1988 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders1988 年致股东的信

原文信息：

• 标题：1988 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
• 作者：Warren Buffett
• 发表时间：1989-02-28
• 链接：HTML
• 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
• 整理：when breath becomes air
• 中文校译：伴读小兽

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BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：

Our gain in net worth during 1988 was $569million,or20.0$19.46 to $2,974.52, or at a rate of 23.0% compounded annually.

本公司1988年的账面价值增加了5.69亿美元，或增长了20.0%(标普16.6%)，自从现任管理层接手的24年以来，每股帐面价值从19.46美元增长到现在的2,974.52美元，年复合增长率约为23.0%。

We’ve emphasized in past reports that what counts, however, is intrinsic business value - the figure, necessarily an estimate, indicating what all of our constituent businesses are worth. By our calculations, Berkshire’s intrinsic business value significantly exceeds its book value. Over the 24 years, business value has grown somewhat faster than book value; in 1988, however, book value grew the faster, by a bit.

在过去的年报中我们一再强调，真正重要的是企业的内在价值，它代表着我们旗下企业组成份子到底值多少钱？这个数字只是个估计数，根据我们内部的估算，目前伯克希尔内在价值已大幅超越其帐面价值，过去24年以来，企业内在价值增长的速度一直比帐面价值增长速度略快一点，但1988年，帐面价值的增长幅度略高于内在价值。

Berkshire’s past rates of gain in both book value and business value were achieved under circumstances far different from those that now exist. Anyone ignoring these differences makes the same mistake that a baseball manager would were he to judge the future prospects of a 42-year-old center fielder on the basis of his lifetime batting average.

过去伯克希尔内在价值与帐面价值成长的背景，与现在有很大的不同，若搞不清楚其间的差异，就好象是一位棒球教练在判断42岁高龄的中场选手未来潜力时，以他一生的平均打击率作为判断依据。

Important negatives affecting our prospects today are: (1) a less attractive stock market than generally existed over the past 24 years; (2) higher corporate tax rates on most forms of investment income; (3) a far more richly-priced market for the acquisition of businesses; and (4) industry conditions for Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - Berkshire’s three permanent investments, constituting about one-half of our net worth - that range from slightly to materially less favorable than those existing five to ten years ago. All of these companies have superb management and strong properties. But, at current prices, their upside potential looks considerably less exciting to us today than it did some years ago.

目前我们所面临不利的因素主要有：(1) 与过去24年相比，股票市场的吸引力普遍下降。(2) 对大多数形式的投资收入，征收更高的公司税率。(3)企业被并购的价格偏高。(4) 约占伯克希尔账面价值一半的主要三大投资企业：大都会/ABC、GEICO保险和华盛顿邮报，其产业状况多多少少不若以往，虽然这些公司有杰出的管理与强势的资产，但以目前的股价来看，他们向上成长的潜力相对有限。

The major problem we face, however, is a growing capital base. You’ve heard that from us before, but this problem, like age, grows in significance each year. (And also, just as with age, it’s better to have this problem continue to grow rather than to have it “solved.”)

然而我们面对的主要问题还是不断增加的资金规模，先前各位也听过类似的说明，不过这个问题就好象是一个人的身体健康与年纪的关系一样，随着时间的流逝，问题也越严重，(当然在这种情况下，我们希望这个问题越严重越好。)

Four years ago I told you that we needed profits of $3.9billiontoachievea15$10.3 billion. That seems like a very big number to me and to Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner. (Should that number indeed prove too big, Charlie will find himself, in future reports, retrospectively identified as the senior partner.)

四年前我曾告诉各位，未来十年，伯克希尔要想每年维持15%的回报率，我们需要赚39亿美元的利润。时至今日，这个数字暴增到103亿美元。对查理与我来说，这实在是无法承担之重，(当然若这个数字事后发现真的过大，大家或许会在以后的报告中，查理可能会另外个别署名资深合伙人)。

As a partial offset to the drag that our growing capital base exerts upon returns, we have a very important advantage now that we lacked 24 years ago. Then, all our capital was tied up in a textile business with inescapably poor economic characteristics. Today part of our capital is invested in some really exceptional businesses.

虽然不断增长的资金规模会拖累的投资回报率，但同时我们也拥有另外一项以前没有的优势。过去我们大部分的资本都被束缚在没有多少经济效益的纺织业务上，如今资本已转移到一些相当不错的业务。

Last year we dubbed these operations the Sainted Seven: Buffalo News, Fechheimer, Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See’s, and World Book. In 1988 the Saints came marching in. You can see just how extraordinary their returns on capital were by examining the historical-cost financial statements on page 45, which combine the figures of the Sainted Seven with those of several smaller units. With no benefit from financial leverage, this group earned about 67% on average equity capital.

去年我将他们取名叫做七个圣徒，布法罗新闻报、费区海默制服、柯比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具超市、斯科特费泽制造集团、喜诗糖果及世界图书公司，今年七圣徒持续向前迈进，大家可以发现以历史投资成本的角度来看，他们的投资报酬实在是惊人，没有依靠财务杠杆，平均股本回报率高达67%。

In most cases the remarkable performance of these units arises partially from an exceptional business franchise; in all cases an exceptional management is a vital factor. The contribution Charlie and I make is to leave these managers alone.

虽然这些企业的卓越表现源于卓越的特许经营权，但优良的管理绝对是关键因素，查理跟我唯一可以做的就是让他们放手去干。

In my judgment, these businesses, in aggregate, will continue to produce superb returns. We’ll need these: Without this help Berkshire would not have a chance of achieving our 15% goal. You can be sure that our operating managers will deliver; the question mark in our future is whether Charlie and I can effectively employ the funds that they generate.

在我看来，这些企业总体上将会持续产生丰厚回报，我们想要在往后年度继续维持15%回报率的目标，绝对需要他们的支持，唯一的关键在于，查理跟我是否能够有效地运用他们所贡献出来源源不绝的现金。

In that respect, we took a step in the right direction early in 1989 when we purchased an 80% interest in Borsheim’s, a jewelry business in Omaha. This purchase, described later in this letter, delivers exactly what we look for: an outstanding business run by people we like, admire, and trust. It’s a great way to start the year.

关于这一点，我们做出了一个正确的决定，那就是买下位于奥马哈的[Borsheims|波仙珠宝]80%的股权，这项并购案会在后面说明，与我们当初的预期相符，一家优秀的企业由我们所欣赏且信任的人来经营。今年有一个好的开始。

Accounting Changes 会计原则变动

We have made a significant accounting change that was mandated for 1988, and likely will have another to make in 1990. When we move figures around from year to year, without any change in economic reality, one of our always-thrilling discussions of accounting is necessary.

1988年执行了一项重要的会计原则变动，展望1990年还会有另一项变动。当经济现况没有改变，却将会计帐面数字改来改去，花一番工夫讨论一下影响层面是必要的。

First, I’ll offer my customary disclaimer: Despite the shortcomings of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), I would hate to have the job of devising a better set of rules. The limitations of the existing set, however, need not be inhibiting: CEOs are free to treat GAAP statements as a beginning rather than an end to their obligation to inform owners and creditors - and indeed they should. After all, any manager of a subsidiary company would find himself in hot water if he reported barebones GAAP numbers that omitted key information needed by his boss, the parent corporation’s CEO. Why, then, should the CEO himself withhold information vitally useful to his bosses - the shareholder-owners of the corporation?

首先我习惯性的提出免责声明：尽管GAAP(一般公认会计原则)确有缺点，但我没有能力重新制定一套新的会计规则，虽然这套原则确有其局限性，却不必就此废除，CEO大可以也应该将GAAP报告当作是对股东与债权人尽告知义务的开始而非结束。若部门经理人只是提供GAAP报告，却不附上经营分析所必要的关键讯息，他们将会被CEO修理的很惨。同样的，公司的CEO是不是也应该向他的老板，也就是公司股东，报告必要的信息呢？

What needs to be reported is data - whether GAAP, non-GAAP, or extra-GAAP - that helps financially-literate readers answer three key questions: (1) Approximately how much is this company worth? (2) What is the likelihood that it can meet its future obligations? and (3) How good a job are its managers doing, given the hand they have been dealt?

真正需要报告的是数据，不管是GAAP、非GAAP或是GAAP之外的，都可以帮助财务报表使用者了解三个问题：(1)这家公司大概价值多少？(2)它到达未来目标的可能性有多大？(3)在现有条件下，管理层的表现如何？

In most cases, answers to one or more of these questions are somewhere between difficult and impossible to glean from the minimum GAAP presentation. The business world is simply too complex for a single set of rules to effectively describe economic reality for all enterprises, particularly those operating in a wide variety of businesses, such as Berkshire.

大部分的情况下，简单的财务数字并不能回答以上的问题，商业世界太复杂了，很难用一套简单的规则有效地来描述所有企业的实质经济状况，尤其是像伯克希尔这种经营多种不同业务的企业集团。

Further complicating the problem is the fact that many managements view GAAP not as a standard to be met, but as an obstacle to overcome. Too often their accountants willingly assist them. (“How much,” says the client, “is two plus two?” Replies the cooperative accountant, “What number did you have in mind?”) Even honest and well-intentioned managements sometimes stretch GAAP a bit in order to present figures they think will more appropriately describe their performance. Both the smoothing of earnings and the “big bath” quarter are “white lie” techniques employed by otherwise upright managements.

更复杂的是，许多管理层不把GAAP当作是应该达到的标准，而是需要克服的障碍。而且，大多数的会计师也心甘情愿给予协助，当客户问到二加二等于几？配合的会计师可能会回答：那要看你想要多少？“即使是诚实且正直的管理阶层有时也会超越GAAP，以使得报表数字更能展示他们的绩效。不管是让损益平滑一点或是某季巨额冲销，都是还算正直的管理层经常运用的做帐技巧。

Then there are managers who actively use GAAP to deceive and defraud. They know that many investors and creditors accept GAAP results as gospel. So these charlatans interpret the rules “imaginatively” and record business transactions in ways that technically comply with GAAP but actually display an economic illusion to the world.

另外还有一些不肖经理人专门利用GAAP来进行欺骗与贪污，他们很清楚许多投资人与债权人把GAAP结果奉为圣经，因此，这些骗子运用丰富的想象力技巧性让交易符合GAAP规则，但却与实际的经济实质背道而驰。

As long as investors - including supposedly sophisticated institutions - place fancy valuations on reported “earnings” that march steadily upward, you can be sure that some managers and promoters will exploit GAAP to produce such numbers, no matter what the truth may be. Over the years, Charlie and I have observed many accounting-based frauds of staggering size. Few of the perpetrators have been punished; many have not even been censured. It has been far safer to steal large sums with a pen than small sums with a gun.

只要投资人，包括老练的专业投资机构，迷信于那些稳定向上攀升的收益数字，我们可以百分之百确定还会有经理人与拥护者不顾现实，继续滥用GAAP来满足投资人的需求。多年以来，查理跟我看到许多规模惊人的会计诈骗案，鲜少有人因此被惩罚，有的甚至都没有被发现，用笔偷钱要比用枪抢劫要来的容易的多。

Under one major change mandated by GAAP for 1988, we have been required to fully consolidate all our subsidiaries in our balance sheet and earnings statement. In the past, Mutual Savings and Loan, and Scott Fetzer Financial (a credit company that primarily finances installment sales of World Book and Kirby products) were consolidated on a “one-line” basis. That meant we (1) showed our equity in their combined net worths as a single-entry asset on Berkshire’s consolidated balance sheet and (2) included our equity in their combined annual earnings as a single-line income entry in our consolidated statement of earnings. Now the rules require that we consolidate each asset and liability of these companies in our balance sheet and each item of their income and expense in our earnings statement.

1988年GAAP有一项重大变更，依新规定，伯克希尔的资产表和损益表必须全面合并所有子公司。在过去，互助储贷与斯科特费泽金融(Scott Fetzer Financial主要为世界百科全书与柯比吸尘器产品提供分期付款服务的信贷公司)，只须单独认列损益即可，意思是说，(1)仅将被投资公司净值按投资比例以投资权益显示在伯克希尔的合并资产负债表之上。(2)仅将被投资公司年度损益按投资比例的投资收益显示在伯克希尔的合并损益表之上。但现在，我们必须将被投资公司的资产与负债、营收与费用，放进合并的财务报表之上。

This change underscores the need for companies also to report segmented data: The greater the number of economically diverse business operations lumped together in conventional financial statements, the less useful those presentations are and the less able investors are to answer the three questions posed earlier. Indeed, the only reason we ever prepare consolidated figures at Berkshire is to meet outside requirements. On the other hand, Charlie and I constantly study our segment data.

这项变更低估了公司也要报告部门信息。企业形态越复杂的公司，其按传统财务报表所加总出来的数字越没有意义，越没有办法让投资人回答前面所提的三个问题。事实上在伯克希尔，我们会准备合并数字的唯一原因就是要符合外部监管规定，查理和我看的则是细分部门的信息。

Now that we are required to bundle more numbers in our GAAP statements, we have decided to publish additional supplementary information that we think will help you measure both business value and managerial performance. (Berkshire’s ability to discharge its obligations to creditors - the third question we listed - should be obvious, whatever statements you examine.) In these supplementary presentations, we will not necessarily follow GAAP procedures, or even corporate structure. Rather, we will attempt to lump major business activities in ways that aid analysis but do not swamp you with detail. Our goal is to give you important information in a form that we would wish to get it if our roles were reversed.

现在我们被要求在财务报表上将更多的数字混在一起，我们现在决定公布更多的补充信息，有助于帮助各位来衡量企业价值与管理层的表现。伯克希尔履行对债权人义务的能力，我们提到的第三个问题，应该是显而易见的，不管你看什么样的报表。在这些补充信息中，我们不一定依照GAAP，甚至不以公司来区分，相反地，我们会试着将同性质的企业汇总，有助于大家分析而不是被一大堆信息所掩没，我们的目标是设身处地的为各位设想，给各位我们认为重要的讯息。

On pages 41-47 we show separate combined balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; (2) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (3) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.

我们按以下四个部门分类：(1)金融业务，包含互助储贷与斯科特财务公司。(2)保险业务，依投资部位分门别类。(3)制造、出版、零售业务，扣除某些非营业资产以及购买法会计调整数。(4)其它业务，包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)及Wesco与伯克希尔母公司所持有的资产与负债。

If you combine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it. (In fact, they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask.)

如果将以上四类的收益与净值加总，你将得到与GAAP一致的总数，但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师审计，最好是不要审，因为他们要是看到这种报表，一定会被吓个半死。

I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990. This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes, and is both complicated and controversial - so much so that its imposition, originally scheduled for 1989, was postponed for a year.

先前我曾提到在1990年会有另一项会计原则的重大变更，主要与递延所得税有关，这项原则相当的复杂且极具争议性，以致于原定计划于1989年实施又被延后一年。

When implemented, the new rule will affect us in various ways. Most important, we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance companies.

当这项原则开始实施后，对我们影响有几个方面，最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得，以及计算递延所得税负债的方式。

Right now, our liability is layered. For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years, $1.2billion,wehavebookeda28$600 million, the tax liability has been booked at 34%. The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987.

原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层，对于1986年以前帐列未实现收益，大约在12亿美元左右，系以28%的税率估算，对于1986年之后的帐列未实现收益，大约在6亿美元左右，系以34%的税率估算，1987年起调整税率的差异反应税负的差异。

It now appears, however, that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990, taking the charge against our earnings. Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990, this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by $71 million. The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet, but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth.

现在看起来，新的会计原则要求我们从1990年开始，必须将所有未实现收益的预估税率订在34%，经估算光是这一项改变，就会使得我们的年度收益与净值减少7100万美元，还不包含其它大大小小的影响，但这些变化对净利润和净资产的影响很小。

We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes. We should point out, however, that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains.

其实我们不认为这样变更有其必要性，因为对于伯克希尔来说，不管税率是28%或是34%，都不能反应我们公司的实质现况，因为我们从来不考虑出售这些，我们具有庞大未实现收益的股票。

To those of you who are uninterested in accounting, I apologize for this dissertation. I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures, but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of “faith” approach to investing. Other shareholders, however, prefer an “analysis” approach and we want to supply the information they need. In our own investing, we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer.

对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人，很抱歉耽误各位的时间，我很清楚你们当中有很多根本不会仔细去看数字，但却仍持续支持我们，因为你们知道：(1)查理跟我本身的身家也都在里面；(2)我们绝对会与各位同甘共苦；(3)到目前为止先前的记录还算令人满意。事实上这种信仰式的投资方法并没有什么不好，但也有一些股东比较喜欢深入分析的方式，因此我们也有必要提供足够的信息给他们，至于伯克希尔本身在做投资时，则是两种方法并用，重点在于能不能得到满意的答案。

Sources of Reported Earnings 报告收益的来源

In addition to supplying you with our new four-sector accounting material, we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings just as we have in the past.

除了提供给各位最新四个部门的会计资料，我们一如往常还是会提列出伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源。

In the following table, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I’ve explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation, which makes purchase-price adjustments on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.

下表的商誉摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各业务的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响。过去我一再地强调，较之GAAP我们认为这样的表达方式更有帮助，不管是对投资者或是管理层来说，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经审计的GAAP数字一致。

Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 32-34, and in the Management’s Discussion section on pages 36-40. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco’s businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger’s letter, which starts on page 52. It contains the best description I have seen of the events that produced the present savings-and-loan crisis. Also, take special note of Dave Hillstrom’s performance at Precision Steel Warehouse, a Wesco subsidiary. Precision operates in an extremely competitive industry, yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested capital. Though data is lacking to prove the point, I think it is likely that his performance, both in 1988 and years past, would rank him number one among his peers.

年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可以看看查理·芒格所写的年报，里头包含我看过对储贷机构危机事件写得最贴切的一篇文章，另外也可以顺便看看精密钢铁厂，这家Wesco在1979年购买的子公司，其所处的产业竞争相当激烈，但经理人戴夫·希尔斯特罗姆(Dave Hillstrom)仍然努力创造出相当不错的绩效，虽然手头上缺乏资料来证明，但我相信他的表现绝对在同行中排第一。

||Pre-Tax Earnings
税前收益|Pre-Tax Earnings
税前收益|Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)
税后收益(伯克希尔应占)|Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests)
税后收益(伯克希尔应占) ---|---:|---:|---:|---: (000s omitted)|1988|1987|1988|1987 Operating Earnings
经营收益:|  Insurance Group
 保险集团:|   Underwriting
  承保收益|$(11,081)|$ (55,429)|$(1,045)|$ (20,696)   Net investment income
  净投资收益|231,250|152,483|197,779|136,658  Buffalo News
 布法罗新闻|42,429|39,410|25,462|21,304  Fechheimer
 费区海默制服|14,152|13,332|7,720|6,580  Kirby
 柯比吸尘器|26,891|22,408|17,842|12,891  Nebraska Furniture Mart
 内布拉斯家具城|18,439|16,837|9,099|7,554  Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group
 斯科特·费策尔制造集团|28,542|30,591|17,640|17,555  See’s Candies
 喜诗糖果|32,473|31,693|19,671|17,363  Wesco - other than insurance
 西科金融-保险除外|16,133|6,209|10,650|4,978  World Book
 世界图书|27,890|25,745|18,021|15,136  Amortization of Goodwill
 商誉摊销|(2,806)|(2,862)|(2,806)|(2,862)  Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges
 购买法会计-其他费用|(6,342)|(5,546)|(7,340)|(6,544)  Interest on Debt
 利息费用*|(35,613)|(11,474)|(23,212)|(5,905)  Shareholder-Designated Contributions
 股东指定捐赠|(4,966)|(4,938)|(3,217)|(2,963)  Other
 其他|41,059|23,217|27,177|13,697 || Operating Earnings
经营收益合计|418,450|281,676|313,441|214,746 Sales of Securities
出售资产和已实现证券收益|131,671|28,838|85,829|19,806 || Total Earnings - all entities
所有实体-收益合计|$550,121|$ 310,514|$399,270|$ 234,552

* Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group.

* 债务利息科目不包含斯科特费泽金融的利息费用

The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb, whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their competitors. For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them.

我们旗下各项营运业务所创造的收益，不管是依绝对值或是与同业相较，实在是相当出色，对此我们衷心感谢这些辛苦的经理人，你我应该感到庆幸能与他们一起共事。

At Berkshire, associations like these last a long time. We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age - whether the traditional 65, or the 95 reached by Mrs. B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988. Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles. Moreover, our experience with newly-minted MBAs has not been that great. Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal commitment to the company and general business savvy. It’s difficult to teach a new dog old tricks.

在伯克希尔，这样的共事关系可以维持相当长久，我们不会因为这些杰出优秀的明星经理人年纪到了一定程度就把他们给换掉，不管是65岁或是B夫人在1988年所打破的95岁上限，明星的经理人绝对是可遇不可求的稀罕宝贝，不能仅仅因为蛋糕上插满了蜡烛(年纪太大)就被丢弃。相较之下，我们对于新培养的MBA企管硕士的评价就没有那么高了，他们的学术经历看起来总是很吓人，讲起话来头头是道，但他们个人往往缺乏对公司的全情投入和普遍的商业常识。实在是很难去教菜狗那套老把戏。

Here’s an update on our major non-insurance operations:

以下是我们非保险业务的最新运营情况：

Nebraska Furniture Mart 内布拉斯家具城

At Nebraska Furniture Mart, Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin) and her cart roll on and on. She’s been the boss for 51 years, having started the business at 44 with $500.(Thinkwhatshewouldhavedonewith$1,000!) With Mrs. B, old age will always be ten years away.

在内布拉斯加家具店，B夫人坐着她的轮椅继续前进。自从44岁那年以500块美金开始创业，至今已有51个年头，(要是当初有1,000块的话，现在可能更不得了)，对于B夫人来说，就是再多十岁也不嫌老。

The Mart, long the largest home furnishings store in the country, continues to grow. In the fall, the store opened a detached 20,000 square foot Clearance Center, which expands our ability to offer bargains in all price ranges.

这家长期以来全美最大的家具店到现在还在持续成长，去年秋天，又新开了一家占地20,000平方英呎的独立折扣店，让我们的产品线在各种价格都应有尽有。

Recently Dillard’s, one of the most successful department store operations in the country, entered the Omaha market. In many of its stores, Dillard’s runs a full furniture department, undoubtedly doing well in this line. Shortly before opening in Omaha, however, William Dillard, chairman of the company, announced that his new store would not sell furniture. Said he, referring to NFM: “We don’t want to compete with them. We think they are about the best there is.”

最近一家在全美地区经营相当成功的狄乐(Dillard)百货公司打算进军奥马哈地区，它在其它主要地区的分店都设有家具部门，事实上他们在这方面也做的相当成功，不过就在其奥马哈分店开幕的前夕，狄乐百货总裁威廉·狄乐先生(William Dillard)却宣布这家分店决定不卖家具，他特别提到内布拉斯加家具店时表示：我们不想和他们竞争，我们认为他们差不多是最好的了。

At the Buffalo News we extol the value of advertising, and our policies at NFM prove that we practice what we preach. Over the past three years NFM has been the largest ROP advertiser in the Omaha World-Herald. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as contrasted to the preprinted-insert kind.) In no other major market, to my knowledge, is a home furnishings operation the leading customer of the newspaper. At times, we also run large ads in papers as far away as Des Moines, Sioux City and Kansas City - always with good results. It truly does pay to advertise, as long as you have something worthwhile to offer.

在布法罗新闻报，我们赞扬广告的价值。我们在内布拉斯加家具店的策略，证明了我们所宣扬的政策确实可行。过去三年来，内布拉斯加家具店是《奥马哈世界先锋报》的最大ROP广告客户，(ROP是指直接印在报纸而非夹报式的广告)，据我所知，除此之外没有一家报纸的主要广告客户是家具商，同时我们也在堪萨斯等地区刊登广告，所得到的反应也相当不错。做广告确实是值得的，只要你所要介绍的东西值得推荐。

Mrs. B’s son, Louie, and his boys, Ron and Irv, complete the winning Blumkin team. It’s a joy to work with this family. All its members have character that matches their extraordinary abilities.

B夫人的儿子路易和他的儿子们组成了一支梦幻队伍，跟这个家族一起共事实在是一种享受，所有的成员品格与才能兼备。

The Buffalo News 布法罗新闻

Last year I stated unequivocally that pre-tax margins at The Buffalo News would fall in 1988. That forecast would have proved correct at almost any other newspaper our size or larger. But Stan Lipsey - bless him - has managed to make me look foolish.

去年我曾明确地表示，布法罗新闻报1988年的税前收益一定会下滑，事实证明要不是有Stan Lipsey，结果可能会如我所预测，像其它同规模的报纸同样地下滑，很高兴Stan让我看起来很愚蠢。

Though we increased our prices a bit less than the industry average last year, and though our newsprint costs and wage rates rose in line with industry norms, Stan actually improved margins a tad. No one in the newspaper business has a better managerial record. He has achieved it, furthermore, while running a paper that gives readers an extraordinary amount of news. We believe that our “newshole” percentage - the portion of the paper devoted to news - is bigger than that of any other dominant paper of our size or larger. The percentage was 49.5% in 1988 versus 49.8% in 1987. We are committed to keeping it around 50%, whatever the level or trend of profit margins.

虽然我们去年调涨的价格较同业水准略低，同时印刷与工资成本调整的幅度与同业一致，但Stan还是让毛利率又扩大一些，在报纸业没有其它人可以像他这样有更好的经营绩效，而且还能够让读者得到如此丰富的新闻，我们相信，我们的新闻比率，绝对是同样规模或甚至更大报纸中最高的，1987年是49.8%，1988年是49.5%，不管获利状况如此，我们一定会努力将这个比率维持在50%上下。

Charlie and I have loved the newspaper business since we were youngsters, and we have had great fun with the News in the 12 years since we purchased it. We were fortunate to find Murray Light, a top-flight editor, on the scene when we arrived and he has made us proud of the paper ever since.

查理跟我在年轻的时候就很热爱新闻事业，而买下布法罗新闻报的12年来，让我们渡过许多快乐时光，我们很幸运能够找到像穆雷·莱特(Murray Light)这样杰出的总编辑，让我们一入主布法罗报纸后，便深深引以为傲。

See’s Candies 喜诗糖果

See’s Candies sold a record 25.1 million pounds in 1988. Prospects did not look good at the end of October, but excellent Christmas volume, considerably better than the record set in 1987, turned the tide.

喜诗糖果在1988年总共销售了2,510万磅重的糖果，本来在十月前整个销售前景看起来不太乐观，但拜圣诞节旺季特别旺所致，整个局势跟着扭转。

As we’ve told you before, See’s business continues to become more Christmas-concentrated. In 1988, the Company earned a record 90% of its full-year profits in December: $29millionoutof$32.5 million before tax. (It’s enough to make you believe in Santa Claus.) December’s deluge of business produces a modest seasonal bulge in Berkshire’s corporate earnings. Another small bulge occurs in the first quarter, when most World Book annuals are sold.

就像我们以前告诉各位的，喜诗的糖果旺季越来越向圣诞节集中，1988年12月份税前获利2,900万，占整个年度3,250万的90%，(如此你应该相信圣诞老人真的存在了吧)，12月的旺季使得伯克希尔第四季的收益看起来相当不错，另外第一季度的增长则是因为世界百科全书年度出版，所以也会有一波小高潮。

Charlie and I put Chuck Huggins in charge of See’s about five minutes after we bought the company. Upon reviewing his record, you may wonder what took us so long.

查理跟我是在买下喜诗糖果五分钟之后，决定让Chuck Huggins负责这家公司的管理，在看过他这些年来的绩效之后，你可能会怀疑为何我们要考虑那么久！

Fechheimer 费区海默

At Fechheimer, the Heldmans - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - are the Cincinnati counterparts of the Blumkins. Neither furniture retailing nor uniform manufacturing has inherently attractive economics. In these businesses, only exceptional managements can deliver high returns on invested capital. And that’s exactly what the five Heldmans do. (As Mets announcer Ralph Kiner once said when comparing pitcher Steve Trout to his father, Dizzy Trout, the famous Detroit Tigers pitcher: “There’s a lot of heredity in that family.”)

在费区海默，Heldman’s家族就好象是Blumkin’s家族的辛辛那提版，不管是家具业或者是制服业，在经济上都不是很有吸引力的行业，也只有卓越的管理才能让股东们获得好的投资回报，这正是五位Heldmans家族成员为伯克希尔所作的贡献。（职业棒球大都会队的发言人，Ralph Kiner曾说：比较该队投手SteveTrout与他的父亲DizzyTrout也是底特律老虎队著名投手，你就会发现虎父无犬子。）

Fechheimer made a fairly good-sized acquisition in 1988. Charlie and I have such confidence in the business savvy of the Heldman family that we okayed the deal without even looking at it. There are very few managements anywhere - including those running the top tier companies of the Fortune 500 - in which we would exhibit similar confidence.

费区海默在1988年进行了一项规模颇大的并购案，查理跟我对于他们相当有信心，所以我们连看都没有看就同意了这项交易。很少有管理层能得到我们这样的信任，即便是财富500强企业的管理层。

Because of both this acquisition and some internal growth, sales at Fechheimer should be up significantly in 1989.

因为这项并购案以及内部自身的成长，费区海默1989年的营业额可望大幅成长。

Scott Fetzer 斯科特·费策尔

All of the operations managed by Ralph Schey - World Book, Kirby, and The Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group - performed splendidly in 1988. Returns on the capital entrusted to Ralph continue to be exceptional.

拉尔夫·谢伊(Ralph Schey)管理的所有业务，包含世界图书公司、柯比吸尘器与斯科特费泽制造集团，在1988年的表现皆相当出色，由其管理的资本获得的回报仍然十分出色。

Within the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, particularly fine progress was recorded at its largest unit, Campbell Hausfeld. This company, the country’s leading producer of small and medium-sized air compressors, has more than doubled earnings since 1986.

在斯科特费泽制造集团当中，又以坎贝尔豪斯菲尔德(Campbell Hausfeld)家用器具最突出，这家全美最大的中小型压缩机生产商，从1986年以来，收益已翻倍有余。

Unit sales at both Kirby and World Book were up significantly in 1988, with export business particularly strong. World Book became available in the Soviet Union in September, when that country’s largest American book store opened in Moscow. Ours is the only general encyclopedia offered at the store.

柯比吸尘器与世界百科全书的1988年销售数量都大幅成长，尤其在外销业务更是强劲，9月开始，随着莫斯科当地最大的一家美国书店开幕，世界百科全书在苏联也能买到了，并成为该店唯一在售的一套百科全书。

Ralph’s personal productivity is amazing: In addition to running 19 businesses in superb fashion, he is active at The Cleveland Clinic, Ohio University, Case Western Reserve, and a venture capital operation that has spawned sixteen Ohio-based companies and resurrected many others. Both Ohio and Berkshire are fortunate to have Ralph on their side.

Ralph的个人能力真是惊人，除了同时经营19项业务之外，他还投入相当精力在克里夫兰医院、Ohio大学，凯斯西部储蓄，以及一家风险资本管理公司VC，该公司投出了16家总部位于Ohio的新公司，并复活了许多其它公司。拉尔夫堪称Ohio与伯克希尔之宝。

Borsheim’s 波仙珠宝店

It was in 1983 that Berkshire purchased an 80% interest in The Nebraska Furniture Mart. Your Chairman blundered then by neglecting to ask Mrs. B a question any schoolboy would have thought of: “Are there any more at home like you?” Last month I corrected the error: We are now 80% partners with another branch of the family.

1983年，伯克希尔买下内布拉斯加家具店80%的股权，当时我忘了问B夫人一个连小学生都会想到的问题：“你还有没有其它兄弟姊妹”。上个月我补救了这个错误，现在我们又成为该家族另一个分支的80%股东。

After Mrs. B came over from Russia in 1917, her parents and five siblings followed. (Her two other siblings had preceded her.) Among the sisters was Rebecca Friedman who, with her husband, Louis, escaped in 1922 to the west through Latvia in a journey as perilous as Mrs. B’s earlier odyssey to the east through Manchuria. When the family members reunited in Omaha they had no tangible assets. However, they came equipped with an extraordinary combination of brains, integrity, and enthusiasm for work - and that’s all they needed. They have since proved themselves invincible.

1917年，当B夫人从俄国往东经满州一路逃到美国之后，她的双亲与五位兄弟姊妹也陆续来到美国，其中包括一个姊妹丽贝卡·弗里德曼(Rebecca Friedman)和她的丈夫路易。1922年，他们冒着生命危险往西途经拉脱维亚来到美国。当家族在奥马哈重新团聚时，大家一无所有，然而，只要身具头脑、品格与对工作的热情，一切就已足够，后来证明他们所向无敌。

In 1948 Mr. Friedman purchased Borsheim’s, a small Omaha jewelry store. He was joined in the business by his son, Ike, in 1950 and, as the years went by, Ike’s son, Alan, and his sons-in-law, Marvin Cohn and Donald Yale, came in also.

1948年Friedman先生买下奥马哈地区一家叫波仙的小珠宝店，1950年他的儿子艾克(Ike)也加入进来。随着时间流逝，艾克的儿子艾伦(Alan)和女婿马文·科恩(MarvinCohn)和唐纳德·耶鲁(DonaldYale)也加入了进来。

You won’t be surprised to learn that this family brings to the jewelry business precisely the same approach that the Blumkins bring to the furniture business. The cornerstone for both enterprises is Mrs. B’s creed: “Sell cheap and tell the truth.” Other fundamentals at both businesses are: (1) single store operations featuring huge inventories that provide customers with an enormous selection across all price ranges, (2) daily attention to detail by top management, (3) rapid turnover, (4) shrewd buying, and (5) incredibly low expenses. The combination of the last three factors lets both stores offer everyday prices that no one in the country comes close to matching.

你应该不难预料，这个家族为当地珠宝业所带来的影响与布鲁姆金家族对于家具行业的情况完全类似，两家店共同的信条就是：货真价实，物美价廉。另外，共同的特色还有：(1)单店经营，但货品样式价格种类齐全(无与伦比的广度与深度，SKU10万+)，满足消费者各式需求；(2)管理层对细节的日常专注(Retail is Details，家族式管理和个性化服务)；(3)货品周转快速；(4)精明的采购；(5)令人难以置信的低运营成本。后面三项特点的结合，让店内产品的售价比全美其它地方都卖的便宜。

Most people, no matter how sophisticated they are in other matters, feel like babes in the woods when purchasing jewelry. They can judge neither quality nor price. For them only one rule makes sense: If you don’t know jewelry, know the jeweler.

大部分的人们不管在其它事情上多么学有专精，但是遇到买珠宝首饰时，就像是迷失在森林里的小孩子，什么都不懂，不会判断东西的品质好坏与价格高低。对这些人来说，只要记住一条，不懂珠宝没有关系，只要认准珠宝商就好。

I can assure you that those who put their trust in Ike Friedman and his family will never be disappointed. The way in which we purchased our interest in their business is the ultimate testimonial. Borsheim’s had no audited financial statements; nevertheless, we didn’t take inventory, verify receivables or audit the operation in any way. Ike simply told us what was so — and on that basis we drew up a one-page contract and wrote a large check.

我敢保证，那些信任Friedman家族的人永远不会失望。我们购买波仙股权的方式就是最好的证明，波仙没有经过审计的财务报告，我们也没有盘点存货、查验应收帐款或是做任何方式的审计。艾克只是简单地告诉我们如何如何，于是双方就草拟了一页简单的合约，并由我们开出一大笔金额的支票。

Business at Borsheim’s has mushroomed in recent years as the reputation of the Friedman family has spread. Customers now come to the store from all over the country. Among them have been some friends of mine from both coasts who thanked me later for getting them there.

随着Friedman家族声誉的远播，近年来波仙珠宝的生意越做越大，客户从美国各地远道而来，其中也包含我一些从东西两岸来的朋友，他们也都很感谢我能带他们去参观波仙珠宝。

Borsheim’s new links to Berkshire will change nothing in the way this business is run. All members of the Friedman family will continue to operate just as they have before; Charlie and I will stay on the sidelines where we belong. And when we say “all members,” the words have real meaning. Mr. and Mrs. Friedman, at 88 and 87, respectively, are in the store daily. The wives of Ike, Alan, Marvin and Donald all pitch in at busy times, and a fourth generation is beginning to learn the ropes.

波仙珠宝的营运模式并不会因为伯克希尔的加入而有所改变，弗里德曼家族成员仍将像以前一样持续在各自的岗位上奋斗。查理跟我会站在旁边默默支持，事实上所有的成员包含高龄88岁与87岁的老先生和夫人，仍然每天到店里工作，其它儿子媳妇也是从早忙到晚，家族的第四代已正准备开始学习接班。

It is great fun to be in business with people you have long admired. The Friedmans, like the Blumkins, have achieved success because they have deserved success. Both families focus on what’s right for the customer and that, inevitably, works out well for them, also. We couldn’t have better partners.

跟你所长期钦佩的人一起共事，实在是人生一大乐事。弗里德曼家族和布鲁姆金家族一样，他们的成功实至名归。两个家族都坚持在做对客户有益的事，同时对他们自己也有很大的益处。他们是我们最好的事业伙伴。

Insurance Operations 保险业务

Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the insurance industry:

下表是有关保险业务的几项主要数据更新

Year
年度|Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%)
保费收入增长率|Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends
综合比率|Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%)
损失赔付增长率|Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%)
通货膨胀率 ---|---|---|---|--- 1981|3.8|106.0|6.5|9.6 1982|3.7|109.6|8.4|6.4 1983|5.0|112.0|6.8|3.8 1984|8.5|118.0|16.9|3.7 1985|22.1|116.3|16.1|3.2 1986|22.2|108.0|13.5|2.7 1987|9.4|104.6|7.8|3.3 1988 (Est.)|3.9|105.4|4.2|3.6

Source: A.M. Best Co.

资料来源：贝氏评级公司

The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding on to policyholders’ funds (“the float”) is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall break-even result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.

综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承保盈利，100以上代表会有承保损失，若把持有保费收入所产生的浮存金(扣除股东权益部分所产生的收益)所产生的投资收益列入考量，盈亏平衡点的范围大概是在107-111之间。

For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry’s incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry’s tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time. As the table shows, the industry’s underwriting loss grew in 1988. This trend is almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years.

基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增长的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入增长没有到达10%以上，亏损一定会扩大。虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来，如表所示，1988年行业整体的承保亏损有所增加，而这个趋势应该会继续持续下去，甚至在未来两年还会加速恶化。

The property-casualty insurance industry is not only subnormally profitable, it is subnormally popular. (As Sam Goldwyn philosophized: “In life, one must learn to take the bitter with the sour.”) One of the ironies of business is that many relatively-unprofitable industries that are plagued by inadequate prices habitually find themselves beat upon by irate customers even while other, hugely profitable industries are spared complaints, no matter how high their prices.

产险业的获利情况不但是相当的低，而且也是不太受尊重的行业，(山姆戈德温(Samuel Goldwyn)曾颇具哲理地说过：生活中必须学会体验人生的苦痛酸涩)。商业中的一大讽刺是：许多行业做的要死要活的同时，还要被客户糟蹋；而有些赚翻了的行业，东西明明贵的要死，却是一个愿打一个愿挨。

Take the breakfast cereal industry, whose return on invested capital is more than double that of the auto insurance industry (which is why companies like Kellogg and General Mills sell at five times book value and most large insurers sell close to book). The cereal companies regularly impose price increases, few of them related to a significant jump in their costs. Yet not a peep is heard from consumers. But when auto insurers raise prices by amounts that do not even match cost increases, customers are outraged. If you want to be loved, it’s clearly better to sell high-priced corn flakes than low-priced auto insurance.

以早餐麦片为例，它的投入资本回报率是汽车保险业的两倍多(这也是为什么家乐氏与通用磨坊的市净率是五倍，而大多数保险业者的市净率仅为一倍)，麦片公司常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变化，但消费者却没什么抱怨。但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是为了反映成本而稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，显然去卖高价的玉米片比卖低价的汽车保险，要好得多。

The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences: Proposition 103, a California initiative passed last fall, threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply, even though costs have been soaring. The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative, but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended: Even if the initiative is overturned, insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California. (Thank heavens the citizenry isn’t mad at bonbons: If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance, See’s would be forced to sell its product for $5.76perpound.ratherthanthe$7.60 we charge - and would be losing money by the bucketful.)

一般大众对于保险业的敌视可能会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项103提案可能会大幅压低保险价格，尽管成本一再飙升，所幸法院正在重新检视这项提案，但这次投票所引发的不满情绪却未曾消减，即使提案被推翻，保险业者在加州已很难再有营运获利的空间，(谢天谢地，加州人还没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，若是103提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜诗可能被迫卖每磅5.76元而不是现在的每磅7.6元，果真如此，喜诗可能就要亏大钱了)。

The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor, since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote. However, the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO, our 44%-owned investee, which gets about 10% of its premium volume from California. Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states, through either initiatives or legislation.

对伯克希尔来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接影响到我们持有44%股权的GEICO保险，其有10%的保费收入系来自加州。对GEICO更具威胁的是，其它州可能会通过提案或是立法的方式也采取类似的行动。

If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost, it eventually must be sold by government. Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period, but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term. At most property-casualty companies, socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders. Because of the commodity characteristics of the industry, most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business. But GEICO, because it is a low-cost producer able to earn high returns on equity, has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk. In turn, so do we.

若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府来直接负责，股东或可暂时补贴保户，但只有纳税人可以长期补贴他们。对大部分的财产意外险公司来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这个产业是属于大众商品，保险业者所赚的投资回报平平，所以，若因此被政府强迫退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失。但GEICO保险就不一样了，由于它的成本低，相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影响到我们。

At Berkshire, in 1988, our premium volume continued to fall, and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason: The contract through which we receive 7% of the business of Fireman’s Fund expires on August 31. At that time, we will return to Fireman’s Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract. This transfer of funds will show up in our “premiums written” account as a negative $85 million or so and will make our third-quarter figures look rather peculiar. However, the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits.

在1988年伯克希尔的保费收入持续减少，到了1989年我们预期保费收入还会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防员退休基金7%的份额业务即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额8,500万美元，这将使得我们第三季度的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然合同结束不会对利润造成太大的影响。

Berkshire’s underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988. Our combined ratio (on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance) was 104. Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row, after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory. Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36-38.

伯克希尔1988年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率约104%(依照法定基础扣除结构化结算与金融再保)，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况还算良好。

Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low, since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce. So be it. At Berkshire, we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss. We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain.

我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在伯克希尔我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们的麻烦够多了。

Despite - or perhaps because of - low volume, our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry’s. We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume, and that augurs well for profits. In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty company. Mike Goldberg, with special help from Ajit Jain, Dinos Iordanou, and the National Indemnity managerial team, has positioned us well in that respect.

尽管(也或许正因为如此)我们的保单量少，可以预期我们的获利情况在未来几年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，这对利润来说是个好兆头。在1989-1990年，我们的浮存金/保费收入比例至少会是同业水准的三倍以上，迈克·戈德伯格(Mike Goldberg)在阿吉特·贾恩(Ajit Jain)、迪诺斯·罗达瑙(Dinos Iordanou)和国民保险的经营团队的协助下使我们站在相当有利的位置。

At some point - we don’t know when - we will be deluged with insurance business. The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe. But we could also experience an explosion in business, as we did in 1985, because large and increasing underwriting losses at other companies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved. in the meantime, we will retain our talented professionals, protect our capital, and try not to make major mistakes.

某些时候(我们不知道什么时候)我们可能会被保险业务拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的自然或金融灾难，但我们也有可能会经历像1985年一样爆炸式增长，因为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会留住优秀的人才，保护好资本并尽量避免犯下重大的错误。

Marketable Securities 有价证券

In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we can choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed-income securities, (3) long-term fixed-income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.

在为我们的保险业务选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择(1)长期股票投资(2)长期固定收益[Bonds|债券]中期固定收益[Bonds|债券]短期现金等价物(5)短期套利交易。

We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories. We just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by “mathematical expectation,” limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.

对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找，最高的税后回报率预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解和熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的报告收益好看，我们的目标是让长期的账面价值极大化。

Long-term Common Stock Investments 普通股投资

Below we list our common stock holdings having a value over $100 million, not including arbitrage commitments, which will be discussed later. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.

下表是我们市值超过1亿美元以上的普通股投资(不包括套利交易，这部分我们后面再谈)，一部分投资属于伯克希尔关系企业所持有。

No of Shares 股份数量	Company 公司名称	Cost 成本(000s omitted)	Market 市值(000s omitted)
3,000,000	Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.大都会/美国广播公司	$ 517,500	$ 1,086,750
14,172,500	The Coca-Cola Company[[Coca_Cola	可口可乐]]	592,540
2,400,000	Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Preferred联邦住房抵押贷款公司（简称“[[Freddie_Mac	房地美]]”）*	71,729
6,850,000	GEICO Corporation政府雇员保险公司（简称“[[GEICO	盖可保险]]”）	45,713
1,727,765	The Washington Post Company[[Washington_Post	华盛顿邮报]]	9,731

* Although nominally a preferred stock, this security is financially equivalent to a common stock.

* （翻译缺失……）

Our permanent holdings - Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., GEICO Corporation, and The Washington Post Company - remain unchanged. Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements: Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities, Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO, and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post. Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses.

我们永久的持股，大都会/ABC、GEICO保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是大都会/ABC的汤姆·墨菲与丹·伯克、GEICO保险的比尔·斯奈德(Bill Snyder)和路易·辛普森(Lou Simpson)，还有华盛顿邮报的凯瑟琳·格雷厄姆与迪克·西蒙斯(Dick Simmons)，查理跟我对于他们所展现的才能与品格同感敬佩。

Their performance, which we have observed at close range, contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs, which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance. Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs; their positions, nevertheless, are usually secure. The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate.

他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的CEO截然不同，所幸我们能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些CEO实在是不胜任，但却总是能够坐稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不称职的老板要比不称职的下属更容易保住其位置。

If a secretary, say, is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute, she will lose her job in no time. There is a logical standard for this job; performance is easily measured; and if you can’t make the grade, you’re out. Similarly, if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough, they will be let go. Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders.

假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打80个字，但录取之后被发现一分钟只能打50个字，很快地她就可能会被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务员，若是不能马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就被解雇，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发生。

However, a CEO who doesn’t perform is frequently carried indefinitely. One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist. When they do, they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away, even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated. At too many companies, the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands.

但是一个CEO表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是能含混解释过去，即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板先射出业绩之箭，再到墙上把准心描上去。

Another important, but seldom recognized, distinction between the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured. The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself. It is in his immediate self-interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes. Otherwise, he himself may be weeded out. An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative.

另外一个很重要但却很少被提起的老板与员工之间的差别是，老板本身没有一个直接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。

But the CEO’s boss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance. If the Board makes a mistake in hiring, and perpetuates that mistake, so what? Even if the company is taken over because of the mistake, the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members. (The bigger they are, the softer they fall.)

但CEO的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益(且通常公司越大，甜头越多)。

Finally, relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial. At board meetings, criticism of the CEO’s performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching. No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist.

最后董事会与CEO之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于CEO表现的批评就好象是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。

These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors: Most are able and hard-working, and a number are truly outstanding. But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings. They love their businesses, they think like owners, and they exude integrity and ability.

以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的CEO或是董事会都相当努力、能干，有一小部分更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。

“Freddie Mac” and Coca Cola “房地美”和可口可乐

In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd. (“Freddie Mac”) and Coca Cola. We expect to hold these securities for a long time. In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever. We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds. Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law, and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter. In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market, since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan, a non-insurance subsidiary.

1988年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进房地美与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间。事实上当我们发现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利，却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林奇曾生动地将这种行为解释成铲除花朵浇灌野草。我们持有房利美的股份比例是法令规定的上限，这部分查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是Wesco子公司旗下互助储贷所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列示。

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way. We agree with Mae West: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”

我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，我们长期坚信的企业只有少数几家¹，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与程度，我们同意Mae West的看法：好东西当然是多多益善。

Medium-term Fixed-income Securities 中期固定收益证券

We reduced our holdings of medium-term tax-exempt bonds by about $100 million last year. All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7, 1986. When such bonds are held by property-casualty insurance companies, 15% of the “tax-exempt” interest earned is subject to tax.

去年我们中期免税债券投资减少了约一亿美元，所有卖出的债券都是在1986年8月7日之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中15%的利息收入是要课税的。

The $800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds “grandfathered” under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which means they are entirely tax-exempt. Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds, which have an average maturity of about six years, are worth modestly more than carrying value.

剩下我们仍持有约8亿美元的债券，都是属于适用1986年租税改革法案完全免税的祖父级债券，出售的债券将有些许的获利，而继续持有的债券平均到期日大概是六年，其市价大概略高于帐面价值。

Last year we described our holdings of short-term and intermediate-term bonds of Texaco, which was then in bankruptcy. During 1988, we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre-tax profit of about $22million.Thissaleexplainscloseto$100 million of the reduction in fixed-income securities on our balance sheet.

去年我们曾提及我们所持有的已破产的Texaco石油短期与中期公司债券，1988年我们已经将所有头寸处分了，获利约2200万美元，此举将使得我们在固定收益债券的投资部位减少1亿美元。

We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed-income issue: our $700 million position in Salomon Inc 9% convertible preferred. This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999. Berkshire carries this holding at cost. For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69, the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end.

去年我们还提到了另外一个深具固定收益特色的投资：亦即所罗门公司9%可转换优先股，这种特别股特别要求公司提拨偿债基金，自1995年到1999年间分批赎回，伯克希尔将这些投资以成本列示在帐上，基于查理所提的原因，现在的估计市价以从前一年度略低于成本，转变为1988年的略高于成本。

The close association we have had with John Gutfreund, CEO of Salomon, during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him. But we continue to have no great insights about the near, intermediate or long-term economics of the investment banking business: This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability. We continue to believe that our conversion privilege could well have important value over the life of our preferred. However, the overwhelming portion of the preferred’s value resides in its fixed-income characteristics, not its equity characteristics.

我们与所罗门CEO约翰·古弗兰(John Gutfreund)之间良好的关系，随着几年来的合作日益增进，但我们还是无法判断投资银行业的前景，不管是短期、中期或是长期皆然，这是一个难以预估未来获利水平的产业，我们仍然相信我们所拥有的转换权益会在其有效期内，对我们产生相当大的贡献，然而这种特别股的价值主要还是来自于其固定收益，而不是股权特性之上。

Long-term Fixed-income Securities 长期固定收益证券

We have not lost our aversion to long-term bonds. We will become enthused about such securities only when we become enthused about prospects for long-term stability in the purchasing power of money. And that kind of stability isn’t in the cards: Both society and elected officials simply have too many higher-ranking priorities that conflict with purchasing-power stability. The only long-term bonds we hold are those of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS). A few of our WPPSS bonds have short maturities and many others, because of their high coupons, are likely to be refunded and paid off in a few years. Overall, our WPPSS holdings are carried on our balance sheet at $247millionandhaveamarketvalueofabout$352 million.

我们对于长期债券的规避依旧不变，唯有当我们对于货币的长期购买力有信心时，我们才会对这类的债券有兴趣，但这种稳定性却根本没办法预期，因为不管是社会或是选出来的官员，实在是有太多的优先事项是与购买力的稳定性相冲突的。所以目前我们唯一持有的长期债券就是华盛顿公用电力供应系统WPPSS，其中有些期限较短，有一些则是分几年赎回的高息票，目前资产负债表上帐列成本为2.47亿美元，目前市价约为3.52亿美元。

We explained the reasons for our WPPSS purchases in the 1983 annual report, and are pleased to tell you that this commitment has worked out about as expected. At the time of purchase, most of our bonds were yielding around 17% after taxes and carried no ratings, which had been suspended. Recently, the bonds were rated AA- by Standard & Poor’s. They now sell at levels only slightly below those enjoyed by top-grade credits.

我们在1983年年报中曾经解释过购买WPPSS的理由，现在很高兴跟大家报告，结果完全符合我们当初的预期，在买进的时候，债券的评级被暂时取消，估计税后的投资回报率约为17%，最近它被标普评为AA-等级，按目前的市价大概只有比最高等级债券的投资回报好一点。

In the 1983 report, we compared the economics of our WPPSS purchase to those involved in buying a business. As it turned out, this purchase actually worked out better than did the general run of business acquisitions made in 1983, assuming both are measured on the basis of unleveraged, after tax returns achieved through 1988.

在1983年的年报中，我们比较了投资WPPSS与一般企业的差异，结果显示这次的投资要比当时同期间所从事并购案还要好，假设两者皆以为无财务杠杆的基础下进行。

Our WPPSS experience, though pleasant, does nothing to alter our negative opinion about long-term bonds. It only makes us hope that we run into some other large stigmatized issue, whose troubles have caused it to be significantly misappraised by the market.

不过我们在WPPSS的愉快经历并未能改变我们对于长期债券的负面看法，除非再让我们碰到暂时僵住的大案子，因为短暂的问题使得其市价严重的被低估。

Arbitrage 套利

In past reports we have told you that our insurance subsidiaries sometimes engage in arbitrage as an alternative to holding short-term cash equivalents. We prefer, of course, to make major long-term commitments, but we often have more cash than good ideas. At such times, arbitrage sometimes promises much greater returns than Treasury Bills and, equally important, cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments. (Charlie’s sign off after we’ve talked about an arbitrage commitment is usually: “Okay, at least it will keep you out of bars.”)

在过去的报告中我曾经告诉各位，保险子公司有时也会从事套利的操作，以作为短期资金的替代方案，当然我们比较喜欢长期的投入，但可惜资金总是多过于点子，与此同时，套利的报酬有时会好过于政府债券，同时很重要的一点是，可以冷却任何我们放松长期投资标准的诱惑²，(每次在我们谈完套利投资之后，查理总是会附带一句：这样也好，至少能让你暂时远离喧闹的市场)³

During 1988 we made unusually large profits from arbitrage, measured both by absolute dollars and rate of return. Our pre-tax gain was about $78milliononaverageinvestedfundsofabout$147 million.

在1988年我们在套利部分斩获不少，不论是金额或是投资回报率，总计投入1.47亿美元的资金，赚取7,800万美元。

This level of activity makes some detailed discussion of arbitrage and our approach to it appropriate. Once, the word applied only to the simultaneous purchase and sale of securities or foreign exchange in two different markets. The goal was to exploit tiny price differentials that might exist between, say, Royal Dutch stock trading in guilders in Amsterdam, pounds in London, and dollars in New York. Some people might call this scalping; it won’t surprise you that practitioners opted for the French term, arbitrage.

如此的成绩使我们值得详细的描述一下，所谓的套利是指在不同的市场同时买卖相同的有价证券或是外汇，目的是为了撷取两者之间微小的差距，例如阿姆斯特丹的荷兰币、英国的英镑或是纽约的美元，有些人将此行为称之为剃头皮，但通常这一行的人惯用法国的字汇-套利。

Since World War I the definition of arbitrage - or “risk arbitrage,” as it is now sometimes called - has expanded to include the pursuit of profits from an announced corporate event such as sale of the company, merger, recapitalization, reorganization, liquidation, self-tender, etc. In most cases the arbitrageur expects to profit regardless of the behavior of the stock market. The major risk he usually faces instead is that the announced event won’t happen.

自从第一次世界大战之后，套利或者说风险套利的定义，已延伸包括从已公开的企业并购、重组、清算等企业活动事件中获利。大部分的情况下，套利者期望不管股市变动如何皆能获利，相对的他面临的主要风险是宣布的事件未如预期般发生。

Some offbeat opportunities occasionally arise in the arbitrage field. I participated in one of these when I was 24 and working in New York for Graham-Newman Corp. Rockwood & Co., a Brooklyn based chocolate products company of limited profitability, had adopted LIFO inventory valuation in 1941 when cocoa was selling for 5¢ per pound. In 1954 a temporary shortage of cocoa caused the price to soar to over 60¢. Consequently Rockwood wished to unload its valuable inventory - quickly, before the price dropped. But if the cocoa had simply been sold off, the company would have owed close to a 50% tax on the proceeds.

在套利领域中，有时候会冒出一些不同寻常的机会。我24岁那年，当时我在纽约的格雷厄姆-纽曼公司（Graham-Newman Corp.）工作，就曾参与过这么一次特殊的套利机会。布鲁克林有家名叫洛克伍德（Rockwood & Co.）的巧克力公司，赚的钱不多，早在1941年就采用了LIFO（后进先出）方式来计算库存成本。那时候，可可的价格只有每磅5美分。可到了1954年，市场上可可一度短缺，价格猛涨到了60美分以上。眼看库存含金量高了，洛克伍德急着趁高价把库存卖出去，好在行情回落前落袋为安。但问题来了，如果他们直接出售这些可可，就得把近一半的收入交给税务局，税负接近50%。

The 1954 Tax Code came to the rescue. It contained an arcane provision that eliminated the tax otherwise due on LIFO profits if inventory was distributed to shareholders as part of a plan reducing the scope of a corporation’s business. Rockwood decided to terminate one of its businesses, the sale of cocoa butter, and said 13 million pounds of its cocoa bean inventory was attributable to that activity. Accordingly, the company offered to repurchase its stock in exchange for the cocoa beans it no longer needed, paying 80 pounds of beans for each share.

但1954的税务法令及时公布，其中有一项不太为人知的规定，就是如果企业不是把这些存货卖掉而是直接分配给股东间接减少营运规模的话，就可以免税，因此，洛克伍德决定停止其可可脂的销售业务，并将1,300万磅的可可豆发还给股东，同时公司也愿意以可可豆换买回部分股份，换算下来，每股可以换得80磅的可可豆。

For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.

有好几个礼拜我整天忙着买进股票、换可可豆，再把可可豆拿去卖，并常常跑到施罗德信托公司拿着股票凭证换取仓库保管单，获利算下来还不错，而唯一的成本费用就是地铁车票。

The architect of Rockwood’s restructuring was an unknown, but brilliant Chicagoan, Jay Pritzker, then 32. If you’re familiar with Jay’s subsequent record, you won’t be surprised to hear the action worked out rather well for Rockwood’s continuing shareholders also. From shortly before the tender until shortly after it, Rockwood stock appreciated from 15 to 100, even though the company was experiencing large operating losses. Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

洛克伍德改造计划的规划者是32岁没有名气但相当优秀的芝加哥人杰伊·普利兹克(Jay Pritzker)，若你知道杰伊后来的记录，你应该就不会讶异这个动作对于公司股东有多大的益处了，在这项提议推出不久之后，虽然公司营运呈现亏损，但股价却从15美元涨到100美元，有时候，股票估值不仅仅是市盈率（这么简单）。⁴

In recent years, most arbitrage operations have involved takeovers, friendly and unfriendly. With acquisition fever rampant, with anti-trust challenges almost non-existent, and with bids often ratcheting upward, arbitrageurs have prospered mightily. They have not needed special talents to do well; the trick, a la Peter Sellers in the movie, has simply been “Being There.” In Wall Street the old proverb has been reworded: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach him how to arbitrage and you feed him forever.” (If, however, he studied at the Ivan Boesky School of Arbitrage, it may be a state institution that supplies his meals.)

近几年来，大部分的套利操作都牵涉到并购案，不管是友善的或是敌意的皆然，在并购案狂热之时，几乎感觉不到反垄断法的存在，投标的竞价屡创天价，在当时套利客大行其道，在这行不需要太多的才能，唯一的技巧就像是皮特·塞勒斯(Peter Sellers)的电影那样，只需要在场即可，华尔街有一句经过改编的俗话，给一个人一条鱼，你只能养活他一天，教他如何套利，却可以养活他一辈子，(当然要是他到学校学习套利，可能就要靠州政府过活了)。

To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire - a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?

在评估套利活动时，你必须要能回答四个问题：(1)已公布的事件有多少可能性确实会发生？(2)你的资金会被占用多久⁵？(3)有多少可能更好的结果会发生，例如并购竞价提高；(4)如果由于反垄断诉讼、融资故障等原因事件没有发生，会发生什么？⁶

Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences, illustrates the twists and turns of the business. On September 28, 1981 the directors of Arcata agreed in principle to sell the company to Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. (KKR), then and now a major leveraged-buy out firm. Arcata was in the printing and forest products businesses and had one other thing going for it: In 1978 the U.S. Government had taken title to 10,700 acres of Arcata timber, primarily old-growth redwood, to expand Redwood National Park. The government had paid $97.9 million, in several installments, for this acreage, a sum Arcata was contesting as grossly inadequate. The parties also disputed the interest rate that should apply to the period between the taking of the property and final payment for it. The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.

Arcata公司就是我们比较偶然发现的套利交易之一⁷，能说明这种交易的曲曲折折。1981年9月28日，Arcata的董事同意将公司卖给KKR公司，KKR在当时同时也是现在一家主要的杠杆收购公司⁸。Arcata所从事的是印刷与森林产品，但其中值得注意的是，在1978年美国政府决定征收该公司所有10700英亩⁹的红木林，以扩增国家公园的范围，为此政府决定分期支付该公司总金额9790万美元的征收款，但Arcata公司却认为金额太少，双方还对财产被占用到最终付款的期间利率存在争议。征收法规定为6%的单利；Arcata公司主张采用高得多的复合利率。¹⁰

Buying a company with a highly-speculative, large-sized claim in litigation creates a negotiating problem, whether the claim is on behalf of or against the company. To solve this problem, KKR offered $37.00 per Arcata share plus two-thirds of any additional amounts paid by the government for the redwood lands.

买下这样一家诉讼中的公司具有高度投机性，将会在诉讼过程中增加许多的难度，不管诉讼案件是不利或是有利于公司皆然，为了化解这个难题，KKR决定支付Arcata每股37美元再加上政府额外赔偿款的三分之二，作为并购的条件。

Appraising this arbitrage opportunity, we had to ask ourselves whether KKR would consummate the transaction since, among other things, its offer was contingent upon its obtaining “satisfactory financing.” A clause of this kind is always dangerous for the seller: It offers an easy exit for a suitor whose ardor fades between proposal and marriage. However, we were not particularly worried about this possibility because KKR’s past record for closing had been good.

评估这一投资机会，我们必须自问，KKR能否真正完成这项交易？其关键在于他们是否能够顺利取得融资，这对卖方来说永远是风险最高的一项条款，追求者在提出求婚到正式结婚的这段期间，反悔是很容易的一件事，不过在这个案子我们却不太担心，原因在于KKR过去的记录还算不错。

We also had to ask ourselves what would happen if the KKR deal did fall through, and here we also felt reasonably comfortable: Arcata’s management and directors had been shopping the company for some time and were clearly determined to sell. If KKR went away, Arcata would likely find another buyer, though of course, the price might be lower.

我们还必须扪心自问，若是KKR真的失败会如何？在这点我们觉得还好，Arcata的董事会与管理层已经在外兜售好一段时间了，显示该公司却有决心要出售，如果KKR跑掉，Arcata一定还会再找新的买主，当然届时的价格可能会差一点。

Finally, we had to ask ourselves what the redwood claim might be worth. Your Chairman, who can’t tell an elm from an oak, had no trouble with that one: He coolly evaluated the claim at somewhere between zero and a whole lot.

最后我们还必须问自己，那块红木林的价值到底有多少？坦白说我虽然个人连榆树跟橡木都分不出来，但对于这个问题我的处理方式倒很简单，反正就是介于零到一大笔钱之间就对了。

We started buying Arcata stock, then around $33.50,onSeptember30andineightweekspurchasedabout400,000shares,or5$37.00 would be paid in January, 1982. Therefore, if everything had gone perfectly, we would have achieved an annual rate of return of about 40% - not counting the redwood claim, which would have been frosting.

后来我们开始从九月开始以每股33.5元买进Arcata股票，2个月总共买进40万股，约占该公司5%的股权，第一次对外公告，股东每股可以拿到37元，将在1982年1月支付。换算年投资报酬约为40%，这还不包含原本一直冻结的红木林所有权。

All did not go perfectly. In December it was announced that the closing would be delayed a bit. Nevertheless, a definitive agreement was signed on January 4. Encouraged, we raised our stake, buying at around $38.00 per share and increasing our holdings to 655,000 shares, or over 7% of the company. Our willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been postponed - reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.

然而过程不太顺利，到了12月宣布，交易可能会延后，尽管如此，1月4日正式签约了。受到这项鼓励，我们决定再加码以38元每股至65.5万股，约7%的股权。我们愿意支付（这个价格）——尽管交易完成时间已被推迟——这反映了我们对于红木林的价值更倾向于“相当多” 而不是“零”。¹¹

Then, on February 25 the lenders said they were taking a “second look” at financing terms “ in view of the severely depressed housing industry and its impact on Arcata’s outlook.” The stockholders’ meeting was postponed again, to April. An Arcata spokesman said he “did not think the fate of the acquisition itself was imperiled.” When arbitrageurs hear such reassurances, their minds flash to the old saying: “He lied like a finance minister on the eve of devaluation.”

接着在2月25日，融资银行说有鉴于房地产景气不佳，连带对Arcata的前景可能有所疑虑，故有关融资条件可能还要再谈，股东大会也因此再度延期到4月，同时Arcata公司发言人表示他不认为并购案已触礁。但是当套利客听到这种保证时，脑中便闪过一句老话：他说谎的方式就象是汇率崩盘前夕的财政部长一样。

On March 12 KKR said its earlier deal wouldn’t work, first cutting its offer to $33.50,thentwodayslaterraisingitto$35.00. On March 15, however, the directors turned this bid down and accepted another group’s offer of $37.50plusone-halfofanyredwoodrecovery.Theshareholdersokayedthedeal,andthe$37.50 was paid on June 4.

3月12日，KKR宣布先前的约定无效，并将报价砍至33.5美元一股，两天后再调高至35美元。然而到了3月15日，董事会拒绝了这项提议，并接受另一个财团37.5美元外加红木林一半的补偿款。股东会迅速通过这项交易，并于6月4日收到现金。

We received $24.6millionversusourcostof$22.9 million; our average holding period was close to six months. Considering the trouble this transaction encountered, our 15% annual rate of return excluding any value for the redwood claim - was more than satisfactory.

总计我们花了近六个月的时间，投资2290万美元，最后收回2460万美元，但若是加计这项交易中间所经历的风风雨雨，则15%的年回报率(未包含红木林潜在收益)还算令人满意。

But the best was yet to come. The trial judge appointed two commissions, one to look at the timber’s value, the other to consider the interest rate questions. In January 1987, the first commission said the redwoods were worth $275.7 million and the second commission recommended a compounded, blended rate of return working out to about 14%.

不过好戏还在后头，初审法院指派两个委员会来解决这项纷争，一个负责认定红木林的价值，一个则负责应该适用的利率。1987年1月，委员会认定红木林的价值为2.75亿美元，适用的年化利率应为14%。

In August 1987 the judge upheld these conclusions, which meant a net amount of about $600millionwouldbedueArcata.Thegovernmentthenappealed.In1988,though,beforethisappealwasheard,theclaimwassettledfor$519 million. Consequently, we received an additional $29.48pershare,orabout$19.3 million. We will get another $800,000 or so in 1989.

1987年8月，法官裁定这项决议，这代表政府需要再支付高达6亿美元的赔偿金，联邦政府立刻提出上诉，而就在上诉即将宣判结果时，双方以5.19亿美元达成和解，因此我们又额外收到1,930万美元，相当于每股29.48美元的大红包，之后还可以再拿到80万美元的进帐。

Berkshire’s arbitrage activities differ from those of many arbitrageurs. First, we participate in only a few, and usually very large, transactions each year. Most practitioners buy into a great many deals perhaps 50 or more per year. With that many irons in the fire, they must spend most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks. This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives. (What’s the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day?)

伯克希尔的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先，相较于一般套利客一年从事多达50个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案。有这么多锅子同时在煮，他们必须花很多时间来监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查理跟我想要过的生活方式，(为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义？)

Because we diversify so little, one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation. So far, Berkshire has not had a really bad experience. But we will - and when it happens we’ll report the gory details to you.

也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，伯克希尔还没有遇到什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。

The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced. We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates. We just read the newspapers, think about a few of the big propositions, and go by our own sense of probabilities.

另有一点不同的是，我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或是去预测可能被并购的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判断的可能性做决定。

At yearend, our only major arbitrage position was 3,342,000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of $281.8millionandamarketvalueof$304.5 million. In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position. About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是334.2万股的RJR Nabisco，投资成本2.82亿美元，目前市价3.04亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到400万股，接着在二月全部出清。当我们向收购RJR的KKR公司提交持股时，大约300万股被接受，返回的股票被迅速在市场上卖出。我们的税前利润6400万美元高于预期。¹²

Earlier, another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest: Jay Pritzker, who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax-oriented offer. To quote Yogi Berra; “It was deja vu all over again.”

稍早之前，另外一位熟悉的面孔出现在RJR竞标比赛中：杰伊·普利兹克(Jay Pritzker)，他是第一波士顿集团的一员，该集团提出以税务规划为导向的提案，套句YogiBerra的说法：这感觉识曾相识！

During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR, our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon’s participation in a bidding group. Customarily, Charlie and I, though we are directors of Salomon, are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work. We have asked that it be that way: The information would do us no good and could, in fact, occasionally inhibit Berkshire’s arbitrage operations.

大部分的时间我们买进RJR有相当大的限制，由于在竞争者所罗兄公司我们有投资头寸，查理跟我也都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与所罗门整个并购案的所有信息隔绝，我们要求这样做：额外的信息对我们不见得就有好处，事实上，有时还会妨碍到伯克希尔进行套利的投资。

However, the unusually large commitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved. Therefore, Berkshire’s purchases of RJR were made at only two times: first, in the few days immediately following management’s announcement of buyout plans, before Salomon became involved; and considerably later, after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR. Because we could not buy at other times, our directorships cost Berkshire significant money.

然而由于所罗门的提案规模相当的大，以致于所有的董事都必须完全被知会并参与，因此伯克希尔总共只有两个时点可以进行买进RJR的动作，第一次是当RJR管理层宣布整个并购计划的几天内，当时所罗门还未宣布加入竞标；另外一次是， RJR董事会决定优先考虑KKR的提案之后。也因为所罗门的董事职务，使得伯克希尔的投资成本大大提高。

Considering Berkshire’s good results in 1988, you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989. Instead, we expect to be on the sidelines.

看到1988年如此丰硕的套利成果，你可能会觉得我们应该继续朝这方面加强，但事实上，我们决定采取观望的态度。

One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down - because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up. As regular readers of this report know, our new commitments are not based on a judgment about short-term prospects for the stock market. Rather, they reflect an opinion about long-term business prospects for specific companies. We do not have, never have had, and never will have an opinion about where the stock market, interest rates, or business activity will be a year from now.

一个好的理由是因为我们决定大幅提高在长期股权方面的投资，所以目前的现金水位已经下降，常常读我们年报的人可能都知道，我们的决定不是基于短期股市的表现，反而我们注重的是个别企业的长期经济展望，我们从来没有、以后也不会对一年后的股市、利率或企业活动做任何的评论。

Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989. Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field. As Dorothy says: “Toto, I have a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more.”

然而就算是我们现金满满，我们在1989年可能也不会从事太多的套利交易，并购市场的发展已经有点过头了，就像Dorothy所说的：“奥图，我觉得我们好象已经不是在堪萨斯市了！”

We have no idea how long the excesses will last, nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government, lender and buyer that fuel them. But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs. We have no desire to arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled - and, in our view, often unwarranted - optimism of both buyers and lenders. In our activities, we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein: “If something can’t go on forever, it will end.”

我们不太确定这种过热的现象会持续多久，包含参与热潮的政府、金主与买家的态度会如何转变，不过我们可以确定的是，当别人参与这些活动越不谨慎时，我们就越应该谨慎。我们不愿意参与那些反应买方与金主无可救药的乐观交易，通常我们认为这些乐观情绪是无保障的。在此我们将牢记赫伯·斯坦因(Herb Stein)的教训：如果一件事不能永远持续下去，那么它终将结束。

Efficient Market Theory 有效市场理论

The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of “efficient market theory” (EMT) also seem relevant. This doctrine became highly fashionable - indeed, almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s. Essentially, it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices. In other words, the market always knew everything. As a corollary, the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest, most hard-working security analyst. Amazingly, EMT was embraced not only by academics, but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well. Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient, they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient. The difference between these propositions is night and day.

前面提到的套利活动使得我们有必要讨论一下有效市场理论EMT，这种理论在近年来变得非常热门，尤其在1970年代的学术圈被奉为圣旨，基本上它认为分析股票是没有用的，因为所有公开的信息皆已反应在其股价之上。换句话说，市场永远知道所有的事，学校教有效市场理论的教授因此做了一个推论：任何一个人射飞镖随机所选出来的股票组合可以媲美华尔街最聪明、最努力的证券分析师所选出来的投资组合。令人惊讶的是，市场有效率理论不但为学术界所拥抱，更被许多投资专家与企业经理人所接受。他们正确地观察到市场常常是具有效率的，他们就以此认为市场永远都具有效率，这中间的假设差异，简直有天壤之别。

In my opinion, the continuous 63-year arbitrage experience of Graham-Newman Corp. Buffett Partnership, and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is. (There’s plenty of other evidence, also.) While at Graham-Newman, I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926-1956 lifespan of the company. Unleveraged returns averaged 20% per year. Starting in 1956, I applied Ben Graham’s arbitrage principles, first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire. Though I’ve not made an exact calculation, I have done enough work to know that the 1956-1988 returns averaged well over 20%. (Of course, I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben’s; he had 1929-1932 to contend with.)

就我个人过去在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙公司与伯克希尔公司连续63年的套利经验来看，说明了有效市场理论有多么的愚蠢(当然还有其它一堆证据)，当初在格雷厄姆-纽曼公司上班时，我将该公司1926年到1956年的套利成果做了一番研究，平均每年20%的无杠杆投资回报率。之后，从1956年开始我在巴菲特合伙公司与之后的伯克希尔公司，运用格雷厄姆的套利原则，虽然我并没有仔细地去算，但1956年到1988年间的投资回报率应该也超过20%，(当然，之后的投资环境比起格雷厄姆当时要好的许多，因为当时他遇到过1929-1932年的经济大萧条)。

All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance: (1) the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63-year record; (2) the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences; (3) we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements - we simply acted on highly-publicized events; and (4) our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe - they have not been selected by hindsight.

所有的条件皆已具备来公平测试投资组合的表现：(1)三个公司63年来买卖了上百种不同的股票证券；(2)结果应该不会因为某个特别好的个案所扭曲；(3)我们不需要故意隐瞒事实或是宣扬我们的产品优秀或是经营者眼光独到，我们只是对高度公开的个案采取行动；(4)我们的套利部分可以很容易就被追查到，他们并不是事后才特别挑选出来的。

Over the 63 years, the general market delivered just under a 10% annual return, including dividends. That means $1,000wouldhavegrownto$405,000 if all income had been reinvested. A 20% rate of return, however, would have produced $97 million. That strikes us as a statistically-significant differential that might, conceivably, arouse one’s curiosity.

过去63年来，大盘整体的投资报酬(加计股利)大概只有10%，意思是说若当初投入1,000美元的话，现在可以获得40.5万美元，但是若投资回报率改为20%的话，现在却会变成9,700万美元。这对我们来说是统计上的显著差异，可以想象这会激起人们的好奇心。

Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type. True, they don’t talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever said he was wrong, no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed. EMT, moreover, continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools. Apparently, a reluctance to recant, and thereby to demystify the priesthood, is not limited to theologians.

然而，理论支持者却从来就不会对这种不和谐的证据感兴趣，确实现在他们讲话已不如过去那么大声，但据我所知却没有任何一个人愿意承认错误，不管他们已经误导了多少个学生，有效市场理论还是继续在各个企管名校间列为投资课程的重要教材之一，很显然的，死不悔改、甚而曲解神意，不是只有神学家才做的出来。

Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham. In any sort of a contest - financial, mental, or physical - it’s an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it’s useless to even try. From a selfish point of view, Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT.

自然而然，这些遇人不淑的学生与被骗的投资专家在接受有效市场理论后，对于我们与其它格雷厄姆的追随者实在有莫大的帮助，在任何的竞赛中，不管是投资、心智或是体能方面，要是遇到对手被告知思考与尝试是没有用的，对我们来说等于是占尽了优势，从一个自私的观点来看，格雷厄姆学派应该祈祷有效市场理论能够在校园中永为流传。

All this said, a warning is appropriate. Arbitrage has looked easy recently. But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20% a year or, for that matter, profits of any kind. As noted, the market is reasonably efficient much of the time: For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63-year period, many more were foregone because they seemed properly-priced.

说了那么多，最后还是要提出一个警告，最近套利看起来相当容易，但它却不是永远都保证有20%回报的投资活动，现在的市场比起过去来的有效率许多，除了我们过去63年所真正抓住的套利活动之外，还有更多是因为定价合理而被我们舍弃掉了。

An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply committing to a specific investment category or style. He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline. Investing in arbitrage situations, per se, is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts.

一个投资者很难只靠单一品种投资类别或投资风格而创造超人的收益，他只能靠着仔细评估事实并持续地遵照原则训练才能赚取超额利润。就套利投资本身而言，并没有比选择利用飞镖选股的策略好到哪里去。

New York Stock Exchange Listing 纽约证券交易所挂牌

Berkshire’s shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29, 1988. On pages 50-51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing.

伯克希尔的股份于1988年11月29日正式在纽交所挂牌，后面附有我们写给股东有关挂牌的正式声明。

Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter: Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares, any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold.

除了那封信之外，我个人还有一点要说明，虽然我们在交易所的基本交易单位是10股，但只要是1股以上还是一样可以进行买卖。

As the letter explains, our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs, and we believe this goal is being achieved. Generally, the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over-the-counter market.

另外如同信中所提到的，我们之所以决定挂牌的主要目的是要降低交易成本，而我相信这目的也已经达到，一般来说，在纽交所买卖之间的价差会比在柜台交易要来得小的多。

Henderson Brothers, Inc., the specialist in our shares, is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange; its progenitor, William Thomas Henderson, bought his seat for $500onSeptember8,1861.(Recently,seatsweresellingforabout$625,000.) Among the 54 firms acting as specialists, HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned, with 83. We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI, and have been delighted with the firm’s performance. Jim Maguire, Chairman of HBI, personally manages the trading in Berkshire, and we could not be in better hands.

负责交易伯克希尔股份的是亨德森兄弟公司(Henderson)，交易所中一家老牌专家，它的前身威廉·托马斯·亨德森(William Thomas Henderson)，是在1861年以500块美金买下一个交易所的席位(最近一个席位的成交价大约是62.5万美金)，在所有54家交易公司当中，HBI共被分配到第二多的83种股票，我们很高兴伯克希尔能够被分配给HBI负责交易，到目前为止对于他们的服务感到相当满意，该公司负责人Jim Maguire亲自负责伯克希尔的交易，他是我们可以找到的最佳人选。

In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed companies. First, we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value (which we hope increases at a reasonable - or, better yet, unreasonable - rate). Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation. Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire’s business results. If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value, each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period.

有两点是我们与其它上市公司最大不同的地方，第一，我们不希望伯克希尔的股价过高，相反，我们希望它能够在内在价值为中心的窄幅范围内交易(当然我们希望内在价值能够以合理的速度增加，当然能够不合理的增加更好)，查理跟我都不希望，股价被过分高估或是被过分低估，两者都会使伯克希尔的股东的获利与公司本身经营获利状况不相当，所以，如果伯克希尔的股价持续地反应企业内在价值，则我们可以确定每个股东在他持有公司股份的期间所获得的收益，都能与公司本身营运的获利成正比。

Second, we wish for very little trading activity. If we ran a private business with a few passive partners, we would be disappointed if those partners, and their replacements, frequently wanted to leave the partnership. Running a public company, we feel the same way.

第二，我们希望交易量越少越好，如果我们经营的是一家只有几位合伙人的私人企业，我们也不希望合伙人时常进进出出合伙公司，经营一家公开上市公司也是同样的道理。

Our goal is to attract long-term owners who, at the time of purchase, have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely. We don’t understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity, for that can be achieved only if many of his owners are constantly exiting. At what other organization - school, club, church, etc. - do leaders cheer when members leave? (However, if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations, you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity, as in: “There hasn’t been much going on in Christianity for a while; maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week.“)

我们的目标是吸引长期的股东，在买进股份时，抱着打算与我们永远同在，而不是订有卖出价格的时间表，我们实在不能理解为何有公司的CEO希望自己公司的股份交易量越多越好，这代表公司的股东会来来去去，在其它如学校、俱乐部、教堂等社会机构当中，没有领导人希望自己的组织成员离开的，(然而，偏偏就有营业员就是要靠着说服成员离开组织来维生，你有没有听过有人劝你：反正最近基督教也没有什么搞头，不如下礼拜大家改信佛教试一试)。

Of course, some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time, and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price. Therefore we try, through our policies, performance, and communications, to attract new shareholders who understand our operations, share our time horizons, and measure us as we measure ourselves. If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder - and, just as important, can continue to be uninteresting to those with short-term or unrealistic expectations - Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value.

当然还是有些伯克希尔股东需要或是想要偶尔把他持有的股份卖掉，而我们希望能够找到合适的人以适当的价格来接手，因此我们试着通过我们的政策、表现与沟通，吸引真正了解我们营运、认同我们理念并用同样的方式来对待我们的新股东，如果我们能够持续地吸引这种类型的股东，同时很重要的，让那些短视近利的投资人远离我们，相信伯克希尔一定能够持续地以合理的价格交易买卖。

David L. Dodd 大卫·多德

Dave Dodd, my friend and teacher for 38 years, died last year at age 93. Most of you don’t know of him. Yet any long-time shareholder of Berkshire is appreciably wealthier because of the indirect influence he had upon our company.

与我相交38年亦师亦友的大卫·多德，于去年以高龄93岁过世，大多数的人可能都不知道他是谁，但是许多伯克希尔的老股东却因为他对本公司的间接影响而受益良多。

Dave spent a lifetime teaching at Columbia University, and he co-authored Security Analysis with Ben Graham. From the moment I arrived at Columbia, Dave personally encouraged and educated me; one influence was as important as the other. Everything he taught me, directly or through his book, made sense. Later, through dozens of letters, he continued my education right up until his death.

大卫终其一生在哥伦比亚大学教书，同时他也与格雷厄姆合作著述《证券分析》一书，自从我到哥伦比亚之后，大卫不时地鼓励与教导我，给我的影响一个接着一个，他所教导我的每一件事，不论是直接或通过他的著作都非常有道理，后来毕业后，通过不断往来的信件，他给我的教育持续到他逝世之前。

I have known many professors of finance and investments but I have never seen any, except for Ben Graham, who was the match of Dave. The proof of his talent is the record of his students: No other teacher of investments has sent forth so many who have achieved unusual success.

我认识许多财经与投资学的教授，除了格雷厄姆以外，没有人可以比得上大卫，最好的证明就是他学生的成绩，没有其它投资学的教授可以教出那么多杰出的英才。

When students left Dave’s classroom, they were equipped to invest intelligently for a lifetime because the principles he taught were simple, sound, useful, and enduring. Though these may appear to be unremarkable virtues, the teaching of principles embodying them has been rare.

当学生离开大卫的教室，就代表着他们一生将具备投资才能，因为他所教导的原则是如此的简单、完整有用且持久，虽然这些特点看起来并不显著，但要将这些原则教导给学生却不是一件容易的事。

It’s particularly impressive that Dave could practice as well as preach. just as Keynes became wealthy by applying his academic ideas to a very small purse, so, too, did Dave. Indeed, his financial performance far outshone that of Keynes, who began as a market-timer (leaning on business and credit-cycle theory) and converted, after much thought, to value investing. Dave was right from the start.

让我印象最深刻的是大卫总是言行一致，就像凯恩斯运用自己研究出的学术观点来致富，大卫也是如此。事实上他在财务表现远比凯恩斯来得出色，凭借着企业与信用周期理论，之后再演变成价值投资，大卫一开始就选择了正确的方向。

In Berkshire’s investments, Charlie and I have employed the principles taught by Dave and Ben Graham. Our prosperity is the fruit of their intellectual tree.

查理跟我运用大卫与格雷厄姆所教的原则，在伯克希尔的投资之上，我们的成功正代表着他们心血的结晶。

Miscellaneous 其他

We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.

我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以通过大家的协助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我。

Here’s what we’re looking for:

以下是我们想要找：

(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

(1) 具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到1000万美元。

(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turnaround” situations),

(2) 表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对美好前景或困境反转的公司没有兴趣。

(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

(3) 企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率ROE。

(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),

(4) 公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理。

(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),

(5) 简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知。

(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

(6) 合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。

We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.

我们不会进行敌意并购，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内在价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。

Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company’s owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. However, these managers also wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with these objectives and invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.

我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像Blumkin/Friedman/Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。

Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: We’ve found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by another Goldwynism: “Please include me out.”

另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆人打电话来要卖你可卡犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有戈德温的另一句话可以形容：请把我排除在外。

Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon. We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long-term investment, as we did at Salomon.

除了以上买下整家公司的并购案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部分不具控制权的股份，就像我们在大都会与所罗门这两个例子一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买所罗门一样的可转换优先股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。

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We received some good news a few weeks ago: Standard & Poor’s raised our credit rating to AAA, which is the highest rating it bestows. Only 15 other U.S. industrial or property-casualty companies are rated AAA, down from 28 in 1980.

几个礼拜以前，我们接到了一个好消息，标准普尔评级机构将我们的债信等级调高到AAA的最高标准，相较于1980年的28家，目前全美只有15家公司可以拥有此殊荣。

Corporate bondholders have taken their lumps in the past few years from “event risk.” This term refers to the overnight degradation of credit that accompanies a heavily-leveraged purchase or recapitalization of a business whose financial policies, up to then, had been conservative. In a world of takeovers inhabited by few owner-managers, most corporations present such a risk. Berkshire does not. Charlie and I promise bondholders the same respect we afford shareholders.

过去几年企业债的持有人在事件风险上跌了一大跤，意思是说一家原本财务操作保守的公司，因为进行高杠杆并购或是重整再造，使得公司在一夜之间被大幅调降信用评级。并购的世界之中，除了少数经营权与所有权一致的公司之外，大部分的公司都会面临这样的风险，但伯克希尔绝对不会，查理跟我保证给债券持有人与股东一样的承诺。

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About 97.4% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1988 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5 million, and 2,319 charities were recipients. If we achieve reasonable business results, we plan to increase the per-share contributions in 1989.

大约有97.4%的有效股权参与1988年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约500万美元捐出的款项分配给2,319家慈善机构，若经营情况许可，我们计划在1989年扩大这项捐赠计划。

We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 48-49. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1989 will be ineligible for the 1989 program.

我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1989年9月30日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1989年的计划。

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Berkshire’s annual meeting will be held in Omaha on Monday, April 24, 1989, and I hope you will come. The meeting provides the forum for you to ask any owner-related questions you may have, and we will keep answering until all (except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information) have been dealt with.

今年的股东年会将在1989年4月24日周一在奥马哈举行，我们希望大家都能来参加，这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一直回答到所有股东都满意为止(除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的人)。

After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs. B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim’s. Be prepared for bargains.

会后我们将安排几台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到内布拉斯加家具店和波仙珠宝店，大家准备大捡便宜货吧！

Out-of-towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs. B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five. (These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs. B, who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up; she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.) Borsheims, however, is not open on Sunday.

外地来的股东可以会选择提早一点来，B夫人的家具店周日会从中午开到下午五点，只有五个小时可能不够B夫人暖身，她可能希望还是能够像平日一样从早上10点到晚上9点，另外波仙珠宝周日并不开门营业。

Ask Mrs. B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices. She will confide to you - as she does to everyone - how she does it: “I can sell so cheap ‘cause I work for this dummy who doesn’t know anything about carpet.”

记得问B夫人地毯价格为什么会如此便宜的秘密，她一定会向跟所有人一样地偷偷跟你讲她是如何办到的(我之所以能够卖的这么便宜是因为，我的老板对于地毯根本就一无所知！)。

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事长

February 28, 1989

1989.02.28

原文：There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions.

共读版翻译：只有少部分企业是我们想要长期持有的，

修改为：我们长期坚信的企业只有少数几家。

原文：cools any temptation we may have to relax our standards for long-term investments.

共读版翻译：可以稍微缓和我们对于寻找长期资金去处的压力，

修改为：可以冷却任何我们放松长期投资标准的诱惑。（这个是直译，但我感觉更能说明我自己在拿现金时的那种想出手买股票的诱惑。）

原文：bars.

共读版翻译：市场。

修改为：喧闹的市场。

原文：Sometimes there is more to stock valuation than price-earnings ratios.

共读版翻译：有时股票的价格会远远超过合理的市盈率之外。

修改为：有时候，股票估值不仅仅是市盈率（这么简单）。

原文：How long will your money be tied up?

共读版翻译：你的资金总计要投入多久？

修改为：你的资金会被占用多久？

原文：What will happen if the event does not take place because of anti-trust action, financing glitches, etc.?

共读版翻译：因为反垄断或是财务意外状况发生导致并购案触礁的机率有多高？

修改为：如果由于反垄断诉讼、融资故障等原因事件没有发生，会发生什么？

原文：Arcata Corp., one of our more serendipitous arbitrage experiences,

共读版翻译：Arcata公司是我们最曲折离奇的并购经历，

修改为：Arcata公司就是我们比较偶然发现的套利交易之一，

原文：a major leveraged-buy out firm.

共读版翻译：最大的杠杆并购公司。

修改为：一家主要的杠杆收购公司。

原文：acres

共读版翻译：公顷

修改为：英亩

原文：The enabling legislation stipulated 6% simple interest; Arcata argued for a much higher and compounded rate.

共读版翻译：同时双方也对这期间适用的6%利率有争议，Arcata极力争取更高的赔偿金与适用的利率。

修改为：双方还对财产被占用到最终付款的期间利率存在争议。征收法规定为6%的单利；Arcata公司主张采用高得多的复合利率。

原文： Our willingness to pay up - even though the closing had been postponed - reflected our leaning toward “a whole lot” rather than “zero” for the redwoods.

共读版翻译：我们的努力终于获得回报，虽然有点拖延，但结果却相当令人满意。

修改为：我们愿意支付（这个价格）-尽管交易完成时间已被推迟-这反映了我们对于红木林的价值更倾向于“相当多” 而不是“零”。

原文：About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR, which acquired RJR, and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market. Our pre-tax profit was a better-than-expected $64 million.

共读版翻译：有300万股是KKR决定并购RJR后，我们卖给KKR的，获利6,400万美元略高于预期。

修改为：当我们向收购RJR的KKR公司提交持股时，大约300万股被接受，返回的股票被迅速在市场上卖出。我们的税前利润6400万美元高于预期。

Footnotes

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