原文信息：
Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman’s Letter.
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Relative Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 10.0 | 13.8 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (11.7) | 32.0 |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 30.9 | (19.9) |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | (8.4) | 24.6 |
| 1970 | 12.0 | 3.9 | 8.1 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 1.8 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 2.8 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (14.8) | 19.5 |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (26.4) | 31.9 |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 37.2 | (15.3) |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 23.6 | 35.7 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | (7.4) | 39.3 |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 6.4 | 17.6 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 18.2 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.3 | (13.0) |
| 1981 | 31.4 | (5.0) | 36.4 |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 21.4 | 18.6 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 9.9 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 7.5 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 31.6 | 16.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 18.6 | 7.5 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 14.4 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 3.5 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 31.7 | 12.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (3.1) | 10.5 |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 30.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 7.6 | 12.7 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 10.1 | 4.2 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 12.6 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 5.5 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 23.0 | 8.8 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 33.4 | .7 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 28.6 | 19.7 |
| 1999 | .5 | 21.0 | (20.5) |
| 2000 | 6.5 | (9.1) | 15.6 |
| 2001 | (6.2) | (11.9) | 5.7 |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (22.1) | 32.1 |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 28.7 | (7.7) |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 10.9 | (.4) |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 1.5 |
| Average Annual Gain — 1965-2005 | 21.5 | 10.3 | 11.2 |
| Overall Gain — 1964-2005 | 305,134 | 5,583 |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.
The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our gain in net worth during 2005 was 19 to $59,377, a rate of 21.5% compounded annually.1
公司2005年的账面价值增加56亿美元，A/B股每股的账面价值增加6.4%(标普4.9%)，自现任管理层接手的41年以来，每股账面价值由当初的19美元成长到目前的59377美元，年复合成长率约为21.5%。1
本报告中使用的所有数据均适用于伯克希尔的 A 股，该股是该公司 1996 年之前发行的唯一一支股票的继承者。B 股的经济利益相当于 A 股的 1/30。
Berkshire had a decent year in 2005. We initiated five acquisitions (two of which have yet to close) and most of our operating subsidiaries prospered. Even our insurance business in its entirety did well, though Hurricane Katrina inflicted record losses on both Berkshire and the industry. We estimate our loss from Katrina at .9 billion.
2005年伯克希尔的表现相当不错。我们进行了5起并购，其中2起并购已经完成，而且我们下属的大多数业务经营良好。尽管卡特里娜飓风(Katrina)让伯克希尔和整个保险行业遭受到了创纪录的巨大损失。估计卡特里娜飓风给我们造成的损失高达25亿美元，她那两个同样可恶的妹妹丽塔(Rita)和威尔玛(Wilma)飓风，又让我们进一步损失了9亿美元。
Credit GEICO — and its brilliant CEO, Tony Nicely — for our stellar insurance results in a disaster-ridden year. One statistic stands out: In just two years, GEICO improved its productivity by 32%. Remarkably, employment fell by 4% even as policy count grew by 26% — and more gains are in store. When we drive unit costs down in such a dramatic manner, we can offer ever-greater value to our customers. The payoff: Last year, GEICO gained market-share, earned commendable profits and strengthened its brand. If you have a new son or grandson in 2006, name him Tony.
在2005年这个巨灾之年我们的保险业务能够取得如此辉煌的业绩，应该归功于GEICO及其杰出的首席执行官托尼·莱斯利。统计数据清楚地表明，在过去仅仅两年时间里，GEICO经营效率提高了32%。尤为引人注目的是，保单数量增长了26%，收益大幅增长，与此同时，公司员工数量却减少了4%。由于我们能够如此显著地降低单位运营成本，所以能为客户创造更多的价值。这样的结果如何呢？GEICO去年赢得了更多的市场份额，获得了令人羡慕的盈利，并进一步提高了品牌的影响力。如果你2006年喜得子孙的话，给他起名叫Tony。
My goal in writing this report is to give you the information you need to estimate Berkshire’s intrinsic value. I say “estimate” because calculations of intrinsic value, though all-important, are necessarily imprecise and often seriously wrong. The more uncertain the future of a business, the more possibility there is that the calculation will be wildly off-base. (For an explanation of intrinsic value, see pages 77-78.) Here Berkshire has some advantages: a wide variety of relatively-stable earnings streams, combined with great liquidity and minimum debt. These factors mean that Berkshire’s intrinsic value can be more precisely calculated than can the intrinsic value of most companies.
我写这份报告的目的是为股东们估计伯克希尔的内在价值并提供相应的信息，之所以说是估计，是因为尽管计算内在价值在投资中为重中之重，但往往并不精确，且错误常常非常严重。公司业务的前景越是不确定，内在价值的计算就越是有可能谬之千里(关于内在价值的有关解释，请参见股东手册)。不过伯克希尔具有以下有利因素：业务种类众多的相对稳定的现金流，同时拥有巨大的流动性和很少的债务。这些因素使伯克希尔能够比其他绝大多数公司更为准确地估计内在价值。
Yet if precision is aided by Berkshire’s financial characteristics, the job of calculating intrinsic value has been made more complex by the mere presence of so many earnings streams. Back in 1965, when we owned only a small textile operation, the task of calculating intrinsic value was a snap. Now we own 68 distinct businesses with widely disparate operating and financial characteristics. This array of unrelated enterprises, coupled with our massive investment holdings, makes it impossible for you to simply examine our consolidated financial statements and arrive at an informed estimate of intrinsic value.
尽管伯克希尔的财务特征有助于提高估值的准确度，但计算内在价值的工作由于有如此之多的收益来源而变得更加复杂。早在1965年，我们只有一家小小的纺织厂，估值不过是小菜一碟。如今我们已经拥有68种经营特性和财务特性相差很大的业务，这些各不相关的业务，加上我们巨大的投资规模，使你根本不可能简单地分析一下我们的合并报表就能对公司内在价值做出一个合理的估计。
We have attempted to ease this problem by clustering our businesses into four logical groups, each of which we discuss later in this report. In these discussions, we will provide the key figures for both the group and its important components. Of course, the value of Berkshire may be either greater or less than the sum of these four parts. The outcome depends on whether our many units function better or worse by being part of a larger enterprise and whether capital allocation improves or deteriorates when it is under the direction of a holding company. In other words, does Berkshire ownership bring anything to the party, or would our shareholders be better off if they directly owned shares in each of our 68 businesses? These are important questions but ones that you will have to answer for yourself.
为了更好地解决这一难题，我们将自身的业务合理地分为四类并在以下报告中详细分析每一类业务，讨论中我们会提供每类业务及其主要企业的关键数据。当然，伯克希尔的总体价值可能会高于或低于四类业务价值之和。最终结果取决于两个因素，一是我们下属的众多部门作为一个规模更大的企业的组成部分，运作得更好还是更差？二是在母公司的管理下，资本配置进一步改善了还是进一步恶化了？简而言之，伯克希尔作为母公司为下属各企业带来了什么好处？是不是伯克希尔的股东们，直接持股而不是通过伯克希尔间接持股，更加有利？这是一个至关重要的问题，各位股东必须自己寻找答案。
Before we look at our individual businesses, however, let’s review two sets of figures that show where we’ve come from and where we are now. The first set is the amount of investments (including cash and cash-equivalents) we own on a per-share basis. In making this calculation, we exclude investments held in our finance operation because these are largely offset by borrowings:
在讨论下属各个业务之前，让我们先来看看两组说明我们的起点如何及现状如何的数据。第一列数据是每股投资金额(包括现金及现金等价物)，在进行计算时，我们将下属金融企业中持有的投资排除不计，因为这些投资大部分为借款所抵消。除了这些有价证券(少数股票为下属非保险企业持有)，我们还拥有种类广泛的非保险业务。第二列数据是这些非保险业务的每股税前收益(不包括商誉摊销)。
| Year 年份 | Per-Share Investments* 每股投资金额* |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $ 4 |
| 1975 | 159 |
| 1985 | 2,407 |
| 1995 | 21,817 |
| 2005 | $ 74,129 |
| Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005 1965-2005 复合增长率 | 28.0% |
| Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005 1995-2005 复合增长率 | 13.0% |
* Net of minority interests*
* 扣除少数股东权益
In addition to these marketable securities, which with minor exceptions are held in our insurance companies, we own a wide variety of non-insurance businesses. Below, we show the pre-tax earnings (excluding goodwill amortization) of these businesses, again on a per-share basis:
| Year 年份 | Per-Share Earnings* 每股税前收益* |
|---|---|
| 1965 | $ 4 |
| 1975 | 4 |
| 1985 | 52 |
| 1995 | 175 |
| 2005 | $ 2,441 |
| Compound Growth Rate 1965-2005 1965-2005 复合增长率 | 17.2% |
| Compound Growth Rate 1995-2005 1995-2005 复合增长率 | 30.2% |
* Pre-tax and net of minority interests
* 税前扣除少数股东权益
When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good; Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.
在讨论增长率时，你非常有必要留心基期与终期年度的选择。开始与结束的年度二者中有一个选择不当，无论如何计算出来的增长率都会被歪曲，尤其是当基期年度盈利很少时，计算出来的增长率会高得惊人却毫无实际意义。在表中，作为基期的1965年度的盈利却是异乎寻常地好，伯克希尔1965年的盈利水平高于此前10年中的9个年度。
As you can see from the two tables, the comparative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our ever-increasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope — metaphorically — to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife — stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight — felt a long — absent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”
从上表中可以看出，伯克希尔的两个价值要素的复合增长率，在最后一个10年期间发生了很大的变化，这一结果反映了我们的经营重心日益向企业并购倾斜。尽管如此，伯克希尔的副董事长兼我的合伙人查理·芒格，和我的目标还是努力使这两个表格中的数字能够双双实现增长。
对于这一雄心壮志，我们希望打个比方，避免那些年迈的夫妇一度在浪漫方面面临挑战的命运。当这对夫妇庆祝结婚50周年的晚餐结束之后，妻子在温柔的音乐、醉人的香槟和摇曳的烛光的刺激下，忽然感到一阵久违的冲动，于是故作娇羞地建议她的丈夫一起上楼到卧室去做爱。她丈夫极度痛苦了好一阵子才回答说：“我可以做其中一个，但两个都做可不行。”
Acquisitions 并购
Over the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done.
未来几年，我们目前的业务总体上应该在经营利润上表现出一定的增长，但仅靠这些业务本身并不能产生出令人满意的回报，要想实现这样的理想目标，我们必须进行一些规模较大的并购。
In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were completed last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another company for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself — and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.
已经过去的2005年，我们的大规模并购活动令人鼓舞，我们达成了5项并购协议，其中2项在2005年年内完成，1项在2006年年初完成，其余2项预计也会很快完成。这些并购交易均不涉及到伯克希尔发行新股，这一点非常关键却常常被忽略：当一家公司管理层骄傲地宣布以股票收购另一家公司时，作为收购方公司的股东们不得不为此牺牲自身的一部分股东权益。我也做过几次类似的并购交易，当然，伯克希尔的股东们为我的行动付出了相应的代价。
Here are last year’s purchases:
以下逐一讨论我们去年的并购：
- On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106-year-old medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its competitors, a quality assuring doctors that long-to-settle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the company has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.
2005年6月30日，我们收购了医疗事故保险公司(MedicalProtectiveCo.，MedPro)，这是一家位于韦恩堡(FortWayne)、有着106年经营历史的医疗事故保险公司。医疗事故保险是一种十分难以承保的险种，一度成为许多保险公司的梦魇之地。然而，MedPro却由于以下原因将会经营良好：首先，MedPro将和伯克希尔下属其他保险公司一样在制度上领先一筹，那就是承保纪律重于其他一切经营目标；其次，作为伯克希尔的一个组成部分，MedPro拥有远远超过其竞争对手的财务实力，这足以向医生们保证，那些需要很长时间的诉讼案件绝不会由于他们所投保的保险公司的破产而无法结案；第三，这家公司有一个聪明能干的CEO：TimKenesey，他本能地和其他伯克希尔经理人一样遵循同样的思考模式。
- Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21,I received a two-page fax telling me — point by point — why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the company, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $1.6 billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal.
我们的第二起并购是森林之河房车公司(ForestRiver)，已经于2005年8月31日完成。在此之前的7月21日，我收到一份只有2页纸的传真，上面逐一说明了森林之河完全符合我们曾经在年报上披露的收购标准。在此之前，我从未听说过这位年销售额16亿美元的周末旅游房车制造商及其所有人兼总经理PeteLiegl。但这份传真却让我十分动心，于是我马上要求对方提供更多的相关数据。第二天早上我就拿到了这些数据，当天上午我就向PeteLiegl提出了收购要约。7月28日，我们俩握手成交。
Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long. Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.
PeteLiegl是一个杰出的企业家，几年之前，他的企业远远比现在小，那时他把企业卖给了一家杠杆收购机构(LBO)，他们接手后马上对他指手画脚，不久PeteLiegl就离开了公司。此后不久，公司就陷入破产，PeteLiegl重新买回了这家公司。你可以放心，我绝不会干涉PeteLiegl的任何经营行为。
Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 — and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that accompanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.
森林之河拥有60家工厂和5,400名雇员，在休闲房车制造业中持续保持相当的市场份额，同时还将向船舶制造等其他业务拓展。PeteLiegl现年61岁，绝对处于加速前进的状态。请你好好读读年报中所附的刊登在《RVBusiness》上的一篇文章，你就会明白为什么Pete会和伯克希尔喜结良缘。
- On November 12, 2005, an article ran in The Wall Street Journal dealing with Berkshire’s unusual acquisition and managerial practices. In it Pete declared, “It was easier to sell my business than to renew my driver’s license.
In New York, Cathy Baron Tamraz read the article, and it struck a chord. On November 21, she sent me a letter that began, “As president of Business Wire, I’d like to introduce you to my company, as I believe it fits the profile of Berkshire Hathaway subsidiary companies as detailed in a recent Wall Street Journal article.”
纽约的凯西·巴伦·塔姆拉兹(CathyBaronTamraz)读了这篇文章之后，触动了心弦。11月21日，她给我写来一封信，开头这样写道：“作为美国商业咨询公司(BusinessWire)的CEO，我想向你介绍我的公司，因为我认为我的公司符合最近一篇刊登在华尔街日报上的文章中详细说明的伯克希尔下属子公司的特征。”
By the time I finished Cathy’s two-page letter, I felt Business Wire and Berkshire were a fit. I particularly liked her penultimate paragraph: “We run a tight ship and keep unnecessary spending under wraps. No secretaries or management layers here. Yet we’ll invest big dollars to gain a technological advantage and move the business forward.”
一看完Cathy的来信，我马上觉得BusinessWire与伯克希尔是一对佳偶，我特别喜欢她来信中的倒数第二段：“我们严格控制成本，并且限制一切不必要的支出。我们公司没有秘书，也没有管理分层。但我们却会大量投资以取得技术领先和推动业务发展。”
I promptly gave Cathy a call, and before long Berkshire had reached agreement with Business Wire’s controlling shareholder, Lorry Lokey, who founded the company in 1961 (and who had just made Cathy CEO). I love success stories like Lorry’s. Today 78, he has built a company that disseminates information in 150 countries for 25,000 clients. His story, like those of many entrepreneurs who have selected Berkshire as a home for their life’s work, is an example of what can happen when a good idea, a talented individual and hard work converge.
我马上给Cathy打了一个电话，伯克希尔与BusinessWire的控股股东LorryLokey很快达成了收购协议。LorryLokey于1961年创建了这家公司，刚刚聘请Cathy为CEO。我非常欣赏像LorryLokey这样的商业成功传奇故事，今年78岁高龄的他已经把公司打造成一家把信息传送到150个国家的25,000个客户的优秀企业，与许多其他同样选择将伯克希尔作为他们一生打造的企业的最终归宿的企业家一样，他的商业成功传奇故事是一个好的创意、一个商业天才、一种勤奋刻苦工作的态度完美结合的成功典范。
- In December we agreed to buy 81% of Applied Underwriters, a company that offers a combination of payroll services and workers’ compensation insurance to small businesses. A majority of Applied’s customers are located in California.
In 1998, though, when the company had 12 employees, it acquired an Omaha-based operation with 24 employees that offered a somewhat-similar service. Sid Ferenc and Steve Menzies, who have built Applied’s remarkable business, concluded that Omaha had many advantages as an operational base — a brilliant insight, I might add — and today 400 of the company’s 479 employees are located here.
1998年，这家只有12名员工的小公司并购了一家基地位于奥马哈的有24名员工、经营类似业务的公司。AUW保险杰出业务的创始人SidFerenc和SteveMenzies经过分析得出结论，奥马哈作为经营基地拥有很多优势——我想说这真是远见卓识，如今这家公司的479名员工中有400人在此安家落户。
Less than a year ago, Applied entered into a large reinsurance contract with Ajit Jain, the extraordinary manager of National Indemnity’s reinsurance division. Ajit was impressed by Sid and Steve, and they liked Berkshire’s method of operation. So we decided to join forces. We are pleased that Sid and Steve retain 19% of Applied. They started on a shoestring only 12 years ago, and it will be fun to see what they can accomplish with Berkshire’s backing.
不到一年之前，AUW保险与国民保险再保险部门的杰出经理人阿吉特·贾恩达成了一项大额再保险合同。阿吉特·贾恩对SidFerenc和SteveMenzies留下很深的印象，而他们俩对伯克希尔的经营之道也赞叹不已，我们双方决定合作。我们很高兴地看到，SidFerenc和SteveMenzies在收购后继续保持19%的股份，12年前他们刚起家时只有很小一笔资本，现在获得如此的成就，想一想有伯克希尔强大的资本支撑，之后他们还会取得多么巨大的成就，我简直乐不可支。
- Last spring, MidAmerican Energy, our 80.5% owned subsidiary, agreed to buy PacifiCorp, a major electric utility serving six Western states. An acquisition of this sort requires many regulatory approvals, but we’ve now obtained these and expect to close this transaction soon. Berkshire wilI then buy 1.7 billion of borrowing to complete the purchase. You can’t expect to earn outsized profits in regulated utilities, but the industry offers owners the opportunity to deploy large sums at fair returns — and therefore, it makes good sense for Berkshire. A few years back, I said that we hoped to make some very large purchases in the utility field. Note the plural — we’ll be looking for more.
2005年春天，我们控股80.5%的中美能源达成协议，收购一家为西部6个州提供电力服务的太平洋电力公司PacifiCorp。这类并购案需要获得许多监管部门的批准，目前我们已经得到批准，预计交易很快就会完成。伯克希尔将为此购买34亿美元的中美能源普通股，中美能源用这笔资金加上17亿美元的贷款来完成收购交易(51亿)。投资政府监管的公用事业，你不能指望获得特别高的盈利，但这种行业却能为巨额资金提供合理收益的盈利机会，因此对资金规模庞大的伯克希尔来说，这种投资是十分有利的。早在几年之前，我曾说我们希望能够在公用事业方面进行一些规模巨大的投资。请注意我说的是一些，我们将寻找更多的这种投资机会。
In addition to buying these new operations, we continue to make “bolt-on” acquisitions. Some aren’t so small: Shaw, our carpet operation, spent about $550 million last year on two purchases that furthered its vertical integration and should improve its profit margin in the future. XTRA and Clayton Homes also made value-enhancing acquisitions.
除了收购新的业务之外，我们继续在进行补强并购(bolt-on)，其中一些并购规模不可小看——我们下属的地毯企业Shaw 工业2005年投资5亿美元进行两起业务链垂直整合的并购，这将进一步提升其毛利率。XTRA和ClaytonHomes也进行了价值提升的并购。
Unlike many business buyers, Berkshire has no “exit strategy.” We buy to keep. We do, though, have an entrance strategy, looking for businesses in this country or abroad that meet our six criteria and are available at a price that will produce a reasonable return. If you have a business that fits, give me a call. Like a hopeful teenage girl, I’ll be waiting by the phone.
与其他并购方不同，伯克希尔根本没有”退出策略”，我们买入只是为了长期持有。不过我们的确有一个进入策略，在美国及国际上寻找符合我们的6个标准且价格合理、能够提供合理回报的目标企业，如果你有合适的企业，请给我来电。就像一个充满爱情憧憬的小女生，我会在电话旁等候梦中男孩的电话。
Insurance 保险业务
Let’s now talk about our four sectors and start with insurance, our core business. What counts here is the amount of “float” and its cost over time.
让我开始讨论我们的四大部分业务。首先从我们最核心的保险开始，在保险业务中，浮存金的规模，及其获得的成本意义重大。
For new readers, let me explain. “Float” is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide — insurance protection — is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and; (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The 49 billion.
考虑到我的新读者，需要解释一下浮存金。保险公司的浮存金是一笔虽然不属于我们所有，但可暂时为我们所使用的资金。我们的浮存金增加的两个主要原因是：(1)在保险业务中，我们先收取保费，通常在1年左右之后才提供保险服务；(2)目前发生的损失不表示我们马上就要理赔，从发现损害、调解到最终解决，有时需要经过好几年时间。1967年我们的保险浮存金为2000万美元，经过多年的内部成长及外部并购，已经增长到如今的490亿美元之巨。
Float is wonderful — if doesn’t come at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay compare with the premiums we have received. When an insurer earns an underwriting profit — as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have been in the insurance business — float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the property-casualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float becomes expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.
拥有大量浮存金确是一件大好事，但前提是取得的成本不能太高。其成本取决于承保的结果，也就是我们的经营费用和最终承担的赔付损失与收取的保费对比后的结果。当一家保险公司获得承保利润时，就像伯克希尔过去38年来多数年份的保险业务那样，浮存金的成本甚至低于零成本。在这些年度，我们实际上是持有客户的资金还要向他们收费。然而，对于其他大部分保险同业来说，日子却过得非常艰难——总体而言，财产意外险通常不可避免地会发生承保损失，当损失很大时，他们就必须为浮存金支付代价，有时甚至是毁灭性的代价。
In 2004 our float cost us less than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance — absent a mega-catastrophe — of no-cost float in 2005. But we had the mega-cat, and as a specialist in that coverage, Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $3.4 billion. Nevertheless, our float was costless in 2005 because of the superb results we had in our other insurance activities, particularly at GEICO.
2004年我们的浮存金成本低于零，即负成本，我曾告诉大家，除非发生超级巨大灾难，2005年我们仍会有机会使浮存金成本为零。遗憾的是，作为承保超级巨灾保险的专家，我们确实遭遇了超级巨灾，由于飓风袭击，伯克希尔赔付损失高达34亿美元(Katrina飓风25亿，Rita和Wilma飓风9亿)。尽管如此，我们的浮存金仍然无需支付任何成本，这主要是由于我们其他保险业务尤其是GEICO的杰出经营所创造的超级业绩。
Auto policies in force grew by 12.1% at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of U.S. private passenger auto business from about 5.6% to about 6.1%. Auto insurance is a big business: Each share-point equates to $1.6 billion in sales.
While our brand strength is not quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly. When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual advertising expenditures were 502 million. And I can’t wait to spend more.
尽管我们的品牌无法量化，但我相信同样在显著增长。1996年伯克希尔完全控股GEICO时，其年均广告费支出为3,100万美元。2005年广告费支出增长到5.02亿美元，而且我们迫不及待要继续追加广告费投入。
Our advertising works because we have a great story to tell: More people can save money by insuring with us than is the case with any other national carrier offering policies to all comers. (Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for applicants fitting into their niches; also, because our national competitors use rating systems that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.) Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate — the percentage of internet and phone quotes turned into sales — in our history. This is powerful evidence that our prices are more attractive relative to the competition than ever before. Test us by going to GEICO.com or by calling 800-847-7536. Be sure to indicate you are a shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a discount.
我们的广告之所以有效，是因为我们讲述了一个非常好的故事：与任何一家向所有客户提供汽车保险服务的全国性保险公司相比，在GEICO公司投保汽车险能节省更多的钱(一些专业汽车保险公司的确在其擅长的领域中向申请人提供特别良好的服务；同样，由于我们的全国性竞争对手运用不同的分类系统，所以有时能提供比我们更好的价格)。2004年我们获得了迄今为止的历史最高转化比率，即网络和电话询问转化为销售保单的比率，这正是我们的价格与竞争对手相比，现在比以前更加有吸引力的一个强有力的证据。 访问GEICO.com或致电800-847-7536，你就会发现我所言不虚，记住一定要说明你是伯克希尔的股东，因为作为股东往往会让你享受特别的优惠。
I told you last year about GEICO’s entry into New Jersey in August,2004. Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new policyholders is running higher than in any other state, and by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to become the third largest auto insurer in New Jersey. There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead to steady gains in profitable business.
我曾对人说过，2004年8月GEICO进入新泽西州，那里的驾车人士非常喜欢GEICO。我们在该州的新保户的保留率大大高于其他州，估计到2007年左右，GEICO可能将成为新泽西第三大汽车保险商。除此之外，我们的低成本能够在低价格销售的同时保持稳定的盈利。
That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an article about the company — it’s reproduced on page 24 — when its market value was $7 million. As you can see, I called GEICO “The Security I Like Best.” And that’s what I still call it.
55年前，我第一次发现GEICO时，这家公司简单却有效的经营之道给我留下了深刻的印象。实际上，我21岁时还写了一篇关于这家公司的文章(其副本在年报第24页)，当时这家公司市值只有700万美元。在文章中你会看到，我称GEICO为”我最喜欢的股票”。如今我还是这样称呼它。
We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.
我们的再保险业务主要由通用再保险和国民保险经营，前者由JoeBrandon和TadMontross管理，后者由阿吉特·贾恩管理。考虑到2005年异常严重的飓风损害让再保险业遭受了严重打击，两家公司的业绩表现可以说相当不错。
It’s an open question whether atmospheric, oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the frequency or intensity of hurricanes. Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of Category 3 strength, or greater, hit the Southeastern and Gulf Coast states, and that only three of these were Category 5s. We further know that in 2004 there were three Category 3 storms that hammered those areas and that these were followed by four more in 2005, one of them, Katrina, the most destructive hurricane in industry history. Moreover, there were three Category 5s near the coast last year that fortunately weakened before landfall.
大气、海洋或者其他偶然因素是否已经大大改变了飓风发生的频率和强度，这至今还是一个未能解开的谜。最近飓风发生的情况令人相当恐惧不安。例如，我们知道，在2004年前的100年中大约有59次3级或更强一些的飓风袭击了东南部和墨西哥湾海岸地区各州，其中只有3次为5级飓风。我们知道，2004年有三次3级飓风袭击了这些地区，2005年发生了4次，其中1次是历史上破坏性最大的卡特里娜飓风(Katrina)。此外，2005年沿海发生了3次5级飓风，幸运的是在登陆之前风力减弱了。
Was this onslaught of more frequent and more intense storms merely an anomaly? Or was it caused by changes in climate, water temperature or other variables we don’t fully understand? And could these factors be developing in a manner that will soon produce disasters dwarfing Katrina?
这种更频繁且更强烈的飓风袭击只是一种异常现象？还是由于气候、水温或者我们并不完全了解的其他因素引发的变化？这些因素能否发展为一种模式，导致未来将会出现连卡特里娜飓风也相形见绌的更大的灾难？
Joe, Ajit and I don’t know the answer to these all-important questions. What we do know is that our ignorance means we must follow the course prescribed by Pascal in his famous wager about the existence of God. As you may recall, he concluded that since he didn’t know the answer, his personal gain/loss ratio dictated an affirmative conclusion.
Joe、Ajit和我并不知道这些问题的答案，我们所知道的是，我们对这些问题的答案一无所知，这就意味着我们必须遵循帕斯卡Pascal提出的应对之道。正如你所知道的那样，在一场著名的关于上帝是否存在的打赌中，帕斯卡得出的结论是，既然他不知道答案是什么，个人的输赢比率注定他应该选择一个，上帝肯定存在的答案。
So guided, we’ve concluded that we should now write mega-cat policies only at prices far higher than prevailed last year — and then only with an aggregate exposure that would not cause us distress if shifts in some important variable produce far more costly storms in the near future. To a lesser degree, we felt this way after 2004 — and cut back our writings when prices didn’t move. Now our caution has intensified. If prices seem appropriate, however, we continue to have both the ability and the appetite to be the largest writer of mega-cat coverage in the world.
以此原则为指导，我们已经得出结论，我们目前只能在价格远远高于去年的水平上承保超级巨灾保险，而且如果不久将来某些重要因素发生变化导致发生危害更为严重的风暴时，我们的总体风险水平才不会让我们痛心。2004年以后，在相对较弱的程度上我们已经觉察到这样的变化，在价格没有提高的情况下减少了承保。现在我们将会更加小心谨慎，不过如果价格合适，我们仍然有能力和愿望成为世界上保险金额最大的超级巨灾承保商。
Our smaller insurers, with MedPro added to the fold, delivered truly outstanding results last year. However, what you see in the table below does not do full justice to their performance. That’s because we increased the loss reserves of MedPro by about $125 million immediately after our purchase.
我们下属的规模较小的保险公司，包括最近加入进来的MedPro，2005年取得了非常杰出的业绩。不过，你们在以下表格中所看到的数据并没有完全反映他们的业绩，这是因为，我们在收购MedPro以后，马上将其损失准备金提高了约1.25亿美元。
No one knows with any precision what amount will be required to pay the claims we inherited. Medical malpractice insurance is a “long-tail” line, meaning that claims often take many years to settle. In addition, there are other losses that have occurred, but that we won’t even hear about for some time. One thing, though, we have learned — the hard way — after many years in the business: Surprises in insurance are far from symmetrical. You are lucky if you get one that is pleasant for every ten that go the other way. Too often, however, insurers react to looming loss problems with optimism. They behave like the fellow in a switchblade fight who, after his opponent has taken a mighty swipe at his throat, exclaimed, “You never touched me.” His adversary’s reply: “Just wait until you try to shake your head.”
没人能够精确地知道需要多少资金才足以支付我们承保的保单的索赔，医疗过失责任保险是一种长尾型的保险，这意味着索赔往往需要好多年才能最终解决。另外还会有其他损失发生，但我们却可能在一段时间内对此一无所知。不过，我们从事保险业多年，经历了艰难的道路后，学到了一件事: 保险业的惊喜远非对称。如果十份保单有一份得到一个令人愉快结果，那么你也是幸运的。保险商对迫在眉睫的损失问题往往过于乐观，他们的行为类似一个弹簧刀搏斗中的一个家伙，当对手在他喉咙上猛刺一刀后，他高喊道：“你别想靠近我。“他的对手回答：“等你摇摇脑袋后再喊喊试试。”
Excluding the reserves we added for prior periods. MedPro wrote at an underwriting profit. And our other primary companies, in aggregate, had an underwriting profit of 1,270 million of volume. This is an extraordinary result, and our thanks go to Rod Eldred of Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, John Kizer of Central States Indemnity, Tom Nerney of U. S. Liability, Don Towle of Kansas Bankers Surety and Don Wurster of National Indemnity.
除了我们为前期的保单增加了损失准备金之外，MedPro只在能够取得承保利润时才签发保单。我们下属其他主要保险公司在12.7亿美元承保业务量上取得了3.24亿美元承保利润，这是一个非常卓越的业绩，我们为此应该感谢Homestate保险公司的RodEldred、CentralStates保险公司的JohnKizer、U.S.Liability责任险公司的TomNerney、Kansas银行家保险公司的DonTowle、国民保险的DonWurster。
Here’s the overall tally on our underwriting and float for each major sector of insurance:
以下是我们各主要保险业务的承保和浮存金总体统计：
Insurance Operations
保险业务|Underwriting Profit(Loss) 2005 (in millions)
承保损益2004（百万美元）|Yearend Float 2005 (in millions)
年末浮存金2004（百万美元）
---|---:|---:|---:|---:
General Re
通用再保险| 3| 23,120
B-H Reinsurance
伯克希尔再保险|(1,069)|417|16,233|15,278
GEICO
盖可保险|1,221|970|6,692|5,960
Other Primary
其他保值|235*|161|3,442|1,736
Total
合计| 1,551| 46,094
* Includes MedPro from June 30,2005.
* 从2005年6月30日起包括Medpro在内
Regulated Utility Business 受管制的公用事业
We have an80.5% (fully diluted) interest in MidAmerican Energy Holdings, which owns a wide variety of utility operations. The largest of these are (1)Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electric, whose 3.7 million electric customers make it the third largest distributor of electricity in the U.K.;(2) MidAmerican Energy, which serves 706,000 electric customers, primarily in Iowa; and (3) Kern River and Northern Natural pipelines, which carry 7.8% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. When our PacifiCorp acquisition closes, we will add 1.6 million electric customers in six Western states, with Oregon and Utah providing us the most business. This transaction will increase MidAmerican’s revenues by 14.1 billion.
我们持有中美能源控股公司80.5%的股权(完全稀释后)，这是一家拥有许多不同种类公用事业企业的控股公司，其中下属最大的三家企业包括：(1)约克郡电力公司与北方电力公司，拥有370万电力用户，为英国第三大电力供应商(2)中美能源，主要是为爱荷华的70.6万用户提供服务；(3)科恩河与北部天然气，运输了美国消费天然气的7.8%。并购太平洋能源完成后，我们将在西部6州增加160万的电力用户，其中大部分业务在俄勒冈州和犹他州。这次交易将使中美能源的收入增加330亿美元，资产增加141亿美元。
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (“PUHCA”) was repealed on August 8, 2005, a milestone that allowed Berkshire to convert its MidAmerican preferred stock into voting common shares on February 9, 2006. This conversion ended a convoluted corporate arrangement that PUHCA had forced upon us. Now we have 83.4% of both the common stock and the votes at MidAmerican, which allows us to consolidate the company’s income for financial accounting and tax purposes. Our true economic interest, however, is the aforementioned 80.5%, since there are options outstanding that are sure to be exercised within a few years and that upon exercise will dilute our ownership.
2005年8月8日，公用事业控股公司法案(PUHCA)被废止，这一里程碑事件，使伯克希尔能够在2006年1月9日，将其持有的中美能源优先股转换为拥有投票权的普通股，这次转换结束了公用事业控股公司法案强加于我们的错综复杂的公司制度安排。现在我们同时持有中美能源的83.4%普通股和投票权，这使得我们在财务会计和税收上能够合并这家公司的报表。可是我们真正的经济权益是前面提到的80.5%，因为已经发行的期权肯定会在未来几年间执行，这将稀释我们的持股比例。
Though our voting power has increased dramatically, the dynamics of our four-party ownership have not changed at all. We view MidAmerican as a partnership among Berkshire, Walter Scott, and two terrific managers, Dave Sokol and Greg Abel. It’s unimportant how many votes each party has; we will make major moves only when we are unanimous in thinking them wise. Five years of working with Dave, Greg and Walter have underscored mny original belief: Berkshire couldn’t have better partners.
尽管我们的投票权大幅度增加，但四方共同持有的股权结构根本不会发生任何变化。我们将中美能源看作是伯克希尔、WalterScott及其两位超级经理人DaveSokol和GregAbel四方组成的合伙公司，每一方持有多少投票权并不重要，重要的是，只有我们大家共同认为明智的情况下，我们才会采取重大的行动。与Dave、Greg和Walter共同合作了5年，进一步强化了我最初的信念：没有比他们更好的合作伙伴了。
You will notice that this year we have provided you with two balance sheets, one representing our actual figures per GAAP on December 31, 2005 (which does not consolidate MidAmerican) and one that reflects the subsequent conversion of our preferred. All future financial reports of Berkshire will include MidAmerican’s figures.
你会注意到，2005年我们提供了两份资产负债表，一份是根据GAAP规定我们在2005年12月31日的实际数据(不包括中美能源在内)，另一份反映了我们将中美能源优先股转换为普通股的情况。今后伯克希尔所有财务报表都将中美能源合并在内。
Somewhat incongruously, MidAmerican owns the second largest real estate brokerage firm in the U.S. And it’s a gem. The parent company’s name is HomeServices of America, but our 19,200 agents operate through 18 locally-branded firms. Aided by three small acquisitions, we participated in $64 billion of transactions last year, up 6.5% from 2004.
也许看起来与公司主业有些不太协调，中美能源持有美国第二大房地产经纪公司，这可真是一颗掌上明珠。母公司为美国家庭服务公司HomeServices，但公司的19,200个代理人通过18家以当地品牌命名的下属企业进行经营，由于三次小规模并购，2005年我们参与了金额达640亿美元的房地产交易，比2004年增长了6.5%。
Currently, the white-hot market in residential real estate of recent years is cooling down, and that should lead to additional acquisition possibilities for us. Both we and Ron Peltier, the company’s CEO. expect HomeServices to be far larger a decade from now.
近年来持续狂热的住宅相关房地产市场目前正在逐步降温，这将为我们带来更多的并购机会。我和公司CEO：RonPeltier希望HomeServices公司在未来十年内能进一步发展壮大。
Here are some key figures on MidAmerican’s operations:
下表是中美能源业务经营的主要数据：
| 2005 Earnings (in $ millions) 2005收益（百万美元） | 2004 Earnings (in $ millions) 2004收益（百万美元） | |
|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities 美国电力 | $ 308 | $ 326 |
| Iowa utility 爱荷华电力 | 288 | 268 |
| Pipelines 管道运输业务 | 309 | 288 |
| Home Services 家庭服务 | 148 | 130 |
| Other (Net) 其他 | 107 | 172 |
| Income (loss) from discontinued zinc project 来自锌回收项目停运损失 | 8 | (579) |
| Earnings before corporate interest and tax 息税前收益 | 1,168 | 605 |
| Interest, other than to Berkshire 利息支出-其它企业债务 | (200) | (212) |
| Interest on Berkshire junior debt 利息支出-[[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]次级[[Bonds | 债券]] |
| Income tax 所得税 | (248) | (53) |
| Net Earnings 净收益 | $ 563 | $ 170 |
| Earnings Applicable to Berkshire * 归属于[[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]净收益 * | $ 523 |
| Debt Owed to Others 应付其它企业债务 | 10,296 | 10,528 |
| Debt Owed to Berkshire 应付[[Berkshire_Hathaway | 伯克希尔]]债务 | 1,289 |
* Includes interest earned by Berkshire (net of related income taxes) of 110 in 2004.
* 包括伯克希尔历年借款获得的利息(扣除相关所得税后) 2005年102百万美元和 2004年110百万美元
Finance and Financial Products 金融与金融产品
The star of our finance sector is Clayton Homes, masterfully run by Kevin Clayton. He does not owe his brilliant record to a rising tide: The manufactured-housing business has been disappointing since Berkshire purchased Clayton in 2003. Industry sales have stagnated at 40-year lows, and the recent uptick from Katrina-related demand will almost certainly be short-lived. In recent years, many industry participants have suffered losses, and only Clayton has earned significant money.
我们金融业务的明星是由管理技巧炉火纯青的KevinClayton先生经营的克莱顿房屋公司ClaytonHomes，他卓越的经营业绩记录并非只是由于行业景气而水涨船高，自2003年伯克希尔收购ClaytonHomes以来，预制房屋业务一直很不景气，最近由于卡特里娜飓风破坏带来的市场需求上升，几乎可以肯定是短暂的，近年来该行业许多企业都在亏损，只有ClaytonHomes盈利丰厚。
In this brutal environment Clayton has bought a large amount of manufactured-housing loans from major banks that found them unprofitable and difficult to service. Clayton’s operating expertise and Berkshire’s financial resources have made this an excellent business for us and one in which we are preeminent. We presently service 5.4 billon at the time of our purchase. Moreover, Clayton now owns $9.6 billion of its servicing portfolio, a position built up almost entirely since Berkshire entered the picture.
在这种非常残酷的经营环境下，ClaytonHomes从几家大型银行买入了大量预制房屋贷款，这些银行认为这种贷款无利可图而且难以提供服务。ClaytonHomes的专业能力和伯克希尔的财务实力却使这种业务成为一个非常有利可图的业务，在这项业务中我们是鹤立鸡群。买入贷款时我们只提供了54亿美元预制房屋贷款服务，而现在我们提供的预制房屋贷款服务高达170亿美元。不仅如此，ClaytonHomes现在持有96亿美元的贷款服务资产组合，这些几乎全部是伯克希尔进入后新增的。
To finance this portfolio, Clayton borrows money from Berkshire, which in turn borrows the same amount publicly. For the use of its credit, Berkshire charges Clayton a one percentage-point markup on its borrowing cost. In 2005, the cost to Clayton for this arrangement was 416 million are after deducting this payment.
ClaytonHomes从伯克希尔借款以建立这些资产组合，由于使用了伯克希尔的信用，伯克希尔加收1%的利差费用以弥补其借款成本。2005年ClaytonHomes为此项借款安排所支付的成本为8300万美元，这些数据包括在报表中的其他收入中，ClaytonHomes的4.16亿美元收益已经扣除该项利息成本。
On the manufacturing side, Clayton has also been active. To its original base of twenty plants, it first added twelve more in 2004 by way of the bankruptcy purchase of Oakwood, which just a few years earlier was one of the largest companies in the business. Then in 2005 Clayton purchased Karsten, a four-plant operation that greatly strengthens Clayton’s position on the West Coast.
在制造业务上，ClaytonHomes表现得相当活跃。在原有的20家工厂的基础上，2004年一次增加了12家工厂，这些工厂全部来自于对几年前还是行业老大的Oakwood的破产收购。2005年又收购了拥有4家工厂的Karsten，大大加强了公司在西海岸地区的地位。
Long ago, Mark Twain said: “A man who tries to carry a cat home by its tail will learn a lesson that can be learned in no other way.” If Twain were around now, he might try winding up a derivatives business. After a few days, he would opt for cats.
很早以前，马克.吐温说：“一个想揪着猫尾巴把它弄回家的人，将会得到一个他除此之外根本不可能得到的教训”。如果马克.吐温现在还在世，他可能会试图终止一个衍生产品业务。过不了几天，他会觉得还是选择揪猫尾巴更好。
We lost 404 million.
在2005年继续努力退出通用再保险衍生业务的过程中，我们税前损失为1.04亿美元，自从我们开始这一工作之后，我们的累计损失高达4.04亿美元。
Originally we had 23,218 contracts outstanding. By the start of 2005 we were down to 2,890. You might expect that our losses would have been stemmed by this point, but the blood has kept flowing. Reducing our inventory to 741 contracts last year cost us the $104 million mentioned above.
原来我们有23218份未平仓合约，2005年初下降为2890份。你也许会以为我们的损失会到此为止，但事实上，我们仍旧血流不止，2005年将未平仓合约减至741份让我们付出了前面所说的1.04亿美元的代价。
Remember that the rationale for establishing this unit in 1990 was Gen Re’s wish to meet the needs of insurance clients. Yet one of the contracts we liquidated in 2005 had a term of 100 years! It’s difficult to imagine what “need” such a contract could fulfill except, perhaps, the need of a compensation-conscious trader to have a long-dated contract on his books. Long contracts, or alternatively those with multiple variables, are the most difficult to mark to market (the standard procedure used in accounting for derivatives) and provide the most opportunity for “imagination” when traders are estimating their value. Small wonder that traders promote them.
请记住，通用再保险在1990年设立衍生交易部门是为了满足客户的再保险需求，但我们2005年清算的合约中有一个期限竟然是100年。很难以想象这样一个合约所满足的是什么需求，除非可能是一个只关心其补偿的交易员在他的交易登记簿中有一个长期合约需要对冲的需求。长期合约或者那些多变量合约，是最难以市值计价的(mark to market，在衍生交易财务会计中应用的标准程序)，这就为交易员们在估值时提供了绝佳的”想象”机会，因此，交易员们拼命向客户推荐这些合约一点也不奇怪。
A business in which huge amounts of compensation flow from assumed numbers is obviously fraught with danger. When two traders execute a transaction that has several, sometimes esoteric, variables and a far-off settlement date, their respective firms must subsequently value these contracts whenever they calculate their earnings. A given contract may be valued at one price by Firm A and at another by Firm B. You can bet that the valuation differences --- and I’m personally familiar with several that were huge — tend to be tilted in a direction favoring higher earnings at each firm. It’s a strange world in which two parties can carry out a paper transaction that each can promptly report as profitable.
一个根据假设的数据，计算出拥有巨额收益的业务，很明显将危机四伏。当两个交易者执行一项交易，其中包含深奥难懂的多个变量，而且结算日非常遥远，他们各自代表的公司在计算收益时，必须相应对他们的合约进行估值。对于一份相同的既定合约，A企业会得出一个估值，而B企业则会得出另一个估值。但你可以打赌，他们的估值差异往往是因为，两家公司都向有利于提高自身收益的方向进行估值。我个人的几次经验表明双方估值的差异甚至差之千里，执行同一份书面合约的双方竟然同时报告盈利，这种事情真是匪夷所思。
I dwell on our experience in derivatives each year for two reasons. One is personal and unpleasant. The hard fact is that I have cost you a lot of money by not moving immediately to close down Gen Re’s trading operation. Both Charlie and I knew at the time of the Gen Re purchase that it was a problem and told its management that we wanted to exit the business. It was my responsibility to make sure that happened. Rather than address the situation head on, however, I wasted several years while we attempted to selI the operation. That was a doomed endeavor because no realistic solution could have extricated us from the maze of liabilities that was going to exist for decades. Our obligations were particularly worrisome because their potential to explode could not be measured. Moreover, if severe trouble occurred, we knew it was likely to correlate with problems elsewhere in financial markets.
我之所以每年都细述有关衍生交易的经历，主要基于两个原因：一个是让我感觉相当不快的个人原因。严酷的事实是，由于我没有马上采取行动，结束通用再保险的衍生交易业务，导致股东们损失了大笔金钱。在收购通用再保险时，我和查理·芒格都知道这是一个麻烦的问题，并且告诉这家公司的管理层，我们想尽快从这项业务中脱身。督促执行这一计划本是我的职责所在，但我不但不强调尽快脱身，还浪费了好几年时间试图卖出该业务。这一努力注定必然失败，因为对于我们那些将要持续几十年的债务迷宫来说，根本不存在任何真正的解脱之道。我们为这些合约承担的责任尤其令人不安，因为一旦问题爆发，后果会不堪设想。更有甚之，一旦发生严重的问题，我们知道这可能与金融市场上其他领域引发出的连锁反应有关。
So I failed in my attempt to exit painlessly, and in the meantime more trades were put on the books. Fault me for dithering. (Charlie calls it thumb-sucking.) When a problem exists, whether in personnel or in business operations, the time to act is now.
我想不伤毫发地脱身的努力以失败而告终，与此同时，我们进行了更多的交易。都怪我优柔寡断犯下大错(芒格称之为吮拇指癖)，当一个问题发生时，不管是人事方面还是商业运营方面，行动的最佳时机是马上行动。
The second reason I regularly describe our problems in this area lies in the hope that our experiences may prove instructive for managers, auditors and regulators. In a sense, we are a canary in this business coal mine and should sing a song of warning as we expire. The number and value of derivative contracts outstanding in the world continues to mushroom and is now a multiple of what existed in 1998, the last time that financial chaos erupted.
第二个原因是，之所以一再阐述我们在这一领域遇到的问题，是希望我们的经历，能够对经理人、审计师、监管层有所启发。在某种意义上，我们是一只刚刚从这一商业煤矿坑逃离的百灵鸟，有义务为大家敲响警钟。全球衍生交易合约的数量和价值继续不断攀升，现在已经是上一次金融危机爆发的1998年的数倍之多。
Our experience should be particularly sobering because we were a better-than-average candidate to exit gracefully. Gen Re was a relatively minor operator in the derivatives field. It has had the good fortune to unwind its supposedly liquid positions in a benign market, all the while free of financial or other pressures that might have forced it to conduct the liquidation in a less-than-efficient manner. Our accounting in the past was conventional and actually thought to be conservative. Additionally, we know of no bad behavior by anyone involved.
我们的经验尤其应该让大家更加清醒，因为我们的情况要好于平均水平，本来完全可以体面地脱身而去，却由于拖延的缘故，一错再错，一损再损。通用再保险在衍生交易市场中只不过是一个小玩家，它幸运地在一个良性的市场上解除了其预计流动性头寸，从而不用在财务或其他压力之下可能被迫以并不有效的方式进行清算。我们过去的会计政策是十分传统的，实际上，大家都认为我们相当保守。另外，据我们所知公司没有任何人卷入不正当交易行为。
It could be a different story for others in the future. Imagine, if you will, one or more firms (troubles often spread) with positions that are many multiples of ours attempting to liquidate in chaotic markets and under extreme, and well-publicized, pressures. This is a scenario to which much attention should be given now rather than after the fact. The time to have considered — and improved — the reliability of New Orleans’ levees was before Katrina.
对于其他人来说，未来故事的结局可能会完全不同。想象一下，如果一个或者更多拥有数倍于我们的头寸的企业(麻烦总会迅速扩散)，想要在一个混乱的市场中进行平仓，并且面临着巨大的且广为人知的压力，事情会如何。对于这种情形，应该在事前而不是在事后充分加以关注，考虑并改进新奥尔良防洪堤的最佳时机应该是在卡特里娜飓风来临之前。
When we finally wind up Gen Re Securities, my feelings about its departure will be akin to those expressed in a country song, “My wife ran away with my best friend, and I sure miss him a lot.”
当我们最终将通用再保险的证券交易部门关门大吉之后，我对它的感觉就像一首乡村歌曲中所唱的那样：“我的老婆跟我最好的朋友跑了，我想念的更多的是我的朋友而不是我的老婆。”
Below are the results of our various finance and financial products activities:
以下是我们不同业务类型的金融及金融产品的经营情况：
| (in $ millions) 百万美元 | Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 2005 | Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 2004 | Interest-bearing Liabilities 有息负债 2005 | Interest-bearing Liabilities 有息负债 2004 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trading - Ordinary Income 交易-经常性收入 | $ 200 | $ 264 | $ 1,061 | $ 5,751 |
| Gen Re Securities (loss) [[General_Re | 通用再保险]]证券 | (104) | (44) | 2,617* |
| Life and annuity operation 人寿年金业务 | 11 | (57) | 2,461 | 2,467 |
| Value Capital (loss) 价值资本 | (33) | 30 | N/A | N/A |
| Leasing operations 租赁业务 | 173 | 92 | 370 | 391 |
| Manufactured-housing finance (Clayton) 克莱顿金融 | 416 | 192 | 9,299 | 3,636 |
| Other 其他 | 159 | 107 | N/A | N/A |
| Income before capital gains 收益合计 | 822 | 584 | ||
| Trading - Capital Gains (losses) 交易-资本性收益 | (234) | 1,750 | ||
| Total 合计 | $ 588 | $ 2,334 |
* Includes all liabilities
* 通用再保证券负债包括所有债务
Manufacturing, Service and Retailing Operations 制造、服务和零售业务
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们这部分业务种类繁多，让我们先看看总体的资产负债表和利润表主要数据：
Balance Sheet 12/31/05 (in $ millions) 资产负债表2005年12月31日（百万美金）
| Assets 资产 | Amt. | Liabilities and Equity 负债 | Amt. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents 现金及其等价物 | $ 1,004 | Notes payable 应付票据 | $ 1,469 |
| Accounts and notes receivable 应收账款和票据 | 3,287 | ||
| Inventory 存货 | 4,143 | ||
| Other current assets 其他流动资产 | 342 | Other current liabilities 其他流动负债 | 5,371 |
| Total current assets 流动资产合计 | 8,776 | Total current liabilities 流动负债合计 | 6,840 |
| Goodwill and other intangibles [[Goodwill | 商誉]]及无形资产 | 9,260 | Deferred taxes 递延所得税 |
| Fixed assets 固定资产 | 7,148 | Term debt and other liabilities 长期及其他负债 | 2,188 |
| Other assets 其他非流动资产 | 1,021 | Equity 所有者权益 | 16,839 |
| 合计 | $ 26,205 | 合计 | $ 26,205 |
Earnings Statement (in $ millions) 利润表（百万美金）
| Item | 2005 | 2004 | 2003 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues 收入 | $ 46,896 | $ 44,142 | $ 32,106 |
| Operating expenses 营业费用 | 44,190 | 41,604 | 29,885 |
| (including depreciation of 676 in 2004 and $605 in 2003) 其中，折旧费用 | 699 | 676 | 605 |
| Interest expense (net) 利息费用 | 83 | 57 | 64 |
| Pre-tax income 税前利润 | 2,623 | 2,481 | 2,157 |
| Income taxes 所得税 | 977 | 941 | 813 |
| Net income 净利润 | $ 1,646 | $ 1,540 | $ 1,344 |
This eclectic collection, which sells products ranging from Dilly Bars to fractional interests in Boeing 737s,earned a very respectable 22.2% on average tangible net worth last year. It’s noteworthy also that these operations used only minor financial leverage in achieving that return. Clearly, we own some terrific businesses. We purchased many of them, however, at substantial premiums to net worth — a point reflected in the goodwill item shown on the balance sheet — and that fact reduces the earnings on our average carrying value to 10.1%.
这个多种多样的业务组合，销售的产品从DillyBars冰淇淋到波音737的部分所有权应有尽有，其2005年平均有形资产净值收益率达到令人称奇的22.2%。值得说明的是，这部分业务经营取得如此之高的收益率，只使用了很小的财务杠杆。显而易见，我们拥有非常卓越的企业，可是我们是以显著高于其账面价值的价格收购其中大部分企业的，这种溢价反映在资产负债表的商誉上，这使我们平均账面价值收益率减少为10.1%。
Here are the pre-tax earnings for the larger categories or units.
以下是规模较大的业务类型或经营单位的税前收益情况：
| (in $ millions) （百万美元） | Pre-Tax Earnings 2005 税前收益2005 | Pre-Tax Earnings 2004 税前收益2004 |
|---|---|---|
| Building Products 建筑产品 | $ 751 | $ 643 |
| Shaw Industries Shaw工业 | 485 | 466 |
| Apparel & Footwear 服装鞋类 | 348 | 325 |
| Retailing of Jewelry, Home Furnishings and Candy 零售业务 | 257 | 215 |
| Flight Services 航空服务 | 120 | 191 |
| McLane [[McLane_Company | 麦克莱恩]] | 217 |
| Other businesses 其他 | 445 | 413 |
| 税前收益合计 | $ 2,623 | $ 2,481 |
- In both our building-products companies and at Shaw, we continue to be hit by rising costs for raw materials and energy. Most of these operations are significant users of oil (or more specifically, petrochemicals) and natural gas. And prices for these commodities have soared.
我们的建筑产品企业和Shaw地毯仍然受到原材料和能源成本上升的打击，这些企业中大多数是石油(更准确地说是石化产品)和天然气的消费大户，这些商品的价格已经快速上涨。
We, likewise, have raised prices on many products, but there are often lags before increases become effective. Nevertheless, both our building-products operations and Shaw delivered respectable results in 2005, a fact attributable to their strong business franchises and able managements.
我们同样也提高了产品的销售价格，但在提价生效之前往往有相当长时间的滞后，尽管如此，我们的建筑产品企业和Shaw地毯的经营业绩还是令人称赞的，这应该归功于他们强大的商业特许权和能干的管理层。
- In apparel, our largest unit, Fruit of the Loom, again increased earnings and market-share. You know, of course, of our leadership position in men’s and boys’ underwear, in which we account for about 48.7% of the sales recorded by mass-marketers (Wal-Mart, Target, etc.). That’s up from 44.2% in 2002, when we acquired the company. Operating from a smaller base, we have made still greater gains in intimate apparel for women and girls that is sold by the mass-marketers, climbing from 13.7% of their sales in 2002 to 24.7% in 2005. A gain like that in a major category doesn’t come easy. Thank John Holland, Fruit’s extraordinary CEO, for making this happen.
在服饰鞋业方面，我们最大的企业鲜果布衣收益与市场份额再次双双增长。当然，我们在男士和女士内衣市场上的领先优势尽人皆知，根据沃尔玛、Target等大型卖场的统计，我们的销售份额约为48.7%，与2002年我们收购这家企业时的44.2%相比显著上升。从较小的基数开始，我们在大卖场销售的成年妇女和女孩的内衣的市场份额从2002年的13.7%上升到2005年的24.7%。在一个主要服饰类别市场上能够实现如此的增长并非易事，为此我们要特别感谢公司的CEO：JohnHolland创造了这一奇迹。
- I told you last year that Ben Bridge (jewelry) and R. C. Willey (home furnishings) had same-store sales gains far above the average of their industries. You might think that blow-out figures in one year would make comparisons difficult in the following year. But Ed and Jon Bridge at their operation and Scott Hymas at R. C. Willey were more than up to this challenge. Ben Bridge had a 6.6% same-store gain in 2005, and R. C. Willey came in at 9.9%.
2005年我曾告诉各位：BenBridge珠宝和R.C.Willey家居的销售额远远超过业内同行。你们可能会认为，一个年度的爆炸性增长会导致第二年的业绩难以比肩，但BenBridge的Ed和JonBridge、R.C.Willey的ScottHymas面对这种挑战却仍旧实现了继续增长，2005年BenBridge单店销售额增长了6.6%，R.C.Willey单店增长了9.9%。
Our never-on-Sunday approach at R. C. Willey continues to overwhelm seven-day competitors as we roll out stores in new markets. The Boise store, about which I was such a skeptic a few years back, had a 21% gain in 2005, coming off a 10% gain in 2004. Our new Reno store, opened in November, broke out of the gate fast with sales that exceeded Boise’s early pace, and we will begin business in Sacramento in June. If this store succeeds as I expect it to, Californians will see many more R. C. Willey stores in the years to come.
当我们在新的市场开出新店铺时，R.C.Willey继续以周日不营业的经营方式横扫一周经营七天的竞争对手，几年之前我还十分怀疑的Boise店，2005年销售额竟然增长了21%，刷新了2004年10%的纪录。2005年11月新开的内华达州Reno店一开张就挤破了大门，销售额很快超过了Boise店早期的水平。2006年6月加州中部Sacramento店将开始营业，如果这家店能够像我所预料的那样成功的话，那么，未来几年内在加州将会看到更多R.C.Willey专卖店。
- In flight services, earnings improved at FlightSafety as corporate aviation continued its rebound. To support growth, we invest heavily in new simulators. Our most recent expansion, bringing us to 42 training centers, is a major facility at Farnborough, England that opened in September. When it is fully built out in 2007, we will have invested more than $100 million in the building and its 15 simulators. Bruce Whitman, FlightSafety’s able CEO, makes sure that no competitor comes close to offering the breadth and depth of services that we do.
在航空服务业务方面，航空公司业务的反弹使飞安公司FlightSafety的收益得到改善。为了支持公司业务持续增长，我们大笔投资新的飞行模拟器，我们最近的扩张是2005年9月份在英国Farnborough新运营一个主要飞行训练基地，拥有42个训练中心。到2007年完全建成时，我们将累计投资1亿美元用于基础建筑及15台飞行模拟器。FlightSafety非常能干的CEO：BruceWhitman确信，没有任何竞争对手所提供服务在深度和广度上能够与我们相媲美的。
Operating results at NetJets were a different story. I said last year that this business would earn money in 2005 — and I was dead wrong.
[NetJets|利捷航空]的经营成果却是一个完全不同的故事。2004年我曾放言其业务将在2005年实现盈利，但我却错得一塌糊涂。
Our European operation, it should be noted, showed both excellent growth and a reduced loss. Customer contracts there increased by 37%. We are the only fractional-ownership operation of any size in Europe, and our now-pervasive presence there is a key factor in making NetJets the worldwide leader in this industry.
应该说明的是，我们欧洲地区的业务在实现了良好的增长的同时，成本也有所下降，客户合同数量增长了37%。我们是欧洲地区经营共享飞机所有权业务的唯一一家企业，我们目前在欧洲地区业务遍地开花的局面是NetJets成为这一行业全球领导者的关键因素。
Despite a large increase in customers, however, our U.S. operation dipped far into the red. Its efficiency fell, and costs soared. We believe that our three largest competitors suffered similar problems, but each is owned by aircraft manufacturers that may think differently than we do about the necessity of making adequate profits. The combined value of the fleets managed by these three competitors, in any case, continues to be less valuable than the fleet that we operate.
可是我们的美国业务尽管客户大幅度增长，却出现了严重的亏损，其经营效率下降、成本急升。我们相信，我们三个最大的竞争对手也遭受到了同样的打击，但他们都隶属于各自飞机制造商，因此可能并不像我们那样非常关注获得足够利润的必要性。无论如何，这三家竞争对手管理的飞行机队的综合价值都继续远低于我们运作的机队的价值。
Rich Santulli, one of the most dynamic managers I’ve ever met, will solve our revenue/expense problem. He won’t do it, however, in a manner that impairs the quality of the NetJets experience. Both he and I are committed to a level of service, security and safety that can’t be matched by others.
RichSantulli这位我所认识的最具活力的经理人将会解决公司的收入成本问题，但他绝不会以损害公司服务质量的方式来解决问题。我和他都保证我们的服务、安保、飞行安全水平肯定是其他任何对手难以比拟的。
- Our retailing category includes See’s Candies, a company we bought early in 1972 (a date making it our oldest non-insurance business). At that time, Charlie and I immediately decided to put Chuck Huggins, then 46, in charge. Though we were new at the game of selecting managers, Charlie and I hit a home run with this appointment. Chuck’s love for the customer and the brand permeated the organization1, which in his 34-year tenure produced a more-than-tenfold increase in profits. This gain was achieved in an industry growing at best slowly and perhaps not at all. (Volume figures in this industry are hard to pin down.)
我们的零售业务中包括喜诗糖果这家我们早在1972年收购的公司，这也是我们历史最为悠久的非保险企业，当时我们马上决定由46岁的ChuckHuggins来负责。尽管我们俩当时在选择经理人上还是新手，芒格和我在这次任命上却打出了一个”本垒打”。在34年的任期中(80岁)，他对客户和品牌的热爱已经渗透到整个组织中，使这家公司的盈利增长了10倍。值得指出的是，这一成就是在一个增长得很慢甚至可以说是几乎没有增长的产业中所取得的(在这个行业中，销售数量的数据很难搞清楚)。
At yearend, Chuck turned the reins at See’s over to Brad Kinstler, who previously had served Berkshire well while running Cypress Insurance and Fechheimer’s. It’s unusual for us to move managers around, but Brad’s record made him an obvious choice for the See’s job. I hope Chuck and his wife, Donna, are at the annual meeting. If they are, shareholders can join Charlie and me in giving America’s number one candy maker a richly-deserved round of applause.
2005年年底，我们把喜诗的管理权杖交给了BradKinstler，在此之前，他在为伯克希尔管理Cypress工伤赔偿保险(1993)和费区海默(2000)时就做得很好。对于我们来说，把经理人调来调去并不寻常，但BradKinstler的良好记录让我们认为，他显而易见是喜诗经理人的最佳选择。我希望Chuck和妻子Donna能够出席今年的股东大会。如果出席的话，所有股东就能与我和查理一起，给这位美国第一的糖果制造商经理人非常应得的掌声。
Every day, in countless ways, the competitive position of each of our businesses grows either weaker or stronger. If we are delighting customers, eliminating unnecessary costs and improving our products and services, we gain strength. But if we treat customers with indifference or tolerate bloat, our businesses will wither. On a daily basis, the effects of our actions are imperceptible; cumulatively, though, their consequences are enormous.
每一天，我们旗下每一家企业的竞争地位，都在以无数种方式，要么变强，要么变弱。如果我们让客户更加满意、消除不必要的成本支出、改善我们的产品和服务，我们的竞争力就会更强。但如果我们对待客户时冷淡，容忍不必要的费用成本不断上升，我们的竞争力就会萎缩。就每一天而言，我们日常行为的影响难以察觉，但天长日久所累计的影响后果之巨大却难以估计。
When our long-term competitive position improves as a result of these almost unnoticeable actions, we describe the phenomenon as “widening the moat.” And doing that is essential if we are to have the kind of business we want a decade or two from now. We always, of course, hope to earn more money in the short-term. But when short-term and long-term conflict, widening the moat must take precedence. If a management makes bad decisions in order to hit short-term earnings targets, and consequently gets behind the eight-ball in terms of costs, customer satisfaction or brand strength, no amount of subsequent brilliance will overcome the damage that has been inflicted. Take a look at the dilemmas of managers in the auto and airline industries today as they struggle with the huge problems handed them by their predecessors. Charlie is fond of quoting Ben Franklin’s “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. “But sometimes no amount of cure will overcome the mistakes of the past.
当我们的长期竞争地位，因这些几乎毫不显眼的行为，而得到改善时，我们称这种现象为”加宽护城河”，这些行为对于我们想要打造10年甚至20年以后的企业至关重要。当然，我们总是想在短期内赚到更多的钱，但当短期与长期目标冲突时，加宽护城河应该优先加以考虑。如果一个公司管理层为实现短期盈利目标，而作出糟糕的决策，并因此置成本、客户满意度、品牌吸引力于不顾，那么，以后再出色的努力也难免弥补由此造成的损害。当今汽车和航空行业的公司经理人，在努力处置其前任留下的问题时，所面临的进退两难的局面就是最好的证明。芒格和我喜欢引用本·富兰克林的名言：“一盎司的预防抵得上一磅的治疗”。但有时再多的治疗也无法治愈过去的错误。
Our managers focus on moat-widening — and are brilliant at it. Quite simply, they are passionate about their businesses. Usually, they were running those long before we came along, our only function since has been to stay out of the way. If you see these heroes — and I our four heroines as well — at the annual meeting, thank them for the job they do for you.
我们的经理人们专注于加宽护城河并且在这方面才华横溢，原因非常简单，他们对他们的事业充满热情。在伯克希尔收购以前，他们往往已经管理了这家公司很长时间，伯克希尔进入之后唯一的作用是保持原来的方向，而不要成为障碍。各位股东如果在年度大会上看到这些为股东们作为杰出贡献的英雄们(其中包括四位女中豪杰)，请向他们表示感谢。
The attitude of our managers vividly contrasts with that of the young man who married a tycoon’s only child, a decidedly homely and dull lass. Relieved, the father called in his new son-in-law after the wedding and began to discuss the future:
我们的经理人的态度，与一位娶了商业大亨独生女儿的年轻小伙子形成了鲜明的对比，在婚礼之后，感到十分宽慰的父亲把他的女婿叫来，开始讨论他们的将来：
“Son, you’re the boy I always wanted and never had. Here’s a stock certificate for 50% of the company. You’re my equal partner from now on.”
“孩子，你是我盼望已久却一直未能找到的乘龙快婿，这是我的公司的50%的股权证明，从现在开始，你就是与我平起平坐的合伙人了。”
“Thanks, dad.”
“谢谢您，父亲大人。”
“Now, what would you like to run? How about sales?”
“那么，你想负责公司的哪些业务？负责销售怎么样？”
“I’m afraid I couldn’t sell water to a man crawling in the Sahara.”
“恐怕我连把水卖给一个在撒哈拉沙漠里爬行的人也做不到。”
“Well then, how about heading human relations?”
“好吧，那么负责人际关系如何？”
“I really don’t care for people.”
“我对别人根本毫不关心。”
“No problem, we have lots of other spots in the business. What would you like to do?”
“没关系，在经营中我们还有许多其他事情要做。你愿意做什么？”
“Actually, nothing appeals to me. Why don’t you just buy me out?”
“事实上，我对任何事都没有兴趣。你为什么不直接买下我的股份呢？”
Investments 投资业务
We show below our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $700 million at the end of 2005 are itemized.
以下是我们的普通股投资情况。2005年年底市值超过7亿美元的股票投资明细如下：
12/31/05
| Shares 股份数量 | Company 公司名称 | Percentage of Company Owned 股份占比 | Cost* (in $ millions) 成本（百万美元） | Market (in $ millions) 市值（百万美元） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company [[American_Express | 美国运通]] | 12.2 | $ 1,287 |
| 30,322,137 | Ameriprise Financial,Inc. Ameriprise金融 | 12.1 | 183 | 1,243 |
| 43,854,200 | Anheuser-Busch Cos.,Inc. | 5.6 | 2,133 | 1,884 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company [[Coca_Cola | 可口可乐]] | 8.4 | 1,299 |
| 6,708,760 | M&T Bank Corporation M&T 银行 | 6.0 | 103 | 732 |
| 48,000,000 | Moody’s Corporation [[Moodys | 穆迪]]M&T银行 | 16.2 | 499 |
| 2,338,961,000 | PetroChina “H” shares (or equivalents) [[PetroChina | 中国石油]] | 1.3 | 488 |
| 100,000,000 | The Procter & Gamble CompanyP&G P&G保洁人员 | 3.0 | 940 | 5,788 |
| 19,944,300 | Wal-Mart Stores,Inc. 沃尔玛 | 0.5 | 944 | 933 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company [[Washington_Post | 华盛顿邮报]] | 18.0 | 11 |
| 95,092,200 | Wells Fargo &Company [[Wells_Fargo | 富国银行]] | 5.7 | 2,754 |
| 1,724,200 | White Mountains Insurance 白山保险 | 16.0 | 369 | 963 |
| Others 其他 | 4,937 | 7,154 | ||
| Total Common Stocks 股票投资合计 | $ 15,947 | $ 46,721 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required.
* H&R block大力扩张房屋抵押贷款业务(Clayton金融业务)，带来的利率风险可能是巴菲特清仓的理由。
A couple of last year’s changes in our portfolio occurred because of corporate events: Gillette was merged into Procter & Gamble, and American Express spun off Ameriprise. In addition, we substantially increased our holdings in Wells Fargo, a company that Dick Kovacevich runs brilliantly, and established positions in Anheuser-Busch and Wal-Mart.
2005年，我们的投资组合由于公司事件而出现了两个变化：吉列公司被宝洁合并，美国运通将Ameriprise分拆上市。另外，我们大幅增持了富国银行的股票，这家公司由DickKovacevich管理得非常出色，同时在安海斯布希(Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc.啤酒制造商)和沃尔玛公司股票上大量建仓。
Expect no miracles from our equity portfolio. Though we own major interests in a number of strong, highly-profitable businesses, they are not selling at anything like bargain prices. As a group, they may double in value in ten years. The likelihood is that their per-share earnings, in aggregate, will grow 6-8% per year over the decade and that their stock prices will more or less match that growth. (Their managers, of course, think my expectations are too modest — and I hope they’re right.)
不要期望我们的证券投资组合会出现什么奇迹，尽管我们主要持股一些实力强大且盈利能力很高的企业，但其股价根本谈不上便宜。作为一个整体，它们的价值可能会在10年内翻一番，在未来十年内，这些公司的每股收益每年可能增长6-8%，其股价将或多或少与每股收益的增长相近(当然这些公司的经理人会认为我的预期过于保守，我希望他们是对的)。
The P&G-Gillette merger, closing in the fourth quarter of 2005, required Berkshire to record a $5.0 billion pre-tax capital gain. This bookkeeping entry, dictated by GAAP, is meaningless from an economic standpoint, and you should ignore it when you are evaluating Berkshire’s 2005 earnings. We didn’t intend to sell our Gillette shares before the merger, we don’t intend to sell our P&G shares now, and we incurred no tax when the merger took place.
宝洁与吉列的合并于2005年第4季度结束，这要求伯克希尔记录50亿美元的税前收益。从经济的观点来看，美国公认会计准则(GAAP)规定的这种会计分录没有任何意义，你在评估伯克希尔2005年收益情况时，应该忽略这笔巨额会计收益。在合并之前，我们从来没有打算卖出吉列的股票，合并之后，我们也不打算卖出宝洁的股票，合并也不会导致我们缴纳任何税费。
It’s hard to overemphasize the importance of who is CEO of a company. Before Jim Kilts arrived at Gillette in 2001, the company was struggling, having particularly suffered from capital-allocation blunders. In the major example, Gillette’s acquisition of Duracell cost Gillette shareholders billions of dollars, a loss never made visible by conventional accounting. Quite simply, what Gillette received in business value in this acquisition was not equivalent to what it gave up. (Amazingly, this most fundamental of yardsticks is almost always ignored by both managements and their investment bankers when acquisitions are under discussion.)
无论如何强调一个CEO对公司的重要性也不过分，在2001年吉姆·基尔茨进入吉列之前(James Kilts，吉列的第一任空降CEO，著有《刀锋上的舞蹈：我如何挽救了吉列》，临危受命与其搭档JohnF.Manfresi从纳斯贝克一起来到吉列，拯救这家陷入困难的公司)，这家公司正在苦苦地挣扎之中(盈利停滞股价腰斩)，特别是在资本配置上的失误。吉列收购金霸王电池花费了股东们几十亿美元(1股金霸王交换1.8股吉列，总价约72亿美元，KKR于1988年花费18亿收购金霸王，至1996年，多次发行股票已获利13亿)，而这种代价在传统财务会计上根本看不出任何反映。简而言之，吉列在并购中获得的商业价值与其付出的并购成本并不相等(令人非常吃惊的是，这种非常简单的衡量标准在管理层及其投资银行家讨论并购时几乎总是被忽略)。
Upon taking office at Gillette, Jim quickly instilled fiscal discipline, tightened operations and energized marketing, moves that dramatically increased the intrinsic value of the company. Gillette’s merger with P&G then expanded the potential of both companies. For his accomplishments, Jim was paid very well — but he earned every penny. (This is no academic evaluation: As a 9.7% owner of Gillette, Berkshire in effect paid that proportion of his compensation.) Indeed, it’s difficult to overpay the truly extraordinary CEO of a giant enterprise. But this species is rare.
JimKilts上任吉列以后，马上开始严肃财务纪律(一般管理费用零增长)，全面收紧业务(砍掉50%SKU)，推动市场营销(加大广告投入)，他的一系列措施大幅度提升了公司的内在价值。吉列并入宝洁进一步增强了两家公司的发展潜力。由于其管理成就，JimKilts获得了非常丰厚的薪酬——但他所挣的每一分钱都理所应当(这并非一个学术探讨：作为在吉列公司持股9.7%的股东，伯克希尔实际上支付了相应比例的薪酬)。事实上，向一个巨型企业的能力超凡的CEO支付再高的回报也不为过，可惜这种CEO实在是太罕见了。
Too often, executive compensation in the U.S. is ridiculously out of line with performance. That won’t change, moreover, because the deck is stacked against investors when it comes to the CEO’s pay. The upshot is that a mediocre-or-worse CEO — aided by his handpicked VP of human relations and a consultant from the ever-accommodating firm of Ratchet, Ratchet and Bingo — all too often receives gobs of money from an ill-designed compensation arrangement.
大多数美国高管的薪酬与经营业绩并不匹配，将来也不会出现什么太大的变化，因为在涉及到CEO薪酬问题时，投资者完全处于劣势。结果是，一个平庸或者表现糟糕的CEO，在他精心物色的人际关系高管和一个非常善于利用棘轮效应的薪酬顾问的协助下，所有人都从一个恶意设计的高管薪酬安排中获得大量的金钱。
Take, for instance, ten year, fixed-price options (and who wouldn’t?). If Fred Futile, CEO of Stagnant, Inc., receives a bundle of these — let’s say enough to give him an option on 1% of the company — his self-interest is clear: He should skip dividends entirely and instead use all of the company’s earnings to repurchase stock.
例如，十年固定价格的股票期权(谁不想要呢？)。假设停滞不前公司的CEO废物先生接受了这样一批期权，比如给予他相当于公司1%的股票期权，那么，他获取个人利益的方法就会显而易见——他肯定不会支付任何红利，而是保留公司所有的收益，用来回购股票。
Let’s assume that under Fred’s leadership Stagnant lives up to its name. In each of the ten years after the option grant, it earns 10 billion of net worth, which initially comes to 25.80. Simply by withholding earnings from owners, Fred gets very rich, making a cool 100 million if Stagnant’s earnings had declined by 20% during the ten-year period.
假设在废物先生的领导下，停滞不前公司恰如其名没有什么增长，在发行期权后的十年间，公司每年在100亿美元的净资产价值基础上盈利10亿美元，相当于所发行的1亿股股票每股盈利10美元。废物先生拒绝向股东派发红利，用全部收益来回购股票。如果股价一直保持10倍市盈率的水平，那么，在期权到期之日股价将增值158%。这是因为持续回购使股份减少 3870万股，每股收益将因此提高到25.80美元/股。通过将股东收益全部保留不作分配，废物先生就能获得1.58亿美元的巨额财富，尽管公司业务没有任何增长。更令人吃惊的是，即使停滞不前公司的收益在这十年间下降了20%，废物先生仍然可以赚到1亿美元以上。
Fred can also get a splendid result for himself by paying no dividends and deploying the earnings he withholds from shareholders into a variety of disappointing projects and acquisitions. Even if these initiatives deliver a paltry 5% return, Fred will still make a bundle. Specifically — with Stagnant’s p/e ratio remaining unchanged at ten — Fred’s option will deliver him $63 million. Meanwhile, his shareholders will wonder what happened to the “alignment of interests” that was supposed to occur when Fred was issued options.
通过不分配红利而将留存收益投资到各种令人失望的项目和并购上，废物先生仍然会获得巨大的回报，即使这些投资只能取得微不足道的5%的收益率，废物先生个人仍然能有大笔金钱进账。具体来说，在停滞不前公司的市盈率在十年间保持不变的情况下，废物先生的期权会让他赚到630万美元。与此同时，所有股东会开始怀疑：当时向废物先生发行期权时所声称的股东与管理层结成”利益同盟”究竟是什么回事？
A “normal” dividend policy, of course — one-third of earnings paid out, for example —produces less extreme results but still can provide lush rewards for managers who achieve nothing.
一种”正常”的红利政策，比如将收益的三分之一派发红利，虽然不会导致如此极端的结果出现，但仍然会让那些根本没有任何成就的经理人获得极其丰厚的回报。
CEOs understand this math and know that every dime paid out in dividends reduces the value of all outstanding options. I’ve never, however, seen this manager-owner conflict referenced in proxy materials that request approval of a fixed-priced option plan. Though CEOs invariably preach internally that capital comes at a cost, they somehow forget to tell shareholders that fixed-price options give them capital that is free.
CEO们非常明白这个数学道理，他们知道支付给股东的每一分钱红利都会相应减少已发行期权的价值，可是我从未见在要求批准固定价格股票期权计划的股东大会委托材料中，看到过管理层与股东之间发生冲突。尽管CEO们总是在公司内部宣扬资本是有成本的，但他们不知为何总是忘记告诉股东们，固定价格股票期权给CEO们带来的资本却是免费的。
It doesn’t have to be this way: It’s child’s play for a board to design options that give effect to the automatic build-up in value that occurs when earnings are retained. But — surprise, surprise — options of that kind are almost never issued. Indeed, the very thought of options with strike prices that are adjusted for retained earnings seems foreign to compensation “experts,” who are nevertheless encyclopedic about every management-friendly plan that exists. (“Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.“)
事情本来并非注定必须如此，对于一家公司的董事会来说，当保留收益时，实行一种自动调整计算期权价值的做法简直是轻而易举的。但让我吃惊又吃惊的是，这种期权几乎从来没有发行过。实际上，期权履约价格随着留存收益而调整的期权激励计划，对于管理层激励”专家”来说似乎十分陌生，然而这些专家对所有出现过的有利于管理层的期权计划，却像百科全书一样了如指掌，(吃谁的面包就唱谁的歌)。
Getting fired can produce a particularly bountiful payday for a CEO. Indeed, he can “earn” more in that single day, while cleaning out his desk, than an American worker earns in a lifetime of cleaning toilets. Forget the old maxim about nothing succeeding like success: Today, in the executive suite, the all-too-prevalent rule is that nothing succeeds like failure.
被解雇会给CEO带来特别丰厚的薪水，事实上，在清理他的办公桌走人的那一天，他”挣”到的钱要比一个清扫厕所的美国环卫工人一年所挣的钱还要多得多(可口可乐CEO道格拉斯·伊维斯特离职近1亿遣散费)。忘掉那句古老的格言：“一事成功事事成功”。如今，在公司管理层中，一个风靡一时的定律是：“失败是成功之母”。
Huge severance payments, lavish perks and outsized payments for ho-hum performance often occur because comp committees have become slaves to comparative data. The drill is simple: Three or so directors — not chosen by chance — are bombarded for a few hours before a board meeting with pay statistics that perpetually ratchet upwards. Additionally, the committee is told about new perks that other managers are receiving. In this manner, outlandish “goodies” are showered upon CEOs simply because of a corporate version of the argument we all used when children: “But, Mom, all the other kids have one.” When comp committees follow this “logic,” yesterday’s most egregious excess becomes today’s baseline.
为管理层毫不起眼的平平业绩支付巨额的离职补偿、慷慨的福利和超标的奖金，早已司空见惯，因为公司薪酬委员会已经成为数据比较的奴隶。搞定董事会的方法很简单，选择三名董事，当然并非随机选择，在董事会会议召开前几个小时，用薪酬支付永远逐步提高的统计数据对他们进行一番狂轰乱炸。如此这般，董事会就会把一大堆稀奇古怪的”糖果”撒向CEO们，而原因只是我们儿时都会用的小把戏：“但是，妈妈，所有其他小朋友都有一个”。当公司薪酬委员会遵循类似的逻辑时，昨天令人震惊的过分要求，就会成为今天的底线。
Comp committees should adopt the attitude of Hank Greenberg, the Detroit slugger and a boyhood hero of mine. Hank’s son, Steve, at one time was a player’s agent. Representing an outfielder in negotiations with a major league club, Steve sounded out his dad about the size of the signing bonus he should ask for. Hank, a true pay-for-performance guy, got straight to the point, “What did he hit last year?” When Steve answered “.246,” Hank’s comeback was immediate: “Ask for a uniform.”
公司董事会应该采取我儿时的偶像底特律队著名强击手(打出许多本垒打的击球手)HankGreenberg的态度。HankGreenberg的儿子Steve曾经是一个球手的代理人，在代表一个外场手与一家职业棒球大联盟俱乐部谈判时，Steve试探性地问他的老爸，他应该要求多少签约奖金。HankGreenberg这位真正的按劳付酬主义者一针见血地问：“去年他的击打成功率是多少？“Steve说：“0.246。“HankGreenberg的回答直截了当：“要一件队服。”
(Let me pause for a brief confession: In criticizing comp committee behavior, I don’t speak as a true insider. Though I have served as a director of twenty public companies, only one CEO has put me on his comp committee. Hmmmm…)
(让我停下来简短地坦白一下：在批评公司薪酬委员会的行为时，我并非作为一个真正的内幕人士进行爆料，尽管我曾经担任过20家上市公司的董事，但只有一家公司的CEO把我安排进入公司薪酬委员会。嗯……)
My views on America’s long-term problem in respect to trade imbalances, which I have laid out in previous reports, remain unchanged. My conviction, however, cost Berkshire 1 billion in value early on to 8.1 billion — with none of these moves affecting our earnings statement. Long-term currency positions, however, are daily marked to market and therefore have an effect on earnings in every reporting period. From the date we first entered into currency contracts, we are $2.0 billion in the black.
我认为美国经济的长期问题在于贸易不平衡，对此，我已经在过去的年报中详细陈述，我的观点仍旧不变。我的这一信念却让伯克希尔2005年度税前利润减少了9.55亿美元，这一数据包括在我们的损益表中，也反映了美国公认会计准则(GAAP)对待收益和损失的不同方式。我们在股票或债券上持有长期头寸时，每年的持仓市值变化会反映在资产负债中，但只要我们没有出售，这笔资产就极少反映在损益表中。比如，我们的可口可乐股票价值从1998年年底的134亿美元下跌到2005年年底的81亿美元，市值下降了53亿美元之巨，却不会影响我们的损益表。可是长期外汇头寸却是根据当日市价每日计价的，因此，每个报表日都会影响我们的收益情况，从我们第一次涉足外汇交易起至今，我们一共赚了20亿美元。
We reduced our direct position in currencies somewhat during 2005. We partially offset this change, however, by purchasing equities whose prices are denominated in a variety of foreign currencies and that earn a large part of their profits internationally. Charlie and I prefer this method of acquiring non-dollar exposure. That’s largely because of changes in interest rates: As U.S. rates have risen relative to those of the rest of the world, holding most foreign currencies now involves a significant negative “carry.” The carry aspect of our direct currency position indeed cost us money in 2005 and is likely to do so again in 2006. In contrast, the ownership of foreign equities is likely, over time, to create a positive carry — perhaps a substantial one.
2005年我们减少了一些美元现汇看跌头寸，可是通过买入以多种外汇计价的股票，我们部分抵消了这一变化，而且他们大部分利润来自国际市场。查理和我更喜欢以这种方式获得非美元风险敞口。这主要是由于利率的变化：当美国利率相对于其他国家上升时，持有资产大部分为外汇就会形成一个显著的负盈利。2005年，我们持有美元头寸的这种盈利变化实际上给我们造成了损失，2006年可能会继续如此。与之相反，持有国外股票经过一段时间之后，形成一个正盈利的可能性会相当大。
The underlying factors affecting the U.S. current account deficit continue to worsen, and no letup is in sight. Not only did our trade deficit — the largest and most familiar item in the current account — hit an all-time high in 2005, but we also can expect a second item — the balance of investment income — to soon turn negative. As foreigners increase their ownership of U.S. assets (or of claims against us) relative to U.S. investments abroad, these investors will begin earning more on their holdings than we do on ours. Finally, the third component of the current account, unilateral transfers, is always negative.
影响美国经常账户赤字的潜在因素继续恶化，而且看起来没有中止的迹象，不仅我们的贸易赤字——经常账户中最大也是最常见的项目——在2005年创下了历史新高，而且我们预计第二大项目——投资收支也将很快由正转负。由于相对于美国海外投资而言，外国投资者所持有的美国资产(或者对美国的索取权)增加得更多，因此，这些外国投资者通过他们所持有的美国资产所获得的收益，将开始超过我们美国所持有的海外资产获得的收益。最后，经常账户的第三个项目国际收支中的单边资金转移总是负的。
The U.S., it should be emphasized, is extraordinarily rich and will get richer. As a result, the huge imbalances in its current account may continue for a long time without their having noticeable deleterious effects on the U.S. economy or on markets. I doubt, however, that the situation will forever remain benign. Either Americans address the problem soon in a way we select, or at some point the problem will likely address us in an unpleasant way of its own.
应该强调的是，美国特别富裕，并且将更加富裕。结果是，美国经常账户的巨大不平衡如果对美国经济或市场没有产生显而易见的有害影响的话，可能会持续很长一段时间。可是我不太相信这种情况会永远是有利的，要么美国人尽快用我们所选择的方式来处理这个问题，要么到了某种程度，这个问题可能将会以一种不太令人愉快的方式引起我们的注意。
How to Minimize Investment Returns 如何使投资收益最小化
It’s been an easy matter for Berkshire and other owners of American equities to prosper over the years. Between December 31, 1899 and December 31, 1999, to give a really long-term example, the Dow rose from 66 to 11,497. (Guess what annual growth rate is required to produce this result; the surprising answer is at the end of this section.) This huge rise came about for a simple reason: Over the century American businesses did extraordinarily well and investors rode the wave of their prosperity. Businesses continue to do well. But now shareholders, through a series of self-inflicted wounds, are in a major way cutting the returns they will realize from their investments.
对于伯克希尔和其他美国股票投资人来说，过去这些年来大把赚钱简直是轻而易举的。一个真正称得上长期的例子是，从1899年12月31日到1999年12月31日的100年间，道琼斯指数从66点上涨到11497点(猜一猜需要多大的年增长率才能形成这一结果？在这一部分的结尾，你会看到一个吃惊的答案)。如此巨大的升幅只有一个十分简单的原因：20世纪美国企业经营得非常出色，投资人借企业繁荣的东风赚得盆满钵满。目前美国企业经营继续良好，但如今的投资人由于受到了一系列的伤害，在相当大的程度上减少了他们本来能从投资中实现的收益。
The explanation of how this is happening begins with a fundamental truth: With unimportant exceptions, such as bankruptcies in which some of a company’s losses are borne by creditors, the most that owners in aggregate can earn between now and Judgment Day is what their businesses in aggregate earn. True, by buying and selling that is clever or lucky, investor A may take more than his share of the pie at the expense of investor B. And, yes, all investors feel richer when stocks soar. But an owner can exit only by having someone take his place. If one investor sells high, another must buy high. For owners as a whole, there is simply no magic — no shower of money from outer space — that will enable them to extract wealth from their companies beyond that created by the companies themselves.
要解释这一切是怎么回事，我们得从一个最基本的事实开始：除了一些无足轻重的情况例外(比如企业破产时企业的损失由债权人负担)，在大多数情况下，所有股东从现在开始到世界末日期间，所能获得的收益与他们所拥有的公司总体而言的收益相等。当然，通过聪明地买入和卖出，投资者A能够比投资者B获得更多的收益，但总体而言，A赚的正好相当于B赔的，总的收益还是那么多。当股市上涨时，所有的投资者都会感觉更有钱了，但一个股东要退出，前提必须是有新的股东加入接替他的位置。如果一个投资者高价卖出，另一个投资者必须高价买入。所有的股东作为一个整体而言，如果没有从天而降的金钱暴雨神话发生的话，根本不可能从公司那里得到比公司所创造的收益更多的财富。
Indeed, owners must earn less than their businesses earn because of “frictional” costs. And that’s my point: These costs are now being incurred in amounts that will cause shareholders to earn far less than they historically have.
实际上，由于”摩擦”成本的存在，股东获得的收益肯定少于公司的收益。我个人的看法是：这些成本如今正变得越来越高，将会导致股东们未来的收益水平要远远低于他们的历史收益水平。
To understand how this toll has ballooned, imagine for a moment that all American corporations are, and always will be, owned by a single family. We’ll call them the Gotrocks. After paying taxes on dividends, this family — generation after generation — becomes richer by the aggregate amount earned by its companies. Today that amount is about $700 billion annually. Naturally, the family spends some of these dollars. But the portion it saves steadily compounds for its benefit. In the Gotrocks household everyone grows wealthier at the same pace, and all is harmonious.
为了弄清楚这些费用是如何飞涨起来的，你可以这样想象一下。美国所有的上市公司被一个美国家庭所拥有，而且将永远如此。我们称其为GotRocks(牛逼家族)。对所得分红纳税之后，这个家庭的一代接一代依靠他们拥有的公司所获得的利润将变得更加富有。目前美国所有上市公司一年的收益约为7,000亿美元，这个家庭自然还得花费掉一些钱用于生活，但这个家庭所积蓄的那部分财富将会稳定地以复利不断地累积财富。在这个GotRocks大家庭里，所有的人的财富都以同样的速度持续增长，一切都十分协调。
But let’s now assume that a few fast-talking Helpers approach the family and persuade each of its members to try to outsmart his relatives by buying certain of their holdings and selling them certain others. The Helpers — for a fee, of course — obligingly agree to handle these transactions. The Gotrocks still own all of corporate America; the trades just rearrange who owns what. So the family’s annual gain in wealth diminishes, equaling the earnings of American business minus commissions paid. The more that family members trade, the smaller their share of the pie and the larger the slice received by the Helpers. This fact is not lost upon these broker-Helpers: Activity is their friend and, in a wide variety of ways, they urge it on.
但让我们设想一下，几个伶牙俐齿的帮助者接近这个家庭，劝说每个家庭成员通过买入某一只股票和卖出另外一只股票来取得比其他家庭成员更好的投资业绩。这些帮助者十分热心地答应来处理这些交易，当然他们要收取一定的佣金。GotRocks这个大家庭仍然包括美国所有的上市公司，这些交易只不过是重新安排哪些人持有哪些公司而已，因此，这个家庭每年的总体财富收益在减少。这些家庭成员交易的次数越多，他们从企业收益这个大饼中所分到份额就越少，那些作为经纪人的帮助者分到的份额却变得越多。这些作为经纪人的帮助者始终牢记的事实是：交易的活跃性是他们的朋友，因此他们总是想方设法提高客户交易的活跃性。
After a while, most of the family members realize that they are not doing so well at this new “beat-my-brother” game. Enter another set of Helpers. These newcomers explain to each member of the Gotrocks clan that by himself he’ll never outsmart the rest of the family. The suggested cure: “Hire a manager — yes, us — and get the job done professionally.” These manager-Helpers continue to use the broker-Helpers to execute trades; the managers may even increase their activity so as to permit the brokers to prosper still more. Overall, a bigger slice of the pie now goes to the two classes of Helpers.
不久之后，大多数家庭成员意识到，在这种新的”打败我兄弟”的游戏中，这些经纪人做得并不好，于是又来了另一批帮助者。第二批帮助者对每个家庭成员解释说，只靠成员们自己的努力是很难胜过其他家庭成员的，他们给出的解决办法是：“聘用一个经理人，就是我们，我们会做得非常专业”。第二批帮助者兼经理人继续使用第一批帮助者兼经纪人进行交易，这些经理人甚至提高了交易的活跃性以致那些经纪人业务更加兴隆。总之，企业收益这张大饼的更大一块儿落入了这两批帮助者的私囊。
The family’s disappointment grows. Each of its members is now employing professionals. Yet overall, the group’s finances have taken a turn for the worse. The solution? More help, of course.
这个大家庭的失望与日俱增。每个家庭成员都聘用了专业人士，但这个家庭整体的财务状况却每况愈下，怎么办？答案是显而易见的：要寻求更多的帮助。
It arrives in the form of financial planners and institutional consultants, who weigh in to advise the Gotrocks on selecting manager-Helpers. The befuddled family welcomes this assistance. By now its members know they can pick neither the right stocks nor the right stock-pickers. Why, one might ask, should they expect success in picking the right consultant? But this question does not occur to the Gotrocks, and the consultant-Helpers certainly don’t suggest it to them.
第三批帮助者的身份是财务规划专家和机构咨询专家，他们正在仔细斟酌向GotRocks这个大家庭提供关于选择经理人的建议，已经晕头晕脑的这个家庭对他们的协助自然非常欢迎。事到如今，这些家庭成员才明白，他们自己既不能选择合适的股票，也不能选择合适的选股人。有人就会产生疑问，为什么他们还想成功地选择合适的顾问呢？遗憾的是，GotRocks这个大家庭并没有产生类似的疑问，第三批帮助者兼顾问当然肯定不会向他们说明这个问题。
The Gotrocks, now supporting three classes of expensive Helpers, find that their results get worse, and they sink into despair. But just as hope seems lost, a fourth group — we’ll call them the hyper-Helpers — appears. These friendly folk explain to the Gotrocks that their unsatisfactory results are occurring because the existing Helpers — brokers, managers, consultants — are not sufficiently motivated and are simply going through the motions. “What,” the new Helpers ask, “can you expect from such a bunch of zombies?”
GotRocks这个大家庭现在要为这三批帮助者支付昂贵的费用，但他们却发现情况更加不妙，他们陷入了绝望之中。但就在最后的希望即将破灭之时，第四批帮助者——我们称其为超级帮助者出现了。他们态度十分友好地向这个大家庭解释，他们至今无法得到理想结果的原因在于现有的三批帮助者(经纪人、经理人、顾问)的积极性没有充分调动起来，他们只不过是走过场而已。第四批人说：“你们能指望这些行尸走肉做什么呢？”
The new arrivals offer a breathtakingly simple solution: Pay more money. Brimming with self-confidence, the hyper-Helpers assert that huge contingent payments — in addition to stiff fixed fees — are what each family member must fork over in order to really outmaneuver his relatives.
新来的第四批帮助者提出了一个惊人的简单解决之道——支付更多的回报。超级帮助者充满自信地断言：舍不得孩子套不着狼，为了真正做到超越其他家庭成员的投资业务，每个家庭成员必须付出更多的代价：在固定的佣金之外，因事而定，支付巨额的或有费用(按盈利分成)。
The more observant members of the family see that some of the hyper-Helpers are really just manager-Helpers wearing new uniforms, bearing sewn-on sexy names like HEDGE FUND or PRIVATE EQUITY. The new Helpers, however, assure the Gotrocks that this change of clothing is all-important, bestowing on its wearers magical powers similar to those acquired by mild-mannered Clark Kent when he changed into his Superman costume. Calmed by this explanation, the family decides to pay up.
这个家庭中比较敏锐的成员发现，第四批超级帮助者其实就是第二批帮助者兼经理人，只不过是穿上新的工作服、上面绣着吸引人的对冲基金或私人股权投资公司而已。可是第四批帮助者向这个大家庭信誓旦旦地说，工作服的变化非常重要，会赐予穿着者一种魔力，就像本来性格温和的ClarkKent换上超人衣服之后就威力无比一样。这个家庭听信了他们的解释，决定全部付清或有费用。
And that’s where we are today: A record portion of the earnings that would go in their entirety to owners — if they all just stayed in their rocking chairs — is now going to a swelling army of Helpers. Particularly expensive is the recent pandemic of profit arrangements under which Helpers receive large portions of the winnings when they are smart or lucky, and leave family members with all of the losses — and large fixed fees to boot — when the Helpers are dumb or unlucky (or occasionally crooked).
这正是我们投资人今天的处境：如果投资人只是老老实实地躺在摇椅上休息的话，所有上市公司收益中一个创纪录的比例本来会全部装进他们的口袋里，而如今却落入了队伍日益庞大的帮助者们的口袋。最近广为流行的盈利分配机制使这个家庭付出的代价更加昂贵，根据这种分配机制，由于帮助者的聪明或运气所取得的盈利，大部分归帮助者所有，而由于帮助者的无能或运气不好所发生的损失则全部由家庭成员承担，同时还得支付大笔的固定佣金。
A sufficient number of arrangements like this — heads, the Helper takes much of the winnings; tails, the Gotrocks lose and pay dearly for the privilege of doing so — may make it more accurate to call the family the Hadrocks. Today, in fact, the family’s frictional costs of all sorts may well amount to 20% of the earnings of American business. In other words, the burden of paying Helpers may cause American equity investors, overall, to earn only 80% or so of what they would earn if they just sat still and listened to no one.
大量的盈利分配安排与此类似，都是帮助者拿大头，而由GotRocks这个家庭承担损失，而且还要为如此安排而享有的特权支付昂贵的费用，因此，我们也许将GotRocks(牛逼家族)这个家庭的名字改为HadRocks(愚蠢家族)更为恰当。如今事实上这个家庭的所有这样那样的摩擦成本大约要占到所有美国上市公司盈利的20%，也就是说，支付给帮助者的负担，使美国股票投资者总体上只能得到所有上市公司收益的80%，而如果他们静静地坐在家里休息而不听任何人的建议的话，就能稳稳得到100%。
Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.
很久以前，牛顿发现了三大运动定律，这的确是天才的伟大发现。但牛顿的天才却并没有延伸到投资中。牛顿在南海泡沫中损失惨重，后来他对此解释说：“我能够计算星球的运动，却无法计算人类的疯狂。“如果不是这次投资损失造成的巨大创伤，也许牛顿就会发现第四大运动定律：对于投资者整体而言，交易的增加导致了收益的减少。
Here’s the answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section: To get very specific, the Dow increased from 65.73 to 11,497.12 in the 20th century, and that amounts to a gain of 5.3% compounded annually. (Investors would also have received dividends, of course.) To achieve an equal rate of gain in the 21st century, the Dow will have to rise by December 31, 2099 to — brace yourself — precisely 2,011,011.23. But I’m willing to settle for 2,000,000; six years into this century, the Dow has gained not at all.
这部分开始时提出的问题的答案如下：非常精确地说，20世纪道琼斯指数从65.73点上涨到11,497.12点，总体上相当于每年5.3%的复利收益率(当然投资者也收到分配的红利)。要在21世纪得到相同的收益率，道琼斯指数在2099年12月31日必须上涨到2,011,011.23点才能让你心满意足，而我只要能够达到2,000,000点就相当满意了。事实上，在21世纪过去的6年里，道琼斯指数根本没有任何上涨。
Debt and Risk 债务与风险
As we consolidate MidAmerican, our new balance sheet may suggest that Berkshire has expanded its tolerance for borrowing. But that’s not so. Except for token amounts, we shun debt, turning to it for only three purposes:
- We occasionally use repos as a part of certain short-term investing strategies that incorporate ownership of U.S. government (or agency) securities. Purchases of this kind are highly opportunistic and involve only the most liquid of securities. A few years ago, we entered into several interesting transactions that have since been unwound or are running off. The offsetting debt has likewise been cut substantially and before long may be gone.
我们偶而利用回购协议作为某种短期投资策略的一个组成部分，其中包括持有美国政府(或其机构)证券。购买这种类型的证券是高度机会主义的，只能涉及最具流动性的证券。几年前，我们进行了几次有趣的交易都毫发无损或者全身而退。对应债务同样已经大幅度缩减并且不久将全部清除。(外汇白银等衍生品)
- We borrow money against portfolios of interest-bearing receivables whose risk characteristics we understand. We did this in2001 when we guaranteed $5.6 billion of bank debt to take over, in partnership with Leucadia, a bankrupt Finova (which held a broad range of receivables).All of that debt has been repaid. More recently, we have borrowed to finance a widely-diversified, predictably-performing portfolio of manufactured-home receivables managed by Clayton. Alternatively, we could “securitize” — that is, sell — these receivables, but retain the servicing of them. If we followed this procedure, which is common in the industry, we would not show the debt that we do on our balance sheet, and we would also accelerate the earnings we report. In the end, however, we would earn less money. Were market variables to change so as to favor securitization (an unlikely event), we could sell part of our portfolio and eliminate the related debt. Until then, we prefer better profits to better cosmetics.
我们会为自己了解其风险特征的带息应收账款组合而借债。2001年我们就曾经这样操作过，为了与Leucadia合伙收购破产的Finova金融公司(这家公司有很多种类的应收账款)，我们为56亿美元的银行借款提供了担保。最近我们借款给Clayton管理的一个广泛多元化的、业绩能够预测的预制房屋应收账款组合提供财务支持。作为选择，我们可能将这些应收账款”证券化”，也就是说将其出售，但我们将继续保持相应的服务。如果我们采取类似的这种在业内十分常见的操作程序，在资产负债表上并不会反映这样做所产生的债务，而且将加快报告收益的时间，可是最终我们的盈利会相对较少一些。如果市场因素的变化使证券化对我们更有利时(这种情形不太可能发生)，我们将会出售一部分资产组合并消除相关的债务。在这种情况发生之前，我们宁愿要更好的利润而不是更好的财务包装。
- At MidAmerican, we have substantial debt, but it is that company’s obligation only. Though it will appear on our consolidated balance sheet, Berkshire does not guarantee it.
Even so, this debt is unquestionably secure because it is serviced by MidAmerican’s diversified stream of highly-stable utility earnings. If there were to be some bolt from the blue that hurt one of MidAmerican’s utility properties, earnings from the others would still be more than ample to cover all debt requirements. Moreover, MidAmerican retains all of its earnings, an equity-building practice that is rare in the utility field.
From a risk standpoint, it is far safer to have earnings from ten diverse and uncorrelated utility operations that cover interest charges by, say, a 2:1 ratio than it is to have far greater coverage provided by a single utility. A catastrophic event can render a single utility insolvent — witness what Katrina did to the local electric utility in New Orleans — no matter how conservative its debt policy. A geographical disaster — say, an earthquake in a Western state — can’t have the same effect on MidAmerican. And even a worrier like Charlie can’t think of an event that would systemically decrease utility earnings in any major way. Because of MidAmerican’s ever-widening diversity of regulated earnings, it will always utilize major amounts of debt.
从风险的角度来说，拥有十种各不相同且各不相关的公用事业收入足以支付利息，假设二者比例为2∶1，与单一来源但支付能力更大的收入相比，前者要安全得多。不管公司的债务政策多么保守，一个灾难性事件就会让单独一个公用业务陷入破产境地——Katrina飓风摧毁了新奥尔良当地的电力事业就是明证。一个地理灾难，比如在美国西部地区发生地震，却不会对中美能源产生类似的毁灭性打击，即使是像查理这样的忧虑者，也不会认为一场事故能够大幅度减少这家公司的公用事业收入。由于中美能源政府管制业务收入的多元化程度不断增强，这家公司能够充分利用大量的债务。
And that’s about it. We are not interested in incurring any significant debt at Berkshire for acquisitions or operating purposes. Conventional business wisdom, of course, would argue that we are being too conservative and that there are added profits that could be safely earned if we injected moderate leverage into our balance sheet.
我们对债务的态度基本上就是这样。我们对于伯克希尔为了并购或经营的目的，而发生任何大量的债务根本不感兴趣。当然，根据传统的商业智慧，我们在财务上显得太过保守，如果我们在资产负债表中加入适当的财务杠杆，无疑能够安全地增加盈利。
Maybe so. But many of Berkshire’s hundreds of thousands of investors have a large portion of their net worth in our stock (among them, it should be emphasized, a large number of our board and key managers) and a disaster for the company would be a disaster for them. Moreover, there are people who have been permanently injured to whom we owe insurance payments that stretch out for fifty years or more. To these and other constituencies we have promised total security, whatever comes: financial panics, stock-exchange closures (an extended one occurred in 1914) or even domestic nuclear, chemical or biological attacks.
也许如此吧。但成千上万的投资者将其个人很大一部分净资产投资到伯克希尔股票之上(应该强调的是，其中包括我们大部分董事会成员和主要经理人)，公司的一个重大灾难就会成为这些投资者们个人的一个重大灾难。不仅如此，对于那些我们已经向其收取了50年甚至更多年份保费的人们，会造成永远无法弥补的伤害。对于这些以及其他客户，我们已经承诺，无论发生什么情况，他们的投资都会绝对安全，无论是金融恐慌、股市关闭(例如1914年拖延了很长时间的股市关闭)、甚至是美国遭受核武器、化学或生物武器袭击。
We are quite willing to accept huge risks. Indeed, more than any other insurer, we write high-limit policies that are tied to single catastrophic events. We also own a large investment portfolio whose market value could fall dramatically and quickly under certain conditions (as happened on October 19,1987). Whatever occurs, though. Berkshire will have the net worth, the earnings streams and the liquidity to handle the problem with ease.
我们十分乐意承保巨大的风险，实际上，我们为单独一种巨大灾难事件承保远远超过其保险公司的最高上限的保险金额，我们还持有在某种情况下(如1987年10月19日股市崩盘)市值可能将迅速大幅下跌的巨额投资组合。不论发生什么情况，伯克希尔都有足够的资本净值、现金流和流动性轻而易举地处理这些问题。
Any other approach is dangerous. Over the years, a number of very smart people have learned the hard way that a long string of impressive numbers multiplied by a single zero always equals zero. That is not an equation whose effects I would like to experience personally, and I would like even less to be responsible for imposing its penalties upon others.
除此之外，任何其他解决问题的方式都是危险的。多年来，一些非常聪明的投资人经过痛苦的经历已经懂得：在长一串让人动心的数字上，乘以一个零，结果只能是零。我永远不想亲身体验这个等式的影响力有多大，我也永远不想因为将其惩罚加之于他人而承担罪责。
Management Succession 管理继任
As owners, you are naturally concerned about whether I will insist on continuing as CEO after I begin to fade and, if so, how the board will handle that problem. You aIso want to know what happens if I should die tonight.
作为伯克希尔的所有者，你们自然会十分关心，如果我的精力开始日渐衰退之后是否会继续坚持担任CEO，以及如果果真如此，董事会将如何处理这个问题？你们也想知道如果我今晚突然与世长辞，公司将会如何运作？
That second question is easy to answer. Most of our many businesses have strong market positions, significant momentum, and terrific managers. The special Berkshire culture is deeply ingrained throughout our subsidiaries, and these operations won’t miss a beat when I die.
Moreover, we have three managers at Berkshire who are reasonably young and fully capable of being CEO. Any of the three would be much better at certain management aspects of my job than I. On the minus side, none has my crossover experience that allows me to be comfortable making decisions in either the business arena or in investments. That problem will be solved by having another person in the organization handle marketable securities. That’s an interesting job at Berkshire, and the new CEO will have no problem in hiring a talented individual to do it. Indeed, that’s what we have done at GEICO for 26 years, and our results have been terrific.
除此之外，在伯克希尔，我们拥有三位相当年轻而且完全胜任CEO的经理人，这三位经理人中的任何一位在我的工作范围之内的某一管理方面都要远胜于我，但不利的一面是，他们之中没有一人具备我所独有的广泛的跨界经验，这种经验使我在商业和投资领域都能从容地作出正确的决策。解决这一问题的办法是，在公司内部指定另一位人士专门负责有价证券的投资工作。在伯克希尔，这是一件十分有趣的工作，新的CEO毫无问题将会选择一位聪明能干的人士来负责这项投资工作。实际上，这正和我们过去26年在GEICO公司所做的完全一模一样，我们这样做的结果简直是好极了。
Berkshire’s board has fully discussed each of the three CEO candidates and has unanimously agreed on the person who should succeed me if a replacement were needed today. The directors stay updated on this subject and could alter their view as circumstances change — new managerial stars may emerge and present ones will age. The important point is that the directors know now — and will always know in the future — exactly what they will do when the need arises.
伯克希尔董事会已经充分讨论过这三位CEO候选人中的每一位，而且就接替我的最终人选已经全体一致达成决议。董事们就此问题继续根据最新情况对决议进行更新，如果情况发生变化，可能将会改变他们的看法，新的管理明星可能会升起，原来的管理明星则会陨落。 重要的一点是，董事们现在完全知道，且未来也会知道，如果需要的话，他们应该做些什么。
The other question that must be addressed is whether the Board will be prepared to make a change if that need should arise not from my death but rather from my decay, particularly if this decay is accompanied by my delusionally thinking that I am reaching new peaks of managerial brilliance. That problem would not be unique to me. Charlie and I have faced this situation from time to time at Berkshire’s subsidiaries. Humans age at greatly varying rates — but sooner or later their talents and vigor decline. Some managers remain effective well into their 80s — Charlie is a wonder at 82 — and others noticeably fade in their 60s. When their abilities ebb, so usually do their powers of self-assessment. Someone else often needs to blow the whistle.
另一个需要处理的问题是，如果更换CEO的需要，不是由于我的去世，而是由于我的智力衰退，尤其是与这种衰退随之而来的是我虚妄地认为我正处于个人管理才华的一个新的高峰时，董事会是否将会准备好作出变化。在伯克希尔下属企业中，我和查理一次又一次遇到这种情况。人老化的速度差别非常大，但或早或晚他们的智力和精力都会衰减，有些经理人在进入80岁高龄之后仍然生龙活虎……查理本人就是一个82岁的神奇经理人。但其他经理人刚刚年满60岁就明显地出现衰退，当他们的能力衰退之时，他们自我评估的能力也往往相应衰减，有些还需要经常在其耳边鸣笛警告。
When that time comes for me, our board will have to step up to the job. From a financial standpoint, its members are unusually motivated to do so. I know of no other board in the country in which the financial interests of directors are so completely aligned with those of shareholders. Few boards even come close. On a personal level, however, it is extraordinarily difficult for most people to tell someone. particularly a friend, that he or she is no longer capable.
当这种情况出现在我的身上之时，我们的董事会将不得不出面接替我的工作。从财务的观点来看，董事会成员很少有此动机作出如此举动。据我所知，没有其他任何一家美国公司董事会中的董事与股东们的财务利益如此完全紧密地结合在一起，少数董事甚至关系更为紧密。可是在私人关系层面上，对于大多数人来说，要告诉别人尤其是一个朋友，他(她)已经能力不济，实在是件特别难以启齿的事。
If I become a candidate for that message, however, our board will be doing me a favor by delivering it. Every share of Berkshire that I own is destined to go to philanthropies, and I want society to reap the maximum good from these gifts and bequests. It would be a tragedy if the philanthropic potential of my holdings was diminished because my associates shirked their responsibility to (tenderly, I hope) show me the door. But don’t worry about this. We have an outstanding group of directors, and they will always do what’s right for shareholders.
如果我开始成为这一信息的候选人，我们的董事会将善意地实言相告。我所拥有的每一股股票都已经事先指定捐赠给慈善事业，我希望整个社会能够从这些生前赠予和死后遗赠中收获到最大限度的好处。如果由于我的合作伙伴们逃避责任，没有告诉我我应该离开了(我希望他们说得温和一些)，那将是一场悲剧。但不必为此担心，我们拥有一群非常杰出的董事，他们总是能够做出对于股东来说最为正确之事。
And while we are on the subject, I feel terrific.
谈及此事时，我的感觉好极了。
The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会
Our meeting this year will be on Saturday, May 6. As always, the doors will open at the Qwest Center at 7 a.m., and the latest Berkshire movie will be shown at 8:30. At 9:30 we will go directly to the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at the Qwest’s stands) will last until 3:00. Then, after a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:15. This schedule worked well last year, because it let those who wanted to attend the formal session to do so, while freeing others to shop.
2006年我们的股东大会将在5月6日周六召开。与往常一样，Qwest中心的大门将会在早上7:00准时打开，最新的伯克希尔电影短片将在8:30开始播放，9:30我们将直接进入提问回答时间，并将一直持续到下午3:00为止(中间短暂地休息，在Qwest摊位上有午餐供应)。短暂休息之后，我和查理将在3:15正式召开年度股东大会，这一会议的程序去年进行得十分顺利，因为这使得那些想要参加正式会议的股东可以如愿参加，没有兴趣的股东也可以自由地去购物。
You certainly did your share in this respect last year. The 194,300 square foot hall adjoining the meeting area was filled with the products of Berkshire subsidiaries, and the 21,000 people who came to the meeting allowed every location to rack up sales records. Kelly Broz (neé Muchemore), the Flo Ziegfeld of Berkshire, orchestrates both this magnificent shopping extravaganza and the meeting itself. The exhibitors love her, and so do I. Kelly got married in October, and I gave her away. She asked me how I wanted to be listed in the wedding program. I replied “envious of the groom,” and that’s the way it went to press.
你去年肯定也参与了购物方面的活动，与大会场地相连的194,300平方英尺的大厅布满了伯克希尔下属公司的产品，而且2.1万名参加会议的股东将会让每个展台创造新的销售纪录。KellyBroz组织了这次超豪华的购物秀和年度大会。展出者都非常喜欢她，我也同样如此。Kelly问我，是否愿意在婚礼节目上亮相，我的回答是”嫉妒新郎”，这句话竟然原封不动地就上了新闻。
This year we will showcase two Clayton homes (featuring Acme brick, Shaw carpet, Johns Manville insulation, MiTek fasteners, Carefree awnings and NFM furniture). You will find that these homes, priced at 89,000, deliver excellent value. In fact, three shareholders came so firmly to that conclusion last year that they bought the $119,000 model we then showcased. Flanking the Clayton homes on the exhibition floor will be RVs from Forest River.
今年我们将重点展示两套Clayton预制房屋(内部布置有Acme的砖块、Shaw的地毯、JohnsManville的隔热材料、MiTek的连接件、Carefree的遮阳篷及内布拉斯加家具店的家具)。你会发现，这些标价7.9万-8.9万美元的预制房屋非常价廉物美。事实上，2005年三位与会股东对这些房屋的性价比非常青睐，以至于他们竟然购买了我们用来展示的价值11.9万美元的样板房。与Clayton预制房屋相邻的是森林之河的房车展览。
GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%)This special offer is permitted by 45 of the 50 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least 50% of you, I believe we can. And while you’re at it, sign up for the new GEICO credit card. It’s the one I now use.
GEICO公司将在会场设立摊位，取信全美最顶尖的保险顾问，他们将为你提供汽车保险的报价，在大多数情况下，GEICO都会为你提供一个相当优惠的股东折扣(大约8%)。这个特别优惠在我们开展业务的全美50个州中的45个州都可以提供。请各位股东将自己现在的详细保险资料带来，GEICO的顾问将会帮你检查是否能为你省下一笔保费。我相信，我们至少能为你们之中的一半人省下不少的保费。当你到了之后，请签名申请新的GEICO信用卡，我现在用的就是这张卡。
On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Stop by the NetJets booth at the Qwest to learn about viewing these planes. Come to Omaha by bus; leave in your new plane.
周六在奥马哈机场，我们仍将展示NetJets一系列的机型以供大家检阅。请到Qwest中心会场里NetJets的展位参观了解这些飞机的详情。来奥马哈时是坐车，回去时坐你的新飞机。
The Bookworm boutique at the Qwest broke all records last year selling Berkshire-related books. An amazing 3,500 of these were Poor Charlie’s Almanack, the collected wisdom of my partner. This means that a copy was sold every 9 seconds. And for good reason: You will never find a book with more useful ideas. Word-of-mouth recommendations have caused Charlie’s first printing of 20,500 copies to sell out, and we will therefore have a revised and expanded edition on sale at our meeting. Among the other 22 titles and DVDs available last year at the Bookworm,4,597 copies were sold for $84,746. Our shareholders are a bookseller’s dream.
2005年书虫书店在Qwest销售与伯克希尔相关的书籍打破了所有的销售纪录，令人吃惊的是，竟然卖出了3500本收集了我的合伙人查理·芒格智慧妙论的好书《穷查理宝典》，这意味着，每隔9秒种就会卖出一本。如此畅销的原因相当简单，你无法找到比这本书拥有更多有价值的思想的书。口口相传的一致推荐使查理第一次印刷的20500册书已经销售一空，我们在今年的股东大会上将推出经过修订和扩充的新版。2005年在书虫书店还展示了其他22种书籍和DVD，总共销售了4,597册，销售收入84,746美元。我们的股东们确实是书商们梦寐以求的客户。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. Carol Pedersen, who handles these matters, does a terrific job for us each year, and I thank her for it.
这份报告后面附有股东大会相关资料，向各位解释如何索取参加股东大会以及其他活动所需的证件。至于有关机票、住宿、用车预订服务，我们很高兴再次与[American_Express|美国运通]签约，为您提供具体帮助。负责处理这些事宜的CarolPedersen每年都为我们提供非常周到的服务，在此向他表示感谢。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing. We initiated this special event at NFM nine years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from 27.4 million in 2005 (up 9% from a year earlier). I get goose bumps just thinking about this volume.
在第72大街位于Dodge与Pacific之间的占地77英亩的内布拉斯加家具店中，我们将再次举办”伯克希尔周末”专场特卖会。我们在9年前首次推出这种专场特卖活动，“伯克希尔周末”的营业额从1997年的530万美元增长到2005年的2,740万美元(平均每年增长9%)，去年股东会周末再度创下单日营业额新高610万美元。一想到如此之高的销售额，我不禁热血沸腾。
To obtain the discount, you must make your purchases between Thursday, May 4 and Monday, May 8 inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating barbeque, drinking Coke, and counting sales.
想要获得优惠折扣，你必须在5月4日(周四)到5月8日(周一)之间进行采购，并且出示你参加股东大会的证件。这期间的优惠活动将包括一些平常从不打折的顶级品牌，这可是为了我们伯克希尔股东周末专场才特别破的例，我们非常感谢他们的配合。内布拉斯加家具店的营业时间是周一到周六从上午10:00到下午9:00，周日则是从早上10:00到下午6:00。在今年股东大会期间，周六从下午5:30到下午8:00，我们将举行一个只对股东开放的特别活动，我本人也将到场，一边吃着烤肉喝着可乐，一边计算销售额。
Borsheim’s again will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 5. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Sunday, May 7.On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m.
波仙珠宝在股东会期间将再次有两场专门为股东举办的活动，第一场是5月5日(周五)从下午6:00到晚上10:00举办的鸡尾酒会；第二场是大型售卖活动，在5月7日(周日)从早上9:00到下午4：00举行，周六营业时间一直到下午6:00。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheim’s throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, May 1 through Saturday, May 13. During that period, just identify yourself as a shareholder through your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement.
整个周末，波仙珠宝店都将人满为患。为了方便股东们购物，从5月1日(周一)到5月13日(周六)期间，波仙珠宝店都将为股东提供优惠价，只要出示参加股东大会的证件或者是交易单表明你的股东身份，即可享受优惠。
Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that, even before the shareholders’ discount, is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals. Last year, our shareholder-period business increased 9% from 2004, which came on top of a 73% gain the year before. The store sold 5,000 Berkshire Monopoly games — and then ran out. We’ve learned: Plenty will be in stock this year.
波仙珠宝店的营业毛利即使是不计算为股东提供的折扣，也要比其主要竞争对手低20%以上。2005年股东大会期间营业额比2004年增长了9%，2004年股东大会期间营业额则比2003年创纪录地增长了73%。这家店销售了5,000套伯克希尔大富翁游戏Monopoly，后来一度脱销。我们已经汲取了教训，今年将有充足的库存。
In a tent outside of Borsheim’s, Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers in groups of six — blindfolded. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. They plan to keep their eyes open — but Bob never sorts his cards, even when playing for a national championship.
在波仙外面所搭的帐篷里，美国两届棋赛冠军PatrickWolff将蒙上双眼与所有挑战者们六个一组地进行对奕。此外，两位世界级桥牌顶尖高手BobHamman和SharonOsberg也会在周日下午与我们的股东们进行比赛，他们当然不会蒙着双眼，但Bob从来不理牌，就算是参加全国桥牌冠军大赛也如此。
Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 7,and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on that day, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before).
我个人最爱的牛排餐厅Gorat’s将再次单独为伯克希尔股东们在5月7日(周日)开放，从下午4:00开始一直营业到晚上10:00。请记得周日务必光临Gorat’s牛排馆，你一定要提前预约订位，预约请在5月1日之后(请不要在此之前预约)，请致电402-551-3733。
In this school year, about 35 university classes will come to Omaha for sessions with me. I take almost all — in aggregate, perhaps 2,000 students — to lunch at Gorat’s. And they love it. To learn why, come join us on Sunday.
在这个学年，大约有35个班级的大学生到奥马哈来和我交流。我带所有的学生到Gorat’s共进午餐，学生人数总计约有2,000人之多，他们都非常喜欢这家餐馆。要想知道原因何在，周日请和我们一道光临。
We will again have a special reception from 4:00 to 5:30 on Saturday afternoon for shareholders who have come from outside of North America. Every year our meeting draws many people from around the globe, and Charlie and I want to be sure we personally greet those who have come so far. Last year we enjoyed meeting more than 400 of you from many dozens of countries. Any shareholder who comes from other than the U.S. or Canada will be given a special credential and instructions for attending this function.
周六下午4:00-5:30，我们会为来自北美地区以外的股东们举行一个特别招待会，每年股东年度大会都吸引了全球各地的人们参加，查理跟我希望能够亲自接待这些远道而来的股东们。去年我们非常高兴地接待了400多位来自北美以外数十个国家的股东们，任何来自美国与加拿大以外其他国家的股东都会拿到参与这个活动的专门证件与具体指南。
Charlie and I are extraordinarily lucky. We were born in America; had terrific parents who saw that we got good educations; have enjoyed wonderful families and great health; and came equipped with a “business” gene that allows us to prosper in a manner hugely disproportionate to other people who contribute as much or more to our society’s well-being. Moreover, we have long had jobs that we love, in which we are helped every day in countless ways by talented and cheerful associates. No wonder we tap-dance to work. But nothing is more fun for us than getting together with our shareholder-partners at Berkshire’s annual meeting. So join us on May 6th at the Qwest for our annual Woodstock for Capitalists. We’ll see you there.
查理跟我实在是万分幸运。我们出生在美国；我们有杰出的父母抚育我们并让我们受到良好的教育；我们享受到幸福的家庭生活并拥有非常健康的身体；上天赋予我们一种”商业”基因，从而使我们在商业上所取得的成就大大超过了其他为我们这个社会贡献同样多甚至更多的人。不仅如此，我们能够长期从事我们喜爱的工作，工作中方方面面得到了既聪明能干又令人心情愉悦的同事们的大力帮助。因此，毫不奇怪我们每天都会跳着踢踏舞来工作。当然，没有什么比每年能够在伯克希尔年度股东大会上与我们的股东兼合伙人们欢聚一堂更开心的事了，所以请大家5月6日来Qwest中心参加我们为资本家举办的年度伍德斯托克音乐节(Woodstock for Capitalists)。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
February 28, 2006