原文信息:

On May 19, 1987, approximately 500 shareholders filed into the Witherspoon Concert Hall at Omaha’s Joslyn Art Museum for the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting.

1987 年 5 月 19 日,约 500 名股东来到奥马哈乔斯林艺术博物馆的威瑟斯彭音乐厅,参加伯克希尔的年会。

That Tuesday morning, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger sped through the formal proceedings in a matter of minutes — before opening the floor to questions from shareholders for the next two to three hours.

周二上午,沃伦-巴菲特和查理-芒格在短短几分钟内完成了正式流程—然后在接下来的两三个小时里接受股东提问。

The Omaha World-Herald noted that “Buffett constantly made humorous remarks while consuming Cherry Coke” — which, I must admit, is a pretty apt description of these Q&A sessions.

奥马哈世界先驱报》(Omaha World-Herald)指出,“巴菲特一边喝着樱桃可乐,一边不断发表幽默言论”—我必须承认,用这句话来形容这些问答环节再恰当不过了。

Well, without further ado, here’s everything that I could dig up from this (very) early episode of the Warren & Charlie show…

好了,废话不多说,下面是我能从这期(非常)早期的沃伦与查理问答中找到的所有内容…

(1) Will Berkshire Hathaway ever split its stock?

(1) 伯克希尔是否会拆分股票?

“I have a stockholder friend of mine who is 60,” said Buffett. “I just sent him a telegram on his birthday that said, ‘May you live until Berkshire Hathaway splits.’”

巴菲特说:“我有一位 60 岁的股东朋友。“我刚在他生日那天给他发了一封电报,上面写着’祝你活到伯克希尔拆股那天’。

The implication being, of course, that it never will.

当然,这意味着它永远不会拆股。

If only immortality could be won so easily.

如果长生不老可以如此轻易地赢得,那该多好。

Buffett’s reluctance to split the stock was the same then as it is today. Berkshire already has the exact group of patient, long-term shareholders that he wants — and it’s “a hard group to upgrade”.

巴菲特当时不愿拆分股票的原因和今天一样。伯克希尔已经拥有了他想要的那批耐心的长期股东—而且这批股东 “很难替代”。

(2) Would splitting the stock help Berkshire get listed on the New York Stock Exchange?

(2) 拆分股票是否有助于伯克希尔在纽约证券交易所上市?

Back in 1987, Berkshire’s stock was traded on the over-the-counter market. At least in part because its unusually large share price (already north of $3,000) all but ruled out inclusion in the NYSE.

1987 年,伯克希尔的股票在场外市场交易。至少在一定程度上是因为其异常高的股价(已经超过 3000 美元)几乎排除了在纽约证券交易所上市的可能性。

“A couple of people from the New York Stock Exchange came out three or four months ago [to try to convince me to list on the NYSE],” Buffett told shareholders.

巴菲特对股东们说:“三四个月前,纽约证券交易所的几个人来(试图说服我在纽约证券交易所上市)。

In those days, stock was typically purchased in 100-share “round” lots — which would be prohibitively expensive at Berkshire’s lofty price. And, if someone wished to buy a smaller amount (known as an “odd” lot), they got nickel-and-dimed with extra fees.

在当时,股票通常以 100 股 “一手”的方式购买—以伯克希尔的高价来说,这将是非常昂贵的。而且,如果有人希望购买较小数量的股票(称为 “非整数”手),就会被收取额外的费用。

So Buffett asked the NYSE to allow Berkshire to sell 10-share round lots as a compromise. “The New York Stock Exchange wants us,” he said, “but not the 10-share round lot. It wouldn’t work as 100 share trades.”

因此,巴菲特要求纽约证券交易所允许伯克希尔能以 10 股为一手出售股票,作为一种妥协。“他说:“纽约证券交易所想要我们加入,但不接受 10 股为一手。它不能像 100 股为一手交易那样运作”。

He sounded like he preferred the sedate pace of OTC anyway. “The less stock traded,” he said, “the better job we’ve done. That’s not an attitude the NYSE likes.”

无论如何,他听起来更喜欢场外交易的缓慢节奏。他说:“交易的股票越少,我们就做得越好。纽约证券交易所可不喜欢这种态度。”

  • The New York Stock Exchange agreed to Berkshire’s terms the following year and the Omaha-based conglomerate officially joined the Big Board on November 29, 1988 — with 10-share round lots instead of 100.

  • 次年,纽约证券交易所同意了伯克希尔的条件,这家总部位于奥马哈的企业集团于 1988 年 11 月 29 日正式加入大证券交易所—以 10 股而不是 100 股为一手的交易方式上市。

(3) Are there advantages to spinning off parts of Berkshire?

(3) 分拆伯克希尔的部分业务是否有好处?

“I don’t think it’s easier to administer two public companies instead of one,” said Buffett.

巴菲特说:“我不认为管理两家上市公司比管理一家公司更容易。

(4) Will you repurchase shares to boost Berkshire’s value?

(4) 你会回购股票来提升伯克希尔的价值吗?

“It would have to be significantly discounted from its intrinsic value,” said Buffett. “Berkshire’s stock trades close to its intrinsic value [right now].”

巴菲特说:“那必须大幅低于其内在价值。“伯克希尔的股票交易接近其内在价值”。

If that were to change, he said, “we’d repurchase some stock — but we don’t want that to happen.”

他说,如果这种情况发生变化,“我们会回购一些股票—但我们不希望这种情况发生”。

(5) Did your advertisement in the Wall Street Journal last year lead to any deals?

(5) 你去年在《华尔街日报》上刊登的广告是否促成了交易?

In 1986, Buffett placed an ad in the Wall Street Journal in search of companies to acquire — because tax changes coming at the end of the year made it a particularly advantageous time for owners to sell. He sought businesses worth at least 10 million of after-tax earnings.

1986 年,巴菲特在《华尔街日报》上刊登了一则广告,寻找可以收购的公司—因为年底的税制改革使公司所有者在这个时候出售公司特别有利。他寻找的是价值至少 1 亿美元、税后盈利 1 千万美元的企业。

And while he got a lot of responses, the vast majority were not a fit. “If you run an ad for a chihuahua,” said Buffett, “you get a lot of collie replies.”

虽然他收到了很多回复,但绝大多数都不合适。“巴菲特说:“如果你刊登一则招聘吉娃娃的广告,你会收到很多牧羊犬的回复。

(An example of a “collie reply” was the Mississippi woman who tried to sell Berkshire her antebellum mansion. Or the man who wanted to offload his NYC newsstand.)

(“牧羊犬回复 “的一个例子是,密西西比州的一位妇女试图把她的战前豪宅卖给伯克希尔。或者是那个想卖掉纽约报摊的男人)。

Buffett admitted that about five of the responses intrigued him, though none led to a deal. Nevertheless, he hoped that the advertisement made an impression on would-be sellers and might pay off down the line.

巴菲特承认,大约有五条回复引起了他的兴趣,但没有一条促成交易。尽管如此,他还是希望这则广告能给潜在卖家留下深刻印象,并在日后获得回报。

“The ad cost $47,000,” he said. “The Wall Street Journal is expensive. Even though it didn’t work, people will remember the ad.”

他说:“这则广告花费了 4.7 万美元。“《华尔街日报》很贵。即使没有成功,人们也会记住这个广告。

Until then, though, Berkshire would go back to business as usual. “We have a sophisticated acquisition policy,” Buffett said. “We wait for the phone to ring.”

不过,在此之前,伯克希尔将一切照旧。“巴菲特说:“我们有一套成熟的收购政策。“我们等着电话铃响。”

(6) What kind of businesses are you looking for?

(6) 你在寻找什么样的生意?

“I’d like to buy something for a penny, sell it for a dollar, and have it be habit-forming,” he laughed.

他笑着说:“我希望低价买,高价卖,而且能不断重复”。

Sadly, such unicorns are few and far between. “I don’t find any stocks that are attractive to me [right now].”

遗憾的是,这样的独角兽企业少之又少。“我找不到任何对我有吸引力的股票(现在)”。

(7) Would you invest in a foreign corporation?

(7) 你会投资外国公司吗?

“We had a few inquiries from Canada,” he said, “but it’s unlikely we’ll buy anything outside the United States.”

他说,“我们收到了一些来自加拿大的询价,但我们不太可能购买美国以外的任何东西”。

(8) What’s going to happen with inflation?

(8) 通货膨胀会怎样?

“At some point,” said Buffett, “we will see lots of inflation. We will not profit from it — and we’ll try not to be destroyed by it.”

巴菲特说:“在某些时候,我们会看到大量的通货膨胀。我们不会从中获利—我们会尽量不被它摧毁。”

He believed that the U.S. government would continue to print more money as needed, thereby fueling further inflation. “If you had a printing press in your basement and you had some problems, you might slip down there occasionally [too],” he said.

他认为,美国政府将继续根据需要印制更多的钞票,从而进一步加剧通货膨胀。他说:“如果你的地下室里有一台印刷机,而你又遇到了一些问题,你可能会时不时的去印制钞票。

(9) What is your position on protectionism?

(9) 你对保护主义的立场?

Buffett referred the questioner to an op-ed that he wrote earlier that month for the Washington Post. In it, he proposed a “plan that will promptly eliminate the trade deficit but leave us free of most of the problems that quotas and tariffs produce”.

巴菲特向提问者提到了他当月早些时候为《华盛顿邮报》撰写的一篇专栏文章。在这篇文章中,他提出了一个 “既能迅速消除贸易赤字,又能使我们摆脱配额和关税所带来的大多数问题的计划”。

His plan called for the creation and use of Import Certificates that would be issued to exporters based on the value of their exports. And any company seeking to import goods from overseas would need to purchase an equal amount of these ICs from the exporters. Voila, a trade balance.

他的计划要求创建和使用进口证书,根据出口商的出口价值向其发放。任何想要从海外进口商品的公司都需要从出口商那里购买等额的进口证书。这样,贸易就平衡了。

“In 1626, we made one of our better moves,” he wrote. “Encountering some consumption-oriented locals, we swapped a few trinkets for ownership of Manhattan Island. Now, we’ve begun reversing the process. We should stop this foolishness promptly — and ICs will do the job.”

他写道:“1626 年,我们采取了一个更好的举措。遇到一些注重消费的当地人,我们用一些小玩意换取了曼哈顿岛的所有权。现在,我们开始采取不一样的措施。我们应该及时制止这种愚蠢的行为—进口证书将起到作用。”

(10) What are your views on the insurance business?

(10) 您对保险业务有何看法?

In 1986, Berkshire’s insurance operations achieved a combined ratio of 103% — pretty good for that era’s high interest rate environment — but there were ominous signs that increased capacity throughout the industry would soon drive down prices.

1986 年,伯克希尔保险业务综合比率达到 103%,这在当时的高利率环境下相当不错,但有不祥之兆表明,整个行业产能的增加很快就会导致价格下降。

And that’s exactly what happened.

事实也正是如此。

Berkshire’s insurance volume dropped by 35% in the first quarter of 1987 — and Buffett expected the situation to worsen in the coming years. “The [insurance] business is becoming intrinsically less profitable,” he said.

1987 年第一季度,伯克希尔公司的保险额下降了 35%,巴菲特预计未来几年情况还会恶化。他说:“从本质上讲,保险业务的利润越来越低。”

(11) Do you think executive compensation at Berkshire is too high?

(11)你认为伯克希尔的高管薪酬是否过高?

This question seemed mostly aimed at insurance chief Mike Goldberg’s $2.2 million total compensation (salary and bonus) in 1986.

这个问题似乎主要针对保险业主管迈克-戈德伯格 1986 年 220 万美元的总薪酬(工资和奖金)。

“Mike’s compensation relates to the business under his control,” said Buffett. “I pulled it down — and he pulled it up. Our compensation reflects that.” (A joke at the sizable difference between Goldberg’s multi-million-dollar pay package and Buffett’s customary $100,000 salary.)

巴菲特说:“迈克的薪酬与他管理的业务有关。我的降低了,他的提高了。我们的报酬情况反映了这一点。(这是对戈德伯格数百万美元的薪酬待遇与巴菲特惯常的 10 万美元薪水之间巨大差距的玩笑)。”

“Mike’s not the only one up there,” he added. “The figures can’t get too big as far as we’re concerned.”

他补充说:“高的不只有迈克一个人。就我们而言,数额不可能太大”。

Buffett has said elsewhere that he never minds writing a big check for outstanding performance. In fact, it’s the managers who muddle along in mediocrity — never earning lucrative bonuses — that really bother him.

巴菲特曾在其他地方说过,他从来不介意为出色的业绩付高报酬。事实上,真正让他感到困扰的是那些平庸无为、从来没有获得过丰厚奖金的经理人。

(12) What is the long-term plan for Berkshire?

(12) 伯克希尔公司的长期计划是什么?

“We have no interest in selling or merging,” said Buffett. “We have no end-game strategy. Charlie and I have fun. We like the people we work with.”

巴菲特说:“我们对出售或合并没有兴趣。我们没有终极战略。查理和我玩得很开心。我们喜欢与我们共事的人。”

(13) What do you think will happen in the stock market?

(13) 你认为股市会发生什么变化?

By 1987, Berkshire’s stock cupboard looked pretty bare. Buffett and Munger had sold almost all of their non-permanent holdings because of the frothy market and invested the proceeds in tax-free bonds.

到 1987 年,伯克希尔的股票投资选择已经相当有限。面对泡沫化的市场,巴菲特芒格几乎卖掉了所有非长期持股,并将收益投资于免税债券

It was a time of all greed and no fear on Wall Street — which has never been Berkshire’s kind of market. Killer timing, too, with the Black Monday crash just a few months away.

当时的华尔街只有贪婪,没有恐惧—伯克希尔从来不喜欢这样的市场。伯克希尔选择的时机也很好,黑色星期一崩盘就在几个月后。

Berkshire hung onto its primary holdings of Capital Cities/ABC, the Washington Post Co., and GEICO — along with a smaller arbitrage position in Lear Siegler.

伯克希尔坚持持有 Capital Cities/ABC、华盛顿邮报公司和 GEICO 等主要股票,以及李尔-西格勒(Lear Siegler)的较小套利头寸。

“I’ve been around for 40 years and I don’t know how to forecast the market,” Buffett admitted. “We’re going to hold our stocks even if the stocks go down 50%. [If it’s] psychologically impossible for you to own stocks that fall 50%, don’t own them.”

巴菲特承认:“我已经投资了 40 年,但我不知道如何预测市场。“即使我们的股票下跌 50%,我们也会持有。如果你心理上无法承受股票下跌 50%,那就不要持有。”

(14) How do you feel about those caught insider trading?

(14) 你如何看待那些被抓的内幕交易者?

“You can’t put them away long enough,” said Buffett. “We applaud what the SEC is doing.”

巴菲特说:“对他们的惩罚时间太短了。我们对美国证券交易委员会的做法表示赞赏。”

And then Charlie chimed in: “When incredible rewards go to the casino operators, it is extremely unlikely that civilization has reached nirvana.”

然后查理也插话了: “当赌场经营者获得难以置信的回报时,人类文明就极有可能已经涅槃了。”

(15) What will happen to Berkshire when Warren Buffett dies?

(15) 巴菲特去世后,伯克希尔会怎么样?

It’s kind of crazy to think about, but Buffett has spent over two-thirds of his life answering questions about his death. In one of his early partnership letters, he admitted that people were already asking him — at scarcely thirty years old — what would happen to their investments if he died.

想想都有点疯狂,但巴菲特一生中有超过三分之二的时间都在回答关于自己死亡的问题。在他早期的一封致合伙人的信中,他承认人们已经在问他—当时他还不到 30 岁—如果他死了,他们的投资会怎么样。

At the 1987 annual meeting, he gave his usual response: His untimely death should not upset the applecart at Berkshire. And, if the stock did drop after he passed away, it would be a strong buy for long-term investors.

在 1987 年的年会上,他一如既往地做出了回答: 他的早逝不应该打乱伯克希尔的计划。而且,如果伯克希尔的股票在他去世后下跌,对于长期投资者来说也是一个很好的买点。

After all, Berkshire would be left in safe hands. “Charlie would run things,” he said.

毕竟,伯克希尔将交到可靠的人手中。“他说:“查理会管理一切。

That answer stirred Charlie and the vice chairman quickly reassured shareholders that the Buffett family was well known for its longevity. To prove his point, he motioned towards Buffett’s 83-year-old mother who was seated in the crowd.

这个回答激起了查理的兴趣,副董事长很快向股东们保证,巴菲特家族以长寿著称。为了证明自己的观点,他向坐在人群中的巴菲特 83 岁的母亲示意。

(16) Do you plan to open more See’s Candies stores?

(16) 你们是否计划开设更多的 See’s 糖果店?

Buffett pointed out that See’s does most of its business during the Christmas season — which leads to long lines at stores. Which, in turn, leads customers (and some shareholders) to grumble that more locations should be opened to capture this demand. But, Buffett warned, while such a strategy might alleviate those holiday lines, it would prove uneconomical the other eleven months.

巴菲特指出,See’s 的大部分业务都是在圣诞节期间完成的—这导致店里排起了长队。这反过来又导致顾客(和一些股东)抱怨说,应该开设更多的分店来满足这种需求。但是,巴菲特警告说,虽然这种策略可能会缓解节假日的排队现象,但在其他 11 个月里,这种策略将被证明是不划算的。

“We only make money [at See’s] when people are inconvenienced,” he said.

他说:“我们只有在人们感到不便的时候才能赚钱。”

I’m guessing that this somewhat cryptic line means that See’s makes its money during short bursts of high demand (when lines are long), but would lose money with more locations (and shorter lines) because of uneven seasonal demand.

我猜想,这句有点隐晦的话的意思是,See’s 在需求旺盛的短时间内(排长队的时候)赚钱,但由于季节性需求不均衡,如果增加分店(缩短排队时间),See’s 就会亏损。

(17) Why did Buffett buy ServiceMaster stock for his personal portfolio and not for Berkshire?

(17) 为什么巴菲特为个人投资组合购买 ServiceMaster 股票,而不是为伯克希尔

In 1986, Buffett personally purchased 5.1% of the Chicago-based maintenance and cleaning service company for between $35-40 million.

1986 年,巴菲特个人以 3,500 万至 4,000 万美元的价格购买了这家总部位于芝加哥的维护和清洁服务公司 5.1% 的股份。

The company had recently switched from a corporation to a limited partnership — which inspired Buffett’s investment. “ServiceMaster is more attractive for an individual due to the tax consequences,” he said.

该公司最近从公司制转为有限合伙制,这激发了巴菲特的投资热情。他说:“由于税收方面的影响,ServiceMaster 对个人来说更具吸引力。”

(18) Can you talk about the precision (or lack thereof) in business and economic forecasts?

(18) 你能谈谈商业和经济预测的精确性(或缺乏精确性)吗?

“[Some business leaders practice] false precision,” said Buffett. “That’s a real problem. A CEO says the hurdle rate is 15%, so they work out the rate to be 15.1%. Business is not that precise. We like numbers, but we don’t try for pinpoint precision.”

巴菲特说:“[一些商业领袖奉行]虚假的精确性。这是一个真正的问题。一位首席执行官说最低预期回报率是 15%,于是他们算出回报率是 15.1%。商业没有那么精确。我们喜欢数字,但不追求精确到小数点后几位。”

In other words, when you carry projections out to three decimal places, it’s way too complicated (and probably wrong to boot).

换句话说,如果把预测精确到小数点后三位,那就太复杂了(而且很可能是错的)。

From the University of Berkshire Hathaway:

摘自《波克夏大学》:

Munger added that the worst mistakes are made from the nicest graphs and what is really needed is “enlightened common sense”.

芒格补充说,最糟糕的错误都是由最漂亮的图表造成的,真正需要的是 “开明的常识”。

(19) What’s going on with Berkshire’s new corporate jet?

(19) 伯克希尔的新公务机是怎么回事?

Berkshire purchased a used corporate jet in 1986. A move so out of character for the thrifty Buffett that he poked fun at himself by announcing it in super-tiny print in that year’s annual letter. Over time, he came to cherish the jet — rebranding it from The Indefensible to The Indispensable.

伯克希尔公司于 1986 年购买了一架二手公务机。这一举动与节俭的巴菲特的性格大相径庭,以至于他在当年的致股东信中用超小的字体公布了这一消息,以此自嘲。随着时间的推移,他开始珍视这架飞机,将其从 “无正当理由”(The Indefensible)重新命名为 “不可或缺”(The Indispensable)。

But, in 1987, it was still quite a curiosity for Berkshire shareholders. The World-Herald reported that Peter Kiewit Sons’ took care of the jet when not in use. “Anything that Kiewit does,” said Buffett, “it does well.”

但在 1987 年,伯克希尔的股东们对这架飞机仍然相当好奇。据《世界先驱报》报道,彼得-凯威特父子公司(Peter Kiewit Sons’s)在飞机不使用时会对其进行保养。“巴菲特说:“Kiewit 所做的任何事情都做得很好。

(20) Do you recommend John Train’s new Buffett biography,The Midas Touch?

(20) 你是否推荐约翰-特雷恩(John Train)的新巴菲特传记-巴菲特教你选股(The Midas Touch)?

“I’m not sure you’ll get your $18 worth,” said Buffett. “The last time I talked to John Train was 12 years ago.”

巴菲特说:“我不确定你这18美元花得值不值。” “我最后一次和约翰-特雷恩谈话已经是 12 年前了。”

In another interview, he said: “I hate to see people shell out $18 for old stuff.”

在另一次采访中,他说: “我不愿意看到人们花18美元买旧货”

Train had interviewed Buffett for The Money Masters — and then later cobbled together parts of that interview and other publicly-available information for The Midas Touch in 1987. In fact, he only used excerpts from Buffett’s letters from 1976 or earlier — because the Berkshire chief started copyrighting them after that.

特雷恩曾为《金融的主人》采访过巴菲特—后来又把那次采访的部分内容和其他公开信息拼凑在一起,于 1987 年出版了《The Midas Touch》。事实上,他只使用了巴菲特 1976 年或更早信件的节选,因为伯克希尔公司总裁在那之后开始对这些信件进行版权保护。

(This might also explain why the collection of annual letters on Berkshire’s website starts with 1977. That has always puzzled me.)

(这也可以解释为什么伯克希尔公司网站上的年度信件是从 1977 年开始的。我一直对此感到困惑)。

And a couple of other odds and ends…

还有一些其他的零碎信息…

  • The University of Berkshire Hathaway notes that Charlie Munger said that Cap Cities CEO Tom Murphy — a devout Catholic — prayed every day for humility. Charlie then joked about his own apparent lack of the humble gene. He added that someone who slightly underestimates his own ability will go farther than a highly intelligent person who thinks too much of himself.

波克夏大学》指出,查理-芒格曾说,Cap Cities 公司首席执行官汤姆-墨菲(Tom Murphy)是一位虔诚的天主教徒,他每天都在为谦逊祈祷。查理随后开玩笑说自己明显缺乏谦逊的基因。他还说,一个稍微低估自己能力的人,会比一个自视过高的高智商人士走得更远。

  • A stockholder from New York City said that while Buffett often praises Berkshire shareholders for their patience and long-term outlook, the same goes in reverse. “[Berkshire] management is a different breed,” he said, “and we’re grateful to you for being unique [and] for your modest compensation.”

  • 一位来自纽约的股东说,虽然巴菲特经常称赞伯克希尔股东的耐心和长远眼光,但反过来也是一样。“伯克希尔管理层是一个与众不同的群体,“他说,“我们很感谢你们的独特之处,你们的报酬并不高。”