dd i t i o na l$ 86 million as a fee for our obtaining the funds to finance Clayton’s $10 billion portfolio of installment receivables. Berkshire’s financial strength has clearly been of huge help to Clayton. But the driving force behind the company’s success is Kevin Clayton. Kevin knows the business forward and backward, is a rational decision-maker and a joy to work with. Because of acquisitions, Clayton now employs 14,787 people, compared to 6,661 at the time of our purchase.

Clayton 税前收益为 5.13 亿，并向伯克希尔支付了 8600 万利息，作为我们为 Clayton 持有的 100 亿美元分期付款的贷款组合的借款费用。伯克希尔健全的财务体质，显然对Clayton 帮助不少，但企业成功幕后的真正推手要归功于凯文克莱顿 Kevin Clayton。Kevin 对此事业了解透彻，是位理性的决策者，与之合作非常愉快。通过收购，Clayton 现今的员工规模已成长至 14,787人，而我们收购时只有 6,661 人。

We have two leasing operations: CORT (furniture), run by Paul Arnold, and XTRA (truck trailers), run by Bill Franz. CORT’s earnings improved significantly last year, and XTRA’s remained at the high level attained in 2005.We continue to look for tuck-in acquisitions to be run by Paul or Bill, and also are open to ideas for new leasing opportunities.

而在租赁方面包含两大业务，由 Paul Arnold 经营的 CORT 家具租赁公司，以及由 Bill Franz 经营的 XTRA 货柜卡车租赁公司。CORT 的营收在去年有显著的成长，而 XTRA 则维持 2005 年的高水平。我们会继续让 Paul 跟 Bill 寻找小型收购机会，并对新租赁业务持开放态度。

Here’s a breakdown of earnings in this sector:

以下为本业务群收益状况：

(in $ millions)	Pre-Tax Earnings 2006	Pre-Tax Earnings 2005	Interest-bearing Liabilities 2006	Interest-bearing Liabilities 2005
Trading - Ordinary Income	$ 274	$ 200	$ 600	$ 1,061
Gen Re Securities (loss)	(5)	(104)	1,204*	2,617*
Life and annuity operation	29	11	2,459	2,461
Value Capital (loss)	6	(33)	N/A	N/A
Leasing operations	182	173	261	370
Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton)	513	416	10,498	9,299
Other	158	159	N/A	N/A
Income before capital gains	1,157	822
Trading - Capital Gains (losses)	938	(234)
Total	$ 2,095	$ 588

* Includes all liabilities

* 通用再保险证券包括所有负债

Investments 投资业务

We show below our common stock investments. With two exceptions, those that had a market value of more than $700 mi ll i o na tt h ee n d o f 2006 a re i t e mi ze d . W e d o n^{'} t i t e mi ze t h e tw osec u r i t i esre f erre d t o, w hi c hha v e ama r k e t v a l u eo f$ 1.9 billion, because we continue to buy them. I could, of course, tell you their names. But then I would have to kill you.

下表为我们普通股方面的投资。我们将 2006 年底市值超过7亿美元股票列出，但有两家例外，因为这两家市值合计超过 19 亿美元的公司，我们仍在持续买进。当然，我也可以告诉各位是哪两家，但随后我可能就有必要杀人灭口了。

12/31/06

Shares	Company	Percentage of Company Owned	Cost* (in $ millions)	Market (in $ millions)
151,610,700	American Express Company	12.6	$ 1,287	$ 9,198
36,417,400	Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc.	4.7	1,761	1,792
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company	8.6	1,299	9.650
17,938,100	Conoco Phillips	1.1	1,066	1,291
21,334,900	Johnson & Johnson	0.7	1,250	1,409
6,708,760	M&T Bank Corporation	6.1	103	820
48,000,000	Moody’s Corporation	17.2	499	3,315
2,338,961,000	PetroChina “H” shares (or equivalents)	1.3	488	3,313
3,486,006	POSCO	4.0	572	1,158
100,000,000	The Procter & Gamble Company	3.2	940	6,427
229,707,000	Tesco	2.9	1,340	1,820
31,033,800	US Bancorp	1.8	969	1,123
17,072,192	USG Corp	19.0	536	936
19,944,300	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.	0.5	942	921
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company	18.0	11	1,288
218,169,300	Wells Fargo & Company	6.5	3,697	7,758
1,724,200	White Mountains Insurance	16.0	369	999
	Others	5,866	8,315
Total Common Stocks	$ 22,995	$ 61,533

* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.

* 成本项是我们实际的购买价格，也是计税的依据；这与GAAP会计原则所认定的「成本」有一些不同，因为少数情况下账面价值需要增加或减记。

We are delighted by the 2006 business performance of virtually all of our investees. Last year, we told you that our expectation was that these companies, in aggregate, would increase their earnings by 6% to 8% annually, a rate that would double their earnings every ten years or so. In 2006 American Express,

我们对几乎所有的投资标的，于 2006 年营运的绩效表现感到高兴。如去年所提的，我们预期其整体而言，每年可在收益上创造 6~8％的成长，而此一比率，大约每十年左右，就能让企业的收益翻一倍。

Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Wells Fargo, our largest holdings, increased per-share earnings by 18%, 9%, 8% and 11%. These are stellar results, and we thank their CEOs.

2006年伯克希尔的最大持股公司美国运通、可口可乐、宝洁、及富国银行，每股收益分别成长 18％、9％、8％、及 11％，感谢这些企业 CEO 所创造的亮眼成绩。

We’ve come close to eliminating our direct foreign-exchange position, from which we realized about $186 mi ll i o nin p re - t a x p ro f i t s in 2006 (e a r nin g s t ha tw ere in c l u d e d in t h e F inan ce an d F inan c ia lP ro d u c t s t ab l es h o w n e a r l i er) . T ha t b ro ug h t o u r t o t a l g ain s in ce in ce pt i o n o f t hi s p os i t i o nin 2002 t o$ 2.2 billion. Here’s a breakdown by currency:

伯克希尔已经接近将直接持有的外汇仓位全数清算，在 2006 年实现了 1.86 亿的税前收益（包含在前面的金融及金融产品的收益报表中）。这使我们自 2002 年开始建立外汇仓位以来，获利的总数升高到 22 亿美元。

Total Gain (Loss) in Millions

Currency	Total Gain (Loss)	Currency	Total Gain (Loss)
Australian dollar	$ 247.1	Mexican peso	$ 106.1
British pound	287.2	New Zealand dollar	102.6
Canadian dollar	398.3	Singapore dollar	(2.6)
Chinese yuan	(12.7)	South Korean won	261.3
Euro	839.2	Swiss franc	9.6
Hong Kong dollar	(2.5)	Taiwan dollar	(45.3)
Japanese yen	1.9	Miscellaneous options	22.9

We’ve made large indirect currency profits as well, though I’ve never tallied the precise amount. For example, in 2002-2003 we spent about $82 mi ll i o nb u y in g - - o f a llt hin g s - - E n ro nb o n d s, so m eo f w hi c h w ere d e n o mina t e d in E u ros . A l re a d y w e^{'} v erece i v e dd i s t r ib u t i o n so f$ 179 million from these bonds, and our remaining stake is worth $173 mi ll i o n . T ha t m e an so u ro v er a ll g aini s$ 270 million, part of which came from the appreciation of the Euro that took place after our bond purchase.

在间接持有外汇的获利方面，伯克希尔也大有斩获，但我从来无法精确地计算实际数字。比如，在 2002-2003 年间，我们以 8200 万美元（已经尽其所能了）买进安然公司（Enron）的垃圾债券，其中部分是以欧元计价的。我们已从这些债券里获得 1.79 亿的利息收入，而持有的债权部分，现值为 1.73 亿美元。这意味了伯克希尔总共的获利为 2.7 亿美元，其中部分是由于购买这些债券之后，拜欧元升值所赐。

When we first began making foreign exchange purchases, interest-rate differentials between the U.S. and most foreign countries favored a direct currency position. But that spread turned negative in 2005. We therefore looked for other ways to gain foreign-currency exposure, such as the ownership of foreign equities or of U.S. stocks with major earnings abroad. The currency factor, we should emphasize, is not dominant in our selection of equities, but is merely one of many considerations.

当我们开始建立外汇仓位时，美国和其它国家货币之间的利率差异，有利于直接持有外汇。但 2005 年时，利差由正转为负值，于是我们寻求其它途径持有外汇部位，比如买进海外企业股权、或有大量海外收益的美国企业。必须强调的是，汇率因素对于选股，并没有太大的意义，而仅是众多考虑之一而已。

As our U.S. trade problems worsen, the probability that the dollar will weaken over time continues to be high. I fervently believe in real trade — the more the better for both us and the world. We had about $1.44 t r i ll i o n o f t hi s h o n es t - t o - G o d t r a d e in 2006. B u tt h e U . S . a l so ha d$ .76 trillion of pseudo-trade last year — imports for which we exchanged no goods or services. (Ponder, for a moment, how commentators would describe the situation if our imports were $.76 trillion — a full 6% of GDP — and we had no exports.) Making these purchases that weren’t reciprocated by sales, the U.S. necessarily transferred ownership of its assets or IOUs to the rest of the world. Like a very wealthy but self-indulgent family, we peeled off a bit of what we owned in order to consume more than we produced.

由于美国贸易逆差的问题恶化，美元持续走贬的可能性居高不下。我热切地相信公平的贸易往来，对美国及任何国家来说都是好事，而 2006 年，大约有 1.44 万亿的贸易规模属于此类。但在去年，美国同时也存在了 7600 亿的伪贸易，也就是只有进口，却没有相等的货品或服务出口的状况。大家不妨沉思一下，若我们全部只有 7600 亿的进口（目前约占 GDP 的 6％），然而却没有任何出口的情势，评论家会如何描述。在大举向外采购，却缺乏相对应的销售收入，美国势必要变卖资产，或向世界其它国家融资。就像是一个相当富有、但奢靡无度的大家族一样，在生产能力不足以支应消费时，我们被迫要舍弃一些目前拥有的东西。

The U.S. can do a lot of this because we are an extraordinarily rich country that has behaved responsibly in the past. The world is therefore willing to accept our bonds, real estate, stocks and businesses. And we have a vast store of these to hand over.

这对美国来说，并没有多大的问题。因为我们仍是非常富裕的国家，而过去的信用也不错。因此，全世界还很乐意接受美国的债券、房地产、股票、以及企业。由于资产雄厚，我们仍有继续挥霍的本钱。

These transfers will have consequences, however. Already the prediction I made last year about one fall-out from our spending binge has come true: The “investment income” account of our country — positive in every previous year since 1915 — turned negative in 2006. Foreigners now earn more on their U.S. investments than we do on our investments abroad. In effect, we’ve used up our bank account and turned to our credit card. And, like everyone who gets in hock, the U.S. will now experience “reverse compounding” as we pay ever-increasing amounts of interest on interest.

然而，这样的变卖家产，后果是不堪设想的。我去年曾预测，大肆挥霍的后果，其中之一已经成真：美国的”投资收益”账户，在 2006 年转为负数（自 1915 年以来皆为正值）。目前外国人从美国投资方面所产生的利得，已经超过美国人在海外投资所赚取的金额。目前的状况，如同美国人已经用尽了银行账户内的钱，并且将目光转向信用卡。然而，就像借高利贷一样，由于要支付不断增加的利息，美国目前正面临一个“反向复利”的处境。

I want to emphasize that even though our course is unwise, Americans will live better ten or twenty years from now than they do today. Per-capita wealth will increase. But our citizens will also be forced every year to ship a significant portion of their current production abroad merely to service the cost of our huge debtor position. It won’t be pleasant to work part of each day to pay for the over-consumption of your ancestors. I believe that at some point in the future U.S. workers and voters will find this annual “tribute” so onerous that there will be a severe political backlash. How that will play out in markets is impossible to predict — but to expect a “soft landing” seems like wishful thinking.

我想强调的是，即使知道此一做法极不明智，美国人仍可在未来十到二十年，过得比今天还要好，人均财富也将升高。只是在此同时，美国公民为了支应庞大负债的成本，在每年的生产成果中，有绝大一部分，是要转交给外国人的。每天辛勤的工作，有很多时间只是在为前一代的过度消费，而付出代价，实在是令人不爽。因此未来会有一天，美国的劳工及选民，终会对这种“贡献”感到厌烦，引发严重的政治反弹。市场将如何面对此一效应，我们根本无法评估，但若对于所谓“软着陆”抱着期望，恐怕只是自我安慰的想法而已。

I should mention that all of the direct currency profits we have realized have come from forward contracts, which are derivatives, and that we have entered into other types of derivatives contracts as well. That may seem odd, since you know of our expensive experience in unwinding the derivatives book at Gen Re and also have heard me talk of the systemic problems that could result from the enormous growth in the use of derivatives. Why, you may wonder, are we fooling around with such potentially toxic material?

我应该告诉过大家，伯克希尔所有由直接外汇部位上实现的收益，都是来自于远期合约。这是一种衍生性金融商品，我们还签订了其它种类的衍生性合约，这可能让大家感到奇怪。我们都清楚通用再保险公司的衍生合约账户，在进行壮士断腕后，所得到的惨痛经验；同时也听我谈论过，衍生性商品运用的惊人成长，将导致金融市场上的系统性问题。你们也许会纳闷，为什么伯克希尔现在还要跟这个有害物质一起厮混呢？

The answer is that derivatives, just like stocks and bonds, are sometimes wildly mispriced. For many years, accordingly, we have selectively written derivative contracts — few in number but sometimes for large dollar amounts. We currently have 62 contracts outstanding. I manage them personally, and they are free of counterparty credit risk. So far, these derivative contracts have worked out well for us, producing pre-tax profits in the hundreds of millions of dollars (above and beyond the gains I’ve itemized from forward foreign-exchange contracts). Though we will experience losses from time to time, we are likely to continue to earn — overall — significant profits from mispriced derivatives.

答案是，衍生性金融商品也像股票及债券一样，有时也会被严重错误的定价。因此，许多年来，伯克希尔在衍生性合约的签订，一向是具有选择性的，在数量上不多，但有时金额却很庞大。我现在亲自管理 62 个流通在外的衍生性合约，确保交易对手没有信用风险。截至目前，这些衍生性合约的效益还不错，为伯克希尔赚取了数亿美元的税前收益（远远超过前面有关远期外汇报表上的获利数字）。虽然时时都有亏损的可能，但是整体来说，还是很有可能继续从价格与价值的偏差中，获得可观的利益。

I have told you that Berkshire has three outstanding candidates to replace me as CEO and that the Board knows exactly who should take over if I should die tonight. Each of the three is much younger than I. The directors believe it’s important that my successor have the prospect of a long tenure.

我过去已经表示，伯克希尔已有 3 位杰出的候选人，将接替我担任 CEO 的职务。而且董事会也明确地知道，要是我今晚就过世，该会由谁来接任。3 位中无论是谁，都比我年轻很多。伯克希尔的董事们也都相信，继任者的任期要长，是很重要的一点。

Frankly, we are not as well-prepared on the investment side of our business. There’s a history here: At one time, Charlie was my potential replacement for investing, and more recently Lou Simpson has filled that slot. Lou is a top-notch investor with an outstanding long-term record of managing GEICO’s equity portfolio. But he is only six years younger than I. If I were to die soon, he would fill in magnificently for a short period. For the long-term, though, we need a different answer.

坦白来说，伯克希尔在投资方面人选的接班上没有做好充分的准备。不过，这有其历史因素：过去有一段时间，查理是潜在继任者，但最近路易·辛普森填补了这个空缺。路易是位长期投资的高手，在管理 GEICO 公司的股票投资组合期间，创造了相当出色的长期绩效。但他仅比我小 6 岁，如果我的大限到了，那么他可以短时间内完美的填补空缺，可能也并不太长。所以长期而言，伯克希尔需要另外的解决之道。

At our October board meeting, we discussed that subject fully. And we emerged with a plan, which I will carry out with the help of Charlie and Lou.

在我们十月的董事会上，我们已针对这一问题彻底讨论。我们制定了一个接班人计划，查理和路易将协助我共同执行。

Under this plan, I intend to hire a younger man or woman with the potential to manage a very large portfolio, who we hope will succeed me as Berkshire’s chief investment officer when the need for someone to do that arises. As part of the selection process, we may in fact take on several candidates.

依照计划，我打算雇用一位更年轻、且有潜力管理大型投资组合的人（男女均可），视状况的需要，继任成为伯克希尔首席投资官。但在评选的过程中，实际上会挑出几位候选人。

Picking the right person(s) will not be an easy task. It’s not hard, of course, to find smart people. among them individuals who have impressive investment records. But there is far more to successful long-term investing than brains and performance that has recently been good.

挑出合适的人选，不是件容易的事。当然，从投资绩效斐然的人才中，再找出聪明的人选并不困难。但是长期投资要想成功，即使有精明的头脑、以及短期的优异绩效，还是有很遥远的距离。

Over time, markets will do extraordinary, even bizarre, things. A single, big mistake could wipe out a long string of successes. We therefore need someone genetically programmed to recognize and avoid serious risks, including those never before encountered. Certain perils that lurk in investment strategies cannot be spotted by use of the models commonly employed today by financial institutions.

随着时间的推移，市场会出现非比寻常、甚至诡异至极的事情。只要一个大错，就可能毁掉过去一长串的成功投资纪录。所以，伯克希尔需要一个生来就能辨认并规避重大风险的人，包括那些以前从未出现过的风险。而现行许多金融机构所普遍采用的模型，无法发现投资策略中潜藏的重大风险。

Temperament is also important. Independent thinking, emotional stability, and a keen understanding of both human and institutional behavior is vital to long-term investment success. I’ve seen a lot of very smart people who have lacked these virtues.

秉性也十分重要。独立思考、情绪稳定、以及对人性及机构行为的敏锐理解，这些对于长期投资的成功都至关重要。我看过很多聪明绝顶的人，但都缺乏这些特质。

Finally, we have a special problem to consider: our ability to keep the person we hire. Being able to list Berkshire on a resume would materially enhance the marketability of an investment manager. We will need, therefore, to be sure we can retain our choice, even though he or she could leave and make much more money elsewhere.

最后，我们还有一个特别的问题需要考虑：我们能让受聘者留任多久。在伯克希尔的资历加到个人履历上，可以让此投资经理人，在市场上更加抢手。因此，我们要能确保最后所选择的人，即使在别的地方收入更高，也能坚持留在伯克希尔。

There are surely people who fit what we need, but they may be hard to identify. In 1979, Jack Byrne and I felt we had found such a person in Lou Simpson. We then made an arrangement with him whereby he would be paid well for sustained overperformance. Under this deal, he has earned large amounts. Lou, however, could have left us long ago to manage far greater sums on more advantageous terms. If money alone had been the object, that’s exactly what he would have done. But Lou never considered such a move. We need to find a younger person or two made of the same stuff.

我们所需要的人才，必定是存在的，只是可能比较难以辨认而已。1979 年，Jack Byrne 和我，认定那个人就是辛普森。于是我们和他达成协议，若能维持过人的绩效，收入就必然可观，辛普森因此在财富上，得到丰硕的成果。然而，辛普森大可以在几年前，因为更优厚的合约条件而离职，去管理更大笔的资金。如果钱是他唯一的选择，他早就离开伯克希尔了，但辛普森从未有此念头。我们就是需要找到一位或两位更年轻的人，前提就是要具备辛普森的特质。

The good news: At 76, I feel terrific and, according to all measurable indicators, am in excellent health. It’s amazing what Cherry Coke and hamburgers will do for a fellow.

好消息是：76 岁的我，感觉自己状况极佳。而且根据所有衡量指标，我的健康程度都在优良的水平。对于一个常喝樱桃可乐、及吃汉堡的家伙来说，实在是再神奇不过的事。

Some Changes on Berkshire’s Board 伯克希尔董事会的一些变动

The composition of our board will change in two ways this spring. One change will involve the Chace family, which has been connected to Berkshire and its predecessor companies for more than a century. In 1929, the first Malcolm G. Chace played an important role in merging four New England textile operations into Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates. That company merged with Hathaway Manufacturing in 1955to form Berkshire Hathaway, and Malcolm G. Chace, Jr. became its chairman.

自今年春季开始，伯克希尔董事会的组成，将在两个方面产生变动，首先是与 Chace 家族有关。Chace 家族和伯克希尔及其前身，有超过一个世纪的渊源。1929 年时，在将四家新英格兰地区的纺织厂，合并成伯克希尔精纺联合公司的行动中，第一代的 Malcolm G．Chace 扮演了重要角色。该公司在 1955 年时，与哈撒韦制造公司合并成伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，而 Malcolm G. Chace, Jr. 随即成为董事长。

Early in 1965, Malcolm arranged for Buffett Partnership Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire shares and welcomed us as the new controlling shareholder of the company. Malcolm continued as non-executive chairman until 1969. He was both a wonderful gentleman and helpful partner.

1965 年初，在小 Malcolm 的安排下，巴菲特有限合伙公司买进了伯克希尔的一笔关键股权，并对我们取得经营权表示欢迎。小 Malcolm 并继续担任伯克希尔的名誉董事长，于 1969 年才卸任。他是一位德高望重、也乐于助人的好伙伴。

That description also fits his son, Malcolm “Kim” Chace, who succeeded his father on Berkshire’s board in 1992. But last year Kim, now actively and successfully running a community bank that he founded in 1996, suggested that we find a younger person to replace him on our board. We have done so, and Kim will step down as a director at the annual meeting. I owe much to the Chaces and wish to thank Kim for his many years of service to Berkshire.

同样的形容词，也适用于他的儿子 Malcolm Kim Chace 身上，他在 1992 年接替父亲成为伯克希尔董事。Kim 于 1996 年自行创业，目前正积极、而且成功地经营一家社区银行，因此在去年他建议，可以寻找一位年轻人来代替他。由于我们找到了适合人选，因此 Kim 将在今年的股东会时卸任董事。我希望对 Chace 家族、以及 Kim 多年来对伯克希尔的贡献，表达我最由衷的感谢。

In selecting a new director, we were guided by our long-standing criteria, which are that board members be owner-oriented, business-savvy, interested and truly independent. I say “truly” because many directors who are now deemed independent by various authorities and observers are far from that, relying heavily as they do on directors’ fees to maintain their standard of living. These payments, which come in many forms, often range between $150, 000 an d$ 250,000 annually, compensation that may approach or even exceed all other income of the “independent” director. And — surprise, surprise — director compensation has soared in recent years, pushed up by recommendations from corporate America’s favorite consultant, Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo. (The name may be phony, but the action it conveys is not.)

在挑选新董事上，我们是沿用多年来的标准：董事会成员要以所有者利益为导向，精通商业，兴致昂然、且真正独立。我所谓「真正」的独立，是指完全不依靠董事的酬劳、来维持其生活水平者，这与目前很多权威机构和观察人士，在独立董事的认定上，有相当的出入。他们严重依赖董事薪酬来维持个人生活水平，这类报酬各种各样，通常每年在 15-25 万美元之间，甚至接近或者超过所谓“独立”董事的其它收入。而且（似乎也见怪不怪），董事酬劳在近年来更持续暴涨，这归功于美国企业界最乐于聘请的薪酬顾问公司：高一点、再高一点、成交！

（Ratchet，Ratchet and Bingo 是虚拟表述，形容薪酬谈判过程：高一点，再高一点，成交！）

（棘轮是一种不可逆的机械机构。棘轮效应用于形容高管薪酬，一旦形成之后，便有不可逆性，即易于向上调整，而难于向下调整，某些公司高管薪酬得到了公开，便对其他公司高管形成不可逆的锚定影响。）

Charlie and I believe our four criteria are essential if directors are to do their job — which, by law, is to faithfully represent owners. Yet these criteria are usually ignored. Instead, consultants and CEOs seeking board candidates will often say, “We’re looking for a woman,” or “a Hispanic,” or “someone from abroad,” or what have you. It sometimes sounds as if the mission is to stock Noah’s ark. Over the years I’ve been queried many times about potential directors and have yet to hear anyone ask, “Does he think like an intelligent owner?”

查理和我都相信，如果董事们要尽职尽责，前面所提的四个标准必不可少，是依法要忠实地代表所有股东。但是，这些标准通常都被大家所忽视。取而代之的，那些为董事会寻觅人选的顾问公司和CEO们，通常的说法只是：“我们想要的是一名女性”、或“西班牙裔”、或“来自海外的人”或诸如此类的话。这样的任务，有时就让人感觉像是把诺亚方舟塞满而已。在征询我某人是否适合成为董事的许多问题中，从来没有任何人问过我：“请问他是否站在明智股东的立场来思考？”

The questions I instead get would sound ridiculous to someone seeking candidates for, say, a football team, or an arbitration panel or a military command. In those cases, the selectors would look for people who had the specific talents and attitudes that were required for a specialized job. At Berkshire, we are in the specialized activity of running a business well, and therefore we seek business judgment.

相反，我被询问的一些问题，对于那些正在寻找候选人的人来说，听起来会非常可笑，比如说：足球队、陪审团、军事指挥部等。在这种情况下，选拔者希望寻找到那些，具备专业工作所需的特定才能和态度的人。对伯克希尔来说，我们主要的活动在于好好地经营企业，因此，商业上的判断力，是我们所企求的。

That’s exactly what we’ve found in Susan Decker, CFO of Yahoo!, who will join our board at the annual meeting. We are lucky to have her: She scores very high on our four criteria and additionally, at 44, is young — an attribute, as you may have noticed, that your Chairman has long lacked. We will seek more young directors in the future, but never by slighting the four qualities that we insist upon.

这正是我在雅虎 CFO，Susan Decker 身上所看到的特质。她将在今年的股东大会上正式加入董事会。我们很幸运，她不但在我们的四个标准上，获得非常高的分数，而且，44 岁的她相当年轻，你可能注意到，这正是你们的董事长目前十分欠缺的。未来我们将继续努力引进新的血液，但长久坚持的四个标准特质，我们是绝不会忽视的。

This and That 其它

Berkshire will pay about $4.4 bi ll i o nin f e d er a l in co m e t a x o ni t s 2006 e a r nin g s . I ni t s l a s t f i sc a l ye a r t h e U . S . G o v er nm e n t s p e n t$ 2.6 trillion, or about $7 billion per day. Thus, for more than half of one day, Berkshire picked up the tab for all federal expenditures, ranging from Social Security and Medicare payments to the cost of our armed services. Had there been1 only 600 taxpayers like Berkshire, no one else in America would have needed to pay any federal income or payroll taxes.

伯克希尔将为其 2006 年的收益，缴纳约 44 亿美元的联邦所得税。而美国政府上一年度的支出为 2.6 万亿美元，即每天的花费约 70 亿美元。换句话说，伯克希尔可以支应所有联邦政府半天以上的所有开支，无论是社会福利、医保、及至于国防相关的成本。只要约有 600 个像伯克希尔这样的纳税者，所有的美国人就无需缴交任何所得税或工资税。

Our federal return last year, we should add, ran to 9,386 pages. To handle this filing, state and foreign tax returns, a myriad of SEC requirements, and all of the other matters involved in running Berkshire, we have gone all the way up to 19 employees at World Headquarters.

应该要加以说明的是，我们去年向美国政府申报的所有文件，页数总共为 9386。而相关业务办理、州政府、外国政府的税务申报、美国证券交易委员会 SEC 限期完成的许多报表，以及所有与伯克希尔营运相关的各类事项，都是由全球总部的 19 位同仁所一手包办。

This crew occupies 9,708 square feet of space, and Charlie — at World Headquarters West in Los Angeles — uses another 655 square feet. Our home-office payroll, including benefits and counting both locations, totaled $3,531,978 last year. We’re careful when spending your money.

这些人员的办公场所，占地 9,708 平方英尺，而查理·芒格所在的洛杉矶美西世界总部，则有 655 平方英尺。我们去年花在总部办公的所有支出，包括员工福利、及两个办公场地费用，总数为 3,531,978 美元，显然我们在开销方面异常谨慎。

Corporate bigwigs often complain about government spending, criticizing bureaucrats who they say spend taxpayers’ money differently from how they would if it were their own. But sometimes the financial behavior of executives will also vary based on whose wallet is getting depleted. Here’s an illustrative tale from my days at Salomon. In the 1980s the company had a barber, Jimmy by name, who came in weekly to give free haircuts to the top brass. A manicurist was also on tap. Then, because of a cost-cutting drive, patrons were told to pay their own way. One top executive (not the CEO) who had previously visited Jimmy weekly went immediately to a once-every-three-weeks schedule.

企业界许多重要人物，对于美国政府的开销颇有微词，指责官僚体系在支出上，无法将纳税人的钱，视为自己的钱一样有所节制。不过，有时这些企业高层在公司的财务上，也会因为钱并不由自己口袋拿出来，而展现出不同的行为模式。我在担任所罗门投资银行董事时，所发生的一个小故事，大家就可以看得很清楚。在 1980 年代时，该公司请了一位名为 Jimmy 的理发师，每周来为高层免费理发，随行还有一位专门修指甲的人。后来，由于削减成本之故，想要接受服务的人，必须自行负担费用。其中有某位高管（并不是 CEO），本来是每周都向吉米报到，但在新规定实施后，立刻决定三个星期再来理一次发。

Every now and then Charlie and I catch on early to a tide-like trend, one brimming over with commercial promise. For example, though American Airlines (with its “miles”) and American Express (with credit card points) are credited as being trailblazers in granting customers “rewards, “Charlie and I were far ahead of them in spotting the appeal of this powerful idea. Excited by our insight, the two of us jumped into the reward business way back in 1970 by buying control of a trading stamp operation, Blue Chip Stamps. In that year, Blue Chip had sales of $126 million, and its stamps papered California.

查理和我时不时地早早引领风潮，掌握一些在商业前景上可能发光发热的潮流。例如，虽然美国航空（里程数）和美国运通（信用卡积分）被视为客户”红利回馈”的先驱，但我们却很早就注意到，这门生意的强大吸引力。在这一洞察力鼓励下，我们于 1970 年收购了一家印花交易公司蓝筹印花。当时，该公司的年营收为 1.26 亿美元，其印花在加州各地随处可见。

In 1970, indeed, about 60 billion of our stamps were licked by savers, pasted into books, and taken to Blue Chip redemption stores. Our catalog of rewards was 116 pages thick and chock full of tantalizing items. When I was told that even certain brothels and mortuaries gave stamps to their patrons, I felt I had finally found a sure thing.

实际上，就在 1970 年，约当有 600 亿张印花券，被收集者累积成册，前往我们的特约商店兑换商品。我们的商品奖励目录的页数厚达 116 页，满满都是令人迫不急待想兑换的商品。当我得知连一些特种行业、及葬仪业者，都会给顾客印花券时，我以为我终于找到了稳赚不赔的生意。

Well, not quite. From the day Charlie and I stepped into the Blue Chip picture, the business went straight downhill. By 1980, sales had fallen to $19.4 mi ll i o n . A n d, b y 1990, s a l es w ere b u m p in g a l o n g a t$ 1.5 million. No quitter, I redoubled my managerial efforts.

然而，事实上并不尽然。从我们踏入此一领域后，却是一路走下坡。到了 1980 年，该公司营收滑落至 1,940 万美元。接着到 1990 年，犹如陷入泥淖的营收，更只剩下 150 万美元。由于我不是轻言退缩的人，在管理上我付出了更加倍地努力。

Sales then fell another 98%. Last year, in Berkshire’s $98 bi ll i o n o f re v e n u es, a ll o f$ 25,920 (no zeros omitted) came from Blue Chip. Ever hopeful, Charlie and I soldier on.

但营收又再衰退了 98％。到了去年，在伯克希尔 980 亿美元的营收中，来自蓝筹印花公司的贡献，一共只有 25920 美元（没省略任何 0）。但我和查理还是怀抱着无比的希望，继续坚持下去。

I mentioned last year that in my service on 19 corporate boards (not counting Berkshire or other controlled companies), I have been the Typhoid Mary of compensation committees. At only one company was I assigned to comp committee duty, and then I was promptly outvoted on the most crucial decision that we faced. My ostracism has been peculiar, considering that I certainly haven’t lacked experience in setting CEO pay. At Berkshire, after all, I am a one-man compensation committee who determines the salaries and incentives for the CEOs of around 40 significant operating businesses.

如我去年的股东信中所提，在我担任 19 个公司（不含伯克希尔和关系企业）的董事职务上，几乎所有的薪酬委员会，都视我如同伤寒玛丽般、避之唯恐不及。只有一家公司的薪酬委员会，邀请我担任委员，但在大多数关键性的决定上，我的意见却还是立刻遭到否决。在制定公司 CEO 薪酬水平上，经验不可谓不丰富的我，却受到如此的排斥，实在令人匪夷所思。毕竟，伯克希尔的薪酬委员会，我是唯一的成员，为集团中近四十个重要的营运事业，决定了所有经理人的薪水和奖励方案。

How much time does this aspect of my job take? Virtually none. How many CEOs have voluntarily left us for other jobs in our 42-year history? Precisely none.

在此类工作方面，究竟占了我多少时间？几乎是没有。那在我们 42 年来的营运历史中，有多少经理人想要跳槽？也是一个也没有。

Berkshire employs many different incentive arrangements, with their terms depending on such elements as the economic potential or capital intensity of a CEO’s business. Whatever the compensation arrangement, though, I try to keep it both simple and fair.

伯克希尔采用了许多完全不同的激励安排，其条款取决于 CEO 所负责业务的经济潜力、或资本密集程度等因素。但无论是什么样的薪酬方案，我总是尽量本着简单、同时维持公平的原则。

When we use incentives — and these can be large — they are always tied to the operating results for which a given CEO has authority. We issue no lottery tickets that carry payoffs unrelated to business performance. If a CEO bats .300, he gets paid for being a.300 hitter, even if circumstances outside of his control cause Berkshire to perform poorly. And if he bats.150, he doesn’t get a payoff just because the successes of others have enabled Berkshire to prosper mightily. An example: We now own S61 billion of equities at Berkshire, whose value can easily rise or fall by 10% in a given year. Why in the world should the pay of our operating executives be affected by such S6 billion swings, however important the gain or loss may be for shareholders?

当我们采用奖励制度时（而且会十分丰厚），总是要与该名 CEO 所负责的营运结果，有直接的关连。我们不希望让他们产生投机的心理，以为可以得到与事业表现无关的回报。如果一个 CEO 的打击率只有三成，那他就应该获得相同成绩的收入，即使是他控制范围以外的因素，导致伯克希尔的表现不尽人意。而对于打击率只有一成五的 CEO 来说，就算其它事业的成功，让伯克希尔大展鸿图，他也不应该因此获得任何好处。举例来说：伯克希尔目前持有 610 亿美元的股权，其任何一年的价值，很轻易地就可能上升或下降 10％。无论此一盈亏对股东的重要性如何，但对那些为我们经营事业的主管而言，究竟有什么样的理由，他们的收入要和这 60 亿美元的变动，有任何的关连？

You’ve read loads about CEOs who have received astronomical compensation for mediocre results. Much less well-advertised is the fact that America’s CEOs also generally live the good life. Many, it should be emphasized, are exceptionally able, and almost all work far more than 40 hours a week. But they are usually treated like royalty in the process. (And we’re certainly going to keep it that way at Berkshire. Though Charlie still favors sackcloth and ashes, I prefer to be spoiled rotten. Berkshire owns The Pampered Chef, our wonderful office group has made me The Pampered Chief.)

企业 CEO 在绩效差强人意，但却仍可领取天文数字薪酬的许多事例，已经广为流传。但大家比较少听说到的真相是，美国的企业 CEO 普遍也过着十分优越的生活。应该强调的是，他们当中有许多人真的是能力非凡，而且大多数一周工作时数也远超过 40 个小时，只是大家看待他们的方式，通常被视为皇室成员。而伯克希尔目前对待 CEO 的方式，必定还是会持续下去。虽然查理比较偏好的是勤俭克难，但我宁愿被过度溺爱。伯克希尔旗下有家公司，名为娇宠大厨，而我们良好的企业文化，则让我成为了娇宠的大家长。

CEO perks at one company are quickly copied elsewhere. “All the other kids have one” may seem a thought too juvenile to use as a rationale in the boardroom. But consultants employ precisely this argument, phrased more elegantly of course, when they make recommendations to comp committees.

一家企业提供给 CEO 的福利津贴，很快就会被其它公司所复制沿用。在董事会中，“别家小孩都这样”的想法，可能因为过于幼稚，比较不会被视为合理的解释。然而，当业界的顾问人员，在对薪酬委员会提出建议时，实际上却是以此为主要的论点。当然，他们只是用更优雅一些的方式，来加以修辞而已。

Irrational and excessive comp practices will not be materially changed by disclosure or by “independent” comp committee members. Indeed, I think it’s likely that the reason I was rejected for service on so many comp committees was that I was regarded as too independent. Compensation reform will only occur if the largest institutional shareholders — it would only take a few — demand a fresh look at the whole system. The consultants’ present drill of deftly selecting “peer” companies to compare with their clients will only perpetuate present excesses.

通过信息的披露，或是聘请“独立董事”来担任薪酬委员，对这类在薪酬发放上不合理、且过于慷慨的普遍作法，并无法产生任何实际上的改变。说实在的，我之所以会被许多薪酬委员会拒于门外，最可能的理由，就是因为我被视为是「过于独立」的董事。薪酬制度的改革只有在几个最大的机构投资者（数目不必多）提出要求，就能使整个系统出现全新的气象。目前这些顾问在面对客户，巧妙运用“同业”水平、来作为比较基准的手法，只会让目前在薪酬发放已过份慷慨的现象，在企业界更为盛行下去。

Last year I arranged for the bulk of my Berkshire holdings to go to five charitable foundations, thus carrying out part of my lifelong plan to eventually use all of my shares for philanthropic purposes. Details of the commitments I made, as well as the rationale for them, are posted on our website. www.berkshirehathaway.com. Taxes, I should note, had nothing to do with my decision or its timing. My federal and state income taxes in 2006 were exactly what they would have been had I not made my first contributions last summer, and the same point will apply to my 2007 contributions.

去年，我已将大部分持有的伯克希尔股权，移转给五个慈善基金会。此一安排，是我生前规划的一部分，最终我会将名下所有持股，全数投入于慈善目的。有关我所做的承诺、及所持的理由，都发布在我们的网站：www.bershirehathaway.com。我应该指出的是，此一决定及实行时机，都并非出于税负的考虑。2006 年我必须缴交给联邦、或州政府的所得税，与我去年夏天的首次捐献前，维持完全相同的水平，对 2007 的所得税来说，也没有任何不同。

In my will I’ve stipulated that the proceeds from all Berkshire shares I still own at death are to be used for philanthropic purposes within ten years after my estate is closed. Because my affairs are not complicated, it should take three years at most for this closing to occur. Adding this 13-year period to my expected lifespan of about 12 years (though, naturally, I’m aiming for more) means that proceeds from all of my Berkshire shares will likely be distributed for societal purposes over the next 25 years or so.

根据我遗嘱中的主张，我在过世时仍持有的伯克希尔股份，将以为期十年的时间加以变卖，以投入慈善事业。由于处理上并不算复杂，因此最多再花三年，就能完成所有程序。将这 13 年的时间，加上我预期自己还能再活约 12 年（当然，我的目标不只如此），就意味着我所有伯克希尔持股的卖出所得，将在未来 25 年间，完全移作社会公益用途。

I’ve set this schedule because I want the money to be spent relatively promptly by people I know to be capable, vigorous and motivated. These managerial attributes sometimes wane as institutions — particularly those that are exempt from market forces — age. Today, there are terrific people in charge at the five foundations. So at my death, why should they not move with dispatch to judiciously spend the money that remains?

决定此一时程，是由于我希望这些钱，交给我所知悉有能力、活力、及动机的人，能够在有限的时间内相对迅速的加以运用。由于这些管理上的特质，常随着机构（尤其不受市场力量影响的机构）的老化而衰减。目前，这五个基金会都是由不可多得的人才来管理，因此在我离开人世时，何不让他们快速行动，明智的花掉我所遗留的财产？

Those people favoring perpetual foundations argue that in the future there will most certainly be large and important societal problems that philanthropy will need to address. I agree. But there will then also be many super-rich individuals and families whose wealth will exceed that of today’s Americans and to whom philanthropic organizations can make their case for funding. These funders can then judge firsthand which operations have both the vitality and the focus to best address the major societal problems that then exist. In this way, a market test of ideas and effectiveness can be applied. Some organizations will deserve major support while others will have outlived their usefulness. Even if the people above ground make their decisions imperfectly, they should be able to allocate funds more rationally than a decedent six feet under will have ordained decades earlier. Wills, of course, can always be rewritten, but it’s very unlikely that my thinking will change in a material way.

对偏重在基金会永续经营方面的人来说，强调未来一定会有更重大的社会问题，需要慈善组织的密切关注。我同意此一看法，但我认为将来一定会出现更多的超级富豪及家族，其财富规模将超过美国现有的水平，能够在慈善组织的号召下，提供所需捐助的基金。届时，这些资助者，就可根据当时的实际需要，提供机构在运作上所需的动能，将焦点放在那时才发生的重大社会问题，以寻求最佳解决之道。如此一来，这些机构的理念及有效性，就可在市场上接受验证。有些基金会理应获得大量支持，但许多社会目标已然完成者，剩余的基金该如何处置，反而形成更大的问题。即使活着的人在决策上不尽理想，但在资金的分配上，也还是应该比几十年前死者的好意安排，更符合实际的需要。当然，遗嘱随时都能改写，但让我的想法出现重大改变，恐怕是不大可能的。

A few shareholders have expressed concern that sales of Berkshire by the foundations receiving shares will depress the stock. These fears are unwarranted. The annual trading volume of many stocks exceeds 100% of the outstanding shares, but nevertheless these stocks usually sell at prices approximating their intrinsic value. Berkshire also tends to sell at an appropriate price, but with annual volume that is only 15% of shares outstanding. At most, sales by the foundations receiving my shares will add three percentage points to annual trading volume, which will still leave Berkshire with a turnover ratio that is the lowest around.

部分股东对这些获得捐助的基金会，可能在变卖持股时，对我们股价所造成的冲击，表达了他们的关切。这其实不足为惧，因为许多股票的年成交量，往往超过其在外流通股数的 100％，但其股价仍可维持在内在价值附近。而伯克希尔的年成交量，只有在外流通股数的 15％，仍可维持在合理的股价水平。获得我手中持股的基金会在卖出时，最多只会增加年成交量的百分之三，伯克希尔的股票周转率，仍然是处在市场的最低水平。

Overall, Berkshire’s business performance will determine the price of our stock, and most of the time it will sell in a zone of reasonableness. It’s important that the foundations receive appropriate prices as they periodically sell Berkshire shares, but it’s also important that incoming shareholders don’t overpay. (See economic principle 14 on page 77.) By both our policies and shareholder communications, Charlie and I will do our best to ensure that Berkshire sells at neither a large discount nor large premium to intrinsic value.

整体而言，伯克希尔的事业表现，才是决定其股价的根本原因。在极大多数的状况下，其价位都将在合理的区间之内变动。对于定期将卖出伯克希尔持股的那些基金会而言，价格的合宜是重要的，但对伯克希尔的新进股东来说，不让他们付出过高的成本，也是同样重要的事（请参阅股东手册经济原则的第 14 点）。无论是经营方针，以及股东的沟通交流方面，伯克希尔的主管们都竭尽所能，确保股价与内在价值间，既不会出现大幅折价，也没有大量溢价的空间。

The existence of foundation ownership will in no way influence our board’s decisions about dividends, repurchases, or the issuance of shares. We will follow exactly the same rule that has guided us in the past: What action will be likely to deliver the best result for shareholders over time?

针对基金会的持股，绝不会影响伯克希尔董事会，在股利、股票回购、及发行新股方面的决策。我们将遵循与过去完全一致、持续提供着启示的规则：长期而言，什么行动极可能带给股东最佳的成果？

In last year’s report I allegorically described the Gotrocks family — a clan that owned all of America’s businesses and that counterproductively attempted to increase its investment returns by paying ever-greater commissions and fees to “helpers.” Sad to say, the “family” continued its self-destructive ways in 2006.

在去年的股东信中，我以寓言的方式象征性描述了一个拥有所有美国企业股权的 GotRocks家族，企图以违反生产原则的方式，支付给“帮手们”愈来愈高的佣金及费用，来增加投资回报率。悲哀的是，这个家族在 2006 年，仍然持续往自我毁灭的路前进。

In part the family persists in this folly because it harbors unrealistic expectations about obtainable returns. Sometimes these delusions are self-serving. For example, private pension plans can temporarily overstate their earnings, and public pension plans can defer the need for increased taxes, by using investment assumptions that are likely to be out of reach. Actuaries and auditors go along with these tactics, and it can be decades before the chickens come home to roost (at which point the CEO or public official who misled the world is apt to be gone).

这个家族执迷不悟地做傻事，部分是对于可获得的回报，怀抱了不符实际的预期。有时候，这类错觉完全是自私的。举例来说，通过一些遥不可及的投资回报假设，私人企业的退休金计划，可以暂时将获利数字美化。而政府的公共养老金计划，也能将原本应增加的税收予以延后。精算师与审计人员，也在这些手法上同流合污，因为真正的结果，要几十年后才看得到。届时，这些误导全世界的企业 CEO 和公务员，早就消失无踪了。

Meanwhile, Wall Street’s Pied Pipers of Performance will have encouraged the futile hopes of the family. The hapless Gotrocks will be assured that they all can achieve above-average investment performance — but only by paying ever-higher fees. Call this promise the adult version of Lake Woebegon.

同时，华尔街也持续以绩效来吸引这个家族，为他们缘木求鱼的愿望来加油添醋。这个不幸的 Gotrocks 家族，以为只要支付了持续升高的费用，家族中所有成员，就能获取优于平均成绩的投资绩效。这就像大人版的 Lake Woebegon 故事一样。（在 1985 年小说《Lake Wobegon Days》故事里，住在这里的每个孩子都有优于平均的表现。）

In 2006, promises and fees hit new highs. A flood of money went from institutional investors to the 2-and-20 crowd. For those innocent of this arrangement, let me explain: It’s a lopsided system whereby 2% of your principal is paid each year to the manager even if he accomplishes nothing — or, for that matter, loses you a bundle — and, additionally, 20% of your profit is paid to him if he succeeds, even if his success is due simply to a rising tide. For example, a manager who achieves a gross return of 10% in a year will keep 3.6 percentage points — two points off the top plus 20% of the residual 8 points — leaving only 6.4 percentage points for his investors. On a S3 billion fund, this 6.4% net “performance” will deliver the manager a cool $108 million. He will receive this bonanza even though an index fund might have returned 15% to investors in the same period and charged them only a token fee.

在 2006 年，前述的承诺、及费用都创下了新高。机构投资人的钱，如洪水般涌入这些以 2％-20％的方式收费的一群人。对这种收费方式一无所知的人，容我作一番解释：这是个一面倒的系统，因为即使毫无绩效表现（甚至是大幅亏损），每年仍需缴交本金的 2％给基金业者；此外，只要是基金公司的绩效为正数，就必须付给它们获利的 20％，即使这样的成绩完全是因为牛市上涨。举例来说，某年绩效为10％的基金，就可收到 3.6％（2％管理费，以及 10％扣掉 2％后的 20％）的费用，而投资人将只剩下 6.4％。对于一支 30 亿美元的基金来说，此— 6.4％的净「绩效」，将为业者带来 1.08 亿美元的收入。对业者来说，这根本就像金矿一样，因为一般的指数基金，就算年回报率高达 15％，投资人也只付出象征性的费用而已。

The inexorable math of this grotesque arrangement is certain to make the Gotrocks family poorer over time than it would have been had it never heard of these “hyper-helpers.” Even so, the 2-and-20 action spreads. Its effects bring to mind the old adage: When someone with experience proposes a deal to someone with money, too often the fellow with money ends up with the experience, and the fellow with experience ends up with the money.

这种无论赚赔、坚持都要收费的古怪方式，注定了 Gotrocks 家族逐步走向贫穷的命运，若他们从未听说过这些“超级帮手”，就不会如此凄惨了。但即使如此，此 2-20 的模式还是继续蔓延。这种现象让我们想到一个英文古谚：“当有经验的人向有钱的人提议一项交易，有钱的人往往会得到经验，而有经验的人往往会得到钱”。

Let me end this section by telling you about one of the good guys of Wall Street, my long-time friend Walter Schloss, who last year turned 90. From 1956 to 2002, Walter managed a remarkably successful investment partnership, from which he took not a dime unless his investors made money. My admiration for Walter, it should be noted, is not based on hindsight. A full fifty years ago, Walter was my sole recommendation to a St. Louis family who wanted an honest and able investment manager.

在本节的末尾，让我介绍一位华尔街的好人代表，我的老朋友 Walter Schloss，他去年刚过 90 大寿。自 1956-2002 年，Walter 掌管着一个十分成功的投资合伙企业，除非投资者赚到钱，否则他不收一毛钱。必须强调的是，我对他的尊崇，并不是事后诸葛。因为早在 50 年前，有个位于 St. Louis 的家族，问我是否可介绍一些既诚实、又能干的投资经理人时，Walter 就是我唯一的推荐者。

Walter did not go to business school, or for that matter, college. His office contained one file cabinet in 1956; the number mushroomed to four by 2002. Walter worked without a secretary, clerk or bookkeeper, his only associate being his son, Edwin, a graduate of the North Carolina School of the Arts. Walter and Edwin never came within a mile of inside information. Indeed, they used “outside” information only sparingly, generally selecting securities by certain simple statistical methods Walter learned while working for Ben Graham. When Walter and Edwin were asked in 1989 by Outstanding Investors Digest, “How would you summarize your approach?” Edwin replied, “We try to buy stocks cheap.” So much for Modern Portfolio Theory, technical analysis, macroeconomic thoughts and complex algorithms.

Walter 并没有上过大学，也没有上过商学院。在 1956 年时，他的办公室只有一个文件柜，到 2002 年时，已增加为四个。Walter 在工作上，从来没有请过秘书、文员或财务人员，唯一的助手是他的儿子 Edwin，他是北卡罗来纳大学的艺术硕士。Walter 及 Edwin 从来不听信什么内线消息，实际上，即使是“外界”信息，他们也很少使用，完全只运用一些特定的统计方法，而那是 Walter 在为格雷厄姆工作时所学习到的。在接受 1989 年杰出投资人文摘（OID）采访时，他们被问道：“请问该如何归纳你们的投资法则？” Edwin 的答复是：“我们只是努力买便宜的股票。”如此来看，现代的投资组合理论、技术分析、宏观经济学派、及许多复杂算法，对他们来说，似乎太多余了。

Following a strategy that involved no real risk — defined as permanent loss of capital — Walter produced results over his 47 partnership years that dramatically surpassed those of the S&P 500. It’s particularly noteworthy that he built this record by investing in about 1,000 securities, mostly of a lackluster type. A few big winners did not account for his success. It’s safe to say that had millions of investment managers made trades by a) drawing stock names from a hat; b) purchasing these stocks in comparable amounts when Walter made a purchase; and then c) selling when Walter sold his pick, the luckiest of them would not have come close to equaling his record. There is simply no possibility that what Walter achieved over 47 years was due to chance.

遵循这种没有实质性风险（或定义为永久性资本损失）的策略，Walter 在他 47 年的合伙事业所创造出的业绩，远远地超越了标普 500 指数的同期表现。值得一提的是，他通过投资约 1000 家、大多为冷门的股票，缔造出这一纪录。少数几支股票的大胜，并不能完全解释他的成功。因为保守估计，数以百万计的投资经理人通过如下方式交易：（1）以随机的方式来选股，（2）与 Walter 购买的数量相当，（3）与 Walter 同时卖出持股。但即使是当中最幸运者，也难以接近 Walter 的纪录。这说明：Walter 在47年间取得的成就，绝对不是运气使然的。

I first publicly discussed Walter’s remarkable record in 1984. At that time ““efficient market theory”(EMT) was the centerpiece of investment instruction at most major business schools. This theory, as then most commonly taught, held that the price of any stock at any moment is not demonstrably mispriced, which means that no investor can be expected to overperform the stock market averages using only publicly-available information (though some will do so by luck). When I talked about Walter 23 years ago, his record forcefully contradicted this dogma.

我在 1984 年时，首次针对 WalterSchloss 的傲人记录，公开加以讨论。当时，“市场有效假说”（EMT）是大多数主流商学院的投资课程的核心。如同那时大多数人所学到的观念，该理论认为，任何股票的价格，在任何时候，都不会出现明显的错误定价。这意味着，任何投资者只运用公开信息，都不可能超越市场平均水平（虽然运气的确能让某些人办到）。在我 23 年前谈到 Walter 时，他的纪录有力的反驳了这一理论教条。

And what did members of the academic community do when they were exposed to this new and important evidence? Unfortunately, they reacted in all-too-human fashion: Rather than opening their minds, they closed their eyes. To my knowledge no business school teaching EMT made any attempt to study Walter’s performance and what it meant for the school’s cherished theory.

但对于学术界的人来说，在接触这些新出现的重要证据时，他们的反应如何？不幸地，他们却与平常人的反应模式太过雷同：他们不但未敞开心扉加以思考，反而选择闭上眼睛。就我所知，没有一个教授市场有效假说（EMT）这门课的商学院，试图研究 Walter 的绩效表现，探讨其对于学院推崇的理论意味着什么。

Instead, the faculties of the schools went merrily on their way presenting EMT as having the certainty of scripture. Typically, a finance instructor who had the nerve to question EMT had about as much chance of major promotion as Galileo had of being named Pope.

取而代之的，这些学院派在传达市场有效假说的意义时，态度有如讲述圣经般坚定。在财务学的讲师中，胆敢对市场有效假说提出质疑者的比例，就如同伽利略被提名为教宗的可能性一样低。

Tens of thousands of students were therefore sent out into life believing that on every day the price of every stock was “right” (or, more accurately, not demonstrably wrong) and that attempts to evaluate businesses — that is, stocks — were useless. Walter meanwhile went on overperforming, his job made easier by the misguided instructions that had been given to those young minds. After all, if you are in the shipping business, it’s helpful to have all of your potential competitors be taught that the earth is flat.

因此，有数以万计的学生在进入社会后，对于所有股票每天价格的“正确性”深信不疑（跟准确地说是，没有明显的错误），而评估企业（股票）都是徒劳的。在此同时，Walter 继续表现出色，他的工作因为那些年轻人接受了这些错误观念而变得更轻松了。毕竟，对于航运业者来说，让你所有的竞争者都以为是地球是平的，应该可获益不少。

Maybe it was a good thing for his investors that Walter didn’t go to college.

对于 Walter Schloss 的投资者而言，也许真应该庆幸的是，他没上过商学院。

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

Our meeting this year will be held on Saturday, May 5th. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and a new Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.

今年的股东会将于 5 月 5 日周六召开。一如往常，Qwest 中心的大门将于早上 7 点开启，介绍伯克希尔的影片将在 8:30 开始播映，9:30 我们会直接进入问答时间，直到下午 3 点结束（中间将有午餐休息时间）。在短暂的休息之后，查理和我将在 3:15 召开年度会议。而如果您决定在问答时间中途离席，请等到查理发言时再这么做吧。

The best reason to exit, of course is to shop. We will help you do that by filling the 194,300 square foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, the 24,000 people who came to the meeting did their part, and almost every location racked up record sales. But records are made to be broken, and I know you can do better.

离开会议的最好理由当然是“购物”。在毗邻会场的 194,300 平方尺的大厅里，将会堆放伯克希尔各业务的产品，如此绝对会符合您的需求。去年经过总计 2.4 万位与会人士的努力，让每个摊位的销售记录都不断向上攀升。不过纪录就是为了被打破而设立的，我相信各位今年会表现地比去年更好。

This year we will again showcase a Clayton home (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that the home, priced at $139,900, delivers excellent value. Last year, a helper at the Qwest bought one of two homes on display well before we opened the doors to shareholders. Flanking the Clayton home on the exhibition floor this year will be an RV and pontoon boat from Forest River.

今年我们将再次展示一组Clayton的房屋，并由 Acme 砖块、萧氏地毯、Johns Manville 隔热材料、Mitek 紧固件、Carefree 雨篷、以及内布拉斯加家具共同构成。而您会发现，这样的房子才开价 139,900 美元，真是物超所值。去年 Qwest 的工作人员在还未向股东开展前，就从所展示的两间样品屋中订走一栋。今年在 Clayton 房屋展示场地的两旁，将会展示森林之河所提供的房车（RV）与浮船。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can. And while you’re at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card. It’s the one I now use (sparingly, of course).

GEICO 的摊位上，将由许多来自全国的顶尖保险顾问，为您提供汽车保险的报价。在大多数的状况，GEICO 会给股东们特别的优惠（通常为 8％），这个优惠在我们全美 50 州中 45 州的营运据点，都可适用（补充一下，若各位股东同时适用于其它特定团体的优惠，不同优惠方案是不能累加的）。请各位股东带着你目前的保险资料，让顾问们为您研究是否有省钱的可能，而我相信有一半以上的股东，是能够办到的。在此同时，您也可以申请一张新的GEICO信用卡，我也是爱用者之一（当然，请抱持节俭的心来使用）。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane. And take all the hair gel that you wish on board with you.

在周六当天的奥马哈机场，NetJets 公司将会一如往常地陈列机队，可供各位股东参观。各位不妨到 Qwest 会场的 NetJets 公司的摊位，索取相关飞机的数据。对于坐车来奥马哈的人，或许可以搭乘全新的客机回家，但请记得带着您的造型发胶上飞机。

In the Bookworm’s corner of our bazaar, there will be about 25 books and DVDs — all discounted — led again by Poor Charlie’s Almanack. (One hapless soul last year asked Charlie what he should do if he didn’t enjoy the book. Back came a Mungerism: “No problem — just give it to someone more intelligent.“) We’ve added a few titles this year. Among them are Seeking Wisdom: From Darwin to Munger by Peter Bevelin, a long-time Swedish shareholder of Berkshire, and Fred Schwed’s classic, Where are the Customers’ Yachts? This book was first published in 1940 and is now in its 4th edition. The funniest book ever written about investing, it lightly delivers many truly important messages on the subject.

在书虫书屋 Bookworm，将会以折扣销售 25 本书与光盘，主打著作依然会是《穷查理宝典》（附带一提，去年有位读者询问查理，如果他不喜欢这本书怎么办？查理则以一贯的芒氏风格回答：“请不用担心，只要把书交给另一位更聪明的家伙就行了！”）。今年在摊位里又多加了几本著作，包括瑞典的伯克希尔长期忠实股东 Peter Bevelin 的《探索智慧：从达尔文到芒格》，与 Fred Schwed 的经典著作《客户的游艇在哪里》，后者在 1940 年出版后目前已第四次再版。这本书可说是有史以来最有趣的投资类书籍，以微言大义的方式点出许多重要的主题。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it. Hotel rooms can be hard to find, but work with Carol and you will get one.

随着本年报一同寄发的委托书附件中，说明了如何取得参加股东会及相关活动的入场券。关于飞机、旅馆、及租车等预约服务，也可以像往常一样向美国运通（800-799-6634）联系以获得协助。Carol Pedersen 每年都负责此工作，而且成果非凡，在此表示感谢。旅馆或许会一位难求，但若跟 Carol 小姐联系，相信不会让您失望。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM ten years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3 mi ll i o nin 1997 t o$ 30 million in 2006. I get goose bumps just thinking about this volume.

位于道奇及太平之间七十二街，占地 77 英亩的内布拉斯加家具卖场，今年将再度举办“伯克希尔周末”特价活动。我们在十年前开始此一活动，活动期间的销售额从 1997 年的 530 万美元，到 2006 年已成长至 3,000 万美元。光想到此一惊人的销售量，都会令我起鸡皮疙瘩。

To obtain the Berkshire discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 3rd and Monday, May 7th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a special shareholder picnic featuring chicken and beef tacos (and hamburgers for traditionalists like me).

如果要享受特价优惠，请您务必在 5 月 3 日周四，到 5 月 7 日周一这一期间（包含头尾）购买商品，同时要以会议入场券作为证明。此一期间的特价也适用于部分知名厂商几乎从不打折的产品，唯有在股东会期间例外，非常感谢这些厂商的鼎力支持。内布拉斯加家具卖场周一到周六的营业时间为早上 10 点到晚上 9 点，周日则为早上 10 点到晚上 6 点。今年在周六下午 5:30 到 8 点，卖场将会举办只限股东参加的餐会，供应鸡肉与牛肉墨西哥卷饼（或是为像我这样的传统主义者提供汉堡类食物）。

At a remodeled and expanded Borsheim’s, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 4th.The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 6th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.

在重新扩充装潢的波仙珠宝店也会再次举办两场股东限定的特卖会。第一场鸡尾酒招待会，在 5 月 4 日周五晚上 6 点到 10 点；第二场重头戏大型售卖活动，将在 5 月 6 日周日的早上 9 点到下午 4 点。周六则在晚上 6 点前，都照常营业。

We will have huge crowds at Borsheim’s throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 30th through Saturday, May 12th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.

整个周末波仙珠宝都将人山人海，因此为了您的方便起见，股东的特惠期间将自 4 月 30 日周一开始，一直到 5 月 12 日周六为止。在此期间请出示你的股东会入场券、或券商对账单，以确认你的股东身份。

On Sunday, in a tent outside of Borsheim’s, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers — who will have their eyes wide open — in groups of six. Last year I carried on a conversation with Patrick while he played in this manner. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon.

周日，两届美国西洋棋冠军 Patrick Wolff，以下盲棋的方式，将在波仙珠宝外的帐棚，接受所有六人一组来宾的挑战，不过这些来宾并不蒙眼睛。去年我在 Patrick 下盲棋时曾跟他有过简短对话。而在帐篷附近，著名的达拉斯魔术师 Norman Beck 也将会用精彩的手法迷炫观众的眼睛。此外，我们也邀请了世界顶尖的桥牌高手 Bob Hamman 及 Sharon Osberg，在周日下午和各位股东切磋牌艺。

To add to the Sunday fun at Borsheim’s, Ariel Hsing will play table tennis (ping-pong to the uninitiated) from 1 p.m. to 4 p.m. against anyone brave enough to take her on. Ariel, though only 11, is ranked number one among girls under 16 in the U.S. (and number 1 among both boys and girls under 12). The week I turned 75 I played Ariel, then 9 and barely tall enough to see across the table, thinking I would take it easy on her so as not to crush her young spirit. Instead she crushed me. I’ve since devised a plan that will give me a chance against her. At 1 p.m. on Sunday, I will initiate play with a 2-point game against Ariel. If I somehow win the first point, I will then feign injury and claim victory. After this strenuous encounter wears Ariel down, our shareholders can then try their luck against her.

为了增加博盛周日的趣味，从下午 1 点到 4 点，邢延华（Ariel Hsing）将会接受所有在场者的乒乓球挑战，虽然她只有11岁，不过已经是美球界的第一把交椅（同时也是 12 岁以下青少男女组的冠军）。在我 75 岁生日那周我曾跟她挑战桌球，当时她九岁，身高甚至只能让她刚好够到桌面，我还在思索要如何才不会因赢的太轻松，而伤害她的幼小心灵，不过最后被伤害的那个人是我。所以从那时开始我就策划，要如何能再次挑战她。因此周日下午一点，我会担任比赛的第一位挑战者，进行一场抢两分的赛局。如果我能先抢下一分，到时我就会佯装受伤，并带着胜利光荣退场。经过这场艰苦的赛局应该可以削弱爱尔信的实力，我们的股东或许就能凭运气获胜。

Gorat’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 6th, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st (but not before).

我最爱的 Gorat’s 牛排馆，也会再度于 5 月 6 日周日，仅为伯克希尔股东敞开大门，自下午 4 点到晚上 10 点为各位服务。若欲当日至该店消费，记得务必事先订位，并请在 4 月 1 日以专线 402-551-3733 预约（但 4 月 1 日前恕不开放）。

In the 2006-2007 school year, 35 university classes, including one from IBMEC in Brazil, will come to Omaha for sessions with me. I take almost all — in aggregate, more than 2,000 students — to lunch at Gorat’s. And they love it. To learn why, come join us on Sunday.

在 2006-2007 学年，将会有 35 个大学班级到奥马哈与我会面讨论（包括巴西的 IBMEC）。我将带着全部超过 2,000位的学生，到 Gorat’s 牛排享用午餐，他们对此都兴奋无比。请各位周日到那里用餐，便可了解个中原因。

We will again have a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.

在周六下午 4 点，我们将再度为来自美加以外地区的股东举办招待会。每年的股东会，都会吸引世界各地的人齐聚一堂，芒格和我都希望亲自接待这些远道而来的贵客，去年共有来自数十个国家 400 多位来宾参与。针对这些美加以外的股东，我们将提供特别的入场券、及指引说明，以便其参与此一盛会，共襄盛举。

Charlie and I are extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to other people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped every day in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. No wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 5th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.

芒格和我都无比幸运，能够生在美国，在父母的良好照顾下，接受高等教育，建立和乐融融的家庭，并且享受健康的生活。同时又因为具备了＂商业＂基因，我们获得无与伦比的财富；但在增进社会福祉的贡献上，却未必超出一般人。而且，拜许多杰出与热情同僚的协助所赐，我们能一直以无比热忱对工作乐在其中，难怪我们上班都像在跳踢踏舞一样，热闹有趣。但我们觉得，没有什么比得上在年度股东会、和各位股东欢聚一堂，更让人愉悦。因此，5 月 5 日请来参加这场在 Qwest 中心为各位资本家召开的年度嘉年华会，期待各位股东的光临，我们将恭候大驾。

February 28, 2007

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/30th of those shown for the A. ↩

B
Coopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

2006 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders2006 年致股东的信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

Yardsticks 评判标准

Acquisitions 收购

Insurance 保险业务

Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance Lloyd’s、Equitas 以及追溯再保险

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务及零售业务

Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务

Finance and Financial Products 金融及金融产品

Investments 投资业务

Some Changes on Berkshire’s Board 伯克希尔董事会的一些变动

This and That 其它

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

Graph View

Table of Contents

BCoopinio投资智慧库

Explorer

2006 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders2006 年致股东的信

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

Yardsticks 评判标准

Acquisitions 收购

Insurance 保险业务

Lloyd’s, Equitas and Retroactive Reinsurance Lloyd’s、Equitas 以及追溯再保险

Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务及零售业务

Regulated Utility Business 受监管的公用事业业务

Finance and Financial Products 金融及金融产品

Investments 投资业务

Some Changes on Berkshire’s Board 伯克希尔董事会的一些变动

This and That 其它

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

Footnotes

Graph View

Table of Contents

B
Coopinio投资智慧库