原文信息：
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1991 was 19 to $6,437, or at a rate of 23.7% compounded annually.
The size of our equity capital - which now totals 20 million, an idea or business producing 370 million idea (i.e., one contributing over 1 million than to make $370 million.
现在我们股东权益的规模已高达74亿美元，所以可以确定的是，我们可能再也无法像过去那样继续维持高增长，而随着伯克希尔不断地增长，现今可以大幅影响我们业绩表现的投资机会也就越来越少。当我们管理的资金只有2,000万美元的时候，一项获利100万美元的投资就可以使得我们的年回报率增加5%，但时至今日，我们却要有3.7亿美元的盈利(要是以税前计算的话，则要5.5亿美元)，才能达到相同的效果，而要一口气赚3.7亿美元比起一次赚100万美元的难度可是高的多了。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, and I have set a goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire’s intrinsic value. If our growth in book value is to keep up with a 15% pace, we must earn $22 billion during the next decade. Wish us luck - we’ll need it.
我和伯克希尔的副主席查理·芒格共同设定的目标，是让伯克希尔的内在价值每年平均增长15%。为了跟上这（指内在价值）15%的增速，我们的账面价值必须在未来十年内增加220亿美元。祝我们好运吧——我们会非常需要它的。
Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the price-earnings ratios of Coca-Cola and Gillette. These two stocks accounted for nearly 2.1 billion growth in net worth last year. When we loaded up on Coke three years ago, Berkshire’s net worth was $3.4 billion; now our Coke stock alone is worth more than that.
我们在1991年所经历帐面数字的超额增长是一种不太可能再发生的现象，受惠于可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀市盈率的大幅飙升，光是这两家公司就合计贡献了我们去年21亿美元账面价值增长中的16亿美元，三年前当我们大笔买进可口可乐股票的时候，伯克希尔的账面价值大约是34亿美元，但是现在光是我们持有可口可乐的股票市值就超过这个数字。
Coca-Cola and Gillette are two of the best companies in the world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the years ahead. Over time, also, the value of our holdings in these stocks should grow in rough proportion. Last year, however, the valuations of these two companies rose far faster than their earnings. In effect, we got a double-dip benefit, delivered partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the market’s reappraisal of these stocks. We believe this reappraisal was warranted. But it can’t recur annually: We’ll have to settle for a single dip in the future.1
可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀可说是当今世上最好的两家公司，我们预期在未来几年他们的盈利还会以惊人的速度成长，相对地我们持股的价值也会以等比例的程度增加，然而另一方面去年这两家公司的股价上涨的幅度却远高于其本身盈利增长的幅度，所以说去年我们是双重获益：一方面是靠公司绝佳的盈利能力，一方面是市场对于公司股票的价值重估。我们认为这样的重估是合理的，但这种情况不可能每年发生，我们将不得不接受未来发生的估值下降。1
A Second Job 第二份工作
In 1989 when I - a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry Coke daily - announced our purchase of $1 billion worth of Coca-Cola stock, I described the move as a rather extreme example of putting our money where my mouth was. On August 18 of last year, when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc, it was a different story: I put my mouth where our money was.
1989 年，当时我作为一名每天开心畅饮五罐樱桃味可口可乐的消费者，宣布我们购买了价值 10 亿美元的可口可乐股票。我把这一举动形容为一种极端的“用金钱印证言论（putting our money where my mouth was）”。而在去年 8 月 18 日，当我被选为所罗门公司的临时董事长时，这笔投资的情况则完全相反：我是在“用言论维护金钱（put my mouth where our money was）”。
You’ve all read of the events that led to my appointment. My decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but important message: Berkshire’s operating managers are so outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was spending at the company and yet remain confident that its economic progress would not skip a beat. The Blumkins, the Friedman family, Mike Goldberg, the Heldmans, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney (CEO of H.H. Brown, our latest acquisition, which I will describe later) are all masters of their operations and need no help from me. My job is merely to treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate. Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon.
我想大家应该都已经从报上看过有关我个人任命为所罗门董事会临时主席的报导，我之所以愿意接受这个职位具有一个深刻且重要的意义，那就是伯克希尔旗下事业的经理人是如此的优秀，让我可能很放心的把时间放在别的工作之上，而完全不必担心公司的营运会走样，Blumkins家族、Friedman家族、Mike Goldberg、Heldmans家族、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey、Ralph Schey与Frank Rooney(我们最新并购的布朗鞋业的CEO，后面还会有详细的介绍)等人，都是所属产业的龙头，因此根本就不需要我个人的协助，我的工作只是要思考如何更公平合理地对待他们，同时有效地运用他们所生产出来的资金，而这两方面都不会因为我在所罗门的工作而受到影响。
The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira, the one-time quarterback of the University of Miami, and his coach, Andy Gustafson. Playing Florida and near its goal line, Mira dropped back to pass. He spotted an open receiver but found his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida linebacker. The right-handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to his other hand and threw the only left-handed pass of his life - for a touchdown. As the crowd erupted, Gustafson calmly turned to a reporter and declared: “Now that’s what I call coaching.”
查理跟我在这些成功的企业所扮演的角色，可以由迈阿密大学著名的四分卫-George Mira与他的教练-Andy Gustafson的故事来作说明，有一回在与佛罗里达大学比赛时，在球门线前Mira接球并准备传球，他看到有一个队友有空档，但他的右手边却有一位难以摆脱的防守球员在侧，右撇子的Mira于是将球换到左手，并丢出生平第一次的左手传球，并触地得分。当所有的球迷疯狂地簇拥而上，教练Gustafson镇定地转向一位记者说到：“这都是因为我平常训练有素的缘故！”
Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units, Berkshire’s performance is not affected if Charlie or I slip away from time to time. You should note, however, the “interim” in my Salomon title. Berkshire is my first love and one that will never fade: At the Harvard Business School last year, a student asked me when I planned to retire and I replied, “About five to ten years after I die.”
以我们现有的梦幻明星级的经营团队阵容来说，伯克希尔的表现绝不会因为查理或是我偶尔跷班而有所影响，大家必须知道，我在所罗门的名衔只是暂时的，伯克希尔才是我的最爱，而且是至死不渝的爱，去年在哈佛商学院，有学生问我何时会退休，我的回答是：“大概要等到我死后五到十年吧！”
Sources of Reported Earnings 报告收益的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。
A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 33-47, where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. However, we will not in this letter discuss each of our non-insurance operations, as we have in the past. Our businesses have grown in number - and will continue to grow - so it now makes sense to rotate coverage, discussing one or two in detail each year.
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，依照一般公认会计原则所编写的格式，另外从今年开始我们将不再像过去那样详细叙述非保险业的营运，因为我们旗下事业组织日益庞大，且以后还会继续增长，所以实在是没有必要每年都重复讨论相同的事情。
| Pre-Tax Earnings | Pre-Tax Earnings | Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) | Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) | 1991 | 1990 | 1991 | 1990 |
| Operating Earnings: | ||||
| Insurance Group: | ||||
| Underwriting | $ (119,593) | $ (26,647) | $ (77,229) | $ (14,936) |
| Net investment income | 331,846 | 327,047 | 285,173 | 282,613 |
| H. H. Brown (acquired 7/1/91) | 13,616 | --- | 8,611 | --- |
| Buffalo News | 37,113 | 43,954 | 21,841 | 25,981 |
| Fechheimer | 12,947 | 12,450 | 6,843 | 6,605 |
| Kirby | 35,726 | 27,445 | 22,555 | 17,613 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart | 14,384 | 17,248 | 6,993 | 8,485 |
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group | 26,123 | 30,378 | 15,901 | 18,458 |
| See’s Candies | 42,390 | 39,580 | 25,575 | 23,892 |
| Wesco - other than insurance | 12,230 | 12,441 | 8,777 | 9,676 |
| World Book | 22,483 | 31,896 | 15,487 | 20,420 |
| Amortization of Goodwill | (4,113) | (3,476) | (4,098) | (3,461) |
| Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges | (6,021) | (5,951) | (7,019) | (6,856) |
| Interest Expense* | (89,250) | (76,374) | (57,165) | (49,726) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions | (6,772) | (5,824) | (4,388) | (3,801) |
| Other | 77,399 | 58,310 | 47,896 | 35,782 |
| Operating Earnings | 400,508 | 482,477 | 315,753 | 370,745 |
| Sales of Securities | 192,478 | 33,989 | 124,155 | 23,348 |
| Total Earnings - all entities | $ 592,986 | $ 516,466 | $ 439,908 | $ 394,093 |
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.
*注：债务利息科目不含斯科特费泽与互助储贷的利息费用
“Look-Through” Earnings 透视收益
We’ve previously discussed look-through earnings, which consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us.
之前我们曾经讨论过透视收益，其主要包括：(1)前段所提到的报告收益，加上(2)主要被投资公司按GAAP未反映在我们帐上的保留收益，扣除(3)若这些保留收益分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。
I’ve told you that over time look-through earnings must increase at about 15% annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate. Indeed, since present management took over in 1965, our look-through earnings have grown at almost the identical 23% rate of gain recorded for book value.
Last year, however, our look-through earnings did not grow at all but rather declined by 14%. To an extent, the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year’s report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look-through earnings.
然而去年我们的透视收益不但没有增加，反而减少了14%，这样的下滑主要导源于去年年报就曾经向各位提过的两项因素，那时我就曾经警告各位，这些将对我们的透视收益会有负面的影响。
First, I told you that our media earnings - both direct and look-through - were “sure to decline” and they in fact did. The second force came into play on April 1, when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into common. The after-tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about $45 million, an amount somewhat higher than the combination in 1991 of three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of look-through earnings on the common.
首先，我曾告诉各位，旗下媒体业务的收益，不管是直接的报告收益，还是间接的透视收益一定会减少，事实证明确是如此。第二，在4月1日，我们的吉列优先股被要求转为普通股，1990年来自优先股的税后收益是4,500万美元，大概比1991年三个月的股利总和加上九个月的普通股透视收益还多一点。
Two other outcomes that I did not foresee also hurt look-through earnings in 1991. First, we had a break-even result from our interest in Wells Fargo (dividends we received from the company were offset by negative retained earnings). Last year I said that such a result at Wells was “a low-level possibility - not a likelihood.” Second, we recorded significantly lower - though still excellent - insurance profits.
另外有二项我没有意料到的结果，也影响到我们1991年的透视收益。首先，我们在富国银行的利益大概仅维持损益两平(所收到的股利收入被其累积亏损所抵消)，去年我说富国银行取得这样结果的可能性很低，但也不是全无可能。第二，我们的保险业务的收益虽然算是不错，但明显下降了。
The following table shows you how we calculate look-through earnings, although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6, mostly under “Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.“)
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视收益的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数字有点粗糙，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险业务的净投资收益项下)。
| Berkshire’s Major Investees | Berkshire’s Approximate Ownership at Yearend | Berkshire’s Approximate Ownership at Yearend | Berkshire’s Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings | Berkshire’s Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (in millions) | 1991 | 1990 | 1991 | 1990 |
| Capital Cities/ABC Inc. | 18.1% | 17.9% | $ 61 | $ 85 |
| The Coca-Cola Company | 7.0% | 7.0% | 69 | 58 |
| Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. | 3.4%(1) | 3.2%(1) | 15 | 10 |
| The Gillette Company | 11.0% | --- | 23(2) | --- |
| GEICO Corp. | 48.2% | 46.1% | 69 | 76 |
| The Washington Post Company | 14.6% | 14.6% | 10 | 18 |
| Wells Fargo & Company | 9.6% | 9.7% | (17) | 19(3) |
| Berkshire’s share of undistributed earnings of major investees | $ 230 | $ 266 | ||
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings | (30) | (35) | ||
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire | 316 | 371 | ||
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire | $ 516 | $ 602 |
(1) Net of minority interest at Wesco
(1) 已经扣除Wesco的少数股权
(2) For the nine months after Berkshire converted its preferred on April 1
(2) 仅含伯克希尔于４月１日申请转换为普通股后的九个月
(3) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(3) 以年平均持有股权比例计算
We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on their own look-through earnings. To calculate these, they should determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares they hold in their portfolio and total these. The goal of each investor should be to create a portfolio (in effect, a “company”) that will deliver him or her the highest possible look-through earnings a decade or so from now.
我们也相信投资人可以通过专注于自己的透视收益而受益，通过计算他们就会了解到，其投资组合所应分配到的真正收益的合计数。所有投资人的目标，应该是要建立这样一个投资组合：其透视收益能在从现在开始的十年内极大化。
An approach of this kind will force the investor to think about long-term business prospects rather than short-term stock market prospects, a perspective likely to improve results. It’s true, of course, that, in the long run, the scoreboard for investment decisions is market price. But prices will be determined by future earnings. In investing, just as in baseball, to put runs on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field, not the scoreboard.
这种方式将会迫使投资人思考企业真正的长期远景而不是短期的股价表现，从而藉此改善其投资绩效。当然就长期而言，投资决策的绩效还是要建立在股价表现之上，但价格将取决于未来的盈利能力。投资就像是打棒球一样，想要得分，大家必须将注意力集中到场上，而不是紧盯着计分板。
A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math 传媒业的变化与其估值
In last year’s report, I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors. The events of 1991 have fortified that case: The economic strength of once-mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate. In the business world, unfortunately, the rear-view mirror is always clearer than the windshield: A few years back no one linked to the media business - neither lenders, owners nor financial analysts - saw the economic deterioration that was in store for the industry. (But give me a few years and I’ll probably convince myself that I did.)
在去年的报告中，我曾经表示媒体公司盈利能力的下降既反映了长期趋势，也反映了周期性因素。1991年的事件进一步证实了这一观点2：由于零售业态的转变加上广告与娱乐选择的多元化，以往曾经一度风光的媒体事业，其竞争力已受到严重的侵蚀，然而不幸的是，在商业世界中，从后视镜所看到的景象永远比挡风玻璃的还清楚。几年前几乎没有人，包含银行、股东与证券分析师在内，会不看好媒体事业的发展，(若是再多给我几年，我可能就能声称我已预见到了)。
The fact is that newspaper, television, and magazine properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their economic behavior. Let’s take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise, keeping in mind, however, that many operations fall in some middle ground and can best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses.
事实是，报纸、电视与杂志等产业在经济行为上，越来越像一般企业，而不是拥有特许经营权的企业。让我们快速地看一下特许事业与一般事业在特性上的不同，不过请记住，很多公司事实上是介于这两者之间，所以也可以将之形容为弱势的特许事业或强势的一般事业。
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation. The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a company’s ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital. Moreover, franchises can tolerate mis-management. Inept managers may diminish a franchise’s profitability, but they cannot inflict mortal damage.
经济上的特许经营权，来源于以下特定的产品或服务：(1)它是被需要或被渴望的；(2)被顾客认定为找不到其它类似的替代品；(3)不受价格上的管制。一家公司到底有没有具有以上三个特点，都将通过公司能不能够定期地对其提供的产品与服务主动调价，从而赚取更高的资本回报率表现出来。更重要的是，特许经营权比较能够容忍不当的管理，无能的经理人虽然会降低特许事业的盈利能力，但是并不会造成致命的伤害。
In contrast, “a business” earns exceptional profits only if it is the low-cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight. Tightness in supply usually does not last long. With superior management, a company may maintain its status as a low-cost operator for a much longer time, but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of competitive attack. And a business, unlike a franchise, can be killed by poor management.
相比之下，一般事业想要获取高回报就只有当其是低成本经营者，或是当其所提供的产品或服务供需紧张之时，但是这种供给不足的情况通常维持不了多久，倒是通过卓越的管理，一家公司却可以长期维持低成本的营运，但即使是如此，还是会面临竞争对手持续不断的攻击。与特许事业不同的是，一般事业可能会因为管理不善而倒闭。
Until recently, media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely. Now, however, consumers looking for information and entertainment (their primary interest being the latter) enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them. Unfortunately, demand can’t expand in response to this new supply: 500 million American eyeballs and a 24-hour day are all that’s available. The result is that competition has intensified, markets have fragmented, and the media industry has lost some - though far from all - of its franchise strength.
就在不久前，媒体产业还拥有特许事业这三项特质，因此还能够提高价格并容忍宽松的管理。不过现在的消费者不断地寻找不同的信息与娱乐来源，其可选择的范围也大大拓宽了。不幸的是，消费者的需求并不会随着供给的增加而变大，美国人的五亿只眼睛，一天24小时，就这么多，不可能再增加了。所以结果可想而知，竞争加剧，市场分裂，媒体产业因而丧失了部分原有的特许经营权。
The industry’s weakened franchise has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings. For an understanding of this phenomenon, let’s look at some much over-simplified, but relevant, math.
媒体产业特性经营权减弱，对其长期价值的影响远远超过了对短期收益的冲击，为了让大家了解这种现象，让我们来看看稍微简化但却颇为相关的数字。
A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper, television or magazine property would forever increase its earnings at 6% or so annually and would do so without the employment of additional capital, for the reason that depreciation charges would roughly match capital expenditures and working capital requirements would be minor. Therefore, reported earnings (before amortization of intangibles) were also freely-distributable earnings, which meant that ownership of a media property could be construed as akin to owning a perpetual annuity set to grow at 6% a year. Say, next, that a discount rate of 10% was used to determine the present value of that earnings stream. One could then calculate that it was appropriate to pay a whopping 1 million. (This after-tax multiplier of 25 translates to a multiplier on pre-tax earnings of about 16.)
几年以前，传统观点都认为新闻、电视或是杂志产业的盈利，将永无止尽地以每年6%左右的比率增长，而且可以完全不必依靠额外的资本，因为每年的折旧费用大致与资本支出相当，而所需的营运资金相当小，所以报告收益(在扣除无形资产摊销前)几乎等于可以自由分配的收益。也就是说，拥有一家媒体事业，类似于拥有每年增长6%的永续年金。若我们以10%的折现率来计算现值的话，可以算出，为税后100万美元净利的产业支付2500万美元是值得的(100/(10%-6%)=2500，25倍税后市盈率，或16倍税前市盈率)。
Now change the assumption and posit that the 1 million of earnings, discounted by the same 10%, translates to a $10 million valuation. Thus a seemingly modest shift in assumptions reduces the property’s valuation to 10 times after-tax earnings (or about 6 1/2 times pre-tax earnings).
现在改变假设条件，这家公司只拥有普通的盈利能力，其盈利周期性的围绕100万上下波动，这种波动模式实际是大部分企业的状况。而公司的盈利想要有所增长，股东就必须要投入更多的资本才行(通常是保留收益的方式)。根据改变后的假设，同样以10%加以折现，大概可以达到1,000万美元的估值。结果可以看出，轻微的假设变动就使这家企业的价值大幅减少(100/(10%-0%)=1000，10倍税后市盈率，或6.5倍税前市盈率)。
Dollars are dollars whether they are derived from the operation of media properties or of steel mills. What in the past caused buyers to value a dollar of earnings from media far higher than a dollar from steel was that the earnings of a media property were expected to constantly grow (without the business requiring much additional capital), whereas steel earnings clearly fell in the bob-around category. Now, however, expectations for media have moved toward the bob-around model. And, as our simplified example illustrates, valuations must change dramatically when expectations are revised.
现金就是现金，不管今天它是靠经营媒体事业或是钢铁工厂得来的都一样，而过去同样是一美元的盈利，大家对媒体事业的估值远高于钢铁工厂的原因是，媒体事业的收益预期会继续成长，且股东不需要再投入额外的资金，而钢铁业很明显属于打摆子的那类。不过现在，大家对于媒体事业的看法也逐渐转向为后者。而且正如我们刚刚简化示例所示，当预期被修正时，估值必然发生巨大变化。
We have a significant investment in media - both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The Washington Post Company and Capital Cities/ABC - and the intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing. (Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look-through earnings, but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value.) However, as our Business Principles on page 2-3 note, one of the rules by which we run Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses - or investee holdings that we have classified as permanent - simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously elsewhere. (We did sell certain other media holdings sometime back, but these were relatively small.)
我们在媒体事业有相当大的投资，不管是完全拥有的布法罗新闻报，还是在华盛顿邮报与大都会/ABC的股票投资，而这些媒体事业的价值因为前面所提到的产业所面临的业态转变而大幅滑落，(周期性因素也使得我们现在的透视收益大受影响，虽然还不致于让内在价值减少)。然而，就像是我们经营伯克希尔的企业原则所揭示的，我们不会只是因为还有其它更有利的资金用途，就随便将已被列为永恒的事业或主要投资出售，(当然之前我们也确实卖了一些媒体股，不过规模相对较小)。
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because the Buffalo News, under Stan Lipsey’s leadership, has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well-managed. In particular, these companies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980’s period in which purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices. Also, the debt of both Cap Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold. As a result, the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage. Among publicly-owned media companies, our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt. Most of the other companies, through a combination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings, find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net income.
还好我们的内在价值受到损害的情况尚属轻微，因为布法罗新闻报在Stan Lipsey的领导之下，表现远比其它报纸同业要来的优秀，另一方面大都会与华盛顿邮报的经营也都管理的很好，特别是在1980年代后期许多媒体公司以高价大举并购同业时，这些公司都只是做壁上观。此外，大都会与华盛顿邮报两家公司的负债也都很少，手上的现金就足以清偿所有的债务，因此，公司资产的缩水并没有因为杠杆而扩大，所以现在在所有主要的媒体公司中，大概就只有我们投资的这两家公司可以免于债务所苦，而大多数同业通过激进的并购，除了收益大幅缩水之外，还同时背负着至少相当于年度盈利能力五倍以上的债务。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities and Washington Post leave us more comfortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media companies. Moreover, most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business. But gone are the days of bullet-proof franchises and cornucopian economics.
总而言之，大都会及华盛顿邮报超强的资产负债表与管理层，持有它们的股份使得我们比持有别家公司的股份感到更放心，而且就现阶段而言，媒体事业的经济特征仍然比其它一般美国企业要来的有竞争力，只是不再像过去那样拥有坚固的经济护城河和诱人的暴利了。
Twenty Years in a Candy Store 糖果店的二十年
We’ve just passed a milestone: Twenty years ago, on January 3, 1972, Blue Chip Stamps (then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it) bought control of See’s Candy Shops, a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed-chocolates. The nominal price that the sellers were asking - calculated on the 100% ownership we ultimately attained - was 10 million of excess cash, and therefore the true offering price was 7 million of tangible net worth and said $25 million was as high as we would go (and we meant it). Fortunately, the sellers accepted our offer.
我们刚刚跨过历史性的一页，20年前也就是1972年1月3日，蓝筹印花公司(原伯克希尔子公司，后来并入其中)，买下喜诗糖果，西海岸的一家盒装巧克力制造与销售厂商，当时卖方所提的报价，以最后取得的100%股权换算约为4,000万美元，但当时光是公司帐上就有1,000万美元的现金，所以认真算起来真正出的资金只有3,000万美金，不过当时，查理跟我还没有完全意识到特许经营权所拥有的真正经济价值，所以在看过账面价值只有700万美元的报表之后，竟向对方表示2,500万是我们可以出的最高上限(当时我们确实是这样子认为)，很幸运的是卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from 1.2 million in 1991. But See’s candy sales in the same period increased from 196 million. Moreover, profits at See’s grew even faster than sales, from 42.4 million last year.
之后蓝筹印花公司的印花销售收入从1972年的1亿美元下滑到1991年的1,200万美元，但在同一期间喜诗糖果的销售收入却从2,900万增长到1.96亿美元，更甚者，其盈利增长的幅度还远高于收入增长的幅度，税前盈利从1972年的420万增长为去年的4,240万美元。
For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly, it must be compared with the incremental capital investment required to produce it. On this score, See’s has been astounding: The company now operates comfortably with only 7 million has had to be supplemented by only 410 million were distributed to Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these companies to deploy (after payment of taxes) in whatever way made most sense.
为了正确评估利润增长，必须将其与产生利润所需的增量资本支出考量进去，就这点儿言，喜诗的表现实在是相当惊人，这家公司现在的账面价值只有2,500万美元，意思是说，除了买入时的初始700万美元，只需要再投入1,800万的收益，此外，喜诗将这20年来剩下所赚的4.1亿美元，在扣除所得税之后，全部发还给蓝筹印花与伯克希尔，将资金分配到更有利的投资之上。
In our See’s purchase, Charlie and I had one important insight: We saw that the business had untapped pricing power. Otherwise, we were lucky twice over. First, the transaction was not derailed by our dumb insistence on a $25 million price. Second, we found Chuck Huggins, then See’s executive vice-president, whom we instantly put in charge. Both our business and personal experiences with Chuck have been outstanding. One example: When the purchase was made, we shook hands with Chuck on a compensation arrangement - conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a written contract - that remains unchanged to this day.
在买下喜诗时，有一点是我们已预见的，那就是它尚未被发掘的提价能力，另外我们有两方面算是很幸运，第一，整个交易还好没有因为我们愚昧地坚持2,500万美元的上限而告吹，第二，我们选中Chuck Huggins，当时喜诗糖果的副总经理，立即走马上任。不管是在公事或是私交方面，我们与Chuck共处的经验都相当棒，有一个例子可以说明，当并购案完成后，我们在短短五分钟内就与Chuck协议好他担任总经理的薪资回报，而且连书面契约都没有签，就一直延续到今天。
In 1991, See’s sales volume, measured in dollars, matched that of 1990. In pounds, however, volume was down 4%. All of that slippage took place in the last two months of the year, a period that normally produces more than 80% of annual profits. Despite the weakness in sales, profits last year grew 7%, and our pre-tax profit margin was a record 21.6%.
1991年，喜诗糖果的销售金额与前一年度相当，但是若是以销售磅数来算，则减少了4%，所有减少的部分大多来自于占年度盈利80%的最后两个月，不过尽管业绩疲软，盈利还是增长了7%，税前利润率更创下21.6%的新记录。
Almost 80% of See’s sales come from California and our business clearly was hurt by the recession, which hit the state with particular force late in the year. Another negative, however, was the mid-year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7%-8% (depending on the county involved) on “snack food” that was deemed applicable to our candy.
喜诗糖果80%的收入都来自于加州，而我们的生意很明显地受到当地经济衰退的影响，尤其下半年更为显著。另外一个负面因素是，加州在年度中开始对零食课征7-8%的营业税(依每个市镇有所不同)，当然巧克力糖果也不能幸免。
Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will enjoy California’s classifications of “snack” and “non-snack” foods:
若是精研认识论差异的股东应该会觉得加州对于零食与非零食的分类感到相当有兴趣。
| Taxable “Snack” Foods | Non-Taxable “Non-Snack” Foods |
|---|---|
| Ritz Crackers | Soda Crackers |
| Popped Popcorn | Unpopped Popcorn |
| Granola Bars | Granola Cereal |
| Slice of Pie (Wrapped) | Whole Pie |
| Milky Way Candy Bar | Milky Way Ice Cream Bar |
What - you are sure to ask - is the tax status of a melted Milky Way ice cream bar? In that androgynous form, does it more resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the sun? It’s no wonder that Brad Sherman, Chairman of California’s State Board of Equalization, who opposed the snack food bill but must now administer it, has said: “I came to this job as a specialist in tax law. Now I find my constituents should have elected Julia Child.”
你一定会问，那融化的牛奶冰淇淋棒要不要课税呢？在这种模棱两可的状态下，它到底是比较像冰淇淋棒还是晒化的糖果棒呢？也难怪加州公平交易委员会的主席Brad Sherman，虽然反对这项法案但还是必须负责监督执行，他说：我以税务专家的身份到这个委员会任职，但我觉得大家要选的对象，应该是小孩子才对。
Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our association with Chuck and See’s. The obvious ones are that we’ve earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process. Equally important, ownership of See’s has taught us much about the evaluation of franchises. We’ve made significant money in certain common stocks because of the lessons we learned at See’s.
查理跟我有太多理由要感谢查克跟喜诗糖果，最明显的原因是他们帮我们赚了那么多钱，而且其间的过程是如此令人愉快，还有一点同样重要的是，拥有喜诗糖果让我们对于特许经营权有了更深一层的认识，我们靠着在喜诗身上所学的东西，在别的股票投资上，又赚了更多的钱。
H. H. Brown 布朗鞋业
We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 - the H. H. Brown Company - and behind this business is an interesting history. In 1927 a 29-year-old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the company, then located in North Brookfield, Massachusetts, for 25 million annually before taxes.
我们在1991年完成了一次大型的并购案，那就是买下布朗鞋业，这背后有一段有趣的故事，1927年时有一位29岁的年轻商人Ray Heffernan以1万美元买下这家位于马萨诸塞州的公司，从此展开长达62年的事业(当然同时他还有其它追求的目标，高龄90岁的他现在还在加入新的高尔夫球俱乐部)，等1990年Heffernan先生宣布退休时，布朗鞋业在美国已有三座工厂，还有另外一座在加拿大，雇员人数近2000人，每年的税前利润约有2,500万美元。
Along the way, Frances Heffernan, one of Ray’s daughters, married Frank Rooney, who was sternly advised by Mr. Heffernan before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might have about working for his father-in-law. That was one of Mr. Heffernan’s few mistakes: Frank went on to become CEO of Melville Shoe (now Melville Corp.). During his 23 years as boss, from 1964 through 1986, Melville’s earnings averaged more than 20% on equity and its stock (adjusted for splits) rose from 960. And a few years after Frank retired, Mr. Heffernan, who had fallen ill, asked him to run Brown.
这期间Heffernan的一个女儿Frances嫁给了Frank Rooney，当时Heffernan严正地告诉他的女婿最好断了想要参与经营布朗鞋业的念头，但这却是Heffernan先生所犯下的少数错误之一，Frank后来跑到另外一家鞋业Melville担任CEO，在他1964-1986年担任主管期间，Mellville每年的平均股本回报率高达20%，而股价更从16元涨到960元(经调整后)，而在Frank退休多年后，Heffernan先生因病请Frank回来经营布朗鞋业。
After Mr. Heffernan died late in 1990, his family decided to sell the company - and here we got lucky. I had known Frank for a few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a possible buyer. He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to a major investment banker, which failed also to think of us. But last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis, a long-time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder, who is always on the alert for something that might fit us. Hearing about the impending sale of Brown, John told Frank that the company should be right up Berkshire’s alley, and Frank promptly gave me a call. I thought right away that we would make a deal and before long it was done.
1990年底Heffernan先生过世，他的家人决定要把公司卖掉，所以我们的机会就来了，那时我们认识Frank也有好几年了，但没有好到让他认为伯克希尔是布朗鞋业合适的买主，相反，他将出售事宜委托给一家投行，可想而知投行绝对不会想到我们，但是就在去年春天，Frank跟John Loomis一起到佛罗里达打高尔夫球，John是我多年的好友，同时也是伯克希尔的股东，他总是随时注意有没有适合我们投资的对象，在听到布朗鞋业即将出售的消息之后，John告诉Frank说这家公司应该要投到伯克希尔的麾下，而Frank也从善如流马上打了通电话给我，我当下觉得我们应该可以谈得成，果然在不久之后，整个交易便确定了。
Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank’s willingness to continue as CEO. Like most of our managers, he has no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and likes to excel. Managers of this stripe cannot be “hired” in the normal sense of the word. What we must do is provide a concert hall in which business artists of this class will wish to perform.
我之所以会对这项交易这么感兴趣的原因在于Frank愿意继续留下来担任CEO，就像我们其它所有经理人一样，他工作不是因为经济上的需求，而是他确实热爱这份工作并且做的出类拔萃。这类型的经理人可不是正常意义上的招聘就可以”请”得到的，我们能做的就是尽量提供一个够水准的演奏厅，让这些商业界的天才艺术家可以在这里好好发挥。
Brown (which, by the way, has no connection to Brown Shoe of St. Louis) is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes and boots, and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins on sales and assets. Shoes are a tough business - of the billion pairs purchased in the United States each year, about 85% are imported - and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly. The wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes inventories to be heavy; substantial capital is also tied up in receivables. In this kind of environment, only outstanding managers like Frank and the group developed by Mr. Heffernan can prosper.
布朗(跟圣路易的布朗鞋子完全没有关系)是北美地区工作鞋与工作靴的领导品牌，同时拥有非凡的销售毛利率与资本回报率记录。鞋业是一项艰难的生意，全美一年10亿双的采购量中，大约有85%是从国外进口，而产业中大部分的制造商表现不佳，由于款式与型号繁多导致库存压力相当重，并且大量资本被束缚在大笔的应收帐款上。在这种环境下，只有像Frank这样优秀的经理人和Heffernan所建立这样的事业才有可能生存。
A distinguishing characteristic of H. H. Brown is one of the most unusual compensation systems I’ve encountered - but one that warms my heart: A number of key managers are paid an annual salary of $7,800, to which is added a designated percentage of the profits of the company after these are reduced by a charge for capital employed. These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of owners. In contrast, most managers talk the talk but don’t walk the walk, choosing instead to employ compensation systems that are long on carrots but short on sticks (and that almost invariably treat equity capital as if it were cost-free). The arrangement at Brown, in any case, has served both the company and its managers exceptionally well, which should be no surprise: Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on.
布朗鞋业有一个相当与众不同的特点，那就是它的薪酬体系与我之前看到的完全不同，不过却深得我心。公司主要的经理人每年的底薪只有7,800美元，之后再依据公司每年的盈利，乘以事先约定的比率，并扣除运用资金的成本。因此，我们可以说这些经理人完全是与股东站在同一条船上，相比之下，大多数只说空话不干活的管理层，更倾向选择奖励多惩罚少的薪酬制度(long on carrots but short on sticks胡萝卜长棍子短)，总是把股东所提供的资金视为无成本的。无论如何，布朗的这种安排对公司和经理们都非常有利，这并不奇怪：渴望在自己的能力上下大赌注的经理们通常有足够的能力下注。
It’s discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of companies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks, we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank. In the other three cases, I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects. We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us - and therefore repeat here what we’re looking for:
令人沮丧的是，尽管我们曾四次大规模收购由知名投行代理的公司，但只有一次是由投行主动联系的。其它三个案子都是在投资银行寻求其名单上的买主不成后，由我本人或是朋友促成最后的交易，我们很希望中介机构在赚取其佣金收入的同时，还能够想到我们的存在，以下就是我们想要找的企业条件：
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(1) 具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到1000万美元。
(2) Demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),
(2) 表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对美好前景或困境反转的公司没有兴趣。
(3) Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率ROE。
(4) Management in place (we can’t supply it),
(4) 公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理。
(5) Simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(5) 简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知。
(6) An offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. (With Brown, we didn’t even need to take five.) We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行敌意的并购，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，像是布朗鞋业这样的案子根本就不要五分钟，我们倾向于现金交易，除非我们所换得的内在价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart, Fechheimer’s and Borsheim’s. In cases like these, the company’s owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最喜欢的购买模式是像我们购买内布拉斯加家具城，费区海默制服，波仙珠宝店那样的方式，在这次方式下，公司所有者经营者希望能马上拿到一大笔现金，有时是给自己，通常是给家人或是不活跃的股东。于此同时，这些经营者希望继续保持所有者身份，如往常一样继续经营自己的公司。我们认为，我们可以为此类需求的经营者提供一个合适的选择，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales: “When the phone don’t ring, you’ll know it’s me.”
另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新创事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，对于这类的事业，有首乡村歌曲其中的一句歌词最能描述我们的感觉，“若电话不响，你就知道那是我”。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir, Champion, and American Express. We are not interested, however, in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market.
除了以上买下整家公司的并购案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部分不具控制权的股份，就像我们在大都会、所罗门、吉列、全美航空、冠军企业与美国运通这几个例子一样的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议，我们则一点兴趣都没有。
Insurance Operations 保险业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
下表是财产意外险业的最新的几项关键数据：
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) | Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends | Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) | Inflation Rate Measured by GDP Deflator (%) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 10.0 |
| 1982 | 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.2 |
| 1983 | 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 4.0 |
| 1984 | 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 4.5 |
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.7 |
| 1986 | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.7 |
| 1987 | 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.1 |
| 1988 | 4.4 | 105.4 | 5.5 | 3.9 |
| 1989 | 3.2 | 109.2 | 7.7 | 4.4 |
| 1990 (Revised) | 4.4 | 109.6 | 4.8 | 4.1 |
| 1991 (Est.) | 3.1 | 109.1 | 2.9 | 3.7 |
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. The higher the ratio, the worse the year. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107 - 111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失+费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承保利润，100以上代表会有承保损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部分所产生的收益)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107-111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow at close to 10% annually, even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Over the last 25 years, incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount.
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入增长没有到达10%以上，损失一定会增加，(事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11%的速度在增长)，若是同期保费收入增长率大幅落后于10%，承保损失一定会继续增加。
However, the industry’s tendency to under-reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time - and that could well describe the situation last year. Though premiums did not come close to growing 10%, the combined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved. Loss-reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that outcome, and it may turn out that 1991’s ratio should have been worse than was reported. In the long run, of course, trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers. Eventually, managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously-ill patient who tells his doctor: “I can’t afford the operation, but would you accept a small payment to touch up the x-rays?”
然而，当保险业状况恶化时，普遍存在损失准备提列不足的现象，使得恶化的程度可以获得暂时的掩饰。这正是去年度所发生的事，虽然保费收入增长不到10%，但综合比率非但没有像我所预测地那样恶化反而还有点改善，损失准备的统计资料显示这样的现象实在是相当令人怀疑，这也可能导致1991年的比率将更进一步恶化，当然就长期而言，这些利用会计手法掩盖运营问题的经理人还是要面对真正的麻烦，到最后这类经理人会变得跟许多病入膏肓的病人对医生说的一样：“我实在是负担不起一次手术费，不过你会接受一小笔钱把我的X光片给补一补吗？”
Berkshire’s insurance business has changed in ways that make combined ratios, our own or the industry’s, largely irrelevant to our performance. What counts with us is the “cost of funds developed from insurance,” or in the vernacular, “the cost of float.”
Float - which we generate in exceptional amounts - is the total of loss reserves, loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss.
浮存金，我们靠保险业务所取得的大量资金，系指将所有的损失准备金、损失费用调整准备金与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付代理商佣金、预付并购成本及相关再保递延费用，浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967.
下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计。
| Year | Underwriting Loss (1) (In $ Millions) | Average Float (2) (In $ Millions) | Approximate Cost of Funds (Ratio of 1 to 2) | Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | profit | $ 17.3 | less than zero | 5.50% |
| 1968 | profit | 19.9 | less than zero | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | 23.4 | less than zero | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $ 0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | 52.5 | less than zero | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | 69.5 | less than zero | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | 73.3 | less than zero | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | 102.6 | less than zero | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | 139.0 | less than zero | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | 190.4 | less than zero | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | 227.3 | less than zero | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | 237.0 | less than zero | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | 228.4 | less than zero | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.6 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
As you can see, our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U. S. Government’s cost on newly-issued long-term bonds. We have in fact beat the government’s rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business, often by a wide margin. We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold, which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory. Our float should continue to grow; the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost.
正如各位看到的，我们1991年的资金成本甚至比美国政府新发行的长期公债利率还低。事实上在过去25年的保险业务经营中，我们有20年是远低于政府公债发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，同时所持有的浮存金数量也以惊人的幅度增长，当然这只有在资金成本低的情况下，才称得上是好现象。展望未来，浮存金的数量还会继续增长，对我们而言，最大的挑战是这些资金是否能以合理的成本取得。
Berkshire continues to be a very large writer - perhaps the largest in the world - of “super-cat” insurance, which is coverage that other insurance companies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses. Profits in this business are enormously volatile. As I mentioned last year, 100 million profit (in a year with no big catastrophe) to a $200 million loss (in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes and/or earthquakes come along).
伯克希尔一直都是巨灾再保险保单非常大的承保者，或许是全世界规模最大的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来保护自己免受重大意外事故损失，这类保险的盈利情况波动相当的大，就像是去年我曾经提过的，一亿美元的巨灾险保费收入，这大约是我们预期一年所能接到的业务量，可能可以让我们有一亿美元的盈利(只要当年度没有重大灾害发生)，也可能让我们产生二亿美元的损失(只要当年度发生连续几个飓风或地震)。
We price this business expecting to pay out, over the long term, about 90% of the premiums we receive. In any given year, however, we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable. That is true in part because GAAP accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe-free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years. In effect, a one-year accounting cycle is ill-suited to the nature of this business - and that is a reality you should be aware of when you assess our annual results.
当我们对这项业务设定价格时，预计从长期来看，将支付我们收到的保费的90%左右。当然在任何一个特定年度，我们可能大赚或是大亏，一部分的原因在于一般公认会计原则GAAP并不允许我们在没有重大灾害发生的年度提列损失准备金，以弥补其它年度一定会发生的损失。事实上，以一年为期的会计期间并不适合这类的保险业务，所以换句话说当你在评断我们公司的年度绩效时，一定要特别注意到这一点。
Last year there appears to have been, by our definition, one super-cat, but it will trigger payments from only about 25% of our policies. Therefore, we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting profit from our catastrophe business to have been about 4-$5 billion. At the higher figure, the loss from the typhoon would surpass that from Hurricane Hugo, the previous record-holder.)
去年照我们的定义可能会有一件巨灾险保单要付上我们年度保费收入的25%，因此我们预计1991年这类业务的承保利润大约是1,100万美元。或许你很好奇想要知道1991年所发生的最大灾害是什么？它既不是奥克兰大火也不是Bob飓风，而是9月在日本发生的台风造成的损失估计在40-50亿美元上下。若以上限估计，这个数字将超过Hugo飓风先前所创下的最高损失记录。
Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural catastrophes. In the 1980’s much of this reinsurance was supplied by “innocents” - that is, by insurers that did not understand the risks of the business - but they have now been financially burned beyond recognition. (Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often when I was personally running the insurance operation.) Insurers, though, like investors, eventually repeat their mistakes. At some point - probably after a few catastrophe-scarce years - innocents will reappear and prices for super-cat policies will plunge to silly levels.
保险业者总会需要大量的再保险来规避航海与航空以及天然灾害等意外事故，在1980年代许多再保险保单都是由外行人来承接，这些人根本就不知道这类保险的风险有多高，所以他们现在的财务状况已经面目全非，在我亲自经营伯克希尔这项业务时也是如此。保险业者如同投资人一样，仍会一再重复过去所发生的错误，只要有一、两年意外灾害较少，就会有无知的业者跳出来，并以极低的保单价格杀价竞争。
As long as apparently-adequate rates prevail, however, we will be a major participant in super-cat coverages. In marketing this product, we enjoy a significant competitive advantage because of our premier financial strength. Thinking insurers know that when “the big one” comes, many reinsurers who found it easy to write policies will find it difficult to write checks. (Some reinsurers can say what Jackie Mason does: “I’m fixed for life - as long as I don’t buy anything.“) Berkshire’s ability to fulfill all its commitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is unquestioned.
然而只要市场上费率看起来合理，我们就会继续留在这一行里，而在推销这类保单时，我们所拥有的最大竞争优势就是我们的财务实力。有远见的客户都知道许多再保业者可以很轻松地接下保单，但是当重大的意外灾害接连发生时，要他们支付赔偿金可能就有点困难，(有些再保业者就像Jackie Mason所说的一样：我可以一辈子不花钱，只要我不买任何东西)，相对地，伯克希尔在任何极端的状况下，都能够履行他所做出的承诺。
Overall, insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities. Mike Goldberg has accomplished wonders with this operation since he took charge and it has become a very valuable asset, albeit one that can’t be appraised with any precision.
总的来说，保险业提供伯克希尔相当大的机会，Mike Goldberg在他接手这项业务之后，就一直缔造出优异的成绩，也使得保险子公司成为我们非常宝贵的资产，虽然我们无法以精确的数字来衡量(1981年加入，1993年被巴菲特免去CEO的职务，由巴菲特亲自接手)。
Marketable Common Stocks 有价证券股票投资
On the next page we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部分的投资系由伯克希尔拥有不到100%的子公司所持有。
| Shares | Company | Cost 12/31/91 (000s omitted) | Market 12/31/91 (000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. | $ 517,500 | $ 1,300,500 |
| 46,700,000 | The Coca-Cola Company. | 1,023,920 | 3,747,675 |
| 2,495,200 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. | 77,245 | 343,090 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corp. | 45,713 | 1,363,150 |
| 24,000,000 | The Gillette Company | 600,000 | 1,347,000 |
| 31,247,000 | Guinness PLC | 264,782 | 296,755 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company | 9,731 | 336,050 |
| 5,000,000 | Wells Fargo & Company | 289,431 | 290,000 |
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing. Guinness is a new position. But we held the other seven stocks a year ago (making allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to common) and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares. The exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage (“Freddie Mac”), in which our shareholdings increased slightly. Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient. (With tongue only partly in check, I suggest that recent events indicate that the much-maligned “idle rich” have received a bad rap: They have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the “energetic rich” - aggressive real estate operators, corporate acquirers, oil drillers, etc. - have seen their fortunes disappear.)
一如往常，以上这张表显示我们躺平式的投资方式，健力士是我们最新的投资部位，至于其它七项主要的投资都是一年前就持有的(如果把吉列从优先股转换成普通股也包含在内的话)，其中六项持股数量保持不变，唯一的例外是房地美，我们投资的股数略微增加(均价58.94增持95200股)。我们以不变应万变的做法主要是反应我们把股票市场当作是财富重新分配的中心，而钱通常由好动的投资人流到有耐心的投资人手中。我嘴巴可能闭的不够紧，我认为最近几件事情显示，许多躺赢的富人招到许多攻击，因为他们好象没做什么事就使得本身的财富暴涨，而那些精力充沛的富人，如房地产大亨、企业并购家与石油钻探大亨等，却眼睁睁地看着自己的财产大幅缩水了。
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire’s first significant investment in a company domiciled outside the United States. Guinness, however, earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca-Cola and Gillette, U.S.-based companies that garner most of their profits from international operations. Indeed, in the sense of where they earn their profits - continent-by-continent - Coca-Cola and Guinness display strong similarities. (But you’ll never get their drinks confused - and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp.)
我们在健力士的持股代表伯克希尔第一次对海外公司进行大规模的投资，不过健力士所赚的钱与可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类似，主要都是依赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看，健力士与可口可乐的盈利来源有相当的共通性，(但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐)。(注：健力士得益于日本烈酒业务的大幅增长)
We continually search for large businesses with understandable, enduring and mouth-watering economics that are run by able and shareholder-oriented managements. This focus doesn’t guarantee results: We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business performance from our companies that validates our assessment. But this investment approach - searching for the superstars - offers us our only chance for real success. Charlie and I are simply not smart enough, considering the large sums we work with, to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far-from-great businesses. Nor do we think many others can achieve long-term investment success by flitting from flower to flower. Indeed, we believe that according the name “investors” to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one-night stands a romantic.
我们不断地在寻找那些容易理解、具有持续性且令人垂涎三尺的经济特征的大型企业，并且由有能力与才干并以股东利益为导向的管理层经营，虽然这些重要的要求并不一定保证结果就会令人满意，当然我们一定要以合理的价格投资并且确保我们的被投资公司绩效表现与我们当初所评估的一致。寻找行业超级明星的投资方法，是我们唯一能够成功的机会。查理跟我的天资实在是有限，以我们目前操作的资金规模，实在是无法靠着买卖一些平凡普通的企业来赚取足够的利益。当然我们也不认为其它人可以通过像小蜜蜂从一朵花飞到另一朵花的方法来实现长期的成功。事实上我们认为，将这些短线交易活跃的机构称为投资者，就像是把一再搞一夜情的人称作为浪漫主义者一样。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited, say, to private companies in Omaha, I would, first, try to assess the long-term economic characteristics of each business; second, assess the quality of the people in charge of running it; and, third, try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price. I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town. Why, then, should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public companies? And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult, why should we discard proven products? (I was tempted to say “the real thing.“) Our motto is: “If at first you do succeed, quit trying.”
今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥马哈地区的私人企业，那么首先，我们会仔细地评估每家企业的长期经济特征，第二，我会再评估经营者的特质，第三，再以合理的价格买进一小部分的股权。既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买城里所有公司的股权，那么，为什么伯克希尔在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的策略？既然要找到伟大企业和优秀的经理人是如此的困难，那为什么我们要拋弃那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢？(通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色)，我们的座右铭是：如果你一开始就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。
John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F. C. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: “As time goes on, I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence… . One’s knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence.”
著名经济学家凯恩斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott，上面写到：“随着时光的流逝，我越来越相信正确的投资方式是，将大部分的资金投入到自己了解的企业和自己完全信任的管理层之上，将资金分散到自己知之甚少且没有特别理由信任的一大堆公司上，以控制风险的做法是错误的……一个人的知识与经验肯定是有限度的，在任何时候，我个人认为，自己有资格充分信任的企业很少超过两三家。”
Mistake Du Jour 今日错误
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about “Mistakes of the First 25 Years” and promised you an update in 2015. My experiences in the first few years of this second “semester” indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will become unmanageable if I stick to my original plan. Therefore, I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings. (Post-mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams; why not for businesses and investors?)
在1989年的年报中，我曾经写过伯克希尔头25年所犯的错误，而且承诺在2015年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得，若是坚持原来的计划的话，积压的待讨论事项将多到难以管理，因此我偶尔会在这里吐露心声，希望公开的忏悔能够阻止进一步的错误。事后分析对医院和足球赛有用，对企业和投资者也会有用。
Typically, our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission, rather than the commission, category. That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment, since you don’t see these errors; but their invisibility does not reduce their cost. In this mea culpa, I am not talking about missing out on some company that depends upon an esoteric invention (such as Xerox), high-technology (Apple), or even brilliant merchandising (Wal-Mart). We will never develop the competence to spot such businesses early. Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive - but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying.
通常情况下，我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部分，而是在于我们没有去做的那部分。虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看不到不代表我们就不必付出代价。而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了某些革命性的新发明(如施乐)、高科技(如苹果)、或是更优秀的连锁零售商(如沃尔玛)，我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的能力。相反，我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易理解，且很明显对我们有吸引力的公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着拇指犹豫不决，而没有下定决心把他们买下来。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples, but I wish the one I now present wasn’t quite so dramatic: In early 1988, we decided to buy 30 million shares (adjusted for a subsequent split) of Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), which would have been a 400 million investment. We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the company’s business. Furthermore, it was clear to us that David Maxwell, Fannie Mae’s CEO, had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the company as a financial powerhouse - with the best yet to come. I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be uncomfortable if we were to take a large position.
每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现在举的例子不会过于极端。回顾1988年，当时我们决定以3.5-4亿美元之间，买进3,000万股(经过事后的分割调整)的联邦国民贷款协会(房利美)，几年之前，我们就拥有这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解。此外，我们也很清楚大卫·麦克斯韦(David Maxwell)也就是房利美的CEO，有能力处理他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。
After we bought about 7 million shares, the price began to climb. In frustration, I stopped buying (a mistake that, thankfully, I did not repeat when Coca-Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program). In an even sillier move, I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned.
只不过当我们开始买进不到700万股时，该公司股价就开始上涨，失望之余，我立刻停止买进(事后回想还好我没有在买进可口可乐时犯下相同的错误)，更有甚者，我觉得区区700万股对我们来说实在是没有太大的意义，所以之后又把持有的700万股全部卖掉。
I wish I could give you a halfway rational explanation for my amateurish behavior vis-a-vis Fannie Mae. But there isn’t one. What I can give you is an estimate as of yearend 1991 of the approximate gain that Berkshire didn’t make because of your Chairman’s mistake: about $1.4 billion.
我期盼对于我这样不具职业水准的投资行为可以给各位一个稍微合理一点的解释，不过我实在是编不出来，不过我倒是可以跟各位报告，因为本人的这项错误，大概使得伯克希尔在1991年少赚了14亿美元。
Fixed-Income Securities 固定收益证券
We made several significant changes in our fixed-income portfolio during 1991. As I noted earlier, our Gillette preferred was called for redemption, which forced us to convert to common stock; we eliminated our holdings of an RJR Nabisco issue that was subject to an exchange offer and subsequent call; and we purchased fixed-income securities of American Express and First Empire State Corp., a Buffalo-based bank holding company. We also added to a small position in ACF Industries that we had established in late 1990. Our largest holdings at yearend were:
1991年我们在固定收益证券这方面的投资有很大的变动，如同先前曾提到的我们的吉列可转换优先股到期，迫使我们转换为普通股；另外我们清仓了RJR Nabisco的债券，因为它在被转换后赎回；我们也买进了美国运通与第一帝国(一家布法罗的银行控股公司)的固定收益证券；我们还在1990年底买进了一些ACF工业的债券，以下是截至年底我们持有的主要部位：
| Issuer | Cost of Preferreds and Amortized Value of Bonds (000s omitted) | Market (000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|
| ACF Industries | $ 93,918(2) | $118,683 |
| American Express | 300,000 | 263,265(1)(2) |
| Champion International | 300,000(2) | 300,000(1) |
| First Empire State | 40,000 | 50,000(1)(2) |
| RJR Nabisco | 222,148(2) | 285,683 |
| Salomon | 700,000(2) | 714,000(1) |
| USAir | 358,000(2) | 232,700(1) |
| Washington Public Power Systems | 158,553(2) | 203,071 |
(1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me
(1) 查理和我认为的合理价值
(2) Carrying value in our financial statements
Our 78.91 per share. Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire, but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers, CEO of First Empire, and like being his partner on any scale.
我们投资了4,000万美元在第一帝国9%收益率的优先股上，在1996年前公司无法赎回，可以以每股78.91美元转换为普通股，通常我会认为这样的规模对于伯克希尔来说实在是太小了，但由于我们对于该公司CEI鲍勃·威莫斯(Bob Wilmers)实在是过于崇敬，所以不管金额大小，还是希望有机会能与他一起合伙共事。
Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed-income security. Rather it is a “Perc,” which carries a fixed dividend of 8.85% on our 414 million the total value of the common we receive. Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the common stock that we will receive upon conversion, there is no floor. The terms of the preferred, however, include a provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the common stock is below $24.50 on the third anniversary of our purchase.
至于美国运通的投资则不是一般的固定收益证券，它算是一种Perc：每年可以为我们3亿美元的投资贡献8.85%的股利收入，除了下述例外，那就是我们的优先股必须在发行后的三年内转换成最多12,244,898股的普通股，若有必要，转换比率会向下调整，以确定我们所收到的股份总值不超过4.14亿美元。因此，虽然对于可能取得的普通股价值有其上限，但相对地却没有下限，然而，这样的特别条款还包含一项规定，若是三年期限到时公司股价低于24.5美元时，可以有权请求延长转换期限一年。
Overall, our fixed-income investments have treated us well, both over the long term and recently. We have realized large capital gains from these holdings, including about $152 million in 1991. Additionally, our after-tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed-income portfolios.
总的来说，不管最近或是是长期而言，我们在固定收益证券上的投资表现还算不错，靠着这样的投资我们赚取大量的资本利得，在1991年这个数字大约在1.52亿美元左右，此外我们的税后回报率也远高于一般的固定收益证券。
Nevertheless, we have had some surprises, none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the Salomon situation. As I write this letter, I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salomon’s annual report and I refer you to that report for an update on the company. (Write to: Corporate Secretary, Salomon Inc, Seven World Trade Center, New York, NY 10048) Despite the company’s travails, Charlie and I believe our Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991. Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon’s common produced this result.
尽管如此，我们还是发生一些小意外，没有比需要我亲自参与的所罗门事件更让人惊讶的了，当我在撰写这封信时，我也同时写了一封信放在所罗门的年度报告之内，我希望您能参阅这份报告，了解该公司的最新情况。(向纽约第七世贸大楼所罗门公司索取)，虽然公司遭逢不幸，但查理跟我都相信，所罗门优先股价值在1991年略有增加，得益于低利率的环境加上所罗门普通股的股价回升。
Last year I told you that our USAir investment “should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years.” Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the industry, as Midway, Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy. (Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add Continental and TWA.)
去年我曾告诉各位除非航空业的经营环境在未来几年内加速恶化，否则我们在全美航空的投资应该可以有不错的结果，不过很不幸的随着中美、泛美与美西航空相继倒闭，1991年正是航空业加速恶化的一年，(若是把时间延长为14个月，则还要包括大陆航空与TWA两家航空公司)。
The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it, a risk that is far from negligible. The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating. These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry’s costs because the bankrupts don’t incur the capital costs faced by their solvent brethren and because they can fund their losses - and thereby stave off shutdown - by selling off assets. This burn-the-furniture-to-provide-firewood approach to fare-setting by bankrupt carriers contributes to the toppling of previously-marginal carriers, creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to bring the industry to its knees.
我们对于全美航空投资的评价之所以如此的低，反应出整个产业目前所面临到的盈利前景不佳的风险，这个风险又因为法院鼓励已经宣布破产的航空公司继续营运而加剧，这些同业以低于一般成本价格卖票，因为破产者完全可以不必在乎其它还奄奄一息的同业所需负担的资金成本，为了避免营运停摆，它们可以靠着变卖资产来提供资金，从而避免被关闭。这种拆家具当柴烧的做法，有可能进一步危及其它营运还算正常的同业，然后引发多米诺骨牌效应，使得整个产业一败涂地。
Seth Schofield, who became CEO of USAir in 1991, is making major adjustments in the airline’s operations in order to improve its chances of being one of the few industry survivors. There is no tougher job in corporate America than running an airline: Despite the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it, the industry, in aggregate, has posted a net loss since its birth after Kitty Hawk. Airline managers need brains, guts, and experience - and Seth possesses all three of these attributes.
赛斯·斯科菲尔德(Seth Schofield)在1991年成为全美航空公司的CEO，正在对整个公司的营运做出重大调整，以提高其成为航空业仅存的几位幸存者之一的机会。在美国企业界，没有比经营一家航空公司还要困难的工作了，虽然大笔的资金已经投入到这个产业，但是从小鹰号诞生开始，航空业历史累积加总所产生的损失却是相当惊人，航空公司的经理人需要智力、勇气还要再加上经验，而毫无疑问的，Seth同时具有以上三项的特质。
Miscellaneous 其它事项
About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1991 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $6.8 million, and 2,630 charities were recipients.
大约有97.7%的有效股权参与1991年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约680万美元捐出的款项分配给2,630家慈善机构。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. To participate in future programs, you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1992 will be ineligible for the 1992 program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1992年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1992年的捐赠计划。
In addition to the shareholder-designated contributions that Berkshire distributes, managers of our operating businesses make contributions, including merchandise, averaging about $1.5 million annually. These contributions support local charities, such as The United Way, and produce roughly commensurate benefits for our businesses.
伯克希尔除了通过股东指定捐赠计划对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每年也会通过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在150万美元左右。这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐出的相当。
However, neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent company use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them, except to the extent they do so as shareholders. If your employees, including your CEO, wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment, we believe they should use their own money, not yours.
然而不管是旗下事业或是母公司的经理人在利用伯克希尔的资金对外捐赠给全国性组织或特别利益团体时，都是以站在股东利益立场所应该做的，相对地若是你的员工也包含CEO在内，想要与其校友会或其它人建立个人关系的，我们认为他们最好是用自己的钱，而不是从你的口袋里掏钱。
The faithful will notice that, for the first time in some years, Charlie’s annual letter to Wesco shareholders is not reprinted in this report. Since his letter is relatively barebones this year4, Charlie said he saw no point in including it in these pages; my own recommendation, however, is that you get a copy of the Wesco report. Simply write: Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101.5
忠实的巴菲特迷可能会发现，许多年来头一次大家在年报中找不到查理·芒格写给Wesco股东的信，主要是因为他认为今年的报告内容很少4，所以没有必要附在我们的年报中，不过我个人还是建议，想办法写信给Wesco公司的秘书，就可以拿到Wesco的年报。索取地址为：Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101.5
Malcolm G. Chace, Jr., now 88, has decided not to stand for election as a director this year. But the association of the Chace family with Berkshire will not end: Malcolm III (Kim), Malcolm’s son, will be nominated to replace him.
现年88岁的马尔科姆二世(Malcolm G. Chace, Jr.)，决定从今年起不再担任本公司的董事，但伯克希尔与蔡斯家族的关系却不会断，他儿子马尔科姆三世(Malcolm Kim Chace)会接替其位置继续担任本公司董事。
In 1931, Malcolm went to work for Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates, which merged with Hathaway Manufacturing Co. in 1955 to form our present company. Two years later, Malcolm became Berkshire Hathaway’s Chairman, a position he held as well in early 1965 when he made it possible for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. to buy a key block of Berkshire stock owned by some of his relatives. This purchase gave our partnership effective control of the company. Malcolm’s immediate family meanwhile kept its Berkshire stock and for the last 27 years has had the second-largest holding in the company, trailing only the Buffett family. Malcolm has been a joy to work with and we are delighted that the long-running relationship between the Chace family and Berkshire is continuing to a new generation.
1931年老马尔科姆进入伯克希尔针织工厂工作，在1955年公司与哈撒韦工业合并，成为现在的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，之后两年他接任本公司董事长，直到1965年由他一手促成巴菲特合伙公司买下他与亲人大部分的股权，而使得我们成功控股公司，之后蔡斯家族在往后的27年内继续持有本公司的股份成为仅次于巴菲特家族本公司第二大股东，小马尔科姆一直是个很容易相处的伙伴，我们很高兴蔡斯家族与巴菲特家族的感情能够延续到下一代。
The annual meeting this year will be held at the Orpheum Theater in downtown Omaha at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 27, 1992. Attendance last year grew to a record 1,550, but that still leaves plenty of room at the Orpheum.
今年的股东年会预计在1992年4月27日周一早上9点30分，在位于奥马哈市中心的奥芬剧院(Orpheum)召开，去年股东年会参加人数又创新高，突破1550人，不过会场还是剩下很多座位。
We recommend that you get your hotel reservations early at one of these hotels: (1) The Radisson-Redick Tower, a small (88 rooms) but nice hotel across the street from the Orpheum; (2) the much larger Red Lion Hotel, located about a five-minute walk from the Orpheum; or (3) the Marriott, located in West Omaha about 100 yards from Borsheim’s and a twenty minute drive from downtown. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.
我们建议大家最好先向以下旅馆预订房间：(1)Radisson-Redick旅馆-就位在Orpheum对街拥有88个房间的一家小旅馆；(2)较大一点的RedLion旅馆-离Orpheum约五分钟路程；(3)Marriott位在奥马哈西区，离波仙珠宝店约100公尺，开车到市中心约需20分钟，届时将会有8:30和8:45出发的巴士接送大家往返股东会会场。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的股东像伯克希尔的股东一样由高智能水准与经营者荣枯与共的股东组合。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. With the admission card, we will enclose information about parking facilities located near the Orpheum. If you are driving, come a little early. Nearby lots fill up quickly and you may have to walk a few blocks.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说明供大家参考。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim’s after the meeting and to take you from there to downtown hotels or the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays. While there, stop at the See’s Candy Cart and find out for yourself why Americans ate 26 million pounds of See’s products last year.
一如往年，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，周六从早上10点到下午5点30分，周日则从中午开到下午5点30分，到那里时记得到喜诗糖果摊逛逛，了解一下为何美国人一年能够吞下2,600万磅的喜诗糖果。
Borsheim’s normally is closed on Sunday, but we will be open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 26. Borsheim’s will also have a special party the previous evening at which shareholders are welcome. (You must, however, write Mrs. Gladys Kaiser at our office for an invitation.) On display that evening will be a 150-year retrospective of the most exceptional timepieces made by Patek Philippe, including watches once owned by Queen Victoria, Pope Pius IX, Rudyard Kipling, Madame Curie and Albert Einstein. The centerpiece of the exhibition will be a $5 million watch whose design and manufacture required nine years of labor by Patek Philippe craftsmen. Along with the rest of the collection, this watch will be on display at the store on Sunday - unless Charlie has by then impulsively bought it.
波仙周日通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别为股东与来宾开放，4月26日周日从中午开到下午6点，同时前一天晚上还将为所有股东举行一个特别的派对，(但必须事先向我们办公室的Gladys Kaiser女士登记取得邀请函)，当晚将会展示百达翡丽(PatekPhilippe)过去150年来的作品回顾，包含英国维多利亚女皇、教宗庇护九世、鲁德亚德·吉卜林、居里夫人和阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦曾经拥有的腕表。另外会场中的重头戏是一只由百达翡丽工匠设计打造，耗时九年价值500万美元的手表，如无意外也会随着其它物品一起展出，除非查理忍不住诱惑先买下了它。
Nicholas Kenner nailed me - again - at last year’s meeting, pointing out that I had said in the 1990 annual report that he was 11 in May 1990, when actually he was 9. So, asked Nicholas rather caustically: “If you can’t get that straight, how do I know the numbers in the back [the financials] are correct?” I’m still searching for a snappy response. Nicholas will be at this year’s meeting - he spurned my offer of a trip to Disney World on that day - so join us to watch a continuation of this lop-sided battle of wits.
去年股东年会Nicholas Kenner又杠上我了，他表示：“我在去年1990年报中表示他在1990年5月11号满十岁，但事实上他那时才刚满9岁”，他接着又用很嘲讽的语气说：“如果你连这个都搞不清楚，我如何还能相信你报告中的其他数字是正确的。“到现在我还在想如何做出一个有力的回答，今年Nicholas还会出席，他拒绝了我邀请他当天到迪士尼乐园玩的建议，所以请大家继续好好观赏这一面倒的机智问答。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦 巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
February 28, 1992
1992年2月28日
原文：We believe this reappraisal was warranted. But it can’t recur annually: We’ll have to settle for a single dip in the future.
肖良版：当然我们认为这样的调整是经得起考验的，但这种情况不太可能每年都发生，展望未来我们可能只能靠前一点而获益。
核对英文原文，酌情改为：我们认为这样的重估是合理的，但这种情况不可能每年发生，我们将不得不接受未来发生的估值下降。
原文: (1) Fair value as determined by Charlie and me (2) Carrying value in our financial statements
肖良版：未翻译
补上中文翻译
原文：Since his letter is relatively barebones this year,
肖良版：主要是因为他认为今年的报告相当阳春,
阅读肖良版翻译稍有困惑，参考英文原文，斟酌直译为：主要是因为他认为今年的报告内容很少，
原文：Simply write: Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101.
肖良版：未翻译
补全翻译：索取地址为：Corporate Secretary, Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, CA 91101.
原文：In last year’s report, I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media companies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors.
共读版翻译：在去年的报告中，我曾经表示媒体事业盈利能力衰退主要是反应景气的循环因素，但在1991年发生的情况则不是那么一回事，
修改为：在去年的报告中，我曾经表示媒体公司盈利能力的下降既反映了长期趋势，也反映了周期性因素。1991年的事件进一步证实了这一观点：