原文信息：
- 标题：An Owner’s Manual
- 作者：Warren E. Buffett
- 发表时间：2011-02-26
- 整理：Terrellchen
In June 1996, Berkshire’s Chairman, Warren E. Buffett, issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual” to Berkshire’s Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of operation.
Owner-related Business Principles</br
股东相关的商业原则
At the time of the Blue Chip merger in 1983, I set down 13 owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach. As is appropriate for “principles,” all 13 remain alive and well today.
1983 年，当时蓝筹印花并入，我制定了 13 条与股东相关的商业原则，我认为这些原则将有助于新股东理解我们的管理方法，作为”原则”，全部 13 条在今天依然适用并且运作良好。
1. Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership. Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners, and of ourselves as managing partners.（Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also, for better or worse, controlling partners.）We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.
1. 虽然我们在形式上是一家公司，但秉持的是合伙事业的精神。查理・芒格和我视我们的股东为事业主──合伙人，并视自己为管理合伙人（因为我俩持有很多股权，不管是好是坏，我们还是控股合伙人）。我们并不视公司本身是公司资产的最终拥有人，因为我们认为公司只是一个管道，股东透过这个管道拥有公司的资产。
Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous. We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely, much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family. For our part, we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd, but rather as co-ventures who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.
查理和我希望，各位不要认为自己只是拥有一张价格每天波动的证券，经济或政治事件令人紧张时不妨卖掉。我们希望各位视自己为一家打算永久持有的公司的股东之一，就像你和家人共同拥有一座农场或一套公寓时的情况。就我们而言，我们也不会视伯克希尔股东为一群成员不断变更的无名氏。我们视股东为投资伙伴，他们将资金托付给我们，而且这种托付可能是一辈子的事。
The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept. The annual percentage turnover in Berkshire’s shares is a fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations, even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.
In effect, our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of, say, Coca-Cola or American Express shares, we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses, in which we measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks. In fact, we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading, or quotation of prices, in the stocks of those companies. If we have good long-term expectations, short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price.
事实上，我们的股东对待他们的伯克希尔持股的方式，与伯克希尔对待所投资事业的持股是一样的。譬如说，作为可口可乐和美国运通的股东，我们视伯克希尔为这两家优秀企业不参与经营管理的合伙人。这两项投资成功与否，我们是以两家公司的长期绩效、而不是每月的股价波动为衡量标准。事实上，这些公司的股票如果好几年都没有交易，或是没人提供买卖报价，我们是一点也不介意的。倘若我们看好长期前景，短期股价波动除了让我们有机会以诱人的价格增加持股之外，对我们并无意义。
2. In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation, most of our directors have a significant portion of their net worth invested in the company. We eat our own cooking.
2. 我们的董事绝大多数将其个人财富的一大部分投资在伯克希尔上，一如我们的多数股东。如果公司经营不善，我们将自食其果。
Charlie’s family has 80% or more of its net worth in Berkshire shares; I have more than 98%. In addition, many of my relatives – my sisters and cousins, for example – keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.
Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary business. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.
对于这种所有鸡蛋放在一个篮子里的资产配置法，查理和我完全放心，因为伯克希尔拥有的事业多种多样，而且是真正杰出的企业。事实上，我们认为伯克希尔所投资的企业（拥有控股权或重要少数股权的公司）就素质和多样性而言，几乎是独一无二的。
Charlie and I cannot promise you results. But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner. We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an “edge” over you. We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion. Moreover, when I do something dumb, I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.
查理和我无法为各位提供绩效保证。但我们可以保证，无论你选择在哪一段时间跟我们作伴，你的财富和我们的财富将完全同步波动。我们对巨额薪酬、经理人认股权或其他占股东便宜的做法不感兴趣。我们只希望和我们的伙伴一起赚钱，而且完全按照合理比例分享成果。此外，如果我做了一些蠢事，我和你一样得按比例承受损失，我希望你能因此得到一点安慰。
3. Our long-term economic goal (subject to some qualifications mentioned later) is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis. We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size; we measure by per-share progress. We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future—a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that. But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.
3. 我们的长期经济目标（限定条件如后述）是尽可能提高伯克希尔每股内在价值的平均年增率。我们评估伯克希尔的经济实力或财务绩效时，并不是以公司整体规模，而是以每股基础上的表现为基准。可以确定的是，因为股本大幅扩增，未来每股基础上的成长率势必会降低。不过，如果我们的成长率不超过美国大企业的平均水平，我们会很失望。
4. Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital. Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries. The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.
4. 为达成目标，我们必须投资在一组多样化的优质企业上，也就是能产生现金且持续赚取高于平均水平的资本报酬率的公司。我们希望能直接拥有这些公司，不行的话，则主要透过我们的保险子公司，在市场上购入这种优质企业的部分股权。伯克希尔每年的资本配置，取决于可投资企业的价格和供给，以及我们对保险资本的需求。
In recent years, we have made a number of acquisitions. Though there will be dry years, we expect to make many more in the decades to come, and our hope is that they will be large. If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past, Berkshire will be well served.
The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash. In this respect, a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages. For one thing, it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase. Second, a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of businesses we already own—at attractive prices. And third, some of those same wonderful businesses are consistent buyers of their own shares, which means that they, and we, gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.
伯克希尔产生现金的速度很快，以同样快的速度想出妥善运用这些资金的主意，是我们面对的考验。就此而言，股市低迷很可能对我们非常有利。首先，股市低迷时，百分百收购一家公司的代价通常会降低。第二，我们的保险子公司将比较容易以诱人的价格买进优质企业的少数股权，包括增持我们已投资的一些公司。第三，此类优质企业有一些（例如可口可乐）常常买回自家股票，股市低迷意味着它们能以较低的价格买回股票，而我们也能因此得益。
Overall, Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets—as it will from time to time—neither panic nor mourn. It’s good news for Berkshire.
5. Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting, consolidated reported earning may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance. Charlie and I, both as owners and managers, virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However, we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control, numbers we consider of great importance. These figures, along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses, should generally aid you in making judgments about them.
5. 因为我们采用双管齐下的策略投资在企业上（译注：也就是百分百收购，或在市场上购入部分股权），而且受限于传统会计规则，合并报表上的公告盈余可能仅反映伯克希尔真正经济绩效的一小部分。作为股东暨经理人，查理和我几乎完全不理会这些合并数据。不过，我们会向各位报告伯克希尔所控制的每一家大企业的盈余，因为我们认为这些数据非常重要。这些数据加上我们就集团个别企业所提供的数据，应有助于你评估这些企业的表现。
To state things simply, we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter. Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing, and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating. For example, is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind? Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly. We will also pass along our conclusions to you.
简而言之，我们尝试在年报中向各位报告真正重要的数据和其他数据。查理和我非常关心伯克希尔旗下企业的表现，也很努力了解这些企业的经营环境。例如，我们会关心旗下公司是正搭上产业景气的顺风车，还是正面对产业艰困期。查理和我必须确切知道情况如何，并相应调整期望。我们会向各位报告我们的结论。
Over time, the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations. But sometimes we have disappointments, and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences. When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress—for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance “float”—we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important. In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.
随着时间的推移，我们的企业几乎每一家都超出我们的期望。但偶尔还是有令我们失望的例子。发生这种情况时，我们会尽可能向各位坦诚报告，就像报告好消息时那样。我们如果以非传统方式记录绩效，例如我们在年报中谈到保险的「浮存金」，将会说明相关概念，以及为何我们认为这些数据很重要。换句话说，我们认为有必要让各位了解我们的想法，好让大家不但能评估伯克希尔旗下企业，还能评价我们的管理和资本配置方式。
6. Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions. When acquisition costs are similar, we much prefer to purchase 1 of earnings that is reportable. This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses（whose earnings will be fully reportable）frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions（whose earnings will be largely unreportable）. In aggregate and over time, we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.
6. 会计结果不影响我们的营运或资本配置决定。假设有两项投资机会，成本相若，前者可带来 2 元的盈余，但按照一般公认会计原则，我们的财报不能纳入这笔盈余；后者可带来 1 元的盈余，但是可以纳入财报中。在此情况下，我们会毫不犹豫地选择前者。事实上，我们常面对这种抉择，因为收购整家公司（盈余可全数纳入集团报表）的代价，往往双倍于收购小额股权（盈余基本上不会反映在集团财报上）按比例换算的代价。总体而言，我们预期这些不能反映在财报上的盈余，将藉由资本利得反映在伯克希尔的内在价值上。
We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees, in aggregate, have been as fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us（and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report）. This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage, either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares. Obviously, every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders, but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained. We consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.
我们发现，长期下来，我们所投资的公司之未分配盈余，为我们贡献的总价值，不低于这些盈余假设都分配给我们（这样的话会全数纳入我们正式公告的盈余中）时的价值。之所以能有这种令人欣喜的结果，是因为我们所投资的企业，绝大多数经营得有声有色，往往能以极具效益的方式运用资本，例如投资在既有业务上，或是买回自家股票。很明显的是，我们投资的企业所做的资本决定，并非每一个都对身为股东的我们有利；但整体而言，这些企业所保留的每一元盈余，为我们贡献的价值远不止一元。因此，我们认为「透视盈余」可真实反映伯克希尔每年的营运利润。
7. We use debt sparingly. We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet. This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable, considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders, lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care. (As one of the Indianapolis “500” winners said: “To finish first, you must first finish.”)
7. 我们在举债方面非常节制。真的需要借钱时，我们会尝试取得利率固定的长期贷款。我们宁可放弃有意思的机会，也不愿意背负过高的债务。这种保守态度对我们的业绩有一定的损害，但若非如此，我们无法安心，因为我们对许多投保人、债权人与股票投资人负有受托人义务；许多股东托付我们管理的资金，占其财富的比重高得异乎寻常。（如印地安纳波里斯 500 英里大赛的一名冠军曾说：「要率先冲线，首先你必须完成比赛。」）
The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return. I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.
查理和我向来审慎估算财务风险，绝不可能为了追求多几个百分点的报酬而牺牲哪怕是一晚的好眠。我从不认为自己可以拿亲友拥有且需要的财富当赌注，去追求他们未拥有也不需要的东西。
Besides, Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit: deferred taxes and “float”, the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $117 billion.
此外，伯克希尔可利用两种低成本、无风险的债务融资方式：递延所得税和「浮存金」，后者是我们的保险子公司因为收取保费后暂未用于理赔而持有的资金，等于是别人暂存在我们这里的钱。这两种资金来源的规模快速扩大，如今总额约为1,170亿美元。拜它们所赐，我们可以安全地拥有远多于我们的股本所能支持的资产。
Better yet, this funding to date has often been cost-free. Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest. And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting, the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they give us the benefit of debt—an ability to have more assets working for us—but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.
更好的是，这种融资迄今一直是免费的。递延所得税负债是不需要付利息的。而且，只要我们的承保业务能损益两平，该业务产生的浮存金也是没有成本的。注意，两者皆非股东的资金；它们是实在的负债，但并无附带条款或到期日。它们实际上让我们享有负债的好处（有更多的资产可运用），但不必承受债务的缺点。
Of course, there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost. But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business. Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman), our 1996 acquisition of GEICO materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.
当然，没有人能保证我们未来仍可免费利用浮存金。不过，我们相信，我们达成此目标的机会不输给任何其他保险业者。我们不但在过去做到了这一点（尽管各位的董事长犯过一些重大错误），而且因为 1996 年收购了盖可公司，未来继续达成此目标的机会已大大增强。
In our present configuration (2010) we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroadbusinesses, loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire. Here, we will favor long-term, fixed-rate loans. When we make a truly large purchase, as we did with BNSF, we will borrow money at the parent company level with the intent of quickly payingit back.
在我们目前的配置里( 2010 )，我们在公用事业及铁路业务上需要更多的借款，那些对伯克希尔没有追索权的贷款。此时，我们偏爱长期固定利率的贷款。当我们做些真正的大收购时，比如收购 BNSF，我们将通过母公司借些钱，并且尽快的还回去。
8. A managerial “wish list” will not be filled at shareholder expense. We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders. We will only do with your money what we would do with our own, weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.
8. 我们不会容许管理层的「愿望清单」由股东买单。我们不会为了分散投资，就以罔顾股东长远经济效益的价格去收购整家企业。我们利用自己的资金时不会做的事，也不会拿各位托付的资金去做。考虑是否拿你的钱去做某些事时，我们会充分盘算你若在股市中直接购买股票、提高自身投资组合的多元化程度，能得到什么样的价值。
Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock. The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.
9. We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at least 1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.
9. 我们觉得高尚的意图也必须定期接受绩效检验。我们会检验自己保留盈余的决定是否明智，标准是如果保留一元的盈余，假以时日是否能为股东增加至少一元的市场价值。迄今为止，我们一直都能通过这项检验。我们将继续在五年期滚动基础上应用这项检验。随着伯克希尔的净值日益成长，要明智地运用保留盈余也日益困难。
I should have written the “five-year rolling basis” sentence differently, an error I didn’t realize until I received a question about this subject at the 2009 annual meeting.
我提到「五年期滚动基础」的那句话应该换个写法──在2009年的公司年会上，有人向我提出相关问题，我才意识到那句话写得不好。
When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has sometimes shrunk. And when that happens, we fail the test as I improperly formulated it. In fact, we fell far short as early as 1971-75, well before I wrote this principle in 1983.
股市如果在五年间大跌，伯克希尔股票市值高于账面净值的幅度有时会萎缩，这时候我们就会无法通过那项我未妥善设计的检验。事实上，这种情况早在1971至75年便发生了，当时距离我在1983年提出上述原则还有多年时间。
The five-year test should be:(1) during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P; and (2) did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book, meaning that every 1? If these tests are met, retaining earnings has made sense.
我们的五年期检验应该是：（1）在这五年间，伯克希尔账面净值的成长幅度是否超过标准普尔500指数的涨幅？（2）伯克希尔的市值是否持续高于账面净值（若是，则每一元的保留盈余，价值总是超过一元）？如果两者皆是，则保留盈余是有道理的。
10. We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give. This rule applies to all forms of issuance—not only mergers or public stock offerings, but stock-for-debt swaps, stock options, and convertible securities as well. We will not sell small portions of your company—and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to—on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.
10. 我们必须能得到与所付代价同等的商业价值，才会发行普通股。此规则适用于所有发行形式──不仅是合并或股票公开发行，还包括股债交换、股票选择权和可换股证券。发行普通股其实就是将各位的公司卖一小部分给别人，我们不会在与整家公司的价值不一致的基础上做这样的事。
When we sold the Class B shares in 1996, we stated that Berkshire stock was not undervalued—and some people found that shocking. That reaction was not well-founded. Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued. Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’ money: Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for 80￠ that in fact are worth $1. We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will. (We did not, however, say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued, though many media have reported that we did.)
1996 年发行伯克希尔 B 股时，我们表示伯克希尔股票的价值当时并未遭市场低估。有些人对我们的说法感到震惊，此反应实在没道理。如果我们在公司股票价值遭低估时发行股票，大家才应该感到震惊。一家公司公开发行股票时，管理层如果明说或暗示他们的股票价值遭低估，通常是在隐瞒真相，又或者是在挥霍既有股东的财富：经理人若故意以 0.8 元出售事实上价值 1 元的资产，股东就不公平地蒙受了损失。我们最近一次发行股票时，并没有犯这种罪，未来也永远不会做这种事（但是，我们 1996 年发行 B 股时并没有说市场高估了伯克希尔股票的价值，虽然当时很多媒体的报导声称我们这么说）。
11. You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: Regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns. We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere, but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.
11. 请各位务必了解，查理和我均抱持一种会损害公司财务绩效的态度：不管价格如何，我们完全无意出售伯克希尔拥有的任何一家优质企业。至于表现不理想的公司，只要我们预期它们至少能产生一些现金，而且我们满意它们的经理人和劳资关系，我们也非常不愿意出售这些企业。我们当初接手这些表现不理想的业务，是犯了资本配置上的错误，我们希望能避免重蹈覆辙。如果有人建议，这些表现不佳的业务，只要大幅增加资本支出，即可恢复令人满意的盈利水平，我们会非常谨慎看待这种建议（提议者总是诚意殷殷、前景展望总是令人振奋，但说到底，产业景气糟糕透顶时仍大手笔增加投资，效果有如在流沙中奋力挣扎）。无论如何，金罗美式管理行为（每次出手总是丢掉前景最悲观的业务）并非我们的作风。我们宁愿牺牲一点整体绩效，也不愿意做这种事。
We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior. True, we closed our textile business in the mid-1980s after 20 years of struggling with it, but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses. We have not, however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards, though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag.
我们继续避免金罗美式行为。没错，经过二十年的挣扎后，我们于 1980 年代中期结束了纺织业务，但那是因为我们认为这项业务已确定无法扭转营运不断亏损的颓势。不过，我们既不考虑出售那些可以引人出极高价格的业务，也没有抛弃我们表现落后的企业──但我们非常努力地对症下药，希望能改善情况。
12. We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. We owe you no less. Moreover, as a company with a major communications business, it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others. We also believe candor benefits us as managers: The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.
12. 我们会坦诚地向各位报告公司事务，突出那些对评估企业价值有重要意义的正、负面因素。我们的准则是推己及人：换成我们是一般股东时会想知道的业务事实，我们都会告诉大家。这是我们对各位应尽的基本义务。此外，作为一家拥有大媒体公司的集团，如果我们在报导自身消息时，在准确、平衡和深刻等标准上，要求不如我们期望我们的新闻人员报导其他人的消息时那么严格，那就实在不可原谅。作为公司的经理人，我们也相信保持坦诚对我们有益：公开误导他人的执行长，最终可能也会在私下误导自己。
At Berkshire you will find no “big bath” accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any “smoothing” of quarterly or annual results. We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard. When the numbers are a very rough “guesstimate”, as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving, we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.
在伯克希尔，你不会发现「洗大澡」这种会计花招，而我们也不会动手脚将季度或年度业绩「平稳化」。就像打高尔夫球那样，我们一定会告诉大家，我们每一个洞打了几杆，而且绝不会窜改计分卡。如果某些数字是非常粗略的估计值（保险准备金的提拨就必然是如此），我们会尽可能采用一致且稳当的做法。
We will be communicating with you in several ways. Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length. We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet, though I don’t write those (one recital a year is enough ). Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting, at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire. But there is one way we can’t communicate: on a one-on-one basis. That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.
我们会以数种方式跟各位保持联系。藉由年报，我会尝试在合理的篇幅内，尽可能为所有股东提供最多的价值界定信息。我们也会尝试藉由季报，传达大量浓缩但重要的数据，但它们不是我写的（独奏会一年一次就够了）。此外，另一个重要的沟通场合是我们的股东年会，会上查理和我很乐意花五个小时或更多时间回答有关伯克希尔的问题。但是，一对一的沟通方式我们可办不到：伯克希尔股东成千上万，不可能采用这种沟通方式。
In all of our communications, we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge: We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings “guidance” or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time.
在所有的沟通交流中，我们会尽力确保没有任何一位股东能占得便宜：我们并不遵行向分析师或大股东提供业绩「指引」这种常规。我们的目标是让所有股东同时获得新数据。
13. Despite our policy of candor we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required. Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are. Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas. This ban extends even to securities we have sold (because we may purchase them again) and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying. If we deny those reports but say “no comment” on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.
13. 虽然我们奉行坦诚相告的原则，但我们只会按法规要求的程度谈论我们在有价证券方面的活动。好的投资主意稀有、珍贵，一如好商品或好并购主意一样容易遭竞争对手盗用。因此，我们通常不谈论我们的投资主意。此禁忌甚至适用于那些我们已卖掉的证券（因为我们可能会再度买进），以及外界谣传我们买进的个股。如果我们否认这种谣传、但在其他情况下则表示「无可置评」，那么无可置评就变成确认了。
Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks, we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy. I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham, the greatest teacher in the history of finance, and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him, even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.
虽然我们一直不愿具体谈论个别股票，但对于我们的经营和投资理念，我们是畅所欲言的。我个人因为金融史上最伟大的导师本杰明・格雷厄姆倾囊相授而获益匪浅，我相信自己应将他教导的知识传授下去，尽管这么做会在投资方面为伯克希尔制造出新的能干竞争者，就像本杰明教导出自己在投资方面的能干竞争者那样。
Two Added Priciples</br
两条新增加的原则
14. To the extent possible, we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period. For this to come about, the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant, and by our preferences at 1-to-1. As that implies, we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level. Obviously, Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price. But by our policies and communications, we can encourage informed, rational behavior by owners that, in turn, will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational. Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders. We believe, however, that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners.
14. 我们希望每一位伯克希尔股东，在持股期间股票市值的涨幅或跌幅，尽可能与伯克希尔每股内在价值同期涨跌幅成比例。要做到这一点，伯克希尔每股内在价值与股票市价的关系必须固定不变，而我们希望两者维持一比一的关系。也就是说，我们希望伯克希尔股价处于公允而非偏高的水平。查理和我显然无法控制伯克希尔的股价，但藉由我们的政策和倡导，我们可以鼓励股东在掌握相关信息的情况下理性行事，这样股价走势也会倾向理性。我们这种「股价高估或低估同样不好」的想法可能会令一些股东失望，但我们相信，正因如此，伯克希尔才有最佳机会吸引理想的长线投资人：他们期望因公司成长而获益，而不是在其他投资人犯错时趁机获利。
15. We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P 500. Over time, we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise, why do our investors need us? The measurement, however, has certain shortcomings that are described in the next section. Moreover, it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case. That is because our equity holdings, whose value tends to move with the S&P 500, are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally, gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at 65% because of the federal tax we incur. We, therefore, expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.
15. 我们定期比较伯克希尔每股账面净值与标准普尔500指数的表现。我们希望长期而言打败这个基准指数。如果我们做不到，投资人为何需要我们呢？但是，这种绩效衡量方式有一些缺点。此外，相对于早年，如今每年以这种方式衡量绩效已变得没那么有意义。这是因为我们手上的股票资产（其价值倾向跟随标准普尔 500 指数波动）占我们净资产的比重，如今远低于早年。此外，标准普尔 500 指数成分股的获利在计算该指数时是全额计入，而伯克希尔持股的获利则只能计入 65％，因为我们必须缴纳联邦所得税。因此，我们预期在股市表现不佳的年度打败标准普尔 500 指数，在股市表现强劲的年度表现不如该指数。
Intrinsic Value</br
Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.
现在让我们关注一个我先前多次提到的而且你将在将来的年报中还将反复碰到的术语。
Intrinsic value is, an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses. Intrinsic value can be defined simply: It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.
The calculation of intrinsic value, though, is not so simple. As our definition suggests, intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure, and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised. Two people looking at the same set of facts, moreover - and this would apply even to Charlie and me - will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures. That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value. What our annual reports do supply, though, are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.
可是，内在价值的计算却没有那么简单。如同我们定义中提示的那样，内在价值是一个估计值而不是一个精确值，当利率发生变化或者未来现金流的预测发生修正时，估计值就会发生很大变化。此外，基于同样的事实和数据，对任意两个人而言——查理和我之间也常常如此——几乎都会不可避免的得出有些许差异的内在价值的估计数字。这也是我们从来不把我们自己对伯克希尔内在价值的估计值告诉你们的一个原因。我们的年报尽量提供我们用以计算内在价值的事实和数据。
Meanwhile, we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities, which are carried on our books at their current prices. Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control, whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.
同时，我们会定期报告公司的每股账面价值，这是个很容易计算的数字，尽管参考价值有限。我们持有的公开市场交易的证券在报表中以市价列示，造成的影响不大。但是，整体买入的公司是以历史成本入账的，其账面价值和内在价值差异巨大。
The disparity can go in either direction. For example, in 1964 we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was 15,180 far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value, a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.
这种差异可能是双向的。以 1964 年为例，我们可以确信伯克希尔的每股账面价值为 19.46 美元。但这个数字在相当程度上大大高估了公司的内在价值，因为公司的所有资源都投入到了一个利润很差的纺织业务中。这些纺织资产即不能通过持续经营带来合理的利润，又能通过清算获得相同的账面价值。然而，今天伯克希尔的情况正好相反：截至 1996 年 3 月 31 日，我们的账面价值为15,180美元，这远远低于伯克希尔的内在价值。这是因为我们控制的许多企业的实际价值远远超过了它们的账面价值。
Inadequate though they are in telling the story, we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough, albeit significantly understated, tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value. In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.
尽管账面价值在反映企业内在价值方面不够准确，但是我们仍然定期向你报告伯克希尔的账面价值，因为现在它可以视为伯克希尔内在价值的一种非常粗糙且保守的估计。换句话说，在任意给定的年份中，账面价值和内在价值的变动比例很可能相当接近。
You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment, a college education. Think of the education’s cost as its “book value.” If this cost is to be accurate, it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.
For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.
为了这次分析，我们将不考虑教育带来的重要的非经济性好处，而是专注于其经济价值。首先，我们需要预测毕业生在其一生中将获得的收入，并从这个预测值中减去如果他没有接受教育可能获得的收入。这样我们就得到了一个额外收入的数值，然后我们需要以一个合适的利率将这个数值贴现回毕业当天。贴现后的结果就是大学教育的内在价值。
Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.
有些毕业生会发现，他们接受大学教育的花费超过了计算的内在价值，那意味着花钱接受教育得不偿失。而另外一些人，接受教育后的内在价值远远超越了大学花费，也就是说投资教育是很明智的资本配置。不管是哪一种情况，账面价值对于计算内在价值是毫无意义的。
The Managing of Berkshire</br
伯克希尔的管理
I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management, today and in the future. As our first owner-related principle tells you, Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire. But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries. In fact, we delegate almost to the point of abdication: Though Berkshire has about 260,000 employees, only 21 of these are at headquarters.
我想，用伯克希尔现在和未来的管理层讨论做为结束是比较合适的。正如股东相关原则里第一条所述，查理和我是伯克希尔的执行合伙人。但是我们把所有经营上的重担都交给了每个业务分部的经理人身上了。实际上，我们俩几乎不干涉他们的经营：尽管整个伯克希尔有大概 260,000 名员工，只有 21 人在总部工作。
Charlie and I mainly attend to capital allocation and the care and feeding of our key managers. Most of these managers are happiest when they are left alone to run their businesses, and that is customarily just how we leave them. That puts them in charge of all operating decisions and of dispatching the excess cash they generate to headquarters. By sending it to us, they don’t get diverted by the various enticements that would come their way were they responsible for deploying the cash their businesses throw off. Furthermore, Charlie and I are exposed to a much wider range of possibilities for investing these funds than any of our managers could find in his or her own industry.
查理和我主要专注于资本配置以及对我们核心管理者的培养和激励。这些管理者大多在能够自主管理业务时感到最为满足，而这正是我们通常给予他们的自由度。这样，他们就全权负责所有的运营决策，并且将他们创造的额外现金汇至总部。通过将资金发送给我们，他们避免了如果他们需要自己负责使用这些现金时可能会遇到的各种诱惑。此外，查理和我对于这些资金的投资选择范围，比我们的任何一位管理者在其自身行业内能够发现的机会要广泛得多。
Most of our managers are independently wealthy, and it’s therefore up to us to create a climate that encourages them to choose working with Berkshire over golfing or fishing. This leaves us needing to treat them fairly and in the manner that we would wish to be treated if our positions were reversed.
我们的大多数经理人早已实现了财富自由，因此我们必须创造一种氛围来鼓励他们为伯克希尔工作，而不是去打高尔夫或钓鱼。这要求我们必须公平以待并尊重他们，就像我们互换位置希望得到的待遇一样。
As for the allocation of capital, that’s an activity both Charlie and I enjoy and in which we have acquired some useful experience. In a general sense, grey hair doesn’t hurt on this playing field: You don’t need good hand-eye coordination or well-toned muscles to push money around (thank heavens). As long as our minds continue to function effectively, Charlie and I can keep on doing our jobs pretty much as we have in the past.
谈到资本配置，这是查理和我都乐在其中，并且积累了一些宝贵经验的工作。大体上说，在这个领域，年岁增长并不是劣势：运作资金并不需要出色的手眼协调或强健的肌肉（谢天谢地）。只要我们的心智依旧敏锐，查理和我就能继续像以往那样履行我们的职责。
On my death, Berkshire’s ownership picture will change but not in a disruptive way: None of my stock will have to be soldto take care of the cash bequests I have made or for taxes. Other assets of mine will take care of these requirements. AllBerkshire shares will be left to foundations that will likely receive the stock in roughly equal installments over a dozen or soyears.
当我离世时，伯克希尔的股权结构会发生变化但不会太过剧烈：我的股份无需出售以满足我设立的现金遗赠或税务需求。我的其他资产将负责这些费用。我所有的伯克希尔股票将捐赠给几个慈善基金会，他们将通过类似于分期注入的模式在大概 12 年里收到相应股份。
At my death, the Buffett family will not be involved in managing the business but, as very substantial shareholders, will help in picking and overseeing the managers who do. Just who those managers will be, of course, depends on the date of my death. But I can anticipate what the management structure will be: Essentially my job will be split into two parts. One executive will become CEO and responsible for operations. The responsibility for investments will be given to one or more executives. If the acquisition of new businesses is in prospect, these executives will cooperate in making the decisions needed, subject, of course, to board approval. We will continue to have an extraordinarily shareholder-minded board, one whose interests are solidly aligned with yours.
我死后巴菲特家族将不再参与公司的管理，但是，做为极其坚定的大股东，家族将协助挑选和监督新的管理层。这些经理人是谁，只有等我去世那天才会揭晓。但我可以预见新的管理层结构：事实上我的工作将会分成两大部分，公司的日常运营将交给一个 CEO，而投资工作将被托付给一个或多个高管。如果出现新的业务收购机会，这些高管将相互配合一起作出必要的决定，当然，还应得到董事会的批准。我们将继续拥有一个以股东利益为导向，与各位利益完全一致的董事会。
Were we to need the management structure I have just described on an immediate basis, my family and a few key individuals know who I would pick to fill both posts. Both currently work for Berkshire and are people in whom I have total confidence.
如果我们立刻需要我刚才描述的管理架构，我的家人和几位核心人物都清楚我会推荐谁来担任这两个职位。这两个人选目前都在伯克希尔任职，并且是我完全信赖的人。
I will continue to keep the directors posted on the succession issue. Since Berkshire stock will make up virtually my entireestate and will account for a similar portion of the assets of various foundations for a considerable period after my death, youcan be sure that the directors and I have thought through the succession question carefully and that we are well prepared. Youcan be equally sure that the principles we have employed to date in running Berkshire will continue to guide the managers who succeed me and that our unusually strong and well-defined culture will remain intact. As an added assurance that this will be thecase, I believe it would be wise when I am no longer CEO to have a member of the Buffett family serve as the non-paid,non-executive Chairman of the Board. That decision, however, will be the responsibility of the then Board of Directors.
我将继续向董事会通报继任计划的相关情况。伯克希尔的股票将几乎构成我全部的遗产，并且在我去世后的很长一段时间内，也将占各种基金会资产的相当一部分，因此你可以确信，董事会和我都已经对继任问题进行了深思熟虑，并且我们已经做好了周全的准备。你也可以同样确信，我们迄今为止在管理伯克希尔时所采用的原则将继续引导我的继任者，我们非同寻常和无比坚定的文化将会完好无损的保留下去。为了确保这一点，明智的做法是，在我卸任后，巴菲特的家族成员将担任无薪酬的非执行董事会主席。当然，这个决定将由那时的董事会做出。
Lest we end on a morbid note, I also want to assure you that I have never felt better. I love running Berkshire, and if enjoying life promotes longevity, Methuselah’s record is in jeopardy.
为了避免在这个话题上留下不愉快的印象，我还想告诉你，我感觉自己的状态前所未有的好。我热爱管理伯克希尔，如果热爱生活能延长寿命的话，那么玛士撒拉的长寿记录可能就要受到挑战了。(注：一位活了 965 岁的圣经人物)。
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman