原文信息：
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
You may remember the wildly upbeat message of last year’s report: nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally.1 This carefully-crafted corporate strategy paid off in 1985. Later sections of this report discuss (a) our purchase of a major position in Capital Cities/ABC, (b) our acquisition of Scott & Fetzer, (c) our entry into a large, extended term participation in the insurance business of Fireman’s Fund, and (d) our sale of our stock in General Foods.
各位可能还记得去年年报最后提到的那个非常乐观的消息：虽然平时表面上无所作为，但根据我们的经验，偶尔也会有一些大动作。这一精心制定的企业策略终于在 1985 年有了结果，本报告的后半部将会讨论到：(a) 入股 Capital Cities/ABC，(b) 并购 Scott & Fetzer，(c) 进入 Fireman’s Fund 保险业务，(d) 卖出 General Foods。
Our gain in net worth during the year was 19.46 to $1643.71, or 23.2% compounded annually, another percentage that will not be repeated.
去年伯克希尔的账面价值约增加了6.136亿美金，约增长了48.2%(标普31.6%)，这一比率就好比哈雷慧星造访一般，在我有生之年这两者都不会再见到了。自现任管理层接手的21年来，每股账面价值从19.46增加到1,643.71美元，年复合增长率约23.2%，这是另一项不可能再重现的比率。
Two factors make anything approaching this rate of gain unachievable in the future. One factor probably transitory - is a stock market that offers very little opportunity compared to the markets that prevailed throughout much of the 1964-1984 period. Today we cannot find significantly-undervalued equities to purchase for our insurance company portfolios. The current situation is 180 degrees removed from that existing about a decade ago, when the only question was which bargain to choose.
有两个因素使得这种比率在未来难以持续，一种因素属于暂时性：与过去20相比，如今的投资机会越来越少。我们很难找到价值低估的股票为保险业务构建投资组合，这种情况与十年前有180度的转变，当时惟一的问题是该挑选哪个便宜货，而现在是没有便宜货。
This change in the market also has negative implications for our present portfolio. In our 1974 annual report I could say: “We consider several of our major holdings to have great potential for significantly increased values in future years.” I can’t say that now. It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974.2 But current market prices generously appraise these attributes, whereas they were ignored in 1974. Today’s valuations mean that our insurance companies have no chance for future portfolio gains on the scale of those achieved in the past.
市场的热情也对我们现有的投资组合产生不利的影响，在1974年的年报中，我可以说：我们认为我们的几个主要持股在未来几年具有显着增加价值的巨大潜力，但现在我们不能这么说了。虽然我们投资组合持有的公司像1974年一样拥有优秀经营团队和特许经营业务，但目前市场上的股价已充分反应这项特点，而1974年股价却被大大低估。现在的估值意味着，今后我们保险公司的投资绩效再也无法像过去那样优异。
The second negative factor, far more telling, is our size. Our equity capital is more than twenty times what it was only ten years ago. And an iron law of business is that growth eventually dampens exceptional economics. just look at the records of high-return companies once they have amassed even $1 billion of equity capital. None that I know of has managed subsequently, over a ten-year period, to keep on earning 20% or more on equity while reinvesting all or substantially all of its earnings. Instead, to sustain their high returns, such companies have needed to shed a lot of capital by way of either dividends or repurchases of stock. Their shareholders would have been far better off if all earnings could have been reinvested at the fat returns earned by these exceptional businesses. But the companies simply couldn’t turn up enough high-return opportunities to make that possible.
第二项负面因素更显而易见，也就是我们的规模。目前我们在股票投入的资金是十年前的20多倍，而市场的铁律是，规模增长终将拖累经济效率。看看那些高回报率的公司，一旦当他们的股本规模超过十亿美金，没有一家公司在往后的十年能够将其全部或大部分收益进行再投资的同时，维持20%以上的股权回报率。相反，为了维持高回报率，这些公司只能通过大量分红或回购来剥离资本。如果所有的收益都可以再投资于这些杰出企业来获得的丰厚回报，股东的情况则会好得多，但是根本无法找到足够的高回报机会来实现这一目标。
Their problem is our problem. Last year I told you that we needed profits of 5.7 billion, a 48% increase that corresponds - as it must mathematically - to the growth in our capital base during 1985. (Here’s a little perspective: leaving aside oil companies, only about 15 U.S. businesses have managed to earn over $5.7 billion during the past ten years.)
而我们的问题就跟他们一样，去年我告诉各位在往后十年我们大约要赚到39亿美金，每年才能达到15%的收益率。今年由于账面价值增长了48%，同样的门槛提高到57亿美金。撇开石油公司，据统计只有15家公司在过去十年能够赚到57亿美金。
Charlie Munger, my partner in managing Berkshire, and I are reasonably optimistic about Berkshire’s ability to earn returns superior to those earned by corporate America generally, and you will benefit from the company’s retention of all earnings as long as those returns are forthcoming. We have several things going for us: (1) we don’t have to worry about quarterly or annual figures but, instead, can focus on whatever actions will maximize long-term value; (2) we can expand the business into any areas that make sense - our scope is not circumscribed by history, structure, or concept; and (3) we love our work. All of these help. Even so, we will also need a full measure of good fortune to average our hoped-for 15% - far more good fortune than was required for our past 23.2%.
查理和我对于伯克希尔能够获得高于一般美国企业的获利能力持相当乐观的态度，而只要获利持续成长，股东就会从公司保留收益中受益。我们有几件事情要做：(1)我们不必去担心每季或每年的帐面获利数字，而是将注意力集中在最大化长期价值上，(2)我们可以将业务版图扩大到任何有利可图的产业之上，而完全不受经验、组织或观念所限，(3)我们喜爱我们的工作。这些都是关键因素，但即便如此我们仍需要充分的好运气(比过去达到23.2%还要更多)才有办法使我们的平均回报率维持15%。
We need to mention one further item in the investment equation that could affect recent purchasers of our stock. Historically, Berkshire shares have sold modestly below intrinsic business value. With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.3
另外我要特别说一下投资恒等式「P=EPS*PE」的另一个项：市场估值，这与最近购买本公司股票的投资者密切相关。回望历史，伯克希尔的股价一直略低于内在价值。在这种情况下，只要折价的幅度不再继续扩大，投资者的投资收益会与公司的业绩表现趋于一致，但最近折价消失了，甚至有一些小幅溢价。
The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.4
折价消失意味着伯克希尔的市值增加幅度高于内在价值增长的速度，虽然后者的表现也不错。当然这对于此前便持有股份的人算是好消息，但对于新股东或潜在股东却是不利的，而后者若想获得与公司的表现一致的投资收益，那就需要这种估值溢价现象一直维持。
Management cannot determine market prices, although it can, by its disclosures and policies, encourage rational behavior by market participants. My own preference, as perhaps you’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.5
然而管理层无法控制股价，尽管可以对外披露公司信息和政策，以促使市场参与者的行为理性一点。也许你已经猜到，我本人更倾向于市场价格始终接近内在价值，惟有这样，股东持有期间的回报才能跟公司业绩趋于一致。市场价格远高于或低于企业价值并不会改变股东的最终回报，归根结底，所有股东的回报必定与公司业绩保持一致。但是，股价长期偏离其[Intrinsic_Value|内在价值]会导致公司收益分配不公，股东的投资收益在很大程度上取决于其幸运、聪明或愚笨的程度。
Over the long term there has been a more consistent relationship between Berkshire’s market value and business value than has existed for any other publicly-traded equity with which I am familiar. This is a tribute to you. Because you have been rational, interested, and investment-oriented, the market price for Berkshire stock has almost always been sensible. This unusual result has been achieved by a shareholder group with unusual demographics: virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.6
长期来看，伯克希尔的市值与内在价值一直保持着一种稳定的关系，在所有我熟悉的上市公司中，这都是很少见的。这要归功于所有伯克希尔的股东，因为你们的理性、专注、以投资为导向，伯克希尔的股价一直很合理，这不寻常的结果是由一群不寻常的股东实现的，实际上，我们的股东几乎都是个人而不是机构，没有一家规模相近的上市公司能够做到这一点。
You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.
或许你会认为机构拥有大量高薪与经验丰富的专业人士，将会成为金融市场稳定与理性的力量。但事实并非如此，机构大量持股且持续关注的股票，其价格通常是最不合理的。
Ben Graham told a story 40 years ago that illustrates why investment professionals behave as they do: An oil prospector, moving to his heavenly reward, was met by St. Peter with bad news. “You’re qualified for residence”, said St. Peter, “but, as you can see, the compound reserved for oil men is packed. There’s no way to squeeze you in.” After thinking a moment, the prospector asked if he might say just four words to the present occupants. That seemed harmless to St. Peter, so the prospector cupped his hands and yelled, “Oil discovered in hell.” Immediately the gate to the compound opened and all of the oil men marched out to head for the nether regions. Impressed, St. Peter invited the prospector to move in and make himself comfortable. The prospector paused. “No,” he said, “I think I’ll go along with the rest of the boys. There might be some truth to that rumor after all.”
格雷厄姆40年前曾讲过一个故事，说明了专业人士为何会如此行事：一个石油商人在天堂的门口见到圣彼得，圣彼得带给他一个好消息跟一个坏消息，好消息是他确实有资格进入天堂，但坏消息专供石油商人居住的屋子已经没有位置了。石油商人想了一下，问圣彼得他能不能跟现有住户讲几句话，圣彼得觉得没什么大碍就答应了，石油商人捧着手对屋里大喊：“地狱里发现石油了”，随即屋门打开，所有的石油商人争先恐后地往地狱奔去，圣彼得随即邀请石油商人搬进来，但石油商人顿了一下后说到：“不！我还是跟他们一起去比较妥当，空穴来风，必有其因。”
Sources of Reported Earnings 报告收益的来源
The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never prepare them for internal use. 7
Segment information is equally essential for investors wanting to know what is going on in a multi-line business. Corporate managers always have insisted upon such information before making acquisition decisions but, until a few years ago, seldom made it available to investors faced with acquisition and disposition decisions of their own. Instead, when owners wishing to understand the economic realities of their business asked for data, managers usually gave them a we-can’t-tell-you-what-is-going-on-because-it-would-hurt-the-company answer. Ultimately the SEC ordered disclosure of segment data and management began supplying real answers. The change in their behavior recalls an insight of Al Capone: “You can get much further with a kind word and a gun than you can with a kind word alone.”
细分业务信息对于想要了解一家多元化公司发展情况的投资者来说同等重要，公司管理层在并购一家公司时通常也是基于这些信息作出决策，但最近这几年，他们很少将这些信息提供给决定买进卖出股权的投资者，相反当股东想要了解公司的经营情况要求管理层提供数据时，他们通常以危害公司利益为由拒绝提供，直到最后证监会下令公司须披露细分业务数据，管理层才报告出来，这种态度的转变让我想起Al Capone的一个比喻：拿着一支枪好好的说比光是好好的说，效果要好上很多。
In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional information regarding our businesses is provided, including Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.8
在该表中，商誉的摊销没有记入具体的业务，而是出于 1983 年年度报告中我的信的附录中所述的原因，作为一个单独的项目汇总在一起。（1977-1984 年信件汇编可应要求提供。）在第 39-41 页和第 49-55 页的 “业务分部数据 “和 “管理层讨论 “部分，提供了有关我们业务的更多信息，包括每个分部的商誉和商誉摊销数字。我恳请您阅读这些章节，以及从第 56 页开始的查理·芒格致西科金融股东的信。
| Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 | Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 | Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings(after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益（伯克希尔应占） | Berkshire’s Share of Net Earnings(after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益（伯克希尔应占） | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) 单位：千美元 | 1985 | 1984 | 1985 | 1984 |
| Operating Earnings: 经营收益 | ||||
| Insurance Group: 保险集团 | ||||
| Underwriting 承保收益 | $ (44,230) | $ (48,060) | $ (23,569) | $ (25,955) |
| Net investment income 净投资收益 | 95,217 | 68,903 | 79,716 | 62,059 |
| Associated Retail Stores 联合零售商店 | 270 | (1,072) | 134 | (579) |
| Blue Chip Stamps 蓝筹印花 | 5,763 | (1,843) | 2,813 | (899) |
| Buffalo News 布法罗晚报 | 29,921 | 27,328 | 14,580 | 13,317 |
| Mutual Savings and Loan 互助储贷 | 2,622 | 1,456 | 4,016 | 3,151 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart 内布拉斯家具城 | 12,686 | 14,511 | 5,181 | 5,917 |
| Precision Steel 精密钢铁 | 3,896 | 4,092 | 1,477 | 1,696 |
| See’s Candies 喜诗糖果 | 28,989 | 26,644 | 14,558 | 13,380 |
| Textiles 纺织业务 | (2,395) | 418 | (1,324) | 226 |
| Wesco Financial 西科金融 | 9,500 | 9,777 | 4,191 | 4,828 |
| Amortization of Goodwill 商誉摊销 | (1,475) | (1,434) | (1,475) | (1,434) |
| Interest on Debt 利息费用 | (14,415) | (14,734) | (7,288) | (7,452) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions 股东指定捐赠 | (4,006) | (3,179) | (2,164) | (1,716) |
| Other 其他 | 3,106 | 4,932 | 2,102 | 3,475 |
| ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益 | 125,449 | 87,739 | 92,948 | 70,014 |
| Special General Foods Distribution 通用食品特别股息 | 4,127 | 8,111 | 3,779 | 7,294 |
| Special Washington Post Distribution 华盛顿邮报特别股息 | 14,877 | --- | 13,851 | --- |
| Sales of Securities 已实现证券收益 | 468,903 | 104,699 | 325,237 | 71,587 |
| ---- | ---- | ---- | ---- | |
| Total Earnings - all entities 所有实体-收益合计 | $ 613,356 | $ 200,549 | $ 435,815 | $ 148,895 |
Our 1985 results include unusually large earnings from the sale of securities. This fact, in itself, does not mean that we had a particularly good year (though, of course, we did). Security profits in a given year bear similarities to a college graduation ceremony in which the knowledge gained over four years is recognized on a day when nothing further is learned. We may hold a stock for a decade or more, and during that period it may grow quite consistently in both business and market value. In the year in which we finally sell it there may be no increase in value, or there may even be a decrease. But all growth in value since purchase will be reflected in the accounting earnings of the year of sale. (If the stock owned is in our insurance subsidiaries, however, any gain or loss in market value will be reflected in net worth annually.) Thus, reported capital gains or losses in any given year are meaningless as a measure of how well we have done in the current year.
1985年业绩包含出售证券异常高的收益，但这并不代表今年就是丰收的一年（虽然事实上的确如此），出售证券收益就好像大学毕业典礼一样，四年来所学的知识在那一天正式被认可，而当天你可能一点长进都没有。我们可能持有一支股票长达十年之久，这期间其价值与价格可能以稳定的步调增长，可是在我们真正出售的那一年其价值可能一点也没变甚至还可能减少，但自购买以来累积的所有价值增长，都将反映在出售当年的会计报表中。（但如果持有股票的是我们的保险子公司，其每年市价的变动将会按要求反映在帐面之上。）总而言之，任何给定年份报表上的资本损益根本无法反映我们当年度的实际表现。
A large portion of the realized gain in 1985 (488 million) came about through the sale of our General Foods shares. We held most of these shares since 1980, when we had purchased them at a price far below what we felt was their per/share business value. Year by year, the managerial efforts of Jim Ferguson and Phil Smith substantially increased General Foods’ business value and, last fall, Philip Morris made an offer for the company that reflected the increase. We thus benefited from four factors: a bargain purchase price, a business with fine underlying economics, an able management concentrating on the interests of shareholders, and a buyer willing to pay full business value. While that last factor is the only one that produces reported earnings, we consider identification of the first three to be the key to building value for Berkshire shareholders. In selecting common stocks, we devote our attention to attractive purchases, not to the possibility of attractive sales.
1985年大部分已实现的资本收益来自我们出售通用食品的股票，（税前收益4.88亿美元中的3.38亿美元）。我们从1980年开始便持有其大部分，我们当初以远低于我们认为合理的每股商业价值的价位买进，年复一年，在詹姆斯·弗格森与菲尔·史密斯管理层的优异表现大幅提升该公司的商业价值。去年秋天，菲利普·莫里斯对该公司提出并购要约，报价合理反映了公司真实的内在价值。我们的获利基于四项要素：便宜的买进价格，优秀的商业模式，专注于股东利益且勤奋能干的管理层，愿意支付完全商业价值的买家。虽然最后一项是这次获利能够一举实现的惟一因素，但我们认为，能识别出前三项的能力才是为伯克希尔股东创造价值的根本因素。在选择股票时，我们专注于如何漂亮的买进，而不是漂亮的卖出。
We have again reported substantial income from special distributions, this year from Washington Post and General Foods. (The General Foods transactions obviously took place well before the Philip Morris offer.) Distributions of this kind occur when we sell a portion of our shares in a company back to it simultaneously with its purchase of shares from other shareholders. The number of shares we sell is contractually set so as to leave our percentage ownership in the company precisely the same after the sale as before. Such a transaction is quite properly regarded by the IRS as substantially equivalent to a dividend since we, as a shareholder, receive cash while maintaining an unchanged ownership interest. This tax treatment benefits us because corporate taxpayers, unlike individual taxpayers, incur much lower taxes on dividend income than on income from long-term capital gains. (This difference will be widened further if the House-passed tax bill becomes law: under its provisions, capital gains realized by corporations will be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.) However, accounting rules are unclear as to proper treatment for shareholder reporting. To conform with last year’s treatment, we have shown these transactions as capital gains.
今年我们又再度收到来自华盛顿邮报以及通用食品的特别股息，通用食品股息的发放是发生在菲利普·莫里斯提出并购要求之前。这种特别股息是由于公司按比例的回购我们的持股产生的，回购合约中确定的交易数量是保证公司的持股比例维持不变，这类交易被国税局认定为类似发放股息，因为我们作为股东是在保证持股比例不变的前提下收到的现金。这种税收待遇对我们有利，因为与个人纳税人不同，企业纳税人对股息收入的税率比对长期资本收益的收入低得多。(若国会通过的税收法案正式成为法律，这种差异可能会进一步扩大：相关条款规定企业实现的资本利得所适用税率与一般所得相同)，然而会计原则对于这类交易在财务报表上应如何处理却无统一看法，为与去年做法一致，在财务上我们仍将之视为资本利得。
Though we have not sought out such transactions, we have agreed to them on several occasions when managements initiated the idea. In each case we have felt that non-selling shareholders (all of whom had an opportunity to sell at the same price we received) benefited because the companies made their repurchases at prices below intrinsic business value. The tax advantages we receive and our wish to cooperate with managements that are increasing values for all shareholders have sometimes led us to sell - but only to the extent that our proportional share of the business was undiminished.
虽然我们不刻意寻求此类交易，但当管理层提出这种想法时，我们通常会举手表示赞同，虽然每次我们都觉得那些选择不卖的股东(所有股东都有权利以我们收到的价格出售)将因公司以低于内在价值的价格回购而受惠。我们获得的税收优惠以及希望与管理层合作为所有股东增加价值的愿望，使得我们不得不接受回售股份，但这仅限于我们的持股比例不变的原则之下。
At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses.9 Our Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, has always emphasized the study of mistakes rather than successes, both in business and other aspects of life. He does so in the spirit of the man who said: “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” You’ll immediately see why we make a good team: Charlie likes to study errors and I have generated ample material for him, particularly in our textile and insurance businesses.
话讲到这，我们通常会接着讨论我们的主营业务，但在此之前，让我们先看看我们旗下事业一个失败的案例。我们的副主席查理·芒格，总是强调研究失败要比研究成功重要的多，无论是商业上还是人生的各个方面。他这样的精神正如有人说： 我只想知道我会死在哪里，我将永远不会去那里。你可能马上就会明白，为什么我们两个能成为好搭档：查理喜欢研究错误，而我为他提供了足够的材料，尤其是在纺织与保险业务方面。
Shutdown of Textile Business 关闭纺织业务
In July we decided to close our textile operation, and by yearend this unpleasant job was largely completed. The history of this business is instructive.
7月我们决定关闭我们的纺织业务，年底这项令人不快的工作也将基本完成，投资纺织业的历史深具启发性。
When Buffett Partnership, Ltd., an investment partnership of which I was general partner, bought control of Berkshire Hathaway 21 years ago, it had an accounting net worth of 530 million had produced an aggregate loss of $10 million. Profits had been reported from time to time but the net effect was always one step forward, two steps back.
21年前，我作为普通合伙人的巴菲特合伙公司收购了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的控制权，当时公司的帐面资产为2200万美元，全部集中在纺织业务。然而当时由于公司无法赚得与帐面价值相称的回报，其内在价值远低于净资产。实际上在前9年，即伯克希尔与哈撒韦两家合并经营期间，总计5.3亿美元的营收产生了1000万美元的累计亏损，虽然时有获利，但净效应总是进一步退两步。
At the time we made our purchase, southern textile plants - largely non-union - were believed to have an important competitive advantage. Most northern textile operations had closed and many people thought we would liquidate our business as well.
We felt, however, that the business would be run much better by a long-time employee whom. We immediately selected to be president, Ken Chace. In this respect we were 100% correct: Ken and his recent successor, Garry Morrison, have been excellent managers, every bit the equal of managers at our more profitable businesses.
然而我们觉得公司若能有一位长期稳定的管理者，营运将可改善，所以当时我们马上选中肯·蔡斯接手，有关这点我们到是做对了，蔡斯跟后来接替他的加里·莫里森干得非常好，一点也不输给我们其它盈利更高的业务经营者。
In early 1967 cash generated by the textile operation was used to fund our entry into insurance via the purchase of National Indemnity Company. Some of the money came from earnings and some from reduced investment in textile inventories, receivables, and fixed assets. This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns. 10
1967年初，我们利用纺织业务产生的大量现金买下国民保险公司进入保险业务，部分资金来自于利润，部分资金来自于减少纺织品存货、应收账款与固定资产的投资。这次撤退的决策事后证明完全正确，尽管在蔡斯的管理下，纺织业务已大为改善，但即使是在景气高峰的时候也没赚到钱。
Further diversification for Berkshire followed, and gradually the textile operation’s depressing effect on our overall return diminished as the business became a progressively smaller portion of the corporation. We remained in the business for reasons that I stated in the 1978 annual report (and summarized at other times also): “(1) our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” I further said, “As long as these conditions prevail - and we expect that they will - we intend to continue to support our textile business despite more attractive alternative uses for capital.”
随后伯克希尔进一步多元化，纺织业份额越来越小，对于公司整体的拖累也越来越轻微，而我们之所以继续保留纺织业务的原因，我早在1978年便曾提过(后来也曾陆续提到)：(1) 该公司为当地非常重要的雇主，(2) 管理层坦诚面对困境并努力解决问题，(3) 公司员工体认困境并极力配合，(4) 相对于投资，尚能产生稳定现金回报。我后来还说：只要这些情况持续不变(我们也预期不会变)，即使有更好的投资机会，我们仍会继续支持纺织业务。
It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil. 11
事实证明我对第四点的判断大错特错，尽管1979年的盈利状况还不错，但此后的业务消耗了大量的现金。到1985年中期，连我自己都清楚，这种情况几乎肯定会持续下去。若我们能够找到合适的买主，即使是贱价出售也比清算要好，但我们知道的别人同样清楚，因此没人会有兴趣。
I won’t close down businesses of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to our corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect. Adam Smith would disagree with my first proposition, and Karl Marx would disagree with my second; the middle ground is the only position that leaves me comfortable.
我们不会仅仅为了提高我们公司的回报率而关闭盈利能力尚可但低于正常水平的企业。但同时我们还认为，即使是一家利润非常丰厚的公司，一旦出现无休止的亏损，也不应该继续向他提供资金。亚当·斯密一定不赞同我第一项的看法，而卡尔·马克思却又会反对我第二项见解，而中间立场是惟一能让我感到安心的做法。
I should reemphasize that Ken and Garry have been resourceful, energetic and imaginative in attempting to make our textile operation a success. Trying to achieve sustainable profitability, they reworked product lines, machinery configurations and distribution arrangements. We also made a major acquisition, Waumbec Mills, with the expectation of important synergy (a term widely used in business to explain an acquisition that otherwise makes no sense). But in the end nothing worked and I should be faulted for not quitting sooner. A recent Business Week article stated that 250 textile mills have closed since 1980. Their owners were not privy to any information that was unknown to me; they simply processed it more objectively. I ignored Comte’s advice - “the intellect should be the servant of the heart, but not its slave” - and believed what I preferred to believe.
我必须再次强调，蔡斯与加里两个人都极具干劲与想象力，努力使我们的纺织业务取得成功，为了使公司持续稳定获利，他们重新规划产品线、生产流程与分销商配置，同时我们还大手笔的并购了瓦姆贝克磨坊，期望发挥协同效应(商业并购中广泛使用的术语，用于解释没有意义的收购)，但最后没有一点效果，没有早点退出纺织业的错误在我。最近《商业周刊》有一篇文章提到，自1980年以来已有250家纺织公司停止运营。这些工厂股东所知道的我亦全都明了，只是他们能够更客观地看待事情，我忽略了孔德的建议：“智者应该是心灵的仆人，而非它的奴隶，“而去选择相信我更愿意相信的东西。
The domestic textile industry operates in a commodity business, competing in a world market in which substantial excess capacity exists. Much of the trouble we experienced was attributable, both directly and indirectly, to competition from foreign countries whose workers are paid a small fraction of the U.S. minimum wage. But that in no way means that our labor force deserves any blame for our closing. In fact, in comparison with employees of American industry generally, our workers were poorly paid, as has been the case throughout the textile business. In contract negotiations, union leaders and members were sensitive to our disadvantageous cost position and did not push for unrealistic wage increases or unproductive work practices. To the contrary, they tried just as hard as we did to keep us competitive. Even during our liquidation period they performed superbly. (Ironically, we would have been better off financially if our union had behaved unreasonably some years ago; we then would have recognized the impossible future that we faced, promptly closed down, and avoided significant future losses.)
国内的纺织业所面临的是全球产能过剩的大宗商品的激烈竞争，我们所面临的问题主要归因于直接或是间接来自于国外低劳力成本的竞争，这些国家的工人工资仅仅是美国最低工资的一小部分。但这绝不意味着我们的劳动力应该为我们的倒闭承担任何责任，事实上比起美国其它产业的劳工来说，整个纺织业的员工薪资水准低得可怜。在劳资协议谈判时，工会的干部与成员体会到整个产业所面临的困境，从未作出不合理的调薪要求或不符生产效益的诉求，相反地，大家都努力的想要维持竞争力，即使在公司清算期间，他们仍极力配合。而讽刺的是，如果工会表现的过分一些，使我们早一点看清行业的不利前景而立刻关厂，我们的损失可能会少一点。
Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses.
多年来，我们一再面临投入大量的资本支出以降低变动成本的抉择，每次提出的投资企划看起来都稳赚不赔，以标准的投资回报率来看，甚至比起我们高回报的糖果与新闻事业还好的多。
But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory. Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.
但事实证明这些预期回报只是一种幻象。因为我们许多国内外竞争者同样也都在加大资本投入力度，使得降低的成本被迫全数反应在售价之上。单独来看，每家公司的资本支出计划看起来都具有成本效益和合理性，但再从整体上看，其效益完全被抵销掉而变得很不合理，就好像每个观看游行的人都认为踮起脚尖可以看得更清楚一样。每一轮投资过后，所有的竞争者押注的金额越来越高，但投资回报却一点也不见起色。
Thus, we faced a miserable choice: huge capital investment would have helped to keep our textile business alive, but would have left us with terrible returns on ever-growing amounts of capital. After the investment, moreover, the foreign competition would still have retained a major, continuing advantage in labor costs. A refusal to invest, however, would make us increasingly non-competitive, even measured against domestic textile manufacturers. I always thought myself in the position described by Woody Allen in one of his movies: “More than any other time in history, mankind faces a crossroads. One path leads to despair and utter hopelessness, the other to total extinction. Let us pray we have the wisdom to choose correctly.”
因此，我们面临着一个悲惨的选择：大笔的资本支出虽然可以令我们的纺织业务得以存活，但糟糕的投资回报却是少得可怜，而且不断的资本投入依然要面对国外持续的低成本的强力竞争。若不再继续投资，将使我们更不具竞争力，即使是与国内同行相比亦是如此。我觉得自己就好象处于伍迪·艾伦在他某一部电影中所描述的位置：比起历史上的任何一刻，此时人类处在面临抉择的路口，一条通往绝望的深渊，而另一条则通往毁灭，让我们祈祷有足够的智慧去作正确的决定。
For an understanding of how the to-invest-or-not-to-invest dilemma plays out in a commodity business, it is instructive to look at Burlington Industries, by far the largest U.S. textile company both 21 years ago and now. In 1964 Burlington had sales of 50 million. It had strengths in both distribution and production that we could never hope to match and also, of course, had an earnings record far superior to ours. Its stock sold at 60 at the end of 1964; ours was 13.
想要了解在大宗商品业务中是否应该继续投入资本，不妨看看伯灵顿工业，21年来都是美国最大的纺织公司，1964年该公司的营业额约为12亿美元，而我们是5000万美元，他们在分销与生产方面都拥有我们永远无法比拟的优势，利润数字也比我们要好看得多，当时它的股价为60美元，我们是13美元。
Burlington made a decision to stick to the textile business, and in 1985 had sales of about 3 billion, far more than any other U.S. textile company and more than 60 stock. A very large part of the expenditures, I am sure, was devoted to cost improvement and expansion. Given Burlington’s basic commitment to stay in textiles, I would also surmise that the company’s capital decisions were quite rational.
之后伯灵顿工业坚守纺织本业，1985年营业额达到28亿美金。1964-1985年间，该公司累计资本支出约30亿美元，远远超过美国任何一家纺织公司，这相当于向1964年底60美元的每股股价累计投入资本超过200美元。我相信其大部分资本用于降低成本与扩张之上，鉴于公司固守本业的承诺，这种投资决策属于是合理的。
Nevertheless, Burlington has lost sales volume in real dollars and has far lower returns on sales and equity now than 20 years ago. Split 2-for-1 in 1965, the stock now sells at 34 — on an adjusted basis, just a little over its $60 price in 1964. Meanwhile, the CPI has more than tripled. Therefore, each share commands about one-third the purchasing power it did at the end of 1964. Regular dividends have been paid but they, too, have shrunk significantly in purchasing power.
尽管如此，与20年前相比，以实际美元购买力计算，伯灵顿现在的实际销售数字有所下降，而且毛利率与股本回报率也大不如前。而该公司现在的股价仅仅是34美元，考虑到1965年一分二扩股，大约略高于当年的60美元，而在此同时，消费者物价指数CPI却早已是当年的三倍，因此每股购买力约为1964年底的三分之一，虽然每年有固定的股息发放，但购买力同样大幅缩水。
This devastating outcome for the shareholders indicates what can happen when much brain power and energy are applied to a faulty premise. The situation is suggestive of Samuel Johnson’s horse: “A horse that can count to ten is a remarkable horse - not a remarkable mathematician.” Likewise, a textile company that allocates capital brilliantly within its industry is a remarkable textile company - but not a remarkable business.
对股东而言，这个最悲惨的结局表明，花费大量人力物力在错误的产业将会导致什么后果。这种情况有如塞缪尔·约翰逊的那匹马：一只能数到十的马是只了不起的马，却不是了不起的数学家。同样的，一家能够合理配置资本的纺织公司是一家了不起的纺织公司，但却不是一家了不起的企业。
My conclusion from my own experiences and from much observation of other businesses is that a good managerial record (measured by economic returns) is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row (though intelligence and effort help considerably, of course, in any business, good or bad). Some years ago I wrote: “When a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for poor fundamental economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Nothing has since changed my point of view on that matter. Should you find yourself in a chronically-leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.
根据我个人的经验和对其他企业的大量观察，我得出一个结论：从经济回报来衡量，一项优异的企业经营记录的背后，你划的是一条怎样的船远比你怎样去划更重要。当然不管企业是好是坏，努力与才能也都很重要。几年前我曾说：当一个以管理著称的管理层遇到一家不具前景的糟糕公司时，通常是后者会占上风。如今我的看法依然不变，当你处于一艘长期漏水的破船上，与其费力修补破洞，还不如把精力放在如何换条好船之上。
There is an investment postscript in our textile saga. Some investors weight book value heavily in their stock-buying decisions (as I, in my early years, did myself). And some economists and academicians believe replacement values are of considerable importance in calculating an appropriate price level for the stock market as a whole. Those of both persuasions would have received an education at the auction we held in early 1986 to dispose of our textile machinery.
在说完我们纺织业的投资传奇后，我想说几句投资忠告。一些投资者在他们的股票购买决策中非常重视[Book_Value|账面价值]，并且一些经济学家和学者认为，重置价值对于计算整个股票市场的适当价格水平具有相当重要的意义。关于这两种说法在经过1986年初拍卖纺织机器设备后，给我好好地上了一课。
The equipment sold (including some disposed of in the few months prior to the auction) took up about 750,000 square feet of factory space in New Bedford and was eminently usable. It originally cost us about 2 million spent in 1980-84, and had a current book value of 30-$50 million.
卖掉的设备(包括几个月前已经卖掉的一部分)堆满了新贝德福德75万英尺的厂房空间，这些设备皆为可用。原始成本为1300万美金，包括近几年投入的200万，经加速折旧后，帐面价值为86.6万美元。虽然没有人会笨到投资纺织业，但要买一套这样的全新的设备也要花3-5千万美金。
Gross proceeds from our sale of this equipment came to 5,000 apiece in 1981 found no takers at 26 each, a sum less than removal costs.
但你知道吗？我们出售此套设备的总收益为163,122美元，考虑到必要的售前和售后成本，净收益为负。我们在1981年以每台5000美元的价格购买的相对现代的织布机，现在以50美元处理却无人问津。最后只能以26美元作为废品卖掉，这连拆除的成本都不够。
Ponder this: the economic goodwill attributable to two paper routes in Buffalo - or a single See’s candy store - considerably exceeds the proceeds we received from this massive collection of tangible assets that not too many years ago, under different competitive conditions, was able to employ over 1,000 people.
Three Very Good Businesses (and a Few Thoughts About Incentive Compensation) 三家非常优秀的企业（以及关于激励性薪酬的几点思考）
When I was 12, I lived with my grandfather for about four months. A grocer by trade, he was also working on a book and each night he dictated a few pages to me. The title - brace yourself - was “How to Run a Grocery Store and a Few Things I Have Learned About Fishing”. My grandfather was sure that interest in these two subjects was universal and that the world awaited his views. You may conclude from this section’s title and contents that I was overexposed to Grandpa’s literary style (and personality).
记得12岁时我和爷爷一起住了大概有4个月，那时他开了一家杂货店，他正在写一本书，每晚都会念几页给我听，书名很大气，叫《如何经营一家杂货店与我从钓鱼上学到的一些事》，我爷爷以为所有人对于这两件事一定都会感兴趣，且全世界一定都会看重他的想法。通过本节的标题和内容，你一定会觉得我的写作风格(也包含个性)完全承袭了我爷爷。
I am merging the discussion of Nebraska Furniture Mart, See’s Candy Shops, and Buffalo Evening News here because the economic strengths, weaknesses, and prospects of these businesses have changed little since I reported to you a year ago. The shortness of this discussion, however, is in no way meant to minimize the importance of these businesses to us: in 1985 they earned an aggregate of 8 million pre-tax.
我把内布拉斯家具城、喜诗糖果与布法罗报纸摆在一起谈是因为我认为这几家企业的竞争优势、劣势与产业前景跟我一年前报告的一样，一点都没有改变，简短的叙述不代表它们占我们公司的重要性有丝毫的减损。在1985年合计税前净利润为7200万美元，在十五年前还未买下它们之前，此数字为800万美元。
While an increase in earnings from 72 million sounds terrific - and usually is - you should not automatically assume that to be the case. You must first make sure that earnings were not severely depressed in the base year. If they were instead substantial in relation to capital employed, an even more important point must be examined: how much additional capital was required to produce the additional earnings?
虽然利润从800万到7200万看起来好象很惊人(事实上也是)，但你千万不要以为本来就是这样。首先你必须确定基期数据没有失真低估，其次，如果盈利相对于投入资本来说是很可观的(高ROIC)，则必须研究一个更重要的问题：产生额外收益需要再投入多少额外资本？
In both respects, our group of three scores well. First, earnings 15 years ago were excellent compared to capital then employed in the businesses. Second, although annual earnings are now 40 million more in invested capital to operate than was the case then.
关于这两点，这三家公司完全经得起考验。相对于其所占用的资本，十五年前它们所产生的收益就颇为可观。现在虽然增加了6400万收益，但企业运营额外累计投入的资本也只有4000万美金而已。
The dramatic growth in earning power of these three businesses, accompanied by their need for only minor amounts of capital, illustrates very well the power of economic goodwill during an inflationary period (a phenomenon explained in detail in the 1983 annual report). The financial characteristics of these businesses have allowed us to use a very large portion of the earnings they generate elsewhere. Corporate America, however, has had a different experience: in order to increase earnings significantly, most companies have needed to increase capital significantly also. The average American business has required about 1 of annual pre-tax earnings. That business, therefore, would have required over $300 million in additional capital from its owners in order to achieve an earnings performance equal to our group of three.
这三个企业的盈利能力急剧增长，同时它们只需要增加少量的资本，原因在于高通膨时期经济商誉所能发挥的魔力，我们在1983年报中有详细解释，这些公司的经济特性使得我们可以将他们所赚到的大部分收益用在别的投资之上。然而美国企业界却是另外一种状况：为了大幅提高获利，大部分公司需要再投入大量的资本。为了增加1美元的税前收益，平均需要再投入5美元资本。等于要额外再投入3亿美元，才能达到我们这三家公司目前的获利水准。
When returns on capital are ordinary, an earn-more-by-putting-up-more record is no great managerial achievement. You can get the same result personally while operating from your rocking chair. Just quadruple the capital you commit to a savings account and you will quadruple your earnings. You would hardly expect hosannas for that particular accomplishment. Yet, retirement announcements regularly sing the praises of CEOs who have, say, quadrupled earnings of their widget company during their reign - with no one examining whether this gain was attributable simply to many years of retained earnings and the workings of compound interest.
当资本回报率平平，这种建立在更多资本投入之上的盈利增长并不是什么伟大的管理成就。你躺在摇椅上也能轻松做出这样的成绩，只要你将存入银行的资金翻倍，你的利息就会翻倍，没有人会对这样的成果报以掌声。但通常我们在某位资深主管的退休仪式上，歌颂他在任内将公司的收益数字提高数倍，却没人会去看看这一成果事实上只是因为公司每年所累积收益与复利所产生的效果。
If the widget company consistently earned a superior return on capital throughout the period, or if capital employed only doubled during the CEO’s reign, the praise for him may be well deserved. But if return on capital was lackluster and capital employed increased in pace with earnings, applause should be withheld. A savings account in which interest was reinvested would achieve the same year-by-year increase in earnings - and, at only 8% interest, would quadruple its annual earnings in 18 years.
当然若那家公司在此期间以有限的资金赚取极高的报酬或是只增加一点资金便创造更多的收益，则他所得到的掌声是名符其实。但若资本回报率低迷，而投入的资本随着收入的增长而增加，那么就应该把掌声收回，因为只要把存在银行所赚的8%利息再继续存着，18年后你的利息收入自然翻倍。
The power of this simple math is often ignored by companies to the detriment of their shareholders. Many corporate compensation plans reward managers handsomely for earnings increases produced solely, or in large part, by retained earnings - i.e., earnings withheld from owners. For example, ten-year, fixed-price stock options are granted routinely, often by companies whose dividends are only a small percentage of earnings.
这种简单的算术问题常常被公司管理层忽视，从而损害其股东的利益。许多公司的奖励计划随随便便就大方的犒赏公司主管，事实上公司的收益增长完全或大部分是由留存收益产生的——即从所有者那里扣留的收益。例如十年固定价格的认股权通常由股息率极低的公司授予。
An example will illustrate the inequities possible under such circumstances. Let’s suppose that you had a $100,000 savings account earning 8% interest and “managed” by a trustee who could decide each year what portion of the interest you were to be paid in cash. Interest not paid out would be “retained earnings” added to the savings account to compound. And let’s suppose that your trustee, in his superior wisdom, set the “pay-out ratio” at one-quarter of the annual earnings.
有一个例子可以用来说明这其中的不合理性，假设你有一个本金10万美元利率8%的银行账户，交由一位理财经理“管理”，该理财经理决定每年以现金支付您的利息是多少。未支付的利息则继续存在银行利滚利，让我们假设理财经理以其卓越的智慧将”支付比率”设定为年收入的25%。
Under these assumptions, your account would be worth 8,000 to 2,000 in the first year to $3,378 in the tenth year. Each year, when your manager’s public relations firm prepared his annual report to you, all of the charts would have had lines marching skyward.
最后让我来看看十年之后你会得到什么：十年后你的账户余额是179,084美元，此外在理财经理的精心管理下，你每年收到的利息从2,000增加到3,378美元，而你整体年收入从8,000增加到13,515美元。每年你的理财经理向你提交的年度报告中，所有的图表都是一条上升的直线。
Now, just for fun, let’s push our scenario one notch further and give your trustee-manager a ten-year fixed-price option on part of your “business” (i.e., your savings account) based on its fair value in the first year. With such an option, your manager would reap a substantial profit at your expense - just from having held on to most of your earnings. If he were both Machiavellian and a bit of a mathematician, your manager might also have cut the pay-out ratio once he was firmly entrenched.
现在让我们再作进一步假设，你与理财经理签订的管理合约中有一项约定：赋予理财经理十年内固定价格的认股权利。现在你会发现，理财经理仅仅通过保留你的大部分利息的方式，就从你的口袋中大捞了一笔。如果他既是马基雅维利主义者，又有点数学基础的话，那么他一旦站稳脚跟，就可能会降低你的派息比例。
This scenario is not as farfetched as you might think. Many stock options in the corporate world have worked in exactly that fashion: they have gained in value simply because management retained earnings, not because it did well with the capital in its hands.
Managers actually apply a double standard to options. Leaving aside warrants (which deliver the issuing corporation immediate and substantial compensation), I believe it is fair to say that nowhere in the business world are ten-year fixed-price options on all or a portion of a business granted to outsiders. Ten months, in fact, would be regarded as extreme. It would be particularly unthinkable for managers to grant a long-term option on a business that was regularly adding to its capital. Any outsider wanting to secure such an option would be required to pay fully for capital added during the option period.
而事实上，公司高管对于期权采用双重标准，撇开认股权即时巨额补偿不谈，我认为公平地说，在商业世界中，没有任何一家公司会向局外人授予全部或部分业务的十年固定价格期权，甚至十个月都是不可想象的。尤其是需要频繁增加资本投入的企业来说，授予长期期权更是完全不可理喻的。任何想要获得类似期权的局外人都需要全额扣除在这期间的资本投入。假设是对外发行这样的认股权，其价格一定会高得惊人。
The unwillingness of managers to do-unto-outsiders, however, is not matched by an unwillingness to do-unto-themselves. (Negotiating with one’s self seldom produces a barroom brawl.) Managers regularly engineer ten-year, fixed-price options for themselves and associates that, first, totally ignore the fact that retained earnings automatically build value and, second, ignore the carrying cost of capital. As a result, these managers end up profiting much as they would have had they had an option on that savings account that was automatically building up in value.
然而管理层虽然不愿意向局外人这么做，却愿意对自己做。毕竟与自己谈判很少引起酒吧间的争吵。管理层定期为自己和同事设计十年期固定价格期权，首先，他们完全忽视留存收益自动创造价值的事实，其次，他们忽略了账面资本的占用成本。结果，从一个本该自动增值的储蓄账户的期权上，这些经理人获得了很多本该属于股东的利润。
Of course, stock options often go to talented, value-adding managers and sometimes deliver them rewards that are perfectly appropriate. (Indeed, managers who are really exceptional almost always get far less than they should.) But when the result is equitable, it is accidental. Once granted, the option is blind to individual performance. Because it is irrevocable and unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the company), the sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the star. A managerial Rip Van Winkle, ready to doze for ten years, could not wish for a better “incentive” system.
当然，有时股票期权也会授予才华横溢、对公司有巨大贡献的经理人，不过通常只是碰巧。事实上，一家公司给真正有杰出贡献的经理人的往往不够多。而股票期权一旦授予便无法撤销，无论这个人之后表现如何都不能取消(只要这位老兄继续留在公司)，一个庸才从期权赚到的跟真正的人才一样多，这实在是管理界的李伯大梦最好的去处了。一个准备打瞌睡十年的经理李伯不希望有更好的激励机制。
(I can’t resist commenting on one long-term option given an “outsider”: that granted the U.S. Government on Chrysler shares as partial consideration for the government’s guarantee of some lifesaving loans. When these options worked out well for the government, Chrysler sought to modify the payoff, arguing that the rewards to the government were both far greater than intended and outsize in relation to its contribution to Chrysler’s recovery. The company’s anguish over what it saw as an imbalance between payoff and performance made national news. That anguish may well be unique: to my knowledge, no managers - anywhere - have been similarly offended by unwarranted payoffs arising from options granted to themselves or their colleagues.)
（我忍不住要再说一次，之前一个”局外人”的长期期权案例：克莱斯勒公司为了获得借款担保，给了美国政府外部期权作为部分报酬，当后来这些期权变得价值不菲时，克莱斯勒竭尽所能想要修改条件，声称与政府对克莱斯勒复苏的贡献相比，政府获得的回报远远超过太多，政府所获得与付出不成正比，这种不满甚至成了全国性的新闻，这种不平之鸣很可能是独一无二的：因为据我所知，没有一家公司的经理人会对自己或同事在期权上类似的不劳而获表示过任何异议。）
Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently describes them as desirable because they put managers and owners in the same financial boat. In reality, the boats are far different. No owner has ever escaped the burden of capital costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs at all. An owner must weigh upside potential against downside risk; an option holder has no downside. In fact, the business project in which you would wish to have an option frequently is a project in which you would reject ownership. (I’ll be happy to accept a lottery ticket as a gift - but I’ll never buy one.)
更讽刺的是，大家一再发表”期权的实施是必要可行的，因为如此一来经理人与股东便能同舟一济”的论调，而事实上，两者的船是完全不同的，所有股东必须负担资本的成本，而经理人持有的固定价格期权却什么成本也不必承担。所有股东在期盼公司壮大的同时还必须承受公司可能破产的风险，而期权持有人没有这些风险。事实上，一个你希望能频繁享有期权的商业项目往往是你根本不想投资的项目，(若有人要免费送我彩票，我一定欣然接受，但我永远不会去买)。
In dividend policy also, the option holders’ interests are best served by a policy that may ill serve the owner. Think back to the savings account example. The trustee, holding his option, would benefit from a no-dividend policy. Conversely, the owner of the account should lean to a total payout so that he can prevent the option-holding manager from sharing in the account’s retained earnings.
在股利政策方面亦然，凡事对持有期权的经理人最有利的对股东一定最不利，回到之前的银行存款案例上，不派发利息对于持有期权的理财经理最有利，相反地，身为所有人应该要把利息全取出来，免得持有期权的经理人利用留存收益利滚利占股东便宜。
Despite their shortcomings, options can be appropriate under some circumstances. My criticism relates to their indiscriminate use and, in that connection, I would like to emphasize three points:
虽然有那么多缺点，期权在某些时后还是很好用，我批评的重点主要是它们被无限制地遭到滥用，这里我有三点要说明：
First, stock options are inevitably tied to the overall performance of a corporation. Logically, therefore, they should be awarded only to those managers with overall responsibility. Managers with limited areas of responsibility should have incentives that pay off in relation to results under their control. The .350 hitter expects, and also deserves, a big payoff for his performance - even if he plays for a cellar-dwelling team. And the .150 hitter should get no reward - even if he plays for a pennant winner. Only those with overall responsibility for the team should have their rewards tied to its results.
首先，股票期权不可避免地与公司的整体业绩挂钩，所以理论上它们应该授予负责公司全局的高级经理人，部门经理则应视其负责部分的表现给予奖励，对于打击率高达0.350的明星球员来说，应该给予大额的奖金，即使他带领的是一支烂队。相反地，对于打击率0.150的入门球员，就算他们那一队最后得到冠军也不应该给予任何奖励。只有那些对团队负有全面责任的人才能将他们的奖励与团队的成绩挂钩。
Second, options should be structured carefully. Absent special factors, they should have built into them a retained-earnings or carrying-cost factor. Equally important, they should be priced realistically. When managers are faced with offers for their companies, they unfailingly point out how unrealistic market prices can be as an index of real value. But why, then, should these same depressed prices be the valuations at which managers sell portions of their businesses to themselves? (They may go further: officers and directors sometimes consult the Tax Code to determine the lowest prices at which they can, in effect, sell part of the business to insiders. While they’re at it, they often elect plans that produce the worst tax result for the company.) Except in highly unusual cases, owners are not well served by the sale of part of their business at a bargain price - whether the sale is to outsiders or to insiders. The obvious conclusion: options should be priced at true business value.
第二，期权设计应当要非常慎重。除非有特殊原因，应该要把账面资金成本与保留收益的影响列入考量，同样重要的是，期权的定价应该是合理的。当公司面临外部敌意并购时，他们一定马上指出市价是如何地不合理，无法反应公司实际的价值，但是为何公司要以更低的价格贱卖公司部分股权给经理人呢？他们可能会走得更远：高管和董事有时会参考税法，以确定将部分股权出售给内部人士的最低价格，甚至会选择对公司产生最坏税收结果的计划。除非在非常特殊的情况，公司将部分股权廉价不管是卖给内部人还是外部人，原来的股东权益一定受到损害，显而易见的结论是：期权的认购价一定要与其真实商业价值对等。
Third, I want to emphasize that some managers whom I admire enormously - and whose operating records are far better than mine - disagree with me regarding fixed-price options. They have built corporate cultures that work, and fixed-price options have been a tool that helped them. By their leadership and example, and by the use of options as incentives, these managers have taught their colleagues to think like owners. Such a Culture is rare and when it exists should perhaps be left intact - despite inefficiencies and inequities that may infest the option program. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is preferable to “purity at any price”.
第三，我必须强调有一些我非常欣赏且经营绩效远胜于我的经理人，不认同我在固定价格期权的看法，他们建立了一套行之有效的企业文化，而固定价格期权是他们认为非常有用的激励工具。通过他们个人的领导风格与示范，并以期权作为激励措施，他们成功地引导员工以股东的心态来思考。这种文化是罕见的，但若有我们也必须小心的呵护，即使这样的期权效率低下并且不公平，孰谚有云：“东西若没坏，就不必修理”，这总比不惜一切代价的完美主义好得多。
At Berkshire, however, we use an incentive@compensation system that rewards key managers for meeting targets in their own bailiwicks. If See’s does well, that does not produce incentive compensation at the News - nor vice versa. Neither do we look at the price of Berkshire stock when we write bonus checks. We believe good unit performance should be rewarded whether Berkshire stock rises, falls, or stays even. Similarly, we think average performance should earn no special rewards even if our stock should soar. “Performance”, furthermore, is defined in different ways depending upon the underlying economics of the business: in some our managers enjoy tailwinds not of their own making, in others they fight unavoidable headwinds.
然而，在伯克希尔我们采用的奖励计划根据每个人在其职权范围内的目标达成状况做为奖赏的依据。若喜诗糖果表现的好，则这与新闻事业部门一点关系都没有，反之亦然。当然，我们在发放奖金时与伯克希尔的股价高低没有任何关连。我们认为，不管伯克希尔的股价是涨是跌，表现好的部门都应该得到应有的奖励，同样的即使伯克希尔的股价飙涨，若员工表现平平也不应该大发奖金。而表现是依据各个公司本身竞争条件与环境列入考量，有时只是运气好搭上行业景气的顺风车，有时不可避免的要在行业低谷中拼搏。
The rewards that go with this system can be large. At our various business units, top managers sometimes receive incentive bonuses of five times their base salary, or more, and it would appear possible that one manager’s bonus could top $2 million in 1986. (I hope so.) We do not put a cap on bonuses, and the potential for rewards is not hierarchical. The manager of a relatively small unit can earn far more than the manager of a larger unit if results indicate he should. We believe, further, that such factors as seniority and age should not affect incentive compensation (though they sometimes influence basic compensation). A 20-year-old who can hit .300 is as valuable to us as a 40-year-old performing as well.
即使是在这样的制度下，有时奖励也相当可观。在各个部门中，高级经理人有时可以领到底薪五倍以上的奖金，甚至更多。1986年，一位经理可能会领到200万以上的奖金。我们奖金不设上限，奖金潜力也没有等级划分，我们认为尽管职位与年资可以影响基本薪酬，但不应该影响奖金。若表现得好，一个小业务主管可能比一个较大业务主管领得奖金多的多，只要打击率能超过0.300，不管你是20岁的小伙或是四十岁的老将，我们都一样重视。
Obviously, all Berkshire managers can use their bonus money (or other funds, including borrowed money) to buy our stock in the market. Many have done just that - and some now have large holdings. By accepting both the risks and the carrying costs that go with outright purchases, these managers truly walk in the shoes of owners.
显然，伯克希尔各业务的经理人可以利用他们所领到的奖金(或其他的钱，甚至去借钱)到股票市场上买进我们公司的股票，而事实上有许多人确实如此，而且持股数量很高。通过直接市场购买与其它股东一样承担风险与资金成本，这些经理人确实与公司股东站在同一条阵线之上。
Now let’s get back - at long last - to our three businesses:
现在，让我们回到我们这三项业务上：
At Nebraska Furniture Mart our basic strength is an exceptionally low-cost operation that allows the business to regularly offer customers the best values available in home furnishings. NFM is the largest store of its kind in the country. Although the already-depressed farm economy worsened considerably in 1985, the store easily set a new sales record. I also am happy to report that NFM’s Chairman, Rose Blumkin (the legendary “Mrs. B”), continues at age 92 to set a pace at the store that none of us can keep up with. She’s there wheeling and dealing seven days a week, and I hope that any of you who visit Omaha will go out to the Mart and see her in action. It will inspire you, as it does me.
在内布拉斯加家具场，我们最具优势的竞争力在于低成本的营运，并提供客户最有性价比的家具。作为全美同类商场规模最大的一家店，尽管本已萧条的农业经济在1985年大幅恶化，营收仍创下新高。我也很高兴跟各位报告，家具店的负责人B夫人虽然高龄92岁，每天仍以年轻人跟不上的节奏在店里忙碌着，她一个礼拜工作七天，我希望当大家造访奥马哈时，能到店里看看她，相信你会与我一样精神一振。
At See’s we continue to get store volumes that are far beyond those achieved by any competitor we know of. Despite the unmatched consumer acceptance we enjoy, industry trends are not good, and we continue to experience slippage in poundage sales on a same-store basis. This puts pressure on per-pound costs. We now are willing to increase prices only modestly and, unless we can stabilize per-shop poundage, profit margins will narrow.
喜诗糖果我们与同业竞争对手相比，其单店销售量仍大幅领先，虽然我们广为消费大众所接受，整个产业表现并不好，单店糖果销售磅数持续下滑，每磅单位成本压力陡升，而我们却只能稍微调涨价格，如此一来我们的毛利势必受到影响。
At the News volume gains are also difficult to achieve. Though linage increased during 1985, the gain was more than accounted for by preprints. ROP linage (advertising printed on our own pages) declined. Preprints are far less profitable than ROP ads, and also more vulnerable to competition. In 1985, the News again controlled costs well and our household penetration continues to be exceptional.
在新闻业务方面一样很难增加发行量，虽然1985年广告量略有增加，但主要来自于夹报部分，ROP广告(报纸版面上的广告)却在下滑，预印广告的利润远低于后者，且竞争较激烈，所幸去年成本控制得宜，我们的家庭渗透率仍然很高。
One problem these three operations do not have is management. At See’s we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey, a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and his unusual business talents have become more evident with every additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins - Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and Steve - a three-generation miracle of management.12
我们最不担心的就是三家公司的管理层，在接手喜诗糖果时我们便一直有查克·哈金斯掌控大局，我们买下公司那天就让他坐镇，选上他是我们做得最对的决策之一。新闻业务我们有斯坦·利普西，也是一位出色的经理人，他跟我们在一起工作十七年了，每当我们赋予他更多责任，他的才能表现便更上一层楼。在NFM家具店我们拥有令人惊叹的布鲁金家族：B 夫人、刘易斯、罗恩、欧文和 史蒂夫，三代人的管理奇迹。
I consider myself extraordinarily lucky to be able to work with managers such as these. I like them personally as much as I admire them professionally.
能够跟这一群优秀的专业经理人一起共事，我实在感到非常幸运，在专业上我佩服之至，在私人方面则是我的好朋友。
Insurance Operations 保险业务
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table, listing two key figures for the insurance industry:
下表是年报中常见表格的更新版本，列示保险业务的两项关键数字：
| Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) 保费收入增长率 | Combined Ratio after Policy-holder Dividends 保单分红后综合比率 | |
|---|---|---|
| 1972 | 10.2 | 96.2 |
| 1973 | 8.0 | 99.2 |
| 1974 | 6.2 | 105.4 |
| 1975 | 11.0 | 107.9 |
| 1976 | 21.9 | 102.4 |
| 1977 | 19.8 | 97.2 |
| 1978 | 12.8 | 97.5 |
| 1979 | 10.3 | 100.6 |
| 1980 | 6.0 | 103.1 |
| 1981 | 3.9 | 106.0 |
| 1982 | 4.4 | 109.7 |
| 1983 | 4.5 | 111.9 |
| 1984 (Revised) 1984（修订后） | 9.2 | 117.9 |
| 1985 (Estimated) 1985（预估） | 20.9 | 118 |
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages
数据来源：Best’s Aggregates and Averages
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.13
综合比率表示总保险成本（发生的赔付加上费用）与保费收入的比值：低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 则表示亏损。
The industry’s 1985 results were highly unusual. The revenue gain was exceptional, and had insured losses grown at their normal rate of most recent years - that is, a few points above the inflation rate - a significant drop in the combined ratio would have occurred. But losses in 1985 didn’t cooperate, as they did not in 1984. Though inflation slowed considerably in these years, insured losses perversely accelerated, growing by 16% in 1984 and by an even more startling 17% in 1985. The year’s growth in losses therefore exceeds the inflation rate by over 13 percentage points, a modern record.
1985年保险业整体的业绩有点不寻常，保费收入大幅成长，如果承保损失与前几年一样以固定比率成长，约比通货膨胀率高几个百分点，那么综合比率就会明显下降。但1985年的承保损失并没有配合，尽管这几年通货膨胀显着放缓，但承保损失却反常地加速增长，1984年增长16%，1985年更是惊人地增长了17%，超过通货膨胀率13个百分点，创下新记录。
Catastrophes were not the culprit in this explosion of loss cost. True, there were an unusual number of hurricanes in 1985, but the aggregate damage caused by all catastrophes in 1984 and 1985 was about 2% of premium volume, a not unusual proportion. Nor was there any burst in the number of insured autos, houses, employers, or other kinds of “exposure units”.
灾难并不是承保损失激增的主因，虽然1985年确实有几次相当大的飓风发生，但1984年和1985年所有灾难造成的总损失约为保费量的2%，这比例不算异常。投保汽车、房屋、员工或其它投保标的出险的也没有爆增。
A partial explanation for the surge in the loss figures is all the additions to reserves that the industry made in 1985. As results for the year were reported, the scene resembled a revival meeting: shouting “I’ve sinned, I’ve sinned”, insurance managers rushed forward to confess they had under reserved in earlier years. Their corrections significantly affected 1985 loss numbers.
承保损失激增的部分原因是去年业界大幅提升损失准备，就像报告所显示的，这场景就像检讨会议，都在大喊”我有罪，我有罪”，保险业务经理人一窝蜂地承认前几年损失准备拨备不足，业界的集体修正显著影响了今年的业绩。
A more disturbing ingredient in the loss surge is the acceleration in “social” or “judicial” inflation. The insurer’s ability to pay has assumed overwhelming importance with juries and judges in the assessment of both liability and damages. More and more, “the deep pocket” is being sought and found, no matter what the policy wording, the facts, or the precedents.
承保损失激增的另外一个更令人不安的因素是社会或司法通胀成本的增加，在陪审团和法官评估责任和损害时，保险人的支付能力具有压倒性的重要性。无论保单条款、事实真相或先前判例如何，越来越多的人在觊觎财大气粗的保险公司。
This judicial inflation represents a wild card in the industry’s future, and makes forecasting difficult. Nevertheless, the short-term outlook is good. Premium growth improved as 1985 went along (quarterly gains were an estimated 15%, 19%, 24%, and 22%) and, barring a supercatastrophe, the industry’s combined ratio should fall sharply in 1986.
这成为保险业预测未来的最不确定的因素。尽管如此，短期前景还不错，整个1985年保费增长不断改善(按季度15%-19%-24%-22%)，除非发生巨灾，否则1986年综合比率有望大幅下降。
The profit improvement, however, is likely to be of short duration. Two economic principles will see to that. First, commodity businesses achieve good levels of profitability only when prices are fixed in some manner or when capacity is short. Second, managers quickly add to capacity when prospects start to improve and capital is available. 14
然而盈利改善的情况无法持续太久，主要有两个经济因素，一是大宗商品企业只有在价格稳定或供给短缺的情况下才能实现良好的盈利水平，二是行业景气转暖且从业者资金充裕时便会猛增产能。
In my 1982 report to you, I discussed the commodity nature of the insurance industry extensively. 15 The typical policyholder does not differentiate between products but concentrates instead on price. For many decades a cartel-like procedure kept prices up, but this arrangement has disappeared for good. The insurance product now is priced as any other commodity for which a free market exists: when capacity is tight, prices will be set remuneratively; otherwise, they will not be.
在1982年年报中，我曾展开讨论保险产品的特点。一般的投保人不太在乎产品的差异而只关注价格，几十年来行业联盟式的制度使得价格居高不下，但这种情况如今已不复存在。保险产品现在的定价方式，与自由市场存在的任何其他商品一样：当供给吃紧，价格自然上升，反之就不会。
Capacity currently is tight in many lines of insurance - though in this industry, unlike most, capacity is an attitudinal concept, not a physical fact. Insurance managers can write whatever amount of business they feel comfortable writing, subject only to pressures applied by regulators and Best’s, the industry’s authoritative rating service. The comfort level of both managers and regulators is tied to capital. More capital means more comfort, which in turn means more capacity. In the typical commodity business, furthermore, such as aluminum or steel, a long gestation precedes the birth of additional capacity. In the insurance industry, capital can be secured instantly. Thus, any capacity shortage can be eliminated in short order.
目前，保险行业许多业务线的产能供应紧张，虽然保险业跟大部分的行业不同，所谓的供应紧张仅仅是心态上而非实质性的(承保意愿低迷)，只要保险业者愿意，他可以签下无限数量的保单，这期间只会受到监管机构和行业评级机构Best’s的压力。而公司管理层和监管当局的承保意愿只跟资本实力有关，更多的资本代表更多的冲动，也意味着乐意签下更多的保单。在大宗商品企业，如钢铁或铝业，增加产能需要很长的准备时间。而在保险业资本可以立刻到位，因此供给不足的情况可能马上就会消失。
That’s exactly what’s going on right now. In 1985, about 15 insurers raised well over $3 billion, piling up capital so that they can write all the business possible at the better prices now available. The capital-raising trend has accelerated dramatically so far in 1986.
这就是目前实际发生的状况，1985年大约15家保险公司筹集了超过30亿美元的资金，以便在价格高位吃进所有可能的生意，而且1986年以来资金募集的速度越来越快。
If capacity additions continue at this rate, it won’t be long before serious price-cutting appears and next a fall in profitability. When the fall comes, it will be the fault of the capital-raisers of 1985 and 1986, not the price-cutters of 198X. (Critics should be understanding, however: as was the case in our textile example, the dynamics of capitalism cause each insurer to make decisions that for itself appear sensible, but that collectively slash profitability.)
如果产能继续以这种速度增加，不用多久马上会出现杀价竞争的情况，之后获利也会承压。而这一切都要归咎那些大幅增资的业者，然而，批评人士应该明白：正如我们的纺织业一样，市场经济的变化导致每个保险公司做出的决策本身似乎是明智的，但就行业整体来说，竞争降低了集体的盈利能力。
In past reports, I have told you that Berkshire’s strong capital position - the best in the industry - should one day allow us to claim a distinct competitive advantage in the insurance market. With the tightening of the market, that day arrived. Our premium volume more than tripled last year, following a long period of stagnation. Berkshire’s financial strength (and our record of maintaining unusual strength through thick and thin) is now a major asset for us in securing good business.
以往年报我曾告诉过大家，伯克希尔强大的资本状况(堪称业界之最)有一天能让我们在保险业拥有明显的竞争优势，随着市场的紧缩，这一天已到来了。在经过长期的停滞之后，去年我们的保费收入增加了2倍多，伯克希尔的财务实力(以及过去优异的承保记录)是我们最好的竞争力。
We correctly foresaw a flight to quality by many large buyers of insurance and reinsurance who belatedly recognized that a policy is only an IOU - and who, in 1985, could not collect on many of their IOUs. These buyers today are attracted to Berkshire because of its strong capital position. But, in a development we did not foresee, we also are finding buyers drawn to us because our ability to insure substantial risks sets us apart from the crowd.
我们正确地预见到许多保险和再保险的大客户会转向高质量保险公司，在1985年他们许多保单无法兑现的时候才发现，保单只是一张欠条。如今这些客户都被伯克希尔雄厚的资产实力吸引上门，而另外一点是我们没有预见到的发展过程，那就是我们有能力为重大风险承保从而使我们脱颖而出。
To understand this point, you need a few background facts about large risks. Traditionally, many insurers have wanted to write this kind of business. However, their willingness to do so has been almost always based upon reinsurance arrangements that allow the insurer to keep just a small portion of the risk itself while passing on (“laying off”) most of the risk to its reinsurers. Imagine, for example, a directors and officers (“D & O”) liability policy providing 1 million of any loss that occurs. The liability for any loss above that amount up to $24 million would be borne by the reinsurers of the issuing insurer. In trade parlance, a company that issues large policies but retains relatively little of the risk for its own account writes a large gross line but a small net line.
要理解这一点，你必须对巨额风险有一些认识，以往有许多保险公司都很愿意承保此类保单，他们这么做是基于再保险的安排，他们自己只要保留一小部分的风险，而将大部分的风险转嫁给再保业者。例如，一单2500万保额的董事和经理人责任险，承保公司通过各种超额损失再保险合同，将超过2400万损失责任签发给再保险公司承担，而自己只留下一个100万的零头。按业界的说法是，保单总额很高，但净额很少。
In any reinsurance arrangement, a key question is how the premiums paid for the policy should be divided among the various “layers” of risk. In our D & O policy, for example. what part of the premium received should be kept by the issuing company to compensate it fairly for taking the first 1 million and $25 million?
在任何的再保安排中，最重要的问题是保费收入应如何公平在各个风险层级中分配。例如前面的管理层责任险案例，签发保单的保险公司应保留多数保费以承担其前面第一个100万的损失风险，以及应该向再保人转嫁多少保费以公平的承担100-2500万之间的损失风险。
One way to solve this problem might be deemed the Patrick Henry approach: “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience.” 16 In other words, how much of the total premium would reinsurers have needed in the past to compensate them fairly for the losses they actually had to bear?
帕特里克·亨利提供了解决这种难题的方法：经验是指导我前进的惟一明灯。换句话说，再保业者需要多少保费才能公平的补偿其所承担的损失要依据过去的经验。
Unfortunately, the lamp of experience has always provided imperfect illumination for reinsurers because so much of their business is “long-tail”, meaning it takes many years before they know what their losses are. Lately, however, the light has not only been dim but also grossly misleading in the images it has revealed. That is, the courts’ tendency to grant awards that are both huge and lacking in precedent makes reinsurers’ usual extrapolations or inferences from past data a formula for disaster. Out with Patrick Henry and in with Pogo: “The future ain’t what it used to be.” 17
但不幸的是经验之灯根本不够亮，因为大部分业务都是”长尾”业务，往往需要在许多年之后才能真正知道发生了多少损失。而且最近经验之灯不仅黯淡下来还存在误导，也就是说，法院倾向于给予缺乏先例的巨额赔偿金，使得再保业者依据过去经验推估变成一场灾难。扔掉经验之灯，响起伴奏：未来已不同往日。
The burgeoning uncertainties of the business, coupled with the entry into reinsurance of many unsophisticated participants, worked in recent years in favor of issuing companies writing a small net line: they were able to keep a far greater percentage of the premiums than the risk. By doing so, the issuing companies sometimes made money on business that was distinctly unprofitable for the issuing and reinsuring companies combined. (This result was not necessarily by intent: issuing companies generally knew no more than reinsurers did about the ultimate costs that would be experienced at higher layers of risk.) Inequities of this sort have been particularly pronounced in lines of insurance in which much change was occurring and losses were soaring; e.g., professional malpractice, D & 0, products liability, etc. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that issuing companies remained enthusiastic about writing business long after premiums became woefully inadequate on a gross basis.
近年来，再保险业务不断增长的不确定性，叠加许多经验不足的新进者，使得直保公司倾向通过保留远高于风险的保费比例，将风险转嫁给再保公司，仅仅承担较少额度的风险。这样的作法有时在直保公司与再保公司整体亏钱的情况下，直保公司甚至还能获利。但这种结局并不是故意的，对于更高风险水平下所产生最终成本，直保公司通常并不比再保公司了解更多。这种不平等现象在保险业中尤为明显，保险业正在发生巨大变化，损失也在飙升，例如职业舞弊、管理层责任险以及产品责任险等。在这些情况下，在保费严重不足的情况下，直保公司还在积极签发保单就不足为奇了。
An example of just how disparate results have been for issuing companies versus their reinsurers is provided by the 1984 financials of one of the leaders in large and unusual risks. In that year the company wrote about 2 1/2 billion of the premiums, or about 40%. It gave the remaining 200 million - an excellent result in that year. Meanwhile, the part laid off produced a loss of over $1.5 billion for the reinsurers. Thus, the issuing company wrote at a combined ratio of well under 110 while its reinsurers, participating in precisely the same policies, came in considerably over 140. This result was not attributable to natural catastrophes; it came from run-of-the-mill insurance losses (occurring, however, in surprising frequency and size). The issuing company’s 1985 report is not yet available, but I would predict it will show that dramatically unbalanced results continued.
1984年，一家大型异常风险领域的领军企业的财务报告提供了一个例子，说明了直保公司与再保险公司的结果有多么不同。在那一年这家公司一共签下60亿元的保单，在保留其中的40%约25亿后，将剩下的35亿转给再保公司，结果最后，保留部分理赔的损失只有不到2亿美元，非常不错的承保业绩。与此同时，分保出去的部分却使再保业者蒙受了15亿美元的损失，使得直保公司的综合比率不到110，但再保公司却高达140，这一结果不是自然灾害造成的，它来自普通保险损失，然而，发生的频率和损失都令人惊讶。虽然我尚未看到该公司今年的年报，但可想而知这种不平衡的情况一定还在继续。
A few years such as this, and even slow-witted reinsurers can lose interest, particularly in explosive lines where the proper split in premium between issuer and reinsurer remains impossible to even roughly estimate. The behavior of reinsurers finally becomes like that of Mark Twain’s cat: having once sat on a hot stove, it never did so again - but it never again sat on a cold stove, either. Reinsurers have had so many unpleasant surprises in long-tail casualty lines that many have decided (probably correctly) to give up the game entirely, regardless of price inducements. Consequently, there has been a dramatic pull-back of reinsurance capacity in certain important lines.
这种情况已经好几年了，在直保和再保公司之间的保费合理分配仍无法粗略估计的大量业务线上，即使是一些反应较慢的再保业者都失去了兴趣。再保业者的行为就像马克·吐温的猫一样：“一旦被热炉子烫过一次，便不会再去碰任何炉子，即使是冷的炉子也一样”，再保公司在长期意外险遭遇了太多不愉快的意外，以至于到最后决定放弃这项业务(可能也是正确的)，完全不理投保价格如何诱人，因此，某些业务的再保能力出现了严重短缺。
This development has left many issuing companies under pressure. They can no longer commit their reinsurers, time after time, for tens of millions per policy as they so easily could do only a year or two ago, and they do not have the capital and/or appetite to take on large risks for their own account. For many issuing companies, gross capacity has shrunk much closer to net capacity - and that is often small, indeed. 18
如此一来许多直保公司面临压力，他们再也不能够像以前一样，动不动就将上千万的保单转给再保公司，他们也没有能力与资本自行承接大额保单。许多直保公司的承保总额也大幅缩水到净额附近——而他们的承保净额通常是很小的。
At Berkshire we have never played the lay-it-off-at-a-profit game and, until recently, that put us at a severe disadvantage in certain lines. Now the tables are turned: we have the underwriting capability whereas others do not. If we believe the price to be right, we are willing to write a net line larger than that of any but the largest insurers. For instance, we are perfectly willing to risk losing $10 million of our own money on a single event, as long as we believe that the price is right and that the risk of loss is not significantly correlated with other risks we are insuring. Very few insurers are willing to risk half that much on single events - although, just a short while ago, many were willing to lose five or ten times that amount as long as virtually all of the loss was for the account of their reinsurers.
在伯克希尔我们从来不玩这类以盈利为目的分割游戏，这也让我们最近几年在某些业务处于严重劣势，不过现在情况发生逆转：我们拥有同业无法比拟的承保实力。只要我们认为价格合理，我们愿意承保其它大型保险公司吃不下的保单。例如，我们愿意承担一次事件中损失1000万美元的风险，只要价格合理且其风险与我们已承保的风险无显著相关性。很少有其他同行肯承保一半的损失风险。尽管在不久之前，他们甚至愿意吃下十倍以上的保单，只要有再保公司来承担所有的损失。
In mid-1985 our largest insurance company, National Indemnity Company, broadcast its willingness to underwrite large risks by running an ad in three issues of an insurance weekly. The ad solicited policies of only large size: those with a minimum premium of 50 million. (Hold the applause: it’s all long-tail business and it will be at least five years before we know whether this marketing success was also an underwriting success.) Today, our insurance subsidiaries continue to be sought out by brokers searching for large net capacity.
1985年年中，我们旗下最大的保险公司国民保险在三期保险期刊上大幅投放广告，对外宣传愿意承保巨大风险的意愿。该广告只征集超过100万美金的大额保单，结果总计收到600条回函，最后产生约5000万美金保费，先不要高兴太早，这些都是长尾业务，至少要经过五年以上才能确定这次成功的营销是不是承保成功。现在，一般的保险经纪人要接高额的保单，一定会首先找到我们的保险子公司。
As I have said, this period of tightness will pass; insurers and reinsurers will return to underpricing. But for a year or two we should do well in several segments of our insurance business. Mike Goldberg has made many important improvements in the operation (prior mismanagement by your Chairman having provided him ample opportunity to do so). He has been particularly successful recently in hiring young managers with excellent potential. They will have a chance to show their stuff in 1986.
正如我说过的，这段供应紧张的时期将会过去，大家还是会回到价格战。不过一两年内，我们在几项业务方面还是有很好的发挥空间，迈克·戈德伯格在营运上作了许多的重要改进(本人先前的管理不当，提供他不少发挥的空间)，尤其是最近几年他找了许多深具潜力的优秀人才进来(1985年迈克把原麦肯锡部下阿吉特·贾因招进伯克希尔)，明年他们将更有机会一显长才。
Our combined ratio has improved - from 134 in 1984 to 111 in 1985 - but continues to reflect past misdeeds. Last year I told you of the major mistakes I had made in loss-reserving, and promised I would update you annually on loss-development figures. Naturally, I made this promise thinking my future record would be much improved. So far this has not been the case. Details on last year’s loss development are on pages 50-52. They reveal significant underreserving at the end of 1984, as they did in the several years preceding.
综合比率方面也有所改善，从1984年的134%改善到1985年的111%，但过去的不良影响仍在。去年我告诉你我在损失准备金方面犯的主要错误，并承诺每年向你更新损失调整的数字。当然，我做出这个承诺是因为我认为未来的记录会有很大的改善，但到目前为止，事实并非如此。细节详如后述。与前几年一样，它们在1984年底揭示了准备金严重不足的情况。
The only bright spot in this picture is that virtually all of the underreserving revealed in 1984 occurred in the reinsurance area - and there, in very large part, in a few contracts that were discontinued several years ago. This explanation, however, recalls all too well a story told me many years ago by the then Chairman of General Reinsurance Company. He said that every year his managers told him that “except for the Florida hurricane” or “except for Midwestern tornadoes”, they would have had a terrific year. Finally he called the group together and suggested that they form a new operation - the Except-For Insurance Company - in which they would henceforth place all of the business that they later wouldn’t want to count.
万幸的是几乎所有的准备金不足都发生在再保部分，而且很大程度上，都发生在几年前陆续到期的许多保单上。这种解释使我想起许多年前，通用再保的董事长告诉我的一个小故事，他说每年公司的经理人都告诉他”除了佛罗里达的飓风和中西部的龙卷风的话，今年的成绩一定很好”，到最后实在忍不住他召集这群人开会并建议他们干脆另外成立一个新的业务，叫作”除了保险公司”，专门把他们后来不想计入的业务放入其中。
In any business, insurance or otherwise, “except for” should be excised from the lexicon. If you are going to play the game, you must count the runs scored against you in all nine innings. Any manager who consistently says “except for” and then reports on the lessons he has learned from his mistakes may be missing the only important lesson - namely, that the real mistake is not the act, but the actor.
不管是保险还是其它行业，应该把”除了”这个字眼从字典里删除。如果你要参加比赛，就应该把对手所有的得分全部计入，任何一直把”除了”挂在嘴上的经理人，不停报告他从错误中吸取的教训，那么他可能会错过唯一重要的教训：错的不是剧本，而是演员。
Inevitably, of course, business errors will occur and the wise manager will try to find the proper lessons in them. But the trick is to learn most lessons from the experiences of others. Managers who have learned much from personal experience in the past usually are destined to learn much from personal experience in the future.
当然做业务往往不可避免的会出些差错，而聪明的经理人一定能从中汲取教训，但诀窍是这个教训最好是从别人身上学来的，过去习惯犯错的经理人通常未来还是会继续犯错。
GEICO, 38%-owned by Berkshire, reported an excellent year in 1985 in premium growth and investment results, but a poor year - by its lofty standards - in underwriting. Private passenger auto and homeowners insurance were the only important lines in the industry whose results deteriorated significantly during the year. GEICO did not escape the trend, although its record was far better than that of virtually all its major competitors.
伯克希尔持有38%股权的盖可保险，在保费收入成长与投资收益方面皆表现突出，但在承保结果与其过去高标准相较却表现不佳，私家车与住宅房屋险是财产险业务中唯一显著恶化的重要险种。盖可也难逃一劫，虽然它的成绩比起其它主要的竞争对手要好得多。
Jack Byrne left GEICO at mid-year to head Fireman’s Fund, leaving behind Bill Snyder as Chairman and Lou Simpson as Vice Chairman. Jack’s performance in reviving GEICO from near-bankruptcy was truly extraordinary, and his work resulted in enormous gains for Berkshire. We owe him a great deal for that.
杰克·伯恩在年中离开盖可加入消防员基金保险公司，留下比尔·斯奈德与刘易斯·辛普森担任正副董事长，杰克之前挽救盖可免于破产的表现卓著，他的努力使得伯克希尔获益巨大，我们欠他太多。
We are equally indebted to Jack for an achievement that eludes most outstanding leaders: he found managers to succeed him who have talents as valuable as his own. By his skill in identifying, attracting and developing Bill and Lou, Jack extended the benefits of his managerial stewardship well beyond his tenure.
我们同样要感谢杰克另一项成就，这是大多数杰出领导者无法做到的：他找到具有跟他一样特质的经理人来接替他，通过发现、吸引和培养比尔和刘易斯，杰克使得他对公司的贡献与影响力超过他实际的任期。
Fireman’s Fund Quota-Share Contract 消防员基金保险公司，份额分担再保险合约
Never one to let go of a meal ticket, we have followed Jack Byrne to Fireman’s Fund (“FFIC”) where he is Chairman and CEO of the holding company.
绝对不要轻易放弃任何一个机会，我们跟着杰克加入由他担任控股公司董事长兼CEO的消防员基金保险公司。
On September 1, 1985 we became a 7% participant in all of the business in force of the FFIC group, with the exception of reinsurance they write for unaffiliated companies. Our contract runs for four years, and provides that our losses and costs will be proportionate to theirs throughout the contract period. If there is no extension, we will thereafter have no participation in any ongoing business. However, for a great many years in the future, we will be reimbursing FFIC for our 7% of the losses that occurred in the September 1, 1985 - August 31, 1989 period.
1985年9月1日我们成为消防员基金保险7%有效业务的参与者（他们为非附属公司承保的再保险保单除外），合约为期四年，并规定期间双方的损失与成本依比例分摊（成数再保险/比例再保险）。如果没有展期，我们将不再继续参与任何业务。不过在可预见的未来，我们将分摊消防员基金保险在1985年9月1日至1989年8月31日四年间发生的损失中的7%。
Under the contract FFIC remits premiums to us promptly and we reimburse FFIC promptly for expenses and losses it has paid. Thus, funds generated by our share of the business are held by us for investment. As part of the deal, I’m available to FFIC for consultation about general investment strategy. I’m not involved, however, in specific investment decisions of FFIC, nor is Berkshire involved in any aspect of the company’s underwriting activities.
根据合同消防员基金保险将7%保费汇给我们，而我们也将支付其所发生的任何损失，预收的资金则用在投资之上，合约附带条款，本人将向消防员基金保险提供一般投资咨询服务，但我并不介入具体的投资决策，而伯克希尔也不参与该公司任何的保险业务。
Currently FFIC is doing about 1.324 billion, and it therefore transferred 7% of this, or 29.4 million representing the underwriting expenses that they had incurred on the transferred premium. All of the FFIC business is written by National Indemnity Company, but two-sevenths of it is passed along to Wesco-Financial Insurance Company (“Wes-FIC”), a new company organized by our 80%-owned subsidiary, Wesco Financial Corporation. Charlie Munger has some interesting comments about Wes-FIC and the reinsurance business on pages 60-62.19
目前消防员基金保险的业务量约达30亿美元，且随着费率上涨规模有可能再增加，该公司在1985年9月1日的未到期保险责任准备金达13.24亿美元，所以消防员基金保险汇了其中的7%，相当于9270万美金转移给我们，同时我们也支付了2940万美金给他们，代表他们转移保费产生的承保费用。所有消防员基金保险业务均由国民保险公司承保，之后再将其中的2/7再保给西科金融保险公司，这是一家由我们持股80%的西科金融公司新组建的再保险公司。芒格在第 60-62 页对 西科金融保险公司和再保险业务发表了一些有趣的看法。
To the Insurance Segment tables on page 41, we have added a new line, labeled Major Quota Share Contracts. The 1985 results of the FFIC contract are reported there, though the newness of the arrangement makes these results only very rough approximations.20
在第 41 页的保险业务表格中，我们新增了一项：份额分担再保险合约。该项展示了 1985 年与消防员基金保险合同的细节，由于是新业务，所有数字都是粗略的估计。
After the end of the year, we secured another quota-share contract, whose 1986 volume should be over $50 million. We hope to develop more of this business, and industry conditions suggest that we could: a significant number of companies are generating more business than they themselves can prudently handle. Our financial strength makes us an attractive partner for such companies.
到了年底我们又获得另一份份额分担合约，1986年度的保费收入大约为5000万美元，我们希望能够发展更多的此类业务，而行业环境也不错，许多公司产生超过其本身处理能力的业务，而我们坚强的财务实力正是他们希望合作的最好对象。
Marketable Securities 股票投资
We show below our 1985 yearend net holdings in marketable equities. All positions with a market value over $25 million are listed, and the interests attributable to minority shareholders of Wesco and Nebraska Furniture Mart are excluded.
我们在 1985 年年底的有价证券净持有量在下表显示。 所有市值超过2500万美元的头寸均已列示，不包括归属于西科金融和内布拉斯家具城少数股东的权益。
| No of Shares 股份数量 | Company 公司 | Cost 成本 | Market 市值 |
|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) 单位：千美元 | (000s omitted) 单位：千美元 | ||
| 1,036,461 | Affiliated Publications, Inc. 联合出版公司 | $ 3,516 | $ 55,710 |
| 900,800 | American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. 美国广播公司 | 54,435 | 108,997 |
| 2,350,922 | Beatrice Companies, Inc. 比阿特丽斯食品公司 | 106,811 | 108,142 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corporation 盖可保险 | 45,713 | 595,950 |
| 2,379,200 | Handy & Harman 汉迪哈曼公司 | 27,318 | 43,718 |
| 847,788 | Time, Inc. 时代公司 | 20,385 | 52,669 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company 华盛顿邮报 | 9,731 | 205,172 |
| 267,909 | 1,170,358 | ||
| All Other Common Stockholdings 所有其他控股公司 | 7,201 | 27,963 | |
| Total Common Stocks 全部权益 | $ 275,110 | $ 1,198,321 |
We mentioned earlier that in the past decade the investment environment has changed from one in which great businesses were totally unappreciated to one in which they are appropriately recognized. The Washington Post Company (“WPC”) provides an excellent example.21
我们此前谈到过去十年来投资环境已经发生了变化，完全不受重视的伟大企业开始得到认可，华盛顿邮报就是一个很好的例子。
We bought all of our WPC holdings in mid-1973 at a price of not more than one-fourth of the then per-share business value of the enterprise. Calculating the price/value ratio required no unusual insights. Most security analysts, media brokers, and media executives would have estimated WPC’s intrinsic business value at 500 million just as we did. And its $100 million stock market valuation was published daily for all to see. Our advantage, rather, was attitude: we had learned from Ben Graham that the key to successful investing was the purchase of shares in good businesses when market prices were at a large discount from underlying business values.
我们在1973年中以不到当时内在价值四分之一的价格买入华盛顿邮报，计算价格/价值比并不需要独到的见解，大部分的证券分析师、经纪人与媒体跟我们一样估计该公司的价值约在4-5亿美元之间，但当时其仅1亿的市值却是天天可见。相反，我们的优势在于态度：我们从本杰明·格雷厄姆那里学到，成功投资的关键是，在市场价格大大低于企业内在价值的情况下买入优质企业的股票。
Most institutional investors in the early 1970s, on the other hand, regarded business value as of only minor relevance when they were deciding the prices at which they would buy or sell. This now seems hard to believe. However, these institutions were then under the spell of academics at prestigious business schools who were preaching a newly-fashioned theory: the stock market was totally efficient, and therefore calculations of business value - and even thought, itself - were of no importance in investment activities. (We are enormously indebted to those academics: what could be more advantageous in an intellectual contest - whether it be bridge, chess, or stock selection than to have opponents who have been taught that thinking is a waste of energy?)
在1970年代早期，大部分的机构投资者在考量买进卖出的价格时，认为与其内在价值并无太大相关性，现在看来似乎令人难以置信。然而当时他们受到知名的商学院所提出的新理论所惑：股票市场是完全有效的，因此计算企业的价值对于投资活动来说一点也不重要。我们非常感谢这些学者：在不管是桥牌、国际象棋还是选股等智力竞赛中，当对手被教导思考是白费力气时，还有什么比这更有利的？
Through 1973 and 1974, WPC continued to do fine as a business, and intrinsic value grew. Nevertheless, by yearend 1974 our WPC holding showed a loss of about 25%, with market value at 10.6 million. What we had thought ridiculously cheap a year earlier had become a good bit cheaper as the market, in its infinite wisdom, marked WPC stock down to well below 20 cents on the dollar of intrinsic value.
在1973~1974年间，华盛顿邮报表现依旧良好，内在价值持续增加。尽管如此，我们的持股市值却由原始成本的1060万减少25%变成800万美元，一年前我们认为便宜得离谱的东西现在变得更便宜了。一年前我们认为便宜得离谱的东西现在变得更便宜了。仅仅一年，具有无比智慧的市场使得WPC的市值跌至内在价值的20%。
You know the happy outcome. Kay Graham, CEO of WPC, had the brains and courage to repurchase large quantities of stock for the company at those bargain prices, as well as the managerial skills necessary to dramatically increase business values. Meanwhile, investors began to recognize the exceptional economics of the business and the stock price moved closer to underlying value. Thus, we experienced a triple dip: the company’s business value soared upward, per-share business value increased considerably faster because of stock repurchases and, with a narrowing of the discount, the stock price outpaced the gain in per-share business value.
美好的结局可以预知，华盛顿邮报的CEO凯瑟琳.格雷厄姆具备提升内在价值极佳的管理技能，更是有智慧有勇气的以便宜的价格大量买回公司的股份。与此同时投资者开始认识到公司非凡的竞争优势，股价迅速回升到合理的价位。所以我们经历了价值回归三击：一击来自公司内在商业价值的增长，二击来自每股所代表的价值因公司回购大幅增加，三击来自估值的提升，股价表现大幅超越公司内在价值的实际增长。
We hold all of the WPC shares we bought in 1973, except for those sold back to the company in 1985’s proportionate redemption. Proceeds from the redemption plus yearend market value of our holdings total $221 million.
If we had invested our 40 - 160 million or so we gained through ownership of WPC came, in very large part, from the superior nature of the managerial decisions made by Kay as compared to those made by managers of most media companies. Her stunning business success has in large part gone unreported but among Berkshire shareholders it should not go unappreciated.
假若当初在1973年中期我们将1060万投资于当时最受青睐的六大媒体公司之一，那么年底我们持股的市值大约会在4000-6000万元之间，即使这个表现也远远超过一般市场的收益，其原因在于媒体行业非凡的竞争力，我们通过华盛顿邮报获得的额外1.6亿美元左右则完全归功于凯瑟琳管理决策的优越性，虽然她惊人的事业成就并未有人大幅报导，但伯克希尔的所有股东却不能不加以珍惜。
Our Capital Cities purchase, described in the next section, required me to leave the WPC Board early in 1986. But we intend to hold indefinitely whatever WPC stock FCC rules allow us to. We expect WPC’s business values to grow at a reasonable rate, and we know that management is both able and shareholder-oriented. However, the market now values the company at over 100 million. Because market prices have also been bid up for our other holdings, we face the same vastly-reduced potential throughout our portfolio.
大都会的收购，要求我必须在1986年离开华盛顿邮报的董事会，但只要美国联邦通信委员会法令许可我们将无限期的持有华盛顿邮报的股份。我们预计该公司的价值将持续稳定成长，我们也知道公司的管理阶层非常能干且完全以股东的利益为导向，公司的市值目前已增加为18亿美元，公司的价值很难再以当初市值仅一亿美元时的速度成长。由于我们其它主要持股的市场股价大多已很高，所以我们的投资组合面临大幅下降的压力。
You will notice that we had a significant holding in Beatrice Companies at yearend. This is a short-term arbitrage holding - in effect, a parking place for money (though not a totally safe one, since deals sometimes fall through and create substantial losses). We sometimes enter the arbitrage field when we have more money than ideas, but only to participate in announced mergers and sales. We would be a lot happier if the funds currently employed on this short-term basis found a long-term home. At the moment, however, prospects are bleak.
或许你会发现年底我们持有一大笔比阿特丽斯食品的股份，这是一笔短期的套利动作，算是闲置资金暂时的去处，虽然不是100%安全，因为有时也会套利失败导致重大的损失。我们有时也会在钱多于想法时进入套利领域，但我们只参与已公告宣布的案子，当然若能为这些资金找到更长期可靠的归宿我们会更高兴，但现阶段却找不到任何合适的投资对象。
At yearend our insurance subsidiaries had about 194 million at amortized cost were issues of Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”) Projects 1, 2, and 3. 1 discussed this position fully last year, and explained why we would not disclose further purchases or sales until well after the fact (adhering to the policy we follow on stocks). Our unrealized gain on the WPPSS bonds at yearend was 30 million.
年底，我们旗下保险子公司大约持有4亿美元的免税债券，其中1.94亿是华盛顿公用电力供应系统WPPSS发行的债券，该公司我已于去年详尽的说明同时也解释在事情尘埃落定之前我们为何不愿进一步说明公司的进出动作，就像我们投资股票时一样，到年底我们在该债券的未实现投资收益为6200万美元(市值从1.32亿上涨至1.94亿)，三分之一的原因是由于债券价格普遍上涨，其余则是投资人对于WPPSS一、二、三期计划有较正面的看法，我们每年从该投资所获得的免税利息收益大约为3000万美元。
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 大都会/美国广播
Right after yearend, Berkshire purchased 3 million shares of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (“Cap Cities”) at $172.50 per share, the market price of such shares at the time the commitment was made early in March, 1985. I’ve been on record for many years about the management of Cap Cities: I think it is the best of any publicly-owned company in the country. And Tom Murphy and Dan Burke are not only great managers, they are precisely the sort of fellows that you would want your daughter to marry. It is a privilege to be associated with them - and also a lot of fun, as any of you who know them will understand.
大约在年后，伯克希尔以每股172.5美元买进300万股的大都会/美国广播股票，这是1985年3月初做出承诺时这些股票的市场价格。我追踪该公司的管理绩效已有许多年，我认为他们是上市公司当中最优秀的，汤姆·墨菲与丹·伯克不仅是伟大的经理人，也是那种你会想把自己的女儿嫁给他的那一种人，跟他们交往实在是我的荣幸，也相当愉快，任何认识他们的人都会明白。
Our purchase of stock helped Cap Cities finance the $3.5 billion acquisition of American Broadcasting Companies. For Cap Cities, ABC is a major undertaking whose economics are likely to be unexciting over the next few years. This bothers us not an iota; we can be very patient. (No matter how great the talent or effort, some things just take time: you can’t produce a baby in one month by getting nine women pregnant.)
我们投资提供的资金帮助大都会以35亿美元并购美国广播公司，对大都会来说，美国广播是一项重要的业务，其经济状况在未来几年可能并不会令人满意。但我们很有耐心一点也不急，毕竟就算是天赋与努力俱备，很多事情还是需要时间来发酵：就算你让九个女人都怀孕，也不可能让小孩一个月就生出来。
As evidence of our confidence, we have executed an unusual agreement: for an extended period Tom, as CEO (or Dan, should he be CEO) votes our stock. This arrangement was initiated by Charlie and me, not by Tom. We also have restricted ourselves in various ways regarding sale of our shares. The object of these restrictions is to make sure that our block does not get sold to anyone who is a large holder (or intends to become a large holder) without the approval of management, an arrangement similar to ones we initiated some years ago at GEICO and Washington Post.
为了展现我们的信心，我们与管理阶层签订了一项特别的协议：在较长的期间内，我们的投票权将交给担任CEO的汤姆来处理(或是丹，如果他是CEO的话)。事实上这项提案是由查理和我主动提出的，同时还以各种方式限制我们出售自己的股份。这个动作主要是为了确保我们的股份不会未经现有管理层同意的情况下出售给任何潜在大股东，有点类似几年前我们在盖可与华盛顿邮报签订的协议。
Since large blocks frequently command premium prices, some might think we have injured Berkshire financially by creating such restrictions. Our view is just the opposite. We feel the long-term economic prospects for these businesses - and, thus, for ourselves as owners - are enhanced by the arrangements. With them in place, the first-class managers with whom we have aligned ourselves can focus their efforts entirely upon running the businesses and maximizing long-term values for owners. Certainly this is much better than having those managers distracted by “revolving-door capitalists” hoping to put the company “in play”. (Of course, some managers place their own interests above those of the company and its owners and deserve to be shaken up - but, in making investments, we try to steer clear of this type.)
由于巨额股份交易经常会溢价，有些人认为这样的限制可能会损及伯克希尔股东的权益，不过我们的看法正好完全相反，身为公司的所有权人，我们认定这些企业的长期经济利益将因为这些限制而更加巩固，因为如此一来，与之结盟的职业经理人便能将全部精力集中到公司经营上去，进而为全体股东创造最大的利益，很显然这比公司整天换老板分散经理们的注意力要好得多。当然有些经理人会把自己的利益摆在公司的利益之前，所以我们在投资时会尽量避开这类的管理层。
Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequence of widely-diffused ownership of voting stock. At any time a major holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuring rhetoric but frequently harboring uncivil intentions. By circumscribing our blocks of stock as we often do, we intend to promote stability where it otherwise might be lacking. That kind of certainty, combined with a good manager and a good business, provides excellent soil for a rich financial harvest. That’s the economic case for our arrangements.
如今，企业的不稳定是股权分散的必然结果，一家公司随时都会有大股东浮上台面，满口仁义道德但实际上却包藏祸心，我们常藉由锁住自身持有的股权来宣示对公司稳定的支持，这种股权结构的安定感加上优秀的管理层和良好的业务，是让企业获利丰收的沃土，这就是我们会这样安排的用意所在。
The human side is just as important. We don’t want managers we like and admire - and who have welcomed a major financial commitment by us - to ever lose any sleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our large ownership. I have told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put Berkshire’s signature where my mouth is. That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need not worry if my personal participation in Berkshire’s affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three digits).
当然人性也很重要，我们不希望我们欣赏与钦佩的经理人，在欢迎我们的加入后，会担心一觉醒来，因为我们持有重要股权，所有事情一夕生变。我告诉他们绝对放心，我们一定说话算话，而且也包括伯克希尔公司的承诺，即使我个人发生了什么不幸(意思是指我本人活不到一百岁就挂了)。
Our Cap Cities purchase was made at a full price, reflecting the very considerable enthusiasm for both media stocks and media properties that has developed in recent years (and that, in the case of some property purchases, has approached a mania). it’s no field for bargains. However, our Cap Cities investment allies us with an exceptional combination of properties and people - and we like the opportunity to participate in size.
我们以全价购买大都会反映出近年来对媒体股票和媒体资产的极大热情(当然还比不上某些资产并购案的疯狂)，事实上也没有多少讨价还价的余地，但重点是这项投资让我们能与这样杰出的人才与业务结合在一起，而且也是相当庞大的投资规模。
Of course, some of you probably wonder why we are now buying Cap Cities at 43 per share in 1978-80. Anticipating your question, I spent much of 1985 working on a snappy answer that would reconcile these acts.
至于有人可能会觉得很奇怪，为何同样一家公司，你们的董事长在1980年以前曾以43美元的价钱卖掉，而现在却以172.5美元的高价买回，有关这个问题，容我在多花一点时间，想一个漂亮一点的答案给各位。
A little more time, please.
请再给我一点时间。
Acquisition of Scott & Fetzer 收购斯科特·费策尔
Right after yearend we acquired The Scott & Fetzer Company (“Scott Fetzer”) of Cleveland for about 90 million of pre-existing Scott Fetzer debt remains in place.) In the next section of this report I describe the sort of businesses that we wish to buy for Berkshire. Scott Fetzer is a prototype - understandable, large, well-managed, a good earner.
年后，我们还斥资3.2亿美元并购了位于克利夫兰的斯科特·费策尔，其中约0.9亿美元预先存在的债务仍然存在。下一个段落我将会说明伯克希尔并购公司的一些标准，斯科特·费策尔就是个典型的例子：容易懂、规模大、管理佳、赚钱多。
The company has sales of about $700 million derived from 17 businesses, many leaders in their fields. Return on invested capital is good to excellent for most of these businesses. Some well-known products are Kirby home-care systems, Campbell Hausfeld air compressors, and Wayne burners and water pumps.
该公司拥有17家企业，年销售额约7亿美金，很多都是各自领域的佼佼者，大多数投资回报率都相当高，拥有许多知名品牌，如柯比吸尘器、坎贝尔空压机、韦恩瓦斯炉、水泵等。
World Book, Inc. - accounting for about 40% of Scott Fetzer’s sales and a bit more of its income - is by far the company’s largest operation. It also is by far the leader in its industry, selling more than twice as many encyclopedia sets annually as its nearest competitor. In fact, it sells more sets in the U.S. than its four biggest competitors combined.
世界图书约占该公司销售额的40%，收益占比略高一些，是该公司最大的业务，它还是行业龙头，每年销售量百科全书数量超过其它四家同业的总和。
Charlie and I have a particular interest in the World Book operation because we regard its encyclopedia as something special. I’ve been a fan (and user) for 25 years, and now have grandchildren consulting the sets just as my children did. World Book is regularly rated the most useful encyclopedia by teachers, librarians and consumer buying guides. Yet it sells for less than any of its major competitors. Childcraft, another World Book, Inc. product, offers similar value. This combination of exceptional products and modest prices at World Book, Inc. helped make us willing to pay the price demanded for Scott Fetzer, despite declining results for many companies in the direct-selling industry.
我和查理对世界百科全书的运作特别感兴趣，事实上我成为粉丝已有25年的历史，现在连我孙子辈都迷上了它，它被所有的老师、图书馆与读者评选为最有用的百科全书，然而它的售价却低于任何主要竞争对手，旗下另一款产品《儿童手工》也提供类似的价值。这种物美价廉产品使得我们愿意以该公司提出的价格进行并购，尽管直销行业的许多公司业绩都在下滑。
An equal attraction at Scott Fetzer is Ralph Schey, its CEO for nine years. When Ralph took charge, the company had 31 businesses, the result of an acquisition spree in the 1960s. He disposed of many that did not fit or had limited profit potential, but his focus on rationalizing the original potpourri was not so intense that he passed by World Book when it became available for purchase in 1978.22 Ralph’s operating and capital-allocation record is superb, and we are delighted to be associated with him.
在斯科特·费策尔同样吸引人的是担任了9年CEO的拉尔夫·谢伊，当他上任时，该公司共有多达31项业务，这是公司在1960年代杠杆并购狂潮的结果。他大刀阔斧将不合适或不赚钱的业务处置掉，但他对原有业务合理化的重视程度并没有高到在 1978 年世界图书公司待售时与之擦肩而过的地步。他在经营和资本分配上的功力相当杰出，我们很高兴能与他一起共事。
The history of the Scott Fetzer acquisition is interesting, marked by some zigs and zags before we became involved. The company had been an announced candidate for purchase since early 1984. A major investment banking firm spent many months canvassing scores of prospects, evoking interest from several. Finally, in mid-1985 a plan of sale, featuring heavy participation by an ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), was approved by shareholders. However, as difficulty in closing followed, the plan was scuttled.
事实上并购的过程相当有趣，在我们介入之前还有段小插曲，1984年初便传出该公司有意要出售，一家投资银行顾问花了好几个月向数十家潜在客户游说，也确实引起了几家公司的兴趣，最后在1985年中，股东大会批准了一项员工持股计划参与的出售方案，然而到了最后节骨眼该方案却被否决了。
I had followed this corporate odyssey through the newspapers. On October 10, well after the ESOP deal had fallen through, I wrote a short letter to Ralph, whom I did not know. I said we admired the company’s record and asked if he might like to talk. Charlie and I met Ralph for dinner in Chicago on October 22 and signed an acquisition contract the following week.
我在报上看到公司这一奥德赛般的历程，10月10日，在员工持股计划(ESOP)交易失败后不久，我立刻写了一封简短的信给还不认识的拉尔夫，我说我们很欣赏公司过去的表现，不知道他有没有兴趣与我们谈一谈，10月22日查理和我在芝加哥与拉尔夫共进晚餐，并在隔周正式签定并购合约。
The Scott Fetzer acquisition, plus major growth in our insurance business, should push revenues above $2 billion in 1986, more than double those of 1985.
Miscellaneous 其他事项
The Scott Fetzer purchase illustrates our somewhat haphazard approach to acquisitions. We have no master strategy, no corporate planners delivering us insights about socioeconomic trends, and no staff to investigate a multitude of ideas presented by promoters and intermediaries. Instead, we simply hope that something sensible comes along - and, when it does, we act.
斯科特·费策尔并购案充分说明了我们对于并购采取随性的态度，我们没有总体战略，没有企业规划师为我们提供有关社会经济趋势的见解，也没有员工来调查发起人和中介机构提出的大量想法。反而我们倾向一切顺其自然，当他们出现时，我们就会有所行动。
To give fate a helping hand, we again repeat our regular “business wanted” ad. The only change from last year’s copy is in (1): because we continue to want any acquisition we make to have a measurable impact on Berkshire’s financial results, we have raised our minimum profit requirement.
为了主动向命运招手，我们依惯例再次列出征求并购企业的小广告，今年惟一的小变动是第一项获利的标准略微提高，主要是因为我们期望并购能为伯克希尔产生显著的财务业绩影响：
Here’s what we’re looking for:
我们寻求符合下列条件的优秀企业：
(1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(1) 具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到1000万美元；
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are “turn-around” situations),
(2) 表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对前景美好或困境反转的公司没有兴趣；
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率ROE；
(4) management in place (we can’t supply it),
(4) 公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理；
(5) simple businesses (if there’s lots of technology, we won’t understand it),
(5) 简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知；
(6) an offering price (we don’t want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 提供合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we’re interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give. Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past. For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.
我们不会进行敌意并购，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，我们倾向现金交易，除非我们所换得的内在价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。我们欢迎可能的卖家向那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的管理层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。
On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don’t come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) “I’m-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people-get-to-know-each-other”. None of these attracts us in the least.
另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的出售，包括新公司、困境反转公司、拍卖公司以及最常见的中介经纪推销(那些说你们要是能碰一下面一定会感兴趣之类的)。在此重申我们对这些一点兴趣都没有。
Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase. Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation. We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.
除了以上买下整家公司的并购案外，我们还对大型但不具控制权股份的谈判购买感兴趣，就像我们在大都会这个例子一样，只有当我们对于该业务的商业模式与管理层的能力和诚信都非常满意时才会吸引我们。我们需要大笔的交易，个别情况下我们可能会做一些规模小到5000万美金的交易（甚至更小），但更希望是数倍于此。
About 96.8% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire’s 1985 shareholder-designated contributions program. Total contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,724 charities were recipients. We conducted a plebiscite last year in order to get your views about this program, as well as about our dividend policy. (Recognizing that it’s possible to influence the answers to a question by the framing of it, we attempted to make the wording of ours as neutral as possible.) We present the ballot and the results in the Appendix on page 69. I think it’s fair to summarize your response as highly supportive of present policies and your group preference - allowing for the tendency of people to vote for the status quo - to be for increasing the annual charitable commitment as our asset values build.
今年破记录的有96.8%的有效股权参与1985年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约400万美元捐出的款项分配给1,724家慈善机构，同时去年我们针对股东对于这项计划与股利政策的看法，进行全面性的公民投票，以了解您对该计划以及我们的股息政策的看法。(为避免投票问题影响你的答案，我们尽量将措辞保持中立)，附录中有相关的选票与结果，我认为对投票结果这样总结是公平的：股东高度支持当前的捐赠政策，随着我们资产价值的增加，增加年度慈善规模也是大家的群体偏好。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 66 and 67. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in “street” name or nominee name. Shares not so registered on September 30, 1986 will be ineligible for the 1986 program.
我们也建议新股东赶快阅读捐赠计划相关信息，若你也想参加的话，我们强烈建议你赶快把股份从经纪人那儿改登记于自己的名下，未在1986年9月30日登记到个人名下的股票将没有资格参加1986年计划。
Five years ago we were required by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 to dispose of our holdings in The Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois. Our method of doing so was unusual: we announced an exchange ratio between stock of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (the Illinois National’s holding company) and stock of Berkshire, and then let each of our shareholders - except me - make the decision as to whether to exchange all, part, or none of his Berkshire shares for Rockford shares. I took the Rockford stock that was left over and thus my own holding in Rockford was determined by your decisions. At the time I said, “This technique embodies the world’s oldest and most elementary system of fairly dividing an object. Just as when you were a child and one person cut the cake and the other got first choice, I have tried to cut the company fairly, but you get first choice as to which piece you want.”
基于1969年颁布的银行控股公司法的要求，五年前我们将旗下伊利诺伊国民银行信托公司的股份卖掉了，当时我们的作法是相当特别的，我们宣布伯克希尔与罗克福德银行（银行信托的母公司）的换股比例，除了我本人，其他每个股东自行决定是否将其全部或部分伯克希尔的股份转换为银行股份，剩下的部分由我本人兜底。当时我说：这种分法是最古老且最公平分配一件东西的方法，就像是小时候切蛋糕，一个人切，而由另一个人先选。由我试图公平分割，但由你们选择要那一块。
Last fall Illinois National was sold. When Rockford’s liquidation is completed, its shareholders will have received per-share proceeds about equal to Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value at the time of the bank’s sale. I’m pleased that this five-year result indicates that the division of the cake was reasonably equitable.
Last year I put in a plug for our annual meeting, and you took me up on the invitation. Over 250 of our more than 3,000 registered shareholders showed up. Those attending behaved just as those present in previous years, asking the sort of questions you would expect from intelligent and interested owners. You can attend a great many annual meetings without running into a crowd like ours. (Lester Maddox, when Governor of Georgia, was criticized regarding the state’s abysmal prison system. “The solution”, he said, “is simple. All we need is a better class of prisoners.” Upgrading annual meetings works the same way.)
去年年报有个插页是我向你们发出年会邀请，我们3000多名的股东中大约有250名出席了股东年会，与会者的水准与去年相当，问的问题显示大家都是有智慧且真正关心公司的股东，这在其它上市公司的股东会是很少见到的，乔治亚州州长莱斯特·马多斯因为糟糕透顶的狱政制度被批评时他说：“解决的方法其实很简单，我们要做的就是提升人犯的素质水准”，我想要提升股东会的水准也是一样的道理。
I hope you come to this year’s meeting, which will be held on May 20 in Omaha. There will be only one change: after 48 years of allegiance to another soft drink, your Chairman, in an unprecedented display of behavioral flexibility, has converted to the new Cherry Coke. Henceforth, it will be the Official Drink of the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.
伯克希尔的股东年会预计于1986年5月20日在奥马哈举行，我希望各位届时都能参加，今年将会有一项改变：忠于一款软饮料48年后，本人将进行一项前所未有的习惯改变，将平常喝的百事可乐改成新的樱桃可口可乐，此后，它将成为伯克希尔年度会议的官方饮料。
And bring money: Mrs. B promises to have bargains galore if you will pay her a visit at The Nebraska Furniture Mart after the meeting.
最后记得带钱来，B夫人已经答应若股东在会议期间造访她的家具店将会有意想不到的折扣优惠！
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
董事长
March 4, 1986
1986年3月4日
原文：nothing much was in the works but our experience had been that something big popped up occasionally.
共读版：虽然平时表面上无所作为，但我们的经验显示偶尔也会有一些大动作。
参考 DeepL，修改为：虽然平时表面上无所作为，但根据我们的经验，偶尔也会有一些大动作。
原文：It’s true that our insurance companies currently hold major positions in companies with exceptional underlying economics and outstanding managements, just as they did in 1974.
共读版：虽然我们投资组合持有的公司拥有优秀经营团队和特许经营的经济业务像1974年一样的优秀，
修改为：虽然我们投资组合持有的公司像1974年一样拥有优秀经营团队和特许经营业务，
原文：With the price there, purchasers could be certain (as long as they did not experience a widening of this discount) that their personal investment experience would at least equal the financial experience of the business. But recently the discount has disappeared, and occasionally a modest premium has prevailed.
共读版：从历史上看，伯克希尔股票的售价一直略低于内在商业价值。维持在这样的估值，投资人可以确定，只要折价的幅度不再继续扩大，其个人的投资收益与公司的业绩表现趋于一致，但最近折价消失了，甚至出现适度的溢价。
原文：The elimination of the discount means that Berkshire’s market value increased even faster than business value (which, itself, grew at a pleasing pace). That was good news for any owner holding while that move took place, but it is bad news for the new or prospective owner. If the financial experience of new owners of Berkshire is merely to match the future financial experience of the company, any premium of market value over intrinsic business value that they pay must be maintained.
共读版：折价消失代表着伯克希尔的市值增加的幅度高于内在价值增长的速度，虽然后者的表现也不错，当然这对于此前便持有股份的人算是好消息，但对于新股东或潜在股东却是不利的，而后者若想投资收益与公司的表现一致，则这种估值溢价现象需一直维持。
修改为：折价消失意味着伯克希尔的市值增加幅度高于内在价值增长的速度，虽然后者的表现也不错。当然这对于此前便持有股份的人来说是个好消息，但对于新股东或潜在股东却是不利的，而后者若想获得与公司的表现一致的投资收益，那就需要这种估值溢价现象一直维持。
原文：My own preference, as perhaps you’d guess, is for a market price that consistently approximates business value. Given that relationship, all owners prosper precisely as the business prospers during their period of ownership. Wild swings in market prices far above and below business value do not change the final gains for owners in aggregate; in the end, investor gains must equal business gains. But long periods of substantial undervaluation and/or overvaluation will cause the gains of the business to be inequitably distributed among various owners, with the investment result of any given owner largely depending upon how lucky, shrewd, or foolish he happens to be.
共读版：而我个人偏好是期望公司股价的表现始终与其企业内在价值接近，惟有这样，股东持有期间的回报跟公司业绩才能趋于一致。股价过高或过低地偏离其内在价值的剧幅波动并无法改变股东的最终回报，所有股东的回报必定与公司的业绩保持一致。股价长期偏离其[Intrinsic_Value|内在价值]只会导致企业的获利被不公平的分配到各个股东之间，而股东投资结果的好坏完全取决于其幸运、聪明或愚笨的程度。
修改为：也许你已经猜到，我本人更倾向于市场价格始终接近内在价值，惟有这样，股东持有期间的回报才能跟公司业绩趋于一致。市场价格远高于或低于企业价值并不会改变股东的最终回报，归根结底，所有股东的回报必定与公司业绩保持一致。但是，股价长期偏离其[Intrinsic_Value|内在价值]会导致公司收益分配不公，股东的投资收益在很大程度上取决于其幸运、聪明或愚笨的程度。
原文：virtually all of our shareholders are individuals, not institutions. No other public company our size can claim the same.
共读版：实际上，几乎我们所有的股东都是个人而不是机构，没有一家这样规模的上市公司能够做到这一点。
修改为：实际上，我们的股东几乎都是个人而不是机构，没有一家规模相近的上市公司能够做到这一点。
原文：The table on the next page shows the major sources of Berkshire’s reported earnings. These numbers, along with far more detailed sub-segment numbers, are the ones that Charlie and I focus upon. We do not find consolidated figures an aid in either managing or evaluating Berkshire and, in fact, never prepare them for internal use.
原文：In the table, amortization of Goodwill is not charged against the specific businesses but, for reasons outlined in the Appendix to my letter in the 1983 annual report, is aggregated as a separate item. (A compendium of the 1977-1984 letters is available upon request.) In the Business Segment Data and Management’s Discussion sections on pages 39-41 and 49-55, much additional information regarding our businesses is provided, including Goodwill and Goodwill Amortization figures for each of the segments. I urge you to read those sections as well as Charlie Munger’s letter to Wesco shareholders, which starts on page 56.
共读版没有翻译这部分内容，参照DeepL翻译为：在该表中，商誉的摊销没有记入具体的业务，而是出于 1983 年年度报告中我的信的附录中所述的原因，作为一个单独的项目汇总在一起。（1977-1984 年信件汇编可应要求提供。）在第 39-41 页和第 49-55 页的 “业务分部数据 “和 “管理层讨论 “部分，提供了有关我们业务的更多信息，包括每个分部的商誉和商誉摊销数字。我恳请您阅读这些章节，以及从第 56 页开始的查理·芒格致西科金融股东的信。
原文：At this point we usually turn to a discussion of some of our major business units. Before doing so, however, we should first look at a failure at one of our smaller businesses.
共读版：通常讲到这里接下来要谈的是，我们经营的主要业务，在开始之前，让我们先看看我们旗下事业的一项失败。
修改为：话讲到这，我们通常会接着讨论我们的主营业务，但在此之前，让我们先看看我们旗下事业一个失败的案例。
原文：This pullback proved wise: although much improved by Ken’s management, the textile business never became a good earner, not even in cyclical upturns.
共读版：这次撤退的决策事后证明完全正确，尽管Ken的管理营运已大为改善，但即使是在景气高峰的时候，纺织业务也没赚到钱。
修改为：这次撤退的决策事后证明完全正确，尽管在蔡斯的管理下，纺织业务已大为改善，但即使是在景气高峰的时候也没赚到钱。
原文：It turned out that I was very wrong about (4). Though 1979 was moderately profitable, the business thereafter consumed major amounts of cash. By mid-1985 it became clear, even to me, that this condition was almost sure to continue. Could we have found a buyer who would continue operations, I would have certainly preferred to sell the business rather than liquidate it, even if that meant somewhat lower proceeds for us. But the economics that were finally obvious to me were also obvious to others, and interest was nil.
共读版：但事实证明我对(4)的判断大错特错，尽管第二年1979年的获利状况还不错，但此后就消耗了大量的现金。到1985年中期，情况变得再明显不过了。若我们能够找到合适的买主，即使贱价出售我们也不愿意清算，但我们清楚这点表示别人更清楚，没有人会有兴趣。
修改为：事实证明我对第四点的判断大错特错，尽管1979年的盈利状况还不错，但此后的业务消耗了大量的现金。到1985年中期，连我自己都清楚，这种情况几乎肯定会持续下去。若我们能够找到合适的买主，即使是贱价出售也比清算要好，但我们知道的别人同样清楚，因此没人会有兴趣。
原文：One problem these three operations do not have is management. At See’s we have Chuck Huggins, the man we put in charge the day we bought the business. Selecting him remains one of our best business decisions. At the News we have Stan Lipsey, a manager of equal caliber. Stan has been with us 17 years, and his unusual business talents have become more evident with every additional level of responsibility he has tackled. And, at the Mart, we have the amazing Blumkins - Mrs. B, Louie, Ron, Irv, and Steve - a three-generation miracle of management.
共读版：我们较不担心的是这三家都有优秀的管理阶层，在接手喜诗糖果时我们便一直有Chuck Huggins掌控大局，我们买下公司那天就让他坐镇，选上他是我们作得最对的决策之一。新闻业务我们有Stan Lipsey，也是一个出色的经理人，他跟我们在一起工作十七年了，每当我们赋予他更多责任，他的才能表现便更上一层楼。在NFM家具店我们拥有令人惊叹的Blumkins家族：B 夫人、Louie、Ron、Irv 和 Steve，三代人的管理奇迹。
修改为：我们最不担心的就是三家公司的管理层，在接手喜诗糖果时我们便一直有查克·哈金斯掌控大局，我们买下公司那天就让他坐镇，选上他是我们做得最对的决策之一。新闻业务我们有斯坦·利普西，也是一位出色的经理人，他跟我们在一起工作十七年了，每当我们赋予他更多责任，他的才能表现便更上一层楼。在NFM家具店我们拥有令人惊叹的布鲁金家族：B 夫人、刘易斯、罗恩、欧文和 史蒂夫，三代人的管理奇迹。
原文：The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.
共读版没有翻译，参考DeepL翻译为：综合比率表示总保险成本（发生的赔付加上费用）与保费收入的比值：低于 100 表示承保盈利，高于 100 则表示亏损。
原文：The profit improvement, however, is likely to be of short duration. Two economic principles will see to that. First, commodity businesses achieve good levels of profitability only when prices are fixed in some manner or when capacity is short. Second, managers quickly add to capacity when prospects start to improve and capital is available.
共读版：然而获利改善的情况无法持续太久，经济上有两个主要原因，一是大宗商品企业只有当价格稳定或供给短缺的情况下才能维持不错的获利水平，二是行业景气转暖且业者资金充裕时便会猛增产能。
修改为：然而盈利改善的情况无法持续太久，主要有两个经济因素，一是大宗商品企业只有当价格稳定或供给短缺的情况下才能实现良好的盈利水平，二是行业景气转暖且从业者资金充裕时便会猛增产能。
原文：In my 1982 report to you, I discussed the commodity nature of the insurance industry extensively.
共读版：在1982年年报中，我曾广泛地讨论大宗商品化企业的特点。
修改为：在1982年年报中，我曾展开讨论保险产品的特点。
原文：One way to solve this problem might be deemed the Patrick Henry approach: “I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, and that is the lamp of experience.”
共读版：一种解决这种难题的方法叫做Patrick Henry法则：我只有一盏灯可以指引我的脚，那就是经验之灯。
修改为：帕特里克·亨利提供了解决这种难题的方法：经验是指导我前进的惟一明灯。
原文：Out with Patrick Henry and in with Pogo: “The future ain’t what it used to be.”
共读版：Patrick Henry失效，换成Pogo：未来已今非昔比了。
修改为：扔掉经验之灯，响起伴奏：未来已不同往日。
原文：This development has left many issuing companies under pressure. They can no longer commit their reinsurers, time after time, for tens of millions per policy as they so easily could do only a year or two ago, and they do not have the capital and/or appetite to take on large risks for their own account. For many issuing companies, gross capacity has shrunk much closer to net capacity - and that is often small, indeed.
共读版：如此一来许多直保客户面临压力，他们再也不能够像以前一样，动不动就将上千万的保单转给再保业者。他们也没有能力与资本自行承接大额的保单，有的直保业者的承保总额也大幅缩水到净额附近。
修改为：如此一来许多直保公司面临压力，他们再也不能够像以前一样，动不动就将上千万的保单转给再保公司，他们也没有能力与资本自行承接大额保单。许多直保公司的承保总额也大幅缩水到净额附近——而他们的承保净额通常是很小的。
原文：All of the FFIC business is written by National Indemnity Company, but two-sevenths of it is passed along to Wesco-Financial Insurance Company (“Wes-FIC”), a new company organized by our 80%-owned subsidiary, Wesco Financial Corporation. Charlie Munger has some interesting comments about Wes-FIC and the reinsurance business on pages 60-62.
共读版：所有FFIC业务均由国民保险公司承保，之后再将其中的2/7再保给Wesco财务子公司(Wes-FIC)，这是一家新组建的再保险公司。
部分内容没有翻译，补充为：所有消防员基金保险业务均由国民保险公司承保，之后再将其中的2/7再保给西科金融保险公司，这是一家由我们持股80%的西科金融公司新组建的再保险公司。芒格在第 60-62 页对 西科金融保险公司和再保险业务发表了一些有趣的看法。
原文：To the Insurance Segment tables on page 41, we have added a new line, labeled Major Quota Share Contracts. The 1985 results of the FFIC contract are reported there, though the newness of the arrangement makes these results only very rough approximations.
共读版：在保险部门我们特别新增一项份额保险合约，不过由于属于新业务，所有数字只能算是大概的估计。
部分内容没有翻译，补充为：在第 41 页的保险业务表格中，我们新增了一项：份额分担再保险合约。该项展示了 1985 年与消防员基金保险合同的细节，由于是新业务，所有数字都是粗略的估计。
原文：We mentioned earlier that in the past decade the investment environment has changed from one in which great businesses were totally unappreciated to one in which they are appropriately recognized. The Washington Post Company (“WPC”) provides an excellent example.
共读版：我们之前曾提到，过去十年来投资环境已从一个伟大企业完全不受重视转变成适当认可的环境，华盛顿邮报WPC就是一个最好的例子。
修改为：我们此前谈到过去十年来投资环境已经发生了变化，完全不受重视的伟大企业开始得到认可，华盛顿邮报就是一个很好的例子。
原文：He disposed of many that did not fit or had limited profit potential, but his focus on rationalizing the original potpourri was not so intense that he passed by World Book when it became available for purchase in 1978.
共读版：他大刀阔斧将不合适或不赚钱的业务处置掉，他对复兴这些业务没有任何兴趣，但1978年世界图书公司出售时买下了它。
修改为：他大刀阔斧将不合适或不赚钱的业务处置掉，但他对原有业务合理化的重视程度并没有高到在 1978 年世界图书公司待售时与之擦肩而过的地步。
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