1986 Annual Meeting Kingswell整合伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司 1986 年年会

Piecing Together Berkshire Hathaway’s 1986 Annual Meeting

整合伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司 1986 年年会

CNBC’s invaluable archive of Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting videos and transcripts only dates back to 1994. Meaning that decades’ worth of Q&A sessions with Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger remain shrouded in the mists of time.

CNBC

宝贵的 archive 伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司年会视频和文字记录只能追溯到 1994 年。这意味着，数十年来沃伦-巴菲特和查理-芒格的问答会谈仍然深藏在时间的迷雾中。

You will occasionally stumble upon a fragmentary account about one of the early Berkshire meetings, whether it’s in the pages of the Omaha World-Herald, Outstanding Investor Digest, or University of Berkshire Hathaway (by Daniel Pecaut and Corey Wrenn). These typically include a few partial quotes and other highlights from Buffett’s remarks — but nothing like the comprehensive records of the post-1993 meetings.

你偶尔会在《奥马哈世界先驱报》、《杰出投资者文摘》（Outstanding Investor Digest）或《波克夏大學 : 巴菲特與窮查理30年的投資備忘錄》[注：台版]（University of Berkshire Hathaway）（作者丹尼尔-佩考特（Daniel Pecaut）和科里-沃伦（Corey Wrenn））的页面上，偶然发现有关伯克希尔早期会议的零星报道。这些内容通常包括巴菲特发言的部分引语和其他要点，但与 1993 年后会议的全面记录完全不同。

So, today, I’ll do my best to piece together various accounts — from the three aforementioned sources — about Berkshire’s annual meeting in 1986. I’ve compared several different reports from the meeting and organized the commentary by topic.

因此，今天，我将尽我所能，从上述三个来源中整理出有关伯克希尔公司 1986 年年会的各种报道。我比较了会议的几份不同报告，并按主题整理了实况。

This cannot claim to be the definitive study of Berkshire’s 1986 meeting — there are, no doubt, holes big enough to drive a truck through — but it’s my best effort to compile all of the available information about the wit and wisdom on display that day.

这不能算是对1986年伯克希尔会议的最终定论—毋庸置疑，其中定有诸多疏漏—但这是我尽最大努力整理出的关于当天所展示的机智和智慧的所有可用信息。

On May 20, 1986, approximately 500 shareholders filed into the Witherspoon Concert Hall at Omaha’s Joslyn Art Museum for the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting.

1986 年 5 月 20 日，大约 500 名股东来到奥马哈乔斯林艺术博物馆的威瑟斯彭音乐厅，参加伯克希尔-哈撒韦公司的年会。

That Tuesday morning, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger sped through the formal proceedings in a matter of minutes — before opening the floor to questions from shareholders for the next two-and-a-half hours.

星期二上午，沃伦-巴菲特和查理-芒格在短短几分钟内就完成了正式流程，然后在接下来的两个半小时里接受股东提问。

Below is everything that I could find from this (very) early episode of the Warren & Charlie Show…

以下是我能从这期（非常）早期的沃伦与查理问答中找到的所有内容…

On inflation

关于通货膨胀

1.“[Inflation] is a political phenomenon, not an economic one. If you print lots of tickets, ticket prices decline. If you print lots of dollars, the value of each dollar goes down. Eventually, that has to happen. I see no evidence of any great self-restraint that will change our propensity to print money.”

1.通货膨胀是一种政治现象，而不是经济现象。如果你印了很多票，票价就会下降。如果你大量印制美元，每美元的价值就会下降。最终，这必然会发生。我没有看到任何证据表明，任何伟大的自我克制会改变我们印钞的倾向。

2.“I expect a lot of inflation in the long run. Unfortunately, I can’t define ‘a lot’ and I can’t define ‘the long run’. But I expect worse inflation than we have ever seen before. Fortunately, I’ve been wrong [about inflation] quite often.”

2.”从长远来看，我预计通货膨胀会很严重。不幸的是，我无法明确’大量’，也无法明确’长期’。但我预计通货膨胀会比我们以前看到的更严重。幸运的是，我经常出错。

• Buffett added ominously, “Most people in this room will see inflation that they have never seen before.” Happily, that did not turn out to be the case.

• 巴菲特严肃地补充道：“在座的大多数人将会看到他们从未见过的通货膨胀。令人欣慰的是，情况并非如此。

On Berkshire’s acquisition strategy

关于伯克希尔的收购策略

3.“You can have a wonderful business without it being a wonderful stock. But it’s quite another story to have a wonderful stock without having a wonderful business.”

3.”你可以拥有一家出色的企业，但这并不意味着它的股票也同样出色。然而，如果股票表现优异，却没有一家出色的企业作为支撑，那情况就完全不同了。“

4.“We have no equations. Ben Graham used to say that it’s a lot like selecting a wife. You can thoughtfully establish certain qualities you’d like her to have — and then, all of a sudden, you meet someone and you do it.”

4.“我们没有公式 本-格雷厄姆曾经说过，这就像选老婆一样。你可以深思熟虑地确定你希望她具备的某些品质—然后，突然间，你遇到了一个人，你就选了。”

• If Berkshire found a company that it wished to “marry” — at a fair valuation — Buffett assured shareholders that he would not be put off by a high price tag. “Don’t hold back on showing us a [potential] deal because we don’t have the money. We have yet to not do a deal because of not having enough money.”

• 如果伯克希尔发现了一家它希望以合理估值 “长期持有”的公司，巴菲特向股东保证，他不会被高价所吓倒。“不要因为我们没钱，就不向我们展示一笔潜在交易。我们还没有因为资金不足而放弃交易。”

On investing in Capital Cities/ABC

关于投资首都企业/美国广播公司

5.“Capital Cities is not a stock holding, but a 10-20 year relationship.”

5.”首都企业/美国广播公司不是一时的股票持有，而是一种 10-20 年的合作关系。

• In 1985, Berkshire helped finance the media company’s merger with ABC by purchasing 3 million shares of Cap Cities at $172.50apiece.This$517 million investment made Berkshire the largest shareholder of Cap Cities/ABC.

• 1985 年，伯克希尔公司以每股 172.50 美元的价格购买了 300 万股首都企业的股票，为该媒体公司与美国广播公司的合并提供了资金支持。这笔 5.17 亿美元的投资使伯克希尔成为首都企业/美国广播公司的最大股东。

6.“They have strong management at Cap Cities — the best management of any public company in the country. I have enormous confidence in Cap Cities.”

6.”首都企业拥有强大的管理层，是全国所有上市公司中管理最好的。我对首都企业非常有信心。

• This was no idle flattery. Buffett had complete faith in the management duo of Tom Murphy and Dan Burke — even agreeing to sales restrictions on Berkshire’s stake and to vote his shares in accordance with Murphy and Burke.

• 这不是空洞的奉承。巴菲特对汤姆-墨菲和丹-伯克这对管理组合充满信心—甚至同意对伯克希尔的股份进行销售限制，并让墨菲和伯克来行使他的股份投票权。

7.“The near-term outlook [for Cap Cities/ABC] is not good. The value of ABC’s franchise has deteriorated in the last 6-12 months. However, the networks did $6.5 billion of business last year. It will be there — like radio. Despite inroads from television, [radio] is still quite profitable. ABC will be around forever.”

7.”[首都企业/美国广播公司的]近期前景不容乐观。在过去的 6-12 个月里，美国广播公司的特许经营权价值已经下降。但是，电视网去年的业务量达到了 65 亿美元。它将继续存在—就像广播一样。尽管受到了电视的冲击，但广播仍然相当有利可图。美国广播公司将永远存续。”

• “If people ever take up reading,” Buffett joked, “that will cut into [our] business.”

• “如果人们开始养成阅读习惯，”巴菲特开玩笑说 “那将会削减我们的业务”

8.“I have repressed the memory of the sale of Capital Cities [a few years earlier].”

8.“我已经淡忘了几年前出售首都企业的记忆”

• Berkshire had previously owned shares of Cap Cities, but sold out of this position in 1978-1980 at just $43 per share. And while Buffett claimed to have repressed any memory of this blunder, Munger was quick to point out: “I kept my personal holdings [in Cap Cities].”

• 伯克希尔曾拥有首都企业的股份，但在 1978-1980 年间以每股 43 美元的价格卖出了。虽然巴菲特声称已经淡忘了这一失误，但芒格很快就指出：“我保留了我个人的[首都企业]持股”

• Interestingly enough, OIDreported that Berkshire’s equity portfolio (which, presumably, the Cap Cities proceeds were reinvested into) actually outperformed the Cap Cities stock price between 1980 and 1985. So, ultimately, Buffett out-compounded his own mistake.

• 有趣的是，OID （杰出投资者文摘）报道称，在 1980 年至 1985 年期间，伯克希尔的股票投资组合（据推测，首都企业的收益被重新投进去了）的表现实际上超过了首都企业的股价。因此，最终巴菲特还是错上加错。

On speculative excess in media stocks

关于媒体股票的投机性过剩

9.“The underlying business has deteriorated substantially from competition, cable, the VCR, etc. — all adding up to more consumer alternatives. At the same time, media prices have skyrocketed. Prices don’t make sense to me.”

9.”由于竞争、有线电视、录像机等因素的影响，基本业务已经严重恶化，所有这些都为消费者提供了更多的选择。与此同时，媒体的价格也在飞涨。价格对我来说没有意义。

10.“You don’t care what channel the football game comes in on. You don’t have loyalty to any [one] channel.”

10.”你不在乎橄榄球赛在哪个频道播出。你对任何频道都没有忠诚度。

11.“I try not to get caught up in the current mania, but it’s hard to avoid.”

11.“我试着不被当前的狂热所迷惑，但这很难避免。”

12.“During tulip mania, single tulip bulbs were exchanged for houses and businesses. If you could buy a company that owned twelve tulip bulbs for a 20% discount to the value of those tulip bulbs, would that be a bargain?”

12.”在郁金香狂热时期，单个郁金香球茎可以交换房屋和企业。如果你能以比这些郁金香球茎价值低 20% 的价格买下一家拥有 12 个郁金香球茎的公司，那会是一笔划算的交易吗？”。

• Buffett’s point is that a 20% discount from an irrationally high price does not necessarily equal good value.

• 巴菲特的观点是，在不合理的高价基础上打八折并不一定等同于物美价廉。

• The Omaha World-Herald gives a slightly different version of this quote (or maybe it’s a subsequent remark that’s just very similar to this one). Like I said, piecing this all together is a bit of a guessing game. The OWH quote is below as #14.

• 《

奥马哈世界先驱报》（Omaha World-Herald）对这句话的表述略有不同（也可能是后来的一句话，只是与这句话非常相似）。就像我说的，要把这一切拼凑在一起，还得靠猜测。下面是_OWH_引用的第 14 段。

13.“[Tulip mania] was mass delusion. People traded homes for a single tulip bulb. If you owned twelve tulips, is that [the same thing as] a sound company?”

13. “郁金香狂热是一种群众性癫狂。人们用房子换一个郁金香球茎。如果你拥有十二朵郁金香，这和拥有一家健全的公司是[一回事]吗？”

14.“Buyers are most silly when they’re most happy.”

14.“买家在最开心的时候是最容易犯傻的”

15.“We’re not interested in the hula hoop.”

15.“我们对呼啦圈不感兴趣”

• The hula hoop catches a stray here as a fad that Berkshire would try to avoid. In 1958, an estimated 80-100 million hula hoops were sold — but then quickly went out of fashion. “It was born in January and dead as a doornail by October,” said Rich Knerr of WHAM-O. By 1985, sales had stabilized in the 1-2 million range.

• 呼啦圈是伯克希尔极力避免的一种时尚。据估计，1958 年呼啦圈的销量达到了 8000 万到 1 亿个，但很快就过时了。“WHAM-O 公司的里奇-克纳尔（Rich Knerr）说：”呼啦圈诞生于 1 月，到 10 月就像门钉一样死掉了。到 1985 年，销售量稳定在 100 万到 200 万个之间。

• Buffett added that the inventors of Trivial Pursuit had recently sold their company, but should have done so sooner before the game’s popularity “hit the skids”. He apparently had the toy/game industry on his mind that day.

• 巴菲特补充说，“智力棋盘”（一种游戏）的发明者最近出售了他们的公司，但他们本应在游戏的受欢迎程度 “滑坡 ”之前尽早出售公司。显然，那天他心里一直惦记着玩具/游戏行业。

On shorting stocks

关于做空股票

16.“The mathematics [of shorting] are very unattractive. You can go broke very quickly. If you had shorted tulip bulbs long after the prices had become silly, the prices would have kept going up for a long time. It’s a tough way to make a living. I’ve tried it.”

16.”做空的数学原理是非常不吸引人的。你可能会很快破产。如果你在郁金香价格已经变得荒谬之后做空郁金香球茎，价格可能会在很长一段时间内继续上涨。这是一种艰难的谋生方式。我试过。“

17.“[It’s] quite a contrast to buying bargain stocks. So long as you buy without debt, you can keep buying by the bushel basket as prices decline.”

17.”（这）和买便宜的股票形成了鲜明的对比。只要你没有用杠杆交易，你就可以在价格下跌的时候继续大量地买。”

On macroeconomic forecasting

关于宏观经济预测

18.“Economic forecasts have a small role in any decisions we make. We pay no attention to what anyone thinks the Gross National Product or interest rates will do.”

18.”经济预测在我们的任何决策中作用都很小。我们不关注任何人对国民生产总值或利率的看法。

19.“[It] plays a very small role in our securities and business acquisitions. We haven’t found any reliably consistent forecasters anywhere. We don’t subscribe to any economic forecasting letters.”

19.”[它]在我们的证券和业务收购中只起很小的作用。我们在任何地方都找不到可靠一致的预测者，我们不订阅任何经济预测信件。”

20.“If there were one future variable that I wish I had the answer to, it would be future interest rates.”

20.“如果有一个我希望能预测的未来变量，那就是未来的利率变化”

On refusing to sell a subsidiary — even a mediocre one

关于拒绝出售子公司—哪怕是一个平庸的子公司

21.“You may quit having children if you keep having clunkers, but you don’t just cast them out.”

21.”如果你一直生不出好孩子，你可以放弃生孩子，但你不能就这样把他们扔掉。

• Munger jumped in to add that whatever this policy lacks in terms of bottom-line sense, it’s more than made up for by burnishing Berkshire’s reputation among sellers. “It allows [us] to see businesses for sale that [we] might not otherwise see.”

• 芒格插话补充说，尽管这项政策在直接的经济利益方面有所欠缺，但它通过提升伯克希尔在卖家中的声誉而得到了充分的补偿。“这让我们能够看到一些可能本来看不到的待售企业。”

On the lack of international investments

关于缺乏国际投资

22.“We don’t understand overseas businesses.”

22.“我们不了解海外业务”

23.“If you can’t make money in a $2 trillion pool [in the United States], you’re not likely to make it elsewhere. Anyway, we only understand maybe 10-15% of U.S. companies. There are many complexities of investing overseas.”

23.”如果你不能在一个 2 万亿美元的池子里赚钱，你也不可能在其他地方赚钱。无论如何，我们只了解 10-15% 的美国公司。海外投资有很多复杂因素。

On Berkshire’s stock price

关于伯克希尔的股价

24.“The current market price [around $2,690 per share] is near the high end of intrinsic value — give or take 15%. But it’s not a crazy price, by any means.

24.”目前的市场价格（大约每股 2,690 美元）接近内在价值的上限—上下浮动 15%。但这绝不是一个疯狂的价格。

• Munger was also asked about Wesco Financial’s future performance. “[We] still haven’t come up with an acceptable strategy that we’re satisfied with. I don’t think it’s a good bet that Wesco will outgrow Berkshire Hathaway.”

• 芒格还被问及 Wesco Financial 的未来表现。“我们还没有制定出我们满意的可接受的战略。我不认为 Wesco 会超越伯克希尔的增长。”

On insurance

关于保险

25.“Currently, it’s an outstanding market for insurance companies to write new business. I wouldn’t want to bet on [what it will be like in] 1988.”

25.”目前，保险行业正处于一个极好的新业务承保期。我不想赌 1988 年会怎样。”

26.“When insurance companies get money in their pockets, there’s a great eagerness to write business. The easy business will disappear very fast.”

26.”当保险公司口袋里有钱的时候，就会非常渴望承保业务。容易做的生意很快就会消失。

27.“We sell insurance. We don’t buy it.”

27.”我们卖保险。我们不买保险。

• In response to a question about “key man” insurance on Buffett and Munger.

• 在回答关于巴菲特和芒格的 “关键人物 ”保险的问题时

On Berkshire’s investment philosophy

关于伯克希尔的投资理念

28.“Value investing and growth investing are one and the same. Growth is a part of value. [They are both] part of the same equation. Returns on incremental capital are the key. Despite that, I still can’t find any bargains in today’s market. We don’t currently own any equities to speak of.”

28.”价值投资和成长投资是一体的。成长是价值的一部分。\它们是同一个等式的一部分。增量资本的回报是关键。尽管如此，我仍然无法在今天的市场上找到任何便宜货。我们目前没有任何股票值得一提。

• When Buffett says that Berkshire doesn’t “own any equities to speak of”, he wasn’t talking about his core holdings of Cap Cities/ABC, Washington Post, and GEICO. He reiterated that those would continue to “be held indefinitely”.

• 当巴菲特说伯克希尔 “没有任何股票值得一提 ”时，他并不是在谈论他的核心持股 Cap Cities/ABC、华盛顿邮报和 GEICO。他重申，这些股票将继续 “无限期持有”。

29.“Our core holdings don’t keep us busy. However, they give us something to do and keep us out of bars.”

29.”我们的核心持股不会让我们忙得不可开交。但是，它们让我们有事可做，让我们不至于无所事事。”

30.“We’re going to be there every day. We’ll run on a fast or sloppy track.”

30.”我们将始终坚守岗位。无论市场环境是快速变化还是松散无序，我们都会持续运作。”

31.“We see nothing in marketable securities that interests us in the least.”

31.“我们在有价证券中看不到任何我们感兴趣的东西”

• As previously mentioned, both the insurance and media sectors — two of Buffett’s longtime faves — appeared to be overpriced in 1986. This, no doubt, contributed to Berkshire’s inability to find bargains on the open market.

• 如前所述，1986 年，巴菲特长期看好的保险业和传媒业似乎定价过高。毫无疑问，这也是伯克希尔无法在公开市场上找到便宜货的原因之一。

On the post-Buffett era

关于后巴菲特时代

32.“In the event of the proverbial truck [running me over], Berkshire’s structure, holdings, and policies would continue intact for a long, long time. There would be no surprises for operating or portfolio managements. In the short run, Charlie Munger would take over.”

32.”如果我被卡车撞了，伯克希尔的结构、持股和政策将在很长很长时间内保持不变。运营或投资组合管理不会有任何意外。短期内，查理-芒格将接管公司。

• Munger added: “In the long run, we’d look for someone as much like a young Warren Buffett as possible.”

• 芒格补充说：“从长远来看，我们会寻找一个尽可能像年轻的沃伦-巴菲特的人。

• Funny moment from the OID report: Buffett mentioned how the stock price of Resorts doubled in the immediate aftermath of its CEO’s death — and predicted that the price of Berkshire would rise, too. “However, I’d be upset if it increased more than 25% or 50%,” he laughed. Munger scoffed: “The hell you would! You’d love it!”

• OID_

报告中的有趣片段： 巴菲特提到 Resorts 公司的股价在其首席执行官去世后立即翻了一番，并预测伯克希尔的股价也会上涨。“他笑着说：”不过，如果股价上涨超过 25% 或 50%，我就会不高兴了。芒格戏说道：“你才不会呢！你会乐在其中！”

• In a later interview with the Omaha World-Herald, Munger said that operating companies had nothing to fear if Buffett passed away. “People have sold [their businesses] to us expecting to operate in a certain kind of culture — and that would continue.”

• 在后来接受《奥马哈世界先驱报》采访时，芒格说，如果巴菲特去世，运营公司也没有什么可担心的。“人们把他们的企业卖给我们，是希望我们能在某种文化下运营 - 而这种文化会一直延续下去。”

On whether or not social issues affect Berkshire’s investment choices

关于社会问题是否会影响伯克希尔的投资选择

33.“We like to buy in with people we like. We don’t get in where we are uncomfortable.”

33.“我们喜欢和我们喜欢的人一起投资。我们不会涉足让我们感到不舒服的领域。”

• This specific question was in relation to investing in apartheid-era South Africa. Buffett explained that while Berkshire did not own any South African companies, such social concerns would not stop any potential investment decision.

• 这个具体问题与在种族隔离时代的南非投资有关。巴菲特解释说，虽然伯克希尔不拥有任何南非公司，但这些社会问题不会阻止任何潜在的投资决策。

On institutional interest in Berkshire (or the lack thereof

) 关于机构对伯克希尔的兴趣（或缺乏兴趣）

34.“They look in the house, but they don’t want to enter. We don’t attract much institutional interest. We have smarter, more rational, and a stabler group of shareholders than if the institutions bought our stock.”

34.“他们只是观望，并没有真正投入。我们并没有吸引到太多的机构投资者。与机构投资者相比，我们的股东群体更加明智、理性，且更加稳定。”

On the savings-and-loan industry

关于储贷业

35.“[We] don’t like the business, as such. [It’s] not a very good business, given the risks involved. In a world where all liabilities are guaranteed by the government, the least credit-worthy can issue paper just the same as the most credit-worthy. [There’s] just too much pressure for the participants to do the wrong thing.”

35.“我们不喜欢这个行业 \考虑到其中的风险，这不是一个很好的行业。在一个所有债务都由政府担保的世界里，最不讲信用的人和最讲信用的人一样，可以发行债券 \对于参与者来说，做错事的压力太大了。”

36.“A lot of people aren’t properly reserved for the risks they’re taking. Like an earthquake insurer in a year where there are no earthquakes.”

36.”很多人没有为他们所承担的风险做好充分的准备。就像没有地震的年份里的地震保险公司一样。”

On the Bowery Savings Bank

关于包厘储蓄银行

37.“It’s a good gamble. This is as low-tech as you can get.”

37.“这是一次明智的尝试。这已经简单到不能再简单了。”

• Munger fielded this question about one of Berkshire’s more obscure investments. In 1985, Berkshire banded together with Richard Ravitch (Metropolitan Transit Authority) and Laurence Tisch (Loews) to purchase the beleaguered Bowery Savings Bank of New York. Berkshire invested $20millionfor20$200 million — a tidy profit for all involved.

• 芒格在回答这个问题时谈到了伯克希尔的一项不起眼的投资。1985 年，伯克希尔与理查德-拉维奇（Richard Ravitch）（大都会运输局）和劳伦斯-蒂施（Laurence Tisch）（Loews）联合收购了陷入困境的纽约包厘储蓄银行。伯克希尔投资 2,000 万美元获得了该银行 20% 的股份，该银行在 20 世纪 70 年代末利率飙升时陷入困境。两年后，该集团以 2 亿美元的价格出售了包厘储蓄银行—所有参与方都获得了丰厚的利润。

38.“[It’s] basically a venture capital deal.”

38.“这基本上是一笔风险投资交易”。

And a couple other meeting-related details

还有一些与会议有关的细节

• Warren Buffett’s annual letters were already a cult hit in investment circles by 1986. That year’s letter needed a second printing after the initial supply of 15,500 got snapped up. An extra 2,500 were hurriedly printed and sent out.

• 沃伦-巴菲特的年度信在1986年已经成为投资界的热门话题，当年的信件在最初供应的 15,500 封被抢购一空后，需要进行第二次印刷。于是又匆忙加印了 2500 封并寄出。

• Just ten years earlier, Berkshire printed only 2,000 total copies of the letter.

• 而就在十年前，伯克希尔总共只印刷了 2000 封。

• Buffett sipped on Cherry Coke throughout the meeting, leading one shareholder from Atlanta to compliment him on his soft drink selection.

• 巴菲特在整个会议中一直在喝樱桃可乐，这让来自亚特兰大的一位股东称赞他选择了一款好饮料。