2002 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders2002 年致股东的信

原文信息：

• 标题：2002 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：2003-02-21
• 链接：https://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf
• 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
• 整理：Vito
• 校译：Vito

Note: The following table appears in the printed Annual Report on the facing page of the Chairman’s Letter and is referred to in that letter.

Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500

Year	Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1)	Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2)	Relative Results (1)-(2)
1965	23.8	10.0	13.8
1966	20.3	(11.7)	32.0
1967	11.0	30.9	(19.9)
1968	19.0	11.0	8.0
1969	16.2	(8.4)	24.6
1970	12.0	3.9	8.1
1971	16.4	14.6	1.8
1972	21.7	18.9	2.8
1973	4.7	(14.8)	19.5
1974	5.5	(26.4)	31.9
1975	21.9	37.2	(15.3)
1976	59.3	23.6	35.7
1977	31.9	(7.4)	39.3
1978	24.0	6.4	17.6
1979	35.7	18.2	17.5
1980	19.3	32.3	(13.0)
1981	31.4	(5.0)	36.4
1982	40.0	21.4	18.6
1983	32.3	22.4	9.9
1984	13.6	6.1	7.5
1985	48.2	31.6	16.6
1986	26.1	18.6	7.5
1987	19.5	5.1	14.4
1988	20.1	16.6	3.5
1989	44.4	31.7	12.7
1990	7.4	(3.1)	10.5
1991	39.6	30.5	9.1
1992	20.3	7.6	12.7
1993	14.3	10.1	4.2
1994	13.9	1.3	12.6
1995	43.1	37.6	5.5
1996	31.8	23.0	8.8
1997	34.1	33.4	.7
1998	48.3	28.6	19.7
1999	.5	21.0	(20.5)
2000	6.5	(9.1)	15.6
2001	(6.2)	(11.9)	5.7
2002	10.0	(22.1)	32.1
Average Annual Gain — 1965-2002	22.2	10.0	12.2
Overall Gain — 1964-2002	214,433	3,663

Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967,15 months ended 12/31.

Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported.

The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P in years when the index showed a negative return.Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

**To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：

Our gain in net worth during 2002 was S6.1 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 10.0%. Over the last 38 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19to$41,727,a rate of 22.2% compounded annually.¹

公司2002年的账面价值增加61亿美元，A/B股每股账面价值增加10.0%（标普下跌22.1%）²，自现任管理层接手的38年以来，每股账面价值由当初的19美元增长到现在的41727美元，年复合增长率为22.2%。

In all respects 2002 was a banner year. I’ll provide details later, but here’s a sumuary.

从任何角度来看，2002年都是丰收的一年，后面我会再详加说明，以下是几点总结：

• Our various non-insurance operations performed exceptionally well, despite a sluggish economy. A decade ago Berkshire’s annual pre-tax earnings from our non-insurance businesses was $272 million. Now, from our ever expanding collection of manufacturing, retailing, service and finance businesses, we earn that sum monthly.

整体经济不景气，但伯克希尔旗下所有非保险事业表现异常优异。十年前，我们非保险事业年税前利润为2.72亿美元，时至今日，在持续扩张零售、制造、服务以及金融事业版图之后，我们一个月就能赚到这个数。

• Our insurance group increased its float to $41.2billion,aheftygainof$5.7 billion. Better yet, the use of these funds in 2002 cost us only 1%. Getting back to low-cost float feels good, particularly after our poor results during the three previous years. Berkshire’s reinsurance division and GEICO shot the lights out in 2002, and underwriting discipline was restored at General Re.

2002年我们旗下保险事业的浮存金大幅增加了57亿美元，累积达到412亿美元。更棒的是，2002年度获取这些资金的成本仅为1%。浮存金再度回到低成本状态，让人感觉真好，特别是刚经历过惨淡的三年之后。伯克希尔的再保险部门以及盖可保险在2002年都大放异彩，而通用再保险的承保纪律也已恢复。

• Berkshire acquired some important new businesses — with economic characteristics ranging from good to great, run by managers ranging from great to great. Those attributes are two legs of our “entrance” strategy, the third being a sensible purchase price. Unlike LBO operators and private equity firms, we have no “exit” strategy — we buy to keep. That’s one reason why Berkshire is usually the first-and sometimes the only-choice for sellers and their managers.

伯克希尔并购了几项重要的新事业，其产业竞争力在各自的业界均数一数二，经理人更是出类拔萃。这是我们决定「买进」策略的两个关键要素，第三个要素是合理的价格。不过不同于杠杆收购者（LBO）及私募股权投资公司，我们并没有「退出」策略——我们买进以后，就会一直留着。这也是为什么伯克希尔往往成为众多卖方及其经理人心目中的首选，有时甚至是唯一的选择。

• Our marketable securities outperformed most indices. For Lou Simpson, who manages equities at GEICO, this was old stuff. But, for me, it was a welcome change from the last few years, during which my investment record was dismal.

我们的股票投资组合表现超越了市场上大多数的指数。对于负责管理盖可保险资金的路易·辛普森来说，这是司空见惯的事。但对我而言，却是在经历过好几个悲惨的年头后，终于迎来可喜的转折。

The confluence of these favorable factors in 2002 caused our book-value gain to outstrip the performance of the S&P 500 by 32.1 percentage points. This result is aberrational: Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I hope to achieve — at most — an average annual advantage of a few points. In the future, there will be years in which the S&P soundly trounces us. That will in fact almost certainly happen during a strong bull market, because the portion of our assets committed to common stocks has significantly declined. This change, of course, helps our relative performance in down markets such as we had in 2002.

这些有利的因素在2002年来了个大会师，使得我们的帐面价值增幅大幅超越标普500指数32.1个百分点。这样的成绩好的反常：查理和我至多只是希望伯克希尔能平均每年稳定地超越指数几个百分点就好。我想在以后的某些年度，极有可能会看到标普指数大幅超越我们的表现。事实上，在强劲的牛市期间这种情况几成定局，因为我们的普通股投资占总资产的比例已大幅下降，当然也由于这样的转变，让我们在类似2002年这样的股市走低之际，相对来说取得不错的表现。

I have another caveat to mention about last year’s results. If you’ve been a reader of financial reports in recent years, you’ve seen a flood of “pro-forma” earnings statements — tabulations in which managers invariably show “earnings” far in excess of those allowed by their auditors. In these presentations, the CEO tells his owners “don’t count this, don’t count that — just count what makes earnings fat.” Often, a forget-all-this-bad-stuff message is delivered year after year without management so much as blushing.

关于去年的结果，我还有一点要补充。如果你经常阅读最近几年上市公司的财务报表，你会发现满是所谓”备考收益”这类的报表——这种报表所报告的利润数字往往都远高于经过审计师签证的查核数。而公司的CEO会告诉股东们：“不要算这个，不要算那个，只要算那些会让利润数字好看一点的就好了。” 这种”忘掉糟的，只计好的”的报告方式一年接一年地出现，管理层根本不会因此感到脸红。

We’ve yet to see a pro-forma presentation disclosing that audited earnings were somewhat high. So let’s make a little history: Last year, on a pro-forma basis, Berkshire had lower earnings than those we actually reported.

我们还没有看过有哪家公司的备考收益报表，其利润是低于审计师查核数字的。如今就让我们来小小创造一下历史：去年按备考收益来算，伯克希尔的利润数字低于实际报告的数字。

That is true because two favorable factors aided our reported figures. First, in 2002 there was no mega-catastrophe, which means that Berkshire (and other insurers as well) earned more from insurance than if losses had been normal. In years when the reverse is true — because of a blockbuster hurricane, earthquake or man-made disaster — many insurers like to report that they would have earned X “except for” the unusual event. The implication is that since such megacats are infrequent, they shouldn’t be counted when “true” earnings are calculated. That is deceptive nonsense. “Except for” losses will forever be part of the insurance business, and they will forever be paid with shareholders’ money.

这是因为去年有两项有利因素确实让我们的财报数字更加好看。第一，由于2002年没有发生什么重大的灾难，所以伯克希尔（以及其它保险业同行）赚取的承保利润比一般正常的年度更多。而在情况相反的年份里，比如遇到飓风、地震或其它人为灾害的时候，许多保险同业往往会声明「要是」没有发生意外事件的话，本来可以赚到多少多少。意思是说，由于这类大灾难很不寻常，所以在计算”真实”的收益时就不应考虑在内。这根本就是骗人的一派胡言。要知道「意外」损失本来就是保险业应担之风险，而且绝对必须要由公司背后的股东来买单。

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this exercise, we’ll take a page from the industry’s book. For last year, when we didn’t have any truly major disasters, a downward adjustment is appropriate if you wish to “normalize” our underwriting result.

不论如何，我们因为这样的备考收益声明，将在各类保险业报告中被特书一笔。由于去年我们没有遇到什么重大的灾难，所以实有必要将帐面利润向下调整，以反映”正常合理的”承保绩效。

Secondly, the bond market in 2002 favored certain strategies we employed in our finance and financial products business. Gains from those strategies will certainly diminish within a year or two — and may well disappear.

第二，2002年的债券市场特别有利于我们金融产品部门的策略运作。这类策略的利得在未来一两年内很可能会逐渐缩减，甚至完全消失。

Soooo … “except for” a couple of favorable breaks, our pre-tax earnings last year would have been about $500 million less than we actually reported. We’re happy, nevertheless, to bank the excess. As Jack Benny once said upon receiving an award: “I don’t deserve this honor — but, then, I have arthritis, and I don’t deserve that either.”

所以呢……在”扣除”这几项有利的短期因素后，我们去年的税前获利应比实际报告值减少约5亿美元。当然，我们也很开心多赚这些钱。正如喜剧演员杰克·本尼在一次获奖后所说的：“我实在是不配得到这个奖项——但正如我的关节炎，虽然不是应得的，但还是得了。”

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We continue to be blessed with an extraordinary group of managers, many of whom haven’t the slightest financial need to work. They stick around, though: In 38 years, we’ve never had a single CEO of a subsidiary elect to leave Berkshire to work elsewhere. Counting Charlie, we now have six managers over 75, and I hope that in four years that number increases by at least two (Bob Shaw and I are both 72). Our rationale: “It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.”

伯克希尔旗下一直有一大群杰出的经理人为我们打拼着，且其中绝大多数人都早已不必再为这份薪水奔忙。但他们依然不离不弃：38年来还没有任何一家子公司的CEO离开伯克希尔另谋高就。算上查理，目前我们共有6位经理人的年龄超过75岁，预期4年后还会再增加2名，那就是鲍勃·肖跟我本人，我们现年都是72岁。我们的理念是：实在是很难教会新狗玩老把戏！

Berkshire’s operating CEOs are masters of their crafts and run their businesses as if they were their own. My job is to stay out of their way and allocate whatever excess capital their businesses generate. It’s easy work.

负责伯克希尔各项事业经营的CEO们都是各自行业的佼佼者，并把公司当作是自己的那样在经营。我的工作很简单，就是尽量不要妨碍他们，并好好地运用他们所赚来的盈余资本。

My managerial model is Eddie Bennett, who was a batboy. In 1919, at age 19, Eddie began his work with the Chicago White Sox, who that year went to the World Series. The next year, Eddie switched to the Brooklyn Dodgers, and they, too, won their league title. Our hero, however, smelled trouble. Changing boroughs, he joined the Yankees in 1921, and they promptly won their first pennant in history. Now Eddie settled in, shrewdly seeing what was coming. In the next seven years, the Yankees won five American League titles.

我遵循的管理模式源自一位叫做Eddie Bennett的球童。1919年，年仅19岁的Eddie开始在芝加哥白袜队干活，当年度白袜队立刻就打进世界大赛。第二年Eddie跳槽到布鲁克林道奇队，果不其然，道奇队又赢得世界大赛。之后不久，这位传奇人物发现苗头不对，于是转换门庭于1921年到了纽约洋基队，结果扬基队当年就赢得了队史上第一座世界大赛冠军。自此，Eddie仿佛预知接下来会发生什么，决定安顿下来。结果扬基队在往后的七年间，五度赢得美国职业棒球大联盟总冠军。

What does this have to do with management? It’s simple — to be a winner, work with winners. In 1927, for example, Eddie received $700 for the 1/8th World Series share voted him by the legendary Yankee team of Ruth and Gehrig. This sum, which Eddie earned by working only four days (because New York swept the Series) was roughly equal to the full-year pay then earned by batboys who worked with ordinary associates.

或许有人会问，这跟管理模式有什么相干？很简单——想要成为赢家，就应与赢家共事。举例来说，1927年，Eddie因为当年棒球界传奇人物George Herman “Babe” Ruth和Henry Louis Gehrig领衔的扬基队仅用八分之一赛季就赢得世界大赛而分到700美元的奖金。这笔钱大约相当于其它球童一整年的收入，结果Eddie总共只工作4天就拿到手（因为当年度扬基队四连胜横扫对手）。

Eddie understood that how he lugged bats was unimportant; what counted instead was hooking up with the cream of those on the playing field. I’ve learned from Eddie. At Berkshire, I regularly hand bats to many of the heaviest hitters in American business.

Eddie很清楚地知道：他如何拎球棒并不重要，重要的是他是在为球场上最当红的明星拎球棒才最关键。我从Eddie身上学到很多，所以在伯克希尔，我总是将各项业务的经营之棒交给美国商业大联盟的超级击球手们。

Acquisitions 并购活动

We added some sluggers to our lineup last year. Two acquisitions pending at yearend 2001 were completed: Albecca (which operates under the name Larson-Juhl), the U.S. leader in custom-made picture frames; and Fruit of the Loom, the producer of about 33.3% of the men’s and boy’s underwear sold in the U.S. and of other apparel as well.

去年我们队伍中又增添了好几位优秀击球手。两个2001年就开始谈的并购在去年完成：全美高级定制画框的领导厂商Albecca公司（品牌名称是Larson-Juhl）；以及鲜果布衣公司，全美约1/3的男士及儿童内衣系由该公司出品，当然该公司还经营其它服装。

Both companies came with outstanding CEOs: Steve McKenzie at Albecca and John Holland at Fruit. John, who had retired from Fruit in 1996, rejoined it three years ago and rescued the company from the disastrous path it had gone down after he’d left. He’s now 70, and I am trying to convince him to make his next retirement coincident with mine (presently scheduled for five years after my death — a date subject, however, to extension).

两家公司都由相当优秀的经理人管理：经营Albecca的是史蒂夫·麦肯齐，鲜果布衣则是约翰·霍兰德。约翰在1996年自该公司退休，三年前又重返公司，挽救其离开后该公司一路下坠的命运。他今年70岁，现在我正努力说服他跟我同进退（目前我个人计划死后5年再退休，并且有可能会视状况予以延长）。

We initiated and completed two other acquisitions last year that were somewhat below our normal size threshold. In aggregate, however, these businesses earn more than $60 million pre-tax annually. Both operate in industries characterized by tough economics, but both also have important competitive strengths that enable them to earn decent returns on capital.

此外，去年我们还另外完成了其它两件低于我们通常门槛的并购案。不过两家公司加起来的年度税前获利仍超过6000万美元。虽然两者所处的产业竞争都相当激烈，但却同样拥有相当的竞争优势，使其投入资本回报率还不错。

The newcomers are:

这两位新成员分别是：

(a) CTB, a worldwide leader in equipment for the poultry, hog, egg production and grain industries; and

CTB——全世界猪、禽、蛋等农畜设备的领导厂商；

(b) Garan, a manufacturer of children’s apparel, whose largest and best-known line is Garanimals®.

Garan——童装生产厂商，旗下最大最知名的品牌是Garanimals®。

These two companies came with the managers responsible for their impressive records: Vic Mancinelli at CTB and Seymour Lichtenstein at Garan.

两家公司的经理人过去都战绩彪炳：CTB的Vic Mancinelli，Garan的Seymour Lichtenstein。

The largest acquisition we initiated in 2002 was The Pampered Chef, a company with a fascinating history dating back to 1980. Doris Christopher was then a 34-year-old suburban Chicago home economics teacher with a husband, two little girls, and absolutely no business background. Wanting, however, to supplement her family’s modest income, she turned to thinking about what she knew best-food preparation. Why not, she wondered, make a business out of marketing kitchenware, focusing on the items she herself had found most useful?

至于在2002年开始进行的并购案中，规模最大的是The Pampered Chef——这也是一家拥有辉煌历史的传奇公司，时间可以回溯到1980年。当时34岁的Doris Christopher还是一位芝加哥郊区的家政教师，与先生育有2个年龄尚小的女儿，完全没有任何商业经验。为了补贴家庭微薄的收入，她想到了运用其自身所长——烹饪。她在想，为什么不可以推销厨房用具，聚焦那些她自己认为最好用的东西，来做点生意呢？

To get started, Doris borrowed $3,000 against her life insurance policy — all the money ever injected into the company — and went to the Merchandise Mart on a buying expedition. There, she picked up a dozen each of this and that, and then went home to set up operations in her basement.

为了创业，Doris利用寿险保单质借了3,000美元，这也是她仅有的一次资金投入。然后，她到大卖场买了一堆这个那个的烹饪餐具，回到家里的地下室展开事业。

Her plan was to conduct in-home presentations to small groups of women, gathered at the homes of their friends. While driving to her first presentation, though, Doris almost talked herself into returning home, convinced she was doomed to fail.

她的商业计划，是在主妇家里召集其友人们进行小型展销会。当Doris第一次驾车出门展开推销之旅时，她自认必败无疑，差点就说服自己打道回府。

But the women she faced that evening loved her and her products, purchased $175ofgoods,andTPCwasunderway.Workingwithherhusband,Jay,Dorisdid$50,000 of business in the first year. Today — only 22 years later — TPC does more than $700 million of business annually, working through 67,000 kitchen consultants.

所幸，当晚她所遇到的主妇们相当喜爱她及她的产品，总共买了175美元的各种东西，TPC由此呱呱坠地。和她的先生Jay夫妻合力，Doris头一年总共做了50,000美元的生意。22年后的今天，TPC的年营业额高达7亿美元，共有67,000名厨具顾问。

I’ve been to a TPC party, and it’s easy to see why the business is a success. The company’s products, in large part proprietary, are well-styled and highly useful, and the consultants are knowledgeable and enthusiastic. Everyone has a good time. Hurry to pamperedchef.com on the Internet to find where to attend a party near you.

我自己也曾经体验过TPC的展销派对，很轻易就能发现她们成功的原因。公司的产品很多都设计新颖、兼具实用，厨具顾问们又经验丰富、热情推销。每一位参加派对的客人都会尽兴而归。赶快上pamperedchef.com网站看看如何才能就近参加她们所举办的派对吧。

Two years ago, Doris brought in Sheila O’Connell Cooper, now CEO, to share the management load, and in August they met with me in Omaha. It took me about ten seconds to decide that these were two managers with whom I wished to partner, and we promptly made a deal. Berkshire shareholders couldn’t be luckier than to be associated with Doris and Sheila.

两年前，Doris找到现任CEO——Sheila O’Connell Cooper加入，以分担管理重责，两人在八月联袂来到奥马哈与我会面。我前后只花了10秒钟就确定我想要这两个人加入我们的合伙人序列，当下就签约成交。能够与Doris和Sheila共事，伯克希尔的股东实在是再幸运也不过了。

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Berkshire also made some important acquisitions last year through MidAmerican Energy Holdings (MEHC), a company in which our equity interest is 80.2%. Because the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) limits us to 9.9% voting control, however, we are unable to fully consolidate MEHC’s financial statements.

去年伯克希尔通过持股80.2%的美国中部能源公司（MEHC）³进行了几项重要的并购案，由于公用事业控股公司法（PUHCA）限制我们只能拥有该公司9.9%的投票权，所以我们无法将该公司财报完全并表到伯克希尔财报之中。

Despite the voting-control limitation — and the somewhat strange capital structure at MEHC it has engendered — the company is a key part of Berkshire. Already it has $18 billion of assets and delivers our largest stream of non-insurance earnings. It could well grow to be huge.

尽管受限于投票控制权的限制，使得MEHC现在的资本结构有点奇怪，但该公司仍然是伯克希尔非常重要的一部分。目前它的资产总额达到180亿美元，并成为伯克希尔非保险事业收益的主要来源，展望未来，其成长依然可期。

Last year MEHC acquired two important gas pipelines. The first, Kern River, extends from Southwest Wyoming to Southern California. This line moves about 900 million cubic feet of gas a day and is undergoing a $1.2 billion expansion that will double throughput by this fall. At that point, the line will carry enough gas to generate electricity for ten million homes.

去年MEHC买下了两条重要的天然气管线。第一条是科恩河管线（KernRiver,4.5亿现金+承担5.1亿债务）⁴，从怀俄明州西南部通往南加州方向，每天运送9亿立方英尺的天然气，且目前我们又另外投资12亿美元进行扩充（700英里）⁵，预计在今年秋天完工后，运输量可增加一倍，届时将可满足1千万家庭用户所需。

The second acquisition, Northern Natural Gas, is a 16,600 mile line extending from the Southwest to a wide range of Midwestern locations. This purchase completes a corporate odyssey of particular interest to Omahans.

第二条路线则是从美国西南部一路延伸到广袤的中西部地区，全长16600英里，名为北方天然气管线（Northern Natural Gas）。这项如探索之旅般的天然气管道并购案的完成增进了奥马哈地区居民的福祉。

From its beginnings in the 1930s, Northern Natural was one of Omaha’s premier businesses, run by CEOs who regularly distinguished themselves as community leaders. Then, in July, 1985, the company — which in 1980 had been renamed Inter North — merged with Houston Natural Gas, a business less than half its size. The companies announced that the enlarged operation would be headquartered in Omaha, with InterNorth’s CEO continuing in that job.

自从1930年代初期，北方天然气公司一直是奥马哈地区的著名企业之一，该公司的CEO通常都由本地的社区领袖担任。不过，到了1985年7月，这家公司——1980年已被改名为国际北方公司（Inter North）——与规模不到它一半的休斯敦天然气（Houston Natural Gas）合并。该公司当时曾宣布总部会继续留在奥马哈，并让原CEO继续留任。

Within a year, those promises were broken. By then, the former CEO of Houston Natural had taken over the top job at InterNorth, the company had been renamed, and the headquarters had been moved to Houston. These switches were orchestrated by the new CEO — Ken Lay — and the name he chose was Enron.

可是不到一年，这些承诺就被打破。休斯敦天然气的原任总裁接掌总裁职位，总部也搬到休斯敦，更有甚者，连公司名称都被后来新继任的总裁肯尼斯·雷（Ken Lay）改名为安然公司（Enron）⁶。

Fast forward 15 years to late 2001. Enron ran into the troubles we’ve heard so much about and borrowed money from Dynegy, putting up the Northern Natural pipeline operation as collateral. The two companies quickly had a falling out, and the pipeline’s ownership moved to Dynegy. That company, in turn, soon encountered severe financial problems of its own.

时光飞逝，一晃到了15年之后的2001年。安然公司陷入了众所周知的经营困境，被迫向另一家能源公司Dynegy公司借款15亿美元，借款抵押就是这条北方天然气管道。这两家公司很快闹翻，这条管线的所有权就移转到了Dynegy公司的名下。没过多久，Dynegy公司自身也遭遇严重的财务困境。

MEHC received a call on Friday, July 26, from Dynegy, which was looking for a quick and certain cash sale of the pipeline. Dynegy phoned the right party: On July 29, we signed a contract, and shortly thereafter Northern Natural returned home.

MEHC在7月26日，周五，接到了Dynegy公司打来的求救电话，对方希望将这条管线立即变现以换取现金。他们真是找对人了：7月29日，我们就完成了签约（9.28亿现金+承担9.5亿债务），不久之后，北方天然气公司就回到了家乡的怀抱。

When 2001 began, Charlie and I had no idea that Berkshire would be moving into the pipeline business. But upon completion of the Kern River expansion, MEHC will transport about 8% of all gas used in the U.S. We continue to look for large energy-related assets, though in the electric utility field PUHCA constrains what we can do.

2001年刚开始那会儿，查理跟我压根就没想到，我们会介入能源管道业务的经营。不过在完成肯特河管线扩充案之后，MEHC所运送的天然气，将占全美使用量的近8%。虽然在能源产业，PUHCA依然对我们有诸多限制，但我们仍将继续寻求大型的能源事业投资案。

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A few years ago, and somewhat by accident, MEHC found itself in the residential real estate brokerage business. It is no accident, however, that we have dramatically expanded the operation. Moreover, we are likely to keep on expanding in the future.

几年前，机缘巧合，MEHC进入了不动产中介业务。并非意外，这一业务后来大幅成长。而且，我们将来会继续扩大这一业务。

We call this business HomeServices of America. In the various communities it serves, though, it operates under the names of the businesses it has acquired, such as CBS in Omaha, Edina Realty in Minneapolis and Iowa Realty in Des Moines. In most metropolitan areas in which we operate, we are the clear market leader.

我们将这一业务整体命名为美国家庭服务公司（HomeServices of America）。尽管在不同地区，我们是以在当地收购的公司名称对外经营，比如说奥马哈的CBS不动产、明尼阿波利斯的Edina不动产、Des Moines的Iowa不动产等。在多数我们有营运的大城市中，我们都是当地市场的领导者。

HomeServices is now the second largest residential brokerage business in the country. On one side or the other (or both), we participated in $37 billion of transactions last year, up 100% from 2001.

HomeServices如今是全美第二大的住宅不动产中介商。我们去年参与了总值370亿美元的不动产交易案（或单边或双边参与交易），较2001年增加了一倍。

Most of our growth came from three acquisitions we made during 2002, the largest of which was Prudential California Realty. Last year, this company, the leading realtor in a territory consisting of Los Angeles, Orange and San Diego Counties, participated in $16 billion of closings.

大部分的增长来自于我们在2002年完成的三项并购案，其中最大的一件是保德信加州不动产（Prudential California Realty）。该公司是LosAngeles、Orange及SanDiego等地区最大的地产中介，去年促成的不动产成交总额高达160亿美元。

In a very short period, Ron Peltier, the company’s CEO, has increased HomeServices’ revenues — and profits — dramatically. Though this business will always be cyclical, it’s one we like and in which we continue to have an appetite for sensible acquisitions.

该公司的CEO罗恩·佩提耶（RonPeltier）在相当短的时间之内，就让HomeServices公司的营收及获利大幅增长。虽然这个行业的周期性波动相当的大，但是我们仍然想要继续进行并购扩张。

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Dave Sokol, MEHC’s CEO, and Greg Abel, his key associate, are huge assets for Berkshire.They are dealmakers, and they are managers. Berkshire stands ready to inject massive amounts of money into MEHC-and it will be fun to watch how far Dave and Greg can take the business.

MEHC的CEO大卫·索科尔（Dave Sokol）及其搭档格雷格·阿贝尔（Greg Abel），现已成为伯克希尔的珍贵资产。他们既是并购达人，更是优秀的经理人。伯克希尔已准备好要投入大量资金到MEHC，相当期待Dave与Greg会如何运用这些资金开疆辟土。

The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance 财产险/意外险的经济模型

Our core business — though we have others of great importance-is insurance. To understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates; (2) its cost; and (3) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these factors.

我们最主要的本业是保险，当然其它事业也相当重要。想要了解伯克希尔，你就必须知道如何去评估一家保险公司，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这家公司所能产生的浮存金数量，(2)以及浮存金的获取成本，(3)最重要的是这些因素的长期前景。

To begin with, float is money we hold but don’t own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money. Moreover, the downward trend of interest rates in recent years has transformed underwriting losses that formerly were tolerable into burdens that move insurance businesses deeply into the lemon category.

首先，浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金。在保险公司的营运中，浮存金产生的原因在于，保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，会先收到保户支付的保费，而且收付之间往往会间隔好多年。在这期间，保险公司会用这笔“浮动”资金投资获利。当然，这样的好处也有相应的代价：通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以覆盖最后支付出去的理赔损失与费用，这样保险公司便会发生承保亏损，这就是浮存金的成本。长期而言，当一家保险公司取得的浮存金成本低于从其它渠道获取资金的成本时，保险业务就有其价值。相反，一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本高于市场利率时，这项业务就会变得鸡肋。此外，近年来利率的不断下降，已经让过去可以承受的承保损失变得难以负担，这更使保险业务食之无味弃之可惜。

Historically, Berkshire has obtained its float at a very low cost. Indeed, our cost has been less than zero in many years; that is, we’ve actually been paid for holding other people’s money. In 2001, however, our cost was terrible, coming in at 12.8%, about half of which was attributable to World Trade Center losses. Back in 1983-84, we had years that were even worse. There’s nothing automatic about cheap float.

历史记录显示，伯克希尔的浮存金成本向来较低。实际上，在伯克希尔经营的这些年来，有半数以上的年头，浮存金的成本甚至低于零；也就是说，这实际上意味着别人要付费请我们帮他们保管资金。但2001年，我们的成本大幅飙涨，资金成本涨至12.8%，其中半数归因于世界贸易大楼造成的损失（指911事件）。回顾过去，我们在1983到1984年间，曾有过更悲惨的记录。便宜的浮存金绝非凭空而降。

The table that follows shows (at intervals) the float generated by the various segments of Berkshire’s insurance operations since we entered the business 36 years ago upon acquiring National Indemnity Company (whose traditional lines are included in the segment “Other Primary”). For the table we have calculated our float-which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume-by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting insurance-related receivables, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

下表中所显示的数字（有所缺失，并不完整），是伯克希尔自取得国民保险公司经营权，进入保险事业36年以来，各不同分部所贡献的浮存金（其中传统业务包含在其它主险项下）。在这张计算浮存金的表中——相对于收到的保费，我们持有的浮存金规模更为庞大——我们将所有的损失准备金、损失调整准备金、已承担再保险的持有资金、未到期责任准备金加总后，再扣除相关应收账款，预付并购成本、预付税金、适用于已承担再保险下的相关递延费用，从而得出浮存金的数额。（搞明白了吗？）

Yearend Float (in $ millions)

Year	GEICO	General Re	Other Reinsurance	Other Primary	Total
1967				20	20
1977			40	131	171
1987			701	807	1,508
1997	2,917		4,014	455	7,386
1998	3,125	14,909	4,305	415	22,754
1999	3,444	15,166	6,285	403	25,298
2000	3,943	15,525	7,805	598	27,871
2001	4,251	19,310	11,262	685	35,508
2002	4,678	22,207	13,396	943	41,224

Last year our cost of float was 1%. As I mentioned earlier, you should temper your enthusiasm about this favorable result given that no mega-catastrophe occurred in 2002. We’re certain to get one of these disasters periodically, and when we do our float-cost will spike.

去年，我们的浮存金成本约为1%。不过我早就有言在先，大家千万不要因这一年的低成本就盲目乐观，那完全是因为2002年没有发生什么重大的天灾人祸所致。总有一天，我们会碰到某些大灾难，届时我们的浮存金成本将激增。

Our 2002 results were hurt by 1) a painful charge at General Re for losses that should have been recorded as costs in earlier years, and 2) a “desirable” charge we incur annually for retroactive insurance (see the next section for more about these items). These costs totaled $1.75 billion, or about 4.6% of float. Fortunately, our overall underwriting experience on 2002 business was excellent, which allowed us, even after the charges noted, to approach a no-cost result.

2002年，我们的业绩因下列因素而承压：(1)痛苦的补充计提通用再保险以前年度未计提的损失准备金，(2)追溯再保险业务每年固定必须摊销的损失成本（在下一节会有详细说明）。这两项成本金额总计17.5亿美元，约为浮存金的4.6%。幸运的是，2002年我们整体的承保收益相当不错，这使得我们在计提以上损失之后仍接近盈亏平衡。

Absent a mega-catastrophe, I expect our cost of float in 2003 to again be very low-perhaps even less than zero. In the rundown of our insurance operations that follows, you will see why I’m optimistic that, over time, our underwriting results will both surpass those achieved by the industry and deliver us investable funds at minimal cost.

除非再发生什么重大的灾难，否则我预期2003年的浮存金成本将可以压得非常低，甚至有可能在零以下。在以下保险营运概述中，各位将可以看到我为何那么乐观。长期而言，我相信我们的承保绩效一定可以超越同业的平均水准，从而让我们以最低的成本取得投资所需的资金。

Insurance Operations 保险事业运营

If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they must: (a) underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively, and (c) avoid an aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly “impossible” incident to threaten their solvency. All of our major insurance businesses, with one exception, have regularly met those tests.

如果我们的保险事业想要长期产生低成本的浮存金，必须要做到以下几点：(a)必须有毫不妥协的承保纪律，(b)稳健保守地计提损失准备金，(c)避免那些看起来”不可能发生”的意外风险敞口累积进而影响到公司的偿付能力。除了一家公司以外，我们旗下其它所有主要的保险公司基本都通过了这一测试。

The exception is General Re, and there was much to do at that company last year to get it up to snuff. I’m delighted to report that under Joe Brandon’s leadership, and with yeoman assistance by Tad Montross, enormous progress has been made on each of the fronts described.

这个例外正是通用再保险。去年，这家公司为了扑灭那些潜在风险有太多事要忙。我很高兴地向各位报告，在Joe Brandon的领导以及Tad Montross的协助下，该公司在以上提到的这几点皆有重大的进展。

When I agreed in 1998 to merge Berkshire with Gen Re, I thought that company stuck to the three rules I’ve enumerated. I had studied the operation for decades and had observed underwriting discipline that was consistent and reserving that was conservative. At merger time, I detected no slippage in Gen Re’s standards.

当我在1998年同意伯克希尔并购通用再保险时，我以为该公司一直谨守以上所列的三项原则。因为我已追踪该公司营运达数十年，也发现到其历史承保纪律相当一致，同时损失准备金计提也相当保守。在合并当时，我并未发现通用再保险的承保标准有任何下滑。

I was dead wrong. Gen Re’s culture and practices had substantially changed and unbeknownst to management — and to me — the company was grossly mispricing its current business. In addition, Gen Re had accumulated an aggregation of risks that would have been fatal had, say, terrorists detonated several large-scale nuclear bombs in an attack on the U.S. A disaster of that scope was highly improbable, of course, but it is up to insurers to limit their risks in a manner that leaves their finances rock-solid if the “impossible” happens. Indeed, had Gen Re remained independent, the World Trade Center attack alone would have threatened the company’s existence.

不过事后证明我的判断大错特错。通用再保险的文化及作风近年来已彻底变质，公司管理层，以及我本人，却都茫然未知——这家公司的承保定价已经严重不当。此外，通用再保险还不知不觉地累积了致命的风险。例如，恐怖份子就有可能扔几个大当量核弹来攻击美国。虽然发生这样灾难的机率微乎其微，但万一这样的小概率事件发生，保险公司也绝对必须将最高保额限制在一定范围内，以确保公司的财务安全稳如磐石。事实上，如果通用再保险没有合并进伯克希尔的话，单单世贸中心袭击事件的损失就足以危及公司的生存。

When the WTC disaster occurred, it exposed weaknesses in Gen Re’s operations that I shouldI have detected earlier. But I was lucky: Joe and Tad were on hand, freshly endowed with increased authority and eager to rapidly correct the errors of the past. They knew what to do — and they did it.

911世贸中心恐袭事件的发生，严重地暴露了通用再保险营运上的盲点，这是我早该注意却偏偏没有注意到的一点。所幸我的运气还算不错，有Joe跟Tad在身边，他们刚被赋予更大的权力，并渴望迅速纠正过去的错误。他们知道该做什么，而且他们做到了。

It takes time for insurance policies to run off, however, and 2002 was well along before we managed to reduce our aggregation of nuclear, chemical and biological risk (NCB) to a tolerable level. That problem is now behind us.

虽然保险契约有时间递延性，不过2002年整体的结果还算令人满意，虽然我们仍未将核子生化等事故（NCB）累积的风险降到可以忍受的限度之内，好在911事件已成往事。

On another front, Gen Re’s underwriting attitude has been dramatically altered: The entire organization now understands that we wish to write only properly-priced business, whatever the effect on volume. Joe and Tad judge themselves only by Gen Re’s underwriting profitability. Size simply doesn’t count.

另外一方面，通用再保险的承保态度也已彻底转变：整个团队如今非常清楚，无论对业务规模有多少负面影响，我们只愿承保定价合理的风险。Joe跟Tad只根据通用再保险的获利能力考核自己，至于规模大小则完全不会考虑。

Finally, we are making every effort to get our reserving right. If we fail at that, we can’t know our true costs. And any insurer that has no idea what its costs are is heading for big trouble.

最后，我们正尽一切努力准确地提列损失准备金。如果做不到这一点，那么我们可能根本就不知道我们真实的成本。任何一家不了解自家公司成本的保险业者，将来肯定会遇到大麻烦。

At yearend 2001, General Re attempted to reserve adequately for all losses that had occurred prior to that date and were not yet paid — but we failed badly. Therefore the company’s 2002 underwriting results were penalized by an additional $1.31 billion that we recorded to correct the estimation mistakes of earlier years. When I review the reserving errors that have been uncovered at General Re, a line from a country song seems apt: “I wish I didn’t know now what I didn’t know then.”

2001年底，通用再保险试图将以前年度已发生但未支付的损失准备金补足，但事后证明我们做的还远远不够。因此，该公司在2002年不得不再补充计提13.1亿美元以修正以前年度的估计错误。当我再次回顾通用再保险被揭露的准备金计提错误时，突然想到有一首乡村歌曲词达此意：我希我不知，往昔所不知。

I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to avoid inadequate reserving. But I can’t guarantee success. The natural tendency of most casualty-insurance managers is to underreserve, and they must have a particular mindset — which, it may surprise you, has nothing to do with actuarial expertise — if they are to overcome this devastating bias. Additionally, a reinsurer faces far more difficulties in reserving properly than does a primary insurer. Nevertheless, at Berkshire, we have generally been successful in our reserving, and we are determined to be at General Re as well.

我向各位保证，未来我们的首要任务就是避免损失准备金计提不足。但我无法保证一定能做到。财产险经营者大多倾向少提损失准备金（从而能多记利润），而想要克服这种会导致灾难性结果的心理偏差——说起来或许你会讶异，这完全与精算专业能力无关——需要的只是诚实与正直。此外，再保险人在合理计提准备金方面比直接保险人面临的困难多得多。不过即便如此，伯克希尔在损失准备金计提这方面一直做得还不错，而我们也决意让通用再保险萧规曹随。

In summary, I believe General Re is now well positioned to deliver huge amounts of no-cost float to Berkshire and that its sink-the-ship catastrophe risk has been eliminated. The company still possesses the important competitive strengths that I’ve outlined in the past. And it gained another highly significant advantage last year when each of its three largest worldwide competitors, previously rated AAA, was demoted by at least one rating agency. Among the giants, General Re, rated AAA across-the-board, is now in a class by itself in respect to financial strength.

总的来说，我相信通用再保险倒闭的风险已被排除，现在已准备好为伯克希尔贡献大量无成本的浮存金。该公司仍然保有过去我一再提到的竞争优势。同时，去年它又获得另外一项重要的竞争优势，那就是其它三家原本同列AAA最高信用评级的全球主要竞争对手，都在去年至少被一家评级机构调降一个评级。在这些保险巨头当中，唯有通用再保险一路维持AAA评级，占得信用先机。

No attribute is more important. Recently, in contrast, one of the world’s largest reinsurers — a company regularly recommended to primary insurers by leading brokers — has all but ceased paying claims, including those both valid and due. This company owes many billions of dollars to hundreds of primary insurers who now face massive write-offs. “Cheap reinsurance is a fool’s bargain: When an insurer lays out money today in exchange for a reinsurer’s promise to pay a decade or two later, it’s dangerous — and possibly life-threatening — for the insurer to deal with any but the strongest reinsurer around.

再没有其它特点比这个更重要了。相较之下，一家通常被保险经纪人列为首选的世界级大型再保险公司，目前已近乎暂停支付损失理赔金，即便是对那些合同有效且到期的理赔亦是如此。该公司积欠数百家保险公司高达数十亿美元的理赔金，这些保险公司将被迫大幅减计应收理赔款。「追求便宜」对再保业来说，绝对是愚蠢的交易：当投保者今天将资金交付再保业者以换取十年、二十年后的保障承诺时，唯有跟实力最强的再保业者打交道，才有可能避免无谓且有时甚至危及企业生存的风险。

Berkshire shareholders owe Joe and Tad a huge thank you for their accomplishments in 2002. They worked harder during the year than I would wish for anyone — and it is paying off.

伯克希尔的股东们要特别感谢Joe跟Tad在2002年所取得的巨大成就。过去的一年，他们付出了比我希望的任何人都要更多的努力——当然这一切都得偿所报。

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At GEICO, everything went so well in 2002 that we should pinch ourselves. Growth was substantial, profits were outstanding, policyholder retention was up and sales productivity jumped significantly. These trends continue in early 2003.

在GEICO，2002年所有的事都再顺利也不过了，好到甚至让我们无法置信。增长的幅度相当可观，获利也相当突出，保户续约率持续提升，同时销售效率也大幅跃升。这些趋势在2003年初依然未减。

Thank Tony Nicely for all of this. As anyone who knows him will attest, Tony has been in love with GEICO for 41 years — ever since he went to work for the company at 18 — and his results reflect this passion. He is proud of the money we save policyholders — about $1 billion annually versus what other insurers, on average, would have charged them. He is proud of the service we provide these policyholders: In a key industry survey, GEICO was recently ranked above all major competitors. He is proud of his 19,162 associates, who last year were awarded profit-sharing payments equal to 19% of their base salary because of the splendid results they achieved. And he is proud of the growing profits he delivers to Berkshire shareholders.

这一切都要归功于Tony Nicely。认识他的人都知道，他跟GEICO结缘已达41个年头，加入GEICO时他只有18岁，累累硕果映此长情。他为客户节省的保费而自豪。相较于其它承保商，GEICO平均每年可为保户省下约10亿美元的保费。他为GEICO提供的服务而骄傲。根据业界的一项调查，GEICO目前名列消费者满意度第一名。他更为旗下19162位同仁而自豪。去年这些同仁因为优异的表现，为自己赚取了相当于19%底薪的奖金。最后他也因持续为伯克希尔贡献稳定增长的获利而自豪。

GEICO took in $2.9billioninpremiumswhenBerkshireacquiredfullownershipin1996.Lastyear,itsvolumewas$6.9 billion, with plenty of growth to come. Particularly promising is the company’s Internet operation, whose new business grew by 75% last year. Check us out at GEICO.com (or call 800-847-7536). In most states, shareholders get a special 8% discount.

1996年，在我们完全买下GEICO时，年度保费收入约29亿美元。去年这个数字增加到69亿美元，且后续增长依然可期。其中尤以网络直销最具潜力，去年这个部门增长率高达75%。记得到GEICO.com看看（或致电800-847-7536）。在大部分的州，股东都可以享受8%的特别折扣。

Here’s one footnote to GEICO’s 2002 earnings that underscores the need for insurers to do business with only the strongest of reinsurers. In 1981-1983, the managers then running GEICO decided to try their hand at writing commercial umbrella and product liability insurance. The risks seemed modest the company took in only $3,051,000fromthislineandusedalmostallofit--$2,979,000 — to buy reinsurance in order to limit its losses. GEICO was left with a paltry $72,000ascompensationfortheminorportionoftheriskthatitretained.Butthissmallbiteoftheapplewasmorethanenoughtomaketheexperiencememorable.GEIC{O}^{\prime }slossesfromthisventurenowtotalabreathtaking$94.1 million or about 130,000% of the net premium it received. Of the total loss, uncollectable receivables from deadbeat reinsurers account for no less than $90.3million(including$19 million charged in 2002). So much for “cheap” reinsurance.

关于GEICO在2002年的利润有一件事要附带报告，这件事突显了保险公司绝对只能与最好的再保公司开展业务的重要性。1981-1983年间，当时负责经营GEICO的经理人决定要在商业防护及产品责任险上试试身手。这类保单看起来似乎风险不大。公司在当年不过收取了约305万美元的保费，并将几乎全部保费——298万美元投保了再保险以限制损失在最小范围内。GEICO仅留下区区7.2万美元作为承担自留风险的对价。谁知这一小试牛刀竟让公司承受了难以抹灭的惨痛教训。GEICO后来总计为此承受的损失高达9410万美元，约当所收取净保费的1300倍。在这笔损失中，9030万美元是所托非人的应收再保险理赔款（其中包含摊余到2002年的1900万损失）。便宜实在是没好货啊！

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Ajit Jain’s reinsurance division was the major reason our float cost us so little last year. If we ever put a photo in a Berkshire annual report, it will be of Ajit. In color!

阿吉特·贾恩（Ajit Jain）领导的再保险部门是我们去年浮存金成本之所以能够压得这么低的主要原因。如果伯克希尔的年报里要摆上年度风云人物照片，那肯定会是Ajit，而且一定要用彩色的！

Ajit’s operation has amassed $13.4 billion of float, more than all but a handful of insurers have ever built up. He accomplished this from a standing start in 1986, and even now has a workforce numbering only 20. And, most important, he has produced underwriting profits.

从1986年开始，Ajit的部门，截至目前已经为我们累积了134亿美元的浮存金，这是其它业者前所未有的成绩，而雇用员工人数不过20人。更重要的是，他还享有承保收益。

His profits are particularly remarkable if you factor in some accounting arcana that I am about to lay on you. So prepare to eat your spinach (or, alternatively, if debits and credits aren’t your thing, skip the next two paragraphs).

如果各位再将我之前提到过的几项会计因素考虑进去，这样的利润就更显得难能可贵。所以各位请准备好你们的大力丸（如果你对会计借贷事项没兴趣，可以跳过后面两段不看）。

Ajit’s 2002 underwriting profit of $534millioncame\ast after\ast hisoperationrecognizedachargeof$428 million attributable to “retroactive” insurance he has written over the years. In this line of business, we assume from another insurer the obligation to pay up to a specified amount for losses they have already incurred — often for events that took place decades earlier — but that are yet to be paid (for example, because a worker hurt in 1980 will receive monthly payments for life). In these arrangements, an insurer pays us a large upfront premium, but one that is less than the losses we expect to pay. We willingly accept this differential because a) our payments are capped, and b) we get to use the money until loss payments are actually made, with these often stretching out over a decade or more. About 80% of the $6.6 billion in asbestos and environmental loss reserves that we carry arises from capped contracts, whose costs consequently can’t skyrocket.

2002年Ajit的承保收益达5.34亿美元，其中已包括所承担4.28亿美元的追溯再保险损失。这一业务领域，我们承保其它保险业者已经发生损失但尚未履行完毕的赔付义务，这类损失通常早在几十年前就已经发生，但理赔金到现在却还没有付完（举例来说一件1980年发生的石棉职业损害，但现在可能还持续按月支付终生的理赔金）。在这类保单中，由投保的保险公司一次性支付一大笔保险费给我们，但金额仍低于我们将来预期要付出的总数。而我们之所以愿意承接这样的保单，原因在于：a)我们赔付的金额仍有其上限，b)在理赔金真正付出之前，持续时间往往长达数十年以上，我们得以运用这笔资金投资。在我们承保的66亿美元的石棉及环境伤害赔付保险中，有80%是有上限的合约，因此其损失成本不至于无限制飙升。

When we write a retoactive policy, we immediately record both the premium and a reserve for the expected losses. The difference between the two is entered as an asset entitled “deferred charges — reinsurance assumed.” This is no small item: at yearend, for all retroactive policies, it was $3.4billion.Wethenamortizethisassetdownwardbychargestoincomeovertheexpectedlifeofeachpolicy.Thesecharges--$440 million in 2002, including charges at Gen Re — create an underwriting loss, but one that is intentional and desirable. And even after this drag on reported results. Ajit achieved a large underwriting gain last year.

当我们签下一张追溯再保险保单时，我们立即将保费收入入帐，并把预期会发生的损失计提准备金。至于两者的差额则以一项资产科目”递延费用-已承担再保险”入帐。这金额通常都不小，截至年底，资产负债表中的这个科目，金额高达34亿美元。之后我们会按这笔资产的预计年限分年摊销，并列为损益减项。2002年的摊销金额高达4.4亿美元（含通用再保险部分），这些承保损失是我们事先就预期到的必然支出。但即便账列收益因此受到拖累，Ajit去年依然缔造了可观的承保利润。

We want to emphasize, however, that we assume risks in Ajit’s operation that are huge — far larger than those retained by any other insurer in the world. Therefore, a single event could cause a major swing in Ajit’s results in any given quarter or year. That bothers us not at all: As long as we are paid appropriately, we love taking on short-term volatility that others wish to shed. At Berkshire, we would rather earn a lumpy 15% over time than a smooth 12%.

不过需要强调的是，我们在Ajit运营的业务中所承担的风险是巨大的，甚至远高于世界上任何其它保险业者所承担的风险。因此，单一事件可能导致Ajit在任何一季或任何一个年头的业绩出现巨大波动。不过这一点一点也不会困扰我们：只要我们收到的保费合理，我们乐于承担那些别人避之唯恐不及的短期损益波动。在伯克希尔，我们宁愿赚取忽上忽下的15%的长期投资回报，也不要一成不变的12%回报。

If you see Ajit at our annual meeting, bow deeply.

各位如果在股东会上遇到Ajit，记得深鞠一躬。

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Berkshire’s smaller insurers had an outstanding year. Their aggregate float grew by 38%, and they realized an underwriting profit of $32 million, or 4.5% of premiums. Collectively, these operations would make one of the finest insurance companies in the country.

伯克希尔其它规模较小的保险公司表现同样突出。合计浮存金增加了38%，并贡献了3,200万美元的承保收益，约当保费收入的4.5%。如果这些公司加起来，可以堪称为全美最好的保险公司之一。

Included in these figures, however, were terrible results in our California workers’ compensation operation. There, we have work to do. There, too, our reserving severely missed the mark. Until we figure out how to get this business right, we will keep it small.

不过除了这些好消息外，我们在加州工伤保险公司的经营绩效却惨不忍睹。关于那边的业务我们还有许多工作要做，同时提列准备金也严重失真。直到我们确信找到如何做好这些业务之前，否则我们宁愿维持目前较小的规模。

For the fabulous year they had in 2002, we thank Rod Eldred, John Kizer, Tom Nerney, Don Towle and Don Wurster. They added a lot of value to your Berkshire investment.

感谢Rod Eldred、John Kizer、Tom Nerney、Don Towle及Don Wurster，让2002年成为美好的一年，是他们让各位在伯克希尔的投资平添许多价值。

Sources of Reported Earnings 账列收益的来源

The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. You will notice that “Purchase-Accounting Adjustments” dropped sharply in 2002, the reason being that GAAP rules changed then, no longer requiring the amortization of goodwill. This change increases our reported earnings, but has no effect on our economic earnings.

下表显示伯克希尔账列收益的主要来源。大家或许已经发现，2002年的“购买法会计调整数”大幅减少，其原因在于GAAP会计规则已经过修正，不再要求商誉必须摊销，此举将使得我们的帐面收益增加，只是这对实质的经济收益一点影响也没有。

	Pre-Tax Earnings	Pre-Tax Earnings	Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)	Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)
(in millions)	2002	2001	2002	2001
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting — General Re	$ (1,393)	$ (3.671)	$ (930)	$ (2,391)
Underwriting — Berkshire Group	534	(647)	347	(433)
Underwriting — GEICO	416	221	271	144
Underwriting — Other Primary	32	30	20	18
Net investment income	3,050	2,824	2,096	1,968
Apparel (1)	229	(33)	156	(28)
Building Products (2)	516	461	313	287
Finance and Financial Products Businesses	1,016	519	659	336
Flight Services	225	186	133	105
MidAmerican Energy (80% owned)	613	565	359	230
Retail Operations	166	175	97	101
Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation)	129	129	83	83
Shaw Industries (3)	424	292	258	156
Other Businesses	256	212	160	131
Purchase-Accounting Adjustments	(119)	(726)	(65)	(669)
Corporate Interest Expense	(86)	(92)	(55)	(60)
Shareholder-Designated Contributions	(17)	(17)	(11)	(11)
Other	19	25	12	16
Operating Earnings	6,010	453	3,903	(47)
Capital Gains from Investments	603	1,320	383	842
Total Earnings - All Entities	$ 6,613	$ 1,773	$ 4,286	$ 795

(1) Includes Fruit of the Loom from April 30,2002 and Garan from September 4, 2002.

(2) Includes Johns Manville from February 27, 2001 and MiTek from July31, 2001.

(3) From date of acquistion, January 8, 2001.

Here’s a summary of major developments at our non-insurance businesses:

以下是2002年我们非保险事业相关的重点摘要：

• MidAmerican Energy’s earnings grew in 2002 and will likely do so again this year. Most of the increase, both present and expected, results from the acquisitions described earlier. To fund these, Berkshire purchased $1,273millionofMidAmericanjuniordebt(bringingourtotalholdingsofthese11$1,728 million) and aIso invested $402 million in a “common-equivalent” stock. We now own (on a fully-diluted basis) 80.2% of MidAmerican’s equity. MidAmerican’s financial statements are presented in detail on page 37.

MidAmerican Energy2002年的收益稳定增长，展望明年仍将维持这一态势。不论是现在还是将来，收益的增长主要来自于先前提过的并购案。为了支持MidAmerican Energy的收购，伯克希尔已买进该公司发行12.73亿美元的次级债（此举使得我们累计持有这种年息11%的债券达到17.28亿美元），另外我们还投资了约4.02亿美元的普通股，总计伯克希尔现在持有（在完全稀释基础下）MidAmerican Energy80.2%的股权。该公司详细的财务报表请参阅第37页。

• Last year I told you of the problems at Dexter that led to a huge loss in our shoe business. Thanks to Frank Rooney and Jim Issler of H.H.Brown, the Dexter operation has been turned around. Despite the cost of unwinding our problems there, we earned $24millioninshoeslastyear,anupwardswingof$70 million from 2001.

去年我曾向各位报告，Dexter制鞋公司是造成我们鞋业大幅亏损的元凶。在H.H.Brown鞋业的Frank Rooney及Jim Issler的努力下，现在Dexter的营运已回归正轨。尽管解决问题耗费了不少成本，但去年鞋业仍然赚了2400万美元的利润，较2001年的亏损，大幅增加了7000万美元。

Randy Watson at Justin also contributed to this improvement, increasing margins significantly while trimming invested capital. Shoes are a tough business, but we have terrific managers and believe that in the future we will earn reasonable returns on the capital we employ in this operation.

主管Justin的Randy Watson也为这一次转变贡献良多，在缩减资本开支规模的同时，大幅提高了利润率。鞋业是一项艰困产业，好在我们拥有最优秀的经理人，而且我也相信在未来我们一定能够为已经投入的资本赚取合理的回报。

• In a so-so year for home-furnishing and jewelry retailers, our operations did well. Among our eight retailing operations, the best performer was Homemaker’s in Des Moines. There, the talented Merschman family achieved outstanding gains in both sales and profits.

去年对于家具及珠宝零售业来说，算是平平的一年，但我们旗下事业的表现却相当不错。在我们旗下八家公司当中，表现最好的当属位于Des Moins的Homemaker’s。才华洋溢的Merschman家族缔造了优异的营业额与获利记录。

Nebraska Furniture Mart will open a new blockbuster store in metropolitan Kansas City in August. With 450,000 square feet of retail space, it could well produce the second largest volume of any furniture store in the country — the Omaha operation being the national champion. I hope Berkshire shareholders in the Kansas City area will come out for the opening (and keep coming).

NFM将于今年八月在Kansas开立一家全新的大型购物中心，总面积高达45万平方英尺。它将成为全美单店规模第二位的家具店，仅次于其位于奥马哈的旗舰店，我希望住在堪萨斯地区的伯克希尔股东能够一起莅临开幕剪彩（当然以后更要继续惠顾）。

• Our home and construction-related businesses — Acme Brick, Benjamin Moore Paint, Johns-Manville, MiTek and Shaw — delivered $941millionofpre-taxearningslastyear.OfparticularsignificancewasSha{w}^{\prime }sgainfrom$292 million in 2001 to $424 million. Bob Shaw and Julian Saul are terrific operators. Carpet prices increased only 1% last year, but Shaw’s productivity gains and excellent expense control delivered significantly improved margins.

我们住宅建筑相关业务：Acme砖块、Benjamin油漆、Johns-Manville屋面材料、MiTek及Shaw地毯等业务，去年总计贡献了9.41亿美元的税前利润。其中要特别提到的是Shaw地毯的表现，其税前利润从2001年的2.92亿美元大幅提高到2002年的4.24亿美元，Bob Shaw及Julian Saul堪称经营高手，去年地毯的价格涨幅平均不过1%，但Shaw本身的生产力提升以及绝佳的成本控管使得该公司的毛利率依然大幅提高。

We cherish cost-consciousness at Berkshire. Our model is the widow who went to the local newspaper to place an obituary notice. Told there was a 25-cents-a-word charge, she requested “Fred Brown died.” She was then informed there was a seven-word minimum. “Okay” the bereaved woman replied, “make it ‘Fred Brown died, golf clubs for sale’.”

在伯克希尔我们特别强调成本意识。我们的模范是一位准备刊登丈夫讣告的寡妇。报社告诉她每登一个字要25美分，于是她要求刊登「Fred死了」，但报社又表示每则至少要七个字，于是这位哀伤的妇人回复到，那就改为「Fred死了，售高尔夫会员卡」。

• Earnings from flight services increased last year — but only because we realized a special pre-tax gain of $60 million from the sale of our 50% interest in FlightSafety Boeing. Without this gain, earnings from our training business would have fallen slightly in concert with the slowdown in business-aviation activity. FlightSafety training continues to be the gold standard for the industry, and we expect growth in the years to come.

航空服务去年的收益略微增长，但那纯粹是因为我们出售持股50%的飞安-波音公司股权所实现6000万美元特别税前收益的关系。扣除这项收益，我们飞行员训练业务的利润略微下滑，主要反应商务飞行业务的下滑。飞安公司的飞行训练业务依旧是这个产业的最高标准，我们预期未来几年将会持续增长。

At NetJets, our fractional-ownership operation, we are the runaway leader of the four-company field. FAA records indicate that our industry share in 2002 was 75%, meaning that clients purchased or leased planes from us that were valued at triple those recorded by our three competitors combined. Last year, our fleet flew 132.7 million nautical miles, taking clients to 130 countries.

至于公务机分时租赁业务NetJets的营运，我们在这行大幅领先市场上其它三家同业。FAA的记录显示我们2002年的市场占有率高达75%，这代表客户购买或租赁我们飞机的金额是其它三家同业合计金额的三倍。去年我们的机队飞行里程数高达1.327亿海里，搭载客户到全世界130个国家。

Our preeminence is directly attributable to Rich Santulli, NetJets’ CEO. He invented the business in 1986 and ever since has exhibited an unbending devotion to the highest levels of service, safety and security. Rich, Charlie and I insist on planes (and personnel) worthy of carrying our own families –because they regularly do.

我们的优势完全要归功于Netjets的CEO理查德·桑图里。他在1986年开创这个行业，至此之后，他便展现不折不挠的决心提供最顶级、最安全的服务。Rich、查理跟我本人一向坚持必须培养足堪信赖的机队与机组人员，因为我们自己本身的家人就经常使用搭乘。

Though NetJets revenues set a record in 2002, the company again lost money. A small profit in the U.S. was more than offset by losses in Europe. Overall, the fractional-ownership industry lost significant sums last year, and that is almost certain to be the outcome in 2003 as well. The bald fact is that airplanes are costly to operate.

虽然NetJets的营业额在2002年创下新高，但该公司仍然处于亏损状态。美国地区确有小赚但仍抵不过欧洲地区的亏损。总的来说，专机分时租赁这行业在去年亏了不少钱，大概率2003年也是这样的光景。养机队实在是一项很沉重的负担。

Over time, this economic reality should work to our advantage, given that for a great many companies, private aircraft are an essential business tool. And for most of these companies, NetJets makes compelling sense as either a primary or supplementary supplier of the aircraft they need.

长期而言，经济现实终将站在我们这一边，主要是考量私人专机仍是许多大企业必备的商务工具。对于这些公司来说，NetJets无疑是他们最优或次优选择的飞行供应厂商。

Many businesses could save millions of dollars annually by flying with us. Indeed, the yearly savings at some large companies could exceed $10 million. Equally important, these companies would actually increase their operational capabilities by using us. A fractional ownership of a single NetJets plane allows a client to have several planes in the air simultaneously. Additionally, through the interchange arrangement we make available, an owner of an interest in one plane can fly any of 12 other models, using whatever plane makes most sense for a mission. (One of my sisters owns a fraction of a Falcon 2000, which she uses for trips to Hawaii, but — exhibiting the Buffett gene — she interchanges to a more economical Citation Excel for short trips in the U.S.)

利用我们的飞机，很多公司每年都可以轻松省下数百万美元的开支，有些大公司节省的金额甚至可达千万美元。更重要的是，搭配我们的飞机，这些公司可以大幅增加自己的飞机调度弹性。只要持有一小部分的飞机所有权，客户甚至可以同时使用好几架飞机。此外，经由我们提供的机队组合，一位客户可以视状况自由选择12种不同机型。（我有一个姐姐拥有一架Falcon2000部分所有权，她经常利用它往来夏威夷与美国本土之间，但由于同样的巴菲特家族基因，她也经常转换选用比较经济的Citation Excel在美国境内短程的旅行）。

The roster of NetJets users confirms the advantages we offer major businesses. Take General Electric, for example. It has a large fleet of its own but also has an unsurpassed knowledge of how to utilize aircraft effectively and economically. And it is our largest customer.

NetJets的客户名单证明了我们能够提供给大企业的种种好处。以通用电气为例，由于其公司本身就养着庞大的机队，因此相当了解应该如何有效率地运用其飞机。事实上，它正是我们的最大客户。

• Our finance and financial products line covers a variety of operations, among them certain activities in high-grade fixed-income securities that proved highly profitable in 2002. Earnings in this arena will probably continue for a while, but are certain to decrease — and perhaps disappear — in time.

我们的金融产品部门覆盖多类交易，其中包含一些高信用评级的固定收益债券，这类交易在2002年的获利特别高。我们预期这方面的高收益还会持续一阵子，但就长期而言，这部分的收益终究会日渐下滑，甚至消失殆尽。

This category also includes a highly satisfactory — but rapidly diminishing — income stream from our Berkadia investment in Finova (described in last year’s report). Our partner, Leucadia National Corp., has managed this operation with great skill, willingly doing far more than its share of the heavy lifting. I like this division of labor and hope to join with Leucadia in future transactions.

这其中还包括我们的合资公司Berkadia在Finova的投资，回报特别令人满意，但下降速度也很快（这项交易在去年的年报就详述过）。我们的合资伙伴Leucadia National公司以相当高超的技巧来经营这项业务，并极愿分担远超过其股份的重担。我个人也很愿意将这重担分给它们，并期望在将来可以与Leucadia共同参与更多的交易。

On the minus side, the Finance line also includes the operations of General Re Securities, a derivatives and trading business. This entity lost $173 million pre-tax last year, a result that, in part, is a belated acknowledgment of faulty, albeit standard, accounting it used in earlier periods. Derivatives, in fact, deserve an extensive look, both in respect to the accounting their users employ and to the problems they may pose for both individual companies and our economy.

从负面的角度来看，金融部门的业务也包含了通用再保险证券，这是一种金融衍生品及其交易业务。这个业务去年税前亏损了1.73亿美元，这个成绩中也包含了一部分补录之前错误会计记录的损失，虽然当时依照一般公认会计原则，那样的做法相当正常。事实上，对于金融衍生品，人们必须施以特别的关照，不管是其所适用的会计方法，还是它对个别公司或整个经济体可能造成的潜在危害。

Derivatives 金融衍生品

Charlie and I are of one mind in how we feel about derivatives and the trading activities that go with them: We view them as time bombs, both for the parties that deal in them and the economic system.

对于金融衍生品及其交易，查理跟我的看法完全一致：我们认为不论是对参与交易的双方或者是整个经济体系而言，它们就像是一颗颗定时炸弹！

Having delivered that thought, which I’ll get back to, let me retreat to explaining derivatives, though the explanation must be general because the word covers an extraordinarily wide range of financial contracts. Essentially, these instruments call for money to change hands at some future date, with the amount to be determined by one or more reference items, such as interest rates, stock prices or currency values. If, for example, you are either long or short an S&P 500 futures contract, you are a party to a very simple derivatives transaction — with your gain or loss derived from movements in the index. Derivatives contracts are of varying duration (running sometimes to 20 or more years) and their value is often tied to several variables.

抛出了这么个爆炸性的看法——晚点我会详加说明——目前先稍微解释一下金融衍生品到底是个啥。这类解释只能蜻蜓点水，因为这个名称代表着相当广泛的金融交易。基本上，这类交易工具要求货币在未来的某个日期易手，其金额决定于某个或数个关键指标，比如利率、股价或汇率等。举例来说，假设你做多或做空标普S&P500指数期权合约，那么你等于已经参与了一项非常简单的金融衍生品交易，你的回报取决于未来指数的变动。金融衍生品合约期有长有短，有时甚至可能超过20年，其价值的变化则系于许多变量。

Unless derivatives contracts are collateralized or guaranteed, their ultimate value also depends on the creditworthiness of the counterparties to them. In the meantime, though, before a contract is settled, the counterparties record profits and losses — often huge in amount — in their current earnings statements without so much as a penny changing hands.

除非衍生品交易有抵押或担保，否则其最终的价值还必须取决于交易对手的信用履约能力。虽然在交易正式清算之前，交易双方都会在各自的损益表上记录盈亏，且金额通常巨大，即便实际上尚未换手一分钱。

The range of derivatives contracts is limited only by the imagination of man (or sometimes, so it seems, madmen). At Enron, for example, newsprint and broadband derivatives, due to be settled many years in the future, were put on the books. Or say you want to write a contract speculating on the number of twins to be born in Nebraska in 2020. No problem — at a price, you will easily find an obliging counterparty.

人类（无论男女）有多疯狂，金融衍生品的交易范围就可以有多大。举例来说，当初在安然，就有新闻纸和宽带的金融衍生品，虽然要在许多年后才会结算，但此类交易还是躺在公司帐上。或者说你想要签一个合约，预测内布拉斯加州2020年双胞胎出生的数目，没有问题，只要你肯出价，保证一定找得到有人肯跟你对赌。

When we purchased Gen Re, it came with General Re Securities, a derivatives dealer that Charlie and I didn’t want, judging it to be dangerous. We failed in our attempts to sell the operation, however, and are now terminating it.

当初我们在买下通用再保险时，该公司有一家附属的通用再保险证券公司，这是一家金融衍生品经纪商，查理跟我都认为它具有相当的危险性，所以并不想保留这个部门。我们试图将这个部门出售，但并没有成功，最后只好将它慢慢清算。

But closing down a derivatives business is easier said than done. It will be a great many years before we are totally out of this operation (though we reduce our exposure daily). In fact, the reinsurance and derivatives businesses are similar: Like Hell, both are easy to enter and almost impossible to exit. In either industry, once you write a contract — which may require a large payment decades later — you are usually stuck with it. True, there are methods by which the risk can be laid off with others. But most strategies of that kind leave you with residual liability.

但想要关闭一个金融衍生品部门，说起来容易做起来却很难。想要摆脱它的纠缠可能要耗费许多个年头，虽然我们正逐日降低所暴露的风险。事实上，再保险业与衍生品交易有点类似，两者都如同地狱那样，进去容易，逃离却难如登天。一旦签订合约，就会身陷其中，指不定几十年后，突然冒出来要你支付一大笔钱。确实也有些法子可以让你将风险转嫁给别人，但大多数的做法还是无法免除连带的责任。

Another commonality of reinsurance and derivatives is that both generate reported earnings that are often wildly overstated. That’s true because today’s earnings are in a significant way based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years.

再保险业与衍生品交易另一个共同特点，就是两者的帐面收益通常都容易被高估。这是由于当前的收益大多系于许多未来的变量，这些变量估得准确与否，需要很多年后才能揭晓。

Errors will usually be honest, reflecting only the human tendency to take an optimistic view of one’s commitments. But the parties to derivatives also have enormous incentives to cheat in accounting for them. Those who trade derivatives are usually paid (in whole or part) on “earnings” calculated by mark-to-market accounting. But often there is no real market (think about our contract involving twins) and “mark-to-model” is utilized. This substitution can bring on large-scale mischief. As a general rule, contracts involving multiple reference items and distant settlement dates increase the opportunities for counterparties to use fanciful assumptions. In the twins scenario, for example, the two parties to the contract might well use differing models allowing both to show substantial profits for many years. In extreme cases, mark-to-model degenerates into what I would call mark-to-myth.

（衍生品交易中那些主观或客观的）⁷错误总有一天会图穷匕见，结果证明，人们只是倾向于高估他人承诺的可信度。衍生品交易的双方都有极大的动机在会计数字上动手脚。因为这些衍生品交易员的全部或部分回报大多取决于按市价结算的帐面“收益”。但现实状况是，那个所谓的市场价格根本就不存在（比如前面提到的双胞胎对赌合约），所以只能用”数学模型结算”取而代之。这种替代完全是胡闹。通常情况下，由于合约牵涉多个变量再加上超远的结算日期，这给交易双方使用幻想假设创造了条件。以我们刚刚提到的双胞胎对赌案例来说，订立合约的双方可能使用截然不同的定价模型，能使交易双方多年内同时享受可观的帐面收益。在极端状况下，所谓的「按模型结算」，在我看来极可能堕落为「按鬼话结算」。

Of course, both internal and outside auditors review the numbers, but that’s no easy job. For example, General Re Securities at yearend (after ten months of winding down its operation) had 14,384 contracts outstanding, involving 672 counterparties around the world. Each contract had a plus or minus value derived from one or more reference items, including some of mind-boggling complexity. Valuing a portfolio like that, expert auditors could easily and honestly have widely varying opinions.

当然，不论是内部的稽核人员或者是外部的审计师，都会审查这些数字，但要弄懂可不是一件容易的事。举例来说，通用再保险证券截至2002年年底（在决定彻底关闭它的10个月后）仍有14384份有效合约流落在外，672个交易对手遍布全世界。每一项合约的价值都会随着一个或好几个变量的变化而随时上下变动，其中有一些变量光是看了就令人觉得头皮发麻。想要对这些交易组合进行估值，就算是专业而诚实的审计师，也往往会有不同的意见与看法。

The valuation problem is far from academic: In recent years, some huge-scale frauds and near-frauds have been facilitated by derivatives trades. In the energy and electric utility sectors, for example, companies used derivatives and trading activities to report great “earnings” — until the roof fell in when they actually tried to convert the derivatives-related receivables on their balance sheets into cash. “Mark-to-market” then turned out to be truly “mark-to-myth.”

评价难度本身早已超越学术讨论范围。近几年来，有好几件大规模的欺诈案及疑似舞弊案都是借力于衍生品交易。以电力及能源事业来说，许多公司利用衍生品交易来虚设巨额账面利润——当他们真刀真枪将资产负债表上与衍生品相关的应收款项变现为现金时，假模假式就原形毕露。至此”按市价结算”真正沦为”按鬼话结算”。

I can assure you that the marking errors in the derivatives business have not been symmetrical. Almost invariably, they have favored either the trader who was eyeing a multi-million dollar bonus or the CEO who wanted to report impressive “earnings” (or both). The bonuses were paid, and the CEO profited from his options. Only much later did shareholders learn that the reported earnings were a sham.

我可以向各位保证，金融衍生品合约中的记账错误，绝对无法让交易双方的帐对得平。几乎不例外的，他们要么偏坦眼盯着百万奖金的交易员，要么青睐特别希望帐面拥有亮丽数字的CEO（或兼而有之）。而最后往往是奖金支付给了交易员，CEO则从认股期权中赚的盆满钵满。很久以后，股东们才会发现所谓亮丽的财报数字根本就是一场骗局。

Another problem about derivatives is that they can exacerbate trouble that a corporation has run into for completely unrelated reasons. This pile-on effect occurs because many derivatives contracts require that a company suffering a credit downgrade immediately supply collateral to counterparties. Imagine, then, that a company is downgraded because of general adversity and that its derivatives instantly kick in with their requirement, imposing an unexpected and enormous demand for cash collateral on the company. The need to meet this demand can then throw the company into a liquidity crisis that may, in some cases, trigger still more downgrades. It all becomes a spiral that can lead to a corporate meltdown.

金融衍生品交易的另一项危害是，它们可能因一些毫不相关的因素，加剧一家公司陷入困境。这种雪上加霜效应之所以会发生，主要在于许多金融衍生品合约都要求对手方一旦信用评级遭到调降，必须立刻追加质押担保。大家可以想象一下，当一家公司因普遍行业困境而被调降信用评级的时候，衍生品交易对手却又立即登门，要求提供事先完全没有设想到且金额庞大的现金抵押品时的情景。此举可能让公司进一步陷入流动性危机，而通常这又会让公司的信用评级再度向下调降。恶性循环的结果可能导致一家原本好好的公司因此垮台。

Derivatives also create a daisy-chain risk that is akin to the risk run by insurers or reinsurers that lay off much of their business with others. In both cases, huge receivables from many counterparties tend to build up over time. (At Gen Re Securities, we still have $6.5 billion of receivables, though we’ve been in a liquidation mode for nearly a year.) A participant may see himself as prudent, believing his large credit exposures to be diversified and therefore not dangerous. Under certain circumstances, though, an exogenous event that causes the receivable from Company A to go bad will also affect those from Companies B through Z. History teaches us that a crisis often causes problems to correlate i a manner undreamed of in more tranquil times.

金融衍生品交易也有可能造成多米诺骨牌效应的风险，这是因为许多保险业及再保险业者习惯将风险分散给其它保险公司。在这种情况下，来自许多交易对手的巨额应收账款往往会随着时间的推移而累积（以通用再保险证券公司来说，虽然已经经过将近一年的清算，目前仍有高达65亿美元的应收款项流通在外）。交易的一方或许对于自己相当有信心，认为其巨额的信用风险已经经过适度的分散，因此不会发生任何危险。然而在某种特殊状况下，一个外部事件导致A公司的应收帐款发生问题，从而影响B公司，乃至于一路到Z公司的应收款。历史教训告诉我们，在太平盛世时的小问题，往往以做梦也想不到的方式相互关联，最终导致危机的爆发。

In banking, the recognition of a “linkage” problem was one of the reasons for the formation of the Federal Reserve System. Before the Fed was established, the failure of weak banks would sometimes put sudden and unanticipated liquidity demands on previously-strong banks, causing them to fail in turn. The Fed now insulates the strong from the troubles of the weak. But there is no central bank assigned to the job of preventing the dominoes toppling in insurance or derivatives. In these industries, firms that are fundamentally solid can become troubled simply because of the travails of other firms further down the chain. When a “chain reaction” threat exists within an industry, it pays to minimize links of any kind. That’s how we conduct our reinsurance business, and it’s one reason we are exiting derivatives.

在银行体系中，连锁反应问题是美联储成立的主要原因之一。在美联储成立以前，弱势银行倒闭有时可能会对一些原本体质还不错的银行造成突然没有预期到的流动性压力，导致它们跟着出现问题。美联储于是建立一道防火墙将有问题的金融机构隔绝开。但是在保险业或是衍生品交易中，却没有类似中央银行的控管机制来防止骨牌效应的发生。在这些产业，一家原本体质不错的公司很有可能因为其它公司发生问题而受到拖累。当一个行业中存在这种连锁反应的威胁时，就绝对有必要尽量降低彼此间的牵连。这正是我们目前在再保业采取的做法，同样也是我们选择退出金融衍生品交易的原因之一。

Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can’t bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. Indeed, at Berkshire, I sometimes engage in large-scale derivatives transactions in order to facilitate certain investment strategies.

许多人声称衍生品交易可以有效降低系统风险，通过这类交易可以让原本无法承担特定风险的人将风险移转到他人身上。这些人认为衍生品可以稳定经济、促进贸易、消除个别参与者的障碍。就微观层面而言，他们的说法或许确是事实。在伯克希尔，我有时也会参与进一些大规模的衍生品交易，以使某些投资策略更易实施。

Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I’ve mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Likage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems.

然而查理跟我本人都认为，从宏观经济的角度来看，这却是相当危险，而且风险更有日益加重的趋势。大量的风险，尤其是信用风险，目前已逐渐累积在少数几家衍生品交易商身上，而且彼此的交易更是相当频繁。这使得一家公司在发生问题后，将很快地传染给其它公司。到最后这些交易商将积欠非交易商的交易对手巨额欠款，而这些交易对方，如我刚刚提到的，由于彼此关系过于紧密，将导致一个单一事件让他们同时出现问题（比如说电信产业的崩溃或者商业电力项目的价值大幅减损等）。当问题浮现时，关联度过高可能引发严重的系统性风险。

Indeed, in 1998, the leveraged and derivatives-heavy activities of a single hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, caused the Federal Reserve anxieties so severe that it hastily orchestrated a rescue effort. In later Congressional testimony, Fed officials acknowledged that, had they not intervened, the outstanding trades of LTCM — a firm unknown to the general public and employing only a few hundred people — could well have posed a serious threat to the stability of American markets. In other words, the Fed acted because its leaders were fearful of what might have happened to other financial institutions had the LTCM domino toppled. And this affair, though it paralyzed many parts of the fixed-income market for weeks, was far from a worst-case scenario.

事实上，1998年，大量从事高杠杆及衍生品交易的对冲基金长期资本管理公司，就曾使美联储如临深渊，不得不火急火燎组织紧急救援。在随后的国会听证会中，美联储官员坦承，当初若非他们及时介入，LTCM——一家对公众来说名不见经传的、只雇有小几百人的公司——的交易敞口，很有可能对美国资本市场的稳定造成极严重的威胁。换句话说，美联储之所以甘冒大不讳打破惯例介入干预，完全是因为领导层害怕类似的事件会传导到其它金融机构的身上进而引发骨牌效应。而这次的事件虽然导致很大部分固定收益市场一度瘫痪达数周之久，但个人认为，这远远不是最坏的状况。

One of the derivatives instruments that LTCM used was total-return swaps, contracts that facilitate 100% leverage in various markets, including stocks. For example, Party A to a contract, usually a bank, puts up all of the money for the purchase of a stock while Party B, without putting up any capital, agrees that at a future date it will receive any gain or pay any loss that the bank realizes.

在所有衍生品中，全收益掉期互换是LTCM经常使用的工具之一，这类合约使得该公司可以运用100%的杠杆在各种市场进行套利，也包含股票市场。举例来说，合约的一方A，通常是一家银行，必须投入百分之百的资金买进股票，而在此同时，合约的另一方B，在不投入任何资金的情况下，约定在未来的某个日子时，将收到银行A实现的任何收益或支付银行A的任何损失。

Total-return swaps of this type make a joke of margin requirements. Beyond that, other types of derivatives severely curtail the ability of regulators to curb leverage and generally get their arms around the risk profiles of banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Similarly, even experienced investors and analysts encounter major problems in analyzing the financial condition of firms that are heavily involved with derivatives contracts. When Charlie and I finish reading the long footnotes detailing the derivatives activities of major banks, the only thing we understand is that we don’t understand how much risk the institution is running.

这类全收益互换合约竟然连保证金都可以不需要。除此之外，其它种类的衍生品也严重削弱了监管机构抑制杠杆的能力，以及对银行保险及其它金融机构风险的控管。同时，即便是经验老道的投资者及分析师在看到这类布满衍生品交易公司的财务状况时，也束手无策。记得当查理跟我自己在看完几家大型银行有关衍生品交易冗长的财务报表附注时，我们唯一可以确定的是，我们根本就*无法知晓这些金融机构到底承担了多少的风险。

The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these contracts.

衍生品交易魔鬼现在已从潘多拉瓶子中窜出，而这类交易的种类和数量还会继续以各种不同形式倍增，直至某些标志性事件让这种祸害大白于天下。对衍生品危险性的认识已经在电力和天然气行业众所周知，因为衍生品在这个行业导致了几个重大麻烦（猜测安然事件是其中之一）⁸，这类交易在能源行业已经大幅减少。然而在其它产业，衍生品交易却照样毫无节制的急速扩张中。到目前为止，各国央行及政府依然没用找到有效的方法来控制甚至监控这些合约所带来的风险。

Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength — for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and employees. We try to be alert to any sort of mega-catastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.

查理跟我相信，伯克希尔理所应当应该是所有股东、债权人、投保人及员工最坚强的财务堡垒。我们对于任何可能的潜在重大风险都保持警惕。即便或许，对于远期衍生品的大量交易、以及巨额膨胀的无担保应收款项的保留态度，让我们看起有点过分忧虑。但我们还是认为，衍生品是大规模杀伤性金融武器，虽然目前仍然潜伏，但极具致命危险。

Investments 股票投资

Below we show our common stock investments. Those that had a market value of more than $500 million at the end of 2002 are itemized.

下表是伯克希尔2002年市价超过5亿美元以上的股票投资。

Shares	Company	Cost* 12/31/02 (dollars in millions)	Market 12/31/02 (dollars in millions)
151,610,700	American Express Company	$ 1,470	$ 5,359
200,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company	1,299	8,768
96,000,000	The Gillette Company	600	2,915
15,999,200	H&R Block,Inc.	255	643
6,708,760	M&T Bank	103	532
24,000,000	Moody’s Corporation	499	991
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company	11	1,275
53,265,080	Wells Fargo & Company	306	2,497
	Others	4,621	5,383
Total Common Stocks	$ 9,164	$ 28,363

We continue to do little in equities. Charlie and I are increasingly comfortable with our holdings in Berkshire’s major investees because most of them have increased their earnings while their valuations have decreased. But we are not inclined to add to them. Though these enterprises have good prospects, we don’t yet believe their shares are undervalued.

在股票投资方面，我们依旧没有什么动作。查理跟我对于伯克希尔目前主要的持股组合越来越感到满意。一方面是由于被投资公司的利润逐年增加，其估值却反而下滑。不过现在我们还是无意增加持股仓位。虽然这些公司的前景都相当不错，但截至目前为止，我们还是不认为他们的股价低估了。

In our view, the same conclusion fits stocks generally. Despite three years of falling prices, which have significantly improved the attractiveness of common stocks, we still find very few that even mildly interest us. That dismal fact is testimony to the insanity of valuations reached during The Great Bubble. Unfortunately, the hangover may prove to be proportional to the binge.

我们认为，这种看法也大体上适用于股票市场。尽管股市连续三年下跌，相对大大增加了投资股票的吸引力，但我们还是很难找到真正能够引起我们兴趣的投资标的。这一令人沮丧的事实证明，科网股大泡沫时期的估值有多疯狂。不幸的是，如今的宿醉有多长，恰证明当初的盛宴有多狂。

The aversion to equities that Charlie and I exhibit today is far from congenital. We love owning common stocks — if they can be purchased at attractive prices. In my 61 years of investing, 50 or so years have offered that kind of opportunity. There will be years like that again. Unless, however, we see a very high probability of at least 10% pre-tax returns (which translate to 6.5-7% after corporate tax), we will sit on the sidelines. With short-term money returning less than 1% after-tax, sitting it out is no fun. But occasionally successful investing requires inactivity.

查理跟我现在对于股票退避三舍的态度，并非天生如此。事实上，我们非常喜欢投资股票——我是说如果可以以合理的价格买进的话。在我61年的投资生涯中，大约有50个年头以上，都有这样的机会出现。我想以后也还会有相当多类似的机会。只不过，除非是我们发现，至少可以获得税前10%回报率的概率相当高时（即税后6.5-7%的回报），否则我们宁可在旁观望。虽然这么做必须要忍受短期闲置资金不到1%的税后回报，闲坐无事可不那么好受。但有时成功的投资本来就必须要有耐性。

Last year we were, however, able to make sensible investments in a few “junk” bonds and loans. Overall, our commitments in this sector sextupled, reaching $8.3 billion by yearend.

所幸，去年我们得以将部分资本配置到一些不错的垃圾债券及债权投资之上。至去年底，我们在这方面的累计投资金额增加至6倍，达到83亿美元。

Investing in junk bonds and investing in stocks are alike in certain ways: Both activities require us to make a price-value calculation and also to scan hundreds of securities to find the very few that have attractive reward/risk ratios. But there are important differences between the two disciplines as well. In stocks, we expect every commitment to work out well because we concentrate on conservatively financed businesses with strong competitive strengths, run by able and honest people. If we buy into these companies at sensible prices, losses should be rare. Indeed, during the 38 years we have run the company’s affairs, gains from the equities we manage at Berkshire (that is, excluding those managed at General Re and GEICO) have exceeded losses by a ratio of about 100 to one.

投资垃圾债券跟投资股票在许多方面相当雷同：两者都需要评估价格与价值比，并在成千上万个标的中挑选出少数风险/回报比率最佳者。当然两者在原则上也有许多明显的不同。在投资股票时，我们预期每一笔投资都会成功，因为我们专注于少数几家财务稳健、具备竞争优势并由才干诚信兼具的经理人所经营的公司上。如果我们以合理的价格买进这类公司时，损失发生的机率通常非常小。事实上，在我们经营伯克希尔的38年当中（扣除通用再保险与GEICO的对外投资），投资结果的盈亏比例约为100比1。

Purchasing junk bonds, we are dealing with enterprises that are far more marginal. These businesses are usually overloaded with debt and often operate in industries characterized by low returns on capital. Additionally, the quality of management is sometimes questionable. Management may even have interests that are directly counter to those of debtholders. Therefore, we expect that we will have occasional large losses in junk issues. So far, however, we have done reasonably well in this field.

但在投资垃圾债券时，我们面对的企业体质就比较差了。这些公司通常都背负大笔的负债，同时所处产业的投资回报率都相当低。此外，管理层的素质有时也有问题。其利益有时甚至与债权人相冲突。因此，我们预期这类投资难免会出现较大亏损。所幸到目前为止，我们在这个领域的投资绩效还算相当不错。

Corporate Governance 公司治理

Both the ability and fidelity of managers have long needed monitoring. Indeed, nearly 2,000 years ago, Jesus Christ addressed this subject, speaking (Luke 16:2) approvingly of “a certain rich man” who told his manager, “Give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest no longer be steward.”

长久以来，管理层的能力与诚信本就必须受到严密的检视。事实上，在2000多年以前，耶稣基督就曾对这个议题发表过看法，他在路加福音16：2提到：「一位财主叫管家来，请你把所管的事情交代一下，因为你不再是我的管家了」。

Accountability and stewardship withered in the last decade, becoming qualities deemed of little importance by those caught up in the Great Bubble. As stock prices went up, the behavioral norms of managers went down. By the late ’90s, as a result, CEOs who traveled the high road did not encounter heavy traffic.

过去10多年来，企业管理层的责任感和管理能力日渐萎靡，在科网股泡沫巅峰时期，这些特质不再受到人们的重视。当公司股价上涨的同时，经理人的行为规范却向下沉沦。这导致，90年代末期，那些高格调的CEO几乎形单影只。

Most CEOs, it should be noted, are men and women you would be happy to have as trustees for your children’s assets or as next-door neighbors. Too many of these people, however, have in recent years behaved badly at the office, fudging numbers and drawing obscene pay for mediocre business achievements. These otherwise decent people simply followed the career path of Mae West: “I was Snow White but I drifted.”

不得不提到的是，大部分CEO，就像那些你很乐意让他们成为你孩子资产的受托人，或像是邻居般亲切的好好先生或女士。然而近几年来，这里面有太多人在职场上的表现却每况愈下。不但表现平庸，还假造数字藉以榨取高额不当利益。这些原本体面的人士，走的不过是Mae West那样的下坡路：“曾经我是位白雪公主，但如今却已不再清白。”

In theory, corporate boards should have prevented this deterioration of conduct. I last wrote about the responsibilities of directors in the 1993 annual report. (We will send you a copy of this discussion on request, or you may read it on the Internet in the Corporate Governance section of the 1993 letter.) There, I said that directors “should behave as if there was a single absentee owner, whose long-term interest they should try to further in all proper ways.” This means that directors must get rid of a manager who is mediocre or worse, no matter how likable he may be. Directors must react as did the chorus-girl bride of an 85-year-old multimillionaire when he asked whether she would love him if he lost his money. “Of course,” the young beauty replied, “I would miss you, but I would still love you.”

理论上，公司董事会本应预防这类恶劣行为的发生。最近一次我在1993年的年报上曾提到过董事们应尽的责任（若有需要，可向我们索取这份年报，或者通过互联网在线阅读1993年年报的“公司治理章节”）。当时我曾表示「我认为董事会应该表现得像一个因事缺席的唯一股东那样，他们应该以一切适当的方式确保这位虚拟大股东的长期利益不会受到损害」。这句话的意思是，董事会绝对不能容许公司存在一个平庸或甚至是差劲的经理人，不管他是如何讨人喜欢。董事们应该要像是一位年轻的辣妹在下嫁给85岁的亿万富翁时，被问到：「如果我身无分文的话，你是否还会爱我？」时的反应一样，这位年轻女郎回答说：「虽然我爱你，但我会更想念你」。

In the 1993 annual report, I also said directors had another job: “If able but greedy managers over-reach and try to dip too deeply into the shareholders’ pockets, directors must slap their hands.” Since I wrote that, over-reaching has become common but few hands have been slapped.

在1993年的年报中，我也曾说过董事的另外一项责任：「要是能干的管理层过于贪心，不时地想要从股东的口袋里捞钱，那么董事会就必须适时地出手制止并给予警告」。只可惜自从那以后，尽管经理人过度伸手的行为已司空见惯，但却不见有人出面制止。

Why have intelligent and decent directors failed so miserably? The answer lies not in inadequate laws — it’s always been clear that directors are obligated to represent the interests of shareholders — but rather in what I’d call “boardroom atmosphere.”

为何一向英明体面的董事们会如此惨败呢？其实问题并不在法律层面——董事会本来就应该以捍卫股东利益为最高职责——我认为真正的症结在于我所谓的「董事会上的一团和气氛围」。

It’s almost impossible, for example, in a boardroom populated by well-mannered people, to raise the question of whether the CEO should be replaced. It’s equally awkward to question a proposed acquisition that has been endorsed by the CEO, particularly when his inside staff and outside advisors are present and unanimously support his decision. (They wouldn’t be in the room if they didn’t.) Finally, when the compensation committee — armed, as always, with support from a high-paid consultant — reports on a megagrant of options to the CEO, it would be like belching at the dinner table for a director to suggest that the committee reconsider.

举例来说，通常在充满和谐气氛的董事会议上，几乎不可能讨论到是否应该撤换CEO这类严肃的话题。同样令人尴尬的是，董事也不可能笨到会去质疑已经由CEO大力背书的并购案，尤其是当列席的内部幕僚与外部顾问皆一致地支持他英明的决策时（他们若不支持的话，就不可能出现在董事会上了）。最后，通常由高薪的顾问组成的薪酬委员会，在报告将给予CEO大量的认股期权时，任何提出保留意见的董事，通常会被视为像是在宴会上打嗝一样地失礼。

These “social” difficulties argue for outside directors regularly meeting without the CEO — a reform that is being instituted and that I enthusiastically endorse. I doubt, however, that most of the other new governance rules and recommendations will provide benefits commensurate with the monetary and other costs they impose.

这些“社交礼仪”导致的董事会运行障碍，号召外部董事在CEO不在场的情况下定期开会——这是一项正在实施的改革，我非常赞同。不过我也怀疑，增加任何的治理规定以及建议，其所必须付出的金钱与其它成本，能否与因此所得到的利益相当。

The current cry is for “independent” directors. It is certainly true that it is desirable to have directors who think and speak independently — but they must also be business-savvy, interested and shareholder- oriented. In my 1993 commentary, those are the three qualities I described as essential.

目前，业界正在大声疾呼设立”独立董事”制度。理论上，公司绝对必须应有所思所言皆独立的董事存在——但他们同时也必须具有丰富的商业经历、关心公司的态度、并以股东利益为导向。我在1993年致股东信中就曾提到过，这是我个人认为绝对必要的三项特质。

Over a span of 40 years, I have been on 19 public-company boards (excluding Berkshire’s) and have interacted with perhaps 250 directors. Most of them were “independent” as defined by today’s rules. But the great majority of these directors lacked at least one of the three qualities I value. As a result, their contribution to shareholder well-being was minimal at best and, too often, negative. These people, decent and intelligent though they were, simply did not know enough about business and/or care enough about shareholders to question foolish acquisitions or egregious compensation. My own behavior, I must ruefully add, frequently fell short as well: Too often I was silent when management made proposals that I judged to be counter to the interests of shareholders. In those cases, collegiality trumped independence.

过去40多年来，我曾经担任过19家公开上市公司的董事（伯克希尔不算在内），同时至少跟250位以上的董事打过交道。他们其中多数都符合目前”独立董事”的标准。但这些董事大多至少缺乏我所提到的三项特质之一。因此，他们对于股东利益的贡献微乎其微，甚至常常有损股东的利益。这些人虽然体面睿智，但对于生意经营的了解却极其有限，同时也不会站在股东的立场去质疑愚蠢的并购决策或夸张的管理层薪酬。我必须遗憾地补充说，我自己的行为也经常达不到要求：当管理层在做出有违股东利益的提案时，我常常选择沉默以对。那时，老好人心态战胜了独立性。

So that we may further see the failings of “independence,” let’s look at a 62-year case study covering thousands of companies. Since 1940, federal law has mandated that a large proportion of the directors of investment companies (most of these mutual funds) be independent. The requirement was originally 40% and now it is 50%. In any case, the typical fund has long operated with a majority of directors who qualify as independent.

通过一个涵盖数千家公司的，历时62年的案例研究，我们进一步来探讨丧失独立性的现象。自从1940年以来，联邦法令规定投资公司（其中绝大部分为共同基金）大部分董事必须独立。原本的要求是40%，目前则提高为50%。但不论如何，共同基金的董事会组织运作一般都符合独立性的条件。

These directors and the entire board have many perfunctory duties, but in actuality have only two important responsibilities: obtaining the best possible investment manager and negotiating with that manager for the lowest possible fee. When you are seeking investment help yourself, those two goals are the only ones that count, and directors acting for other investors should have exactly the same priorities. Yet when it comes to independent directors pursuing either goal, their record has been absolutely pathetic.

这些董事及整个董事会有许多敷衍了事的义务，但实际上只有两项职责最重要：一是找到最优秀的基金经理，一是协调争取最低的管理费。我想当一个人在为自己寻求投资的协助时，这两项目标应该是最要紧的，代表其他投资者的董事们应该有完全相同的考量。然而实证显示，这些独立董事在这方面的表现却是令人感到叹息。

Many thousands of investment-company boards meet annually to carry out the vital job of selecting who will manage the savings of the millions of owners they represent. Year after year the directors of Fund A select manager A, Fund B directors select manager B, etc. … in a zombie-like process that makes a mockery of stewardship. Very occasionally, a board will revolt. But for the most part, a monkey will type out a Shakespeare play before an “independent” mutual-fund director will suggest that his fund look at other managers, even if the incumbent manager has persistently delivered substandard performance. When they are handling their own money, of course, directors will look to alternative advisors — but it never enters their minds to do so when they are acting as fiduciaries for others.

成千上万的投资公司董事会每年都会开会，履行他们的神圣职责，为其背后所代表的数百万投资人选择适当的基金管理人来管理其身家财产。年复一年，基金A的董事们选择经理A，基金B的董事们选择经理B，如此等等……这是一个僵尸般的过程，完全是对他们所负职责的嘲弄。极罕见的情况下，也会有董事会良心发现。但大部分的时候，就算现任基金经理的表现再差劲也一样视而不见。我想，等待这些独立董事提议寻找其它合适的基金经理，恐怕连猴子都能写出莎士比亚歌剧了。当然，这些人在管理自己的资产时，只要发现苗头不对，会立刻另觅贤能，但他们作为受托人帮他人管理资产时，却从来没有想过要这样做。

The hypocrisy permeating the system is vividly exposed when a fund management company — call it “A” — is sold for a huge sum to Manager “B”. Now the “independent” directors experience a “counter-revelation” and decide that Manager B is the best that can be found — even though B was available (and ignored) in previous years. Not so incidentally, B also could formerly have been hired at a far lower rate than is possible now that it has bought Manager A. That’s because B has laid out a fortune to acquire A, and B must now recoup that cost through fees paid by the A shareholders who were “delivered” as part of the deal. (For a terrific discussion of the mutual fund business, read John Bogle’s Common Sense on Mutual Funds.)

当一家基金公司，我们姑且称之为A公司，被一位经理人B以极高价位买断时，弥漫在这个系统内的伪善气氛就会被特别凸显。这时我们立刻可以发现这些独立董事们终于开始”自我反省”，认为B先生才是最佳的基金经理人，尽管B先生不是今天才存在这个业界（其实是被刻意忽略）。而且通常很不凑巧的，B先生在自A先生手中买下A公司后，其薪资价码肯定比原本的薪资水准高得许多。我想主要原因在于，为了取得A公司，B先生已经投入巨资，而B现在必须通过A股东支付的费用来补偿这一成本，A股东事实上成为交易的一部分。如果想要多了解基金公司的内幕，建议各位读一读John Bogle的著作*《共同基金的常识》***。

A few years ago, my daughter was asked to become a director of a family of funds managed by a major institution. The fees she would have received as a director were very substantial, enough to have increased her annual income by about 50% (a boost, she will tell you, she could use!). Legally, she would have been an independent director. But did the fund manager who approached her think there was any chance that she would think independently as to what advisor the fund should employ? Of course not. I am proud to say that she showed real independence by turning down the offer. The fund, however, had no trouble filling the slot (and — surprise — the fund has not changed managers).

几年前，我的女儿受一家大型的基金机构的邀请担任该公司旗下系列基金的董事。担任董事的回报非常可观，大概可以让她的年收入一下子增加50%以上（她会告诉你说，这是一项很大的激励！）。法律上，她将会是一位独立董事。但接洽她的基金经理内心真的会认为她有任何机会能够独立地提供有用的资本配置建议吗？当然不。然而我也很自傲的跟各位报告，她果然很独立地拒绝了这项诱人的邀请。当然，该基金也绝对不愁找不到人来替代（毫不奇怪的，该基金并未更换基金经理）。

Investment company directors have failed as well in negotiating management fees (just as compensation committees of many American companies have failed to hold the compensation of their CEOs to sensible levels). If you or I were empowered, I can assure you that we could easily negotiate materially lower management fees with the incumbent managers of most mutual funds. And, believe me, if directors were promised a portion of any fee savings they realized, the skies would be filled with falling fees. Under the current system, though, reductions mean nothing to “independent” directors while meaning everything to managers. So guess who wins?

投资公司的董事同样也没有能够好好地为投资人协调争取合理的管理费（就像是很多美国大企业的薪酬委员会未能将该公司总裁的薪资限制在合理的范围内一样）。我想如果是你我受命委托，我可以跟各位保证，我们绝对可以轻易地跟绝大多数共同基金的现任的基金经理谈判，大幅降低其所收取的管理费。而且相信我，如果董事们能被承诺可以分到节省下来的部分所得，我保证管理费用一定降翻天。然而在现行制度下，降低管理费对于独立的董事们来说一点好处都没有，但却又是基金经理最最在乎的地方，所以谁胜谁负就很明显的了吧？

Having the right money manager, of course, is far more important to a fund than reducing the manager’s fee. Both tasks are nonetheless the job of directors. And in stepping up to these all-important responsibilities, tens of thousands of “independent” directors, over more than six decades, have failed miserably. (They’ve succeeded, however, in taking care of themselves, their fees from serving on multiple boards of a single “family” of funds often run well into six figures.)

当然对于一支基金来说，找到一位好的基金经理要远比降低管理费重要的多。但不论如何，两者都是董事最主要的职责。只是在谈到这些最最重要的责任时，数万名独立董事六十多年来的成绩实在是惨不忍睹。（不过他们对于自己的权益倒是保护的不错，即便是担任同一基金公司旗下不同基金的董事，其酬劳也高达六位数。）

When the manager cares deeply and the directors don’t, what’s needed is a powerful countervailing force — and that’s the missing element in today’s corporate governance. Getting rid of mediocre CEOs and eliminating overreaching by the able ones requires action by owners — big owners. The logistics aren’t that tough: The ownership of stock has grown increasingly concentrated in recent decades, and today it would be easy for institutional managers to exert their will on problem situations. Twenty, or even fewer, of the largest institutions, acting together, could effectively reform corporate governance at a given company, simply by withholding their votes for directors who were tolerating odious behavior. In my view, this kind of concerted action is the only way that corporate stewardship can be meaningfully improved.

当经理人过度在乎（自己的）利益，而董事们却漠不关心（公司利益），这时就需要有一股强而有力的反制力量——但偏偏这却是今日公司治理最缺乏的要素。想要摆脱平庸的CEO，管管那些有能耐的CEO伸得过长的手，股东们，尤其是大股东必须要站起来有所行动。公司治理并没有那么困难：近年来股权的集中程度有增无减，机构投资者在面对问题时，可以很容易依其意志行使权力。只要20家，甚至更少的大型投资机构联合采取行动，就可以有效地改革任何一家企业的企业治理，只要不把票投给那些容忍恶劣行为发生的董事就成了。就我个人的看法，唯有采取这种团结一致的行动，才可能明显改善公司治理。

Unfortunately, certain major investing institutions have “glass house” problems in arguing for better governance elsewhere; they would shudder, for example, at the thought of their own performance and fees being closely inspected by their own boards. But Jack Bogle of Vanguard fame, Chris Davis of Davis Advisors, and Bill Miller of Legg Mason are now offering leadership in getting CEOs to treat their owners properly. Pension funds, as well as other fiduciaries, will reap better investment returns in the future if they support these men.

不幸的是，某些大型投资机构在谈到公司治理时面临”玻璃屋效应”⁹障碍，因为，他们一想到自己的董事会要来严密检视其绩效及管理费时，就感到惊惧不已。但先锋基金的Jack Bogle、Davis投顾的Chris Davis及Legg Mason的Bill Miller现在都站出来促使CEO们朝着公平对待股东的路上迈进。而如果退休基金以及其它信托基金也能够站出来支持这些人，相信这些机构在未来一定可以得到更佳的投资回报。

The acid test for reform will be CEO compensation. Managers will cheerfully agree to board “diversity,” attest to SEC filings and adopt meaningless proposals relating to process. What many will fight, however, is a hard look at their own pay and perks.

辨别改革真伪的最好方法就是看看CEO给自己发多少薪酬。经理人一般都会欣然同意董事会的多元化，以证明自己符合SEC要求的合规性，并依规范遵循一些没有太大意义的作业程序。然而多数经理人真正会反对的，还是对他们自己福利待遇的严肃审查。

In recent years compensation committees too often have been tail-wagging puppy dogs meekly following recommendations by consultants, a breed not known for allegiance to the faceless shareholders who pay their fees. (If you can’t tell whose side someone is on, they are not on yours.) True, each committee is required by the SEC to state its reasoning about pay in the proxy. But the words are usually boilerplate written by the company’s lawyers or its human-relations department.

近年来，薪酬委员会往往对公司所聘顾问言听计从，这是一帮拿着未显名股东们付的高薪却不知效忠其主的货色。（如果你不清楚这群人到底是站在哪一边，那么他们肯定不站在你这边。）确实，每一个薪酬委员会在委托书中都会被SEC要求说明所议定薪酬的理由。但这些文字不过是由公司的律师或人事部门事先拟好的官样文章而已。

This costly charade should cease. Directors should not serve on compensation committees unless they are themselves capable of negotiating on behalf of owners. They should explain both how they think about pay and how they measure performance. Dealing with shareholders’ money, moreover, they should behave as they would were it their own.

是时候终结这类代价高昂的把戏了。董事们不应担任薪酬委员会成员，除非他们自己能够代表股东的利益与管理层议定薪酬。他们必须同时说明给经理人发多少钱以及如何来评估他们的绩效。拿着股东的钱决定给经理人发多少薪酬，他们必须像是在花自己的金钱一样上心。

In the 1890s, Samuel Gompers described the goal of organized labor as “More!” In the 1990s, America’s CEOs adopted his battle cry. The upshot is that CEOs have often amassed riches while their shareholders have experienced financial disasters.

1890年代，美国劳工联盟创盟主席Samuel Gompers形容劳工组织的主要目标就是”我要更多”。1990年代，美国企业的CEO们采纳了相同的口号。最终的结果是，CEO们赚的盆满钵满，对股东们来说却无疑是财政灾难。

Directors should stop such piracy. There’s nothing wrong with paying well for truly exceptional business performance. But, for anything short of that, it’s time for directors to shout “Less!” It would be a travesty if the bloated pay of recent years became a baseline for future compensation. Compensation committees should go back to the drawing boards.

董事们必须阻止这样的盗窃行为。对于真正卓越的业绩表现给付高薪没什么问题。但如果不是那么一回事的话，董事们就有必要大胆说”够了”。否则，如果近年来这类夸张的薪资待遇成为日后薪资的底限，那岂不是荒唐之极。因此，薪酬委员会实有必要对薪酬政策推倒重来。

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Rules that have been proposed and that are almost certain to go into effect will require changes in Berkshire’s board, obliging us to add directors who meet the codified requirements for “independence.”

目前正在修订，并几乎肯定会通过的法令，会要求伯克希尔的董事会进行改组，在原董事基础上增列符合”独立性”法规的独立董事。

Doing so, we will add a test that we believe is important, but far from determinative, in fostering independence: We will select directors who have huge and true ownership interests (that is, stock that they or their family have purchased, not been given by Berkshire or received via options), expecting those interests to influence their actions to a degree that dwarfs other considerations such as prestige and board fees.

为了符合这一合规要求，我们将增加一项我们认为很重要的、但远非决定性的标准，以确认其独立性：符合我们标准的独立董事，应该持有伯克希尔的较大比例股份（这些股份应该是他或他们的家族在市场买进的，而不是通过期权计划授予的或被赠予的），以确保其真正会为了自身的权益而不是名誉或董事酬劳来行使其投票权。

That gets to an often-overlooked point about directors’ compensation, which at public companies averages perhaps $50,000 annually. It baffles me how the many directors who look to these dollars for perhaps 20% or more of their annual income can be considered independent when Ron Olson, for example, who is on our board, may be deemed not independent because he receives a tiny percentage of his very large income from Berkshire legal fees. As the investment company saga suggests, a director whose moderate income is heavily dependent on directors’ fees- and who hopes mightily to be invited to join other boards in order to earn more fees — is highly unlikely to offend a CEO or fellow directors, who in a major way will determine his reputation in corporate circles. If regulators believe that “significant” money taints independence (and it certainly can), they have overlooked a massive class of possible offenders.

这其中又牵涉到常常被忽视的董事酬劳问题，上市公司董事的年平均津贴达到5万美元以上。让我感到困惑的是，比如，我们的董事会成员罗恩·奥尔森（Ron Olson）可能被认为独立性不够，理由是他的董事津贴只占他从伯克希尔获得的巨额律师费收入中的很小一部分，而其他多数董事在面对这笔超过其年收入20%以上的金钱时，是如何维持其独立性的？就如一家名叫saga的投资公司所指出的，一位收入严重依赖董事费的董事，而且非常希望被邀请加入其他董事会以赚取更多金钱，他很有可能不敢得罪CEO或其它董事会成员，因为后者对于前者在公司业界的名声有相当大的影响力。如果监管机构相信高额津贴会影响到独立性（事实也确是如此），那么他们也忽略了一大群可能的违规者。

At Berkshire, wanting our fees to be meaningless to our directors, we pay them only a pittance. Additionally, not wanting to insulate our directors from any corporate disaster we might have, we don’t provide them with officers’ and directors’ liability insurance (an unorthodoxy that, not so incidentally, has saved our shareholders many millions of dollars over the years). Basically, we want the behavior of our directors to be driven by the effect their decisions will have on their family’s net worth, not by their compensation. That’s the equation for Charlie and me as managers, and we think it’s the right one for Berkshire directors as well.

在伯克希尔，为了避免董事津贴占其个人收入的比例太高，我们仅象征性地支付一点报酬。此外，为了不让董事们规避公司发生重大经营意外的风险，我们不向他们提供高管和董事责任保险（这是一种非正统的做法，多年来为我们的股东节省了数百万美元）。基本上，我们希望董事们的行为想法跟在处理自家财产时一样小心谨慎，而不只是着眼于董事回报。这也是查理与我本人身为伯克希尔经理人所秉持的原则，我们认为这一标准同样适用于伯克希尔的董事们。

To find new directors, we will look through our shareholders list for people who directly, or in their family, have had large Berkshire holdings — in the millions of dollars — for a long time. Individuals making that cut should automatically meet two of our tests, namely that they be interested in Berkshire and shareholder-oriented. In our third test, we will look for business savvy, a competence that is far from commonplace.

为了寻找新任董事，我们会先从现有股东名单中着手，挑选其个人或其家族长期持有数百万美元伯克希尔股份的股东。达到标准的这些人很自然的已经符合前两项要求，也就是他们关心伯克希尔，在乎股东利益。至于第三项标准，我们将挑选具有丰富商业经验的人士，这就相对不那么好找。

Finally, we will continue to have members of the Buffett family on the board. They are not there to run the business after I die, nor will they then receive compensation of any kind. Their purpose is to ensure, for both our shareholders and managers, that Berkshire’s special culture will be nurtured when I’m succeeded by other CEOs.

最后，巴菲特家族成员也将继续留在伯克希尔的董事会中。但这并不代表他们在我死后会接手经营伯克希尔，也不会另外领取其它额外的报酬。他们主要的使命，是未来在其它CEO接替我之后，替所有公司经理人与股东，确保伯克希尔保持其特有的企业文化。

Any change we make in the composition of our board will not alter the way Charlie and I run Berkshire. We will continue to emphasize substance over form in our work and waste as little time as possible during board meetings in show-and-tell and perfunctory activities. The most important job of our board is likely to be the selection of successors to Charlie and me, and that is a matter upon which it will focus.

任何董事会的变动都不会影响到查理跟我经营伯克希尔的方式。我们还是会像过去一样，重实质轻形式，并且尽量避免董事会把时间浪费在官僚式的问答或其他形象工程上。伯克希尔董事会最主要的职责就是物色查理跟我日后的继承人，这才是他们将来的中心任务。

The board we have had up to now has overseen a shareholder-oriented business, consistently run in accord with the economic principles set forth on pages 68-74 (which I urge all new shareholders to read). Our goal is to obtain new directors who are equally devoted to those principles.

截至目前为止，我们的董事会监督的是一家以股东利益为导向的企业，始终按照第68-74页所写的经济原则运行（这也是我恳请所有新进股东必读的内容）。我们的目标，也是找到同样秉持这类原则的新任董事。

The Audit Committee 审计委员会

Audit committees can’t audit. Only a company’s outside auditor can determine whether the earnings that a management purports to have made are suspect. Reforms that ignore this reality and that instead focus on the structure and charter of the audit committee will accomplish little.

审计委员会没有能力实施审计。唯有公司外部独立的审计师，才有能力判断公司管理层提交的利润报表是否可疑。没有正视这一现实，而只是将焦点放在审计委员会组织架构和章程的任何改革终将徒劳无功。

As we’ve discussed, far too many managers have fudged their company’s numbers in recent years, using both accounting and operational techniques that are typically legal but that nevertheless materially mislead investors. Frequently, auditors knew about these deceptions. Too often, however, they remained silent. The key job of the audit committee is simply to get the auditors to divulge what they know.

就如我们先前讨论过的，近年来太多的经理人在公司的经营数字上动手脚，不管是会计帐还是营运统计皆是如此，这些手段表面上虽然合法，实际上却会严重误导投资人。审计人员通常都相当清楚这些欺骗手法，但却往往选择保持沉默。审计委员会最主要的职责，应该是让审计师吐露他们所知道的事实。

To do this job, the committee must make sure that the auditors worry more about misleading its members than about offending management. In recent years auditors have not felt that way. They have instead generally viewed the CEO, rather than the shareholders or directors, as their client. That has been a natural result of day-to-day working relationships and also of the auditors’ understanding that, no matter what the book says, the CEO and CFO pay their fees and determine whether they are retained for both auditing and other work. The rules that have been recently instituted won’t materially change this reality. What will break this cozy relationship is audit committees unequivocally putting auditors on the spot, making them understand they will become liable for major monetary penalties if they don’t come forth with what they know or suspect.

要达成这一目标，委员会必须确保审计师更担心的是误导委员会，而不是冒犯管理层。但很遗憾，近年来审计师的想法作为却刚好相反。他们往往把公司的CEO，而不是股东或董事当作是客户。这是低头不见抬头见的工作关系造成的自然结果。同时，审计师也很清楚，不论公司的报表数字如何，CEO与CFO都会支付审计费用，并且还有权决定原审计师是否能继续留任从事审计业务或提供其它服务。最近修订的法规不会实质性改变这一现实。想要打破这种巴结关系，唯有靠审计委员会明确地让审计师承担起责任，让他们清楚地了解，如果不将所发现或怀疑的事实说出来，将承担高额罚款。

In my opinion, audit committees can accomplish this goal by asking four questions of auditors, the answers to which should be recorded and reported to shareholders. These questions are:

我的观点是，审计委员会可以通过向审计师提出以下四个问题来达到这个目的，同时必须将他们的回复记录下来，并向股东报告。这四个问题分别是：

1. If the auditor were solely responsible for preparation of the company’s financial statements, would they have in any way been prepared differently from the manner selected by management? This question should cover both material and nonmaterial differences. If the auditor would have done something differently, both management’s argument and the auditor’s response should be disclosed. The audit committee should then evaluate the facts.

1、如果今年是由贵审计师单独负责本公司的财务报表编制，那么所编制的报表会不会与现管理层准备的报表有所不同？不论是重大或不重大的差异，都必须答复。如果贵审计师的做法有任何不同，则应披露管理层的观点以及审计师的回复。然后由审计委员会来评估现实状况。

2. If the auditor were an investor, would he have received-in plain English-the information essential to his understanding the company’s financial performance during the reporting period?

2、如果贵审计师是一名投资者，那么你是否认为——通过明了易懂的语言——已经收到了你认为了解这家公司报告期内的财务经营状况所需的所有必要信息？

3. Is the company following the same internal audit procedure that would be followed if the auditor himself were CEO? If not, what are the differences and why?

3、如果贵审计师是本公司的CEO，那么你认为本公司是否已经遵循了所有必要的内部审计程序？如果没有，是哪边有差异，以及原因是什么？

4. Is the auditor aware of any actions-either accounting or operational -that have had the purpose and effect of moving revenues or expenses from one reporting period to another?

4、贵审计师是否知悉管理层存在财务操纵，比如将公司的收入或费用从一个报告期，挪移到另一个报告期的目的或举动，不管是会计帐面或者是营运统计上？

If the audit committee asks these questions, its composition-the focus of most reforms-is of minor importance. In addition, the procedure will save time and expense. When auditors are put on the spot, they will do their duty. If they are not put on the spot… well, we have seen the results of that.

我相信，如果审计委员会能确实询问审计师以上四个问题，那么其组织架构（这是大多数改革的重点）就一点也不重要了。此外，这样的做法可以大大节省时间和成本。当审计师被推上火线，保证他们会乖乖负起职责。但如果让他们静静地躲在角落，嗯！届时你就知道结果如何。

The questions we have enumerated should be asked at least a week before an earnings report is released to the public. That timing will allow differences between the auditors and management to be aired with the committee and resolved. If the timing is tighter - if an earnings release is imminent when the auditors and committee interact-the committee will feel pressure to rubberstamp the prepared figures. Haste is the enemy of accuracy. My thinking, in fact, is that the SEC’s recent shortening of reporting deadlines will hurt the quality of information that shareholders receive. Charlie and I believe that rule is a mistake and should be rescinded.

我们列举的这些问题必须要在财务报表正式对外公布的前一周提出。这段时间应该足够让委员会了解审计师与管理层之间的差异在哪里，并把问题解决。因为如果时间太紧，将会面临财报发布在即，但审计师与委员会却还在沟通的窘境，这将使委员会迫于压力沦为橡皮图章。时间越赶，准确度就越差。事实上我个人认为，SEC最近缩短财报公布的时程的做法，将严重影响到股东们收到的财务信息品质。查理跟我认为这样的规定根本就是个错误，应该立即加以改正。

The primary advantage of our four questions is that they will act as a prophylactic. Once the auditors know that the audit committee will require them to affirmatively endorse, rather than merely acquiesce to, management’s actions, they will resist misdoings early in the process, well before specious figures become embedded in the company’s books. Fear of the plaintiff’s bar will see to that.

我们这四个问题最主要的优点在于，它们将能够发挥防范于未然的效果。一旦审计师清楚审计委员会对他们的要求是肯定地为管理层的行为背书，而不是默许管理层的行为，审计师就能够在事情刚发生的初期就出面制止，让有问题的数字不在会计帐上出现。被诉威慑会起到效果的。

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The Chicago Tribune ran a four-part series on Arthur Andersen last September that did a great job of illuminating how accounting standards and audit quality have eroded in recent years. A few decades ago, an Arthur Andersen audit opinion was the gold standard of the profession. Within the firm, an elite Professional Standards Group (PSG) insisted on honest reporting, no matter what pressures were applied by the client. Sticking to these principles, the PSG took a stand in 1992 that the cost of stock options should be recorded as the expense it clearly was. The PSG’s position was reversed, however, by the “rainmaking” partners of Andersen who knew what their clients wanted-higher reported earnings no matter what the reality. Many CEOs also fought expensing because they knew that the obscene mega grants of options they craved would be slashed if the true costs of these had to be recorded.

去年9月，《芝加哥论坛报》就安达信会计师事务所刊登了四天连载，详细报导近年来安达信是如何让会计标准与审计质量腐化到如此地步的。十几年前，安达信事务所出具的意见可以说是业界的金字招牌。在他们内部，由一群菁英组成的专业准则小组（PSG），不管面对来自客户多少的压力，仍坚持财务报表必须诚实编制。为了坚持这项原则，PSG在1992年坚持期权本就应该列为费用的立场。然而曾几何时，PSG在另一群”呼风唤雨”的合伙人推动下，立场180度大转弯，他们相当清楚客户心里最渴望的东西——那就是亮丽的收益数字，而不论实际的状况是如何。许多CEO也极力反对将期权成本列为费用，因为他们相当清楚，如果这些高额期权成本如实反应在公司账上的话，他们心心念念的大笔期权将会大幅缩水。

Soon after the Andersen reversal, the independent accounting standards board (FASB) voted 7-0 for expensing options. Predictably, the major auditing firms and an army of CEOs stormed Washington to pressure the Senate-what better institution to decide accounting questions?-into castrating the FASB. The voices of the protesters were amplified by their large political contributions, usually made with corporate money belonging to the very owners about to be bamboozled. It was not a sight for a civics class.

在安达信立场转变后不久，独立会计准则委员会（FASB）以7比0的票数通过将期权成本列为费用。不出所料，各大会计师事务所和一大群CEO蜂拥华盛顿向参议院施压企图废掉FASB——到底是参议院还是FASB更适合来决定会计规则问题啊？抗议者的声音通过大笔的政治献金放大了，讽刺的是，这些捐款正是来自被欺瞒的那些股东所拥有的公司。这实在不是文明社会应该有的现象。

To its shame, the Senate voted 88-9 against expensing. Several prominent Senators even called for the demise of the FASB if it didn’t abandon its position. (So much for independence.) Arthur Levitt, Jr., then Chairman of the SEC — and generally a vigilant champion of shareholders — has since described his reluctant bowing to Congressional and corporate pressures as the act of his chairmanship that he most regrets.(The details of this sordid affair are related in Levitt’s excellent book, Take on the Street.)

可耻的是，参议院竟以88对9票通过反对期权列为费用。几位著名参议员甚至扬言解散FASB，如果它依然坚持原来的立场的话（真是好有独立性啊!）。当时的SEC主席小阿瑟·莱维特（Arthur Levitt,Jr.）——他一向也是股东权益的捍卫先锋——后来表示当时迫于压力向国会及业界低头，是他在担任SEC主席任内最感到遗憾的一件事。（有关这件遗憾的往事，相关的细节可参考Levitt所写的好书*《挑战华尔街》*)

With the Senate in its pocket and the SEC outgunned, corporate America knew that it was now boss when it came to accounting. With that, a new era of anything-goes earnings reports — blessed and, in some cases, encouraged by big-name auditors — was launched. The licentious behavior that followed quickly became an air pump for The Great Bubble.

在参议院成为其囊中物，而SEC又熄火的情况下，美国企业界自我感觉在会计规则方面已经是他们自己说了算了。就这样，「只要我高兴什么都可以」那样的收益报告的新时代来临了——更理想的是，还有知名的大会计师在后面推波助澜。随之而来的放荡行为很快就成了大泡沫的助推剂。

After being threatened by the Senate, FASB backed off its original position and adopted an “honor system” approach, declaring expensing to be preferable but also allowing companies to ignore the cost if they wished. The disheartening result: Of the 500 companies in the S&P, 498 adopted the method deemed less desirable, which of course let them report higher “earnings.” Compensation-hungry CEOs loved this outcome: Let FASB have the honor; they had the system.

面对来自参议院的威胁，FASB也从原来的立场退缩，转而采取「自我要求」的荣誉制度做法，声明（期权）费用化应优先，但也容许公司根据自身意愿忽略此成本不计。令人沮丧的是，在S&P500大公司当中，共有498家选择采取比较不理想的方法，好让他们的账列收益好看一点。想钱想疯了的CEO们当然很高兴最后的结果：FASB赢得了面子，而他们却赢得了里子。

In our 1992 annual report, discussing the unseemly and self-serving behavior of so many CEOs, I said “the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society — about which it may have much of value to say — when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself.”

在我们1992年的年报当中，我们提到了许多CEO不体面的自肥行为。我说：当企业菁英在事关自身利益的议题上大声呼号到不可思议时，他们正冒着失去他们在社会重大议题中的公信力的风险，而这本来是他们拥有相当发言份量的领域。

That loss of credibility has occurred. The job of CEOs is now to regain America’s trust — and for the country’s sake it’s important that they do so. They will not succeed in this endeavor, however, by way of fatuous ads, meaningless policy statements, or structural changes of boards and committees. Instead, CEOs must embrace stewardship as a way of life and treat their owners as partners, not patsies. It’s time for CEOs to walk the walk.

这种公信力沦丧的现象已经发生。目前，CEO们最大的任务是如何重拾美国大众对他们的信任——为了国家利益，他们绝对有必要这样做。但如果我们看到的是，一再自以为是的言论、无意义的政策声明、董事会与委员会形式上的改组，那么一切的努力终将徒劳无功。相反的，我认为CEO们必须将企业经营作为一种生活方式，并将股东视为合伙人，而不是待宰羔羊。现在是CEO们起而行之的时候了。

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Three suggestions for investors: First, beware of companies displaying weak accounting. If a company still does not expense options, or if its pension assumptions are fanciful, watch out. When managements take the low road in aspects that are visible, it is likely they are following a similar path behind the scenes. There is seldom just one cockroach in the kitchen.

给投资者三个衷心的建议：第一，特别提防会计账目有问题的公司。如果一家公司迟迟不肯将期权成本列为费用，或者其养老金投资预期假设过于乐观，千万要小心。当管理层在人们可见的方面降低标准，那么在幕后很有可能也是如此。厨房里绝对不可能只有一只蟑螂。

Trumpeting EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) is a particularly pernicious practice. Doing so implies that depreciation is not truly an expense, given that it is a “non-cash” charge. That’s nonsense. In truth, depreciation is a particularly unattractive expense because the cash outlay it represents is paid up front, before the asset acquired has delivered any benefits to the business. Imagine, if you will, that at the beginning of this year a company paid all of its employees for the next ten years of their service (in the way they would lay out cash for a fixed asset to be useful for ten years). In the following nine years, compensation would be a “non-cash” expense — a reduction of a prepaid compensation asset established this year. Would anyone care to argue that the recording of the expense in years two through ten would be simply a bookkeeping formality?

大力鼓吹EBITDA（扣除利息税负及折旧摊销前收益）的观念更是一项危险的举动。这意思好象说折旧根本就不是费用的一种，因为它是非现金费用，并不影响到现金的流出。这根本就是一派胡言。事实上，折旧是一项特别不引人注意的费用，因为它的现金支出是在取得的资产还未发挥效益之前就预先支付的。想象一下，在年初你就预先支付公司所有员工未来十年的薪资回报，就好象是支付现金购买一项耐用年限达十年之久的固定资产一般。那么在接下来的九年之间，所有的薪资回报都将变成一项没有现金支出的费用——会计上记录为今年发生的预付费资产的扣减项。在这种状况下，不知道还有没有人敢说后九年所记录的费用只不过是会计上的形式而已呢？

Second, unintelligible footnotes usually indicate untrustworthy management. If you can’t understand a footnote or other managerial explanation, it’s usually because the CEO doesn’t want you to. Enron’s descriptions of certain transactions still baffle me.

第二，复杂难懂的财务报表附注通常暗示管理层不值得信赖。如果你根本就看不懂附注或管理层的说明解释，这通常代表管理层压根就不想让你搞懂。安然公司报表中对某些交易的说明，到现在还让我相当困惑。

Finally, be suspicious of companies that trumpet earnings projections and growth expectations. Businesses seldom operate in a tranquil, no-surprise environment, and earnings simply don’t advance smoothly (except, of course, in the offering books of investment bankers).

第三，要特别小心那些习惯夸大盈利预测及增长预期的公司。企业很少能够在一帆风顺、毫无意外的环境下经营，所以收益也很难按照当初预计般稳定成长（当然，除投资银行家的招股说明书之外）。

Charlie and I not only don’t know today what our businesses will earn next year - we don’t even know what they will earn next quarter. We are suspicious of those CEOs who regularly claim they do know the future-and we become downright incredulous if they consistently reach their declared targets. Managers that always promise to “make the numbers” will at some point be tempted to make up the numbers.

查理跟我不仅不清楚明年我们旗下事业到底能够赚多少钱，我们甚至不知道下一季的数字。所以，我们相当怀疑那些常常声称知道未来会如何如何的CEO——而如果他们真的每次都能达到收益目标，我们反而更怀疑这其中有鬼。那些保证能够达到目标的管理层，总有一天会被迫去造假。

Shareholder-Designated Contributions 股东指定慈善捐赠

About 97.3% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 2002 shareholder-designated contributions program, with contributions totaling $16.5 million.

大约有97.3%的有效股东参与伯克希尔在2002年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐出的款项总计约1,650万美元。

Cumulatively, over the 22 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $197millionpursuanttotheinstructionsofourshareholders.TherestofBerkshir{e}^{\prime }sgivingisdonebyoursubsidiaries,whichsticktothephilanthropicpatternsthatprevailedbeforetheywereacquired(exceptthattheirformerownersthemselvestakeontheresponsibilityfortheirpersonalcharities).Inaggregate,oursubsidiariesmadecontributionsof$24 million in 2002, including in-kind donations of $4 million.

过去22年以来，伯克希尔累计已依照股东意愿捐出高达1.97亿美元的款项。除此之外，伯克希尔还通过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动都是早在他们被我们并购以前就行之有年的（扣除先前的所有者自行负责的个人捐赠计划）。总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在2002年总计捐出2,400万美元，其中包含400万美元等值的物品。

To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 2003 will be ineligible for the 2003 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will not be honored.

想要参加这项计划的人，必须持有A类普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己而非股票经纪人、银行或存管人的名下。同时必须在2003年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与2003年的捐赠计划。当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，以免遗忘或丢失。逾期恕不受理。

The Annual Meeting 年度股东大会

This year’s annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3, and once again we will be at the Civic Auditorium. The doors will open at 7 a.m., the movie will begin at 8:30, and the meeting itself will commence at 9:30. There will be a short break at noon for food. (Sandwiches will be available at the Civic’s concession stands.) That interlude aside, Charlie and I will answer questions until 3:30. Give us your best shot.

今年的股东会预计在5月3日周六举行，地点仍将选在市政礼堂。大门会在当天早上7点开放，宣传短片照例会在8点半播放，正式会议则从9点半开始。中午有短暂的休息时间（会场外有供应三明治等各类点心），除此之外，查理跟我本人会在现场回答大家各类问题直到下午3点半。一定要精心准备你们的连珠炮。

An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-6634) to give you special help. They do a terrific job for us each year, and I thank them for it.

后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，向各位解释如何拿到股东会入场及其它活动必须的识别证。至于有关机票、住宿、租车等预订服务，我们很高兴与美国运通（电话800-799-6634）再次签约为您提供相关安排。每年他们都为大家提供非常好的服务，在此谨代表大家向他们说声谢谢。

In our usual fashion, we will run vans from the larger hotels to the meeting. Afterwards, the vans will make trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim’s and the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

一如往年，我们会安排小巴士往来会场与旅馆之间，同时在会后小巴士还会载大家回旅馆或是到内布拉斯加家具店、波仙珠宝店及机场等地。当然，即便如此你可能会觉得如果有一辆车会更方便。

Our exhibit area for Berkshire goods and services will be bigger and better than ever this year. So be prepared to spend. I think you will particularly enjoy visiting The Pampered Chef display, where you may run into Doris and Sheila.

今年伯克希尔各项产品及服务的展示场地将会比以往更大更好。所以请大家准备好大大地血拼。我想大家应该会特别喜欢TPC的摊位，在那里你很有可能会碰到Doris及Sheila。

GEICO will have a booth staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you with auto insurance quotes. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a special shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 41 of the 49 jurisdictions in which we operate. Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money.

GEICO公司会再度派出各地区最优秀的业务员，在会场设立摊位，随时提供股东们汽车保单的报价。在大多数的情况下，GEICO都可以提供给你一个相当优惠的股东折扣（大约8%）。这个特别优惠在我们有营业网点的全美49州中的41州都有效。各位记得将自己现在的投保资料带来，看看是否能帮自己省下一笔钱。

On Saturday, at the Omaha airport, we will have the usual array of aircraft from NetJets® available for your inspection. Just ask a representative at the Civic about viewing any of these planes. If you buy what we consider an appropriate number of items during the weekend, you may well need your own plane to take them home. Furthermore, if you buy a fraction of a plane, I’ll personally see that you get a three-pack of briefs from Fruit of the Loom.

周六在奥马哈机场，我们仍将展示一系列的机队供大家参观，请到市政礼堂向NetJets®的业务代表洽询参观的事宜。如果你在股东会买了一大推相关产品，我相信你一定也需要用自己的飞机把它们带回家。甚至，如果你真的买下飞机的部分所有权，我会亲自帮你从Fruit of Loom买一包三条装的内裤。

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” pricing, which means we will be offering our shareholders a discount that is customarily given only to employees. We initiated this special pricing at NFM six years ago, and sales during the “Weekend” grew from $5.3millionin1997to$14.2 million in 2002.

位于道奇街与太平洋街的内布拉斯加家具店，再度会有伯克希尔周末特卖，我们将特别提供给股东原先只有员工才可以享有的优惠价。我们在6年前首次推出这一促销活动，营业额更一举从1997年的530万美元增长到2002年的1,420万美元。

To get the discount, you must make your purchases during the Thursday, May 1 through Monday, May 5 period and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but that, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sundays. On Saturday this year. from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m., we are having a special affair for shareholders only. I’ll be there, eating hot dogs and drinking Coke.

想要享有折扣记得在5月1日周四到5月5日周一间采购，并出示股东开会证明。在这期间的特卖活动也适用于许多原本从不打折的顶级品牌，这可是为了股东会才特别破例，我们很感谢他们的配合。NFM的营业时间平日从早上10点到晚上9点，周六及周日则从早上10点到下午6点。在今年的周六，我们将有一个股东会特卖会，时间从下午6点到晚上10点。我本人也将出席，和大家一起享受热狗配配可乐。

Borsheim’s — the largest jewelry store in the country except for Tiffany’s Manhattan store — will have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. on Friday, May 2. The second, the main gala, will be from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sunday, May 4. Ask Charlie to autograph your sales ticket.

全美单店营业额仅次于纽约曼哈顿蒂芙尼的波仙珠宝店，在股东会期间将会有两场专为股东举办的展览会。第一场是在5/2周五的鸡尾酒会，时间从下午6点到晚上10点。第二场大型售卖活动则在5月4日周日举行，从早上9点到下午5点。记得请查理在你的消费单上签名。

Shareholder prices will be available Thursday through Monday, so if you wish to avoid the large crowds that will assemble on Friday evening and Sunday, come at other times and identify yourself as a shareholder. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. Borsheim’s operates on a gross margin that is fully twenty percentage points below that of its major rivals, so the more you buy, the more you save (or at least that’s what my wife and daughter tell me).

从周四到周一的股东会期间，波仙都将提供股东特惠价，所以如果你希望避开周五晚上到周日的拥挤人潮，可以在其它的时间上门光顾，记得表明股东身份哦。周六我们会营业到晚上6点，波仙的营业毛利率要比其它主要竞争对手低20%以上，所以买得越多省得越多（这是我老婆跟女儿告诉我的）。

In the mall outside of Borsheim’s, we will have some of the world’s top bridge experts available to play with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. We expect Bob Hamman, Sharon Osberg, Fred Gitelman and Sheri Winestock to host tables. Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will also be in the mall, taking on all comers — blindfolded! Last year, Patrick played six games simultaneously — with his blindfold securely in place — and for the first time suffered a loss. (He won the other five games, however.) He’s been training overtime ever since and is planning to start a new streak this year.

周日下午，我们照例会在波仙珠宝店外面大厅为股东们举办的一场桥牌大赛，邀请多位世界级桥牌顶尖高手与大家同乐。Bob Hamman、Sharon Osberg、Fred Gitelman及Sheri Winestock都将出席，另外Patrick Wolff——两届美国国际象棋冠军，也会再度在会场蒙眼与所有挑战者对奕。去年，他一口气同时与六位对手下棋，而且头一次落败。（不过他还是赢了其它五个对手）不过事后他已加紧练习，计划重新展开连胜的记录。

Additionally, Bill Robertie, one of only two players who have twice won the backgammon world championship, will be on hand to test your skill at that game. Finally, we will have a newcomer: Peter Morris, the winner of the World Scrabble Championship in 1991. Peter will play on five boards simultaneously (no blindfold for him, however) and will also allow his challengers to consult a Scrabble dictionary.

此外，Bill Robertie——史上惟二赢得两度世界双陆旗冠军的人，也会莅临测试各位双陆旗的实力。最后，今年将会有一位新面孔——Peter Morris，他是1991年世界拼字大赛的冠军，Peter这次将一口气挑战五位对手（当然他无法蒙眼），并允许其对手查阅字典。

We are also going to test your vocal chords at the mall. My friend, Al Oehrle of Philadelphia, will be at the piano to play any song in any key. Susie and I will lead the singing. She is good.

此外，在会场我们也将测试各位的歌喉。我的好朋友，来自费城的Al Oehrle将会在现场以钢琴做伴奏，任何歌任何Key都行。我夫人苏珊跟我本人将会为大家开唱，她的歌声相当不错。

Gorat’s — my favorite steakhouse — will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4, and will be serving from 4 p.m. until 10 p.m. Please remember that to come to Gorat’s on Sunday, you must have a reservation. To make one, call 402-551-3733 on April 1 (but not before). If Sunday is sold out, try Gorat’s on one of the other evenings you will be in town. Show your sophistication by ordering a rare T-bone with a double order of hash browns.

我个人最爱的牛排馆——Gorat’s，为了伯克希尔股东年会破例在5月4日周日开门营业，从下午4点开始营业，一直到晚上10点。请记得周日再去，一定要预先订位。要预约请在4月1日（但不要提前）拨打电话402-551-3733。若订不到周日的位子，也可以试试其它晚上。记得老练一点，点一份稀有的T骨牛排加上双份的薯饼。

There won’t be a ball game this year. After my fastball was clocked at 5 mph last year, I decided to hang up my spikes. So I’ll see you on Saturday night at NFM instead.

很可惜今年将没有棒球赛可以看了。在我的快速球时速降到5英哩之后，我就决定要高挂钉鞋。所以，周六晚上大家还是在NFM相见吧。

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Next year our meeting will be held at Omaha’s new convention center. This switch in locations will allow us to hold the event on either Saturday or Monday, whichever the majority of you prefer. Using the enclosed special ballot, please vote for your preference — but only if you are likely to attend in the future.

明年，我们的股东会将会移师到奥马哈新落成的Qwest会议中心召开。这项变更将得以使我们自由选择在周六或周一举行，只要大多数的股东同意。利用会议通知后附的选票，请选择你个人的偏好——当然最好是你未来有可能参加再投。

We will make the Saturday/Monday decision based upon a count of shareholders, not shares. That is, a Class B shareholder owning one share will have a vote equal to that of a Class A shareholder owning many shares. If the vote is close, we will go with the preference of out-of-towners.

我们将按股东投票的票数而非股数来决定是在周六还是周一开会。也就是说持有一股B类股的股东其投票权将与代表更多股份的A类股股东一样。如果投票数过于接近，我们将以外埠股东意愿为优先考量。

Again, please vote only if there is a reasonable chance that you will be attending some meetings in the future.

再一次提醒大家，只有在将来有可能出席股东大会时，才建议你参与投票。

Warren E. Buffett 沃伦·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board 董事会主席

February 21, 2003

Footnotes

1. All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A. ↩

2. By Vito @20231015 括号内数据为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩

3. By Vito @20231101 MidAmerican Energy Holdings (MEHC) 在中文世界有几个不同的译法，有称为“美中能源”，有“中美能源”，这两种译法都容易让读者误以为这家公司和中国有什么联系，尤其是，因该公司为2008年巴菲特买入比亚迪的那笔著名交易的主体，更容易惹人联想，故将此公司名直译为“美国中部能源公司”。 ↩

4. By Vito @20231015 括号内数据为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩

5. By Vito @20231031 括号内数据为芒格书院共读群友所加。 ↩

6. By Vito @20231031 就是那家后来闯下大祸的安然公司。 ↩

7. By Vito @20231101 为帮助理解原意，括号内为整理者所加。 ↩

8. By Vito @20231102 括号内为整理者所加。 ↩

9. By Vito @20231103 此处的”glass house” problems由@诚明散人翻译。起源可能是Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde 1385年写的一首诗。1651年，George Herbert让这个短语更为现代英国所知，他写的是“Whose house is of glass, must not throw stones at another.” 在美国第一个引用这个短语的是著名的本杰明·富兰克林。他在 “William & Mary Quarterly,” a public journal published in Virginia 写的是：“Don’t throw stones at your neighbors, if your own windows are glass.”这个短语/谚语的意思是说，住在玻璃屋子里的人/或自身有弱点的人/自己的房子也有容易被攻击的玻璃窗之类的东西的时候，要避免批评他人，否则一旦遭报复自己的玻璃屋就很容易被砸碎。 ↩